Handbook of the

5th World Congress and School

on Universal Logic

June, 2030, 2015

Istanbul,
Turkey

UniLog 2015
http://www.uni-log.org/start5.html

Istanbul
University
Turkey

Edited by
Jean-Yves Beziau, Safak Ural, Arthur Buchsbaum,

Iskender
Tasdelen, Vedat Kamer

Contents
I

Introduction

1 Organizing and Scientific Committees

Organizing Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scientific Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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2 Aim of the event

3 What is Universal Logic?

4 Call for papers

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5th World School on Universal Logic

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5 Aim of the school

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6 Tutorials
Opening Session: Why Study Logic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem, by Nate Ackerman . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Politics, by Franca DAgostini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Information, by Patrick Allo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Linstroms Theorem, by Peter Arndt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Language, by Patrick Blackburn . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Godels Incompleteness Theorems, by Bernd Buldt . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic, quantum theory and natural language meaning (all in pictures),
by Bob Coecke . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dugundjis Theorem, by Marcelo Coniglio and Newton Peron . . . . . .
Aristotles Logic, by John Corcoran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Logic of Apuleius and Boethius, by Manuel Correia Machuca . . . .
Logic and Existence (Existence Predicates in Logic)
by Luis Estrada-Gonzalez and Giovanni Mion . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Nonsense, by Thomas Ferguson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hegels Logic, by Elena Ficara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lindenbaum Maximalization Theorem, by Rene Gazzari . . . . . . . . .
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Jain Logic, by Marie-Hel`ene Gorisse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ontological and Epistemological Distinction of Sufi Logical Stand
with Comparison to Buddhist Logic as Traditional Dichotomy of Logic,

by Ismail
Latif Hacnebioglu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An Introduction to Stoic Logic, by Katerina Ierodiakonou . . . . . . . . . . .
Cut-Eliminations Theorem, by Andrzej Indrzejczak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Husserls Conception of Logic, by Manuel Gustavo Isaac . . . . . . . . . . . .
Booles Logic, by Dale Jacquette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Colour, by Dany Jaspers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kants Logic, by Srecko Kovac . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leibnizs logic, by Wolfgang Lenzen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Grammar Contesting the Semantics-Pragmatics Divide,
by Ernie Lepore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theorem of Completeness, by Mara Manzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Music The Logic of Chords and Harmony, by Ingolf Max . . . .
Lewis Carrolls Symbolic Logic, by Amirouche Moktefi . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Category Or Planar Heyting Algebras for Children,
by Eduardo Ochs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Compactness Theorem, by David Pierce . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and the Theory of Relativity, by Gergely Szekely . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Fiction, by John Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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5th World Congress on Universal Logic

7 Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

A Dual Representation Theory of Quantum Systems
and its Ontological Consequences, by Gianfranco Basti . . . . . . . . . .
There is no logical negation: Confessions of a former logical exhaustivist,
by Jc Beall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
From syllogisms to syllogistic consequences: a turning point
in the history of logic, by Julie Brumberg-Chaumont . . . . . . . . . . .
Paraconsistent probability theory: betting rationally under contradiction,
by Juliana Bueno-Soler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hypothetical Syllogism in Avicenna, by Samet B
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ukada . . . . . . . . . . . .
The theory of topos-theoretic bridges, five years later, by Olivia Caramello
Is the Church-Turing Thesis the new Pythagoreanism?, by Ahmet C
evik . .
Identity Statements, Doxastic Co-Indexation and Freges Puzzle,
by Eros Corraza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals and Machines,
by Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The ontology of logical form: formal ontology vs. formal deontology,
by Elena Dragalina-Chernaya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Contents
Cut-free proofs for more and more logics, by Melvin Fitting . . . . . . . .
In search for a conceptual logic of information, by Luciano Floridi . . . .
First-Order Logic and First-Order Functions, by Rodrigo Freire . . . . . .
Is there a Logical Reasoning Module in the Brain?, by Vinod Goel . . . .
Truth-functional alternative to epistemic logic
(and its application to Fitchs paradox), by Ekaterina Kubyshkina .
Discourse and logical form, by Ernest Lepore . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Leon Henkin on Completeness, by Mara Manzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Consequiland: on logics with many dimensions, by Joao Marcos . . . . . .
Connexive Logic based on an Incompatibility Operator, by Storrs McCall
Invitation to Non-Classical Mathematics, by Maarten Mc Kubre-Jordens .
On the Way to Modern Logic the Case of Polish Logic,
by Roman Murawski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Model of Dialectic, by Graham Priest . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Creativity and Visualisations in Mathematics, by Irina Starikova . . . . .
Ones Modus Ponens: Classical Logic and Semantics for Modality,
by Una Stojnic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Argumentation Semantics for Adaptive Logics,
by Christian Straer and Jesse Heyninck . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ontology of Programs, by Raymond Turner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Constructing Universal Logic of Development?
Hundred Years after James Mark Baldwin, by Jaan Valsiner . . . . .
Seduced and Abandoned in the Chinese Room, by Tony Veale . . . . . . .
Toward a Logic for Realistic Reasoning in Humans and Computers,
by Pei Wang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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8 Workshops
The Idea of Logic: Historical Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logical and Non-Logical Lexicons: Was Tarski is right that there are
no objective grounds to draw a sharp boundary between them?,
by Majid Amini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic as Semeiotic: Peirces Philosophy of Logic, by Francesco Bellucci
Logic and its place in philosophy. T.H. Green and the idealistic view,
by Guido Bonino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Metaphysics as Natural Logic in Hegel, by Elena Ficara . . . . . . . .
The Notion of Logical Form and its Application in Boole and Jevons,
by Anna-Sophie Heinemann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic as Physics. On Logic and the Aristotelian Concept of Historia,
according to the Paduan Philosopher Jacobus Zabarella,
by Per Lennart Landgren . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frege and Aristotle about the logical foundation
of mathematical functions, or Aristotle translated by Frege,
by Jose Verssimo Teixeira da Mata . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Logic, Judgement and Inference. What Frege Should Have Said
about Illogical Thought, by Daniele Mezzadri . . . . . . . . . . . .
Husserls Idea of Pure Logic: Constructive or Axiomatic?,
by Mohammad Shafiei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophy of non-classical logics:
Towards problems of paraconsistency and paracompleteness . . .
Hard and Soft Logical Information, by Patrick Allo . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logical pluralism from the perspective of logical expressivism,
by Pavel Arazim . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A piece of logical handicraft illustrating a philosophical position,
by Diderik Batens . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Paraconsistent Defense of Logical Pluralism and Relativism,
by Diogo Henrique Bispo Dias . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Use of Definitions and their Logical Representation
in Paradox Derivation, by Ross T. Brady . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: dealing with evidence
and truth, by Walter Carnielli and Abilio Rodrigues . . . . . . . .
On the exclusivity of logical negation, by Massimiliano Carrara . . . . . .
The Paradox of Singularity. Contradiction and Individuals
between Aristotle and Hegel, by Alessandro De Cesaris . . . . . .
Denial Wont Get You Anywhere, by Matthias Jenny . . . . . . . . . . . .
The explication of paraconsistency, dialetheism and paracompleteness
in classical logic syntactically extended by functorial variables,
by Ingolf Max . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hegel: contradiction as a property of language.
A Hegelian way towards paraconsistency, by Stany Mazurkiewicz
The Non-classical Side of Classical Logic, by David Miller . . . . . . . . .
First steps towards non-classical logic of informal provability,
by Pawel Pawlowski and Rafal Urbaniak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophical elucidation of implication, by Wagner de Campos Sanz . .
What would be a falsitymaker for the principle of non-contradiction?,
by Abilio Rodrigues and Walter Carnielli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophical elucidation of implication, by Wagner de Campos Sanz . .
Catuskoti: Paracomplete, Paraconsistent, Both, or None?,
by Fabien Schang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On the Justification of Logical Principles, by Jairo Jose da Silva . . . . .
Paraconsistency and External Justification, by Koji Tanaka . . . . . . . .
Abstract Duality and Co-Constructive Logic, by James Trafford . . . . .
Hegel and The Idea of Negative Self-Relatedness, by Alper Turken . . . .
Against the World, by Elia Zardini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals and Machines . . . . .
The possibility of superminds. A response to Bringsjords argument
on infinitary logic, by Florent Franchette . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
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Contents
The Relevance of Language for the Problem of Representation,
by Raffaela Giovagnoli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
Supervaluation Semantics for Modeling Spatial Representations
in Humans and Robots, by Marcos Lopes and Paulo Santos . . . . 159
The quantum strategy of completeness, by Vasil Dinev Penchev . . . . . . 161
Representation and Reality by Language,
by Venelina Penkova Pencheva and Vasil Dinev Penchev . . . . . . 162
Internal inconsistencies: how can an information system ontology be
both realistic and common-sense friendly?, by David Zarebski . . 163
4th International Workshop on Computational Creativity,
Concept Invention and General Intelligence (C3GI) . . . . . . . . 165
A Path is a Path is a Path,
by Maria M. Hedblom, Oliver Kutz and Fabian Neuhaus . . . . . 166
Analogical Inference and Transfer for Creativity,
by Ulf Krumnack and Stefan Schneider . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Seeing as and Re-Representation: Their Relation to Insight,
Creative Problem-Solving and Types of Creativity,
by Ana-Maria Olteteanu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
The Input, Coherence, Generativity (ICG) Factors: Towards a Model
of Cognitive Informativity Measures for Productive Cognitive
Systems, by Ana-Maria Olteteanu . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
Mathematical Style as Expression of the Art of Proving,
by Ioannis M. Vandoulakis and Petros Stefaneas . . . . . . . . . . 167
Non-Classical Abstract Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168
Towards a pragmatic logic for denial,
by Daniele Chiffi, Massimiliano Carrara and Ciro De Florio . . . . 170
Anti-intuitionism as a logic of refutation, by Bao Long Dang Van . . . . . 171
Dualizing q-consequence operations, by Sanderson Molick and Daniel Skurt173
Bayesian Networks on Transition Systems, by Andrew Schumann . . . . . 174
Uniqueness without reflexivity or transitivity, by David Ripley . . . . . . 175
Lindstrom Theorem for First-Order Modal Logic,
by Reihane Zoghifard and Massoud Pourmahdian . . . . . . . . . . 176
Emergent Computational Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
Algorithmically Verifiable Quantum Functions vis `a vis Algorithmically
Computable Classical Functions: A suggested mathematical
perspective for the EPR argument, by Bhupinder Singh Anand . 179
Fuzzy-Syllogistic Reasoning with Ontologies,
Kumova and Mikhail Zarechnev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
by Bora I.
Can Machines Learn Logics?, by Chiaki Sakama and Katsumi Inoue . . . 185
n-Valued Refined Neutrosophic Logic and Its Applications to Physics,
by Florentin Smarandache . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
Utopian Thinking and Logic-s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Contemporary imaginaries of women elected in positions of power
in the temporality of globalization, by Nad`ege Chell . . . . . . . .
The time-space of the halka, or narrative circle in Marrakech:
utopia or heterotopia?, by Rachid Mendjeli . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Oppositional Geometry of Badious Political Revolutions,
by Alessio Moretti . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Utopian thinking in the case of the Greek Youth.
The Use of linguistic connectors for two different logics,
by Thalia Magioglou . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Medieval Logic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conceivability and possibility in Abelards theory of modality,
by Irene Binini . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Medieval Octagons: Analogies and Differences,
by Juan Manuel Campos Bentez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logical Consequence in Avicennas Theory, by Saloua Chatti . . . . . . .
Non normal modal logics in Thomas Aquinas, by Luca Gilli . . . . . . . .
Marsilius of Inghens Consequentiae, by Graziana Ciola . . . . . . . . . . .
Where Medieval Logicians Feared to Tread. Syllogismus falsigraphus
according to Medieval Latin Sources, by Leone Gazziero . . . . . .
John Buridan on the Structure of Definitions:
Quaestiones Topicorum I.68, by Rodrigo Guerizoli . . . . . . . . .
Thomas Manlevelt: Ockham and beyond, by Alfred van der Helm . . . .
The Origin of the Distribution Doctrine, by Mehdi Mirzapour . . . . . . .
Paradoxes of Signification, by Stephen Read . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophy of Computer Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Software and causality, by Russ Abbott . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Syntax and Semantics in Evolved Theories, by Mark Addis . . . . . . . .
Software Theory Change by resilient near-complete specifications,
by Balbir Barn, Nikos Gkorogiannis, Giuseppe Primiero
and Franco Raimondi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophical Aspects of Programming Theory Development,
by Vitalii Gavryluk and Mykola Nikitchenko . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Heinz Zemaneks almost forgotten Contributions to the Philosophy
of Informatics, by Stefan Gruner . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Plea for Explanatory Pluralism in Computer Science,
by Guglielmo Tamburrini and Nicola Angius . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Connexive Logics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On Arithmetic Formulated Connexively, by Thomas Macaulay Ferguson
A simple connexive extension of the basic relevant logic BD,
by Hitoshi Omori . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Strange Status of The Principle of Conditional Non-Contradiction,
by Matthias Unterhuber . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Natural deduction for bi-connexive logic, by Heinrich Wansing . . . . . .
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Logic and Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Towards a More Realistic Theory of Semantic Information,
by Marcello DAgostino and Luciano Floridi . . . . . . . . . . .
A quantitative-informational approach to logical consequence,
by Marco A. Alves and Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano . . . . .
Logic Informed, by Justin Bledin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Types of Information Pluralism,
by Neil Coleman and Christopher S. Gifford . . . . . . . . . . .
Procedural theory of analytic information, by Marie Duz . . . . . . .
Depth-bounded Probability Logic: A preliminary investigation,
by Hykel Hosni, Marcello DAgostino and Tommaso Flaminio
20 Years of Inconsistent Mathematics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Round Table: Past, Present and Future of Inconsistent Mathematics .
On the limitations of nave set theory with non-classical logics,
by Luis Estrada-Gonzalez . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hermeneutical and genetic-epistemological glances
at paraconsistent category theory, by Carlos Cesar Jimenez . .
Freges Puzzle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Freges Puzzle: Much Ado about Nothing?, by Emiliano Boccardi . .
Freges Puzzle and Millianism, by Stefano Predelli . . . . . . . . . . . .
Freges Puzzle: Can we Pose it on Freges behalf?, by Marco Ruffino .
In What Sense (Statement) of the Puzzle is Problematic?,
by Ludovic Soutif . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wettstein on Freges Puzzle, by David Suarez-Rivero . . . . . . . . . .

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Universal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 243
Homotopy theoretical aspects of abstract logic, by Peter Arndt . . . . . . 243
Applied Ontology, Logical Pluralism, and the Logical Constants,
by Stefano Borgo and Oliver Kutz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 244
Expanding non-classical logics, by Rodolfo C. Ertola Biraben . . . . . . . 245
Logical Structures as Formal Objects, by Yaroslav Kokhan . . . . . . . . . 246
Logical consequence and measuring of semantic information
via distributive normal forms, by Bruno Ramos Mendonca . . . . 247
Logic as Universal Language and its Limit: Solution to the Problems of
Quantification over Types and Orders in Type Theory,
by Jir Raclavsk
y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 248
A Metalogical Exploration of Logical Structures
and their Cognitive Relevance, by Serge Robert and Janie Brisson 249
From Deductive Systems of Logic to Logic of Information,
by Marcin J. Schroeder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Universal Logical Hermeneutics, by Elena Shulga . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Geometrical formulation of a class of consequence structures,
by Edelcio Goncalves de Souza . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A surprising consequence of pluralism about logical consequence,
by Erik Stei . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cognition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Theories of Questions and Contemporary Direct Democracy,
by Przemyslaw Krzywoszy
nski and Jerzy W. Ochma
nski . . . . .
Logical Aspects of Computational Creativity in the Music Domain,
by Kai-Uwe K
uhnberger and Oliver Kutz . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On the Role of Universal Logic in Concept Invention,
by Oliver Kutz, Fabian Neuhaus and Kai-Uwe K
uhnberger . . .
Toward Logical Models of Understanding: Axiology, Logical Pragmatics,
Pragmatic Logics, What Else?,
by Maria N. Svyatkina and Valery B. Tarassov . . . . . . . . . .
Revision and Logical Neutrality (or: a plea for ecumenical reasons),
by Jack Woods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Modal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A recipe for safe detachment, by Mathieu Beirlaen . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Transworld Identity: Some Questions and Some Answers,
by Hanife Bilgili . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Counterfactuals within Scientific Theories, by Samuel C. Fletcher . . . .
Reflexive Insensitive Modal Logics,
by David R. Gilbert and Giorgio Venturi . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Questions de Valeur et de Concept (Matters of Value and of Concept),
by Tony Marmo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Completeness for some Beziau logics,
by Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Marek Nasieniewski . .
Modal Logics of Partial Quasiary Predicates, by Oksana Shkilniak . . .
Infinitary Modal Logic for Convergence in Distance Spaces,

by Iskender
Tasdelen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paraconsistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paraconsistent Dynamic Epistemology, by Can Baskent . . . . . . . . . .
A Panoramic View over the Dualization of Intuitionistic Logic,
by Veronica Borja Macas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Quasi hybrid logic: Semantics and Proof Theory,
by Diana Costa and Manuel A. Martins . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belnaps logic as a logic of experts, by Jose Martnez Fernandez . . . .
Some Results on 3-valued Paraconsistent Logic Programming,

by Kleidson Eglicio
Carvalho da Silva Oliveira
and Marcelo Coniglio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Vasilievs ideas for non-Aristotelian logics:
insight towards paraconsistency,
by Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano and Evandro Lus Gomes . . .
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Contents
A Paraconsistent Formalization of Nicolaus Cusanuss Logical-Philosophical
Method in De Docta Ignorantia, by Eugen Russo . . . . . . . . . . 282
Logics of trial and error mathematics: dialectical and quasi-dialectical
systems, by Luca San Mauro, Jacopo Amidei, Duccio Pianigiani
and Andrea Sorbi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
Studies on da Costas paraconsistent differential calculus,
by Marcelo Reicher Soares and Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano . . 284
Clarifying some rationality criteria of AGM-like Paraconsistent
Belief Revision, by Rafael Testa, Marcelo Coniglio
and Marcio Ribeiro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
The inapplicability of (selected) paraconsistent logics,
by Rafal Urbaniak and Pawel Sinilo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 286
Argumentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Fallacy and virtue argumentation, by Iovan Drehe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287
Epistemic dialogical logic with possibility of revision,
by Hanna Karpenko . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 288
A Unified Framework for Different Types of Normative Conflicts,
by Joke Meheus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 289
What does The Slingshot needs to shoot?:
Slingshots Arguments and Plural Logics,
by Joao Daniel Dantas de Oliveira . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
Dia-Logics and Dia-Semantics: a Bilattice-Based Approach,
by Valery B. Tarassov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 291
Application of Argumentation in Generalization Problems,
by Vadim Vagin, Marina Fomina and Oleg Morosin . . . . . . . . . 295
Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
A quest for new quantum words: reasons, by Selma Coecke . . . . . . . . 298
On Assigning, by Sylvain Lavelle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 298
Natural language and proof-theoretic semantics:
denotational ghosts in inferential machine, by Ivo Pezlar . . . . . . 299
Linguistic Crisp and Symbolic Logics in Mathematics and Derivations,
by Zekai Sen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 301
Communication is Possible according to a New Interpretation
of Solipsism, by Safak Ural . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Illocutionary Logic, Discourse Pragmatics and Universal Grammar,
by Daniel Vanderveken . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
Logic and Sense, by Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska . . . . . . . . . . . . . 303
Paradox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Paraconsistent intuitionistic logic for future contingents,
by Doukas Kapantais . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
The Role of Paradoxes in Belles-Lettres, by Valeri Zlatanov Lichev . . . . 305
Condorcet Paradox and Program Logics, by Raja Natarajan . . . . . . . . 307
xi

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

On How Kelsenian Jurisprudence and Intuitionistic Logic help to avoid
Contrary-to-Duty paradoxes in Legal Ontologies,
by Alexandre Rademaker and Edward Hermann Haeusler . . . . .
On paradoxical and non-paradoxical systems of propositions referring
to each other, by Denis I. Saveliev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
epanek
Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics, by Jan St
Towards non-classical approaches to circular definitions,
by Shawn Standefer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
An Analysis of Bach-Peters Sentences, by Byeong-uk Yi . . . . . . . . . .
Tools and Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fixing Truth Values for Arithmetical Sentences,
by Edgar Luis Bezerra de Almeida
and Rodrigo de Alvarenga Freire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
A Contextual Definition of an Abstraction Operator
in Second-Order Logic, by Henrique Antunes . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Updates in Logic, by Guillaume Aucher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Computability of unification and admissibility in contact logics,
by Philippe Balbiani and C
igdem Gencer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Librationist Motives and Perspectives, by Frode Bjrdal . . . . . . . . . .
Lambda Theory: to a Zero-Order Logic with Quantifiers,
by Laurent Dubois . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Duality, self-duality and generalized quantifiers,
by Pedro Alonso Amaral Falcao . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foundations of semantic and syntactic proofs in the context
of metatheories, by Alfredo Roque de Oliveira Freire Filho . . . .
Cosmic Logic. On the Conway-Kochen Free Will Theorem,
by Yvon Gauthier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Normalisation in substructural term calculi,
by Silvia Ghilezan, Jelena Ivetic and Nenad Savic . . . . . . . . . .
Transreal Proof of the Existence of Universal Possible Worlds,
by Walter Gomide, Tiago S. dos Reis
and James A.D.W. Anderson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Modelling choice sequences of high types, by Farida Kachapova . . . . . .
Decidable Fragments Of First Order Logic
Godel Incompleteness Property, by Mohamed Khaled . . . . . . .
A Modified Quasi-Set Theory without Identity, by Daniel Molto . . . . .
A Generalization of Kuznetsovs Theorem and Its Consequences,
by Alexei Muravitsky . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logics of Non-Deterministic Quasiary Predicates,
by Mykola Nikitchenko and Stepan Shkilniak . . . . . . . . . . . .
Predictive Competitive Model Game Trees, by Cyrus F. Nourani . . . . .
Harmonizing involutive and constructive negations,
by Mattia Petrolo and Paolo Pistone . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
xii

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Contents
Fuzzy Syllogisms, by Gerald S. Plesniewicz . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On various concepts of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models,
by Nikolai L. Poliakov and Denis I. Saveliev . . . . . . . . . . . .
Periodicity vs reflexivity in revision theories, by Edoardo Rivello . . . .
Embedding of First-Order Nominal Logic into Higher-Order Logic,
by Alexander Steen and Max Wisniewski . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Between triviality and informativeness Identity:
Its logic and its puzzles, by Andre Bazzoni . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Logic and Metaphysics, by Ahmet Ayhan C
itil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Multidimensional Questions in Knowledge Dynamics:
A Study in Diachronic Logic, by Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszy
nska,
Piotr Lesniewski and Malgorzata Lesniewska . . . . . . . . . . . .
uc G
Is self-evidence evident?, by Ozg
uven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The meaninglessness of algebraic-semantics
Rational Agents with-in Logic and its Semantics,
by Satoru Hanada . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Inseparability of Lingua Universalis from Calculus Ratiocinator,
by Priyedarshi Jetli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Universal-Particular Relationship in Solipsist Logic, by Vedat Kamer .
A meta-theoretical interpretation of the logical square and hexagon
of opposition, by Vladimir Lobovikov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The logic of David Humes Dialogues concerning natural religion,
by Stanley Tweyman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Philosophical Significance of Title of Lindenbaums Maximalization
Theorem, by Jan Wole
nski . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Computation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
NP system and Mimp-graph association, by Vaston Goncalves da Costa,
Edward Hermann Haeusler, Marcela Quispe Cruz
and Jefferson de Barros Santos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On non-standard finite computational models,
by Edward Hermann Haeusler . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
New Insights into Minimum Satisfiability,
by Felip Many`a and Chu-Min Li . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Behavioral equivalence of equivalent hidden logics,
by Manuel A. Martins and Sergey Babenyshev . . . . . . . . . . .
Theorems of Tarski and Godels Second
Incompleteness Computationally, by Saeed Salehi . . . . . . .
Algebraic and Logical Operations on Operators:
One Application to Semantic Computation,
by Benot Sauzay, Gaell Guibert and Jean-Pierre Descles . . . .
Completeness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Metatheory of Tableau Systems, by Tomasz Jarmuzek . . . . . . . . . .
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

On the Source of the Notion of Semantic Completeness,
by Enrico Moriconi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
About Syntactic Analogues to Proof of the Completeness Theorem,
by Sergey Pavlov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Atomic systems in proof-theoretic semantics and the problem
of completeness, by Thomas Piecha and Peter Schroeder-Heister .
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Adorno and Logic, by Ben Fulman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Intensionality: uncomfortable but necessary in the history of logic,
by Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas, M. Elena Rodrguez
and Mara Manzano . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

The First Studies on Algebraic Logic in Turkey, by Adnan Omerustao

glu
Various conceptions of science in the light of the distinction
between characteristica universalis and calculus ratiotinator,
by David Svodoba . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jerzy Los and the Origin of Temporal Logic,
by Tomasz Jarmuzek and Marcin Tkaczyk . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pierre de La Ramee as a logician Pontoneer, by Ruxandra Irina Vulcan .
Algebra and Category . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Composition-Nominative Logics as Institutions,
by Alexey Chentsov and Mykola Nikitchenko . . . . . . . . . . . .
Algebraizable Logics and a functorial encoding of its morphisms,
by Darllan Conceicao Pinto and Hugo Luiz Mariano . . . . . . . .
Separator Method for Constructing Canonical Types of Formulas,
by Olga Gerasimova and Ilya Makarov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
On non-deterministic algebras,
by Ana Claudia de Jesus Golzio and Marcelo Coniglio . . . . . . .
The Category TrCx and some results, by Angela Pereira
Rodrigues Moreira and Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano . . . . . . .
Morita-equivalences for MV-algebras,
by Anna Carla Russo and Olivia Caramello . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Dialectica Categories, Cardinalities of the Continuum and Combinatorics
of Ideals, by Samuel G. da Silva and Valeria de Paiva . . . . . . .
Categorical Logic Approach to Formal Epistemology,
by Vladimir L. Vasyukov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
10 Contest: the Future of Logic
Investigations into a Polynomial Calculus for Logics, by Rodrigo de Almeida
The Future of Logic as a Geometry of Scientific Thought,
by Walter Gomide, James Anderson and Tiago Reis . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Future of Logic (and Ethics), by Matt LaVine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
The Future of Logic: Foundation-Independence, by Florian Rabe . . . . . . .
Unified Logic, an Alternative for Combining Logics, by Mohammad Shafiei .
xiv

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383
384
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Contents
The Future of Logic, by Hartley Slater . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386
Triggering a Copernican Shift in Logic through Sequenced Evaluations,
by Erik Thomsen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 386

IV

Publishers, Sponsors and Partners

389

11 Book Exhibition

391

12 Sponsors and Partners

393

Index of Authors

395

xv

Part I
Introduction

1 Organizing and Scientific Committees

Organizing Committee

Jean-Yves Beziau (Co-Chair), UFRJ-CNPq, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Safak Ural (Co-Chair)

Vedat Kamer, Istanbul

University, Turkey

Arthur Buchsbaum, Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil

Can Baskent, University of Bath, UK

Halil Ibrahim
C
etres, Istanbul
University, Turkey

Catherine Chantilly, ABF, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszy
nska, Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna
n, Poland

uc G

Ozg
uven, Istanbul
University, Turkey

on

Nazl In
u, Istanbul
University, Turkey

Oguz Korkmaz, Bogazici University, Istanbul,

Turkey

Przemyslaw Krzywoszy
nski, Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna
n, Poland

Giovanni Mion, Istanbul

Technical University, Turkey

Raja Natarajan, Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India

Turkey
David Pierce, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Istanbul,

Petros Stefaneas, National Technical University of Athens 1, Greece

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Scientific Committee

Arnon Avron, University of Tel-Aviv, Israel

Johan van Benthem, University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands

and Stanford University, USA

Ross T. Brady, La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia

Carlos Caleiro, Instituto Superior Tecnico, Lisbon, Portugal

Walter Carnielli, State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil

Michael Dunn, School of Informatics, Indiana, USA

Dov Gabbay, Kings College, London, UK

Huacan He, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xian, China

Gerhard Jager, University of Bern, Switzerland

Arnold Koslow, City University of New York, USA

Istvan Nemeti, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, Hungary

Gila Sher, University of California, San Diego, USA

Vladimir Vasyukov, Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia

Heinrich Wansing, Bochum University, Germany

2 Aim of the event

This is the 5th World Congress and School on Universal Logic (UniLog 2015), gathering top researchers from all over the world, after
1st UniLog, Montreux, Switzerland, 2005;
2nd UniLog, Xian, China, 2007;
3rd UniLog, Lisbon, Portugal, 2010;
4th UniLog, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013.
All aspects of Universal Logic are under examination.
The UniLog 2015 is emphasizing an interdisciplinary perspective.

3 What is Universal Logic?

In the same way that universal algebra is a general theory of algebraic structures,
universal logic is a general theory of logical structures. During the 20th century, numerous logics have been created: intuitionistic logic, deontic logic, many-valued logic,
relevant logic, linear logic, non monotonic logic, etc. Universal logic is not a new logic,
it is a way of unifying this multiplicity of logics by developing general tools and concepts
that can be applied to all logics.
One aim of universal logic is to determine the domain of validity of such and
such metatheorem (e.g. the completeness theorem) and to give general formulations
of metatheorems. This is very useful for applications and helps to make the distinction
between what is really essential to a particular logic and what is not, and thus gives
a better understanding of this particular logic. Universal logic can also be seen as a
toolkit for producing a specific logic required for a given situation, e.g. a paraconsistent
deontic temporal logic.

4 Call for papers

Participants should submit full versions of their papers by email. People not taking
part of the event are also welcome to submit a paper.
All participants are most welcome to send the full version of their talk for publication
by September 30, 2015 to istanbul2015@uni-log.org.
All talks dealing with general aspects of logic are welcome, in particular those falling
into the categories below. See also the workshops where you can submit your abstract
if it is appropriate and the Contest. Participants of the School are also strongly encouraged to submit a contribution.

Tools and Techniques

consequence operator
diagrams
multiple-conclusion logic
labelled deductive systems
Kripke structures
logical matrices
tableaux and trees
universal algebra and categories
abstract model theory
combination of logics
lambda calculus
games

Scope of Validity
Domain of Applications of Fundamental Theorems

completeness
compactness
cut-elimination
deduction
interpolation
definability
incompleteness
decidability
Lindenbaum lemma
algebrization
Dugundjis theorem
9

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Study of Classes of Logics

modal logics
substructural logics
linear logics
relevant logics
fuzzy logics
non-monotonic logics
paraconsistent logics
intensional logics
temporal logics
many-valued logics
high order logics
free logics

Philosophy and History

axioms and rules

truth and fallacies
identity
lingua universalis vs. calculus ratiocinator
pluralism
origin of logic
reasoning and computing
discovery and creativity
nature of metalogic
deduction and induction
definition
paradoxes

10

Part II
5th World School
on Universal Logic

11

5 Aim of the school

For the 5th edition of this event there will be three kinds of tutorials: some dedicated
to history of logic (Aristotles logic, Jain Logic, Stoic Logic. Leibnizs logic, Kants logic,
Hegels logic. . . ), some dedicated to the relations/applications of logic to other fields
(Logic and Music, Logic and Colour, Logic and Information, Logic and Fiction etc.),
some dedicated to some important logical theorems (Godels Incompleteness theorem,
Compactness theorem, Completeness theorem, Lindstroms theorem, etc.)
ASL1 student travel awards are available:
see http://www.aslonline.org/studenttravelawards.html.
For PhD students, postdoctoral students and young researchers interested in logic,
artificial intelligence, mathematics, philosophy, linguistics and related fields, this will
be a unique opportunity to get a solid background for their future researches.
The idea is to promote interaction between advanced students and researchers
through the combination of the school and the congress (participants of the School
are strongly encouraged to submit a paper for the Congress).

Association for Symbolic Logic

13

6 Tutorials
Opening Session: Why Study Logic?
This topic will be discussed by a variety of people in a round table animated by
J.-Y. Beziau, UFRJ1 & CNPq2 (Brazil) / Visiting Scholar of UCSD3 (USA), organizer
of the School of Universal Logic since 2005, with the participation of
Peter Arndt
Department of Mathematics, University of Regensburg, Germany
Jc Beall
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, USA
University of Tasmania, Australia
Patrick Blackburn
Department of Philosophy and Science Studies,
Centre for Culture and Identity, University of Roskilde, Denmark

L
owenheim-Skolem Theorem
Nate Ackerman
Department of Mathematics, Harvard University, USA
nate@math.harvard.edu

First Session: Downward L

owenheim-Skolem Theorem
Prove the Downward LS for 1st order logic theorem in a countable language via
Skolem functions.
Talk about Mostowski collapse.
Talk about Skolem paradox.
Prove theorem for infinite languages (using Skolem functions).
Introduce L, .
Show you need to take into account the size of the formula (i.e. even in countable
language there is a sentence of L, which only has sentences of size .
Use a downward LS for set theory to prove downward LS for sentences of L, .
1

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro

Brazilian National Council for Scientific and Technological Development
3
University of California in San Diego
2

15

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Show that in L + , there is a sentence with just equality which only has models of
size > . Also show there is a sentence which only has models of size cofinality >
(if > ).
Use downward LS for set theory to prove (a form of) downward LS theorem
for L, .
Define about absolute logics.
Give examples.
Use the same techniques to prove a downward LS theorem for any absolute logic.

Second Session: Upward L

owenheim-Skolem Theorem

Prove the upward LS theorem for 1st order logic using compactness.
Define the Hanf number of an abstract logic.
Show all (set sized) abstract logics have a Hanf number.
Show the Hanf number of omitting types is 1 .
Show the Hanf number of L1 , is1 .

Third Session: Downward L

owenheim-Skolem Theorem
First any spill over from the previous lecture.

Reflection principle in L.
Proof of GCH from the reflection principle.
Observe that LS doesnt hold without choice.
Show that it at least holds for Borel structures (i.e. if there is an infinite structure
there is a Borel one on R)
Chang conjecture.
Connection to large cardinals.
Bibliography: Forthcoming.

Logic and Politics

Franca DAgostini
Graduate School of Economic, Political and Social Sciences,
State University of Milan, Italy
Polytechnical School of Turin, Italy
franca.dagostini@polito.it
The tutorial includes a brief account of theories about the relations between logic
and politics, then three lectures devoted to practical cases, illustrating the use of nonclassical logics in political reasoning and public debate.
16

Tutorials

1. The relations between logic and politics: hypotheses and programs

2. Non-classical logics and politics:
Disagreements, gaps and gluts
Political pluralism and modal logics
Ideology as coherence without truth
Between politics and logics (like between politics and truth) there is traditional foreignness or even enmity. In realistic perspective, political life is alleged to be refractory
to logic and rationality, insofar as ruled by powers and interests. In normative political
theory, logic is alleged to be damage more than advantage for public life, for instance
because the compelling force of logical proofs may promote intolerant and contextinsensitive attitudes, so it is hardly adaptable to the needs of political pluralism.
And yet, one may also see that there is close connection between logic, strictly intended as formal theory of valid inference, and politics, especially democratic politics.
Democracy, in John S. Mills famous definition, is government by discussion, and
human discussions are also if not primarily ruled, for good or ill, by the formal validity
of arguments (I can hardly believe that p, if I believe that p q and q). So it is reasonable to admit that common citizens and politicians logical competence is one of the
basic features of healthy associated life. But which sort of logical competence? And in
which sense logic (as technique of formal validity) intersects politics in a significant way?
The adversaries of logic in political philosophy (see classically H. Arendt, J. Rawls,
J. Habermas) generally have a fairly restricted conception of logic: they conceive it as
study of classical forms as applied to mathematically-oriented ways of thinking. But
this is not all what logic is and can be (like the universal logic enterprise is intended
to show).
The importance of a certain kind of logic for politics is admitted by some theorists
of deliberative or direct democracy (see also the neo-Socratic approach to democracy
proposed by M. Nussbaum and A. Sen). But usually, the logic involved in these
perspectives is not the formal theory of validity, but informal logic, or theory of argumentation, or critical thinking. All these techniques and disciplines can be useful, but
only for a basic education of citizens in classical logic, and they do not seem to capture
the real intersection of politics and logic, in the effective practice of political reasoning
and arguing.
Some neo-structuralist thinkers (such as G. Deleuze or A. Badiou) have proposed
a vision of political facts also including formal considerations, and have tried to apply
some logical acquisitions (especially borrowed from structuralism) to a critical analysis
of political facts. But these accounts usually have poor or null relation to the contemporary acquisitions of philosophical logic in the analytical tradition.
The tutorial is based on the idea that what is needed for politics (and political
theory) is philosophical logic, in the current meaning of a series of logical inquiries con17

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

cerning paradoxes, non-classical conceptions of truth and validity, and the connections
between natural language and formal languages. As a matter of fact, it is not so difficult
to see that political reasoning, especially in democratic perspective, is most often ruled
(and should be ruled) by non-classical logics, and this can be seen in various ways, for
instance:
irreducible public conflicts usually involve under-determined or over- determined
cases, so paracomplete and paraconsistent conceptions of truth may help in dealing
with these sorts of conflicts;
normative disagreements are based on conceptions of how the world is and could
be, so logical awareness concerning modality e.g. possible-worlds semantics is
highly helpful in understanding rival normative pictures of facts, saving pluralism
while allowing truth-oriented confrontations;
ideology in classical Marxian account is a false system of beliefs that blocks
any attempt at modifying reality to meet justice, hence logical pluralism, to say a
ductile conception of validity (including classically deductive as well as Bayesian
and relevant validity), provides a good antidote to ideological blindness.
The three lectures of the tutorial will deal with these three topics. Moving from the
illustration of some particular cases, they will give attending people the preliminary
elements for reflecting on how new acquisitions of philosophical logic may reverse the
traditional judgement about the incompatibility, or enmity, or extraneousness, of logic
and politics. Last but not least, they are also intended to suggest that the consideration
of the real needs and occurrences of associated life can be heuristically useful for logical
researches.

Bibliography (preliminary suggestions):

1. F. DAgostini, Logic & Politics: A New Alliance, forthcoming.
2. H. Arendt, The Human Condition, University of Chicago, 1st edition in 1958, 1999.
3. J.C. Beall and B. van Fraassen, Possibilities and Paradoxes, Oxford University Press,
2003.
4. J.C. Beall and G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2006.
5. F. Berto, How to Sell a Contradiction: The Logic and Metaphysics of Inconsistency,
Kings College, 2007.
6. J. Burgess, Philosophical Logic, Princeton University Press, 2009.
7. C. Cellucci, Rethinking Logic, Springer, 2013.
18

Tutorials
8. D. Christensen and J. Lackey, editors of The Epistemology of Disagreement: New
Essays, Oxford University Press, 2013.
9. R.A. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale Nota Bene series, Yale University Press, 2000.
10. J.W. Garson, Modal Logic for Philosophers, Cambridge University Press, 2006.
11. R. Huckfeldt, P.E. Johnson and J. Sprague, Political Disagreement, Cambridge
University Press, 2004.
12. D. Jacquette, Logic and How It Gets that Way, Acumen, 2010.
13. S. Petrucciani, Democrazia, Einaudi, 2014.
14. G. Priest, An Introduction to Non-Classical Logics: From If to Is, Cambridge University Press, 1st edition in 2001, 2010.
15. S. Read, Thinking About Logic, Oxford University Press, 1st edition in 1994, 2010.
16. T. Williamson, Modal Logic as Metaphysics, Oxford University Press, 2013.

Logic and Information

Patrick Allo
Free University of Brussels, Belgium
patrick.allo@vub.ac.be
The tutorial consists of three parts.
A first part covers the contrast between, on the one hand, the naturalness of characterisations of logical consequence in terms of information-containment, and, on the other
hand, the perceived redundancy of informational notions in the formal characterisation
of logical consequence. As part of this discussion, we review the seminal characterisation
of semantic information due to Carnap & Bar-Hillel, Corcorans information-theoretic
characterisation, and informational interpretations of substructural logic.
A second part deals with the influence of the dynamic and interactive turn in logic on
how we perceive the relation between logic and information. In particular we consider
how a conception of information as a distributed commodity brings many informational
or communicative actions within the scope of logic.
In a third part we identify common themes in the study of logic and information,
explore new challenges for our thinking about logic and information that are inspired
by the philosophy of information and the philosophy of computation.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Bibliography:
1. Patrick Allo, Logical pluralism and semantic information, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 36(6), 2007, pp. 659694.
2. Patrick Allo and Edwin Mares, Informational semantics as a third alternative?,
Erkenntnis, vol. 77(2), 2012, pp. 167185.
3. Rudolf Carnap and Yehoshua Bar-Hillel, An Outline of a Theory of Semantic
Information, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 19, no. 3, 1954.
4. John Corcoran, Information-theoretic logic, in Truth in Perspective, edited
by C. Martnez, U. Rivas and L. Villegas-Forero, Ashgate Publishing, Aldershot,
England, 1998, pp. 113135.
5. Luciano Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, Oxford University Press, 2011.
6. Edwin Mares, Relevant logic and the theory of information, Synthese, vol. 109(3),
1997, pp. 345360.
7. Edwin Mares, The nature of information:
vol. 175(1), 2010, pp. 111132.

A relevant approach, Synthese,

8. Jose M. Saguillo, Methodological practice and complementary concepts of logical consequence: Tarskis model-theoretic consequence and Corcorans informationtheoretic consequence, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 30(1), 2009,
pp. 2148.
9. Johan van Benthem, Logical Dynamics of Information and Interaction, Cambridge
University Press, 2011.

Linstr
oms Theorem
Peter Arndt
Department of Mathematics, Regensburg University, Germany
peter.arndt@mathematik.uni-regensburg.de
These lectures present Lindstroms theorem, a seminal result in abstract model theory. Lindstroms theorem characterizes first-order predicate logic a maximally expressive language that has the compactness property and the Lowenheim-Skolem property.
Equivalently, the result shows that any attempt at increasing the expressive power of
first-order logic in any way, for example by adding second-order quantifiers, cardinality
quantifers, fixed point operators or infinitary connectives, must result in the loss of one
or both of two classical theorems about first-order logic: the compactness theorem, or
the Lowenheim-Skolem theorem.

