} COUNTY COURT COUNTY OF ONONDAGA STATE OF NEW YORK THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK, -against- Indictment No. 2014-0635-1 Index No. 14-0737 M. ROBERT NEULANDER, Defendant. APPEARANCES: WILLIAM J. FITZPATRICK, ESQ. District Attorney of Onondaga County MELINDA McGUNNIGLE, ESQ., of counsel Attorney for the People EDWARD Z. MENKIN, ESQ. J. SCOTT PORTER, ESQ. Attorneys for the Defendant, M. Robert Neulander MILLER, Thomas J., Presiding DECISION/ORDER The defendant was indicted by an Onondaga County Grand Jury for Murder in the Second Degree and Tampering with Physical Evidence. The defendant subsequently moved to suppress tangible physical property which was taken from his home on September 17, 2012. On January 23, 2015, the Court held an evidentiary hearing. The People called four witnesses: DeWitt Fire District Lieutenant William McGarrity and three members of the Town of DeWitt Police Department - Officer Chase : O7FALESBilodeau, Officer Michael Kurgan and Sergeant Thomas Norton.’ The defendant also testified on his own behalf. The parties also consented to the post-hearing submission of three items: a log sheet indicating the times at which all emergency and law enforcement personnel entered the defendant's home on September 17, 2012, a copy of the Town of Dewitt Police Department Operational Manual, and a January 26, 2015 letter from Dr. Robert Stoppacher, the Medical Examiner for Onondaga County. The Court now makes the following findings of fact and conclusions of law. FINDINGS OF FACT From the credible testimony adduced at the hearing, the Court finds that on September 17, 2012 at approximately 8:27 a.m., members of the DeWitt Fire Department, Rural Metro Ambulance Service and the Town of DeWitt Police Department were dispatched to 6916 Shalimar Way in the Town of DeWitt regarding an unconscious person. It was unknown if the Person was breathing, and the caller had stated that there was “blood everywhere”. The Fire Department engine arrived at the residence first and parked in the street. Rural Metro's ambulance arrived next and pulled into the driveway. As soon as Lieutenant McGarrity opened the door of the fire engine, he heard a female (later identified as Jenna ‘At different times after September 17, 2012, both Bilodeau and Kurgan were promoted to the rank of sergeant. PePAIBENeulander, the defendant's daughter) hysterically screaming for help. Jenna appeared on the sidewalk in front of the house and led McGarrity and his crew members inside the house, to a stairway, and into the upstairs bedroom of the injured party (later identified as Leslie Neulander, the defendant's wife). Upon entering the bedroom, McGarrity saw the defendant kneeling over Mrs. Neulander. Mrs. Neulander was covered in a robe from the shoulders down. It appeared that her body was wet, her left eye had a dark bruise, and there was blood around her head, The defendant indicated that his wife had fallen in the shower. Rural Metro paramedic Jamie Pienkowski confirmed that Mrs. Neulander had no pulse and was not breathing. Emergency workers then began to administer CPR to the decedent. Shortly after the workers began efforts to resuscitate Mrs. Neulander, the fire chief then asked the defendant to step out of the room and the defendant complied with the request. Officer Bilodeau was the first police officer to arrive at the home at Shalimar Way, at approximately 8:32 a.m. The fire truck and ambulance had already arrived at the home. Bilodeau, who was wearing a police uniform, let himself in through the front door of the home and heard crying and screaming. Bilodeau followed the noise and went upstairs. He then observed the defendant and Jenna Neulander on the floor, crying and comforting each other. Bilodeau walked a few feet past them into the O7F1I67bedroom, and saw that emergency personnel were working on the decedent. Bilodeau observed a trail of blood from the bathroom to the Mrs, Neulander’s location in the bedroom. Bilodeau ensured that the scene was secure and did not approach the decedent or enter the bathroom at that time. Shortly thereafter, McGarrity and the defendant had a conversation in the sitting area outside of the bedroom. McGarrity asked for permission to terminate life-saving efforts based upon Mrs. Neulander’s condition. The defendant indicated that he wanted to speak to his brother, a physician, before terminating rescue efforts. Jenna was “hysterical”, and a police officer offered to take a cell phone from Jenna and find the number for the defendant's brother. Jenna provided police with a password for the phone.” A few minutes later, the defendant gave McGarrity permission to cease efforts to save Mrs. Neulander’s life, and she was pronounced at 8:42 a.m. Fire Department and Rural Metro personnel left the scene shortly after the pronouncement. After Mrs, Neulander was pronounced, McGarrity informed Bilodeau that the decedent had fallen in the bathroom, sustained injuries, been moved next to the bed in the bedroom, and then lifesaving efforts had commenced. Bilodeau then walked into the bathroom and observed 2 The Court finds that at a subsequent time, Jenna requested that police return the phone and it was indeed returned to her within a reasonable time period. o7vAt6sblood on the bathroom walls. The water was still running in the shower, there were