20

Tutorials
This result has both conceptual and practical importance. Conceptually, Lindstroms theorem tells us something about what makes first-order logic special, what
is essential about first-order logic: the compactness result and the Lowenheim-Skolem
theorem are considered two of the most fundamental results in first-order model theory. Lindstroms theorem shows that they are, in a sense, the fundamental properties
of first-order logic: given some conditions on what counts as a logical system, these
properties single out first-order logic uniquely.
On the practical side, there are good reasons to extend the expressive power of firstorder logic: the inability of first-order logic to distinguish between infinite cardinalities
leads to Skolems paradox, i.e. although ZFC proves the existence of uncountable cardinals, its axioms are true (if consistent) in a countable universe. Also, the discovery
of non-standard models arithmetic casts some doubt on whether first-order logic is
suitable as a language for metamathematics. Lindstroms theorem tells us something
about our options here: it is not possible to remedy these issues without sacrificing
either compactness or the Lowenheim-Skolem property.
The main purpose of the lectures is to present the proof of Lindstroms theorem,
without presupposing familiarity with anything beyond a basic course in first-order
predicate logic. The basic concepts of abstract model theory will be introduced, and
the model theoretic concepts required for the proof (in particular the technique of backand-forth systems, or Ehrenfeucht-Frasse games) will be introduced. We will explain
the topological point of view on Lindstroms theorem and how it leads to variants
for logics without classical negation. If time permits, some additional Lindstrom-style
characterization theorems will be presented: a characterization of the infinitary logic
L due to Barwise, and two Lindstrom theorems for modal logic due to de Rijke and
van Benthem.
Bibliography:
1. J. Barwise, Axioms for abstract model theory, Annals of Mathematical Logic,
vol. 7, 1974, pp. 221265.
2. H.-D. Ebbinghaus, Extended logics: the general framework, in Model-Theoretic
Logics, edited by J. Barwise and S. Feferman, Perspectives in Mathematical Logic,
Springer, 1985.
3. J.v. Benthem, A new modal Lindstrom theorem, Logica Universalis, vol. 1, 2007,
pp. 125138.
4. J. Flum, Characterizing logics, in Model-Theoretic Logics, edited by J. Barwise
and S. Feferman, Perspectives in Mathematical Logic, Springer, 1985.
5. P. Lindstrom, On extensions of elementary logic, Theoria, vol. 35, 1969, pp. 111.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

6. B. Poizat, A Course in Model Theory, Springer, 2000.
7. M. de Rijke, A Lindstrom theorem for modal logic, in Modal Logic and Process
Algebra, edited by A. Ponse, M. de Rijke and Y. Venema, CSLI Publications, 1995,
pp. 217230.
8. X. Caicedo, Lindstroms theorem for positive logics, a topological view, in Logic
Without Borders: Essays on Set Theory, Model Theory, Philosophical Logic
and Philosophy of Mathematics, edited by Andres Villaveces, Roman Kossak,
Juha Kontinen and
Asa Hirvonen, De Gruyter, 2015, pp. 7390.

Logic and Language

Patrick Blackburn
Section of Philosophy and Science Studies,
Roskilde University, Denmark
patrickb@ruc.dk
How is meaning possible? What indeed is meaning? Whether we speak Danish,
Chinese, Maori, or English, we take for granted that we can express content and that
others can grasp it. But what are the mechanisms that lie behind this? What is their
structure? What must the world be like if language is to function as a way of communicating information? And the key question for this course what, if anything,
does logic have to do with any of this?
This course attempts to provide some answers. We will examine how logical representations can be built up compositionally (that is, how word meanings can be plugged
together Lego-style into logical representations for entire sentences) and how meanings
make inference possible. The interplay of grammar, logic and ontology (in particular,
the notion of event) will be emphasised. I will also discuss some basic ideas of what is
called dynamic semantics.
Much of the course covers semantics, or literal meaning. But that is only a part
and perhaps not the most important part of what meaning is. So I will also say
something about pragmatics, or how meaning arises when we actually use language.
And, needless to say, I will try to explain what logic has to do with pragmatic meaning.
The course is introductory. It is not intended for experts, but for novices, and I
will not presuppose any prior knowledge of linguistics. But in order to give even a
superficial overview of the topics just sketched, I will have to assume that attendees
have at least a basic familiarity with propositional and first-order logic. That is, I will
assume that I can write down basic expressions involving first-order quantifiers and the
familiar sentential connectives and expect course participants to read and understand
them.
22

Tutorials
I will give make more detailed reading suggestions during the course, and will be
make a detailed set of slides available to all course participants. In the meantime, here
are a four suggestions for background reading. You will get a lot more out of the course
if you read this material in advance.
Preparatory Readings
1. Discourse Representation Theory, by David Beaver and Bart Geurts, in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. I dont know a better introduction to Discourse
Representation Theory (DRT) than this. DRT was the original, and is probably
still the most best known, approach to dynamic semantics. Written by two leading
semanticists/pragmatists, this article maps out a lot of territory of relevant to this
course. Highly recommended.
2. Meaning and Representation in Natural Language: A First Course in Computational Semantics, by Patrick Blackburn and Johan Bos, CSLI Press, 2005. This
is the most relevant book to browse before the course starts. In particular, if you
are unsure of how much first-order logic you know, please check out Chapter 1.
And definitely look at Chapter 2. This presents the lambda calculus, perhaps the
basic technical tool used to define compositional semantics, and my first lecture
will echo the presentation given here. One important remark. This book not only
discusses the basic ideas of semantics, it also shows how to implement them (using
the programming language Prolog). You do not repeat not! need to read the
Prolog based material in this book. Indeed you do not repeat not! need any
programming expertise whatsoever to follow this course.
3. The Logical Form of Action Sentences, by Donald Davidson, in The Logic
of Decision and Action, University of Pittsburgh, 1967. Widely available. This
was not the first paper on events, but it was one of the most influential: all modern
treatments of the topic take it as its starting point. A (slightly dated) classic. Not
all of it is relevant to the course, but it has valuable lessons to teach about the role
of ontology in inference. Give it a go.
4. Logic and Conversation, by H.P. Grice, in Syntax and semantics 3: Speech arts,
Cole et al., 1975, pp. 4158. Another classic, and you can find it just about
anywhere. It provides the background reading for our discussion of pragmatics.
Essential.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

G
odels Incompleteness Theorems
Bernd Buldt
Department of Philosophy, Indiana University Purdue University,
Fort Wayne, USA
buldtb@ipfw.edu
The goal of this tutorial is to introduce, review, and discuss selected concepts
that play a key role in Godels two theorems on the incompleteness of consistent formal systems of arithmetic (= G1) and their inability to prove their own consistency
(= G2). Each lecture will fall into two parts. A first shorter part will briefly review the
traditional text book approach to Godels theorems and be accessible to everyone with
a modest background in logic. As such, these parts double as either a self-contained
introduction to or a refresher course in the incompleteness theorems and their proofs.
A subsequent second part of each lecture will then introduce and review more recent
and more advanced work pertinent to the lectures topic (as indicated by its title). As
such, the second part will require greater fluency in the language and the techniques of
mathematical logic.
Lecture 1: Diagonalization, self-reference, and paradox. We start out with Godels
proof for the fixed-point theorem and end with certain generalization in the framework
of category theory.
Lecture 2: Models: weak and non-standard. We start out with some basic modeltheoretic considerations of incompleteness and end with the role of cuts for proving G2.
Lecture 3: Provable closures and interpretability. We start out with the roles provable
closure under modus ponens and provable 1-completeness play for proving G2 and end
with the question of whether G2 should better be framed in terms of interpretability of
theories.
In the spirit of universal logic, some mention of non-classical alternatives will be
made throughout the lectures.
Bibliography:
Background readings (free internet resources only):
1. Peter Smith, Godel without (too many) tears.
2. Petr Hajek & Pavel Pudlak, Metamathematics of First-Order Arithmetic.
3. Per Lindstrom, Aspects of Incompleteness.
Tutorial readings (will be made available in June 2015):
http://users.ipfw.edu/buldtb/goedel/index.html.
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Tutorials

Logic, quantum theory and natural language

meaning (all in pictures)
Bob Coecke
Department of Computer Science, Oxford University, UK
coecke@cs.ox.ac.uk
We introduce the idea of a process theory, as developed in the textbook [1].
The mathematical underpinning is entirely diagrammatic, in fact, its category theory
in disguise, although accessible pretty much to anyone who has a brain. Conceptually,
it involves a logical stance that focusses on the interactions rather than on the description of the individual. Its successes so far are a high-level conceptual underpinning
for quantum theory [2, 1], as well a framework to reason about meaning in natural
language, solving the open problem on how to compute the meaning (not just true or
false!) of a sentence given the meaning of its words [3, 2, 4].
This course has no prerequisites except maybe a little bit of linear algebra and an
open mind, so in particular no background in quantum theory, nor category theory are
required. A Long version is annually given at Oxford University as a first course both
on diagrammatic reasoning and quantum computing.
After the course you will for example know what quantum teleportation, quantum
non-locality, and quantum algorithms are about. And also how powerful diagrammatic
reasoning is. You will also understand how meaning of words in natural language
becomes meaning of sentences.
Bibliography:
1. B. Coecke and A. Kissinger, Picturing Quantum Processes, Cambridge University
Press, 2015, 750 pp.
2. B. Coecke, The logic of quantum mechanics Take II, 2012, arXiv:1204.3458.
3. B. Coecke, M. Sadrzadeh and S. Clark, Mathematical foundations for a compositional distributional model of meaning, in Linguistic Analysis, vol. 36(14),
A Festschrift for Joachim Lambek, edited by van Bentham and Moortgat, 2011,
pp. 345384, arXiv:1003.4394.
4. M. Sadrzadeh, S. Clark and B. Coecke, The Frobenius anatomy of word meanings
I: subject and object relative pronouns, Journal of Logic and Computation, Special
Issue: The Incomputable, an Isaac Newton Institute Workshop, vol. 23(6), 2013,
pp. 12931317, arXiv:1404.5278.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Dugundjis Theorem
Marcelo Coniglio
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science,
Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences,
State University of Campinas, Brazil
coniglio@cle.unicamp.br
Newton Peron
, SC, Brazil
Federal University of South Frontier, Chapeco
J. Dugundjis Theorem for Modal Logic is perhaps less popular than his famous
result in Topology, but even so highly important. In 1940, Dugundji proves (see [6])
that no modal system between S1 and S5 can be characterized by a single finite logic
matrix. Rarely cited in manuals of logic, it was Dugundjis result that boosted the
development of new semantics for modal logic, such as R. Carnaps for S5 and S.
Kripkes for S2, S3 and S4.
The method used to arrive at such negative result is not original. As pointed out
by Dugundji himself, his result was inspired by a previous proof by K. Godel [8] on
a similar theorem concerning intuitionistic propositional logic IPC: Godel proved that
a wide family of logics encompassing IPC could not be characterized by finite logical
matrices.
Starting with Godel, passing through Dugundjis Theorem until arriving to paraconsistent logics, it will be shown that the results in [2, 3] support the thesis that,
indeed, a comparatively small number of logic systems can be characterized by finite
matrices (although there is an infinite number of many-valued logics). The first part
of the present tutorial intends to trace a continuous line between the seven decades
distancing these results.
Behind that line there exists, on the one hand, the attempt to generalize the semantics of finite matrices. By means of the notion of Nmatrices, it is possible to
(non-deterministically) associate to each formula of a given language a set of possible
truth-values, instead of a (deterministic) single truth-value. As proved in [1], Dugundjilike theorems even for Nmatrices persist for some systems of paraconsistent logics. In
more precise terms: there is a vast family of paraconsistent systems such that no one
of them can be semantically characterized by a single finite Nmatrix.
On the other hand, there have been attempts to generalize Dugundjis result in
order to encompass the enormous amount of modal systems that have arisen since the
publication of his theorem. Among them, it should be mentioned the results obtained
by [9, 7, 5, 4].
The last part of this tutorial will be devoted to analyzing such generalizations of
Dugundjis Theorem.
26

Tutorials
Bibliography:
1. Arnon Avron, Non-deterministic semantics for paraconsistent C-systems, in Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, Lecture Notes
in Computer Science Volume, vol. 3571, 2005, pp. 625-637.
2. Ayda I. Arruda, Remarques sur les syst`emes Cn , Comptes Rendus de l Academie
de Sciences de Paris, vol. 280(AB), 1975, pp. 12531256.
3. Walter Carnielli, Marcelo Coniglio and Joao Marcos, Logics of Formal Inconsistency, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, 2nd edition, edited by D. Gabbay
and F. Guenthner, vol. 14, 2007, pp. 15107.
4. Marcelo Coniglio e Newton Peron, Dugundjis Theorem Revisited, Logica Universalis, vol. 8(3-4), 2014, pp. 407422.
5. Alexander Chagrov and Michael Zakharyaschev, Modal Logic, Clarendon Press,
1997.
6. James Dugundji, Note on a property of matrices for Lewis and Langfords calculi
of propositions, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 5(4), 1940, pp. 150151.
7. L. Esakia and V. Meskhi, Five critical modal systems, Theoria, vol. 43(1), 1977,
pp. 5260.
8. Kurt Godel, On the intuitionistic propositional calculus, Klasse, vol. 32, Anzeiger
Akademie der Wissenschaften Wien, mathematisch-naturwiss, 1932, pp. 6566.
9. Schiller J. Scroggs, Extensions of the Lewis system S5, The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 16(2), 1951, pp. 112120.

Aristotles Logic
John Corcoran
Department of Philosophy,
State University of New York (at Buffalo), USA
corcoran@buffalo.edu
This tutorial on Aristotles logic begins with a treatment of his demonstrative logic,
the principal motivation for his interest in the field [4]. Demonstrative logic is the
study of demonstration as opposed to persuasion. It presupposes the Socratic knowledge/opinion distinction between knowledge (beliefs that are known) and opinion (beliefs that are not known) [1].
Demonstrative logic is the focal subject of Aristotles two-volume Analytics, as
stated in its first sentence [8]. Many of Aristotles examples are geometrical.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Every demonstration produces (or confirms) knowledge of (the truth of) its conclusion
for every person who comprehends the demonstration. Persuasion merely produces
opinion. Aristotle presented a general truth-and-consequence conception of demonstration meant to apply to all demonstrations.
According to this conception, a demonstration is an extended argumentation [7] that
begins with premises known to be truths and that involves a chain of reasoning showing by deductively evident steps that its conclusion is a consequence of its premises. In
short, a demonstration is a deduction whose premises are known to be true. For Aristotle, starting with premises known to be true, the knower demonstrates a conclusion by
deducing it from the premises. As Tarski emphasized, formal proof in the modern sense
results from refinement and formalization of traditional Aristotelian demonstration.
Aristotles general theory of demonstration required a prior general theory of deduction presented in Prior Analytics and embodied in his natural-deduction underlying
logics. His general immediate-deduction-chaining conception of deduction was meant
to apply to all deductions. According to this general conception, any deduction that
is not immediately evident is an extended argumentation that involves a chaining of
immediately evident steps that shows its final conclusion to follow logically from its
premises. His theory of deduction recognizes both direct and indirect reasoning, an
achievement not equaled before Jaskowskis 1934 masterpiece [6].
To illustrate his general theory of deduction, Aristotle presented an ingeniously simple and mathematically precise specialized system traditionally known as the categorical
syllogistic. With attention limited to propositions of the four so-called categorical forms,
he painstakingly worked out exactly what those immediately evident deductive steps
are and how they are chained. In his specialized theory, Aristotle explained how to
deduce from any given categorical premise set, no matter how large, any categorical
conclusion implied by the given set [10]. He did not extend this specialized treatment
in general to cover non-categorical deductions, for example, those involving equations
or proportionalities. Thus Aristotle set a program for future logicians, a program that
continues to be pursued and that may never be completed.
We will also treat several metatheorems about his basic systems and about various
extensions and subsystems. In particular, we show that one-one translation of Aristotles syllogistic into a certain fragment of modern Hilbertian many-sorted symbolic
logic yields a complete match in the following sense. In order for a conclusion to be a
consequence of given premises according to Aristotle it is necessary and sufficient for
the many-sorted translation of the conclusion to be a consequence of the many-sorted
translation of the premises according to Hilbert [5].
If time permits we will review the high points of the vast literature [2] responding to
the ground-breaking scholarship produced in the 1970s in Buffalo (NY) and Cambridge
(UK) [3, 9].
Time will be set aside for student interaction. Students are encouraged to send
questions in advance to the tutor. No prerequisites: knowledge of Greek and symbolic
logic will not be needed.
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Tutorials
Bibliography:
A list of publications of John Corcoran on Aristotle:
http://www.uni-log.org/im-tutorials2015/corcoran-aristotle.pdf.
1. John Corcoran and Idris Samawi Hamid, Investigating knowledge and opinion,
in The Road to Universal Logic, vol. 1, Studies in Universal Logic series, edited
by Arthur Buchsbaum and Arnold Koslow, Springer, 2015, pp. 95126.
2. John Corcoran, Essay-Review (2010) of translation and commentaries from Gisela
Striker of Prior Analytics: Book I, by Aristotle, Oxford University Press, 2009,
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2010, https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/24281-prior
-analytics-book-i.
3. John Corcoran, Aristotles Logic at the University of Buffalos Department of
Philosophy, Ideas y Valores: Revista Colombiana de Filosofa, vol. 140, 2009,
pp. 99117.
4. John Corcoran, Aristotles Demonstrative Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic,
vol. 30, 2009, pp. 120.
5. John Corcoran, Aristotles Many-sorted Logic, Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14,
2008, pp 155156.
6. John Corcoran, Aristotles Prior Analytics and Booles Laws of Thought, History
and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 24, 2003, pp. 261288.
7. John Corcoran, Argumentations and Logic, Argumentation, vol. 3, 1989,
pp. 1743.
8. Robin Smith, Aristotles Prior Analytics, Hackett Publishing, 1989.
9. Timothy Smiley, What is a Syllogism?, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 2,
1973, pp. 136154.
10. John Corcoran, Completeness of an ancient logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 37, 1972, pp. 696702.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

The Logic of Apuleius and Boethius

Manuel Correia Machuca
Pontifical Catholic University of Chile, Santiago, Chile
mcorreia@uc.cl
In this course we are going to focus on ancient logic, in particular the contributions
made by Apuleius (ca. 124170 AD) and Boethius (480524 AD) contributions to its
development. As to Apuleius, we shall study the treatise named Peri Hermeneias, which
has been attributed to him. As to Boethius, we discuss both treatises on categorical
logic (in relation to his double commentary on Aristotles De Interpretatione [5]) and
his treatise on hypothetical logic. As it is likely that Apuleius and Boethius are depending on some earlier authors some less known than them we are also introducing
those authors and their works (either they have survived or not) to recognize a history
of this textual tradition. Apuleius and categorical logic: Here we discuss the Apuleian
authenticity of the Peri Hermeneias treatise and its particular terminology. We define
its main characteristics from a logical viewpoint, and discuss the similarity between this
treatise and one written by Boethius (De syllogismo categorico). We resolve the issue
of a possible textual dependence between Boethius and Apuleius [9], by pointing out a
common exposition plan for categorical logic (proto-exposition of categorical logic).
Boethius and his categorical logic: Here we examine the logic of Boethius exposition
on categorical logic by integrating his twin treatises on categorical logic (De syllogismo
categorico and Introductio ad syllogismos categoricos) to his twin commentaries on Aristotles De Interpretatione [2]. We try to define Boethius modus operandi and sources
by discussing whether it is likely a textual guidance of Marius Victorinus, Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Galen, Porphyry, Proclus and Ammonius Hermeias. We discuss Shiels
hypothesis [7] that Boethius is taking his comments and explanations from a Greek
codex of Aristotles Organon heavy annotated in the margins. We also state the differences between De syllogismo categorico and Introductio ad syllogismo categorico by
adopting a critical view on Marenbon [4] and Thomsen Thornqvist [10, 11] that the
latter treatise was a second review of the former one. We discuss the possibility of a
categorical syllogistic with indefinite terms and whether Boethius could have had this
material for intending to write a further review on categorical syllogistic.
Boethius and hypothetical logic: we study the main contents of De hypotheticis
syllogismis [6] and whether they come from Stoic hypothetical logic. We defend the
Peripatetic origin of Boethius hypothetical logic by defining its particular Peripatetic
negation and semantic. We also discuss the unity of Aristotelian logic, once the hypothetical and categorical branches are accepted as originally Aristotelian, and we challenge Lukasiewiczs view that hypothetical logic is the logic of any other logical system
[3], by pointing out that hypothetical and categorical syllogistic share a common set of
axioms developed in [1].
Finally, we conclude by an overview of categorical and hypothetical Aristotelian
logic by showing both its doctrinal and formal unity.
30

Tutorials
Bibliography:
1. E. Alvarez and M. Correia, Syllogistic with indefinite terms, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 33, 2012, pp. 297306.
2. M. Correia, The syllogistic theory of Boethius, Ancient Philosophy, vol. 29, 2009,
pp. 391405.
3. J. Lukasiewicz, 1975: Zur Geschichte der Aussagenlogik, Erkenntnis, vol. 5, 1935,
pp. 111131. Spanish version: Jan Lukasiewicz, Para la historia de la logica
de proposiciones, in Estudios de Logica y Filosofa, Biblioteca de la Revista de
Occidente, Grefol S.L., Madrid, 1975, pp. 87108.
4. J. Marenbon, Boethius, Oxford University Press, 2003.
5. C. Meiser, editor, Anicii Manlii Severini Boetii Commentarii in Librum Aristotelis
PERI ERMHNEIAS, 1st and 2nd editions, Leipzig, Germany, 18771880.
6. L. Obertello, translation and commentaries, Severino Boezio De hypotheticis
syllogismis, Paideia Editrice, Brescia, Italy, 1969.
7. J. Shiel, Boethius Commentaries on Aristotle, edited by R. Sorabji, 1990,
pp. 349372. Also in Medieval and Renaissance Studies, vol. 4, 1958, pp. 217244.
8. R. Sorabji, Aristotle Transformed. The Ancient Commentators and their Influence,
Duckworth, London, 1990.
9. M. Sullivan, Apuleian Logic. The Nature, Sources and Influence of Apuleiuss Peri
Hermeneias, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1967.
10. C. Thomsen Thornqvist, Anicii Manlii Seuerini Boethii De syllogismo categorico,
a critical edition with introduction, translation, notes and indexes, A Studia Graeca
et Latina Gothoburgensia LXVIII, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, University
of Gothenburg, Sweden, 2008.
11. C. Thomsen Thornqvist, Anicii Manlii Severini Boethii Introductio ad syllogismos
categoricos, a critical edition with introduction, commentary and indexes, Studia
Graeca et Latina Gothoburgensia LXIX, Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, University of Gothenburg, Sweden, 2008.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Logic and Existence (Existence Predicates in Logic)

lez
Luis Estrada-Gonza
Institute for Philosophical Research,
National Autonomous University of Mexico
loisayaxsegrob@filosoficas.unam.mx
Giovanni Mion

Department of Philosophy, Istanbul

Technical University, Turkey
The tutorial is divided into three sections:
In the first section, we first recapitulate the steps that led to an existential interpretation of the particular quantifier. Then, we critically evaluate some of Priest/Bertos
arguments against such an interpretation. Finally, we also engage some of their philosophical arguments in favor of the introduction of an existence predicate.
In the second session of the tutorial we present some standard examples of logics with
existence predicates, viz. the three major families of free logics anegative, neuter and
positive. We also study the dialogical approach, that provides a very general framework to reformulate those logics and according to which their existence predicates are
entirely dispensable and gives a new perspective on the issue of ontological commitment.
In the third session we present another family of examples of logics, which come
principally from mathematics and specifically from category theory, in which existence
predicates are seemingly needed or, at least, provide the most natural and convenient
treatment of certain issues. We extend the dialogical approach of the second session to
cover those logics.
Bibliography:
Session 1:
1. Franz Berto, Existence as a Real Property: The Ontology of Meinongianism, Springer,
2012.
2. Franz Berto, There is an Is in There is: Meinongian quantification and existence, in Quantifiers, Quantifiers, Quantifiers, edited by Alessandro Torza, Springer,
forthcoming.
3. Michael J. Dunn, Is existence a (relevant) predicate?, Philosophical Topics, vol. 24,
1996, pp. 134.
4. David Lewis, Noneism or allism?, Mind, vol. 99, 1990, pp. 2331.
5. Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being, Oxford University Press, 2005.
32

Tutorials
6. Graham Priest, The closing of the mind: How the particular quantifier became existentially loaded behind our backs, The Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 1,
pp. 4255.
Session 2:
1. Matthieu Fontaine and Juan Redmond, To be is to be chosen: A dialogical understanding of ontological commitment, in Logic of Knowledge. Theory and Applications, edited by Cristina Bares, Sebastien Magniez and Francisco Salguero, College
Publications, London, 2012.
2. John Nolt, Free logics, in Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, vol. 5: Philosophy of Logic, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 10231060.
3. Shahid Rahman and Laurent Keif, On how to be a dialogician, in Logic, Thought
and Action, edited by D. Vanderveken, Springer, pp. 359408, 2004.
4. Shahid Rahman and Tero Tulenheimo, From games to dialogues and back: towards
a general frame for validity, in Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy,
edited by Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Tero Tulenheimo, Springer,
pp. 153208, 2006.
Session 3:
1. Jon Barwise and John Etchemendy, Language, Proof and Logic, CSLI Publications/Seven Bridges Press, 1999.
2. Matthieu Fontaine and Juan Redmond, To be is to be chosen: A dialogical understanding of ontological commitment, in em Logic of Knowledge. Theory and
Applications, edited by Cristina Bares, Sebastien Magniez and Francisco Salguero,
College Publications, 2012.
3. Robert Goldblatt, Topoi: The Categorial Analysis of Logic, revised edition, North
Holland, 1984.
4. Joachim Lambek and Philip J. Scott, Introduction to High Order Categorical Logic,
Cambridge University Press, 1986.
5. Shahid Rahman and Laurent Keif, On how to be a dialogician, in Logic, Thought
and Action, edited by D. Vanderveken, Springer, pp. 359408, 2004.
6. Shahid Rahman and Tero Tulenheimo, From games to dialogues and back: towards
a general frame for validity, in Games: Unifying Logic, Language, and Philosophy,
edited by Ondrej Majer, Ahti-Veikko Pietarinen and Tero Tulenheimo, Springer,
pp. 153208, 2006.
7. Dana Scott, Identity and existence in intuitionistic logic, Applications of Sheaves,
Springer Lectures Notes, vol. 753, 1979, pp. 660696.
33

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Logic and Nonsense

Thomas Ferguson
Department of Philosophy, City University of New York, USA
It is the basic idea of [Bertrand Russells] theory that the division of linguistic
expressions into true and false is not sufficient, that a third category must be introduced
which includes meaningless expressions. It seems to me that this is one of the deepest
and soundest discoveries of modern logic. (Hans Reichenbach, Bertrand Russells
Logic)
Overview: During the early 20th century, the problem of nonsense arose in a
number of contexts. For example, Bertrand Russell solved the paradoxical sentences of
naive class theory by dismissing them as meaningless, while positivists like Carl Hempel
made similar assertions concerning any statements not empirically verifiable. Granted
the existence of grammatical-yet-meaningless sentences, the question how a theory of
deduction should approach such sentences becomes important. It is arguable that the
classical Frege-Russell account of logic is ill-equipped to deal with such sentences. For
example, there is a case to be made that such sentences are neither true nor false; should
such sentences be grammatical while not possessing a truth value, then the semantics
of classical logic cannot account for such sentences.
A number of responses to apparently nonsensical sentences within the bounds of
classical logic have been proposed. Some like Rudolph Carnap have diagnosed all
such sentences as artifacts of an incorrectly constructed language, suggesting that a
category mistake such as Socrates is an even number would ever enter into a logically perfect language. Others such as Willard Van Orman Quine suggested
that while such sentences are grammatical, classical logic is equipped to handle them
by either treating them as dont cares by assigning them truth values arbitrarily, or
by uniformly assigning such sentences the value of falsehood. Each camp asserts that
no revision of logic is necessitated, on the one hand by diagnosing nonsensical sentences
as ill-formed and on the other by diagnosing these statements as irrelevant.
But just as many have argued that the existence of nonsensical sentences indeed
demands a revision of the classical principles of inference, suggesting that a logic of
nonsense provides a natural solution to many of the problems of early 20th century
analytic philosophy. It is against this backdrop that logicians such as Dmitri Bochvar
and Soren Hallden developed their programs of nonsense logics. Such programs aim
to clear up the relationship between deduction and nonsense by examining how logic
must be adapted in order to provide a theory of inference that acknowledges nonsensical
sentences. Once the need for such a project is conceded, a new host of philosophical
questions arise with respect to how to implement such a program: How should an
34

Tutorials
operator x is nonsense behave? What should the appropriate generalization of semantic consequence? Is the negation of a nonsensical statement itself nonsensical? It
is questions such as these that distinguish the major systems of nonsense logic, such as
Bochvars and Halldens C.
The aim of this tutorial is first to acquaint attendees with the primary philosophical
problems giving rise to problems of logic and nonsense and the debates concerning
their resolution. Then, we will introduce the most well-known logics of nonsense at
the propositional level while examining the philosophical positions that motivate their
definitions. Finally, we will review functional and first-order extensions of such systems,
placing an emphasis on the relationship between Russells theory of types and the
theories of predication posited by the proponents of nonsense logics.
Philosophical Topics Concerning Nonsense: We will discuss a number of the
philosophical concerns that underlie the worry about the relationship between logic
and nonsense. Emphasis will be placed on Russells comments on meaninglessness in
the Principia Mathematica and on the empiricist theories of meaning forwarded by the
logical positivists, as well as their respective resolutions to the apparent problem of
grammatical-yet-nonsensical sentences. We will then proceed to examine the question
of whether a revision of classical, bivalent logic is necessitated in light of such concerns.
Propositional Nonsense Logics: Assuming that a revisions of classical logic is
needed in light of nonsensical sentences, we will first examine the philosophical matters
that arise when formalizing logics of nonsense at the propositional level. We will discuss
the philosophical differences between distinct schools of nonsense logic with respect to
challenges such as how to define semantic consequence in this context and how to
generalize the propositional connectives of the Principia Mathematica. One the basis
of these distinctions, we will first discuss the primary propositional logics of nonsense,
i.e., Bochvars logic and Halldens C, drawing on their commentators. Finally, we
will consider some of the alternative accounts of logics of nonsense offered by Bochvar
and Halldens successors.
First-Order Nonsense Logics: Many of the philosophical considerations with
respect to nonsense lead naturally to questions concerning predicates, e.g. the notion of
a category mistake is precisely the suggestion that some properties do not meaningfully
apply to objects of certain types. In this session, we will review some of the accounts of
predication and quantification formalized first order logics of nonsense. We will discuss
Russells theory of types to provide some of the formal apparatus, before discussing
the particular theses of Hallden, Goddard and Routley on the matter of predicates and
properties in logics of nonsense.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Bibliography:
1. L.
Aqvist, Reflections on the logic of nonsense, Theoria, vol. 28(2), 1962, pp. 138
157.
2. A. Ayer, editor, Logical Positivism, The Free Press, New York, 1959.
3. D. Bochvar, On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis
of contradictions, Matematicheskii Sbornik, vol. 4(2), 1938, pp. 287308.
4. D. Bochvar, On a three-valued logical calculus and its application to the analysis of
the paradoxes of the classical extended functional calculus, History and Philosophy
of Logic, vol. 2(1
a 2), translated by M. Bergmann, 1981, pp. 87112.

5. L. Goddard an R. Routley, The Logic of Significance and Context, volume 1, Scottish

Academic Press, Edinburgh, 1973.
6. K. HaLkowska, A note on matrices for systems of nonsense-logics, Studia Logica,
vol. 48(4), 1989, pp. 461464.
7. S. Hallden, The Logic of Nonsense, Lundequista Bokhandeln, Lund, Sweden, 1949.
8. K. Pirog-Rzepecka, Systemy Nonsense-Logics, PWN, Warsaw, Poland, 1977.
9. W.V.O. Quine, Word and Object, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press,
Cambridge, MA, USA, 1960.
10. K. Segerberg, A contribution to nonsense-logics, Theoria, vol. 31(3), 1965, pp. 199
217.
11. P. Woodruff, On constructive nonsense logic, in Modality, Morality and Other
Problems of Sense and Nonsense , edited by S. Hallden, GWK Gleerup Bokforlag,
Lund, Sweden, 1973, pp. 192205.

36

Tutorials

Hegels Logic
Elena Ficara
Department of Philosophy, University of Paderborn, Germany
elena.ficara@upb.de
The tutorial is an introduction to Hegels logic from the point of view of the history
and philosophy of logic.
The first part is about the meaning of Hegelian dialectic within the history of logic,
and focuses on Hegels own reflections on the relation between his dialectical logic to
Aristotles, Leibnizs and Kants logic.
The second is devoted to the role of Hegels logic within the philosophy of logic,
considering Hegels view on some basic concepts such as logic, truth and validity.
The third focuses on the strictly formal import of Hegels logic, briefly presenting
the main attempts at formalizing Hegels dialectic, and examining the behaviour of
dialectical negation, conjunction and contradiction from a paraconsistent point of view.
First Session: Hegel within the History of Logic.
Second Session: Hegel Within the Philosophy of Logic.
Third Session: Formalizing Hegel.
Bibliography:
1. Jc Beall and E. Ficara, Hegelian Conjunction, Hegelian Contradiction, presented
for publication in Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy, to appear.
2. F. Berto, Hegels dialectics as a semantic theory. An analytic reading, European
Journal of Philosophy, vol. 15(1), 2007, pp. 1939.
3. F. DAgostini, Hegels interpretation of Megarian paradoxes. Between logic and
metaphilosophy, in Die Begr
undung der Philosophie im Deutschen Idealismus,
edited by E. Ficara, Konigshausen & Neumann, W
urzburg, Germany, 2011,
pp. 121140.
4. E. Ficara, Dialectic and Dialetheism, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 34,
2013, pp. 3552.
5. E. Ficara, Hegels Glutty Negation, to appear in History and Philosophy of Logic.
37

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

6. S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1978.
7. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, English translation
by E.S. Haldane and F.H. Simson, Kegan Paul, London, 1896.
8. G.W.F. Hegel, Science of Logic, English translation by A.V. Miller, Humanity
Books, New York, 1969.
9. D. Jaquette, editor, Philosophy of Logic, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2007.
10. W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of logic, Oxford University Press,
1967.
11. D. Marconi, editor, La formalizzazione della dialettica. Hegel, Marx e la logica
contemporanea, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1979.
12. A. Nuzzo, La logica, in Hegel, Laterza, Roma-Bari, edited by C. Cesa, 1997,
pp. 3982.
13. G. Priest, Dialectic and Dialetheic, Science and Society, vol. 53,1989,
pp. 388415.
14. G. Priest, What not? A defence of a dialetheic account of negation, in What
is Negation?, edited by D. Gabbay and H. Wansing, Kluwer Academic Publishers,
Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1999, pp. 101120.
15. S. Read, Thinking about Logic, Oxford University Press, 1995.

Lindenbaum Maximalization Theorem

Gazzari
Rene
bingen, Germany
Department of Computer Science, University of Tu
1
Department of Philosophy, PUC-Rio , Brazil
rene.gazzari@uni-tuebingen.de
Lindenbaums Theorem plays a small, but essential role within the canonical proof
of the Completeness Theorem in logic: Lindenbaums Theorem provides maximal consistent extensions of consistent theories and allows, due to the maximality of those
extensions, the construction of models.
Usually, Lindenbaums Theorem is proved by an application of a set-theoretical
theorem, as the Axiom of Choice or Zorns Lemma. Thereby, Lindenbaums Theorem
is a non-constructive method for obtaining special logically relevant objects, similarly
to theorems of other disciplines of mathematics such as, for example, Hahn-Banach
Theorem in functional analysis, Krulls Theorem in ring theory et cetera.
1

Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro

38

Tutorials
First Session
In the first session, we follow Tarskis abstract approach to logic and introduce deductive systems and consequence operations. In this context, we are able to present the
original version of Lindenbaums Theorem (provable in set theory without the Axiom
of Choice).
Due to the abstract approach, we find a great number of versions of this theorem:
within logic we find versions of Lindenbaums Theorem of different logical strength
related to specific kinds of logic (as, for example, propositional logic, classical logic or
intuitionistic logic). But we also can identify versions of Lindenbaums Theorem with
respect to non-standard interpretation of deductive systems.
In this tutorial we are especially interested in some special versions of Lindenbaums
Theorem, formulated in the abstract context of (slightly generalised) deductive systems,
all equivalent to the Axiom of Choice. By these equivalences we have an indirect prove
(via the axiom of choice) that the special versions are all equivalent among each other.
Second Session
In the second session, we investigate a problem raised by Miller. He demands to
re-prove the equivalence of the special versions of Lindenbaums Theorem, but allows
only proofs without an application of the Axiom of Choice.
We discuss the standard set-theoretical approach of Miller and Gazzari to this mathematical problem and provide some partial solutions based on special constructions of
deductive systems. From a mathematical point of view, those partial solutions are
unproblematic.
But from a more philosophical perspective, we observe a problem: having only an
informal description of our restrictions on proofs it is not clear, whether those solutions satisfy our own demand for avoiding the Axiom of Choice or not. There are
crucial philosophical questions, which need some (formal) clarification in order to get
an adequate criterion for our problem. In particular:

What does it mean to avoid an axiom in a proof?

What does it mean to avoid a detour in a proof?

Which formulae qualify to be a version of Lindenbaums Theorem?

We sketch our ideas towards a formal criterion for our demands under the light of
the philosophical problems and discuss the relationship of this criterion to pure, direct
or simple proofs.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Third Session
In the third session, we discuss a proof-theoretical approach to find a proof of the
equivalence of the special versions of Lindenbaums Theorem such that the Axiom of
Choice is not applied.
We investigate composed proofs of the desired equivalence, which first prove a variant of the Axiom of Choice out of a special version of Lindenbaums Theorem before
inferring another version of Lindenbaums Theorem. Clearly, such proofs do not satisfy
our demands.
But analysing the normalisation of proofs, we will argue that the normal form of
the composed proof has changed relevant properties. Our claim is that this resulting
proof satisfies any adequate formalisation of our intuitive demands with respect to the
application of the Axiom of Choice.

Bibliography:
1. R. Gazzari, Direct Proofs of Lindenbaum Conditionals, Logica Universalis, vol. 8,
2014, pp. 321343.
2. D.W. Miller, Some Lindenbaum Theorems Equivalent to the Axiom of Choice,
Logica Universalis, vol. 1, 2007, pp. 183199.
3. A. Tarski, Fundamental Concepts of the Methodology of the Deductive Sciences,
in Logic, Semantic, Metamathematics, by A. Tarski, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK,
1956, pp. 60109.
4. A. Tarski, Foundations of the Calculus of Systems, in Logic, Semantic, Metamathematics, by A. Tarski, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 1956, pp. 342-343.

40

Tutorials

Jain Logic
le
`ne Gorisse
Marie-He
Ghent Center for Buddhist Studies, University of Ghent, Belgium
mhgorisse@gmail.com
The field of investigation traditionally referred to as Indian logic lies at the junction between theories of knowledge, theories of argumentation and theories of meaning.
It consists of the study of persuasive reasoning as a reliable source of knowledge.
In classical India, logicians from different schools, especially Buddhist, Naiyayika (of
Hindu obedience) and Jain logicians, built a common area of discussions within which
an agreement on philosophical issues could be achieved. The 11th century CE can be
seen as the final stage of a period rich in such debates, period in which a pan-Indian
inter-doctrinal consensus on what counts as a canonical presentation of a satisfactory
justification was achieved.
But whereas Buddhist and Naiyayikas conceptions are well known, Jain theses have
a marginal position in this general picture of classical Indian philosophies. However,
Jainism is an ancient religion and a broad philosophical system whose specificity mainly
pertains both to the way it takes into account the context of an assertion and to its
interest for more formal issues, especially the structure of an assertion and its impact
on truth values. This double specialty makes it worth studying from a contemporary
perspective:
First, it is worth confronting Jain classical philosophy, in which the concrete argumentative situation serves as a basis for the semantic notions at stake, with the
actual developments in the field of the semantic-pragmatic interface. More precisely,
Jain philosophers give sets of rules of application of words (theory of angles of analysis,
niks.epavada) and of sentences (theory of viewpoints, nayavada) in given argumentative
contexts. Moreover, they give sets of maxims that one has to take into consideration
when the disputants in a debate cannot agree on ontology. And finally, their theory
of modes of predication (saptabhang
) can be seen as the exhaustive list of types of
end-states a process of ideal deliberation might have.
Second, it is worth confronting the Jain conception of logic in terms of interaction
between agents with the actual discussions concerning the links between logic and proof
in science, because Jain logic can be seen as an example of an original treatment of
these links, since Jain philosophers focus on the procedural aspect of inference. In this
dynamic, logic is conceived in terms of interaction between agents and is more adapted
to empirical situations.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Session 1: Introduction to Jain theory of inference.
Session 2: Introduction to the theory of viewpoints, a set of guidelines for construing an adequate representation of the meaning of a uttered sentence that is especially
concerned with the way to deal with existential presuppositions.
Session 3: Case-study of a debate between Jain and Hindu logicians, and comparison with a similar one between Buddhist and Hindu logicians.
Primary Literature:
1. Dharmakrtis Praman.avarttikasvopaj
navr.tti, in Introduction to Dharmakirtis
theory of inference, by R.P. Hayes and B.S. Gillon, Journal of Indian Philosophy,
vol. 19, Kluwer, 1991, pp. 173.
2. Gun.aratnas Tarkarahasyadpika, in Jain arguments against Nyaya theism.
svarotthapaka section of Gun.aratnas Tarkarahasyadpika ,
A translation of the I
by F. Van Den Bossche, Journal of Indian philosophy, vol. 26, Kluwer, 1998,
pp. 126.
3. Man.ikyanandis Parks.amukham, in The sacred book of the Jaina, vol. 11,
by S.C. Parks.amukham Goshal, Today and tomorrows printers and publishers,
Delhi, 1990.
svarasadhanad
4. Ratnakrtis I
u.san.am, in Against a a Hindu God, by P.G. Patil,
Columbia University Press, 2009.
5. Siddhasena Divakaras Nyayavatara, Jaina epistemology in historical and comparative perspective, by P. Balcerowicz, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2008.
6. Vadi Devas
uris Praman.anayatattvalokalam
. kara, in Praman.anayatattvalokalam
. kara,
by H.S. Bhattacharya, Jain Sahitya Vikas Mandal, Bombay, 1967.
Secondary Literature:
1. N. Clerbout, M.-H. Gorisse and S. Rahman, Context-sensitivity in Jain Strategic
Dialogues: A Dialogical Study of Siddhars.igan.is Commentary on the Handbook
of Logic, in Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 40(5), edited by S. Sarrukai,
Springer, 2011, pp. 633662.
2. P. Fl
ugel, Power and Insight in Jaina Discourse, in Logic and Belief in Indian
Philosophy, Warsaw Indological Studies, vol. 3, edited by P. Balcerowicz, Motilal
Banarsidas, 2010, pp. 85217.
3. J. Ganeri, Indian Logic, in Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 1: Greek,
Indian and Arabic Logic, edited by D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods, Elsevier, 2004,
pp. 309395.
4. G. Priest, Jaina logic: a contemporary perspective, in History and Philosophy
of Logic, vol. 29(3), Taylor and Francis, 2008, pp. 263278.
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Tutorials

Ontological and Epistemological Distinction of Sufi

Logical Stand with Comparison to Buddhist Logic
as Traditional Dichotomy of Logic

lu
Ismail
Latif Hacnebiog
Istanbul University
hacinebioglu@yahoo.com
There are two main methodological ways in classical Islamic thought in relation
to develop argumentation. One is fiqh which is sacred text based reasoning for more
of developing logical arguments for belief and action. The other is falsafa, which is
to develop arguments in a more ontological and epistemological emphasis. In this context Sufi tradition which is called tasawwuf has a special case between two of them.
In application of logic, a Sufi is bound by fiqh, while his ontological preferences philosophically differs to judge any concept and justification. Argumentatively, Sufi logical
stand in comparison with Buddhist logic as ontological critics of concepts and justifications became a distinct approach to develop especially informal argumentations.

An Introduction to Stoic Logic

Katerina Ierodiakonou
Department of History and Philosophy of Sciences,
University of Athens, Greece
Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland
ierokaterina@phs.uoa.gr
The view expressed in the nineteenth century about Stoic logic, namely that it either
copies Aristotles syllogistic or develops it in a vacuous and pedantic way, was accepted
unanimously both in the histories of ancient philosophy and in the works focusing on
the history of logic. From the early decades of the twentieth century on, however, given
the important advances in the field of formal logic, it has finally become obvious that
the Stoic logical system differed essentially from the Aristotelian and should be studied
on its own merits. Indeed, the first reactions to the negative appraisal of Stoic logic
came mainly from logicians, who were interested in the development of ancient logic and
noticed the similarities between Stoic and propositional logic. The articles and books
on the Stoics contribution to logic published since then, have managed to reconstruct
in detail the Stoic logical calculus and to show its significance in the history of ancient
logic.
These tutorials are an introduction to Stoic logic. My aim is to present the context
from which Stoic logic emerged, to give as clearly as possible its basic features, and to
assess its importance by comparing it to the Aristotelian syllogistic. No knowledge of
ancient Greek is assumed.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Session 1: The background of Stoic logic.

Session 2: The Stoic logical system.

Session 3: Stoic vs. Aristotelian syllogistic.

Bibliography:
1. J. Barnes, Aristotle and Stoic logic, in Topics in Stoic Philosophy, edited
by K. Ierodiakonou, Oxford University Press, 1999, pp. 2353.
2. S. Bobzien, The Stoics on hypotheses and hypothetical arguments, Phronesis,
vol. 42, 1997, pp. 299312.
3. S. Bobzien, Logic, in The Cambridge Companion to the Stoics, edited
by B. Inwood, Cambridge University Press, 2003, pp. 85123.
4. M. Frede, Stoic vs. Aristotelian syllogistic, Archiv f
ur Geschichte der Philosophie,
vol. 56, 1974, pp. 132.
5. K. Ierodiakonou, Stoic logic, in A Companion to Ancient Philosophy, Series Blackwell Companions to Philosophy, edited by M.L. Gill and P. Pellegrin, Blackwell
Publishing, 2006, pp. 505529.
6. J. Lukasiewicz, Z historii logiki zda
n, Przeglad
Filozoficzny, vol. 37, 1934,
,
pp. 417437. English translation: On the history of the logic of propositions,
in Polish Logic 19201939, edited by S. McCall, Oxford University Press, 1967,
pp. 6687.
7. B. Mates, Stoic Logic, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1953.

Cut-Eliminations Theorem
Andrzej Indrzejczak
d
Department of Logic, University of Lo
z, Poland
indrzej@filozof.uni.lodz.pl
Cut-elimination Theorem (CET) is one of the most important results of modern
proof theory established in the framework of Sequent Calculi (SC). Gerhard Gentzen
introduced SC for Intuitionistic and Classical Logic in his groundbreaking paper from
1934 devoted to Natural Deduction (ND). Although SC was treated originally as a technical tool for investigations on the properties of ND-proofs soon it became of interest
in its own, for researchers in proof theory. Since then many variants of SC were devised
suitable for dealing with various non-classical logics and formal theories. Also a lot of
generalized versions of SC were provided like Display Calculi, Hypersequent Calculi,
44

Tutorials
Many-sided Sequent Calculi. SC was also influential in the field of investigation on
automated proof search leading to invention of early forms of Tableau Calculi.
The rule of Cut is in a sense essential for any SC; Gentzen needed it for showing equivalence of SC with Axiomatic Calculi, namely for simulation of applications of
Modus Ponens. This is not all - depending on the interpretation of sequents, Cut rule
may be seen as expressing transitivity of consequence relation induced by SC, or as
encoding the process of using lemmata in proof construction, or even as expressing the
principle of bivalence. On the other hand it is welcome not to have it as a primitive rule
of SC. Gentzen was well aware of the importance of CET and used it for showing the
existence of normal ND-proofs, consistency and decidability of Propositional Intuitionistic and Classical Logic. The list of important consequences of CET may be enlarged
with many technical (e.g. automated deduction, interpolation) and philosophical (e.g.
analytic proofs, proof-theoretical semantics).
Despite the variety of applications of CET, the methods of proving it are also of
interest. The original Gentzens proof is brilliant yet quite complicated. Since then a
lot of other proof methods for CET were proposed. One can divide them roughly into
indirect (semantic) and direct (constructive) proofs. The former show how to obtain
cut-free proofs just from the beginning, whereas the latter are based on syntactical
transformations of proofs either of local (e.g. Dragalin, Schutte) or of global character
(e.g. Curry, Buss). Some of the methods were suitably abstracted and generalized in
order to apply them in the framework of nonstandard variants of SC, and for many
non-classical logics.
The tutorial is rather self-contained but familiarity with standard results of mathematical and philosophical logic may help. It is divided into three parts:
1. We briefly present a history of SC, the main variants of this kind of deduction
system, and relations of SC to other systems. We explain the importance of CET
and state a number of preliminary results concerning properties of rules of SC.
2. We focus on the methods of proving CET and discuss the differences as well as the
scope of applications of them.
3. We take a look at some generalizations of SC and related forms of CET.
Bibliography:
1. H. Curry, Foundations of Mathematical Logic, McGraw-Hill, New York 1963.
2. G. Gentzen, Untersuchungen u
ber das Logische Schliessen, I and II, Mathematische Zeitschrift, vol. 39(1), 1935, pp. 176210, pp. 405431.
3. S.C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1952.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

4. S. Negri and J. von Plato, Structural Proof Theory, Cambridge University Press,
2001.
5. K. Sch
utte, Proof Theory, Springer, 1977.
6. G. Takeuti, Proof Theory, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1987.
7. A. Troelstra and H. Schwichtenberg, Basic Proof Theory, Cambridge University
Press, 1996.

Husserls Conception of Logic

Manuel Gustavo Isaac
Department of Philosophy, University Denis Diderot, Paris 7,
Laboratory HTL1 (UMR2 -CNRS3 7597), France
isaac.manuelgustavo@gmail.com
Although the logico-mathematical background of phenomenology belongs nowadays
to common knowledge about history of early analytic philosophy, the scope of Husserls
solutions to epistemic and epistemological questions raised by the use of symbols in
formal systems remains largely to be exploited. At this point, his concept of pure logic
developed at the turn of the 20th century is of the greatest significance. Its structuring
will be the subject of the tutorial.
The structuring of pure logic is conceived by Husserl as to handle the requirement of an epistemic and epistemological justification of the formal logic that grounds
(via axiomatization) the contents of knowledge (objective, ideal, symbolically given)
of mathematics. In the Prolegomena (1900), it is stratified on three levels: on one
hand, the inferior level of categorical morphologies, on the other hand, the superior
level of formal logic subdivided into the theoretical level of objectively valid theories
(grounded in the categories and laws of categorical connections of the inferior level)
and the meta-theoretical level of ultimate logico-categorical generality (conceived as
the science of all theories of the theoretical level); and those three levels are then split
transversally into two planes, the one of syntax (or apophantics), the other of semantics (or ontology). The purpose of this tutorial is to provide a formal systematic
reconstruction of that structuring of pure logic by putting it into the perspective of
the semiotics of the Logical Investigations (1901) combining thereby Husserls philosophical work on mathematical logic with the phenomenological theme of intentionality.
1

Laboratoire dHistoire des Theories Linguistiques

Unite Mixte de Recherche
3
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
2

46

Tutorials
After a historical introduction contextualizing the evolution of Husserls philosophicomathematical investigations, the tutorial will run on three sessions:
S1. The Level of Formal Logic. Systems of axioms and formal manifolds; The
problem of imaginary in mathematics and the question of the expansion of axioms
systems; The notions of definiteness and completeness.
S2. The Level of Categorical Morphologies. The pure morphology of significations and the theory of parts and wholes; Morphologies as theoretical systems; An
epistemic-epistemological foundation of formal logic.
S3. The Structuring of Pure Logic. Stratification and components of pure logic;
The internal linkages of pure logic; From a semiotic point of view.
Edmond Husserls Corpus:
(1891). Philosophie der Arithmetik. Psychologische und logische Untersuchungen.
Halle: Stricker.
(1900). Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. I: Prolegomena zur reinen Logik. Halle:
Niemeyer.
(1901). Logische Untersuchungen. Untersuchungen zur Phanomenologie und Theorie der Erkenntnis. I-VI. Logische Untersuchungen. Vol. II. Halle: Niemeyer.
(1970). Philosophie der Arithmetik. Mit erganzenden Texten (18901901). Edited
by Lothar Eley. Husserliana 12. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
(1979). Aufsatze und Rezensionen (18901910). Edited by Bernhard Rang. Husserliana 22. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
(1983). Studien in Arithmetik und Geometrie. Texte aus dem Nachlass (1886
1901). Edited by Ingeborg Strohmeyer. Husserliana 21. Den Haag: Nijhoff.
(2001a). Logik. Vorlesung 1896. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. Husserliana.
Materialienband 1. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
(2001b). Logik. Vorlesung 19021903. Edited by Elisabeth Schuhmann. Husserliana. Materialienband 2. Dordrecht: Kluwer.
(2009). Untersuchungen zur Urteilstheorie. Texte aus dem Nachlass (18931918).
Ed. by Robin Rollinger. Husserliana 40. I. Vorstudien zu den Logischen Untersuchungen. New York: Springer.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Booles Logic
Dale Jacquette
Department of Philosophy, University of Bern, Switzerland
dale.jacquette@philo.unibe.ch
George Boole undertook the algebrization of a modified syllogistic logic, extended to
conditionals and probabilities. Boolean operators are known worldwide today because
of the search engine pathways they make possible electronically. The electronic circuits
by which search engine software transact the complex traffic of electronic signals across
a circuit switching board are also generally described as Boolean. Booles logic is worth
exploring both as a chapter in the history of nineteenth century logic, in the movement
from Aristotelian term logic to a more flexible universal algebraic logic that was to find
full fruition only later in the century and beginning of the twentieth century in Gottlob
Freges Begriffsschrift and Grundgesetze der Arithmetik. Boole and Frege nevertheless
have rather different visions both of logic as algebra, which is to say of how in general
terms logic should be algebrized, and, more importantly, of the base logic to be cast
as an algebraic formalism. Roughly, Boole takes a modified extended and amplified
Aristotelian syllogistic term logic as given, and, himself a highly accomplished adept of
mathematical algebra, makes use of all the substitution and simplification devices, often
unspoken in his own complex derivations, in order to drive inferences of an algebraic
logic of categoricals. Boole reinterprets syllogistic+plus in algebraic terms and adapts
the tools of arithmetical algebra and trigonometry in his 1847 book, The Mathematical
Analysis of Logic, and later in his much expanded 1854 treatise, An Investigation of
the Laws of Thought on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities, also known simply as the Laws of Thought.
The purpose of this tutorial is to (1) introduce and explain Booles basic concepts
and his model for the reconstruction of syllogistic as an algebra rather than logic of
terms with selections from and commentary on Booles two main books of interest
to logicians; (2) compare and contrast Booles logic with the more familiar functional
calculus or predicate-quantificational logic as developed by Frege, by offering a close
reading of Freges unpublished Nachla essays, translated as, Booles Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script (written c. 18801881) and a revised version of the essay
Booles Logical Formula-Language and My Concept-Script (1882); (3) consider Booles
philosophical interest and importance for contemporary logic, and in particular for such
topics in philosophy of logic as the psychologism that seems to be implied by Booles
reference to logic as laws of thought.
Tutorial Sessions:
1. Principles and Mechanics of Booles Algebraic Syllogistic Logic
2. Freges Comparison of Booles Logic with Begriffsschrift (18811882)
3. Logical and Philosophical Investigations of Boolean Algebras
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Tutorials
Bibliography:
1. George Boole, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic, Rudi Thoemmes reprint from
the original of 1847.
2. George Boole, The Laws of Thought, Dover reprint from the original in 1854.
3. V.H. Dudman, From Boole to Frege, Studien zu Frege, vol. 1, pp. 109138.
4. Gottlob Frege, Booles Logical Calculus and the Concept-Script, 18801881 and
Booles Logical Formula-Language and My Concept-Script, 1882, Posthumous
Writings, edited by Hans Hermes et al, The University of Chicago Press, 1979.
5. Theodore Hailperin, Booles Algebra Isnt Boolean, Mathematics Magazine, vol. 54,
1981, pp. 172184.
6. Theodore Hailperin, Booles Abandoned Propositional Logic, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 5, 1984, pp. 3948.
7. Dale Jacquette, On Boole, Wadsworth Philosophers, 2002.
8. Dale Jacquette, Booles Logic, Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 4: British
Logic in the Nineteenth Century, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods, NorthHolland (Elsevier Science), Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 331379.
9. Alan Musgrave, George Boole and Psychologism, Scientia, vol. 107, 1972, pp. 593
608.
10. Arthur Prior, Categoricals and Hypotheticals in George Boole and his Successors,
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 27, 1948, pp. 171196.
11. Sergiu Rudeanu, Boolean Functions and Equations, North-Holland, 1974.
12. John Eldon Whitesitt, Boolean Algebra and its Applications, Addison-Wesley, 1961.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Logic and Colour

Dany Jaspers
Department of Linguistics, Catholic University of Leuven, Belgium
dany.jaspers@kuleuven.be

Part 1
In the course of history, there have been many attempts to capture patterns
of perceptual colour opposition in diagrammatic representations. In the first lecture,
we shall trace some of the history of these attempts and argue that the postulated
patterns of opposition between cardinal colours represented by such lexical items
as red, green, blue, yellow, black, white, magenta and cyan, though dated in several
respects, are in their basics sursprisingly similar to the relational pattern that has been
proposed between the logical operators that define predicate logic, represented by the
lexical items all/every, some/any, no. We shall see that some of the historical debates
in both domains were actually variants the same discussion about two different realms
of the natural language lexicon.

Part 2
In this lecture we turn to the formal evidence showing that Wittgensteins intuition
about a logic of colour relations is to be taken near-literally. We will show with a
Smessaert-type bitstring algebra that definitions for logical operators are transferable
to basic colour categories and describe relations such as those between complementary
colours, etc. in formal detail. We will go into linguistic data, where the pattern imposes
a distinction between natural and non-natural lexicalization (such as *nand and *nall
in the lexis of logic; cyan and magenta in the field of colour terms).

Part 3
In the third part, we will argue in favour of an internalist view on colour and on what
are called linguistic functional categories. It will be shown that the pattern established
is extendable to other functional domains such as morphological tense distinctions in
English, person and number, as well as to several non-functional categories [11].
Bibliography:
1. R. Blanche, Note sur les relations dordre, Revue Philosophique, vol. 4, 1975,
pp. 431433.
2. R. Blanche, Quantity, modality, and other kindred systems of categories, Mind,
vol. 61(243), 1952, pp. 369375.
50

Tutorials
3. R. Blanche, Sur lopposition des concepts, Theoria, vol. 19, 1953, pp. 89130.
4. R. Blanche, Structures intellectuelles. Essai sur lorganisation systematique des
concepts, Vrin, Paris, 1969.
5. R. Declerck, The grammar of the English tense system: a comprehensive analysis,
Mouton de Gruyter, 2006.
6. D. Jaspers, Logic and colour, Logica Universalis, vol. 6(12), 2012, pp. 227248.
7. A. Sesmat, Logique II: Les raisonnements, la logistique, Hermann, Paris, 1951.
8. P. Seuren, The logic of thinking, Nieuwe Reeks, vol. 65(9), Koninklijke Nederlandse Academie van Wetenschappen, Mededelingen van de Afdeling Letterkunde,
pp. 535, 2002.
9. P. Seuren, The natural logic of language and cognition, Pragmatics, vol. 16(1),
2006, pp. 103138.
10. P. Seuren, Language from within, volume 2 of The logic of language, Oxford University Press, 2010.
11. P. Seuren and D. Jaspers, Logico-cognitive structure in the lexicon, Language,
vol. 90(3), 2014, pp. 607643.
12. H. Smessaert, On the 3d visualisation of logical relations, Logica Universalis,
vol. 3, 2009, pp. 303332.
13. S. Vikner, Reichenbach revisited: one, two or three temporal relations?, Acta
Linguistica Hafniensia, vol. 19, 1985, pp. 8195.
14. G. Von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1951.

Kants Logic
ko Kovac

Srec
Institute of Philosophy, Zagreb, Croatia
skovac@ifzg.hr
The tutorial will give an introduction into the main features of Kants formal and
transcendental logic, their modern formalization, and their impact on the development
of logic.
Logic had been, according to Kant, on a sure path of a science since antiquity,
but had not reached its pure scientific (systematic) form, being often rhapsodical, and
non-systematically mixed with other kinds of knowledge. Kants program is to give
logic a systematic form, founded on the first principles of our knowledge, and that in
two steps: (1) reduction of basic logic to formal logic by means of a functional account
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

of logical forms; (2) establishing of a logic of knowledge (transcendental logic) on the
basis of formal logic and analytic of space and time, with independent verification of
logical forms and concepts on a fixed (empirically defined) model.
According to Kants functional account, logical forms should be conceived in the
sense of bringing different representations under a common one by means of abstract
acts (operations) of our faculty of understanding (formal apperception, consciousness).
For example, it will be shown how for Kant categorical, hypothetical and disjunctive
judgments (as well as their modal counterparts: problematic, assertoric and apodictic
judgments) gradually strengthen the conditions of bringing our representations under
the formal objective unity of apperception, and in this way gradually implement logical
laws. The foundational approach to Kants logic as based on the theory of formal unity
of apperception was developed in a seminal work in [18].
By means of modern formalization, it will be shown that Kants formal logic has
features of paraconsistent and paracomplete logic (see [11], together with an axiomatization of the propositional part in [17]). A formalization of Kants logical forms and
formal unity of apperception with the use of geometric logic and geometric implication
is elaborated in [6].
Kants transcendental logic is a sort of philosophical logic to which, according to
Kants view, formal ontology should be reduced. It will be shown that Kants transcendental logic includes elements of model theory and type theory, by means of which he
solves, for instance, cosmological antinomies. In this part, we will build especially on
the ideas in [20].
Session 1. Kants formal logic. Functional account of logical forms. Concept,
judgment, inference. Relation of judgment (condition of objectivity assertion):
subject predicate, antecedent consequent, whole members. Laws of noncontradiction, sufficient reason, and excluded middle. Modalities. Foundations of logic:
formal unity of apperception (analytic, synthetic).
Session 2. Formalization of Kants predicate logic by means of modal logic and
generalized quantifiers (formal system and semantics). Paraconsistency and paracompleteness in Kants logic.
Session 3. Transcendental logic. A priori a posteriori, analytic synthetic.
Categories and transcendental ideas, transcendental and empirical reality, antinomies.
Formal system and empirical model, type-theoretical distinctions in Kants transcendental logic. Influences on the posterior history of logic (e.g., Frege, Hilbert, Brouwer,
Godel).

52

Tutorials
The tutorial is self-contained, not presupposing anything beyond the elementary
knowledge of classical and modal logic.
Bibliography:
1. Immanuel Kant, Kants gesammelte Schriften, de Gruyter et al., volumes 3 and 4:
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, Prolegomena, volume 9: Jasche-Logik, volume 16: Logik,
volume 24: Vorlesungen u
ber Logik, from 1910 on.
2. Immanuel Kant, Logik-Vorlesung. Unveroffentlichte Nachschriften, vols. 12, Meiner,
Hamburg, Germany, 1998.
3. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith,
St Martins Press, 1965.
4. Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Logic, translated by J. Michael Young, Cambridge
University Press, 1992.
5. Immanuel Kant, Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, translated by James W.
Ellington, 2nd edition, Hackett, Indianapolis, USA, 2001.
6. T. Achourioti and M. van Lambalgen, A formalization of Kants transcendental
logic, The Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4, 2011, pp. 254289.
7. Reinhard Brandt, Die Urteiltafel.
Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A: 6776,
B: 92101, Meiner, Hamburg, Germany, 1991. English version: The Table of Judgments. Critique of Pure Reason, A: 6776, B: 92101, translated by E. Watkins,
Ridgeview, Atascadero, Canada, 1995.
8. Jean-Yves Beziau, What is formal logic ?, in Proceedings of the XXII Congress
of Philosophy, edited by Myung-Hyung-Lee, Korean Philosophical Association,
vol. 13, Seoul, Korea, 2012, pp. 922.
9. Mirella Capozzi and Gino Roncaglia, Logic and philosophy of logic from humanism
to Kant, in The Development of Modern Logic, edited by Leila Haaparanta, Oxford
University Press, 2009, pp. 78158.
10. Michael Friedman, Kant and the Exact Sciences, Harvard University Press, 1992.
11. Srecko Kovac, In what sense is Kantian principle of contradiction non-classical,
Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 17, 2008, pp. 251274.
12. Srecko Kovac, Forms of judgment as a link between mind and the concepts
of substance and cause (Kant, Godel), in Substantiality and Causality, edited
by M. Szatkowski and M. Rosiak, de Gruyter, Berlin, Germany, 2014, in print.
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13. Beatrice Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge: Sensibility and Discursivity
in the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Charles
T. Wolfe, Princeton University Press, 1998.

14. Zeljko
Loparic, The logical structure of the first antinomy, Kant-Studien, vol. 81,
1990, pp.280303.
15. John MacFarlane, Frege, Kant, and the logic in logicism, The Philosophical Review, vol. 111, 2002, pp. 2565.
16. Kurt Mosser, Necessity and Possibility: The Logical Strategy of Kants Critique
of Pure Reason, Catholic University of America Press, Washington, USA, 2008.
17. Marek Nasieniewski, Logiki zdaniowe wyrazalne przez modalnosc, Wydawnictwo
Naukowe Uniwersystetu Mikolaja Kopernika, Toru
n, Poland, 2011.
18. Klaus Reich, Die Vollstandigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel, 2nd edition, Schoetz,
Berlin, Germany, 1948. English version: The Completeness of Kants Table
of Judgments, translated by J. Kneller and M. Losonsky, Standford University Press,
1992.
19. Heinrich Scholz, Abrider Geschichte der Logik, Alber, 1959. English version: Concise History of Logic, translated by K.F. Leidecker, Philosophical Library, New York,
1961.
20. Mary Tiles, Kant: From General to Transcendental Logic, in Handbook
of the History of Logic, volume 3, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and John Woods,
Elsevier, 2004, pp. 85130.
21. Christian Tolley, The Generality of Kants Transcendental Logic, Journal
of the History of Philosophy, vol. 50, 2012, pp. 417446.
22. Michael Wolff, Die Vollstandigkeit der kantischen Urteilstafel, Klostermann, Frankfurt, Germany, 1995.

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Tutorials

Leibnizs logic
Wolfgang Lenzen
ck, Germany
Department of Philosophy, University of Osnabru
lenzen@uni-osnabrueck.de
The logic of G. W. Leibniz (16461716) is usually considered as a pivot between
traditional syllogistic and modern algebra of sets. Many historiographers believe that
although Leibniz intended to produce a calculus wider than traditional logic [. . . ] he
never succeeded in producing a calculus which covered even the whole theory of the
syllogism ([1], p. 337). As a matter of fact, however, Leibniz not only discovered a
fully axiomatized algebra of concepts (provably equivalent to Boolean algebra of sets),
but he also anticipated important principles of contemporary systems of set-theory,
quantifier logic, and modal propositional calculi.

Description of the contents of the tutorial:

This tutorial aims at reconstructing the following main components of Leibnizs
logic:
1) The algebra of concepts, L1, which can be viewed as the intensional counterpart
of the ordinary (extensional) algebra of sets;
2) The extension of L1 by means of indefinite concepts which function as (second
order) quantifiers;
3) A genius mapping of L1 into an algebra of propositions which gives rise to a calculus
of strict implication;
4) The syntax and semantics of alethic and deontic modal logic.

Bibliography:
1. W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press,
1962.
2. W. Lenzen, Das System der Leibnizschen Logik, de Gruyter, Berlin, Germany, 1990.
3. W. Lenzen, Calculus Universalis Studien zur Logik von G. W. Leibniz, mentis
Verlag GmbH, Paderborn, Germany, 2004.
4. W. Lenzen, Leibnizs Logic, in Handbook of the History of Logic, volume 3:
The Rise of Modern Logic: From Leibniz to Frege, edited by D.M. Gabbay
and J. Woods, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2004, pp. 183.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Logic and Grammar Contesting

the Semantics-Pragmatics Divide
Ernie Lepore
Professor of Philosophy and Director of Center for Cognitive Science,
Rutgers, State University of New Jersey, USA

Abstract
Grices theory of conversational implicature offers an influential way to account
for the interpretation of utterances in terms of logical meanings, on the assumption
that speakers purposes shape the understanding of utterances in conversation. This
course provides an overview and critical discussion of Grices theory and of subsequent
developments in philosophy, linguistics, psychology and artificial intelligence. While
acknowledging the central place for collaboration in language use, we find that further
linguistic rules and interpretive processes are often implicated in recognizing alleged
implicatures. These factors necessitate important changes to Grices views. By highlighting researchers opposing takes on key issues the interpretive constraints imposed
by linguistic knowledge, the nature of pragmatic inference, the diversity of imaginative
perspective taking, and the psychological mechanisms of social understandingawe
hope to provide students with a road map to develop their own views about the subject
matter.

Motivation
The category of CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURES, introduced by Grice in his
1969 William James Lectures at Harvard, is a fundamental conceptual tool for getting
clear on the relationship between logic and language. It has helped to cement the modern perspective that ordinary language, warts and all, is rule-governed and amenable
to analysis with formal tools, and has sparked a diverse and exciting range of follow-up
research across cognitive science. It can be justifiably viewed as a breakthrough in linguistics and philosophy. Grices ideas have been profoundly influential by now, they
have inspired a wide variety of modified and extended accounts. These frameworks turn
out to conceptualize pragmatic principles and pragmatic reasoning in diverse ways, and
as a result they make strikingly different claims both about what, in fact, pragmatic
reasoning contributes to interpretation, and about how it does it.
In the first two meetings of the course, we survey the accounts of CIs developed
by Grice himself and those explored in subsequent research in philosophy, linguistics,
psychology and artificial intelligence. We shall reach the conclusion that, while Grices
theory of CIs provides the foundation for most of modern pragmatics, the place and
status of the semantics-pragmatic divide remains deeply contested. The goal of this
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Tutorials
part of the course is for students to appreciate the challenge of getting clear on the
relationship between semantics and pragmatics. There are difficult empirical questions
to answer about the nature and scope of the rules of language. But its not enough to
distinguish the interpretive effects of different kinds of knowledge and reasoning in language use. The interpretation of these empirical results depends on such philosophical
considerations as the nature of content and representation, the relationship of meaning
and agency, and the bases for human interaction and collaboration.
The agenda for the rest of course is then to bring empirical characterizations of utterance interpretation into closer contact with the philosophical issues and arguments
that inform how natural language meaning should be conceptualized and formalized.
In particular, on days three and four of the course, we survey whats known about
the status of various interpretive effects without prejudice to the overarching theoretical and philosophical questions, and develop a broader and better-informed perspective.
Day three gives an overview of the rules of language that potentially affect the status
of interpretive effects as implicatures. Some rules, governing DISCOURSE COHERENCE, seem to explicitly specify the possible actions that particular utterances can
be used for. Other rules, governing PRESUPPOSITION, seem to explicitly specify the
possible contexts in which particular utterances can be used. Still more rules, governing
INFORMATION STRUCTURE, seem to explicitly specify what relationships particular utterances can bear to salient alternatives that have been or might be uttered in the
ongoing conversation. Ultimately, conventional meaning seems so eclectic and variable
that we need an explicit methodological justification for how researchers have been able
to characterize these interpretive effects as linguistic.
Day four, meanwhile, explores speakers diverse and particular ways of engaging
with imagery, through interpretive effects such as metaphor and irony. For example,
we will argue, particularly following [2, 1], that metaphorical interpretation involves a
distinctive process of PERSPECTIVE TAKING. Metaphor invites us to organize our
thinking about something through an analogical correspondence with something it is
not. Any explanation of the import of metaphorical utterances will need to appeal
to this distinctive perspective-taking operation. General pragmatic principles will not
explain metaphor on their own.
Day five distills the consequences of these considerations for semantics and pragmatics. Semantics, on our view, can be taken to include all the linguistic information
truth conditional or otherwise that speakers use to recover the content contributed
to conversation through utterances.
Pragmatics, meanwhile, is best characterized as a process of disambiguation: the
identification of the linguistic structure that the speaker had in mind and the associated
rules that are taken to govern its content. Neither semantics nor pragmatics exhausts interpretation, which also requires interlocutors to approach the content speakers present
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

through appropriate practices of imaginative engagement. And even this broad sense of
interpretation does not exhaust understanding. Even after we interpret an utterance we
may still reason further in an attempt to better understand the speaker. Thus, in place
of Grices uniform pragmatics and its associated notion of conversational implicature,
we have a much more nuanced taxonomy.
We dont expect our perspective to be definitive. However, by exposing students to
this taxonomy, we expect to enable students whether they agree with us or not
to pursue more robust research into interpretation, and to engage more productively
with interdisciplinary audiences in presenting their ideas.
Our course draws closely on my and Matthew Stones recent book Imagination and
Convention: Distinguishing Grammar and Inference in Language, to be published by
Oxford University Press in Fall 2014. The course emphasizes key views that students
should be familiar with, but, with the book as a resource, students will easily be able
to build on what we present, and relate it to current debates on questions such as
the grammatical status of scalar implicatures, the role of meaning in metaphorical
interpretation, the role of speaker intentions in disambiguation, and the limits of logic
in capturing any of these interpretive effects.

Outline
Day 1
The landscape of pragmatic inference. Overview of the course. [4, 13, 14]
Pragmatic inference: linguistic and psychological approaches. [5, 7, 10, 12]
Day 2
The interpretive effects of linguistic rules. Reconciling pragmatic arguments with
empirical accounts of discourse structure, presupposition, anaphora and information
structure. [16, 6, 15]
Day 3
Varieties of interpretive inference. Reconciling pragmatic arguments with empirical
accounts of metaphor and irony. [1, 2]
Theorizing semantics and pragmatics. Communicative intentions, the conversational record, context dependence and the semantics-pragmatics divide. [3, 9, 8, 11]

Expected Level
The course will present its arguments from scratch, so no prior experience is expected. We imagine the course will be most attractive to MS students and early PhD
students, but of course wed welcome more advanced students as well.
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Bibliography:
1. E. Camp, Two varieties of literary imagination: metaphor, fiction and thought,
in Midwest Studies in Philosophy XXXIII: Poetry and Philosophy, edited
by H. Wettstein, Wiley-Blackwell, Oxford, UK, 2009, pp. 107130.
2. D. Davidson, What metaphors mean, Critical Inquiry, vol. 5(1),1978, pp. 4147.
3. H.P. Grice, Meaning, em The Philosophical Review, vol. 66(3), 1957,
pp. 377388.
4. H.P. Grice, Logic and conversation, in Syntax and Semantics III: Speech Acts,
edited by P. Cole and J. Morgan, Academic Press, New York, 1975, pp. 4158.
5. L.R. Horn, Toward a new taxonomy for pragmatic inference: Q-based and R-based
implicature, in Meaning, Form, and Use in Context: Linguistic Applications, edited
by D. Schiffrin, Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC, 1984, pp. 1142.
6. A. Kehler, Coherence, Reference and the Theory of Grammar, CSLI, Stanford, 2001.
7. S.C. Levinson, Presumptive Meanings: The theory of generalized conversational
implicatures, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 2000.
8. D.K. Lewis, Scorekeeping in a language game, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 8(3), 1979, pp. 339359.
9. D.K. Lewis, Convention:
Cambridge, MA, 1969.

A Philosophical Study, Harvard University Press,

10. S. Pinker, M.A. Nowak and J.J. Lee, The logic of indirect speech, Proceedings
of the National Academy of Science, vol. 105(3), 2008, pp. 833838.
11. M.E. Pollack, Plans as complex mental attitudes, in Intentions in Communication, edited by P. Cohen, J. Morgan and M. Pollack, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA,
1990, pp. 77103.
12. D. Sperber and D. Wilson, Relevance: Communication and Cognition, Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1986.
13. R. Stalnaker, Assertion, in Syntax and Semantics, vol. 9, edited by P. Cole,
Academic Press, New York, 1979, pp. 315332.
14. R.H. Thomason, Accommodation, meaning and implicature, Intentions
in Communication, edited by P.R. Cohen, J. Morgan and M.E. Pollack, MIT Press,
Cambridge, MA, 1990, pp. 325363.
15. R.A. van der Sandt, Presupposition projection as anaphora resolution, Journal
of Semantics, vol. 9(4), 1992, pp. 333377.
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16. J. van Kuppevelt, Inferring from topics-scalar implicatures as topic-dependent
inferences, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 19(4), 1996, pp. 393443.

Theorem of Completeness
Mara Manzano
Department of Philosophy, University of Salamanca, Spain
mara@usal.es

The Completeness Theorem

To reconcile the syntactic and semantic presentations of consequence is at the core

of any logic (be it pure or applied, classical or non classical). This aim can also be seen
as the goal to compare (and relate), side by side, the expressive capacity of a formal
language, with the computational power of a particular presentation (calculus).
Together, the soundness and completeness theorems, establish the equivalence between the syntactic (associated to a given calculi) and semantic (associated to a given
class of models) notions of consequence, for a given language. Intuitively, the semantic
notion of truth helps us select the set of all the sentences of a given language that
are always true in all structures or models this set of formulas are usually called
logically valid, VAL. On the other hand, we can also describe a set of formulas using
a purely syntactic definition in the form of a deductive calculus. Such calculus would
define when a formula logically follows from others. In particular, the set of formulas
which logically follows from the empty set is call the set of logical theorems, THEO.
Are these two sets the same?
That is the exact question addressed by the soundness and completeness theorems.

Relevance of the Completeness Theorem

Theoretical Relevance We can say that we dont know a logic till we havent
identified its set of valid formulas. Intuitively, we can say that the logicality of a given
formal language resides in the set VAL of valid sentences. Each model A for a given
signature select from the set of all sentences those which are true under this particular
interpretation. This set of formulas is usually called the theory of the structure, Th(A),
and it characterizes the structure A. But all such theories share a common nucleus
which is the set VAL.
Does this set characterize something?
The answer is yes, VAL characterizes the logic in question itself. It represents what
the logic has to say about any arbitrary structure. If we are able to generate this set
easily, we would have finally capture the essence of a logic, its perfume.
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Practical Relevance As we just discussed, the semantic notion of truth is at the
core of a given logic. But because of its generality, it is very difficult to manipulate.
For example, the semantic notion of consequence perfectly defines when a formula
follows from a given set of formulas (it is enough to verify that is true in all models
where is true); but it does not provide for an algorithm that helps us verify this
relation. This is when the set THEO of theorems, and the notion of completeness,
come to our help. In particular, we can establish a chain of inference from the premises
in to the conclusion . Actually, this operational definition of consequence seems
even more adequate and closer to the intuitive notion of inference, given that it reflects
the discursive character of the process.

The Completeness of the First-order Calculus

Completeness theorem is proved in its strong sense, implies , for any

, such that {} Sent(L). One prove completeness and its corollaries following
the path:
Lindenbaums lemma

Henkins lemma

Henkins theorem

Compactness
Lowenheim-Skolem

Strong completeness

Weak completeness

These theorems are understood as follows:

Lindenbaum lemma: If Sent(L) is consistent, there exists such that

Sent(L ), is maximally consistent and contains witnesses.

Henkins lemma: If is a maximally consistent set of sentences and contains

witnesses, then has a countable model.

Henkins theorem: If Sent(L) is consistent, then has a model whose domain

is countable.

Strong completeness: If then , for any {} Sent(L).

Weak completeness: If then , for any Sent(L).

Compactness theorem: has a model iff every finite subset of it has a model,
for any Sent(L).

Lowenheim-Skolem:
for any Sent(L).

If has a model, then it has a countable model,

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Completeness Notions

In logical writings we find the term completeness applied either to theories, to

deductive calculuses, or just to logics. In all three cases we wish to express some kind
of sufficiency of the rules (or completeness of the final product) but, as we shall see,
these concepts differ in some aspects having to do with the resources and methods
needed to establish them.
In [14] we focus on the evolution of the notion of completeness in contemporary
logic. We discuss the differences between the notions of completeness of a theory, the
completeness of a calculus, and the completeness of a logic in the light of Godels
and Tarskis crucial contributions. As far as first-order logic is concerned, our thesis
is that the contemporary understanding of completeness of a calculus was born as a
generalization of the concept of completeness of a theory.
There are three main lines that I want to consider in the tutorial:
1. Origin: When and how is the necessity of a completeness proof born? When does
it separate itself from a theorem concerning the decidability of satisfiability for a
given logic? For example, the first completeness proofs for Propositional Logics are
intimately related to decidability and representation in terms of finite algebras. The
original publications of Post, Stone, Quine, Tarski, and Godel are relevant for this
line.
2. It seems natural to think that Henkins completeness theorem for first-order logic
was proved before the completeness for type theory. Surprisingly, in his 1996 paper
he stated that he obtained the proof of completeness of first-order logic by readapting
the argument found for the theory of types, not the other way around.
3. Evolution of Henkin Completeness Proof: The original proof of completeness for
classical logic resulted extremely versatile, and its fundamental idea of using witnesses during the model construction can be used for many other logics. In [1] we
use a similar idea. It is specially interesting to establish the relation between Henkin
proof and the use of rigid designators in hybrid logics [2].
Bibliography:
1. C. Areces, P. Blackburn, A. Huertas and M. Manzano, Completeness in Hybrid
Type Theory, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 43(23), pp. 209238.
2. P. Blackburn, A. Huertas, M. Manzano and K.F. Jrgensen, Henkin and Hybrid
Logic, in [15].
3. K. Godel, On the completeness of the calculus of logic, in Kurt Godel: Collected
Works: Volume I: Publications 19291936, Oxford University Press, pp. 61101.
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Tutorials
4. K. Godel, The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic,
in Kurt Godel: Collected Works: Volume I: Publications 19291936, Oxford University Press, pp. 103123.
5. L. Henkin, The completeness of the first order functional calculus, The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14, 1949, pp. 159166.
6. L. Henkin, Completeness in the theory of types, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 15, 1950, pp. 8191.
7. L. Henkin, A Theory of Propositional Types, Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 52,
1963, pp. 323324. Errata ibid., vol. 53, 1964, p. 119.
8. L. Henkin, An Extension of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Theorem,
The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 28(3), 1963, pp. 201216.
9. L. Henkin, Truth and Provability, in [16], 1967, pp. 14-22.
10. L. Henkin, Completeness, in [16], pp. 2335.
11. L. Henkin, The discovery of my completeness proofs, The Bulletin of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 2(2), 1996, pp. 127158.
12. M. Manzano, Extensions of First Order Logic, Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical
Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
13. M. Manzano, Model Theory, Oxford University Press, 1999.
14. M. Manzano and E. Alonso, Completeness: from Godel to Henkin, History and
Philosophy of Logic, vol. 35(1), 2014, pp. 5075, doi=10.1080/01445340.2013.816555.
15. M. Manzano, I. Sain and E. Alonso, editors, The Life and Work of Leon Henkin.
Essays on His Contributions, Studies in Universal Logic. Springer, 2014.
16. S. Morgenbesser, editor, Philosophy of Science today, Basic Books, New York, 1967.
17. A. Tarski, On the Concept of Following Logically, History and Philosophy
of Logic, vol. 23(3), 1936/2002, pp. 155196.
18. A. Tarski, Truth and proof, Scientific American, vol. 220, 1969, pp. 6377.

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Logic and Music The Logic of Chords

and Harmony
Ingolf Max
Section of Logic and Theory of Science, Department of Philosophy,
University of Leipzig, Germany
max@uni-leipzig.de
The tutorial provides a detailed introduction into a very new approach to a formal
theory of music: the logic of chords and their internal harmony. The logic of chords is
closely related to mathematical theories of music but by far not identical with them.
The constitutive decisions creating our logic of chords are (a) fixing the logical space
by specifying a scale, (b) indicating chords as our well-structured basic elements and
(c) introducing n-ary chord operators. The participants are invited to formulate and
discuss advanced ideas to develop a calculus of chords.
Chords possess a complex interval-related inner structure. Internal harmony is the
totality of formal (context-free) relations between chords which is given without fixing
any point on the scale. It can be shown that tonality needs such a fixed point.
(a) Our logical space is given by the scale of integers. Each integer will be interpreted
as a (different) simple tone. Tone intervals are ordered pairs of tones. Each interval
has a characteristic positive length l with l > 0.
(b) A key feature of the logic of chords is that this formal theory is not an atomic one.
The basic elements are chords consisting of at least three tones, two basic intervals
and one reference interval. A basic interval is the relation between directly adjacent
tones. The reference interval is the relation between the highest and the deepest
tone of any chord. A chord is a molecular expression characterized not only by
its tones but mainly by its matrix of interval lengths. Each chord can be uniquely
identified solely by its inner structure. A class of (partially or totally tone-different)
chords e.g., the class of 3-tone-major-chords in root position can be identified
simply by knowing its characteristic matrix of interval lengths. Internal harmony
is nothing else than the relation between two or more chords based solely on the
inner structure of the chords. In this sense chord as well as harmony are formal
concepts. Euphony is not necessary. E.g., we have of course chords and harmony
in twelve-tone music (dodecaphony) and free jazz.
(c) An n-ary chord operator takes an n-tuple of chords as input and yields a chord as its
output. Unary operators are negations (complete inversions of basic interval lengths
relative to tone-related or interval-related fixed points), other interval permutation
operators, barre operators (outputs with isomorphic matrices) and inversion operators. If it comes to more complex harmonic constructions like sequences consisting
of tonic, subdominant and dominant we need at least binary operators to create
them (cadence operators).
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Session 1
The inner logical form of chords
We start with the introduction of our symbolism to describe tones, intervals, interval
lengths and interval classes. We define several relations between intervals. The most important one is the relation of directly connected intervals. Chords are multi-dimensional
sequences of directly connected intervals. The general form of chords will be explained
with emphasis on the inner complexity of the pattern of intervals. We differentiate
between basic and intermediate intervals (in chords with 4 and more tones) as well as
the reference interval. With respect to characteristic matrices of interval lengths it is
possible to characterize classes of chords solely with respect to their inner structure.
No further context is needed. Chord classes with sufficient complex matrices of interval
lengths contain submatrices which characterize other chord classes. Such sub-matrices
can be connected or disconnected. Finally we discuss the interesting cases of interval
length perfect (e.g., all-interval tetrachord) and interval length disjoint chords.

Session 2
Unary chord operators
We start with unary chord operators like negations of chords. One type of chord
negation is characterized by the complete inversion of the order of all basic intervals
within a fixed reference interval. Another type is the complete inversion of this order
with a fixed middle tone (if the chord contains an odd number of tones) or a fixed middle
basic interval (if the chord contains an even number of tones). We show that these
negations are analogies of the (partial) negation in the logic of first degree entailments.
We will sketch a proof that either of these negations of an arbitrary major chord yield
a corresponding minor chord and vice versa. Using both negations alternately we get
the major and minor chords with fixed matrices of all basic tonalities. If time permits
we discuss other unary chord operators like barre operators and inversion operators.

Session 3
Internal harmony, tonality, binary chord operators and family
resemblance
The simplest form of internal harmony is the (context-free) relation between two
chords with respect to their inner formal structure alone. The application of a unary
operator creates necessarily an internal harmony between its input and its output.
Creating internal harmony depends on the logical behavior of the chord operator as
well as the inner structure of the argument(s). It is an inspiring research question for
the logic of music which aspects of tonality can be characterized as internal harmony.
A known candidate is the asymmetric relation is the parallel minor of (but not tonic
parallel ). A novelly defined concept is the symmetric relation is the X-dominant of
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with X is empty (dominant) or replaced by sub (subdominant). To determine a
chord which is located between two other chords we need binary chord operators. But
n-ary operators are insufficient to determine tonic chords as internally harmonious. To
get this we have to extend our approach by a fixed point on the scale. The range
of both kinds of theory is still an open question. But there is also a creative aspect
here: composing new music. One possibility is the creation of family-like sequences of
chords. Adapting Wittgenstein we can say that the strength of the thread [harmony
in a sequence of chords] does not reside in the fact that some one fibre [interval length]
runs through its whole length [whole sequence], but in the overlapping of many fibres
[crisscrossing of interval lengths]. (Philosophical Investigations, vol. 67). An audio
example will be given and formally explained.
Primary text for the tutorial
Well enough in advance of our tutorial an extended handout will be hyperlinked
here!
Secondary sources

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki

All-interval tetrachord, Chord (music);

Chromatic scale;

Diatonic function, Harmony;

Hexachord, Interval (music);

Inversion (music);

Neapolitan chord, Octave;

Riemannian theory, Set theory (music);

Tonality, Trichord, Tristan chord.