drops of blood in the shower, and the rug was “mussed up”. Bilodeau also walked into the bedroom and observed the decedent's body. Bilodeau was in the area of the bedroom and bathroom for approximately three to five minutes. At approximately 8:37 a.m., Bilodeau briefed Sergeant Norton, who had arrived at the scene a few minutes earlier. Norton subsequently made several phone calls in order to notify his duty chief, the District Attorney's Office and the Medical Examiner's Office of the death. Norton also requested that an evidence technician respond to the scene. At Norton's direction, Bilodeau spoke with the defendant and Jenna. Bilodeau explained that an evidence technician was going to process the scene and asked the defendant and Jenna to move to the kitchen area.? Both the defendant and Jenna agreed to do so, and walked downstairs to the kitchen. Once in the kitchen, Bilodeau explained to the defendant and Jenna that he would act as a liaison between the family and the police. Bilodeau explained that he would remain at the home until the body left the house and that he would update them as to the nature of the investigation. In addition, Bilodeau asked questions of both the defendant and Jenna regarding their observations from that morning. 3 To the extent that the hearing testimony of Bilodeau and the defendant contradict each other regarding the nature of their discussions, the Court credits Bilodeau’s version of events. a O7FA169Nether the defendant nor Jenna ever asked to return to the sitting room area or requested that police leave the home at any time. Shortly after 9:00 a.m., evidence technician Michael Kurgan arrived at the home. Before he entered the home, Kurgan saw the defendant and a younger man sitting in the driveway. The defendant made eye contact with Kurgan and did not say or do anything to prohibit Kurgan from entering the home. Kurgan subsequently entered the home, met with Norton, and did a walk-through of the area where the decedent had been found (the bedroom, bathroom and connected sitting room). Norton also updated Kurgan as to the information that had been made available to police. Kurgan noticed blood throughout the carpeting, on some of the walls, on the stairs leading to the bathroom, and on the bathroom floor. Kurgan observed that the decedent was laying down on a backboard in the bedroom. Kurgan began processing the scene by photographing areas of interest. He also marked relevant items with a placard and videotaped the scene as well. He later collected biological samples from the shower, a sample of a cup of coffee that had been on the bedroom night stand and two open bottles of water that had also been on the night stand.* Kurgan also collected a blood swab from the back wall of the bedroom 4 Kurgan explained that he wanted to collect these items because it was important to know what the decedent had ingested prior to her death, 6 o¢Fad7onear the light switch and a blood swab from the wall above the clock in the bedroom, and took measurements of blood spatter on a slanted wall near the decedent's bed. Both Kurgan and Norton explained that evidence technicians usually work closely with the medical examiner’s office in processing scenes. An investigator from the medical examiner's office also collected some prescription bottles from the bathroom, and Kurgan had conversations with Dr. Stoppacher, the Onondaga County Medical Examiner, regarding some of his observations.° After collecting the evidence, Kurgan transported it back to the police department. Kurgan left the home at approximately 12:30 p.m. He did not process other areas of the home because his superiors advised him that the death had been deemed accidental. When Kurgan carried evidentiary items out of the home, neither the defendant nor his family members voiced an objection. Any persons who were present in the kitchen would have been able, from their vantage point, to see Kurgan walk down the staircase and exit the home. Bilodeau was not involved in processing the scene, but he did go 5 In a January 26, 2015 letter to defense counsel, Dr. Stoppacher indicated that he believed that he left the residence shortly after the transport company had been called at 11:04 a.m. The log sheet prepared by the Town of DeWitt Police Department (regarding persons who entered and exited the residence on September 17, 2012) indicates that Dr. Stoppacher left the scene at 11:33 p.m. Regardless of the precise time that Dr. Stoppacher left the residence, it is apparent that after he had determined the cause of death to be accidental and left the home, Kurgan continued to take photographs and collect evidence. ORALback and forth to the upstairs bedroom at times. Bilodeau spent the majority of his time with the defendant and Jenna in the kitchen, and was present at the home for a total of approximately four hours. The defendant appeared to be emotionally upset and frequently nodded and/or gave short answers in response to comments or questions from Bilodeau. At some point in time, Bilodeau and Investigator Jason Law went to look in the defendant's bedroom. Prior to doing so, Bilodeau obtained express permission from the defendant to look in the room. Neither Bilodeau nor Law seized any evidence from the defendant's bedroom. During the time that Bilodeau was present at the home, other family members and