G. Tucker, A Brief Introduction to Pitch-Class Set Analysis, 2001, especially integer
notation and interval classes.
Further References (in German)
1. I. Max, Zur Familienahnlichkeit von Begriffen und Akkorden [On family resemblance of concepts and chords], in expressis verbis: Philosophische Betrachtungen,
edited by M. Kaufmann and A. Krause, Halle, 2003, pp. 385415.
2. I. Max, Familienahnlichkeit als Analysemethode von Spatwerken Beethovens
und Wittgensteins [Family resemblance as method of analysis of Beethovens
and Wittgensteins late works], in Image and Imaging in Philosophy, Science
and the Arts, Papers of the 33rd International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited
by E. Nemeth, H. Richard and W. Pichler, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Lower Austria,
2010, pp. 196200.
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3. I. Max, Ist Familienahnlichkeit ein philosophischer, ein theoretischer Begriff oder
beides? [Is family resemblance a philosophical or/and a theoretical concept?],
in Analytical and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives, Papers
of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, edited by S. Rinofner-Kreidl
and H.A. Wiltsche, Kirchberg am Wechsel, Lower Austria, 2014, pp. 184187.

Lewis Carrolls Symbolic Logic

Amirouche Moktefi
Chair of Philosophy, Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
amirouche.moktefi@ttu.ee
Several expressions have been coined (and many are still in use) to name the new
logic that was developed from the mid-nineteenth-century onwards in the footsteps of
logicians such as George Boole and Gottlob Frege. It has been known as mathematical
logic, algebraic logic, algorithmic logic, logistic, new logic, modern logic, symbolic logic,
etc. The latter was chosen in the 1930s by the founders of the Association and Journal of Symbolic Logic, which consequently contributed to its survival and circulation.
Though earlier occurrences do exist, this expression seems to have been popularised by
John Venn in the second volume of his trilogy: Symbolic Logic (1881, second edition
in 1894). This expression had the advantage of indicating clearly what was seen as
the most perceptible feature of this new logic: its thorough use of symbols. From this
perspective, the very idea of symbolic logic does not assume any a priori relation to
mathematics. All that is required for a logic to be recognised as symbolic, is a broad
use of symbols to represent logical operations.
The aim of this tutorial is to discuss this symbolization process through the singular
case of Lewis Carrolls logic. What makes the author of the Alice tales so special is that
he believed in the utility of symbolic logic in daily life, and as such refused to simplify
his logical system for the sake of convenience, as most his colleagues did and overtly
admitted. He regarded his logic treatise as a work for God, that would help to reason
in everyday circumstances. Consequently, he designed his logical theory in such a way
as to agree both with the accepted facts of Logic and the actual facts of life. This
principle differentiates his logic from most of the symbolic systems of the time. The
tutorial will run on three parts, of about one hour each:

I. Logical Symbolism
This part will be devoted to giving an overview of how symbolic logic was developed
and what logical notations, diagrams included, were used. The idea is to see how the
evolution of those symbolisms led slowly to the standard notation (if any) we use today,
notably after Peirce, Peano and Russell. The point is to highlight the difficulties raised
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by the introduction of symbolism in logic and to identify the criteria that determined
the choice, the design and the neglect of specific logic notations. This is an essential
point to understand what symbolic logicians, Carroll included, were doing at the time.

II. Carrolls Logical Theory

This part will be devoted to the exposition of Carrolls logical theory, mostly as it
is exposed in his main work: Symbolic Logic (4th edition, 1897). We will examine his
typology of propositions and his logic notation. Then we will pay particular attention to
some specific features, notably the existential import of propositions and the theory of
non-existent objects and classes. We will see that Carroll explored some unusual paths
that made him solve some uneasy problems that faced his colleagues, but that also
prevented him from making significant advances due to the complexity of the logical
notation and system he got.

III. Inferring
In this last part, we will discuss the raison detre of Carrolls symbolic logic: the
problem of elimination. That is how to find the conclusion that is to be drawn from a
set of premises, regarding the relation between given terms, by eliminating the middle
terms. It is for the purpose of solving this central problem that mid-nineteenth century
logicians invented symbolic, diagrammatic, and sometimes mechanical, devices. We will
expose some of Carrolls methods for handling such logic sequences, as he called them.
Finally, we will briefly discuss two papers on hypotheticals that Carroll published in
the journal Mind: A logical paradox (1894) and What the Tortoise said to Achilles
(1895). These papers have been widely discussed by nineteenth and twentieth century
logicians (Peirce, Russell, Ryle, Prior, Quine, etc.). The first paper is often mentioned
as a good illustration of the paradoxes of material implication while the second gave
rise to what is known as the paradox of inference.
Bibliography:
1. Lewis Carroll, The Game of Logic, Macmillan, London, 1887, new edition in 1896.
2. Lewis Carroll, A logical paradox, Mind, vol. 3(11), 1894, pp. 436438.
3. Lewis Carroll, What the Tortoise said to Achilles, Mind, vol. 4(14), 1895,
pp. 278280.
4. Lewis Carroll, Symbolic Logic, Part I: Elementary, Macmillan, London, 1896,
4th edition in 1897.

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5. Francine F. Abeles, editor, The Logic Pamphlets of Charles Lutwidge Dodgson
and Related Pieces, Lewis Carroll Society of North America, University Press
of Virginia, 2010.
6. William Warren Bartley III, editor, Lewis Carrolls Symbolic Logic, Part I: Elementary, 5th Edition, 1896. Part II: Advanced (Never Previously Published), Clarkson
N. Potter, New York, 1977, new edition in 1986.
7. Amirouche Moktefi, Lewis Carrolls logic, in Handbook of the History of Logic,
Volume 4: British Logic in the Nineteenth-Century, edited by Dov M. Gabbay
and John Woods, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 457505.
8. John Venn, Symbolic Logic, Macmillan, London, 1881, 2nd edition in 1894.
9. Edward Wakeling, editor, Lewis Carrolls Diaries: the Private Journals of Charles
Lutwidge Dodgson (Lewis Carroll), 10 volumes, The Lewis Carroll Society,
19932007.

Logic and Category Or Planar Heyting Algebras

for Children
Eduardo Ochs
Federal Fluminense University, Rio das Ostras, Brazil
eduardoochs@gmail.com
One way to explain intuitionistic logic to a non-logician is this. The usual truthvalues are just 0 and 1, and we will change that by decreeing that the new truth-values
will be certain diagrams with several 0s and 1s. We choose a subset D of N2 , for example , and we say that a modal truth-value on D is a way of assigning 0s and 1s to
the points of D. A modal truth value is unstable when it has a 1 immediately above a
1
0, for example 1 0 is unstable, and an intuitionistic truth-value on D is a stable modal
truth-value on D. Now that we have defined our (intuitionistic) truth-values we explain
to our non-logician friend how to interpret , , , , on them, and we show that if
0
1
P = 1 1, then P P = 1 1, and some other classical theorems also do not hold. We then
explain some logical axioms and rules that do hold in this system, define intuitionistic
propositional logic from them, show how this particular case based on D generalizes,
present the standard terminology, and so on.
When we do this we are using several tricks finding an insightful particular case,
doing things in the particular and in the general cases in parallel using diagrams with
the same shapes, lifting proofs from the particular case to the general one, and this
didactic method can be defined precisely. In the terminology of [Ochs2013] this logic
on subsets of N2 and DAGs on them (ZSets and ZDAGs) is an archetypal model for
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intuitionistic propositional logic (IPL). If we abbreviate explaining and formalizing
(something) via an archetypal model as (that something) for children, then the
contents of the tutorial become easy to state.
Heyting Algebras for children. When a ZDAG D doesnt have three independent points, then the open sets of (D, O(D)) are in bijection with the points of another
ZDAG, D . This D is a Heyting Algebra, and our way of interpreting Intuitionistic
Predicate Logic on open sets of D translates into a way of interpreting IPL on the points
of D . The operation D D gives us lots of examples of planar Heyting Algebras
but not all.
Take any ZDAG D whose points all have the same parity. There is a simple, visual
criterion that can tell us very quickly whether D is a HA or not. The ZHAs are the Ds
that obey this criterion and the parity condition; an arbitrary ZDAG D is a HA iff it
is isomorphic to a ZHA, and this is also easy to check. This gives us all planar Heyting
Algebras.
There is a system of coordinates that we can put on a ZHA the (l, r) coordinates
that make , , , , trivial to calculate. We will present a computer library that
does all these calculations, and that can produce ascii and LaTeX diagrams for both
ZDAGs and functions on them.
Heyting algebra modalities for children. A modality is an operation * on
the points of a HA obeying P P * = P ** and (P Q)* = P * Q*. The operations
B (P ) = P , BQ (P ) ((P Q) Q), JQ (P ) = Q P , J Q (P ) = Q P , are modalities, and our computer library can show visually how they behave on the points of a
ZHA and how they can be composed in several ways (as in [FourmanScott79], p. 331)
to obtain new modalities.
The usual way of presenting HA modalities in the literature is by showing first
some basic consequences of the axioms, then how modalities interact with , , , then
theorems about how the algebra of modalities behave; I have always found this approach
quite opaque. By using ZHAs we can explain these theorems and exhibit countermodels
for all non-theorems visually and it turns out that modalities on a ZHA D correspond
to ways of cutting D into equivalence classes using diagonal lines. This visual way of
thinking complements the usual formal way. . . but how, exactly? Can we make that
precise?
Categories for children. For our purposes, the archetypal category is Set, and in
most examples we can use only finite subsets of N as its objects in diagrams. This lets us
introduce quickly two flavors of typed -calculus, the distinction between structure and
properties, a trick to focus only on structure and leave the properties part for a second
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moment, and a way to regard having a terminal, binary products, and exponentials
the cartesian-closed structure as extra structure on Set. A CCC is a category with
that extra structure, and by regarding Set as the archetypal case we get a way to
interpret the simply-typed -calculus formally in any CCC.
It turns out that ZDAGs are categories, and ZHAs are CCCs, both archetypal in
slightly weaker ways than Set. By interpreting -calculus in ZHAs and making a series
of changes in the notation we get the categorical interpretation of intuitionistic predicate
calculus, plus Natural Deduction, and Curry-Howard.
Toposes for children. Let D be a ZDAG; for example, D = . The category of
functors SetD is a topos a ZTopos, and its objects are -shaped diagrams that are
easy to draw explicitly. CCCs are categories with extra structure that lets us interpret
simply-typed -calculus on them; toposes are CCCs with extra structure, that lets us
interpret Intuitionistic Set Theory (IST) on them. By regarding both Set and our
SetD s as archetypal toposes we can start topos theory from the internal language,
i.e., from the way of interpreting all operations of IST in terms of basic categorical
operations; our approach lets us begin by examples that show how each operation of
IST ought to behave, then guessing a formalization, than proving that it works and
thus toposes are models for IST, then proving other facts about toposes that are less
logical and more algebraic in character.
Sheaves for children. Each modality on a Heyting Algebra D induces a notion
of sheafness on a ZTopos, plus a quotient from it into a smaller topos, which has
an adjoint that is a functor from the smaller topos back into the bigger one; the
sheaves are the objects of SetD that are in the image of that adjoint functor.
Using ZToposes as our archetypal toposes we can understand how all these entities
and definitions behave by generalizing a few examples where the diagrams are not too
big. One nice example of the logical definition of sheaf shows how the notion of
sheafness induced by B booleanizes the logic of a topos; another example, motivated by
the topological definition of sheaf, shows how sheafification and etalification are adjoint
functors, using an order topology.
The possibilities for exposing technicalities using archetypal cases are endless, but we
will dedicate the best part of our energy in this tutorial not to them, but to something
more general and more useful: how to use archetypal cases to make the literature more
accessible, and to create bridges between different notations.
Bibliography:
1. M.P. Fourman and D.S. Scott, Sheaves and Logic, in Applications of Sheaves,
Springer Lecture Notes in Mathematics, vol. 753, 1979, pp. 302401.
2. E. Ochs, Internal Diagrams and Archetypal Reasoning in Category Theory, Logica
Universalis, vol. 7, issue 3, 2013, pp. 291321.

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The Compactness Theorem

David Pierce
Department of Mathematics, Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Turkey
dpierce@msgsu.edu.tr
Let us say that a logic has the compactness property if a set of sentences of the
logic has a model whenever every finite subset of the set has a model. For present
purposes, the Compactness Theorem is that first-order logic has the compactness
property. This theorem is fundamental to model theory. However, Hodgess comprehensive twelve-chapter 1993 volume Model Theory finds no need to state and prove the
theorem until Chapter 6. It is worthwhile to think about what needs Compactness and
what does not.
One consequence of the Compactness Theorem is that a set of sentences with arbitrarily large finite models must have an infinite model. A more purely mathematical
consequence is the Prime Ideal Theorem: every nontrivial commutative ring has
a prime ideal. One can prove this by noting first that every maximal ideal is prime.
Moreover, every countable ring has a maximal ideal; for we can obtain a generating
set of such an ideal by considering the elements of the ring one by one. In particular
then, every finitely generated subring of a given ring has a maximal ideal, because every
finitely generated ring is countable. By the Compactness Theorem then, the original
ring must have an ideal that is at least prime, although it might not be maximal. The
point here is that primeness is a local property, while maximality is not.
It is usually understood that every nontrivial commutative ring has, not just a prime
ideal, but a maximal ideal. To make it easy to prove such results, Zorn stated in 1935
the result now known by his name. However, Zorns Lemma relies on the Axiom of
Choice. The Compactness Theorem is strictly weaker than this, with respect to ZF
(Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory without Choice). For, Compactness is also a consequence
of the Prime Ideal Theorem, even the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem; and this is strictly
weaker than the Axiom of Choice (as shown by Halpern and Levy in 1971).
The Compactness Theorem for countable sets of sentences needs nothing beyond ZF.
Skolem showed this implicitly in 1922 when he established the paradox that Zermelos
axioms for set theory must have a countable model, if they have a model at all. In 1930,
Godel proved countable Compactness explicitly, though not by that name. Maltsev
stated the full Compactness Theorem as the General Local Theorem in 1941, having
proved it implicitly in 1936; he used it to prove algebraic results in the way we proved
the Prime Ideal Theorem above.
In his 1950 address to the International Congress of Mathematicians, Tarski gave
the Compactness Theorem its current name and noted its topological meaning. But
this meaning is not generally well expressed in todays textbooks of model theory.
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The class of structures having a given signature can be given a topology, although
the closed sets in this topology are not sets, but proper classes (except for the empty
set): they are the classes of models of sets of sentences. The space of all structures
has a Kolmogorov (T0 ) quotient that is a set: it is the space of complete theories of
structures. If one replaces sentences with their logical equivalence classes, then the set
of sentences becomes a Boolean algebra, called a Lindenbaum algebra; and the complete theories of structures become ultrafilters of the Lindenbaum algebra. By means
of the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem, the Stone space consisting of all ultrafilters of the
Lindenbaum algebra is easily shown to be compact. Or one could look instead at the
spectrum, consisting of the prime ideals of the corresponding Boolean ring; the spectrum of every ring is compact. The Compactness Theorem says more: every ultrafilter
of the Lindenbaum algebra is derived from the complete theory of a structure.
The compactness theorem for propositional logic can be seen as a version of the theorem that the product of two-element discrete spaces (or indeed any compact Hausdorff
spaces) is compact. The Compactness Theorem for first-order logic does not follow so
readily, though it can be seen to result from a kind of reduction of first-order logic to
propositional logic. Then Lindstroms Theorem is roughly that there is no such reduction for certain more expressive logics but see that tutorial for more. Sometimes the
Compactness Theorem is derived from the Completeness Theorem: see that tutorial for
more. Meanwhile, the present tutorial is intended to fill out the foregoing sketch of the
Compactness Theorem as such.
Bibliography
1. John W. Dawson, Jr., The compactness of first-order logic: from Godel
to Lindstrom, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 14(1), 1993, pp. 1537.
2. Kurt Godel, The completeness of the axioms of the functional calculus of logic,
in [8], first published in 1930, pp. 582591.
3. J.D. Halpern and A. Levy, The Boolean prime ideal theorem does not imply
the axiom of choice, in Axiomatic Set Theory, Proceedings of Symposium of Pure
Mathematics, Vol. XIII, Part I, American Mathematical Society, 1971, pp. 83134.
4. Wilfrid Hodges, Model Theory, Encyclopedia of Mathematics and its Applications,
volume 42, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
5. Anatoli Ivanovic Malcev, The metamathematics of algebraic systems. Collected
papers: 19361967, translated, edited and provided with supplementary notes by
Benjamin Franklin Wells, III, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics,
volume 66, North-Holland, 1971.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

6. Thoralf Skolem, Some remarks on axiomatized set theory, in [8], first published
in 1923, pp. 290301.
7. Alfred Tarski, Some notions and methods on the borderline of algebra and metamathematics, in Proceedings of the International Congress of Mathematicians,
vol. 1, American Mathematical Society, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1952, pp. 705720.
8. Jean van Heijenoort, editor, From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in Mathematical
Logic, 18791931, Harvard University Press, 2002.
9. Ernst Zermelo, Investigations in the foundations of set theory I, in [8], first published
in 1908, pp. 199215.
10. Max Zorn, A remark on method in transfinite algebra, Bulletin of American
Mathematical Society, vol. 41(10), 1935, pp. 667670.

Logic and the Theory of Relativity

kely
Gergely Sze
Institute of Mathematics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences
turms@renyi.hu
There are several reasons why both special and general relativity theories are interesting from the point of view of logic. For example, both theories contain many surprising predictions and interesting concepts (such as the Twin Paradox, curved space
and time, etc.). Also general relativity predicts self-referential situations (possibility of
time travel) in spacetimes as Godels rotating universe.
These predictions, concepts and models clearly deserve some deep logical investigation and understanding. That is why our research school lead by Hajnal Andreka and
Istvan Nemeti aims to develop a logic based foundation for relativity theories.
Among other we aim to axiomatize relativity theories using simple, comprehensible
and transparent basic assumptions (axioms); and to prove all the surprising predictions
(theorems) of relativity theories using a minimal number of convincing axioms. However, we are not aiming to have one axiom system, but we are building a whole net-like
hierarchy of axiom systems and logical connections between them. And we not only
axiomatize relativity theories, but also analyze their logical and conceptual structures.
Some of the questions we study to investigate relativity theories are:

What is believed and why?

Which axioms are responsible for certain predictions?
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Tutorials

Can we change the axioms and at what price?

What happens if we discard some axioms?

A novelty in our approach is that we try to keep the transition from special relativity to general relativity logically transparent and illuminating. We are going to
derive the axioms of general relativity from those of special relativity in two natural
steps. First we extend special relativity of inertial observers to a theory of accelerated
observers. Then we eliminate the difference between inertial and non inertial observers
in the level of axioms.
Among others, logical analysis makes relativity theory modular: we can replace
some axioms with other ones, and our logical machinery ensures that we can continue
working in the modified theory. This modularity might come handy, e.g., when we want
to extend general relativity and quantum theory to a unified theory of quantum gravity.

Session 1: Axiomatic theory of special relativity

Session 2: Axiomatic theory of accelerated observers
Session 3: Axiomatic theory of general relativity

Bibliography:
1. J.X. Madarasz, I. Nemeti and G. Szekely, Twin Paradox and the Logical Foundation of Relativity Theory, Foundations of Physics, vol. 36(5), 2006, pp. 681714,
doi:10.1007/s10701-005-9041-9.
2. H. Andreka, J.X. Madarasz and I. Nemeti, Logic of spacetime and relativity,
in Handbook of Spatial Logics, edited by M. Aiello, I. Pratt-Hartmann and J. van
Benthem, Springer, 2007, pp. 607711, doi:10.1007/978-1-4020-5587-4 11.
3. H. Andreka, J.X. Madarasz, I. Nemeti and G. Szekely, A logic road from special relativity to general relativity, Synthese, vol. 186(3), 2012, pp. 633649,
doi:10.1007/s11229-011-9914-8.
4. H. Andreka, J.X. Madarasz, I. Nemeti, M. Stannett and G. Szekely, Faster than
light motion does not imply time travel, Classical and Quantum Gravity, vol. 31(9),
doi:10.1088/0264-9381/31/9/095005.

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Logic and Fiction

John Woods
Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Canada
john.woods@ubc.ca
We will consider the impact of three ontologically parsimonious principles or assumptions on the logic of fiction and on the efforts of others to produce an intellectually
satisfying natural language semantics for fictional discourse.
Parmenides Law: There is nothing whatever that doesnt exist.
Kripkes Law: No referring expression refers unless there is something to which it refers.
The Fiction Law: There is no object that any object of fiction is. The objects of fiction
dont exist.
Our particular purpose will be to determine whether a plausible semantics of fiction
is possible under these tight constraints.
Three options will be considered:

A double-aspect semantics
An inferentialist semantics
A no-ambiguity semantics

Bibliography:
1. John Woods and Jillian Isenberg, Psychologizing the semantics of fiction, Methodos 03/2010, doi:10.4000/methodos.2387. This is background for the dual-aspect
option. The paper is available on my webpage at http://www.johnwoods.ca/
PrePrints/PsychologizingtheSemanticsofFictionrevisedJohnlatest.doc.
2. John Woods, Objectless truths, see link below, pages 1525.
3. John Woods, How robust can inconsistency get?, IfCoLog Journal of Logics and
their Applications, vol. 1, no. 1, pp. 177216, 2014. Pages 190204 are all that
is needed for the no-ambiguity option. But pages 205 onwards might also be of
interest. The paper can be accessed from http://www.johnwoods.ca/PrePrints/
IR14VersionOne.doc.
Here some notes for attendees to read the notes as either background or at least
concurrent material.

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Part III
5th World Congress
on Universal Logic

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7 Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

A Dual Representation Theory of Quantum Systems
and its Ontological Consequences
Gianfranco Basti 1
Pontifical Lateran University, Rome, Italy
basti@pul.it
In the framework of formal philosophy, we present the formal ontology of the natural
realism (NR) as a formalization of the ontology of the quantum field theory (QFT) in
fundamental physics, as far as QFT is based on a dual (algebra/coalgebra) representation theory of quantum systems. Indeed, the QFT differently from the quantum
mechanics (QM), and the so-called standard interpretation of QFT based on QM
is fundamentally a thermal field theory. It offers, therefore, one only theoretical
framework to fundamental physics, from the microscopic relativistic realm of quantum
physics (Standard Model), to the macroscopic realm of the condensed matter physics,
the physics of biological and neural systems included. Because of the Third Principle
of Thermodynamics, indeed, no quantum system can be considered as energetically
closed, because it is always open to the irreducible fluctuations of the underlying
quantum vacuum (QV). In this way, the theoretical framework of QFT is based on
the doubling of the degrees of freedom (DDF) between the system and its thermal
bath, represented through the duality, in the category theory (CT) sense, between a
q-deformed Hopf algebra (representing the system) and its opposite q-deformed Hopf
coalgebra (its thermal bath), where q is a thermal parameter (the cosmological evolution parameter), and the functor projecting each structure onto its dual opposite (the
mapping signature) is the functor G of the Bogoliubov thermal transform. Therefore,
the notion of duality between Universal Algebra (UA) Universal Coalgebra (UC),
independently developed in theoretical computer science (TCS), has an immediate relevance for quantum logic and ontology. In TCS, indeed, the semantics of the different
steps of a given program, as far as satisfiable in a sequence of physical states of a
computing system (interpreted as a labeled state transition system (STS)), can be
formalized as the duality between an initial (sub-)algebra and its final (sub-)coalgebra.
This depends on the definition of the UC structures on Aczels non-wellfounded sets,
allowing the set self-inclusion, and therefore the existence of unbounded sequences of
set inclusions with no-total ordering among sets. The immediate relevance of UC for
quantum logic and ontology is related with the possibility of formally defining in the
1

Keynote speaker of the workshop Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals and Machines
(page 154).

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UC framework, the non-extensional notions of bisimilarity (homomorphism up to
isomorphism) and hence of observational equivalence that are dual to the extensional
notion of equivalence by congruence in UA. Consequently, the powerful method of
proof by coinduction is allowed in UC, as dual to the proof by induction in UA.
From the formal ontology standpoint, these notions explain why it is possible to give in
UC a formal proof of completeness of Kripkes relational semantics in ML, extended to
the possibility of infinite inclusions among Kripke models, so to justify the TCS dictum
that modal logics are coalgebraic. The ML of NR is therefore the KD45 system,
defined on Aczel non-wellfounded sets, allowing a non-transitivity of the inclusion relations, and hence their branching, by using the Euclidean relation on them (the ML
axiom 5). In such a way, we can formally justify, in the quantified ML semantics of
NR, the use of evaluations based on bounded morphisms (bisimilarities) among Kripke
models, the logical completeness of their unbounded sequences, and the consequent
theory of stratified rigidity. These notions constitute the core of the NR ontology, as
far as formalizing the causal inclusions of natural kinds (genus/species branching) of
ever more complex physical systems, as characteristic of the QFT evolutionary cosmology, based on the DDF between q-deformed Hopf algebras/coalgebras. More generally,
the NR ontology can formalize, in terms of the CT dualities algebras/coalgebras, with
the inversion of arrows and of compositions characterizing them, the duality between
the logical implication (direct implication, in its modal version: it is impossible that
the premise is true and the consequence is false), and the ontic implication (converse
implication: it is impossible that the effect exists, without its cause exist), originally
suggested by Aquinas in XIII cent. for justifying the ontological bi-conditional (), as
distinguished from the logical bi-conditional ().

There is no logical negation: Confessions

of a former logical exhaustivist
Jc Beall 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Connecticut, USA
University of Tasmania, Australia
jc.beall@uconn.edu
I used to think that the paradoxes teach us that there are gluts, much as the
pioneer Asenjo and later Asenjo-Tamburino and later, and clearer, and much better
known Routley/Sylvan, Mortensen, Priest maintained. The argument appealed to
the exhaustive behavior of logical negation: by logics lights, at least one of A and
its logical negation A is true. Throw in typical paradoxes of circularity, together
with foundational principles governing the target notions, and the gluts seem to roll
out. Of course, just as Asenjo and later glut theorists noted, true glutty theories are
1

Keynote speaker of the session Philosophy (page 339).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

absurd if logical negation is also exclusive, that is, if by logics lights every sentence A
together with its logical negation (logically) entails every sentence (including the scary
ones, the absurd ones, and so on). (This makes the negation operator exclusive in the
sense of excluding the possibility of closed theories that are negation-inconsistent but
short of containing all sentences, where negation-inconsistency is defined as containing
a negation using the given negation operator together with the given negatum.)
But why not the dual response, as is more standard (e.g., the Strong Kleene type
approaches, including recently Kripke, Horsten, Field, and others)? Why not instead
think that the familiar paradoxes tell against exhaustion (but not against exclusion)?
For a long time, Ive had no satisfactory answer to this question, but nonetheless kept
clinging to my logical exhaustivist ways (according to which logical negation is exhaustive).
I still have no satisfactory answer. But my lack of answer has finally pushed me to go
straight: namely, reject both exhaustion and exclusion. If you can justify giving up one
or the other feature (exhaustive, exclusive) but cant in a honest, satisfying fashion
justify giving up one particular side over the other (say, exhaustion over exclusion,
or vice versa), then give up both (provided the initial, antecedent justification remains
intact). And so I now do, openly and publicly: I reject that logical negation is either
exclusive or exhaustive (by logics lights). Thats my confession.
The question is: where does this leave us? My talk gives some answers to this
question by answering or gesturing at answers to the following questions. (My
answers/gestures are in fact snippets from a bigger project.)
Q1. Are there arguments for going weaker than the standard K3 or LP subclassical
logics say, FDE-ish?
A1. Yes. One argument stems from aesthetic considerations of logic (qua topic-neutral
universal closure relation for our theories): each of K3 and LP give a lopsided
picture of logic, whereas something like FDE doesnt. Another argument (related
to the first): each of the K3 and LP approaches to paradox have dual virtues and
dual problems, and so neither (lopsided-logic) framework has clear benefits over the
other; and so a more balanced FDE picture is motivated. (And the FDE-ish picture
seems to be able to accommodate all of the virtues of the lopsided pictures without
gaining any vices.)
Q2. Whats left of logical negation?
A2. Not much. Indeed, in an important sense, there just is no interesting negation
connective that logic characterizes on its own. (E.g., there is no connective that, according to logic, has stand-alone behavior characterized by, say, the classical sequent
rules for negation.) My current view on logic is roughly this: That whatever arguments we had for thinking that logic is subclassical remain (and arguments in this
vicinity are tricky indeed); but giving up the exclusion/exhaustive view of negation
puts logic closer to Anderson-Belnap FDE than to any of its stronger extensions
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

(e.g., K3 or LP extensions). (Terminology: saying that logic is subclassical is to say,
roughly, that if an argument is logically valid, then its valid according to classical
logic.)
Q3. But how then do we explain the apparent ubiquity of classical negation?
A3. If it looks like classical negation, it isnt logical negation; it is instead some operator
whose apparent classical-negation behavior is delivered by some more-than-logical
entailment relation. (Logic, as per A2, wont give such behavior. So, the behavior comes about not from the base, ubiquitous logical entailment operator the
base, universal closure operator on theories but rather via some stronger entailment relation serving as a closure relation for theories in which the given classicalnegation-looking operator appears. (See my work on shrieking theories. In effect,
the apparent classical-negation behavior is behavior imposed by theory-specify entailment or closure relations; it isnt imposed by logic itself.))
Q4. If logic doesnt impose exhaustive behavior on all of our theories (e.g., excluded
middle isnt valid according to logic), we lose all motivation for gluts. No?
A4. No. One argument, which I in fact find plausible, is from naturalness. I will briefly
discuss this in the talk. Such an argument will not be as prima facie powerful as
invoking logic; but that is the price of having a weak logic namely, that the
existence gluts, gaps, etc is a matter on which logic remains nicely neutral.
Q5. If logic is so utterly weak, what possible connection could it have to reasoning
to our rational acceptance and/or rejection behavior?
A5. The answer is that it has its traditional connection: it rules out various patterns of
change in view or acceptance/rejection patterns, but doesnt force one to accept
much (if any) at all. (In this respect, lessons from Gilbert Harman were largely
right.)
Q6. If logic provides so very little by way of constraining our theories (neither exclusivist
or exhaustivist constraints), then how do we come up with constraints on our true
theories?
A6. The answer is the one our parents taught us: rational life is hard; its as if being
on a raft. (See Neurath, Quine, and many others.)

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From syllogisms to syllogistic consequences:

a turning point in the history of logic
Julie Brumberg-Chaumont 1
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, France
European University Institute, Florence, Italy
ulieephe5paris@hotmail.com
The aim of this paper is to weight to theoretical and historical drawbacks of the
inclusion of syllogistic within a general theory of consequences especially as observed
in the English logical tradition that culminated in North Italy in the 14th and the 15th
centuries, while full commentaries on the Posterior Analytics kept on being continuously
produced in the same time, whether in scholastic or humanistic circles. The result is not
so much the eclipse of the Prior Analytics, not commented upon any longer during the
15th century in Italy, and reduced to the sole assertoric and modal syllogistics, but the
very idea of considering syllogisms as consequences, be they formally valid. This means
that important features syllogisms have not as inferences but as arguments (which they
are) are left apart, and that the two Analytics are cut apart; many arguments that
connect the two Analytics as a two-steps theory of deduction and proof are left out of
sight, such as the analytical logic of proof and discovery.

Paraconsistent probability theory: betting rationally

under contradiction
Juliana Bueno-Soler 2
State University of Campinas, Limeira, Brazil
juliana@ft.unicamp.br
I intend to show how probability measures can be neatly introduced in connection
to certain (paraconsistent) Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs), and how such measures can be viewed as degrees of rational belief under contradiction. I argue that
the distribution of degrees of belief under the pressure of contradictions by an ideally
rational agent can be supported by paraconsistent probability axioms, and that this
philosophical stance leads to a new, simpler and yet useful, paraconsistent theory of
probability.
Among other features, probabilistic reasoning under contradictions can be naturally
extended to appropriate notions of conditional probability and updating, via a version
of Bayes Theorem for conditionalization. It will be shown how those paraconsistent
probabilities can be identified, as much as in the classical case, with expectations of
1
2

Keynote speaker of the workshop Medieval Logic (page 193).

Keynote speaker of the session Paraconsistency (page 273).

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

truth values of sentences, and how they can provide more relaxed, but still pragmatically meaningful, constraints on rational belief. It will be also shown that the dissimilarity between the notions of contradiction and inconsistency, one of the pillars of
LFIs, plays a central role in this proposed extension of the notion of probability and
poses interesting problems related to paraconsistent versions of Dutch Book Arguments.
Reference
1. J. Bueno-Soler and W. Carnielli, Title of the paper, May be and may be not:
paraconsistent probability from the LFI viewpoint, vol. 15, no. 2, 2015, pp. 1
25, published online at ftp://ftp.cle.unicamp.br/pub/e-prints/vol.15,n_
2,2015.pdf

Hypothetical Syllogism in Avicenna

yu
kada 1
Samet Bu
Istanbul Medeniyet University, Istanbul,

Turkey
Even though one of the controversial topics in Arabic logic is about Avicennas works
and from 10th to 14th century it is seen an Aristotelian effect on the writings of Arabic
logicians, they are not wholly a rethinking or commenting of Aristotle. Hypothetical
Syllogism, in this respect, comes to light and shows its importance beneath the studies
of Avicenna. Although there may seem the first related issues in Aristotles Prior
Analytics with the statement of syllogism from hypothesis, the more fundamental
and systematic studies are seen within the era between Peripatetic school and Stoics.
As a medieval Arabic philosopher, Avicenna, deals with the hypothetical syllogism
in his The Book of Healing (as-Sifa) and makes several striking claims on conditional
propositions and syllogisms. He develops a non-Aristotelian tradition into his treatment
of syllogistic, especially on categorical and conditional. The quantified hypothetical
propositions, analysis of inferences of categorical and hypothetical syllogism and his
understanding of wholly hypothetical conjunctive syllogistic with quantified condition
can be shown as the main titles of this issue. Decidedly, though his ideas are inherited
from Ancient Greek and particularly Alfarabi in some respect, my aim at this point is
(1) to show the key points of this heritage from Aristotle to Alfarabi and (2) to state
the originality of Avicenna within the concept of hypothetical syllogism.

Keynote speaker of the session History (page 363).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

The theory of topos-theoretic bridges,

five years later
Olivia Caramello 1
University of Paris 7, France
olivia@oliviacaramello.com
The methodology of topos-theoretic bridges was introduced in [1]. This technique
allows to effectively use Grothendieck toposes as unifying spaces for transferring notions,
properties and results across different mathematical theories having an equivalent or a
strictly related semantic content. Throughout the past five years this theory has generated many applications in different mathematical areas, such as model theory, proof
theory, algebra, topology, functional analysis and algebraic geometry. We shall review
the basics of the theory and make a survey of the most significant applications obtained
so far (such as [2, 3, 4]).
References
1. O. Caramello, The unification of Mathematics via Topos Theory, arXiv:math.CT/
1006.3930.
2. O. Caramello Frasses construction from a topos-theoretic perspective, Logica
Universalis, vol. 8, no. 2, 2014, pp. 261281
3. O. Caramello, Topological Galois Theory, arXiv:math.CT/1301.0300, 2013.
4. O. Caramello, A topos-theoretic approach to Stone-type dualities, arXiv:1103.3493,
2011.

Is the Church-Turing Thesis the new Pythagoreanism?

Ahmet C
evik 2
Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey
a.cevik@hotmail.com
The Church-Turing Thesis (CTT) is a philosophical claim that the class of effectively computable functions is precisely the class of functions computable by a Turing machine. Since this hypothesis has not been violated for almost 80 years now, it
motivates me to think about a suitable ontological and epistemological philosophy of
mathematics compatible with CTT.
1
2

Keynote speaker of the session Algebra and Category (page 370).

Keynote speaker of the session Computation (page 349).

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In a broad sense, Pythagoreanism says that everything in the universe can be expressed with the natural numbers and their ratios. Therefore, Pythagoreanism gives a
complete description of the universe and the objects in it via natural numbers. Similarly, CTT says that the complete description of our intuitive computation is provided
by Turing machines. Neither Pythagoreanism nor CTT allows further expansion towards inexpressibility and the possibility of the existence of objects, in their domain,
beyond their expressive barrier. One may say that both Pythagoreanism and CTT are
complete in expressibility. Respectively, one regarding the complete expressibility of
the universe itself via natural numbers, the other regarding the complete expressibility
of the intuitive notion of computation via Turing machines. The relationship between
these two will be based on this type of completeness. Hence, one may say that CTT
holds a new-Pythagoreanistic position, in the new era of formalization and computability, in a sense that computational knowledge is acquired by formulations which can be
explained by mechanical meanings.
I shall investigate a possible ontological philosophy of mathematics taking CTT as a
primary assumption. The main focus will be on a theme called idealistic abstractionism.
Idealism in this context, as a consequence of the formalistic nature of CTT, is based
on the rejection of the existence of a pre-determined consistent Platonic universe of
mathematical objects. Abstractionism, as an Aristotelian view, provides a framework
for the ontological status of mathematical objects regarding where they are originated
from, assuming CTT. The investigated philosophy can be seen to be Pythagoreanistic
due to the relationship between Pythagoreanism and CTT based on the expressivecompleteness of both views.

Identity Statements, Doxastic Co-Indexation

and Freges Puzzle
Eros Corraza 1
LCLI, The University of the Basque Country
Carleton University, Ottawa, Canada

Keynote speaker of the workshop Freges Puzzle (page 239).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

Representation and Reality:

Humans, Animals and Machines
Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic 1
Chalmers University of Technology and Gothenburg University,
Gothenburg, Sweden
dodig@chalmers.se
Symposium Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals and Machines at UNILOG
2015 can be seen as the continuation of the previous two symposia organized by Gordana
Dodig-Crnkovic and Raffaela Giovagnoli: Computing Nature, on the AISB/IACAP
World Congress 2012, that resulted with the book Computing Nature published by
Springer in 2013, and Representation: Humans, Animals and Machines at the AISB50
Convention at Goldsmith 2014, that will result in a new book published by Springer in
2015 under the title Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals and Machines.
Contributors are Terrence Deacon, Jan van Leeuwen and Jir Wiedermann, Clare
Horsman, Susan Stepney, Viv Kendon, David Zarebsky, Dean Petters, John Hummel, Martin J
uttner, Ellie Wakui, Jules Davidoff, Gianfranco Basti, Gordana DodigCrnkovic, Marcin Milkowski, Hector Zenil, Marcin J. Schroeder, Raffaela Giovagnoli,
Rajakishore Nath, Philip Larrey, Matej Hoffmann, Vincent M
uller, Ferdinando Cavaliere,
Yasemin J. Erden, Roberta Lanfredini, Tom Froese, Jean-Yves Beziau, Angela Ales
Bello, Jesus Ezquerro, Mauricio Iza, Henri Prade and Gilles Richard.
They address diverse facets of the relationships between representation and reality
in humans, animals and machines such as: life versus engineering; knowledge, representation and the dynamics of computation; the role of representation in signal processing
in biological systems; the realism of human and machine cognitive ontologies; the visual representations used for object recognition in middle childhood and adulthood;
the quantum field theory (QFT) dual paradigm in fundamental physics and the semantic information content and measure in cognitive sciences; reality construction in
cognitive agent through info-computation; modeling empty representations: the case
of computational models of hallucination; cognition, information & subjective computation; information integration; the social dimension of human representation and its
relevance for the web; mind & machine; machine super-human intelligence; trade-offs
in exploiting body morphology for control: from simple bodies and model-based control to complex ones with model-free distributed control schemes; a distinctive logic
for ontologies and semantic search engines; models, maps and metaphors and why the
brain is not a computer; matter, representation and motion in the phenomenology of
the mind; enactive criticisms of info-computationalism; rationality and representation;
on the difference among animals, humans and machines; cognitive processing; a general
representation setting for capturing homogeneity and heterogeneity.
1

Keynote speaker of the workshop of the same title of this abstract (page 154).

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

In my keynote address I will give a short account of different contributions to the
book and their relationship to the topic of the symposium and to each other and
focus on my view of the process of reality construction in cognitive agent through infocomputation within the framework of info-computational constructivism. Cognition
in this framework is capacity of every living organism. Even a single cell while alive
constantly cognizes, that is registers inputs from the world and its own body, ensures its
own continuous existence through metabolism and food hunting while avoiding dangers
that could cause its disintegration or damage.
Unicellular organisms such as bacteria communicate and build swarms or films with
far more advanced capabilities formed through social cognition. In general groups
of smaller systems cluster into bigger ones and this layered organization provides information processing benefits. Brains in animals also consist of many cells mutually
communicating. Interesting and unexpected is the fact that single neuron is a relatively
simple information processor, while the whole brain possess much more advanced cognizing capacities.
References
1. G. Dodig-Crnkovic, Modeling Life as Cognitive Info-Computation, in Computability in Europe 2014, edited by Arnold Beckmann, Erzsebet Csuhaj-Varj
u and Klaus
Meer. In Proceedings of the 10th Computability in Europe 2014: Language, Life,
Limits, Lecture Notes in Computer Sciences, Springer, Budapest, Hungary, 2014.
2. G. Dodig-Crnkovic, Info-computational Constructivism and Cognition, Constructivist Foundations, 9(2), 2014, pp. 223231.
3. G. Dodig-Crnkovic, Information, Computation, Cognition. Agency-based Hierarchies of Levels., in Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, edited by V.C.
M
uller, Synthese Library, Springer, 2015 (forthcoming).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

The ontology of logical form:

formal ontology vs. formal deontology
Elena Dragalina-Chernaya 1
Higher School of Economics, National Research University,
Moscow, Russia
edragalina@gmail.com
The intuition of formality is a methodological principle traditionally used to demarcate the boundaries of logic. A variety of interpretations of this intuition is possible.
As J.-Y. Beziau put it, form is like a multi-headed dragon: cut one head, three more
heads grow (Beziau 2008, 20). The main aim of this paper is to show the advantages
of shifting focus from substantial towards dynamic model of formality, i.e. from formal
ontology (the domain of higher order formal objects, e.g. hypostases of structurally
invariant properties of models) to formal deontology (the domain of rules-governed and
goals-directed activity). Substantial model goes back to the Aristotelian form versus
matter dichotomy, though, as J. MacFarlane pointed out, the father of both formal
logic and hylomorphism was not the father of logical hylomorphism (MacFarlane 2000,
255). Substantial hylomorphism considers logic as a theory of formal relations which
takes their general properties and turns them into general laws of reasoning. I am going
to systematize the variety of substantial hylomorphism according to different types of
formal relations, e.g. transcendental relations (scholasticism); psychological relations
(E. Husserl); ideal relations (A. Meinong); relations of ideas in themselves (B. Bolzano);
metalogical relations (N. Vasiliev) and logical relations (A. Tarski). For example, Tarski
explained the concept of logical notions as exactly those which are invariant under arbitrary permutations of the underlying domain of individuals. He proposed the following
general philosophical interpretation of his invariance criterion, our logic is logic of cardinality. Because of the overgeneration of the criterion (Tarskis criterion assimilates
logic to set theory; see McGee 1996, Feferman 2010) and its undergeneration with respect to modal logics (MacFarlane, 2000, Dutilh Novaes 2014) permutation invariance
cannot be considered as necessary and sufficient criterion of logicality. According to C.
Dutilh Novaes, [p]ermutation invariance is above all an adequate formal explanans for
the notions of quantity and quantification (Dutilh Novaes 2014, 86). In this paper I
argue that Tarskis thesis of our logic as logic of cardinality is not correct even for
the theory of polyadic quantification. Distinguishing relations of equal power polyadic
quantifiers take into account not only the cardinality of classes of numerically identical
individual, but also the structures or types of the ordering of the universe. Furthermore,
the model-theoretical approach based on the relation of language to model structures is
incapable of recording the dynamic of such ordering. The treatment of the types of isomorphism as formal objects does not involve the application of formality characteristics
to the activity as a result of which formal objects arise. Switching attention to this ac1

Keynote speaker of the workshop The Idea of Logic: Historical Perspectives (page 115).

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tivity means in turn a transition from substantive to dynamic model of formality. The
dynamic model of formality goes back to the scholastic conception of logic as a formal
art. The dynamic formality characterizes a special way to following the rule. Thus, its
various modifications may be classified into two clusters according to J. Rawls and J.
Searles dichotomy of constitutive and regulative rules. The explication of the constitutive formality in Wittgensteins project of philosophical grammar will be sketched. I
am going to compare substantial (model-theoretical) and dynamic (game-theoretical)
approaches to the exegesis of Wittgensteins thesis that colors possess logical structures, focusing on his puzzle proposition that there can be a bluish green but not a
reddish green (Wittgenstein 1977). What is gained, then, is a new game-theoretical
framework for the logic of forbidden (e.g., reddish green and bluish yellow) colors.
Acknowledgments. This study (research grant no. 14-01-0020) was supported by The
National Research UniversityaHigher School of Economics Academic Fund Program
in 2014/2015.
References
1. J.-Y. Beziau, What is formal logic?, in Proceedings of the XXII World Congress
of Philosophy, Logic and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 13, 2008, pp. 922.
2. C. Dutilh Novaes, The Undergeneration of Permutation Invariance as a Criterion
for Logicality, Erkenntnis, vol. 79, no. 1, 2014, pp. 8197.
3. S. Feferman, Set-theoretical invariance criteria for logicality, Notre Dame Journal
of Formal Logic , vol. 51, 2010, pp. 320.
4. J. MacFarlane, What does it mean to say that logic is formal?, PhD dissertation,
Pittsburgh University, 2000.
5. V. McGee, Logical operations logicality, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 25,
1996, pp. 567580.
6. A. Tarski, What are logical notions?, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 7,
1986, pp. 143154.
7. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on Colour, Blackwell, Oxford, 1977.

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Cut-free proofs for more and more logics

Melvin Fitting 1
City University of New York, New York, USA
melvin.fitting@gmail.com
Perhaps universally, if a formal logic has a proof theory, it will have an axiomatic
one. But axiomatic systems are difficult to use, do not yield important metatheoretic
results like interpolation, and are generally useless for proof automation. Ever since
they were introduced in the 1930s, cut free proof systems have been the preferred
alternative to axiomatic systems. They provide the insights and formal consequences
that axiomatics does not. Generally speaking, cut free systems come in two forms,
forward reasoning (sequent calculi) and backward reasoning (tableau systems). These
are dual to each other and can be seen as notational variants.
Unfortunately, most logics do not (or are not known to) possess cut free proof
systems. I want to tell a story about my own work on this, stretching over more years
than I prefer to remember. I am hardly the only person who has contributed to this,
but it is impossible in a short time to cover the whole history. (I must mention the
work of Jan von Plato and Sara Negri here, though I will not discuss it in my talk.)
Confining the discussion to a more-or-less personal history provides a coherence that
may help those unfamiliar with the subject, or so it is hoped.
Early on there were tableau and sequent calculus systems for a small number of
classically based modal logics, say half a dozen or so. Formal machinery was expanded
using prefixes for tableaus (1970s) and nesting for sequent systems (2000s). This
encompassed around two dozen familiar modal logics. Quite recently this machinery has
been further enhanced using set prefixes for tableaus and indexed nesting for sequents
(current work). We now are able to handle infinitely many modal logics. The work
extends naturally to intuitionistic based modal logics as well, but I will not cover this.
We probably will never know which formal logics have cut free proof systems. Indeed, it is not even a well-formulated question, since one can add machinery (as above)
in unexpected ways. One recognizes a cut free system when one has it, but there is no
good abstract definition that I know of. We progress, but cannot know when the work
is done.

Keynote speaker of the session Universal (page 243).

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In search for a conceptual logic of information

Luciano Floridi 1
Oxford Internet Institute, University of Oxford, UK
luciano.floridi@oii.ox.ac.uk
Philosophy is often concerned with structural ways of analysing systems and their
dynamics. Before the advent of modern mathematical logic, such structural studies
could simply be considered as part of logic. Today, this would be very misleading. But
so would be the use of labels such as informal logic and philosophical logic, already
appropriated by other branches of philosophy. So, for lack of a better expression, I
shall refer to them as conceptual logics. Modernity has been dominated by two main
conceptual logics, Kants and Hegels. Kants transcendental logic concerns the study of
the conditions of possibility of a system under investigation. It is therefore consistent
with causal and genetic forms of reasoning, with the identification of necessary and
sufficient conditions, with past-oriented analyses of what must have been the case for
something else to be the case, and with the natural sciences. Hegels dialectical logic
concerns the study of dynamic equilibria. It is therefore more easily associated with
polarised and procedural ways of reasoning, with the identification of contrasts and
their resolutions, with present-oriented analyses of processes and mutual interactions,
and with the social sciences. The two conceptual logics can be seen at work in philosophers such as Marx (Hegel) and Husserl (Kant). They are not incompatible and can
easily be found interacting, e.g. in Foucault. Both investigate systems as something
given, whether in the natural universe or in human history. And both move from the
system to the model understood as a description of it, so to speak, looking for generalities and patterns. Neither is a conceptual logic of construction, which moves from
the model, now understood as a prescription (blueprint), to its implementation as a
realised system. Such a gap in our philosophical reasoning is pressing today because of
the rising importance of computer science as a poietic science, which does not just describe its objects, but actually builds them, and empowers other sciences to build their
own, through simulations, algorithms, and big-data-based research. In my presentation
I shall address such a gap. I shall explore the possibility that the conceptual logic of
construction that we need may be the conceptual logic of information, and that this
may be consistent with design-oriented forms of reasoning, with the identification of requirements and constraints, with future-oriented analyses of what could work, and with
the engineering sciences. Such a poietic logic would concern the study of design projects.

Keynote speaker of the workshop Logic and Information (page 221).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

First-Order Logic and First-Order Functions

Rodrigo Freire 1
University of Braslia, Braslia, Brazil
rodrigofreire@unb.br
In the first part of my talk I will expound basic ideas and goals of the theory of firstorder functions. First-order functions were introduced by me as the proper first-order
correlate of truth-functions. I think the study of those functions has shed new light on
first-order logic and on its relation with propositional logic. Secondly, I would like to
show how the introduction of first-order functions gives us new directions of inquiry in
first-order logic.

Is there a Logical Reasoning Module in the Brain?

Vinod Goel 2
York University, Toronto, Canada
vgoel@yorku.ca
Logically, deductive reasoning is a closed system and thus a good candidate for a
cognitive module. However, neuropsychological research into the neural basis of reasoning has failed to identify a coherent module specifically activated during logical
reasoning. Rather, the data point to a fractionated system that is dynamically configured in response to certain task and environmental cues. We have explored four lines of
demarcation (Goel, 2007): (a) systems for processing familiar and unfamiliar content;
(b) conflict detection/resolution systems; (c) systems for dealing with determinate and
indeterminate inferences; and (d) systems for dealing with emotionally laden content.
Furthermore, meta-analysis studies indicate that different logical forms (e.g. categorical
syllogisms, conditionals, and transitive inferences) also recruit different neural systems.
I will review this evidence and discuss the implications for the psychology of logic.
Reference
1. V. Goel, Anatomy of deductive reasoning, Trends in Cognitive Sciences, vol. 11,
no. 10, 2007, pp. 435441.
1
2

Keynote speaker of the session Tools and Results (page 313).

Keynote speaker of the session Cognition (page 256).

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Truth-functional alternative to epistemic logic

(and its application to Fitchs paradox)
Ekaterina Kubyshkina 1
Paris 1 Panthe
on-Sorbonne, Paris, France
Universite
ekoubychkina@gmail.com
It is common to formalize the expressions of the form agent a knows x by the
use of an epistemic operator Ka x. Hintikka (1962) provides a non-functional semantic
interpretation of this operator in terms of possible worlds semantics. His interpretation
is intuitively clear when the formalization of the fact of knowing something is represented as syntactic operator K. My aim here is to introduce an epistemic system, in
which the K-operator does not appear, but the fact of knowing or not knowing some
truths (or the falsity of some statement) can be defined truth-functionally. In order to
obtain this system, we propose a four-valued logic, that we call the logic of a rational
agent. The valuations in this logic are intuitively understood as follows: true and
known to be true (T 1),true and unknown to be true (T 0),false and known to be
false (F 1) and false and unknown to be false (F 0). Thus, the fact of knowing something is formalized at the level of valuations, without the use of K-operator. On the
base of this semantics, a sound and complete system with two distinct truth-functional
negations (an ontological and an epistemic one) is provided. These negations allow
us to express the statements about knowing or not knowing something by an agent at
the syntactic level. Moreover, such a system may be applied to the analysis of Fitchs
paradox: if we accept the thesis that all truths are knowable, then all truths are already
known. In particular, we show that the paradox is not derivable in terms of the logic
of a rational agent.

Discourse and logical form

Ernest Lepore2
Rutgers Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, USA
lepore@ruccs.rutgers.edu
Traditionally, pronouns are treated as ambiguous between bound and demonstrative
uses. Bound uses are non-referential and function as bound variables; and demonstrative uses are referential, and pick out objects as determined by their linguistic meaning
and surrounding non-linguistic cues e.g., an accompanying demonstration or an appropriate and adequately transparent speakers intention. In this paper, we challenge
tradition and argue that both demonstrative and bound pronouns are dependent on,
1
2

Keynote speaker of the session Paradox (page 304).

Keynote speaker of the session Language (page 298).

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Talks of Invited Keynote Speakers

and co-vary with, antecedent expressions. Moreover, the semantic value of a pronoun
is never determined, even partly, by extra-linguistic cues;, it is fixed, invariably and
unambiguously, by features of its context of use governed entirely by linguistic rules.
We exploit the mechanisms of Centering and Coherence theories to develop a precise
and general meta-semantics for pronouns, according to which the semantic value of a
pronoun is determined by what is at the center of attention in a coherent discourse.
Since the notions of attention and coherence are, we argue, governed by linguistic rules,
we can give a uniform analysis of pronoun resolution that covers bound, demonstrative, and even discourse bound (E-type) readings. Just as the semantic value of the
first-person pronoun I is conventionally set by a particular feature of its context of
useanamely, the speaker so too, we argue, the semantic value, e.g., of he is conventionally set by a particular feature of its context of use. In this paper, we elucidate
what this feature is and how it works.

Leon Henkin on Completeness

Mara Manzano 1
Department of Philosophy, University of Salamanca, Spain
mara@usal.es
This research has been possible thanks to the research project sustained by Ministerio
de Ciencia e Innovacion of Spain with reference FFI2013-47126-P.
The Completeness of Formal Systems is the title of the thesis that Henkin presented
at Princeton in 1947, and his director was Alonzo Church. His renowned results on completeness for both type theory and first order logic are part of his thesis. It is interesting
to note that he obtained the proof of completeness of first order logic readapting the
argument found for the theory of types.
In 1963 Henkin published a completeness proof for propositional type theory, A
Theory of Propositional Types, where he devised yet another method not directly based
on his completeness proof for the whole theory of types.
It is surprising that the first-order proof of completeness that Henkin explained
in class was not his own but was developed by using Herbrands theorem and the
completeness of propositional logic.
Since we use the completeness of sentential logic in our proof, we effectively reduce
the completeness problem for first order logic to that of sentential logic.
We conclude this paper by pointing two of the many influences of his completeness proofs, one is the completeness of basic hybrid type theory and the other is in
correspondence theory, as developed in Extensions of First-order Logic.
In the book The Life and Work of Leon Henkin, recently published, there is a
complete chapter devoted to this issue, Henkin on Completeness.
1

Keynote speaker of the session Completeness (page 357).

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The completeness of FOL in Henkins course

The story behind this is that of Mara Manzano, who during the academic year of
1977-1978 attended his class of metamathematics for doctorate students at Berkeley.
Before each class Henkin would give us a text of some 4-5 pages that summarized what
was to be addressed in the class. The texts were printed in purple ink, done with
the old multicopiers that we called Vietnamese copiers and that were so often used
to (illegally) print pamphlets in our past revolutionary days in Spain against Franco
regime.
It is surprising that the first-order completeness proof that Henkin explained in class
was not his own but was developed by using Herbrands theorem and the completeness
of propositional logic. In what follows I will summarize the proof, but trying to maintain
close to the spirits of Henkins purple notes.
Theorem 1 (Herbrands Theorem). For each first-order sentence A there exist an
A in F OL iff there is
(infinite) set of sentences of propositional logic such that:
some H such that H in LP ( P L means that we just use sentential axioms and
detachment).
The above result can be regarded as a special case of the following
Theorem 2. Let L be a first order language: We can extend L to L by adjoining a
set C of individual constants, and we can effectively give a set of sentences of L with
the following property: For any set of sentences {A} Sent(L),
A iff

A.

PL

Proof. In the first place, we build a set , where

= 1 2 3 .
1 consists of the sentences xi B B(ci,B ) (for each xi B Sent(L )). 2 consists
of various formal axioms for quantifiers (from first order logic), and 3 consists of various formal axioms for the equality symbol (if there is one in the language L, otherwise
is ).
In the spirit of Herbrands theorem, an effective method of transforming any given
derivation of A from in P L into a formal derivation of A from in F OL was
given, which solves half of the theorem.

PL

A implies

A.

As for the other half,

A implies

PL

A.

Suppose now that we do not have LP A. Then if we use completeness of

propositional logic, P L A and we conclude that there is an assignment g for
atoms of L0 that extends to an interpretation I such that I(A) = F , but I( ) = T .
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In order to prove the theorem, from this interpretation I we obtain a first order
structure A such that A , but A

A, and so

A.
By soundness of first order logic,

A.
Predicate Logic Reduction to Sentential Logic: Using the previous theorem
we effectively reduce the completeness problem for first order logic to that of sentential
logic. To this effect the following proposition was proved.
Proposition 3. Theorem 2 and completeness of P L implies completeness of F OL.
Note that a proof of the kind described above, provides a completeness proof for
first order logic. For the theorem shows


A implies

PL

A.

On the other hand, using the structure A we show that

Therefore,

A implies

PL

A implies

A.

A, which is completeness for first order logic.

Another completeness proof he also developed in class was his result based on Craigs
interpolation theorem [7].

His renowned proof of the completeness

The theorem of completeness establishes the correspondence between deductive calculus and semantics. Godel had solved it positively for first-order logic and negatively
for any logical system able to contain arithmetic. The lambda calculus for the theory
of types [2], with the usual semantics over a standard hierarchy of types, was able to
express arithmetic and hence could only be incomplete. Henkin showed that if the
formulae were interpreted in a less rigid way, accepting other hierarchies of types that
did not necessarily have to contain all the functions but at least the definable ones, it
is easily seen that all consequences of a set of hypotheses are provable in the calculus.
The valid formulae with this new semantics, called general semantics, are reduced to
coincide with those generated by the rules of calculus.
As is well known, Henkins completeness theorem rests on the proof that every
consistent set of formulae has a model. Surprisingly, the model uses the expressions
themselves as objects; in particular their elements are equivalence classes of expressions,
the equivalence relationship being that of formal derivability of equality.
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Hierarchy of types The types are structured in a hierarchy that has the following
as basic types:

D1 is a non-empty set; that of individuals of the hierarchy.

D0 is the domain of truth values (since we are in binary logic, these values are
reduced to T and F ).

The other domains are constructed from the basic types as follows: if D and D
have already been constructed, we define D() as the domain formed by all the
functions from D to D .

To talk about this hierarchy, a formal language is introduced.

The hierarchy described above is standard, and the completeness result depended
on accepting other hierarchies of types that did not necessarily have to contain all the
functions but at least the definable ones. In particular, his main theorem reads:
Theorem 4. If is any consistent set of cffs (sentences), there is a general model (in
which each domain D of M is denumerable), with respect to which is satisfiable.
To prove this theorem the set is extended to a maximal consistent set which
serves both as an oracle and as building bricks for the model. Specifically, to identify
objects named by using M and N he made use of a criterion based on the calculus,
in particular the fact that M = N .
How does Henkin construct type hierarchies? On page 86 of Completeness in the
Theory of Types he says this:
We now define by induction on a a frame of domains {Da } and simultaneously
a one-to-one mapping of equivalence classes onto the domains Da such that
([a ]) is in Da .
Surprisingly, he obtained the proof of completeness of first-order logic later, readapting the argument found for the theory of types. Another interesting aspect that Henkin
himself pointed out is the non-constructive nature of the proof, despite coming from a
tradition as tightly bound to proofs with a constructive nature as those developed by
Church.
In 1963 Henkin published the paper An Extension of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation
Theorem, where we can find a different proof of completeness for first order logic. Craig
had shown the following theorem:
Theorem 5. If A and C are any formulas of predicate logic such that A C, then
there is a formula B such that (i) A B and B C, and (ii) each predicate symbol
occurring in B occurs both in A and in C.
Henkin recalls that due to the fact that the relations and coincide in extension
(by the strong completeness theorem), the above theorem is also valid if we replace the
syntactic notion of derivability by the semantical notion of consequence. However, his
idea was to obtain completeness from a slightly modified version of Craigs theorem:
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Notice, however, that if we alter Craigs theorem by replacing the symbol
with in the hypothesis, but leaving unchanged in condition (i) of the
conclusion, then the resulting proposition yields the completeness theorem as an
immediate corollary.
The main theorem to be proved is:
Theorem 6. Let and any sets of nnfs (negation normal formula) such that .
There is a nnf B such that (i) B and B , and (ii) any predicate symbol with a
positive or negative occurrence in B has an occurrence of the same sign in some formula
of and in some formula of .
The strong completeness theorem is implied by the previous one.
The proof of the theorem is done by contraposition and to arrive to the conclusion
that

Henkin inductively builds two sets of sentences and define a model based on
them using the technique he himself developed in his classical completeness proof [4].

Two results based on Henkins ideas

Let us highlight how Henkins general models are related to the theory of representation, or in other words: the correspondence theory and non-standard models. A
more detailed examination of this can be consulted in the article by Manzano entitledDivergencia y rivalidad entre Logicas [9] or in her book Extensions of First
Order Logic [8]. Currently, the proliferation of logics used in Philosophy, Informatics,
Linguistics and Mathematics make it crucial to achieve an operative reduction for all
of them. We attribute most of the ideas handled in the reduction to many-sorted logic
[8] to two articles by Henkin: Completeness in the theory of types from 1950, and the
one from 1953, Banishing the rule of substitution for functional variables. Nevertheless, with all the foregoing we do not wish to deceive possible readers. In the article
from 1950, there are no translations of formulae, and the language and many-sorted
calculus do not even appear explicitly. Regarding higher-order logic, as far as is known
many-sorted calculus appears for the first time in the 1953 article. In it, Henkin proposes the axiom of comprehension as an alternative to the substitution rule used in the
calculuses previously proposed for higher-order logic. If the axiom of comprehension is
removed from this calculus, one obtains the MSL calculus. There is also another idea
this time from the 1953 article that is also interesting and is as follows: If we
weaken the axiom of comprehension (for example, we restrict it to first-order formulae
or to translations of dynamic or modal formulae or to any other recursive set), we obtain calculuses in between MSL and SOL. And it is easy to find their corresponding
semantics. Naturally, the class of structures corresponding to them will be situated in
between F and GS. The new logic, let us call it XL, will also be complete. The reason
is because this class of models is axiomatizable.
In [1] a Basic Hybrid Type Theory is introduced. The goal of this paper is to
investigate whether basic hybridization also leads to simple Henkin-style completeness
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proofs in the setting of (classical) higher-order modal logic (that is, modal logics built
over Churchs simple theory of types [2], and as we shall show, the answer is yes. The
crucial idea is to use @i as a rigidifier for arbitrary types. We shall interpret @i a , where
a is an expression of any type a, to be an expression of type a that rigidly returns
the value that a receives at the i-world. As we show, this enables us to construct a
description of the required model inside a single MCS and hence to prove (generalized)
completeness for higher-order hybrid logic.
We now come back to Henkins crucial idea for taming higher-order logic. The standard semantics (ignore for the moment the modal and hybrid components) is the usual
semantics for higher-order logic and it is logically intractable: if we define validity as
truth in all standard structures, we have a complex (indeed, provably unaxiomatizable)
notion of validity. His notion of general interpretations simultaneously lowers the logical complexity of validity (as there are more general structures than standard ones,
it is, so to speak, easier for a formula to be falsified, and indeed, higher-order validity becomes recursively enumerable) and makes clear just why those plausible looking
axiomatizations were so plausible: they are complete with respect to Henkins general
semantics.
Our completeness theorem is essentially an adaptation of Henkins hierarchy construction, using the rigidity and truth equivalence classes introduced at the end of the
previous section.
References
1. C. Areces, P. Blackburn, A. Huertas and M. Manzano, Completeness in Hybrid
Type Theory, to appear.
2. A. Church, A formulation of the simple theory of types, The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 5, 1940, pp. 5668.
3. L. Henkin, The completeness of the first order functional calculus, The Journal
of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14, 1949, pp. 159166.
4. L. Henkin, Completeness in the theory of types, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 15, 1950, pp. 8191.
5. L. Henkin, Banishing the Rule of Substitution for Functional Variables, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 18(3), 1953, pp. 201208.
6. L. Henkin, A theory of propositional types, Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 52,
1963, pp. 323344.
7. L. Henkin, An Extension of the Craig-Lyndon Interpolation Theorem, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 28(3), 1963, pp. 201216.
8. M. Manzano, Extensions of First Order Logic, Cambridge Tracts in Theoretical
Computer Science, Cambridge University Press, 1996.
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9. M. Manzano, Divergencia y rivalidad entre logicas, in Enciclopedia Iberoamericana
de Filosofa, volume 27: Filosofa de la Logica, edited by Ra
ul Orayen and Alberto
Moretti, Editorial Trotta, Spain, 2004.
10. M. Manzano and E. Alonso, Completeness from Godel to Henkin, The Journal
of History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 35(1), 2014, pp. 5075.
11. M. Manzano, Henkin on Completeness, in The Life and Work of Leon Henkin:
Essays on His Contributions, Studies in Universal Logic, Springer, 2014,
pp. 149176.

Consequiland: on logics with many dimensions

o Marcos 1
Joa
LoLITA2 & DIMAp3 / UFRN4 , Natal, Brazil
jmarcos@dimap.ufrn.br
Universal Logic aims at studying features shared by all sorts of logical structures.
But what are & what should be logical structures? This talk will promote a promenade
beyond the study of structures in which a set of sentences is endowed with some fixed
notion of consequence and have a peek at a number of alternatives that allow for a
single given logical system to combine several modes of reasoning defined over the same
set of sentences, incorporating variegated dimensions in which one might sensibly ask
what-follows-from-what. Among the alternatives that I shall survey, one consists in
having a logic associated to many notions of consequence sharing their perspectives on
validity and unsatisfiability, and hierarchically organized into an appropriate lattice-like
structure; another one portrays a logic as associated to several notions of consequence,
each of which aiming to represent the preservation of some convenient notion of logical
value; yet another path is to abandon truth-values as primitive entities and consider a
single richer notion of consequence that embodies at once the several logical dimensions
that we are interested upon, each one recoverable at any given time simply by taking the
appropriate viewpoint on the whole. Of course, all the alternatives have their qualities
and their shortcomings. The latter alternative, that I call B-consequence, will receive
the biggest amount of attention, for reasons that will be explained in the course of the
talk.

Keynote speaker of the workshop Non-Classical Abstract Logics (page 168).

Group for Logic, Language, Information, Theory and Applications
3
Departamento de Inform
atica e Matematica Aplicada
4
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte
2

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Connexive Logic based on

an Incompatibility Operator
Storrs McCall 1
McGill University, Montreal, Canada
storrs.mccall@mcgill.ca
A new dyadic propositional operator is introduced, where A B is read A is
incompatible with B. The connexive implication operator is defined as follows:
A B =df. A B,
and a semantic tableau formulation of connexive logic based on and
is constructed.

Invitation to Non-Classical Mathematics

Maarten Mc Kubre-Jordens 2
University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
maarten.jordens@canterbury.ac.nz
We take as starting point a theorem from Archimedes on the area of a circle. We
prove this in a setting where some inconsistency is permissible, using paraconsistent
reasoning. The new proof emphasizes that the famous method of exhaustion gives
approximations of areas closer than any consistent quantity. This is equivalent to the
classical theorem in a classical context, but not in a paraconsistent context, where
it is possible that there are inconsistent infinitesimals. That the core of Archimedes
idea still works in a weaker logic is evidence that the integral calculus, analysis, and
mathematics more generally are still practicable even in the event of inconsistency. The
role of equality is central, and leads to investigation of the idea of distinguishability,
rather than identity, as a primitive notion.
Next, we begin to explore a natural approach to mathematics, akin to (but simultaneously dual to) Brouwers, where the logic arises out of the mathematics, rather
than the mathematics out of the logic. The approach shows how a number of key concepts and results from classical analysis can be broken down and reconsidered when
more care is taken with contradiction. Contrary to Hardy, proof by contradiction may
turn out not be a far finer gambit than any chess gambit after allin fact, it may be
characterized as the crudest of all gambits. Direct proof plays a much larger role, and
mathematics may be more characterized as a dynamic, organic enterprise rather than
a sterile, clinical science where theorems are immutable.
1
2

Keynote speaker of the workshop Connexive Logics (page 215).

Keynote speaker of the workshop 20 Years of Inconsistent Mathematics (page 236).

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On the Way to Modern Logic the Case

of Polish Logic
Roman Murawski 1
, Poland
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
rmur@amu.edu.pl
Polish logicians played a significant role in the development of logic in the twentieth century Warsaw School of Logic with its leaders Jan Lukaszewicz, Stanislaw
Lesniewski, Alfred Tarski and many others are known to any historian of logic. They
developed logic in its modern form, in the form of formal, mathematical logic as an
autonomous discipline having its own subject and methods. Nevertheless interest for
logic existed in Poland much earlier though it has been understood and developed in a
traditional way. In this paper we shall present two scholars: Henryk Struve (18141912)
and Wladyslaw Biega
nski (18571917) who can be considered as representatives of the
traditional pre-mathematical approach to logic standing on the threshold of the new
paradigm.
Henryk Struve was a philosopher living at the turn of the 19th and the 20th centuries. He is regarded as one of the most important figures of Polish logic in the 19th
yet he has been forgotten. According to him the object of logic was principles and rules
of thinking. Logic concerns objective reality; nonetheless, it does not concern it directly the mediator between logic and the world is the thought. Struve did not value
the role and significance of symbolic and mathematised formal logic but he stressed
psychological questions.
Wladyslaw Biega
nski was by profession a general practitioner, held a medical doctorate and had his own medical practice. However, his true passion was logic. He was
rather a philosophical logician in the standpoint formulated by Lukasiewicz. According to him the laws of logic concern the relationships of mental phenomena because
of its aim, which is true cognition. Logic is the art of argumentation, it has a normative character and is an applied science. He stressed also the autonomy of logic and
psychology.

Keynote speaker of the workshop The Idea of Logic: Historical Perspectives (page 115).

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A Model of Dialectic
Graham Priest 1
Graduate Center, City University of New York, New York, USA
priest.graham@gmail.com
In this talk I give a formal model of dialectical progression, as found in Hegel and
Marx. The model is outlined in the first half of the paper, and deploys the tools of
a formal paraconsistent logic. In the second half, I discuss a number of examples of
dialectical progressions to be found in Hegel and Marx, showing how they fit the model.

Creativity and Visualisations in Mathematics

Irina Starikova 2
o Paulo, Brazil
University of SA
starikova.irina@gmail.com
This paper aims to show that creative reasoning with visualisations can facilitate
development of a new approach and new mathematical concepts.
The case study for supporting this claim is taken from geometric group theory.
This began as an application of some geometric ideas in combinatorial group theory,
but a novel geometric perspective developed in the 1980s was so fruitful in results about
groups that geometric group theory acquired the status of a branch of mathematical
research in its own right. The case study demonstrates that representing groups as
Cayley graphs, and then representing the latter as metric spaces, facilitated studying groups by geometric methods and led to the discovery of a number of geometric
properties of groups. As a result, many combinatorial problems were solved through
the application of geometry. On top of that, new interesting concepts expressing the
geometric properties of groups were developed.
Groups are not completely alien to geometry. They were first studied as symmetries
of geometric objects. Then in 1870s Kleins Erlangen Programme aimed to provide
a unifying framework for various geometries applying the notion of a transformation
group, viewing each geometry as a space of points with a group of transformations
acting on it. That was a case of applying algebraic methods, specifically group theory,
to obtain results in geometry. In the case of geometric group theory, the direction is
reversed algebraic groups are now considered as geometric objects as such, namely
metric spaces, and studied by geometric methods to obtain new results about groups.
1

Keynote speaker of the workshop Philosophy of non-classical logics: Towards problems of paraconsistency and paracompleteness (page 125).
2
Keynote speaker of the workshop Computational Creativity, Concept Invention and General Intelligence (C3GI) (page 165).

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Groups, even equipped with a simple metric, have relatively un-interesting structure, and it is hardly possible to grasp their geometric properties. However, when
finitely generated groups are represented by their Cayley graphs, the visualisations of
graphs allow for a creative move. When the Cayley graphs are observed from distance, so that only their large-scale structure is visible and the detailed structure is
effaced, the similarity between them and familiar metric spaces becomes evident. For
example, for the group Z, +, the integers look like a straight line and the graphs of
free groups remind one of hyperbolic spaces. All the necessary mathematics still ought
to be provided, but this scaling experiment unfolds the whole idea with its fascinating
opportunities.
Though it sounds puzzling, many known groups turn out to be hyperbolic, or negatively curved, in a precisely defined generalization of this familiar geometric property.
Hyperbolicity is traditionally defined through the sum of the inner angles of a triangle
from the given metric space. For example, in the Euclidean metric space, it amounts
to . Nevertheless when finitely generated groups are represented by their Cayley
graphs, one can define triangles on the Cayley graphs, i.e. triangles with no angles!
In fact, these triangles can be identified as hyperbolic in virtue of a non-angle-related
property. Hyperbolic angle-less triangles defined on graphs are no doubt far from our
habitual image of a triangle, and the use of an angle-independent definition of hyperbolicity is rare. This innovative approach involves an innovative use of visualisations:
graphs have to be seen for a moment not anymore as combinatorial but as geometric
objects. For example, edges are seen as lines and triplets of connected vertices can be
seen as triangles. All the necessary mathematics still ought to be provided, but these
new practices of using visualisation of a graph in a geometric way helped to unfold a
whole area of research. This paper gives a step-by-step epistemic analysis of how such
creative use of visualisations can be performed.

Ones Modus Ponens: Classical Logic and Semantics

for Modality

Una Stojnic
Rutgers University, New Brunswick, USA
una.stojnic@rutgers.edu
Recently, several authors have independently touted counterexamples to some of
the most entrenched classical rules of inference; viz., Modus Ponens (MP) and Modus
Tollens (MT) (e.g. [3, 2, 5]). Heres one from [5]:
Take an urn with a 100 marbles. 10 of them are big and blue, 30 big and red,
50 small and blue, and 10 are small and red. One marble is randomly selected
and hidden (you do not know which). Given this setup, (1) and (2) are licensed,
but, surely, (3) does not follow:
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1.
2.
3.

If the marble is big then it is likely red.

The marble is not likely red.
So, the marble is not big.

The growing consensus among semanticists is that this failure of MT (and other
classical rules of inference) reflects a tension between the semantics for modal vocabulary and classical logic, and that the lesson is that we need a revision of the standard
semantics for modals, that would invalidate these patterns. This is the course taken
by some relativists (Kolodny and MacFarlane 2010), some expressivists [6, 5, 4], and
even some (dynamic) contextualists [1]. I will argue, contra these theorists, that the
real lesson of the apparent counterexamples is not the one the critics have drawn, but
rather one they have missed: namely, that (and how) a discourse context impacts the
interpretation of modal language. I propose a theory of context change that explains
the appearance of counterexamples, while (provably) preserving classically valid patterns of inference.
References
1. T. Gillies, Iffiness, Semantics and Pragmatics, vol. 3, no. 4, 2010, pp. 142.
2. N. Kolodny and J. MacFarlane, Ifs and Oughts, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 107,
no. 3, 2010, pp. 115143.
3. V. McGee, A Counterexample to Modus Ponens, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 82, no. 9, 1985, pp. 462471.
4. S. Moss, On the Semantics and Pragmatics of Epistemic Vocabulary, Semantics
and Pragmatics, vol. 8, no. 5, 2015, pp. 1-81.
5. S. Yalcin, A Counterexample to Modus Tollens, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 41, no. 6, 2012, pp. 10011024.
6. S. Yalcin, Epistemic Modals, Mind, vol. 116, no. 464, 2007, pp. 9831026.

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Argumentation Semantics for Adaptive Logics

Christian Straer 1 and Jesse Heyninck
Ruhr-University, Bochum, Germany
{Christian.Strasser, Jesse.Heyninck}@ruhr-uni-bochum.de
In this talk we will associate adaptive logics with argumentation frameworks in the
tradition of Dung [3].
The standard format for adaptive logics [2, 7] offers a generic framework for defeasible reasoning (e.g., inconsistency handling, inductive generalizations, abduction,
normative reasoning, etc.). Its dynamic proof theory extends a monotonic, reflexive
and transitive core logic (L) with a set of retractable inferences which are associated
with defeasible assumptions. More specifically, these assumptions are sets of formulas
of a predefined abnormal form that are assumed to be false in the given inference.
When an assumption turns out to be dubious in view of a premise set , e.g. when
some A is derived from in L as part of a minimal disjunction of abnormalities,
the inference associated with it gets retracted. Various adaptive strategies offer mechanisms for this retraction of inferences, some following a more cautions rationale then
others.
Examples are inconsistency-adaptive logics based on the paraconsistent core logic
CLuN where abnormalities are contradictions A A. One retractable inference rule
is disjunctive syllogism (DS): A, A B implies B on the assumption that A A is
false. Take the premise set = {p, p, r, p s, r q}. While applying DS to r and
r q, assuming that r r is false, is non-retractable, applying DS to p and p s will
be retracted since p p is derivable.
Argumentation frameworks are one of the central paradigms in A.I. for the modelling
of defeasible reasoning. Arguments are arranged in directed graphs A, in which A
is a set of arguments and A A represents argumentative attacks (e.g. Pollocks
rebuttals and undercuts). Given such a graph, argumentation semantics specify criteria
for selecting sets of arguments that represent stances of rational discussants. While
this often has been studied on an abstract level where the concrete logical structure
of arguments is left unspecified, in recent years we have seen a renewed interest in
frameworks with structured arguments (see e.g., [1, 4, 5, 6]).
In this talk we associate a premise set , a core logic L, and a set of abnormalities
with an argumentation framework AFL () = A, . More precisely, we define
A = {A, A CnL (), } and A, B, iff A . We call A
the conclusion of an argument A, whereas is the assumption under which it was
derived. Various adaptive strategies will be associated with different argumentation
semantics. Continuing the example given above, e.g.,

p, , p, , p p, , s, {p p} AFCLuN
(),
1

Keynote speaker of the session Argumentation (page 287).

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where is the set of contradictions) and p p, s, {p p}.
Accordingly, s, {pp} is not selected since it cannot be defended from this attack.
We will also show how each stage of an adaptive proof from can be associated with
sub-graphs of AFL ().
This research complements [8] where it was proceeded vice versa: abstract argumentation was represented by means of adaptive logics.
References
1. Ofer Arieli and Christian Straer, Sequent-based logical argumentation, forthcoming in Argument & Computation.
2. Diderik Batens, A universal logic approach to adaptive logics, Logica Universalis,
vol. 1, 2007, pp. 221242.
3. Phan Minh Dung, On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in
nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 77, 1995, pp. 321358.
4. Nikos Gorogiannis and Anthony Hunter, Instantiating abstract argumentation
with classical logic arguments: Postulates and properties, Artificial Intelligence,
vol. 175(910), 2011, pp. 14791497.
5. Guido Governatori, Michael J. Maher, Grigoris Antoniou and David Billington,
Argumentation semantics for defeasible logic, Journal of Logic and Computation,
vol. 14(5), 2004, pp. 675702.
6. Henry Prakken, An abstract framework for argumentation with structured arguments, Argument and Computation, vol. 1(2), 2011, pp. 93124.
7. Christian Straer, Adaptive Logic and Defeasible Reasoning: Applications in Argumentation, Normative Reasoning and Default Reasoning, Springer, 2014.
selja, Towards the proof-theoretic unification of
8. Christian Straer and Dunja Se
Dungs argumentation framework: An adaptive logic approach, Journal of Logic
and Computation, vol. 21, 2010, pp. 133156.

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Ontology of Programs
Raymond Turner 1
School of Computer Science and Electronic Engineering,
University of Essex, UK
turnr@essex.ac.uk
Computer science appears to be a strange blend of mathematics and technology; one
in which abstract objects and concepts are gradually massaged into concrete devices
that perform physical computations.
On the face of it programs are formal objects that have a syntactic structure and
semantic content. The latter is most often expressed in terms of their impact upon
abstract machines. Moreover, the activity of programming involves mathematical reasoning about this impact. This cannot be avoided. However informal or implicit this
reasoning might be, at some level, programs do not come into existence without it.
Moreover, high level programs are constructed not in terms of their impact upon a low
level physical machine but in terms of their impact upon a high level virtual or abstract one. Contemporary computer science is dependent upon the level of abstraction
that these machines provide. This activity is formal or even mathematical in nature.
Indeed, if matters stopped here one might suggest that computer science is little more
than mathematics.
However, the central activity of computer science involves the specification, design
and construction of programs and software. While this is partially a mathematical endeavour it is also a technological one. Although part of this process involves abstract
notions, the other part is engineering design rather than mathematical creation. Certainly, many of the methodologies involved in software construction belong to engineering. More to the point, the final objective of computer science involves the construction
of physical devices that induce computations on actual machines. What might start out
as abstract notions end up as physical devices. In this sense, computer science blends
and merges abstract notions with concrete ones. In a different form, this observation is
widely acknowledged.
Much of the philosophical literature has it that programs have both a symbolic
representation and a physical manifestation. The earliest example of this is the following
(from [4]):
It is important to remember that computer programs can be understood on the
physical level as well as the symbolic level. The programming of early digital
computers was commonly done by plugging in wires and throwing switches. Some
analogue computers are still programmed in this way. The resulting programs
are clearly as physical and as much a part of the computer system as any other
part. Today digital machines usually store a program internally to speed up the
1

Keynote speaker of the workshop Philosophy of Computer Science (page 202).

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execution of the program. A program in such a form is certainly physical and
part of the computer system.
A later expression of much the same observation, but put it in terms of text and
machine, is given by [1]:
Software seems to be at once both textual and machine-like. After all, when one
looks at a printout of a program one sees a lot of statements written in a formal
language. But when one holds the same program on a floppy disk in ones hand,
one feels the weight of a piece of a machine.
The following are of more recent origin, and explicitly asserts the duality thesis
(from [4,1]):
Many philosophers and computer scientists share the intuition that software has
a dual nature.
According to [3]:
It appears that software is both an algorithm, a set of instructions, and a concrete
object or a physical causal process.
From [2]:
Software is a rather unique entity. On the one hand it can be considered a
mathematical object its component parts and operations of construction are
rigorously defined, and the output result of a piece of software can be predicted
precisely, at least in principle. On the other hand, it is also an empirical object
a piece of software executing on a machine is a physical object that can, as most
of us have experienced on many occasions, produce unexpected and unforeseen
behavior.
On the face of it programs have both symbolic and physical manifestations; somehow
they have both. But this raises a question about how one thing can exhibit such different
guises. This ontological dilemma expresses [1] as follows:
While computer scientists often enthusiastically embrace this duality, a metaphysician will view it as a puzzle to be explained. How can something, namely a
computer program, be at once concrete and abstract?
To address this question we introduce a central concept from the philosophy of
technology that will unite these two aspects of programs and wrap them up in a single
concept. This will provide us with a way of conceptualizing the ontology of programs;
a way that embraces both their mathematical and technological natures.

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References
1. T.R. Colburn, Philosophy and Computer Science, M.E. Sharp publishers, 2000.
2. B. Indurkhya, Some philosophical observations on the nature of software and their
implications for requirement engineering, New Trends in Software Methodologies,
Tools and Techniques, edited by H. Fujita and P. Johannesson, IOS Press, 2003, pp.
29-38.
3. N. Irmak, Software is an Abstract Artifact, Grazer Philosophische Studien, vol. 86,
2012, pp. 5572.
4. J.H. Moor, Three Myths of Computer Science, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, vol. 29(3), 1978, pp. 213222.

Constructing Universal Logic of Development?

Hundred Years after James Mark Baldwin
Jaan Valsiner 1
Clark University, Worcester, MA, USA
jvalsiner@gmail.com
Simple but basic ideas take long time to reach human sciences. The focus on issues of
embryology (Hans Driesch), philosophy (Henri Bergson) and development (James Mark
Baldwin) in the 1890s led to the efforts to formalize a logic of development (genetic
logic) by James Mark Baldwin in the years 19061915. Hundred years have passed
and Baldwins efforts have not been revitalized or developed further. I will outline basic
premises of Baldwins efforts and show how these could be reconstructed to create a
universal logic of unique transformations (ULUT).

Seduced and Abandoned in the Chinese Room

Tony Veale2
UCD School of Computer Science and Informatics, Dublin, Ireland
tony.veale@ucd.ie
1
2

Keynote speaker of the workshop Utopian Thinking and Logic-s (page 188).
Keynote speaker of the workshop Computational Creativity, Concept Invention and General Intelligence (page 165).