friends arrived. All of the civilians, including the defendant, were permitted to roam freely about the house, but were asked not to enter the bedroom, bathroom or sitting area where the decedent was found. No one registered an objection to this request. The family specifically requested that they be allowed to see the decedent's body before it was removed from the home. When the body came downstairs on a gurney, it was left in the hallway for a short time so that the family could say their good-byes. The family did not make any other requests of Bilodeau. Neither the defendant nor any other family members ever voiced any objections to the presence of police or any police actions that were undertaken at the scene. Moreover, no one ever . OVFAVZ2asked the police to leave the residence. Once the decedent was removed from the home, the police left within an hour. Before he left, Bilodeau expressed his condolences to the family and advised them that he might need to follow up with more questions in the future. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW_ The burden of proof lies with a defendant who challenges the admissibility and seeks the suppression of physical evidence. It is he who must convincingly show that said evidence was searched for and seized from him in an unlawful manner and, therefore, should not be introduced against him at trial. Nevertheless, it is the People who bear the initial burden of showing the legality of police conduct at its inception (see People v. Wesley, 73 NY2d 351; People v. DiStefano, 38 NY2d 640) The defendant argues that evidence was recovered as a result of a warrantless search of his home, and should be suppressed. There is a general presumption that a warrantless search of an individual’s home is unreasonable (see, People v. Hodge, 44 NY2d 553), and the People have the burden of showing that a warrantless search of a home was justified by a preponderance of the evidence (Colorado v. Connelly, 479 US 157). In the present case, the defendant has conceded that under the emergency doctrine outlined in People v. Mitchell (39 NY2d 173, cert denied 426 US 953), the initial entry by police and other emergency WeFAd73personnel into the defendant's residence was lawful because the primary motivation of those who entered the home was to provide medical assistance to a person in distress. The defendant contends, however, that the Court should suppress all evidence subsequently recovered because the emergency ended once the decedent was pronounced. The defendant also contends that police did not obtain a search warrant prior to recovering evidence from the decedent's bedroom suite and that no exception to the warrant requirement was applicable to the facts at bar. At the outset, it is clear to this Court that the circumstances of the reported, unattended death of Mrs. Neulander were filled with emotion, confusion and ambiguity upon the arrival of the DeWitt Police Department, DeWitt Fire Department, and Rural Metro emergency workers. There are, however, multiple streams of authority that exist for this entry and warrantless search by the Town of DeWitt Police. It is the Court’s opinion that they merge to provide that the entry and search of the Neulander residence were proper and appropriate under all of the attendant circumstances. Whether express or implied, the Town of DeWitt Police had the defendant’s consent to do exactly what they did at the Neulander residence and they did so in a search limited in scope and duration to the exigencies of the situation that they were invited into. ee ovvatzaMoreover, as a matter of public policy, the Town of DeWitt Police Department acted in a manner that was entirely reasonable given the unique circumstances of this case. Given that the police were asked to assist with a grave emergency, it would be unreasonable and unrealistic to expect them to wear blinders and not act upon what they saw, incidentally and in plain view, while they were attempting to assist in saving a human life. A. The defendant consent earch of the decedent's bedr: suite. Initially, the Court finds that the defendant consented to a search of the decedent's bedroom suite.° Consent to a search is voluntary “when it is a true act of the will, an unequivocal product of an essentially free and unconstrained choice.” (People v. Gonzalez, 39 NY2d 122). Whether a party has voluntarily consented to a search is a determination which must be ascertained after a review of the totality of the circumstances of the facts at bar. There is no single factor which will be determinative of 6 The testimony established that Bilodeau advised both the defendant and Jenna Neulander that an evidence technician would be processing the scene. As a co-occupant of the home, Ms. Neulander would have had apparent authority to consent to a search of the premises, especially in light of the fact that the defendant did not refuse consent (see, e.g., People v. Carter, 30 NY3d 279; People v. Fells, 279 AD2d 706, Iv denied 96 NY2d 758). There was no indication at the hearing that Jenna Neulander ever registered an objection to the actions of police regarding the processing of the scene. " oveAsesconsent. Moreover, the form of the consent may be oral, written, or implied by a party's specific conduct (see, e.g., People v. Putnam, 50 AD3d 1514, lv denied 2008 Lexis 