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Toward a Logic for Realistic Reasoning in Humans

and Computers
Pei Wang 1
Temple University, Philadelphia, USA
pei.wang@temple.edu
Logic should reestablish its focus on valid reasoning in realistic situations. Since
classical logic only covers valid reasoning in a highly idealized situation, there is a
demand for new logics that are based on more realistic assumptions, while still keeping
the general, formal, and normative nature of logic. A constructive example is NARS,
which is a system that explores the possibility of building a logic as the law of thought,
both in humans and in machines.
NARS is based on the theory that intelligence means adaptation with insufficient
knowledge and resources, which requires the system to depend on finite computational
power, to work in real time, to open to unanticipated tasks, and to learn from its experience. Working in such an environment, the validity of inference in NARS is justified by
adaptivity, and the system uses an experience-grounded semantics. The formal language
and inference rules are formalized in the framework of term logic, and can uniformly
handle multiple types of uncertainty (randomness, fuzziness, ignorance, inconsistency,
etc.), as well as multiple types of inference (deduction, induction, abduction, analogy,
revision, etc.).
NARS has been mostly implemented as an open-source project. Though the system
is still under testing and tuning, it already shows many novel properties, and the results
address many topics in the study of logic, artificial intelligence, and cognitive science.
References
1. P. Wang, Cognitive logic versus mathematical logic, in Lecture notes of the Third
International Seminar on Logic and Cognition, Guangzhou, China, 2004.
2. P. Wang, The limitation of Bayesianism, Artificial Intelligence, vol. 158(1), 2004,
pp. 97106.
3. P. Wang, Experience-grounded semantics: a theory for intelligent systems, Cognitive Systems Research, vol. 6(4), 2005, pp. 282302.
4. P. Wang, Rigid Flexibility: The Logic of Intelligence, Springer, Dordrecht, 2006.
5. P. Wang, What do you mean by AI , in Proceedings of the First Conference on
Artificial General Intelligence, 2008, pp. 362373.
1

Keynote speaker of the workshop Emergent Computational Logics (page 178).

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6. P. Wang, The assumptions on knowledge and resources in models of rationality,
International Journal of Machine Consciousness, vol. 3(1), 2011, pp. 193a218.
7. P. Wang, Non-Axiomatic Logic: A Model of Intelligent Reasoning, World Scientific,
Singapore, 2013.
8. L.A. Zadeh, The role of fuzzy logic in the management of uncertainty in expert
systems, Fuzzy Sets and System, vol. 11, 1983, pp. 199227.

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8 Workshops
The Idea of Logic: Historical Perspectives
This workshop is organized by
Juliette Lemaire
on Robin, Paris Sorbonne University, France
Centre Le
Amirouche Moktefi
Tallinn University of Technology, Estonia
Throughout most of the history of Western philosophy, there has been a closely
related (sub-)discipline called logic. However, the common name should not conceal
the marked differences among what counted as logic at different times. In other words,
despite the stable name, logic as a discipline is not characterized by a stable scope
throughout its history. True enough, the historical influence of Aristotelian logic over
the centuries is something of a common denominator, but even within the Aristotelian
tradition there is significant variability. Furthermore, as is well known, in the 19th
century logic as a discipline underwent a radical modification, with the birth of mathematical logic. The current situation is of logic having strong connections with multiple
disciplines philosophy, mathematics, computer science, linguistics which again
illustrates its multifaceted nature.
The changing scope of logic through its history also has important philosophical
implications: is there such a thing as the essence of logic, permeating all these different
developments? Or is the unity of logic as a discipline an illusion? What can the study
of the changing scope of logic through its history tell us about the nature of logic as
such? What do the different languages used for logical inquiry regimented natural
languages, diagrams, logical formalisms mean for the practices and results obtained?
The invited keynote speakers is this workshop are Elena Dragalina-Chernaya (page 89)
and Roman Murawski (page 103).

Call for papers

This special UNILOG session will focus on both the diversity and the unity of logic
through time. Topics may include:
Historical analyses on what specific logicians or logic traditions considered to be the
nature and scope of logic.
Historical analyses illustrating differences in scope and techniques with respect to
the current conception of logic, but also suggesting points of contact and commonalities between these past traditions and current developments (possibly by means
of formalizations).
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Historical and philosophical discussions on the place of logic among the sciences and
its applications/relations with other disciplines, now and then.
Discussions of the logical monism vs. logical pluralism issue in view of the historical
diversity/unity of logic over time.
General philosophical reflections on what (if anything) the diversity of scope and
practice in the history of logic can tell us about the nature of logic and the role of
universal logic as such.
Abstracts for this workshop should be sent to moktefi@unistra.fr.

Logical and Non-Logical Lexicons: Was Tarski is right that

there are no objective grounds to draw a sharp boundary
between them?
Majid Amini
Virginia State University, Petersburg, USA
mamini@vsu.edu
Inductive logic may be the closest cousin to the high and mighty bastion of logic,
viz. deductive logic, and yet even then it has almost become a philosophical lore that,
unlike induction, deduction is fairly unproblematic and the two modes of argumentation
are in certain significant ways dissimilar. However, appearances aside, there may be
more similarities than dissimilarities between them, and deduction may be as much
open to the same type of problem(s) as induction is purported to face. Indeed, Rudolf
Carnap once remarked that the epistemological situation in inductive logic is not worse
than that in deductive logic, but indeed quite analogous to it. The purpose of this
paper is, therefore, to pursue parallelisms between induction and deduction in terms of
the issue of justification against the wider context of Alfred Tarskis scepticism about
the bifurcation of lexicons into logical and non-logical. David Hume famously argued
that induction faces a crisis of rationality as it cannot be justified either deductively
or inductively. Apparently, a direct analogue could be constructed for deduction where
it will be shown that deduction suffers from the same problem of justification: that is,
it cannot be justified either inductively or deductively. The discussion then focuses on
the limitations and shortcomings of claims made by, for example, Michael Dummett
and Dag Prawitz that, unlike induction, at least some fragments of deductive logic can
be justified. However, an attempt will be made to show that the parallelism could
still be extended to an additional and more interesting analogy between deduction
and induction in terms of Nelson Goodmans the new riddle of induction, i.e., the
problem of grue predicate. It will be contended that likewise a new riddle could be
formulated for deduction in terms of Arthur Priors tonk connective. Yet, it may be
objected, especially in the case of the latter parallelism, that there is a sharp disparity
between deduction and induction, and the similarity is only skin-deep. For, again unlike
induction, in deduction there are, for example, proof-theoretic principles such as Emil
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Posts conservative extension, or some model-theoretic variants of it, that proscribe
the introduction of such rogue logical connectives. Indeed, it may be claimed that such
constraints not only prevent the occurrence of tonk-type connectives, but could also
be deployed to demarcate deductive logics from inductive ones. The remainder of the
paper will, therefore, be devoted in a Carnapian spirit to an examination of this twofold
claim, and in particular the status of those constraints themselves. Generalising the
discussion, it may be argued that, after all, Tarski may have been right to contend that
there are no objective grounds to permit one to draw a sharp boundary between logical
and non-logical lexicons.

Logic as Semeiotic: Peirces Philosophy of Logic

Francesco Bellucci
Tallinn University of Technology, Tallinn, Estonia
bellucci.francesco@gmail.com
In his later years, Peirce devoted much energy to the project of a book on logic,
whose intended title was Logic, considered as Semeiotic. That the science of logic is
better considered as semeiotic is indeed one of the most fundamental tenets of Peirces
mature philosophy of logic. But what is the primary motivation for considering logic
as semeiotic and what advantages did Peirce see in doing so? This question has largely
remained unsettled in Peirce scholarship. If logic is to be considered as semeiotic, this
can only mean that its objects and their functioning are to be described in purely
semeiotical terms. But did Peirce succeed in providing such a description? This paper
deals with the semeiotical functioning of the classical triad of logic: terms, propositions,
and arguments. In particular, the paper focuses on the highly articulated semiotic
structure of arguments.
According to Peirce, a term is a sign whose object and interpretant are implicit, for
a term is a sign of qualitative possibility only. A proposition is a sign whose object is
explicit but whose interpretant is implicit, for a proposition is a sign of actual existence
and of nothing more. An argument is a sign whose object and interpretant are explicit,
for an argument is a sign which is also represented as being a sign. This of course
requires a division of interpretants, for the sign not only determines the interpretant
to represent [. . . ] the object, but also determines the interpretant to represent the sign
(Peirce to Welby, 1906). Peirce thus distinguishes the immediate interpretant, which
is a further sign of the object created or expressed by the sign, from the representative
interpretant, which is the representation of the manner in which the sign represents its
object.
The argument, which is for Peirce the perfect sign, is a body of premises that
represents a conclusion. The conclusion is the immediate interpretant. This is, at
bottom, the Stoic conception of sign or semeion (a pre-antecedent statement in a
sound conditional, revelatory of the consequent, Pyrrh. Hyp. II, 104). But reasoning
for Peirce cannot consist in simply deriving a proposition (the conclusion) from other
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propositions (the premises); rather, it involves the approval of the rationality of the
derivation, or the judgment that the reasoning is valid because it is an instance of a
class of valid arguments. In semeiotical terms: an argument is a sign that separately
represents its immediate interpretant and whose representative interpretant represents
it as representing its immediate interpretant according to a valid logical principle.
A large part of Peirces later (19031914) discussions and divisions of signs and
interpretants had as ultimate objective the description of the semiotic functioning of
the principal logical signs (the classical triad). More than a general theory that would
cover the entire domain of signs, Peirces semeiotic is better understood as his peculiar
way of presenting his philosophy of logic.

Logic and its place in philosophy.

T.H. Green and the idealistic view
Guido Bonino
University of Turin, Turin, Italy
guido.bonino@unito.it
Speaking of 19th-century works on logic, R. Adamson once wrote in the /em Encyclopedia Britannica that in tone, in method, in aim, in fundamental principles, in
extent of field, they diverge so widely as to appear, not so many expositions of the
same science, but so many different sciences. That makes 19th-century logic a difficult
field for historians of philosophy, since they have to deal with a subject whose nature
itself is highly controversial, and which tends to include issues that nowadays would
not be regarded as belonging to logic. The case of idealistic logics is particularly interesting, since they differ both from a formal conception of logic (ultimately stemming
from Aristotle) and from what came to be called a psychologistic approach (famously
exemplified by J.S. Mill). Whithin the British brand of 19th-century idealism, the case
of T.H. Green is most representative, in that his idealistic views are in a way more
orthodox (i.e., closer both to the German antecedents and to the centre of gravity
of the whole movement of British idealism) than those of such later authors such as
F.H. Bradley or J. McTaggart. Furthermore, in his thoughtful attempt at acclimatizing German philosophical culture to his own country, Green paid special attention to
assess the new views against the background of the British tradition in philosophy: in
his Lectures on Logic (1874-75) the idealistic conception of logic is put forth by means
of a sustained criticism of different strands of British logic, mainly formal logicians such
as W. Hamilton and H.L. Mansel on the one hand, and J.S. Mill on the other.
One could surmise that Green wanted to place himself midway between opposite
errors. A widespread historiographic scheme, inspired by M. Dummett, according to
which one of the main features of post-Fregean analytic philosophy is its rejection of
psychologism, seems to corroborate such a surmise: British idealists reacted against
psychologism, but their reaction was not radical enough, and fell short of devising
a fully formal conception of logic (that was also G.E. Moores criticism of Bradleys
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philosophy). But such an interpretation would be simplistic and ultimately incorrect. In
fact, according to Green: (i) formal logicians and Mill share a common error; (ii) formal
logicians are more wrong than Mill. Concerning (ii), in his criticism of formal logicians,
Green did not recoil from using some of Mills arguments against the Scholastic tradition
in logic, especially with regard to classification and definition. The major part of the
debate revolved around the question of the sterility of logic. That was course an
old charge made against logic by Renaissance and early modern thinkers, and it was
very common within the British empiricist tradition. So common indeed, that even
a staunch defender of the formal conception of logic in 19th-century Britain such as
R. Whately felt himself obliged to make in some way more acceptable the apparent
sterility of logic deriving from its formal character. In this sense it is clear that Mill
could become an ally in the struggle against formal logicians. Yet Green thought (in
accordance with the general bent of Hegelian idealism) that Mill and the empiricist
tradition could be accused of the same mistake a though in a somewhat attenuated
form a of the formal logicians. The main root of the common error lies in the central
role attributed to abstraction as the fundamental operation of thought. The criticism
of abstraction (which is to be replaced by the opposite process of accretion) thus
becomes the crucial move in Greens effort to establish a correct understanding of logic.
Probably the clearest account of such criticism can be found in Greens Essay on
Aristotle (1866), where the modern debates on these issues are transposed to ancient
times, and where Aristotle seems to play a role similar to that of Mill: Aristotle clearly
understood the barrenness of Platos abstract ideas, but he did not succeed in freeing
himself completely from the shackles of the old way of thinking (and, what is worse,
his most precious insights got lost in the later Scholastic tradition).
According to Greens positive views (similar to Hegels), there is no place for logic
as distinct from metaphysics, since logic really concerns the way in which knowledge is
constituted by consciousness, by way of accretion. Such a process of constitution, as
performed by the so-called eternal consciousness, is identical with the constitution of
reality itself. Perhaps a relative independence of logic could be envisioned with reference
to the thought processes of individual minds, which are just vehicles of the eternal
consciousness. However, the critical character of Greens writings on this subject does
not leave enough room for the development of these suggestions.
More room for a relatively independent logic can be found in Bradleys philosophy. That is in part due to accidental circumstances (Bradley devoted a whole book
The Principles of Logic, to a systematic, and not merely critical, exposition of logical doctrines), but probably also to philosophical reasons. First, Bradley elaborated a
theory of the degrees of truth (which is only implicit in Greens thought), and within
such a framework the relative independence of logic with respect to metaphysics can
be easily accommodated. Second, but that is just a suggestion to be further developed,
Bradleys opposition between immediate experience and thought (which is wholly alien
to Green and to more orthodox forms of idealism) might have opened a somewhat more
comfortable space for logic.
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Metaphysics as Natural Logic in Hegel

Elena Ficara
t Paderborn, Germany
Universita
elena.ficara@upb.de
In my talk I focus on what Hegel explicitly says on the concept of logic and its
relation to metaphysics in some passages of the Science of Logic, the Encyclopaedia
Logic and the Lectures on Logic and Metaphysics. These texts show that Hegel aimed
at both tracing metaphysics back to its logical roots and logic back to its metaphysical
roots, thus developing the idea of an interplay between the two disciplines. In particular,
I focus on the Hegelian idea that both logic and metaphysics have a natural level (or
phase), distinguished from the theoretical one. Natural logic is the logic (the form)
of natural reasoning; natural metaphysics is natural thought about reality and being.
The two are strictly connected, as natural logic is based on metaphysical notions, such
as unity, identity, causal connection. Conversely, natural metaphysics is based on the
natural use of language and thought, as the human practice of reasoning needs the
notions of unity, identity, etc. This dialectical connection remains for Hegel also at the
theoretical level, when both metaphysics and logic become theories and disciplines, so
that, for Hegel, there is no logic without metaphysics, and vice versa. My claim is that
this theory is one of the main reasons of Hegels importance for contemporary debates
in philosophy of logic and metaphysics.

The Notion of Logical Form and its Application

in Boole and Jevons
Anna-Sophie Heinemann
Department of Philosophy, Paderborn University, Germany
annasoph@mail.uni-paderborn.de
Keywords: History of Logic, Notion of Form, Algebraic Logic, Reasoning and Computing,
Logic Machines, George Boole, John Venn, William Stanley Jevons.
Todays notion of formal logic is coined in the 19th Century. This concerns the form
of logic: its shape and ways of representation. But it also relates to the conception of
logical form: its interpretation and the scope of applications. Thus, a new notion of
the formal originates from seminal changes concerning both the form of logic and the
logic of form.
In the 1880s, John Venn distinguishes three views of the logical form of propositions
shaped A is B. The first is characterized by a predicative interpretation. To say that
A is B means to specify a subject A by predication of an attribute B. The second point
of view is to conceive of propositions as expressing relations between classes. Given two
classes A and B, either A is contained in B or B is contained in A, or A and B overlap,
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or they are coextensive. A negative proposition indicates that they are disjoint. The
third approach departs from splitting A into compartments one of which does involve B
while the second does not. Similar case-by-case analyses pertain to each term of logical
problems of higher complexity.
Around the mid-century, George Boole launches an algebraic model of logic. Its distinctive shape is determined by the use of functions and variables. Its methods derive
from calculating techniques based on explicit transformation rules, most importantly
from the idea of expansion of a function. A function f (x) is developed into an expression of the form ax+b(1x). To determine a and b, the function is factored in x = 1 and
x = 0, which translates into equating the variable to the totality of elements in a given
domain, and to the absence of any of them alternately. The expansion will then be of
the form f (1)x + f (0)(1 x); given functions of more than one variable, their expansions become more complex. As one variable may always be expressed in terms of the
others, the resulting system allows for solutions with respect to each of them. Venns
principle of case-by-case compartmental analyses is mirrored in the differentiation of
each constituent according to the functions values for 0 and 1.
Some ten years later, William Stanley Jevons proposes an understanding of logical
method which is grounded in a classification of the differentiated cases. For instance,
a consideration of four terms A, B, C and D yields their 16 possible combinations:
ABCD, ABCd, ABcD, ABcd, AbCD, AbCd, AbcD, Abcd, aBCD, aBCd, aBcD,
aBcd, abCD, abCd, abcD, abcd (where lower case italics represent negatives). Now
as a premise, introduce, e.g., the implication From A follows B. All combinations
not containing A are temporarily sorted out as irrelevant. The remainder is split up
according as they do or do not contain both A and B. The latter contradict the
given premise, while the former comply with it. The joint set of the former and the
temporarily excluded combinations gives the number of cases which prove consistent
with the premise. They may then be subject to subsequent selections according to
further premises such as From C follows D. This technique of crossing out empty
compartments from the list of all possible junctions of terms Jevons calls a method of
indirect deduction.
The proposed contribution to the Universal Logic Conference aims at showing that
both Booles and Jevonss approaches are based on the methodical principle of compartmental analyses derived from Venns third understanding of logical form. However,
they differ in their possibilities of symbolical generalization and to the respective kind
of algorithms. While Booles ideas give direction to design and application of logical
calculi, Jevonss proposal may be seen in relation to diagrammatic and tabular methods. Nowadays, Booles name is remembered in the history of computing and computer
science. However, Jevonss method allowed for implementation in a mechanical logic
machine even in his own lifetime.
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Logic as Physics. On Logic and the Aristotelian Concept

of Historia, according to the Paduan Philosopher
Jacobus Zabarella

Per Lennart Landgren

Oxford University, Oxford, UK
per.landgren@history.ox.ac.uk

My paper will focus on the Paduan philosopher Jacobus Zabarella (1533-1589);

probably the most prominent and influential Neoaristotelian in the field of logic in the
sixteenth century. In his logical writings Zabarella developed the Aristotelian distinction between factual knowledge and causal knowledge. The first kind of knowledge goes
back to the senses, cognitio sensilis, and was, perhaps surprisingly, called historia. The
other one goes back to ratio and was called scientia in theoretical philosophy. This Aristotelian concept of historia, distinct, as it is, from the chronological concept of history,
was rapidly disseminated in the republic of letters, but it is almost totally neglected by
modern research. None the less, it has striking consequences for our understanding of
the structure of early modern Aristotelian logic and of the academic disciplines.
The distinction, mentioned above, is, possibly, most clearly displayed in the theoretical discipline of physics or natural philosophy, of which methodology became a
somewhat imperialistic paradigm for other disciplines. In physics, natural history provided the discipline with empirical data, observations, or historiae. By means of induction, data were transformed into general and true statements, in order to be used in
natural philosophy proper as premises in deductions or syllogisms. Logic, applied on
a discipline, was, according to the Paduan philosopher, transformed to very discipline
itself. When the logical methods were applied to physics, logic was transformed into
physics. Logic became physics. In such a case, logic was called applied logic, i.e. logica
applicata or logica utens, in contrast the logic as a discipline, logica docens.
In the Aristotelian epistemological paradigm, historiae formed the empirical foundation of any discipline, which had to do with the sensual part of reality. On that
foundation, the philosophical part of the same discipline was built. Consequently,
when logic was applied to physics, logic as physics was dependent upon natural history,
and both natural history and natural philosophy constituted vital parts in forming the
integrated discipline of natural philosophy or physics.
In my lecture, I will delineate the Aristotelian concept of historia according to
Zabarella and explain how histories, i.e. factual knowledge, related to logic and other
disciplines on which logic was applied.
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Frege and Aristotle about the logical foundation

of mathematical functions, or Aristotle translated by Frege
Verssimo Teixeira da Mata
Jose
Advisory Board of the Brazilian House of Representatives
joseverissimo@terra.com.br
The aim of this presentation is to understand the relation between Aristotles
thought and Freges foundation of logic. Particularly, it is focused here the enormous
debt that Freges notions of concept (Begriff) and to fall under concept (f
allt unter
Begriff ) has to Aristotles foundation of logic.
Of course, Frege takes the concept of concept from German tradition, from Kants
tradition and from Hegels philosophy, in both these thinkers, this word appears abundantly. Specially in the last, the word Begriff acquired a more intensional sense. This
word frequently translates the universal and the second substance(Aristotles concepts
that came to us by Categories and De Interpretatione). In Freges formula this word
appears in relation to another object (Gegenstand).
Ein Gegenstand fallt unter einen Begriff. By this formula, Frege, as Aristotle in
his own way, makes a dialectical approach toward extensional (Logik des Umfangs) and
intensional logic(Logik des Inhalts) and he can surpass this dicotomy, that he pointed
in his essay Ausf
uhrungen uber Sinn und Bedeutung.
Supposing the concept of house, we can geometrically find infinite solutions(objects)
for this Begriff.
It is to remark that Frege sees the absence of maths in Aristotles theory Logik in
Mathematik 1 ), but his foundation of mathematical function is not other thing than
saving the Aristotles substantial proposition:
Ein Gegenstand fallt unter einen Begriff
is a very good translation for the aristotelical formula:
first substance is second substance.
Socrates (Plato and a large number of persons) is man [F (m)]:
F (m) = x, where x is one man.
Congratulations, Herr Frege, you very well translated Aristotle!
1

Wenn man nun die Logik zur Philosophie rechned, so ergibt sich hieraus das Bestehen einer besonders
engen Verbindungzwischen Mathematik und Philosophie, was duch die Geschichte der Wissenschaften
best
atigt wird. (Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz, Newton, Kant). Maybe we discovered this Verbindung
(connection) only lately concerning Aristotle! Or, at least, after Freges inventions. Of course, concerning others aspects, Lukasiewicz has already pointed the presence of mathematicism in Aristotles
logic.

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Logic, Judgement and Inference. What Frege Should Have Said

about Illogical Thought
Daniele Mezzadri
United Arab Emirates University, Al Ain, United Arab Emirates
d.mezzadri@uaeu.ac.ae
Frege held the view that logic is a normative science, because he saw logic as being
concerned with setting forth norms for thinking judging and inferring correctly,
and not with merely describing how thinking takes place. Not abiding by logical norms
will thus make one think wrongly, or incorrectly. This view forms the core motivation
for Freges polemic against psychologistic conceptions of logic, widespread during his
lifetime.
I argue that this normative view of logic motivates Freges response to the logical
aliens scenario, as discussed in the introduction to the Grundgesetze. Logical aliens are
beings who reject (basic) laws of logic, and therefore manifest illogical thought. Given
his normative understanding of logical laws, Frege seems compelled to say that logical
aliens do think judge and infer albeit wrongly, or incorrectly. As he puts it, our
acceptance of logic hinders us not at all in supposing beings who do reject it; where
it hinders us is in supposing that these beings are right in so doing, it hinders us in
having doubts whether we or they are right.
This is what Frege actually said about the possibility of illogical thought. Some
scholars have thought that Freges diagnosis amounts to an understatement, however;
someone who rejects basic logical laws one could argue does not simply think
incorrectly, but fails to think altogether. In the remainder of this paper I explore
and expand two lines of thought originally developed by James Conant and Joan
Weiner according to which, even from a Fregean understanding of the nature of
logic, the very idea of illogical thought should be rejected as not constituting a genuine
possibility. These thus amount to two different accounts of what Frege should have said
about illogical thought.
According to the former account Frege should reject the possibility of (deeply) illogical thought, in so far as he believes logic to be an arbiter that establishes the
possibility of agreement and disagreement. But if the framework of logic is let go, then
illogical thought could not be recognised as contradicting ours, and could not even be
recognised as thought or reasoning at all. According to the latter account, Frege saw an
internal relation between judgement and inference; in particular, he was committed to
the view that the content of a judgement is not independent of the (correct) inferences
in which the judgement in question can figure, and so any judgement already presupposes some acceptance of logical laws, which are laws of correct inference. Rejecting
logical laws thus undermines the very possibility of judgement. While the former line of
thought is unsuccessful, the latter is successful, and constitutes an important Fregean
correction to Freges own response to the possibility of illogical thought.
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Husserls Idea of Pure Logic: Constructive or Axiomatic?

Mohammad Shafiei
IHPST1 , Pantheon-Sorbonne University, Paris, France
Mohammad.Shafiei@malix.univ-paris1.fr
In this presentation, I aim to show that despite of some textual evidences from
Husserls work, his main approach is in contrast with the axiomatic method of FregeHilbert-Russell; rather, it is, in its basic philosophical grounds, in accordance with the
overall attitude of Peirce and of Brouwer, regarding their actual practice in mathematics
and logic. That Husserl does not support algebraic view toward logic and Peirce does,
and that Brouwer does not give primacy to logic over mathematics and Husserl, in some
sense, does, I hope to show, are only secondary and rather terminological issues.
According to the conception of logic that transcendental phenomenology endorses
we may speak of the interplay between axiomatic method and constructive method.
This is based upon the interplay between intuition and construction, more precisely,
between intuitive intention and signitive intention while the latter serves in categorial
synthesis. I would argue for the claim that not only phenomenology admits constructive
approach toward logic, but also it provides a philosophical ground in order to develop
constructive logic; yet the emphasis that Husserl puts on axiomatization should be
interpreted in its own peculiar way.

Philosophy of non-classical logics:

Towards problems of paraconsistency
and paracompleteness
This workshop is organized by
Marcos Silva
, Brazil
Federal University of Ceara
Ingolf Max
University of Leipzig, Germany
There is an ongoing philosophical and logical debate about motivations in accepting
or rejecting the principle (law) of (non-)contradiction and the principle (law) of excluded
middle. A logic rejecting the principle of non-contradiction is called paraconsistent
and a logic rejecting the principle of excluded middle is called paracomplete. If both
principles are dual of each other we have some reason to reject both principles and get
paranormal systems. But what does it really mean to reject a classical principle (law)?
1

Institute for History and Philosophy of Sciences and Technology

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And what are the philosophical consequences for this refusal? In which sense would it
still be possible to defend nowadays that there is just one true logic, if we have such a
great diversity of logics?
Among the famous logical systems which are paraconsistent but not paracomplete
are, for instance, the da Costa systems. Intuitionist logics are paracomplete but not
paraconsistent. And a lot of systems of relevant logic are paraconsistent as well as
paracomplete. To evaluate these systems philosophical relevance, we have to inter alia
examine the logical form of their atomic formulas, the logical behavior of their negation,
conjunction and disjunction as well as the properties of logical consequence relations.
From a philosophical point of view it is very important to understand which elements
are responsible for such deviations from classical logic. E.g., do we have only local
reasons? In the case of Jaskowskis version of paraconsistent logic we have to change
the conjunction. In the da Costa systems mainly negation is under attack. Or do we
have global reasons like in systems of first degree entailments? (Belnap, Dunn, Priest).
What is the position of paracomplete, intuitionist approaches (Brouwer, Heyting and
their followers)?
This workshop shall represent a privileged platform to evaluate proposals for a more
integrated and general approach to philosophical motivations and consequences in the
emergence of non-classical logics.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Graham Priest (page 104).

Call for papers

Topics may include:

logical monism & logical pluralism

philosophical motivations for creating non-classical logics (dialethism, anti-realism,
relevantism, etc.)
local vs. global and formal vs. application-oriented reasons for paraconsistency
and/or paracompleteness
non-explosiveness of logical consequence
trivialization strategies and classical logic
philosophy of contradiction and inconsistency (Hegel, Wittgenstein, Meinong, Heraclitus, Indian Philosophy, etc.)
philosophy of constructivism (Poincare, Brouwer, Heyting, Kolmogorov, Wittgenstein, Lorenzen, Dummett, Prawitz, etc.)
philosophical relations between paraconsistency and paracompleteness

Abstracts (500 words maximum) should be sent via e-mail before November 15th
2014 to istanbul2015philosophyncl@gmail.com.
Notification of acceptance: December 1st 2014.
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Hard and soft logical information

Patrick Allo
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Brussels, Belgium
patrick.allo@vub.ac.be
The problem of accounting for acceptable uses of classically valid but paraconsistently invalid arguments is a recurrent theme in the history of paraconsistent logics. In
particular, the invalidity of the disjunctive syllogism (DS) and modus ponens (MP) in,
for instance, the logic of paradox LP, has attracted much attention.
In a number of recent publications, Jc Beall has explicitly defended the rejection of
these inference-forms, and has suggested that their acceptable uses cannot be warranted
on purely logical grounds [1, 2]. Some uses of DS and MP can lead us from truth to
falsehood in the presence of contradictions, and are therefore not generally or infallibly
applicable [3].
Not much can be objected to this view: if one accepts LP, then MP and DS can
only be conditionally reintroduced by either
1. opting for Bealls multiple-conclusion presentation of LP (LP+ ) which only gives
us
A, A B

LP+

B, A A, and

A, A B

LP+

B, A A

2. by treating MP and DS as default rules.

The latter strategy was initiated by inconsistency adaptive logics [4, 5], and implemented for the logic LP under the name Minimally inconsistent LP or MiLP [6].
The gap between these two options is not as wide as it may seem: The restricted
versions of MP and DS that are valid in LP are the motor of the default classicality of MiLP. The only difference is that the restricted version only give us logical
options (Beall speaks of strict choice validities), whereas default classicality presupposes a preference among these options (unless shown otherwise, we must assume that
contradictions are false).
A cursory look at the debate between Beall and Priest [3, 7] may suggest that not
much can be added to their disagreement. However, if we focus on the contrast between
the mere choices of LP+ and the ordering of these choices in MiLP, we can tap into
the formal and conceptual resources of modal epistemic and doxastic logic to provide a
deeper analysis [8]. We can thus develop the following analogy:
LP+ is motivated by the view that logical consequence is a strict conditional modality, and is therefore knowledge-like. Using a slightly more general terminology: all
logical information is hard information.
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MiLP is motivated by the acceptance of forms of logical consequence that are variable conditional modalities, and are therefore belief-like. With the same more general
information: some logical information is soft information.
This presentation still gives the upper-hand to Bealls stance (shouldnt logical consequences be necessary consequences?), but only barely so. The upshot of this talk is
to motivate the views that (i) the soft information that underlies the functioning of
MiLP can be seen as a global as well as formal property of a logical space, and is
therefore more logical than we may initially expect, and that (ii) adding a preference
among logical options can be seen as a legitimate and perhaps even desirable step in a
process of logical revision.
References

1. J. Beall, Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts, No

us, 2013.
2. J. Beall, Strict-Choice Validities: A Note on a Familiar Pluralism, Erkenntnis,
Vol. 79, no. 2, 2014, pp. 301307.
3. J. Beall, Why Priests reassurance is not reassuring, Analysis, vol. 72, no. 3, 2012,
pp. 517525.
4. D. Batens, Dynamic Dialectical Logics, in Paraconsistent Logic Essays on the
inconsistent, edited by G. Priest, R. Routley and J. Norman, Philosophia Verlag,
1989, pp. 187217.
5. D. Batens, Inconsistency-adaptive logics, in Logic at Work Essays dedicated to
the Memory of Helena Rasiowa, edited by E. Orlowska, Springer, 1999, pp. 445472.
6. G. Priest, Minimally inconsistent LP, Studia Logica, vol. 50, no. 2, 1991, pp. 321
331.
7. G. Priest, The sun may not, indeed, rise tomorrow: a reply to Beall, Analysis,
vol. 72, no. 4, 2012, pp. 739741.
8. J. Van Benthem, Logical dynamics of information and interaction, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

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Logical pluralism from the perspective of logical expressivism

Pavel Arazim
Charles University in Prague, Prague, Czech Republic
pavel.arazim@centrum.cz
I will attempt to tackle the question whether there can be more right logics by
first considering what the criteria for being a logic might be. The relatively easy way
to logical pluralism is to assert the plurality of purposes a logic might serve to fulfil and
derive the plurality of legitimate logics from it. It is, of course, only good for a given
logic if it can do more jobs at a time, yet it will not be very surprising if we would
actually need different logics for different tasks. This thesis can be easily trivialized,
when we formulate the purposes of various logics in ways favorable to particular systems.
Thus intuitionistic logic clearly serves to study inference in constructivist mathematics,
while the classical logic in the non-constructivist and so on.
I wish to concentrate, though, on one particular thing some philosophers think a
logic should deliver, namely to make explicit the implicit rules of inference that we
apply in our discourse. According to this Brandomian view, logic plays first of all an
expressive role. The key notion of an implicit rule of inference is far from clear, though.
My main question is whether such an approach is compatible with logical pluralism and
what the sources and reasons for logical pluralism might in this particular case be.
On the one hand, it is clear that the implicit rules should be here before logic,
which comes to express them. They are autonomous. But does the process of making
them explicit involve creativity? To some degree it is simply given what is supposed to
be expressed but perhaps more ways of expression might be possible due to different
possible interpretations of these rules. Can it be therefore said that a given implicit
rule can be interpreted to state various different things? If so, does such a plurality
of interpretation enforce logical pluralism? I am inclined that say that it does not.
First of all, the implicit rules are normative statuses of actions rather than normative
statements, so the talk of their interpretation does not make much sense. Furthermore,
it is not clear what the criteria of equivalence of formulations would be, whether two
interpretations could really differ while being about the same implicit rule. But this
issue has to be examined more closely.
Whatever the answer to the question about the possible plurality of interpretations
of implicit rules might be there still remains a possibility of logical pluralism because
there might be more ways how to explicate the same rules. If logic is a tool for explication, then perhaps it can come in more shapes which are just as satisfactory for
the relevant purposes. How much can such logics differ, if at all? I will examine the
proof-theoretic demarcations of the domain of logic from this expressivist perspective
and show how they help to clarify this problem.
Finally the focus should shift rather from the rules of inference to the very activity
of making them explicit. Debates between adherents of different logics can be seen
as debates about the nature of this expressive rationality and the tools, such as the
conditional or negation, which we use to perform the expressive task.
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A piece of logical handicraft illustrating a philosophical position

Diderik Batens
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Diderik.Batens@UGent.be
I shall defend a position with respect to three topics from the Call for Papers:
(i) logical monism and logical pluralism, (ii) philosophical motivations for creating
non-classical logics, and (iii) local vs. global and formal vs. application-oriented reasons
for paraconsistency and/or paracompleteness.
Rather than extending the cluster of available theoretical arguments, I shall illustrate my position by discussing a specific problem solving process, namely, the elaboration of an adaptive Fregean set theory, or rather of a set of such theories. Those
theories should enable one to remain faithful to the full richness of Freges underlying
ideas while avoiding triviality. The process leading to the theories should be helpful
to understand the transition from Freges trivial theory to apparently non-trivial set
theories.
In preparation, I shall refer to published results by Peter Verdee and offer some
reasons for the quest for different theories. Next, I shall show that the desired theories
cannot be obtained by applying a general and a priori method, but requires a contentguided procedure in the sense of Dudley Shapere. The specific problem solving process
will enable me to tell a concrete and detailed story, which has an interest of its own. It
is my hope that, first and foremost, the story will clarify my philosophical position on
those three topics, in particular on logical pluralism. Once that is done, the strength
of the position should be apparent.

A Paraconsistent Defense of Logical Pluralism and Relativism

Diogo Henrique Bispo Dias
o Paulo, Sa
o Paulo, Brazil
University of Sa
diogo.bispo.dias@gmail.com
From the emergence of paraconsistent logics, there were several criticisms claiming
that they should not be called logics. In the same way it was argued that paraconsistent
negation was not a real negation and hence when paraconsistent logicians talk about
contradiction, they are not talking about logical contradiction but something else.
These criticisms lead to several abstracts discussion regarding the nature of negation, consequence relation and logic itself. But most of this debate neglects what we
think is essential to comprehend this situation, namely: the acknowledgment of a logical pluralism and relativism. Hence, the aim of this communication is discuss how
paraconsistent logics lead not only to logical pluralism as some claim [3, 4] but also to
logical relativism. It should be mention that well be dealing not with a single form of
pluralism or relativism, but with a (possibly overlapping) family of both.
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In addition to that, well discuss how to extend this logical relativism to a mathematical relativism. Bell [2] argues that in Category Theory - by rejecting in a sense
the set-theoretic discourse, in which every concept is reduced to an absolute idea of
set-mathematical concepts no longer have absolute meaning, but become relative to
local frameworks.
From that perspective we developed a Paraconsistent Functor that enables us to
finding, for a given logic, its paraconsistent counterpart. This functor allows us to shift
from one local framework to another, establishing a connection between distinct structures, providing us with a conceptual framework for possible comparisons among these
structures.
References
1. J.C. Beall and G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006.
2. J.L. Bell, From Absolute to Local Mathematics, Synthese, vol. 69, 1986, pp. 409
426.
3. O. Bueno, Can a Paraconsistent Theorist be a Logical Monist?, in Paraconsistency: The Logical Way to the Inconsistent, edited by W. Carnielli, M. Coniglio and
I. DOttaviano, CRC Press, New York, 2002, pp. 535552.
4. N.C.A. da Costa, Ensaio sobre os Fundamentos da Logica, Editora Hucitec, 2008.
5. G. Shairo, Varieties of Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2014.

The Use of Definitions and their Logical Representation

in Paradox Derivation
Ross T. Brady
La Trobe University, Melbourne, Australia
ross.brady@latrobe.edu.au
We will start by examining the role and usage of definitions in the derivation of
paradoxes, both set-theoretic and semantic. Then, we examine the various ways that
such definitions have been logically represented in practice.
There are three features that are special about these definitions in these contexts.
The first is the use of self-reference between the definiens and the definiendum, the
second is the generality of context in the definiendum, and the third is the underdetermination and overdetermination that occurs as a result of these definitions. We
examine the impact of these three features on the logical representation of definitions
and how this representation then leads to a uniform paradox solution.
The first has an effect on the representation of definition, as the usual differentiation
between definiens and definiendum is broken down. A new symbol is usually introduced
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by definition, being defined as some more complex expression, and every instance of
this expression is then replaceable by the new symbol. In this usual case, the new
symbol is equated with its definiendum as a shorthand form, and one is still operating
within the range of symbols under consideration. A circularity here would introduce an
infinite regress of expressions, created out of just one expression, such as occurs in the
Liar Paradox, where L is defined as L is false. So, one needs to go beyond the level of
expressions to deal with definitions such as this self-referential one. Indeed, one needs
to go to the next step of dealing with meanings rather than just expressions, so that
the definitions are meaning equivalences rather than expression equivalences.
The second requires a logic representing meaning equivalence to be included in the
definiendum, because of its generality. Meaning equivalence is naturally broken up into
a conjunction of two meaning containments, one in each direction. The logic MC of
meaning containment has been developed by Brady in Universal Logic, CSLI, 2006, but
subsequently tweaked by dropping the distribution axiom in favour of its rule form. As
such, the logic MC of meaning containment is well enough conceptualized to be able
to work out how to apply the logic. This is better than a logic which is technically
determined but without a clear concept.
The third feature of a self-referring definition is the prospect of underdetermination
and overdetermination, due to the lack of specificity or overspecificity produced by the
self-reference. Underdetermination is ubiquitous in logical reasoning, whilst overdetermination requires a resolution of a conceptual clash. We identify the conceptual clashes
that occur in various current accounts that leave the contradictions in place and we will
indicate how these clashes can be resolved to finally produce a uniform paradox solution. That this solution is possible is essentially due to the fact that the logic does
not contain the Law of Excluded Middle or any forms of Contraction. Thus, this paper serves to explain the philosophy behind the simple consistency results in Universal
Logic and other sources.

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An epistemic approach to paraconsistency: dealing

with evidence and truth
Walter Carnielli
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science,
Department of Philosophy, State University of Campinas, Brazil
walter.carnielli@cle.unicamp.br
Abilio Rodrigues
Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Minas Gerais,
Belo Horizonte, Brazil
abilio@ufmg.br
The aim of this paper is to offer an alternative way to paraconsistency, besides metaphysical neutrality and dialetheism. If we assume that there are no real contradictions,
hence, no pair of contradictory true propositions, and yet a pair of propositions A and
A is accepted in some context of reasoning, it is on us to say what it means, if it is
not the case that they are both true.
The basic idea is that contradictions occurring in several contexts of reasoning have
epistemic character in the sense that their occurrence is related to thought and reason
alone. Although the topic of epistemic contradictions is not new, and its origins can
be traced back at least to Kant, the issue has not been properly developed yet, neither
in its philosophical motivations, nor in terms of a paraconsistent non-dialetheist formal system designed to represent contexts of reasoning in which contradictions have a
strictly epistemic character.
Our supposition is that logic is not restricted to the idea of truth preservation.
Classical logic is a very good account of strict truth preservation perhaps the best
possible account but sometimes truth is not only what is at stake. The guiding
intuition here defended is that the acceptance of a pair of contradictory propositions
A and A does not commit us to their truth. Rather, we understand it as some kind
of conflicting information about A, namely, that there is conflicting evidence about
A. Evidence for A is understood in broad terms as reasons for believing that A is true.
Evidence is clearly a notion weaker than truth, in the sense that if one knows that a
proposition A is true, one has evidence that A is true, but not vice-versa.
This paper introduces a natural deduction system designed to express preservation
of evidence rather than preservation of truth. The system is paraconsistent and paracomplete, since neither explosion nor excluded middle hold, although double negation
equivalence holds. The inference rules for , and are obtained in two steps. First,
we ask about the sufficient conditions for having evidence that a given proposition is
true. Then, we ask what would be sufficient conditions for having evidence that a given
proposition is false. Each step produce rules whose conclusions are disjunctions, conjunctions, conditionals and negations of these formulas. Once we have the introduction
rules, the elimination rules are obtained, as suggested by Gentzen, as consequences
of the introduction rules.
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Although the system so obtained is able to express the notion of preservation of
evidence, and not preservation of truth, by applying the resources of the logics of formal
inconsistency, classical logic is recovered within the domain of propositions whose truth
value has already been conclusively established. Once classical logic is recovered, the
system turns out to be able to give an account of preservation of truth.

On the exclusivity of logical negation

Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua, Padova, Italy
massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it
Let glut theories be theories postulating the existence of gluts on the face of semantical, and perhaps soritical, paradoxes. A standard criticism to glut theorist
but here I limit ourselves to Priests dialetheism concerns the difficulty of expressing
the notion of exclusivity exclusive truth or exclusive false dialetheically. Only
true, or just true is usually understood as true and not false, where the mentioned
not in true and not false should be exclusive, a resource which is not available for a
dialetheist. We say that the not is exclusive if, in virtue of its very meaning, for any
proposition A, the truth of both A and A is excluded in virtue of the very meaning
of negation. The exclusive negation is called by Priest Boolean negation.
However, Priest contends that, like dialetheic negation, even classical logical negation is non exclusive (see 1, cap. 4): the very meaning of classical logical negation would
fail, according to him, to guarantee that two propositions A, A are incompatible, i.e.
that a contradiction like (A A) cannot be true. The reason would be, in a nutshell,
that what classical logic can say about a contradiction is expressed by the rule of
ex falso quodlibet (EFQ): from a contradiction like (A A) everything follows. And
classical logic fails to exclude that everything is true, i.e. triviality.
With Priests words: A dialetheist [glut theorist] can express the claim that something, , is not true in those very words, T(). What she cannot do is ensure that
the words she utters behave consistently: even if T() holds, T() may yet hold.
But in fact, a classical logician [or any explosive logic theorist] can do no better. He
can endorse T(), but this does not prevent his endorsing as well... . [C]lassical
logic, as such, is no guard against this... . [A]ll the classical logician can do by way of
saying something to indicate that is not to be accepted is to assert something that
will collapse things into triviality if he does accept . But the dialetheist can do this
too. She can assert (1, p. 291).
Here is Priests entailment connective in the tradition of relevance logic, and
some explosive sentence, i.e. a sentence that implies all sentences.
In this paper I discuss Priests claim that even the classical negation cannot guarantee consistency. I will argue that, though there is a precise sense according to which the
claim is acceptable even by a classical logician, nevertheless the exclusivity of negation
is essential to classical logic and its semantics. Furthermore, I will argue that even
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a dialetheist cannot avoid some use of exclusive negation and this fact is in contrast
with Priest thesis that the meaning of logical constants is to be the same both in the
object language and in the meta-language.
I conclude that:
A classical logician can develop any classical theory adopting in the object language
a non-exclusive negation.
The use of the exclusive negation in the metalanguage is essential for a classicist, as
well as for a dialetheist: Priest himself needs the exclusive negation for developing
his dialetheic semantics.
Reference
1. G. Priest, In Contradiction. A Study of the Transconsistent, Oxford University
Press, Oxford/New York, Second Edition, 2006.