4671; People v. Montana, 298 AD2d 934, Iv denied 99 NY2d 561; People v. Washington, 209 AD2d 819, Iv denied 85 NY2d 944). Consent may also be formulated through a combination of words and conduct (see, e.g., People v. Johnson, 46 AD3d 276, Iv denied 10 NY3d 865). An analysis of several relevant factors leads the Court to the conclusion that the defendant consented to continued police presence in his home on September 17, 2012, including the processing of the scene and the collection of evidence in the suite of the home where the decedent was found. Here, the defendant was not at any time in police custody or under arrest when he spoke to Officer Bilodeau on the day in question. There were no threats, or any behavior on the part of Bilodeau or other members of the police department which could be described as coercive or deceptive. The defendant was at all times cooperative with the investigation. Moreover, although there was no testimony that Bilodeau warned the defendant that he could refuse to give consent, it was not necessary that the defendant be apprised of this right (see, Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 US 218). While the defendant may have been emotionally upset given the circumstances of his wife's death, his emotional state did not leave him 12 - OVALEincapable of rational thought or the ability to understand what police were asking of him.’ Thus, even if the defendant did not expressly consent to a search of the decedent’s bedroom suite, he impliedly consented to the search by failing to object to the presence of officers or their ongoing activities after his conversation with Bilodeau (see, e.g., People v. Smith, 239 AD2d 219, lv denied 90 NY2d 911). Moreover, the scope of the search in this case did not exceed the terms of the defendant's consent. The test of measuring the scope of a person’s consent is a standard of objective reasonableness, which requires a court to ascertain what a reasonable person would have understood by the interaction between police and the consenting party (see, People v. Gomez, 5 NY3d 416; see also People v. Mitchell, 211 AD2d 553, Iv denied 86 NY2d 738). Here, the defendant was advised that an evidence technician would be coming to process the scene - a scene replete with blood, where the defendant’s wife had recently succumbed to a violent death. A typical reasonable person would have understood such an advisement to mean that police officer would be potentially taking photographs of the decedent and the area in which she was found, taking appropriate measurements, and collecting items of evidentiary value (such as samples of blood, or substances that the 7 The defendant himself testified at the hearing that although he was distraught, he was capable of remembering things (Hearing Transcript, at. P, 228-229). OPVAV??decedent might have recently ingested) in order to verify the manner and cause of her death. Accordingly, the Court finds that the People have met their burden of proving that “the consent was, in fact, freely and voluntarily given”, and that this was not a case of “mere acquiescence” to a false claim of lawful authority (see, Bumper v. North Carolina, 397 US 543, 548- 549). B. Any investigation pertaining to the decedent’s bedroom suite was li by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation. Even if the defendant had not consented to the search of the decedent’s bedroom suite, the Court would find that any seizure of evidence by police was limited by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation. The defendant correctly states that no “crime scene exception” to the warrant requirement exists (Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 US 11; Mincey v. Arizona, 437 US 385). When police respond to a constitutionally protected area in response to an emergency, however, they may “subject the premises to a preliminary search and inspection whose scope and duration must be limited by and reasonably related to the exigencies of the situation (People v. Cohen, 87 AD2d 77, 83, affd 58 NY2d 844, cert denied 461 US 930). Once an emergency is over, the police can not continue to search for evidence under the emergency 14 478 o7exception (see, e.g., People v. Matta, 76 AD2d 844). The emergency doctrine allows for a warrantless seizure in a home when three prerequisites are present. “First, ‘the police must have reasonable grounds to believe there is an emergency at hand and an immediate need for their assistance for the protection of life or property’ (citation omitted)”. “Second, ‘the search must not be primarily motivated by intent to arrest and seize evidence’ (citation omitted)”. “Third, ‘there must be some reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched’ (People v. Molnar 98 NY2d 328, 332, quoting Mitchell, supra at 177-178). As noted above, the defense has conceded that the first factor under Mitchell was present, since the police lawfully entered the defendant's home in response to the 911 call regarding the decedent. With regard to the second Mitchell factor, the Court agrees with the assertion by the People in their responding affidavit that the actions undertaken by Kurgan were not motivated by an intent to arrest and seize evidence, but rather by an intent to preserve the scene and investigate circumstances that were clearly not a result of a natural death, illness or disease.* Moreover, under Brigham City v. Stuart (547 8 The Court reaches this conclusion despite Norton’s testimony before the Grand Jury that he went into “homicide mode” after the decedent's pronouncement. The Court finds this phrase was used as a matter of 15 OWIUS 398), it is unnecessary to inquire into the subjective motivations of police when determining whether there has been a violation of a party's rights under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (see also, People v. Desmarat, 38 AD3d 913, 914-915, Iv denied 9 NY3d 482). Indeed, under any reasonable interpretation of their duties, the DeWitt Police Department had an obligation to maintain the scene for the medical examiner? given that Mrs. Neulander’s death appeared to involve a form of violence, regardless of whether it was “criminal, suicidal, accidental, intentional or unintentional” and that the death had occurred in a “suspicious, unusual or unexplained fashion” (see Article IV of the Town of Dewitt Police Department Operational Manual [Deaths Reportable to the Medical Examiner]). In accordance with the Operational Manual, officers on scene were also required to notify a superior officer, preserve the scene, and determine the circumstances surrounding the incident (Article VI). While the police here did not work at the Medical Examiner's direction, their role was to work in conjunction with the Medical Examiner and his staff. Indeed, the Court of Appeals has recognized that police do not always function in the traditional criminal arena, but may act “as speech, and that the police treated this matter as a suspicious death rather than as a homicide. ° The medical examiner had a statutory obligation to investigate the circumstances of Mrs. Neulander’s death in accordance with County Law §§673 and 674. 16 o7¥1180public servants in the name of protecting public health and safety” (People v. Molnar, supra at 742). Given that the police and the Medical Examiner's staff were essentially performing the same task in attempting to determine the cause and manner of Mrs, Neulander’s death, the “interdictions of the Fourth Amendment would apply equally to both”. Id. at 742. Finally, the Court concludes that the police had a “reasonable basis, approximating probable cause, to associate the emergency with the area or place to be searched”. The defendant also argues that even if members of the DeWitt Police Department were entitled to be present in the bedroom suite after the decedent had been pronounced, suppression is still required because it was not established at the hearing that the incriminating character of any of the seized evidence was immediately apparent.'° Under the “plain view” doctrine, the police can make a warrantless seizure of contraband, evidence or other instrumentalities of a crime if the police are lawfully in the position from which the object is viewed, the police have lawful access to the object and the object's incriminating nature is immediately apparent (People v. Diaz, 81 NY2d 106; see also People v. Brown, 96 NY2d 80). 10 Inherent in this argument is a claim that in order to seize evidence under the emergency doctrine, the requirements of the plain view doctrine also had to be satisfied. a7 o7Fi4elThe defendant contends that the incriminating nature of the items seized here was not immediately apparent. The plain view doctrine does not, however, require “certainty or near certainty” as to the incriminating nature of the items (see, e.g., People v. Taylor, 104 AD3d 431, Iv denied 21 NY3d 914). Indeed, it “merely requires that the facts available to the officer would warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that certain items may be contraband or stolen property or useful as evidence of a crime; it does not demand any showing that such a belief be correct or more likely true than false. A practical, nontechnical probability that incriminating evidence is involved is all that is required” (People v. Taylor, supra, quoting Texas v. Brown, 460 US 730, 742 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]), In the instant case, a person of reasonable caution would have believed that blood found in the shower and on the walls of the bedroom, as well as beverages possibly imbibed by the defendant shortly before her death, would have provided an indication as to the cause and/or manner of Mrs. Neulander’s death." i The presence of the blood on the walls of the bedroom was, at a minimum, inconsistent with the indication that the decedent had fallen in the shower. Notwithstanding the Medical Examiner's original opinion that the cause of death was accidental, such an observation would have warranted a man of reasonable caution in believing that Mrs. Neulander’s death had not taken place in the manner which was described to McGarrity, as well as the belief that such samples could have constituted evidence of a crime. In light of the Medical Examiner's determination at the scene that the death was accidental, it likely would have been impractical for the police to obtain a search warrant in an expeditious fashion. 