The Paradox of Singularity. Contradiction and Individuals

between Aristotle and Hegel
Alessandro De Cesaris
University of Eastern Piedmont, Vercelli, Italy
alessandro.decesaris@gmail.com
The main thesis of this paper is that the problem of contradiction is tightly related,
from an ontological point of view, to the question of the status of individual being. In
order to discuss that I will take into account two thinkers, Aristotle and Hegel, who are
traditionally pointed out as the main exponents of two rival positions: on one side the
thought of non-contradiction, on the other the idea of contradiction as regula veri; on
one side analytical, on the other dialectical logic.
First of all, Ill try to prove that its questionable that such an incompatibility can
be found between the standpoints of these two philosophers: this not just because,
as more than once stated during the last century, its not so evident that Hegel really wanted to negate the principium firmissimum stated by Aristotle, but also and
mostly because Aristotle himself recognises, as the origin of philosophy, the very
same factor pointed out by Hegel: the aporetic nature of experience and the appearance of contradiction. Reading thoroughly the IV book of Metaphysics, in fact, its
possible to underline a deep agreement between the aristotelian standpoint, that easily
acknowledges the evidence of an apparently contradictory world of becoming, and the
hegelian one, which makes of it the dialectical engine of individual and collective human
experience. Its also hard to negate the further agreement of the two thinkers about
the sake of philosophy: it has its origin in the appearing of contradiction and aims to
overcome it. But if Aristotle and Hegel agree on these topics, and about the general
essence of philosophy itself, they are indeed opposed with respect to the solution given
in order to satisfy the need for consistency: on one side we find the attempt to save
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the phenomena, on the other the statement that only the Whole is true. In Aristotles
case the result is an ontology of independent, identical individual being, which should
guarantee the meaningfulness of language against the apparent paradoxicality of experience. In Hegels case, on the contrary, the finite is inconsistent but is not true being:
the only true being is the Whole, whose nature is to be free from contradiction. In both
cases the study of contradiction leads to an ontology of individual being: Ill argue that
it is only here that Aristotle and Hegels philosophies are really opposed to each other.
But the aristotelian attempt to save individuals from contradiction is doomed to
failure. In the second part of my paper I will discuss the main aristotelian arguments
defending the consistency of individuals, in order to show their insufficiency. Ill so
defend the hegelian standpoint, understood as the statement of the consistency of the
Whole against the inconsistency of abstract finitude. The result is the acnkowledgement of the paradoxical nature of individuality, and of the incompatibility between this
latter understood as in Aristotle and in the aristotelian tradition until today and
consistency of being.

Denial Wont Get You Anywhere

Matthias Jenny
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, USA
mjenny@mit.edu
Glut theorists think that there are sentences that are both true and false, among
them the liar sentence that says of itself that its false. They have certain expressive
advantages over competing non-classical approaches to the liar paradox. However,
glut theorists face an expressibility problem of their own. Consider a version of the
strengthened liar sentence that says of itself that its not just true. Since the glut
theorists distinction between just true, just false, an both true and false sentences is
pairwise exclusive and jointly exhaustive, this strengthened liar produces triviality if the
glut theorists had a just true predicate in their language. Nonetheless, glut theorists
might want to be able to express of a sentence that its just true. This is the so-called
just true problem: Glut theorists are unable to fully say what they think regarding
sentences that are just true. Surely, even glut theorists dont think that every sentence
is both true and false and that, for example, many sentences not involving the notion
of truth, are either just true or just false. However, glut theorists have trouble saying
of a just true sentence that its just true. They cant simply say that the sentence is
true. For that, according to their own lights, doesnt rule out that its also false, as in
the case of the liar.
One response to the just true problem thats popular among glut theorists (see
[8, 11, 3, 4, 6, 9, 10]) is the one that involves the speech act of denial (as well as its
mental cognate, rejection). Denial is unlike assertion of a negation for it is governed by
the rule that one ought to deny something only if it is just false (whereas one ought to
assert a negation only if its negatum is either just false or both true and false). Denial
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allows glut theorists to express that a sentence is just true by denying its negation.
However, the distinction between denial and assertion of the negation just made relies
on the notion of just false, which in turn relies on the notion of just true.
In this paper, I argue that from within the glut theorists own logic, the notion of
denial presupposes a solution to the just true problem and thus cant be invoked in a
solution to that problem. I also show that, due to contingent facts about our assertive
practices, there isnt an analogous problem for paracomplete logicians. The result is
that its very easy for champions of paracomplete logics such as K3 to regain classical
reasoning in select domains, whereas champions of paraconsistent logics such as LP a
much harder time doing so. The paper ends with a discussion of proposed solutions
to the just true problem based on the notions of shrieking (see [8, 5]) and Gricean
implicatures (see [2], pg. 512, and [1], pg. 168) and finds these proposals wanting as well.
References
1. B. Armour-Garb and G. Priest, Analetheism: a Pyrrhic victory, Analysis, vol. 65,
no. 2, 2005, pp. 167173.
2. J. Beall, Spandrels of Truth, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009.
3. J. Beall, Multiple-Conclusion LP and Default Classicality, Review of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 4, no. 2, 2011, pp. 326336.
4. J. Beall, LP+, K3+, FDE+ and Their Classical Collapse, Review of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 6, no. 4, 2013, pp. 742754.
5. J. Beall, Shrieking Against Gluts: The Solution to the Just True Problem, Analysis, vol. 73, no. 3, 2013, pp. 438445.
6. J. Beall, Free of Detachment: Logic, Rationality, and Gluts, No
us, forthcoming.
7. G. Priest, What Not? A Defence of Dialetheic Theory of Negation, in What is
Negation?, edited by Dov M. Gabbay and Heinrich Wansing, Kulwer, Dordrecht,
1999, pp. 101120.
8. G. Priest, In Contradiction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, second edition, 2006.
9. G. Restall, Assertion, Denial and Non-classical Theories, in Paraconsistency:
Logic and Applications, edited by Koji Tanaka, Francesco Berto, Edwin Mares,
and Francesco Paoli, Springer, Dordrecht, 2013, pp. 81100.
10. G. Restall, Assertion, Denial, Accepting, Rejecting, Symmetry & Paradox, in
Foundations of Logical Consequence, edited by Colin R. Caret and Ole T. Hjortland,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015.
11. D. Ripley, Negation, Denial, and Rejection, Philosophy Compass, vol. 6, no. 9,
2011, pp. 622629.
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The explication of paraconsistency, dialetheism

and paracompleteness in classical logic syntactically
extended by functorial variables
Ingolf Max
University of Leipzig, Germany
max@uni-leipzig.de
The ongoing debate on paraconsistency, dialetheism and paracompleteness seems to
be based on two fundamental assumptions: (1) The logical explication of paraconsistency and/or paracompleteness forces us to use or develop concrete non-classical calculi.
(2) There is a direct connection between being a dialetheist and accepting/using paraconsistent logics: A dialetheist has to be a paraconsistentist (but no vice versa). In this
talk it will be shown that both assumptions are not correct.
To reject (1) we develop a syntactically extended version of classical propositional
logic. We introduce four restricted unary functorial variables which have exactly two
not necessarily different classical functors as their substitutable values. These
functorial variables can be interpreted as 4 different types of negations. This relatively
minor extension yields a remarkable enhancement of our expressive power which allows
to explicate a whole bunch of concepts precisely. But nevertheless it is still a classical
logic because the concepts being a theorem and being a tautology of our enriched
structures remain explicitly definable using only the classical ones.
To reject (2) we show that from our point of view there is no direct comparability of
paraconsistency with dialetheism if we differentiate clearly between the formal concept
paraconsistency which can be explicated formally without considering some sort of
application. The concept true contradiction tries to combine the expressions true
and contradiction within one and the same dimension but they belong not to the same
one. We can keep our classical understanding of contradiction (0 in all assignments)
in the first dimension. True in true contradiction is not represented by 1 or any
special truth-value like both. It indicates that we try to understand contradiction not
logically but in the context of some application which gives rise to a second dimension
where we can have the technical value 1. A 1 in the second dimension should not be
read true but it can be interpreted, e.g., as applicable, usable etc. Gluts does not
indicate a value but the interaction of dimensions with respect to possible applications.
To make this criticisms clear a syntactically extended version of classical propositional logic will be sketched. The aim is not to vote for this relatively weak system as
an exceptionally nice logic. The aim is to show that a lot a relevant concepts and their
interrelations can be explicated within one and the same object language. We can use
this system philosophically to reject several misapprehensions.
The introduction of functorial variables (variable functors, in German: Funktorenvariablen) dates from S. Lesniewski (1929).
Another famous Polish logician,
J. Lukasiewicz (1951) connected this new syntactic tool with special substitution rules.
By restricting the values of such variable functors he himself, C.A. Meredith
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and A.N. Prior (1956, 1963, 1965) and W. Stelzner (1977, 1979) created new areas
of application.
Let F 1 be a symbol within the object language of the new syntactic type unary
functorial variable. The substitutable values of F 1 are the unary classical functors 11 ,
12 , 13 and 14 characterized by the following value-tables:
p
1
1

11 p
1
1

12 p
1
0

13 p () 14 p
0
0
1
0

If there are several occurrences of F 1 in a formula X we have to substitute the same

classical functor for each occurrence of F 1 (abbreviated by [F 1 /1i ]). Now we are able
to express extensionality within the object language: as theorem 4 (p q) (F 1 p
F 1 q) or as tautology 4 (p q) (F 1 p F 1 q). 4 ( 4 ) indicates that the four
substitution instances without functorial variables are classical theorems (tautologies).
If we restrict each functorial variable to exactly two substitutable values 1i and
1
1
1j in that order it has the form Fi,j
. Lukasiewics showed that, e.g., F4,2
is a good
1
candidate for explicating necessity (without Godel-rule) and F1,2 for possibility. Each
formula X containing n occurrences of functorial variables of the forms Fi11 ,j1 , . . . , Fi1n ,jn
represents exactly two classical formulas A1 and A2 : A1 is created by the simultaneous
substitution of the form [Fi11 ,j1 /1i1 , . . . , Fi1n ,jn /1in ] and A2 by [Fi11 ,j1 /1j1 , . . . , Fi1n ,jn /1jn ].
1
We interpret each functorial variable of the form F3,j
as negation. The i-dimension
(first dimension) gives it the classical characterization as negation. We can freely
choose the j-dimension with 1 j 4. Therefore, we get four functorial variables as
negations characterized by the second dimensions in the following way:
1
F3,1
: tautological negation
1
F3,2 : assertoric negation
1
F3,3
: negative negation (given the full logic it behaves like the functor 13 ())
1
F3,4
: contradictory negation.
It will be shown how tautological negation can be used for representing paraconsistency but not paracompleteness, contradictory negation for representing paracompleteness but not paraconsistency and assertoric negation for representing both.
1
1
Finally, we discuss dialetheism with respect to the constructions pF3,1
p and pF3,2
p
1
1
1
1
p) F4,2
p as well as 2 (p F3,2
p) F4,2
p each representand the fact that 2 (p F3,1
ing on both sides of a Lukasiewicz-type of necessity and not a true contradiction.
References
1. S. Lesniewski, Grundz
uge eines neuen Systems der Grundlagen der Mathematik,
Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 14, pp. 181.

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2. J. Lukasiewics, On variable functors of propositional arguments, Proceedings
of the Royal Irish Academy, Section A: Mathematical and Physical Sciences, vol. 54,
section A, no. 2, 19511952, pp. 2535.
Reprinted in J. Lukasiewics:
Selected Works, edited by L. Borkowski, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1970,
pp. 311324.
3. C.A. Meredith and A.N. Prior, Interpretations of different modal logics in the
Property Calculus , Mimeograph, Philosophy Department, University of Canterbury, 1956. Reprinted in Logic and Reality: Essays on the Legacy of Arthur Prior,
edited by B.J. Copeland, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.
4. C.A. Meredith and A.N. Prior, Notes on the axiomatics of the propositional calculus, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic vol. 4, 1963, pp. 171187.
5. C.A. Meredith and A.N. Prior, Modal logic with functorial variables and a contingent constant, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 6, 1965, pp. 99109.
6. W. Stelzner, Funktorenvariable, Funktionenvariable und nichtklassische Logik,
Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, Gesellschafts und sprachwissenschaftliche Reihe, vol. 1,
Karl-Marx-Universitat, Leipzig, German, 1977, pp. 313318.
7. W. Stelzner, Effektive epistemische Logik, habilitation, University of Leipzig, German, 1979.

Hegel: contradiction as a property of language. A Hegelian way

towards paraconsistency
Stany Mazurkiewicz
`ge, Belgium
University of Lie
Technical University of Dresden, Germany
mazurstany@gmail.com
We know it at least since Platos Sophist: speaking, as identifying the different, has
organically something to do with contradiction. We will sustain that the Hegelian Wesenslogik offers an explicit theorisation of these topics and that these texts significantly
meet contemporary problems in paraconsistent logics.
Lets try to determinate the linguistic stakes of Hegels Logic in what concerns
identity, difference and contradiction. If the logic of essence appears to be the always
presupposed truth of the logic of being, its not only in the sense of an external metalanguage. On the opposite, we see in the logic of Grund that Hegel is totally aware
of the possibility of a regressio ad infinitum from languages-objects to metalanguages,
anticipating, could we say, some Godelian problems. To avoid this vortex, Hegel
will rather accept a kind of reflexivity, major logical theme by him. For Hegel, every
linguistic act, whose basic form is A = A, is an interlacing (in the Platonician sense
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of Symploke) of identity and difference. Identitys function appears to presuppose
difference and differences function identity as a positive element of itself (like a name,
to identify a thing, to put it as something [als Bestimmtsein], has to be different from
this thing, to negate it, while remaining a constituting element of this determined thing).
We could also summarize the Hegelian development in this way: Identity = identity
and difference; difference = difference and identity; so, difference = identity, which is
precisely a new category: contradiction. We see that the Hegelian contradiction is not
simply trivial, as it always involves in itself two levels of language. But these two ranks
are not in a fixed hierarchy of meta-language and language-object, their roles reverse,
which is precisely the contradictory process of reflexion.
If we compare the Hegelian trial to more recent logical problems, we can discover
that it matches the category of paraconsistency. In order to avoid paradoxes, Russell
will forbid this kind of reflexivity, will forbid that a category (a totality) possesses a
part defined in terms of this category, a part that presupposes this category. Tarski
will also refuse the reflexivity of natural languages. But after works such as the
one of Jaskowski we can imagine a formal logic dealing with these problems. A basic
formalisation of the previous dialectics could be the following:
1. (A A);
2. A = (A A);
3. A = (A A);
4. so A A;
5. (A A) = B;
6. (B B).
And so on. We see the properly paradoxical and reflexive character of this logic.
We will develop the questions about this logical system in three complementary directions:
What do we have to accept concerning the different levels of language in order not
to make this logic trivial?
What are the formal implications and the range of such a logic?
Can we say that we managed to formalize the dialectics?

The Non-classical Side of Classical Logic

David Miller
University of Warwick, Coventry, UK
dwmiller57@yahoo.com
The aim of this paper is to make more widely known an old result that shows that
there are non-classical phenomena, indeed paraconsistent phenomena, just below the
surface of conventional classical logic, and to investigate how far the result can be
generalized to non-classical logics.
The result alluded to is a slight variation (and, in an uncensorious sense, rectification) of Tarskis observation that the formal relation of the calculus of systems to the
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ordinary calculus of classes is exactly the same as the relation of Heytings sentential
calculus to the ordinary [classical] sentential calculus (19351936, 2, p. 352). By the
calculus of deductive systems is here meant the calculus of axiomatizable and unaxiomatizable deductive theories, which is described by Tarski as representing a very
essential extension of the sentential algorithm (ibidem, p. 350).
A classical deductive theory is a set of sentences closed under a finitary consequence
operation Cn that contains at least the whole of classical sentential logic. Tarski defines
the logical product and logical sum of two theories X and Z as X Z and Cn(X Z)
respectively. Evidently the product of two theories, so defined, is in general weaker
than either, and the sum is stronger. A smoother integration of sentences and theories
is obtained by interchanging these definitions, that is, by defining X Z as X Z and
X Z as Cn(X Z), so that X Z {X, Z} X Z, as in the sentential case. Arbitrary
conjunctions and disjunctions of theories can be defined similarly. The negation of
a theory Y can then be defined as {Z Y Z}, which is the dual of one form
of the definition that Tarski gives for negation. Whereas what Tarski defines is the
of Y, which satisfies the law of non-contradiction but in general
pseudocomplement Y
may violate the law of excluded middle, what is defined here is the authocomplement
Y , which satisfies the law of excluded middle but violates the law of non-contradiction
whenever the theory Y is not finitely axiomatizable. Indeed, if is a maximal theory
that is not axiomatizable, then = , which implies that the law of explosion
fails. In short, the logic of classical deductive theories is paraconsistent.
This result calls stridently into question the view promulgated by Quine (1970),
p. 81, that the advocate of paraconsistent logic hardly knows what he is talking about,
since the notation , ceases to be recognizable as a notation for negation when some
conjunctions in the form p . p [are regarded] as true, and such sentences [are not
regarded] as implying all others. . . . [The paraconsistent logician] only changes the subject. For the calculus of deductive systems is no more than a natural generalization
of sentential calculus. Looked at in reverse, indeed, sentential calculus is just the special case of the calculus of deductive systems in which authocomplementation becomes
classical. In no way does it involve any change of subject matter.
References
1. W.v.O. Quine, Philosophy of Logic, Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA, 1970.
2. A. Tarski, Grundz
uge des Systemenkalk
ul, Fundamenta Mathematicae, vol. 25,
no. 4, 19351936, pp. 503526, and vol. 26, no. 2, pp. 283301. References are to
the English translation, Foundations of the Calculus of Systems, in A. Tarski,
Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1956, pp. 342383.

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First steps towards non-classical logic of informal provability

Pawel Pawlowski
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
haptism89@gmail.com
Rafal Urbaniak
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Gdansk University, Gdansk, Poland
rfl.urbaniak@gmail.com
Mathematicians prove theorems. They dont do that in any particular axiomatic
system. Rather, they reason in a semi-formal setting, providing what well call informal
proofs. There are quite a few reasons not to reduce informal provability to formal
provability within some appropriate axiomatic theory [6, 5].
The main worry about identifying informal provability with formal provability starts
with the following observation. We have a strong intuition that whatever is informally
provable is true. Thus, we are committed to all instances of the so-called reflection
schema P () (where is the number coding formula and P is the informal
provability predicate).
Yet, not all such instances for formal provability (in standard Peano Arithmetic,
henceforth PA) are provable in PA. Even worse, a sufficiently strong arithmetical theory
T resulting from adding to PA (or any sufficiently strong arithmetic) all instances of
the reflection schema for provability in T will be inconsistent (assuming derivability
conditions for provability in T are provable in T). Thus, something else has to be done.
The main idea behind most of the current approaches [7, 2, 3] is to extend the
language with a new informal provability predicate or operator, and include all instances
of the reflection schema for it. Contradiction is avoided at the price of dropping one of
the derivability conditions. Thus, various options regarding trade-offs between various
principles which all seem convincing are studied.
In order to overcome some of the resulting difficulties and arbitrariness we investigate
the strategy which changes the underlying logic and treats informal provability as a
partial notion, just like Kripkes theory of truth [4] treats truth as a partial notion (one
that clearly applies to some sentences, clearly doesnt apply to some other sentences,
but is undecided about the remaining ones). The intuition is that at a given stage,
certain claims are clearly informally provable, some are clearly informally disprovable,
whereas the status of the remaining ones is undecided.
In Kripke-style truth theories strong Kleene three-valued logic is usually used
which seems adequate for interpreting truth as a partial notion. Yet, we will argue
that no well-known three-valued logic can do a similar job for informal provability.
The main reason is that the value of a complex formula in those logics is always a
function of the values of its components. This fails to capture the fact that, for instance,
some informally provable disjunctions of mathematical claims have informally provable
disjuncts, while some other dont.
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We develop a non-functional many-valued logic which avoids this problem and captures our intuitions about informal provability. The logic is inspired by paraconsistent
logic CLuN (see e.g. [1]), in whose standard semantics the value of a negation is not
determined by the value of its argument. We describe the semantics of our logic and
some of its properties. We argue that it does a much better job when it comes to reasoning with informal provability predicate in formalized theories built over arithmetic.
References
1. D. Batens and K. Clercq, A rich paraconsistent extension of full positive logic,
Logique et Analyse, 2004, pp. 185188.
2. L. Horsten, Modal-epistemic variants of Shapiros system of epistemic arithmetic,
Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 35, no. 2, 1994, pp. 284291.
3. L. Horsten, Reflecting in epistemic arithemtic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 61, 1996, pp. 788801.
4. S. Kripke, Outline of a theory of truth, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72, no. 19,
1975, pp. 690716.
5. H. Leitgeb, On formal and informal provability, in New Waves in Philosophy of
Mathematics, edited by . Linnebo and O. Bueno, Palgrave Macmillan, New York,
2009, pp. 263299.
6. M. Marfori, Informal proofs and mathematical rigour, Studia Logica, vol. 96,
2010, pp. 261272.
7. S. Shapiro, Epistemic and intuitionistic arithmetic, in Intensional Mathematics,
edited by S. Shapiro, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1985.

Philosophical elucidation of implication

Wagner de Campos Sanz
s, Goia
nia, Brazil
Universidade Federal de Goia
wsanz@uol.com.br
Implication is semantically explained, either from a classical or from an intuitionistic
perspective, as a connective which expresses the fact that from a proof of the antecedent
a proof of the consequent can be obtained. But, we will argue, this is only a necessary
condition for being an implication, it is not sufficient. At least, the explanation is not
completely clear before explaining how proofs are conceived.
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What would be a falsitymaker for the principle

of non-contradiction?
Abilio Rodrigues
Department of Philosophy, Federal University of Minas Gerais,
Belo Horizonte, Brazil
abilio@ufmg.br
Walter Carnielli
Centre for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science,
Department of Philosophy, State University of Campinas, Brazil
walter.carnielli@cle.unicamp.br
The basic idea of truth as correspondence is that the truth of a proposition must
be grounded in reality. The so-called truthmaker scheme, p is true if and only if there
is an s such that s makes p true, intends to capture the fundamental tenet of truth as
correspondence. Dually, we may say that if a proposition p is false, there is something
that makes it false, i.e., whatever is false, there must be a falsitymaker in virtue of
which it is false. Falsity, as well as truth, must be grounded in reality. Whether or
not the principle of non-contradiction is false and only false, not simultaneously
true and false is obviously a central question for paraconsistent logicians, especially
dialetheists. But what would be a falsitymaker for the principle of non-contradiction?
In Metaphysics Aristotle presents three versions of the principle of non-contradiction
(from now on, PNC ), that may be rephrased as follows:
(1) A property cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same object.
(2) Two beliefs which correspond to two contradictory propositions cannot obtain
in the same consciousness.
(3) Two contradictory propositions cannot be true at the same time.
These versions are talking about (1) objects and their properties, (2) beliefs, and
(3) propositions. We call them, respectively, ontological, epistemological and linguistic.
The epistemological version, as it stands, is plainly false, since it is a fact that in various
circumstances people have contradictory beliefs. The ontological version corresponds to
the theorem-scheme of first order logic x (P xP x), and is based on a categorization
of reality in terms of objects and properties that has been central in philosophy and
is present in logic since its beginnings. The linguistic formulation, although talking
about language, also has an ontological vein because of the link between reality and the
notion of truth. Furthermore, if we accept that every proposition says something about
something, there is no important difference between the ontological and the linguistic
versions of PNC. So, it is reasonable to consider that these two versions collapse.
Thus, in order to show a falsitymaker for PNC one needs an object a and a property
P such that a has and does not have P . It is very unlikely that such a contradictory
object is to be found in mathematics. With respect to the empirical sciences, there is
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an extensive literature about the occurrence of contradictions in empirical theories. Up
to the present day there is no clear indication that these contradictions are grounded
in the nature of reality or, borrowing a Kantian terminology, that they belong to
the things-in-themselves and not only to phenomena.
However, there still remains to be analyzed two alleged counterexamples to PNC :
Russells set and the Liar sentence. We argue here that none of them provide a legitimate falsitymaker for the PNC.

Philosophical elucidation of implication

Wagner de Campos Sanz
s, Goia
nia, Brazil
Universidade Federal de Goia
wsanz@uol.com.br
Implication is semantically explained, either from a classical or from an intuitionistic
perspective, as a connective which expresses the fact that from a proof of the antecedent
a proof of the consequent can be obtained. But, we will argue, this is only a necessary
condition for being an implication, it is not sufficient. At least, the explanation is not
completely clear before explaining how proofs are conceived.

Catuskoti: Paracomplete, Paraconsistent, Both, or None?

Fabien Schang
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow,
Russia
schang.fabien@voila.fr
We deal here with the logical import of the Buddhist Logic of Catuskoti (tetralemma),
before arguing for its dual relationship with the Jain Logic of Saptabhangi (seven-fold
theory of predication). Let us symbolize these by LC and LS, respectively. Should
LC be taken as a paracomplete, or a paraconsistent logic? Can it be both, otherwise?
Why not none, even leading to an increasingly set of paradoxical combinations between
these four options?
Recall that, for any sentences p,q, an arbitrary logic L is said to be paraconsistent
if the following Principle of Explosion fails:
p, p
L
q
and L is said to be paracomplete if the following Principle of Implosion fails:
p
L
q, q
The talk consists of three steps.
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Firstly, we display the logic behind LC and LS, arguing that these are more like
single sets of sentences than logical systems in the Tarskian sense of a truth-preserving
theory.
Secondly, we display a number of strategies proposed in the literature to make sense
of LC and LS, including Priests five-valued system for the Catuskoti.
Thirdly, we question the logical nature of LC and LS in their usual form of combined
literals p/p with paradoxical valuations.
Our constructive answer is semantic and relies upon a number of logical concepts
including logical form, sentences, logical constants (negation, especially), model, truthvalues, and the core relation of consequence. The latter plays a central role in the
talk, since the traditional question whether the initial Buddhist proposition p is true,
false, both, or none is replaced by a more general question about whether the Buddhist
system is consistent, inconsistent, both, or none.
References
1. A.J. Bahm, Does Seven-Fold Predications equal Four-Cornered Negation Reversed?,
Philosophy East and West, vol. 7, 1958, pp. 127130.
2. J. Ganeri, Jaina Logic and the Philosophy Basis of Pluralism, History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 23, 2002, pp. 267281.
3. J.L. Garfield and G. Priest, Nagarjuna and the Limits of Thought, Philosophy
East and West, vol. 53, 2003, pp. 121.
4. G. Priest, The Logic of the Catuskoti, Comparative Philosophy, vol. 1, 2010,
pp. 2454.
5. F. Schang, A Non-One Sided Logic for Non-One-Sidedness, International Journal
of Jaina Studies, (on line), vol. 9, 2013, pp. 125.
6. R. Sylvan, A Generous Jainist Interpretation of Core Relevant Logics, Bulletin of
the Section of Logic, vol. 16, 1987, pp. 5866.

On the Justification of Logical Principles

da Silva
Jairo Jose
lio de Mesquita Filho, Araraquara,
Universidade Estadual Paulista Ju

Sao Paulo, Brazil

dasilvajairo1@gmail.com
How to justify logical principles? Some would rather put this question aside and
take logical principles for example, the principle of bivalence (a well-formed assertion
is either true or false independently of us being in a position to actually decide which)
or non-contradiction on a par with the axioms of any formal mathematical discipline
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(e.g. formal geometry), which in themselves do not have any intrinsic meaning or truth,
acquiring both only upon interpretation. We would then be free to chose the principles
by which a logic is to abide, whose scope of validity would be circumscribed by the
interpretations that validate these principles. From this perspective, logical principles
are not justified, but freely chosen.
But this is not the traditional sense of logic. For Frege, logic has to do with truth
to the same extent zoology has to do with animals; for Husserl, logic is the a priori
theory of science, the science of science. Traditionally, logic is identified with reason
and its most basic notion is that of truth. Logic, together with intuition, a direct
grasp of truth in the same sense that perception is a direct grasp of objects (which
does not rule out cases of misperception), are the only forms of rational justification
available. In mathematics, both types have a place, intuition for the basic truths, the
axioms, and logical reasoning, mixed or not with intuition, for the rest. From this
perspective logical principles can and must be justified. Obviously, we cannot justify
logical principles logically, since logic rests on its principles, but we can look for a
justification either in intuition (by clarifying intuitively the concept of truth) or by
unveiling yet more basic facts concerning truth on which logical principles rest. I take
these approaches as essentially the same.
Concrete logic, if I am permitted the term, is to formal logic as concrete geometry is
to formal geometry. Whereas the latter deals with an abstract notion of space, concrete
geometry has to do with perceptual space. Analogously, concrete logic is the theory
of the concept of truth; its principles spell out our apprehension of this concept to the
same extent that concrete geometry spells out our notion of perceptual space.
There are further analogies between logic and geometry. Although geometry was
born out of our interest on perceptual space, the space of mathematical geometry is
not space as directly perceived; geometrical space is an idealization of perceptual space.
Analogously, there is a more fundamental concept of truth and an idealized one, based
on it. On the most basic level, truth is an experience, that of the adequation between
what is said and what is directly experienced (adequatio rei ad intellectum as an experience); on a more abstract, theoretical level, it is an idealization of such an experience
(adequatio rei ad intellectum as an ideal ). There is then the logic of the (immediate)
experience of truth (to the same extent there is a geometry of our immediate perception
of space, which may or may not take a mathematical form) and the logic of an idealized
conception of truth (the counterpart of the mathematical theory of idealized perceptual
space). Both have a role in science.
The concept of truth involves, on the one hand, assertions and, on the other, that
to which assertions refer, either experience, in the case of the logic of experience or, in
the case of abstract logic, that which underlies experience, which I call the world or
reality, in the most general sense of these terms, which encompasses, in particular,
mathematical realms and worlds of fantasy. Experience is the subject privileged access
to reality but it cannot give it the whole of reality; the realm of (actualizable) experience is by its very nature constantly open to new experiences. Reality is the ideal
realm, considered as a being-in-itself, of all possible contents of experience, in a sense
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of possibility that goes beyond mere actualizability. An (actualized) experience opens
a window to the real, and no chunk of reality is in principle incapable of being given
in direct experience.
Although looking a lot like a metaphysical principle, the last sentence above is
instead a presupposition, but one of a very peculiar nature; not something that can
be put to test and be found to be untenable, not a hypothesis, but a true constitutive
aspect of reality as intentionally posited. Reality, as a scientific notion, is an intentional
construct, a background against which experiences acquire a sense, an ideal pole to
which experiences converge, that which science strives to represent in a way that better
makes sense of experience. The logic of assertions as referring to facts of reality (not
necessarily actually experienceable facts), that is, abstract logic, the logic of the real,
depends, then, on the sense with which reality is intentionally posited.
Ill point out the most relevant aspects of reality as an intentional object. 1) Reality
is an ontologically complete being-in-itself, i.e. no possible situation remains indefinite
as to its factuality (on the side of the subject this translates into the presupposition that
the subject can ideally maybe not actually verify any assertion that it can meaningfully assert); 2) reality is an ontologically stable domain, i.e. the same fact, with the
same objects in the same relations, can be the content of different experiences, with different intentional senses and modes (intuitively given or only symbolically represented,
as a content of perception or one of memory, for instance).
Now we have reached the crux of the matter, logical principles are justified by these
presuppositions. The principles of bivalence and identity, in particular, rest on, respectively, presuppositions (1) and (2) above (which implies that the logic of reality, as we
characterized this notion here, is the so-called classical logic).
Husserls Formal and Transcendental Logic makes this point very clearly (92b):
[. . . ] logic, by its relation to a real world, presupposes not only a real world
being-in-itself but also the possibility, existing in itself, of acquiring cognition
of a world as genuine knowledge, genuine science, either empirically or a priori
[. . . ] all of that is claimed as an Apriori.
There are presuppositions concerning experiences too. Although (1) is not valid for
the realm of (actual or actualizable) experiences, since this does not constitute an ontologically complete realm of being (there are experiences in principle possible that are
not in principle actualizable keep in mind that logic, any logic, as an a priori science,
can consider only matters of principle, not fact; supposing, of course, that one does not
believe, with Brouwer, that logic is a posteriori), (2) arguably still stands. But there is
a third presupposition worth mentioning: (3) experience is consistent, i.e. the subject
cannot experience simultaneously both a fact and that this fact is not experienceable;
this is inscribed in our very conception of experience. Since experiences necessarily involve a subject considered abstractly and ideally, idealizing presuppositions concerning
the subject will necessarily be reflected on the principles of the logic of experience; (3)
is one of these presuppositions, on it rests the principle of non-contradiction (which
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implies that a logic of experience, as we understand this notion, cannot do without
non-contradiction).
In conclusion, these considerations purport to show that the justification of logical
principles is a task for a transcendental sort of inquiry into intentional constitutive
experiences, and that formal logic demands philosophical completion in a sort of transcendental logic that digs below experience and reality into the intentional constitution
of the conceptions of experience and reality.
Reference
1. Edmund Husserl, Formale und transzendentale Logik, 2nd edition, 1929. In Husserliana, vol. 17, edited by Paul Janssen, Martinus Nijhoff / The Hague, Netherlands,
1974. Formal and Transcendental Logic, english translation by Dorion Cairns, Martinus Nijhoff / The Hague, Netherlands, 1969.

Paraconsistency and External Justification

Koji Tanaka
Australian National University, Canberra, Australia
koji.tanaka@anu.edu.au
Graham Priest often argues for the non-classical (in particular, paraconsistent) nature of logical consequence by showing a discrepancy between classical principles and
how we rationally reason. This methodology for justifying logical principles is often
considered to be flawed. In this paper, I will argue that, for Priests argument to
succeed, the logical principles governing consequence relations must not only be internally coherent (and thereby non-trivial) but also externally justified. In other words,
the justification of paraconsistent logic involves establishing non-triviality as well as the
adequacy of someone reasoning paraconsistently in relation to the external circumstance
that prompted that reasoning. I shall defend Priests methodology by articulating and
defending the role of external justification of logical principles for justifying paraconsistent logic. I shall thereby make a new case for the paraconsistent nature of logical
consequence. Moreover, given that logical principles are not thought to be responsive
to the external world, the argument advanced in the paper challenges not only classical logic but also the formal conception of logic presupposed by most contemporary
logicians.

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Abstract Duality and Co-Constructive Logic

James Trafford
University for the Creative Arts, Epsom, UK
jtrafford2@ucreative.ac.uk
This paper investigates an abstract duality existing between paracomplete and paraconsistent logics, with the suggestion that these can be understood as co-constructive
logics of proofs and refutations. In the current literature, dual-logics (including self-dual
logics) are typically held together by some form of coherence principle, where, roughly,
if a formula is a theorem (or provable) in one system then the dual sentence will be a
counter-theorem (or refutable) in the dual system. We formalize this by means of a Galois connection between dual logics, and show that coherence holds for: classical logic;
Greg Restalls [2] inferentialist approach to logic by means of assertion and denial; general logics of proofs and refutations (e.g. [3, 4, 5]); Dummetts [1] consideration of a dual
falsificationism logic to verificationism; Urbas [6] analysis of dual-intuitionistic logic.
In so doing, it is also simple to see why the coherence principle renders such systems
fairly uninteresting (for example, bi-intuitionistic logic, which combines intuitionistic
and dual-intuitionistic logic contains theorems which are constructively unacceptable).
By syntactically separating dual calculi for intuitionistic and co-intuitionistic logic, we
then investigate structures where the coherence principle does not hold unrestrictedly,
and which generate non-trivial inferentialist semantics. Philosophically, we understand
the relation between dual calculi in terms of a dialogue between prover and refuter,
allowing for both potential and conclusive proofs (refutations).
References
1. M. Dummett, The Seas of Language, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.
2. G. Restall, Multiple conclusions, Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science:
Proceedings of the Twelfth International Congress, Kings College Publications, London, 2005, pp. 189205.
3. T. Skura, On pure refutation formulations of sentential logics, Bulletin of the
Section of Logic, vol. 19, no. 3, 1990, pp. 102107.
4. J. Slupecki, G. Bryll and U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Theory of rejected propositions i, Studia Logica, vol. 29, no. 1, 1971, pp. 75123.
5. J. Slupecki, G. Bryll and U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, The theory of rejected propositions ii, Studia Logica, vol. 30, no. 1, 1972, pp. 97145.
6. I. Urbas, Dual-intuitionistic logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 37,
no. 3, 1996, pp. 440451.
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Hegel and The Idea of Negative Self-Relatedness

Alper Turken

azic
Bog
i University, Istanbul,
Turkey
alper.turken@gmail.com
Hegels adoption of the medieval principle omnis determinatio est negatio which
he attributes to Spinoza is widely acknowledged as one of his most important philosophical commitments and an essential aspect of his thought. Recently, Brandom has
argued that the concept of determinate negation which Hegel developed based on this
principle is Hegels fundamental conceptual tool ([1], p. 180) and that the relations of
determinate negation articulate the basic structure of Hegels metaphysics ([1], p. 49).
According to this, determinateness of a property requires exclusion of the incompatible properties and this allows definition of incompatibility and consequence relations.
The proposition or property p entails q just in case everything incompatible with q
is incompatible with p. For instance, having the property square entails having the
property polygonal as everything materially incompatible with square is incompatible
with polygonal ([1], p. 49). Brandom made a convincing case that this particular aspect of Hegels concept of determinate negation can be domesticated into the context
of contemporary philosophy and receive new life.
On the other hand, another important dimension of Hegels further development of
the same concept which is no less important for his speculative thought is often missed.
This is the negative self-relatedness of every finite determination. In Hegels treatment
of determinate being in Science of Logic, we learn that something is determinate being
by excluding its other from itself. Hegel claims that this exclusion of the other from
itself is at the same time is its inclusion of its own limit. According to this, limit of
something does not fall outside it but belongs to its very own determination. Without
its limit, it would not be a determinate being but indeterminate being. But limit is
nothing but the non-being of something. Consequently, something includes its own
non-being within itself and is determinate and therefore something only by virtue of
this. Finitude and therefore being determinate is not being limited in general but inclusion of its own limit or its own non-being within itself:
The something, posited with its immanent limit as the contradiction of itself by
virtue of which it is directed and driven out and beyond itself, is the finite ([2], p. 101).
This inclusion of its own non-being, within itself is the negative self-relatedness of
everything finite and is an essential aspect of being determinate:
Finite things are, but in their reference to themselves they refer to themselves negatively in this very self-reference they propel themselves beyond themselves, beyond
their being ([2], p. 101).

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In my view, negative self-relatedness of every finite determination is the core idea
defining the dialectical moment in Hegels thought. The objective of this paper is to
present this revolutionary concept and evaluate its prospects for being domesticated to
contemporary philosophy.
References
1. R. Brandom, Tales of the Mighty Dead, Harvard University Press, 2002.
2. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, translated by A.G.D. Giovanni, Cambridge
University Press, 2010.

Against the World

Elia Zardini
University of Lisbon, Lisbon, Portugal
elia.zardini@campus.ul.pt
In previous works (e.g. [2]), Ive developed a naive theory of truth (i.e. a theory that
validates the intersubstitutability between and is true). The theory validates
the law of excluded middle (LEM) and the law of non-contradiction (LNC), and solves
the semantic paradoxes (e.g. the Liar paradox) by restricting instead the structural
property of contraction; more in detail, the base sentential logic of the theory is the
multiplicative fragment of sentential affine logic. Thus, the principle of distributivity of
conjunction over disjunction (D) fails in the theoryin fact, even the weaker principle
of modularity (M) fails. In other previous works (e.g. [1]), Ive developed a naive theory
of vagueness (i.e. a theory that validates the intersubstitutability between, say, n is
small and n + 1 is small). Again, the theory validates LEM and LNC, and solves the
paradoxes of vagueness (e.g. the Sorites paradox) by restricting instead the structural
property of transitivity; more in detail, the logic of the theory is defined over a class of
non-modular lattices. Thus, again, D fails in the theory in fact, again, M also fails.
The failures of D and M in both theories is certainly surprising: after all, while many
logical moves have been tried out to solve the semantic paradoxes and the paradoxes of
vagueness, to the best of my knowledge no antecedent solution to either the semantic
paradoxes or the paradoxes of vagueness has ever envisaged failures of D and M. And
that does not seem a mere historical accident: neither kind of paradox seems to involve
those principles in the first place. How could it be that, in this respect, familiar liars and
heaps deviate from the laws of classical logic in an even deeper way than the exoteric
objects of quantum mechanics? It might then seem that the solutions Ive proposed
feature unnecessarily weak logics. Ill argue that these appearances are deceiving: if
the broad naive approaches Ive proposed are on anything like the right track in
particular, if they are correct in upholding LEM and LNC D and M just cannot be
had. Ill then draw out a philosophically significant consequence of the failure of D and
M in the solutions Ive proposed: on both solutions, there is no true statement that, for
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every , either entails or entails ; in other words, there is no complete way things
are. Since the world is supposed to be just that the complete way things are it
thus turns out that, on both solutions, there is no world.
References
1. Elia Zardini, A model of tolerance, Studia Logica, vol. 90, 2008, pp. 337368.
2. Elia Zardini, Truth without contra(di)ction, The Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 4,
2011, pp. 498535.

Representation and Reality: Humans, Animals

and Machines
This workshop is organized by
Raffaela Giovagnoli
Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican
Our workshop could be considered as the continuation of a part of the symposium
Computing Nature, organized by Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic and Raffaela Giovagnoli,
in the AISB/IACAP World Congress 2012 and Representation: Humans, Animals
and Machines in the AISB50 Convention at Goldsmith 2015. We would like to offer a
further occasion to discuss the problem of representation in humans, other animals
and machines. It is closely related to the question what capacities can be plausibly
computed and what are the most promising approaches that try to solve the problem.
The invited keynote speakers of this workshop are Gordana Dodig-Crnkovic (page 87)
and Gianfranco Basti (page 79).

Call for papers

The following interesting topics related to the problem of representation are welcome:
The point of view of connectionism and dynamical systems (Scheutz, Clark, Juarrero, Kaneko and Tsuda, OBrien, Horgan, Trenholme) namely the different proposals about the possibility to rule out representation.
A plausible strategy to analyze the problem of representation from a philosophical perspective implies the comparison between human and machine capacities and
skills. Searle presented an interesting theory of representation based on the minds
capacities to represent objects and to the linguistic capacities to extend the representation to social entities. For machine representation current results in AI and
cognitive robotics are of interest.
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Evolutionary aspects of the development of increasingly complex capacities in (embodied, embedded) living organisms to process information in the interaction with
the environment and as a consequence develop new morphological structures
morphogenesis, meta-morphogenesis.
Abstracts should be sent to raffa.giovagnoli@tiscali.it.