18 O7FI188In determining that the actions of police were appropriate here, the Court is also guided by the similarities between this case and the facts involved in People v. Neulist (43 AD2d 150). In Neulist, police responded to a call from a man indicating that he had found his mother dead in her bedroom. After arriving at the residence, a pillow, pillowcase and sheet were removed from the decedent’s bed. Police then made a preliminary determination that the decedent had died from natural causes. The body of the decedent was removed and an autopsy conducted. Several of the officers who had responded to the call left the residence, while others remained at the residence in order to secure the decedent’s bedroom. Within an hour, detectives were informed that a bullet had been found in the brain of the decedent. The detectives returned to the home and conducted a warrantless search of the premises, which led to the recovery of certain items of evidence. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department determined that the initial recovery of evidence was lawful and that the subsequent search was an extension of the initial investigation. The Second Department focused on the fact that there was a continued police presence on the scene as well as the relatively brief lapse of time between the removal of the body and the continuation of the investigation.” The Second Department also indicated that “{c]learly 2 It is unclear if the second search in Neulist would be still be O7FA183there had been a violent death and it was logical to assume that a crime had been committed and that evidence of that crime might still be on the premises” (Neulist, supra at 154). In People v. Cohen, infra, police received a call indicating that someone had been shot inside an apartment. The police arrived at the apartment and discovered the decedent lying in bed with an apparent gunshot wound. The defendant informed police that the decedent had shot himself. The police seized the gun found on the bed, two notes found in open view in the bedroom, two live rounds and a spent shell casing. Officers left the scene later that day. The following morning, the medical examiner's office notified police that an examination of the decedent's wounds led to a possibility that he had been the victim of a homicide. Several hours later, police went back to the apartment and conducted a warrantless search of the premises, which led to the recovery of incriminating items. On appeal, the Appellate Division, Second Department determined that the items recovered should have been suppressed, finding that the preliminary investigation had come to an end and noting that the premises had not been secured by a continuous police presence. As the People have noted, however, the Second Department upheld the admissibility of the evidence that was considered appropriate in light of Mincey v. Arizona (437 US 385) and its progeny. Nevertheless, it is largely an academic point, since the police maintained a continuous presence at the scene in this case. 20 oatinitially seized, when police were under the impression that the decedent had committed suicide. Here, the police maintained a continuous presence at the scene, the search was close in temporal proximity to the initial entry of the premises, and the importance of the items seized was readily apparent to police. Thus, the collection of evidence was proper even if the emergency had abated (see, People v. Desmarat, 38 AD3d 913, Iv denied 9 NY3d 482; People v. George, 7 AD3d 810, Iv denied 3 NY3d 674; People v. Paul, 15 Misc3d 1128[A], affd 74 AD3d 1239, Iv denied 15 NY3d 923; People v. Chumbley, 10 Misc3d 1051[A]). The Court therefore finds that under all of the attendant circumstances, the search of the decedent's bedroom suite area was limited by and reasonably related to the nature of the situation presented in both duration and scope. Finally, the People have also argued that a separate exception to the warrant requirement - commonly referred to as “exigent circumstances” - applied here. The exigent circumstances doctrine is related to the emergency exception, but specifically allows police to act without a warrant where police possess probable cause to search but “urgent events make it impossible to obtain a warrant” in where evidence could be easily removed or destroyed (People v. Knapp, 52 NY2d 689, 695-696; see also People v. Perez, 202 AD2d 319). Based upon the defendant's conversation with McGarrity, as related 2 y7F1A 85to Bilodeau, police were apprised that Mrs. Neulander had fallen in the shower. There was biological material found in the shower, although the water was still running and could have destroyed the evidence. As the People have argued, the material could have flowed down the drain. With respect to the blood found on the walls of the bedroom, the People correctly noted that it could have been easily cleaned or destroyed. Similarly, the beverages taken by police from the decedent's nightstand could have also been easily discarded. Thus, time was of paramount importance in preserving the integrity of these items. Thus, the Court also finds that unusual nature of this situation justified a warrantless search of the items in question under the “exigent circumstances” exception. Conclusion Based upon the foregoing, the Court finds the police conduct proper in all respects and the defendant's motion to suppress is therefore denied in its entirety. The decision herein constitutes the Order of this Court. ee — Dated: February 18 2015 Bras J OMAS 3. MILLE! Onondaga County Court Judge a o'2FAt 86 yaaa aay