The possibility of superminds. A response to Bringsjords

argument on infinitary logic, by Florent Franchette
Florent Franchette
INSA de Lyon, Lyon, France
florent.franchette@insa-lyon.fr
The term supermind refers to human brains that exceed Turing machines limits,
and was vastly discussed in the literature e.g., in [7, 8, 4, 3, 10, 9]. [2], in particular,
provided an argument in favour of the possibility of superminds based on infinitary
logic. According to the argument, the infinitary nature of mathematical expertise is
a proof of the impossibility for human expertise to be formalised by a formal system,
i.e., to be computed by a Turing machine (TM). My talk, however, is meant to
provide a response to Bringsjords argument on infinitary logic, and thus to
minimize the possibility of superminds.
To show that human expertise cannot be computed by TMs, Bringsjord focuses
on a specific infinitary system called Lw1 w . Such a system is based on the first-order
logic and is able to express some mathematical concepts e.g. the concepts of finite
interpretation or ordinary arithmetic that cannot be expressed in the first-order logic
system LI ([6]). According to Bringsjord, since human expertise can deal with Lw1 w ,
which is a system capable of expressing some concepts that cannot be expressed in
first-order logic and so by TMs , human expertise exceeds Turing machines limits.
A couple of objections was raised against Bringsjords argument though. Among
these is the following objection which was discussed by Bringsjord himself:
Here you switch from describing infinite sentences to somehow using them [. . . ]
Surely it is quite possible that a human expert mathematician uses some finite
mental representations to reason about Lw1 w . Not even you, Bringsjord, can be
reasoning with Lw1 w ([2], pp. 2223).
Although Bringsjord provided a reply to the objection, its entire force remains. In
my opinion, the distinction between to reason about and to reason with is crucial for
deciding whether superminds are possible. I argue, specifically, that human minds
cannot reason with Lw1 w , even though they may reason about Lw1 w . To this
end, I propose the following definitions:

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Definition 1. To reason about and with a deductive system.
To reason about a deductive system means inferring theorems of the system by
using verifiable and non-verifiable proofs.
To reason with a deductive system means inferring theorems of the system by using
verifiable proofs only.
Definition 2. (Verifiable proofs and rules).
A proof is verifiable if it only contains verifiable rules.
A rule is verifiable if a human computer is able to verify the correctness of every
elementary step of the rule.
Example 1. (Verifiable and non-verifiable rules).
An example of a verifiable rule can be found in Peano arithmetic: if n is a natural
number then its successor is also a natural number. Formally, N (n) N (s(n))
where N is the property of being a natural number and the logical inference.
The correctness of every elementary step of the rule can be verified by a human
computer because the successor function s(n) is a primitive recursive function, i.e.,
there is an effective procedure computing s(n) for all n.
An example of a non-verifiable rule is the -rule of the -logic. The -logic is a deductive system which both contains all axioms and rules of the first-order logic and
the -rule: for every formula P (x) where x is a free variable, P (0), P (1), P (2), . . .
x (N (x) P (x)). The -rule is not verifiable because the correctness
of the infinite number of elementary steps included in the rule cannot be verified
by a human computer.
It is now possible from these definitions to specify my response to Bringsjords argument: human minds can reason about Lw1 w , for they are able to infer theorems such as
Scotts Isomorphism theorem by using non-verifiable rules such as the ones allowing to
construct infinite conjunctions ([5]). However, human minds cannot reason with Lw1 w ,
for they are not able to infer all known theorems of Lw1 w from verifiable rules only. The
system requires, in particular, the use of infinite long proofs that are not verifiable ([1]).
References
1. K.J. Barwise, Infinitary Logic and Admissible Sets, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 34, 1969, pp. 226252.
2. S. Bringsjord, An Argument for the Uncomputability of Infinitary Mathematical
Expertise, in Expertise in Context, edited by P. Feltovich, K. Ford and P. Hayes,
AAAI Press, Menlo Park, CA, USA, 1997, pp. 475497.
3. S. Bringsjord and M. Zenzen, Superminds: People Harness Hypercomputation, and
More, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 2003.
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4. B.J. Copeland, Narrow Versus Wide Mechanism : Including a Re-Examination
of Turings Views of the Mind-Machine Issue, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 1,
2000, pp. 532.
5. H.D. Ebbinghaus, J. Flum and W. Thomas, Mathematical Logic, Springer-Verlag,
New York, USA, 1984.
6. H.J. Keisler, Model Theory for Infinitary Logic: Logic with Countable Conjunctions
and Finite Quantifiers, North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1971.
7. J.R. Lucas, Minds, Machines and Godel, Philosophy, vol. 36, 1961, pp. 112127.
8. R. Penrose, Shadows of the Mind, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994.
9. H. Siegelmann, Neural and Super-Turing Computing, Minds and Machines, vol. 13,
2003, pp. 115153.
10. M. Stannett, Computation and Hypercomputation, Minds and Machines, vol. 13,
2003, pp. 103114.

The Relevance of Language for the Problem of Representation

Raffaela Giovagnoli
Pontifical Lateran University, Vatican City, Italy
raffa.giovagnoli@tiscali.it
The present contribution deals with the relationship between representation and
language that becomes more relevant if we do not intend the process of forming internal
representations of reality but rather the representative function of language.
According to Searle, a belief is a representation (not in the sense of having an
idea) that has a propositional content and a psychological mode: the propositional
content or intentional content determines a set of conditions of satisfaction under certain
aspects and the psychological mode determines the direction of fit the propositional
content [9].
Thoughts can be true or false but sentences do not express them randomly. Sentences express thoughts as related to contexts of use in which they acquire their truthvalue i.e. they are true or false. For instance the sentence That is a funny play can
be true or false depending on the context of use. We can grasp thoughts but Frege
does not present an analysis of the grasping because he thinks that this implies a
psychological order of explanation [3]. Searle rather gives an account of the grasping
through his brilliant account of the functioning of background based on intentionality.
We can therefore show the complementarity between the description of the functioning
of the cognitive grasping of the content of beliefs and the normative objective content
that represent the ground of shared beliefs.
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There is a different interpretation of the Fregean semantics, which is bound to the
concepts use in ordinary language along the line of Davidson, Dummett and Sellars
[1, 2]. This theoretical option cannot be discussed in the ambit of cognitive sciences
(in particular cognitive psychology, developmental psychology, animal psychology and
artificial intelligence).
Well show the human representation of knowledge through the use of language by
following a peculiar logical process. It entails three steps:
1. the differentiation between labeling and describing;
2. the separation between force and content;
3. the formation of complex predicates.
References
1. R. Brandom, Between Saying & Doing, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008.
2. R. Brandom, How Analytic Philosophy Has failed Cognitive Science, in Reason
in Philosophy: Animating Ideas, by R. Brandom, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 2012.
3. R. Giovagnoli, Why the Fregean Square of Opposition Matters for Epistemology, in Around and Beyond the Square of Opposition, edited by J.-Y. Beziau and
D. Jaquette, Birkhauser, 2012, pp. 111116.
4. R. Giovagnoli, Representation, Analytic Pragmatism and AI, in Computing Nature, edited by G. Dodig-Crnkovic and R. Giovagnoli, Springer, Basel, Switzerland,
2013.
5. R. Giovagnoli, editor, Prelinguistic Practice, Social Ontology and Semantic, Etica
& Politica/Ethics & Politics, Rivista di filosofia/A Review of Philosophy, vol. XI,
no. 1, Monographica II, 2009, http://www2.units.it/etica/2009_1/copertina.
html.
6. R. Giovagnoli, Computational Aspects of Autonomous Discursive Practices, in
Proceedings of the Symposium Social Aspects of Cognition and Computation, edited
by R. Giovagnoli, G. Dodig-Crnkovic and Y. Erden, 2015, http://www.cs.kent.
ac.uk/events/2015/AISB2015/proceedings/socialComp/papers/SACCS-AISB2015
submission 12.pdf.
7. R. Kibble, Reasoning, Representation and Social Practices, in Proceedings
of the Symposium Social Aspects of Cognition and Computation, edited
by R. Giovagnoli, G. Dodig-Crnkovic, and Y. Erden, 2015, http://www.cs.kent.ac.uk
/events/2015/AISB2015/proceedings/socialComp/papers/SACCS-AISB2015 subm
ission 5.pdf.
8. J. Searle, Speech Acts, Cambridge University Press, 1969.
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9. J. Searle, Intentionality, Cambridge University Press, 1983.
10. W. Sellars, Counterfactuals, Dispositions and Causal Modalities, in Minnesota
Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Volume II: Concepts, Theories and the MindBody Problem, edited by H. Feigl, M. Scriven and G. Maxwell, University
of Minnesota Press, 1958, pp. 306307.
11. H.D. Sluga, Gottlob Frege, Routledge & Kegan, London, 1980.

Supervaluation Semantics for Modeling Spatial Representations

in Humans and Robots
Marcos Lopes
University of Sao Paulo, Brazil
marcoslopes@usp.br
Paulo Santos
rio da FEI, Sa
o Bernardo do Campo, Brazil
Centro Universita
paedusan@gmail.com
Spatial knowledge plays an essential role in human reasoning, permeating tasks such
as locating objects in the world (including oneself), reasoning about everyday actions
and describing perceptual information. In this work, we propose to investigate the
possibilities for both a unifying theory for spatial expressions representations in humans
and a working system with which to equip an intelligent tool (such as a robot) with
the ability to understand and use natural language spatial relations to refer to objects
in the environment. Ideally, these relations are to be formalized as to be the closest
in meaning to the human usage of spatial expressions in natural language. Although
there has been a long tradition in cognitive psychology on human understanding of
such expressions [2], attempts in representing them in artificial languages rarely takes
natural languages semantics into account.
Using spatial expressions in their absolute form (e.g. Cartesian coordinates or cardinal points) is not common in spoken language, specially when it comes to instructions
for locating objects in space. Natural speech most often mentions interactions between
objects: The book is on the table; The spotlight above the sofa, etc. Such descriptions imply some cognitive aspects of the relationships between located objects and
reference objects. Other expressions, although propositionally analogous to the same
state of affairs, would sound strange and are therefore rarely verbalized: ? The table
is under the book; ? The sofa below the spotlight. Furthermore, simple notions of
distance between objects are also meaningless without a context [2].
Finally, another feature to consider is that of the spatial axes biases in human
representation of space [5]. In short, humans tend to favor the lower portion of vertical
space (as pointing towards the feet) and, horizontally, the front. In this work we propose
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a novel formalism for space representation that takes into account this asymmetry on
the human perception. This formalism is built upon current methods for Qualitative
Spatial Reasoning [1; 6] and takes supervaluation semantics [4] as the base logical
framework to represent the distinct preferences taken by the human perceptual system
as standpoints within a consistent theory. Supervaluation semantics is commonly used
to model vagueness in a language as a set of distinct precise versions of it. Each of
these versions is called a precisification of the language. In this work, we provide a
new definition to precisification that applies to the distinct ways a particular predicate
can be applied on the same situation, but with distinct angle (or standpoint) of it.
For instance, the term below can have distinct precisifications given the particular
arrangement of objects, observers and observers poses involved when applying it.
The resulting formalism will be applied on a robot capable of interacting verbally
with a human operator. Usability tests shall be fully conducted to evaluate the quality
of the formalism on the human-robot interaction [3].
References
1. A.G. Cohn and J. Renz, Qualitative Spatial Representation and Reasoning, in
Handbook of Knowledge Representation, edited by F.V. Harmelen et al., Elsevier,
Amsterdam, 2008, pp. 551596.
2. K. Coventry and S. Garrod, Saying, Seeing and Acting: The Psychological Semantics
of Spatial Prepositions, Psychology Press, Hove, 2004.
3. B. Daniel, T. Thomessen, and P. Korondi, Simplified Human-Robot Interaction:
Modeling and Evaluation, Modeling, Identification and Control, vol. 34, no. 4,
2013, pp. 199211.
4. K. Fine, Vagueness, truth and logic, Synthese, vol. 30, nos. 34, 1975, pp. 265
300.
5. N. Franklin and B. Tversky, Searching imagined environments, Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 119, no. 1, 1990, pp. 6376.
6. G. Ligozat, Qualitative Spatial and Temporal Reasoning, Wiley, London, 2011.

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The quantum strategy of completeness

Vasil Dinev Penchev
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria
vasildinev@gmail.com
The thesis is: The Godel incompleteness can be modeled on the alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics. Then the proved completeness of quantum mechanics can
be reversely interpreted as a strategy of completeness as to the foundation of mathematics.
That argument supposes that the Godel incompleteness originates from the deficiency of the mathematical structure, on which it is grounded. Furthermore, one can
point out that generalized structure, on which completeness is provable and thus it can
serve as a reliable fundament of mathematics.
Set theory and arithmetic were what was put as the base of mathematics. However,
it is a random historical fact appealing to intuition or to intellectual authorities such as
Cantor, Frege, Russell, Hilbert, Nicolas Bourbaki, etc. rather than to a mathematical
proof. Even more, the so-called Godel incompleteness theorems demonstrated that set
theory and arithmetic are irrelevant as the ground of mathematics rather than no
relevant branch of mathematics allowing of self-grounding though the orthodox view.
One can utilize an analogy to the so-called fundamental theorem of algebra: It
needs a more general structure than the real numbers, within which it can be proved.
Analogically, the self-foundation of mathematics needs some more general structure
than the positive integers in order to be provable.
The key for a relevant structure is Einsteins failure to show that quantum mechanics
is incomplete. The incompleteness of set theory and arithmetic and the alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics can be linked. The close friendship of the Princeton
refugees Godel and Einstein might address that fact. However, Godel came to Princeton
in 1940 much after the beginning of Einsteins attempts to reveal that and how quantum mechanics was incomplete. In particular, the famous triple article of Einstein,
Podolsky, and Rosen Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be
Considered Complete? pointed out as a kind of theoretical forecast as to the phenomena of entanglement and thus of quantum information was published in 1935. So, there
should exist a common mathematical structure underlying both incompletenesses and
in turn interpretable as each of them.
The mathematical formalism of quantum mechanics is based on the complex Hilbert
space featuring by a few important properties relevant to that structure apt to underlie
mathematics:
1. It is a generalization of positive integers: Thus it involves infinity.
2. It is both discrete and continuous (even smooth): Thus it can unify arithmetic and
geometry.
3. It is invariant to the axiom of choice: Thus it can unify as the externality and
internality of an infinite set as the probabilistic and deterministic consideration of
the modeled reality as well as even model and reality in general.
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The target of the presentation is:
Those three properties of the complex Hilbert space to be demonstrated.
A simple mathematical structure underlying both the Godel incompleteness and
the alleged incompleteness of quantum mechanics to be described explicitly.
III. The undecidable statements according to the Godel incompleteness theorems to
be demonstrated as decidable in that generalized structure of Hilbert space.
IV. The so-called Godel first incompleteness theorem to be interpreted as allowing of
the self-foundation of mathematics.
I.
II.

Representation and Reality by Language

Venelina Penkova Pencheva
Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridski, Sofia, Bulgaria
venelichka@yahoo.com
Vasil Dinev Penchev
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria
vasildinev@gmail.com
Reality as if is doubled in relation to language: The one counterpart of reality
is within the language as the representation of the other counterpart of reality being
outside the language and existing by itself. Both representation and metaphor are
called to support the correspondence between the two twins as an image and simile.
The mechanism of that correspondence and its formal conditions are investigated
by the following construction: Language is reduced to an infinite countable set (A) of
its units of meaning, either words or propositions, or whatever others. It includes all
possible meanings, which can be ever expressed in the language rather than the existing
till now, which would always a finite set.
The external twin of reality is introduced by another set (B) such that its intersection with the above set of language to be empty. The union of them (C = A B) exists
always so that a one-to-one mapping (f C A) should exist under the condition of
the axiom of choice. The mapping (f ) produces an image (B(f )) of the latter set (B)
within the former set (A). That image (B(f )) serves as the other twin of reality to
model the reality within the language as the exact representation of the reality out of
language (modeled as the set B). In the model, the necessity and sufficient condition
of that representation between reality both within and out of the language is just the
axiom of choice: If the axiom of choice does not hold, the relation between the sets
B(f ) and B cannot be defined rigorously as an exact representation but rather as some
simile and the vehicle between the two twins can be only metaphor.
Furthermore the metaphor can be anyway defined to a set of one-to-one representations of the only similar external twin into a set of internal twins, each of which is a
different interpretation of the external twin so that a different metaphor is generated
in each case. The representation seems to be vague, defocused, after which the image
is bifurcate and necessary described by some metaphors within the language.
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Consequently reality is in an indefinite, bifurcate position to language according to
the choice formalized in the axiom of choice. If that choice is granted, the language
generates an exact image of reality in itself; if not, only some simile can exist expressible
within it only by metaphors.
If the axiom of choice does not hold, language and reality converge, e.g. as ontology:
Ontology utilizing metaphors can describe being as an inseparable unity of language
and reality within language abandoning representations and the conception of truth as
the adequacy of language to reality. Furthermore, those metaphors should coincide with
reality (and with physical reality in particular) in virtue of the ontological viewpoint.
Furthermore, language can be formally defined by representation after the latter is in
turn defined as a one-to-one mapping between two infinite sets, one of which is defined
as reality and the other, as its image. Language is namely the natural interpretation of
that image.
The advantage of that approach is to link the representation of the human being
supplied by language to the representation by a machine (e.g. a computer), which should
be formally modeled to be constructed. Another point of interest is the following:
That mathematics, which is underlain by the mapping between sets, can be related to
language by link of representation.

Internal inconsistencies: how can an information system

ontology be both realistic and common-sense friendly?
David Zarebski
Paris 1 Panthe
on-Sorbonne, Paris, France
Universite
zarebskidavid@gmail.com
The robustness of some high-level cognitive categories and their subsequent representational constraints across various domains is one of the striking facts about human
cognition. In this way, no matter the scale of the domain from chemistry to astrophysics
human common sense remains ontologically committed to the existence of time-proof
entities (individuals) which may 1) possess some common essence, 2) be affected by
processes some of which depend causally on others, etc. In other words, these intuitive
high-level representational constraints constitute the human Cognitive Ontology (CO).
Ontologies, similarly understood as conceptual structures, became also relevant in
the context of Artificial Intelligence and Knowledge Engineering Information System
Ontologies (ISO). In such a context, the ability to fit our CO is a secondary goal, for the
main one consists in developing an efficient artificial agent able to deal with complex
situations. However, interestingly, some upper level ISO are claimed to be consistent
with our human common sense representations, either explicitly as the Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering (Gangemi et al. 2002) or implicitly as
the Basic Formal Ontology [7, 6]. This specific feature is usually not perceived as a
treat for the realistic significance of these ISOs. As it is the case in some formal ontological investigations, the ontology is believed to grasp genuine ontological differences
and, by chance, being consistent with our CO (see [2]).
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Supporting together a realist ontological claim and consistency with common sense
is usually a difficult, nay an impossible, task. The two main reasons for this are a)
the partiality of the middle-sized objects of a typical human environment, thus the fact
that, as an example, some intuitive ontological categories might not be relevant in the
sub-atomic domain and its quantum phenomena, b) the internal inconsistencies of CO,
i.e. the existence of conflicting formats of mental representation in human understanding [5, 4]. We will address these two issues and evaluate in what extent their current
answers the Theory of Granular Partitions [1] and the Realist Perspectivalism [8] fulfill
the requirement of a classical realist position.
References
1. T. Bittner and B. Smith, A Theory of Granular Partitions, in Applied Ontology:
An Introduction, edited by B. Smith and K. Munn, Ontos Verlag, vol. 9, 2001,
pp. 125158. Metaphysical Research, vol. 8, Heusenstamm, 2008.
2. Nino B. Cocchiarella, Formal Ontology and Conceptual Realism, Springer, 2007.
3. A. Gangemi, N. Guarino, C. Masolo, A. Oltramari and L. Schneider, Sweetening
ontologies with DOLCE, in Knowledge engineering and knowledge management:
Ontologies and the semantic Web, pp. 166181, Springer, 2002.
4. A. Goldman, A Program for Naturalizing Metaphysics, with Application to the
Ontology of Events, The Monist, vol. 90, 2007, pp. 457479.
5. A. Goldman, Liaisons: Philosophy meets the cognitive and social sciences, MIT
Press, 1992.
6. Simon K. Milton and Barry Smith, Top-level ontology: The problem with naturalism, in Formal ontology in information systems, 2004, pp. 8594.
7. B. Smith, Formal ontology, common sense and cognitive science, International
Journal of Human Computer Studies, vol. 43, 1995, pp. 641667.
8. Barry Smith and Pierre Grenon, The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations,
Dialectica, vol. 58, 2004, pp. 279296.

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4th International Workshop on Computational

Creativity, Concept Invention
and General Intelligence (C3GI)
The invited keynote speakers of this workshop are Tony Veale (page 111)
and Irina Starikova (page 104).
For every kind of workshop-related question, please mail to c3gi@cogsci.uos.de.

The Workshops Mission Statement: Why and what for?

Over the last years, an old AI dream has seen its renaissance: Thinking machines.
Having been almost completely abandoned for decades, more and more researchers have
recognized the necessity and feasibility of returning to the original goal of creating
systems with human-like intelligence. Increasingly, there is a call for confronting the
more difficult issues of human-level intelligence, addressing the artificial (re)creation of
high-level cognitive capacities. Within the range of these capacities, due to their elusive
and nonetheless indispensable nature, creativity in all its facets (e.g. in engineering, science, mathematics, business processes), concept invention, concept formation, creative
problem solving, the production of art, and the like are assigned a special status.
Researchers in several communities are trying to understand the basic principles
underlying these special abilities, working on computational models of their functioning, and also their utilization in different contexts and applications (e.g. applications of
computational creativity frameworks with respect to mathematical invention and inventions in engineering, to the creation of poems, drawings, and music, to product design
and development, to architecture etc.). In particular, a variety of different methodologies are used in such contexts ranging from logic-based frameworks to probabilistic and
neuro-inspired approaches. Although the different approaches to questions concerning
aspects of computational creativity, concept invention, and artificial general intelligence
do share significant overlap in underlying ideas, the cooperation between the respective
communities is still in an early stage, and can greatly profit from interaction and discussion between people from the respective fields, forming trans- and interdisciplinary
alliances in research and application.
The workshop shall offer a platform for scientists and professional users within relevant areas, on the one hand presenting actual and ongoing work in research, on the
other hand also offering a chance for obtaining feedback and input from applications
and use-case studies. The format of the workshop will leave ample space for interaction
and discussion, complementing talks highlighting the key points of the accepted paper
submissions with dedicated discussion phases and special contributed flash talks by
renowned people in the field. Furthermore, this workshop explicitly encourages controversial position papers about open problems, ongoing discussions, and projections to
the future of computational creativity.
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A Path is a Path is a Path

Maria M. Hedblom
Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
Oliver Kutz
Free University of Bozen-Bolzano, Bolzano, Italy
Fabian Neuhaus
Otto-von-Guericke University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
Image schemas are recognised as a fundamental ingredient in human cognition,
learning, abstraction, and creative thought. They have been studied extensively in
areas such as cognitive linguistics. However, the very notion of an image schemas is
still ill-defined, with varying terminology and definitions throughout the literature.
For the purpose of formalising image schemas in order to exploit their role in computational creative systems, we here study the viability of an idea to formalise image
schemas as graphs of interlinked theories. We discuss in particular a selection of image schemas related to the notion of path and show how they can be mapped to a
formalised family of micro theories reflecting the different aspects of path following.

Analogical Inference and Transfer for Creativity

Ulf Krumnack and Stefan Schneider
ck, Osnabru
ck, Germany
University of Osnabru
Analogies are often considered a mechanism that allows to explain phenomena of
creativity. An analogical mapping prepares the transfer of concepts and ideas between
different domains. The imported knowledge can provide new insights into the target,
leading to a reconceptualization of a domain or showing solutions to a problem.
While the process of mapping between domains is in the focus of many works on
analogy, the actual transfer receives much less attention. We argue, that this lack of
interest is inappropriate as transfer is not a straight forward continuation of the mapping
process but a complex phenomenon with close connections to the field of conceptual
change. We further claim that there are different ways in which analogical transfer can
contribute to the introduction of new ideas into a domain and suggest a classification
of transfer types based on a formal analogy model.

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Seeing as and Re-Representation: Their Relation to Insight,

Creative Problem-Solving and Types of Creativity
Ana-Maria Olteteanu
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Re-representation and restructuring are processes relevant to creativity research.
These are related to seeing as defined as the ability to represent features as different
meaningful objects, and select and group objects as relevant structures for the problem
at hand.
Creative problem-solving, insight and the three types of creativity proposed by Boden are explored from the perspective of these terms. A set of essential questions to be
answered by the cognitive systems discipline from the perspective of re-representational
ability is put forward. Some of the implications of enabling re-representation and evaluating systems based on re-representation are then explored.

The Input, Coherence, Generativity (ICG) Factors: Towards

a Model of Cognitive Informativity Measures for Productive
Cognitive Systems
Ana-Maria Olteteanu
University of Bremen, Bremen, Germany
Classical thinking on information and informativity considers the informee as a
perfect information receiver. However, when studying productive natural and artificial
cognitive systems, cognitively based models of informativity need to be formulated.
Three factors relevant to cognitive informativity measures are proposed: Input,
Coherence and Generativity (ICG). These factors take into account the type of Input
which can be stored, the Coherence of the system after acquiring the information, and
the Generativity of the system after the new information was integrated.

Mathematical Style as Expression of the Art of Proving

Ioannis M. Vandoulakis
The Hellenic Open University, Greece
Petros Stefaneas
National Technical University of Athens, Athens, Greece
Mathematicians talk of proofs as if they were real things. However, the only things
that can actually happen in the real world are proof-events, or provings, which are actual experiences, each occurring at a particular place and time, and involving particular
people. Proof-events are social events that generate proofs presented in different styles.
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Styles describe specific mathematical practices and characterize different cultures or
schools that may differ in their views of rigor. A style can be personal for a mathematician, or for the school he belongs or for a whole tradition; it may be also mimicry
of the style of a renowned authority. In general, it is considered as principal indicator
of the art of proving.
In our view, style can be defined as a meta-code that determines the individual mode
of integration (selection, combination, blending) of concepts into a narrative structure
(proof). Thus, style depends on the chosen mode of signification (semiosis), the selected
code and the underlying semiotic space (algebraic, geometric, probabilistic, -calculus,
etc.). Styles perform certain functions that concern not only the elegance of exposition
of a proof (the way of writing a proof), but might also facilitate or obstruct communication and understanding of a mathematical proof, depending on the metaphors used
in the narrative (semiotic) space as well as the communicational functions of the codes
and metaphors chosen.
In this paper, we attempt to analyze the communicative functions of mathematical
proving styles by appealing to Roman Jakobsons communication model. This model
was initially conceived for describing the communicative functions of language. However, it can be modified and specified for use in any medium of communication, in
particular in the medium of mathematical proving, computer-generated proving, Webbased proving, etc. In the framework of this model, aesthetic pleasure gained from
mathematical proving can be associated with the poetic function. It is an ideal for a
(pure) mathematician (prover) to find an elegant proof and cause the reader aesthetic
pleasure from his proving activity and its stylized outcome.

Non-Classical Abstract Logics

This workshop is organized by
Fabien Schang
National Research University, Higher School of Economics, Moscow,
Russia
James Trafford
University for the Creative Arts, Epsom, UK
According to the classical view, a logic is a theory of consequence L, Cn, where
Cn is taken to be either a relation between sets of formulas in a language L or an
operator on formulas. By classical here, we do not mean the view of logic which is
defined by a semantic model with only two truth-values (truth and falsity). Rather,
we mean the broader sense in which the foundations of a logic have to do with a basic
relation of truth-preservation. This workshop will question this view, and investigate
alternatives.
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There are a number of suggestions available in the literature regarding what shape
such a non-classical abstract logic might take. For example, from the point of view
of semantics, Shramko and Wansing suggest a generalized theory of truth-values and
entailment relations which do not solely preserve truth. From the point of view of
dialogue, reasoning and inferentialism, a number of authors (e.g. Dutilh-Novaes; Restall;
Ripley) both investigate the foundations of logical deduction and question the centrality
of truth-preservation in the construction of logical systems.
We think that there are three predominant attitudes that can be identified in the
investigation of the abstract properties of logical systems. The first contends that every
logical system has ultimately to do with different ways to preserve truth from premises
to conclusion. The second questions the centrality of truth and makes room for more
relations of consequence between premises and conclusion. Finally, the third is even
more radical by questioning the very relation of consequence. Should the latter always
be seen as a cornerstone in any abstract study of logic? In this vein, falsification, and
relations of rejection, have been studied on a equal footing with truth-preservation (e.g.
Slupecki, Skura). Such investigations may be understood as initiating a broader view
of logical relations that could lead to a more comprehensive reflection on the discipline.
In this regard, consequence, rejection, inference, or even mere difference (in the context
of a wider reading of the logical concept of opposition) may be considered to be equally
basic notions to investigate the foundations of logic.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Joao Marcos (page 101).

Call for papers

Any contribution to the renewal of abstract logic (both in a classical or nonclassical trend) will be welcome in this workshop, utilising various working methods
(algebraic semantics, proof theory, sequent calculus, dialogues), and aiming at a unifying abstract theory of logic of the form L, Cn. This includes questions concerning:
the notion of consequence and its various facets;
the notion of rejection, as both a dual of consequence or a more complex (and
independent) relation non-classical abstract relations, like rejection or difference;
logic and language-games;
investigations regarding consequence and implication, opposition and duality, and
pure negation.
Abstracts should be sent via email to schang.fabien@voila.fr.

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Towards a pragmatic logic for denial

Daniele Chiffi and Massimiliano Carrara
University of Padua, Padua, Italy
daniele.chiffi@unipd.it, massimiliano.carrara@unipd.it
Ciro De Florio
Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Milan, Italy
ciro.deflorio@unicatt.it
In a classical theory of denial to deny A is equivalent to asserting A:
Classical denial. A is correctly denied iff A is correctly asserted.
Glut theorists reject the right-to-left direction of the Classical denial : asserting A
must not commit one to denying A, i.e. denial must not be reducible to the assertion
of A. In particular, the paraconsistent denial of A is stronger than the assertion of
A. Unlike paraconsistent negation, which allows for overlap between truth and falsity,
denial is assumed to be exclusive: assertion and denial are mutually incompatible speech
acts (For a general background on denial in non-classical theories, see Ripley [2].)
Our paper starts from this basic idea i.e. that assertion and denial are mutually
incompatible speech acts and from the fact that we have a logic for assertion as a speech
act, i.e. the logic for pragmatics (LP), a logic proposed by Dalla Pozza and Garola in
(1). Question: Is it possibile to extend LP to include also the speech act of denial? Aim
of the paper is to defend a negative answer to the question. Doing so, we also skectch
some positive requirements for a logic of denial.
In a nutshell, the basic idea of LP is to follow Freges idea of distinguishing propositions from judgments: A proposition is either true or false, while a judgment, expressed
through the speech act of an assertion, is either justified (J) or unjustified (U). A justified assertion is defined in terms of the existence of a proof that the asserted content is
true. Although the concept of proof is meant to be intuitive and unspecified, it must always be understood as correct: a proof is a proof of the truth. Elementary sentences of
LP are built up using only the sign of pragmatic mood of assertion, . So, for example,
if 1 and 2 are propositional formulas, then 1 and 2 are elementary assertions,
while 1 2 or 1 2 , 1 are complex assertions of LP.
Let us suppose that it is possible to extend LP to the speech act of denial; one could
think that the easiest way for doing so is to say that:
(i) v( A) = J iff v( A) = J,
where is a symbol for denial. The informal meaning of (i) is that it is justified
to deny A if and only if it is justified to assert A. Prima face, (i) is simply the
translation, in an extension of LP, of our before mentioned basic idea: assertion and
denial are mutually incompatible speech acts. But, in LP, A entails A, where
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the last formula means that there is a proof that A has not been proved. If so, the
direction from left to right of (i) does not work: it does not seem to be necessary to
have a proof that A is not proven to deny A. A may be denied without a so strong
reason. Moreover, observe that (i) should be taken distinct from (ii):
(ii ) v( A) = J iff v( A) = U,
where the informal meaning of (ii) is that it is justified to deny A if and only if there
is not a proof for the truth of A. But (ii) does not work too. It is indeed too weak:
if there is no conclusive proof for A why should I have to deny it? We formulate
lots of scientific hypotheses without a conclusive proof, and we accept them for some
other/different reasons. If (i) and (ii) are respectively too strong and too weak, what
can we say on assertion and denial as speech acts modeled on LP?
In the paper we consider a proposal based on the dual notions of what is rational
to accept and what is rational to reject. Briefly put: It seems adequate to argue that
if v( A) = J then it is rational to accept A and, on the same line, if v( A) = J it
is rational to reject A. Moreover, if v( A) = J then it is rational to reject A. We
analyse this different characterization of denial and LP. The new proposal seems to
capture a basic requirement for the extension of LP: if to assert a certain proposition
you need a proof of it in LP, to reject it you need something like a disproof of the
same proposition. Such extension, its pro and cons will be analysed in the paper.
References

1. C. Dalla Pozza and C. Garola, A pragmatic interpretation of intuitionistic propositional logic, Erkenntnis, vol. 43, no. 1, 1995, pp. 81109.
2. D. Ripley, Negation, denial and rejection, Philosophy Compass, vol. 9, 2011,
pp. 622629.

Anti-intuitionism as a logic of refutation

Bao Long Dang Van
Catholique de Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
Universite
bao.dangvan@uclouvain.be
There has been a relatively small but recurring interest in the paraconsistent logic
that is dual to intuitionistic logic (and called anti-intuitionistic-, dual-intuitionistic, Brouwer- or even co-intuitionistic logic; we will use the first appellation). Yet, no
approach has established itself as a standard one. Some view anti-intuitionism as a
logic suited for refutation (see [7], [4] or [8]) but, to my knowledge, a formulation of it as
a pure refutation system (in the sense of, say, [9]) is still lacking. Others have studied it
as a logic dual to intuitionism and have tried to define it by various algebraic, syntactic,
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Gentzen-like or category-theoretic methods, but without considering its potential as a
refutation system.
In our work, we try to take the idea of a refutation system seriously and offer a
unified account of anti-intuitionism. We describe it as a refutation system in three
ways: (1) as a Hilbert-like formal system with counter-axioms and a reverse modus
ponens,(2) as a sequent calculus where a sequent actually represents the process of
refuting the succedent on the assumption that the antecedent is refuted and (3) as a
logic with a Kripke-style semantics based on the value False.
From a category-theoretic point of view, the resulting logic then appears as a natural
particular case of the internal logic of a complement topos (see [6]), thus elucidating the
link between the logical, algebraic and category-theoretic aspects of anti-intuitionism.
As a consequence, a higher-order anti-intuitionistic set theory becomes readily available
and anti-intuitionism reveals itself as a constructive logic of refutation. Another consequence of our approach is that the status of the logical operator dual to implication
(and called pseudo-difference) becomes clear in a refutative framework.
Finally, anti-intuitionism can be seen as a concrete, experimental proof that a
genuine logic based on falsity and refutation is possible and can be potentially as useful
and philosophically interesting as intuitionism proved to be.
References
1. A.B.M. Brunner, W.A. Carnielli, Anti-intuitionism and paraconsistency, Journal
of Applied Logic, vol. 3, 2005, pp. 161184.
2. T. Crolard, Subtractive Logic, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 254,
issues 12, 2001, pp. 151185.
3. L. Estrada-Gonzalez, Complement-Topoi and Dual Intuitionistic Logic, Australasian
Journal of Logic, vol. 9, 2010, pp. 2644.
4. N.D. Goodman, The Logic of Contradictions, Zeitschrift f
ur Mathematische Logik
und Grundlagen der Mathematik, vol. 27, 1981, pp. 119126.
5. R. Gore, Dual Intuitionistic Logic Revisited, in Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1847, Automated Reasoning with Analytic Tableaux and Related Methods,
edited by R. Dyckhoff, 2000, pp. 252267.
6. C. Mortensen, Inconsistent Mathematics, Kluwer Mathematics and Its Applications
Series, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995.
7. C. Rauszer, Applications of Kripke Models to Heyting-Brouwer Logic, Studia
Logica, vol. 36, issue 12, 1977, pp. 6171.
8. Y. Shramko, Dual Intuitionistic Logic and a Variety of Negations: The Logic of
Scientific Research, Studia Logica, vol. 80, 2005, pp. 347367.
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9. T. Skura, Refutation Systems in Propositional Logic, in Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 16, edited by D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, 2011, pp. 115157.
10. I. Urbas, Dual-Intuitionistic Logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 27,
no. 3, 1996, pp. 440451.

Dualizing q-consequence operations

Sanderson Molick
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil
smolicks@gmail.com
Daniel Skurt
Ruhr University of Bochum, Bochum, Germany
daniel.skurt@rub.de
q-consequence relations were proposed in [3] by Grzegorz Malinowski, in the context
of a discussion raised by the Polish logician Roman Suszko. According to Malinowski,
q-consequence relations are based on Lukasiewiczs notion of rejection and try to reflect
the process of reasoning behind scientific investigation. In contrast to the canonical
notion of entailment, namely the preservation of designated values from the premises
to the conclusion, a q-consequence is valid iff there is no interpretation that assigns a
non-rejected value to the premises but a non-designated value to the conclusion. This
is due to a tripartition of the set of truth-values into designated, rejected and neither
designated nor rejected values. Such tripartition defines what Malinowski called a
q-matrix. Later on, Frankowski proposed in [2], based on Malinowskis notion of a
q-matrix, another non-canonical notion of entailment, which he called p-entailment
(plausible entailment). A p-consequence is valid iff there is no interpretation that
assigns a designated value to the premises but a rejected value to the conclusion.
In [1], based on a bi-dimensional approach to entailment, the authors proposed a
general procedure to explore the duality between noncanonical notions of consequence
relations. However, the duality between rules and operators from the point of view of
q-logics and p-logics are not explored. By following a general requirement for duality
proposed in [4, 5], we will explore the duality of operators and its consequences within
p- and q-logics. Furthermore, we will investigate in what sense p-logics can be recognized as the dual of q-logics.
References
1. C. Blasio and J. Marcos, When the square meets the cross, talk given at IV Square
of Oppositions, 2014, Rome, Italy.
2. S. Frankowski, Formalization of a plausible inference, Bulletin of the Section of
Logic, vol. 33, no. 1, 2004, pp. 4152.
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3. G. Malinowski, Q-consequence operations, Reports on Mathematical Logic, vol. 24,
no. 1, 1990, pp. 4959.
4. J. Marcos, Ineffable Inconsistencies, in Handbook of Paraconsistency, edited by
J.Y. Beziau, W. Carnielli and D. Gabbay, College Publications, 2007, pp. 301311.
5. J. Marcos and S. Molick, The mistery duality unraveled: dualizing rules, operators
and logics, talk given at workshop Compositional Meaning in Logic [GeTFuN 1.0],
held in IV World Congress and School on Universal Logic, 2013, Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil.

Bayesian Networks on Transition Systems

Andrew Schumann
w, Poland
University of Information Technology and Management, Rzeszo
andrew.schumann@gmail.com
Let T S = (S, E, T, I) be a transition system, where S is the non-empty set of states,
E is the set of actions, T S E S is the transition relation, I S is the set of initial
states. Let us extend the transition system T S to the following information system:
S = (S, At, {Va a At}, {Ia a At}), where S is a finite nonempty set of objects
called universe associated with the set of all states of T S, At is a finite nonempty set of
attributes which express properties of s S (such as color, intensity, chemical formula
of attractants, etc.), Va is a nonempty set of values v Va for a At (such as type of
color, type of intensity, type of chemical formula, etc.), Ia S Va is an information
function that maps an object in S to a value of v Va for an attribute a At (e.g. this
attractant s S is blue). Now, let us build a standard logical language LS closed over
Boolean compositions of atomic formulas (a, v). The meaning S of formulas LS
is defined by induction:
(a, v)S = {s S Ia (s) = v}, a At, v Va ;
S = S S ;
S = S S ;
S = S S .
In the language LS , we can define decision rules in S as follows. Assume, each
formula LS is considered a node of the directed, acyclic graph. Then a decision rule
in S is a graph , where is a parent and is a child, that is interpreted as an
appropriate conditional probability:
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S () = pS (S S ) =

card(S S )
,
card(S )

whereS .
In this way, the direct cause { } in decision is expressed by S (), the
indirect cause { , } by S () S (), the common cause { ,
} by S (, ), the common effect { , } by S () S ().
For each formula LS with k atomic parents, we have 2k rows for the combinations
of parent values v Va . Each row gives a number p [0, 1] if is true, and it gives a
number 1 p if is false. If each formula has no more than k parents, the complete
network requires O(n 2k ) numbers.
So, we can construct Bayesian networks in LS by using the following Bayes formula:
S () =

S () S ()
,
S () S () + S () S ()

where S () is the a posteriori probability of given , S () is the a priori

probability of , and S () is the likelihood of with respect to . Hence, the
Bayes formula allows us to infer the a posteriori probability S () from the a priori
probability S () through the likelihood S ().

Uniqueness without reflexivity or transitivity

David Ripley
University of Connecticut, Storrs, Connecticut, USA
davewripley@gmail.com
The goal of this paper is to explore the idea of a set of rules uniquely pinning down
the meaning of a piece of vocabulary. This is an idea that might be of interest for
anyone, but it looms large in at least two different domains.
First, uniqueness is of concern to inferentialist theories of meaning, where rules are
taken to be meaning-giving. It is natural to think, and many have thought, that in
order to be meaning-giving, a set of rules must succeed in giving a unique meaning.
Second, uniqueness is of concern to anyone interested in combining logics. It is wellknown, for example, that intuitionist negation and classical negation cannot live happily
together in the same language, at least in many familiar settings. This is because the
rules that specify intuitionist negation succeed in characterizing it uniquely. But these
rules also apply to classical negation. As a result, the two negations collapse into each
other; there is a merely syntactic distinction between them.
A common criterion given for uniqueness of connectives is the following. A set of
rules characterizes an nary connective uniquely iff: supposing that the rules apply to
and supposing that they also apply to , we can show (A1 , . . . , An ) (A1 , . . . , An )
for any formulas A1 , . . . , An . Call this the reflexivity criterion.
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The reflexivity criterion works well in many tame settings. But it depends crucially
(as a criterion for uniqueness) on both reflexivity and transitivity. Regarding reflexivity:
if sentences do not entail themselves, then entailing their relatives is not a sign
of uniqueness; it is a guarantee that uniqueness fails! Regarding transitivity: knowing
that (A1 , . . . , An ) (A1 , . . . , An ) only allows us to substitute for (or vice versa)
in the presence of transitivity. But surely if the rules for succeed in uniquely pinning
down a meaning, we ought to be able to substitute one thing obeying those rules for
another freely; after all, they ought to mean the same.
So the reflexivity criterion cannot work as a criterion for uniqueness in settings where
either reflexivity or transitivity of consequence is not assumed. In this talk, I will press
the above argument in more detail, and explore other options for a uniqueness criterion,
options that can continue to work in the absence of reflexivity and transitivity.

Lindstr
om Theorem for First-Order Modal Logic
Reihane Zoghifard and Massoud Pourmahdian
Department of Mathematics and Computer Science,
AmirKabir University of Technology, Tehran, Iran
r.zoghifard@aut.ac.ir, pourmahd@ipm.ir
Lindstrom style theorems are used to show the maximal expressive power of logics in
terms of model theory. In 1969, Per Lindstrom proved that any abstract logic extending
first-order logic with the compactness and the Lowenheim-Skolem property is not more
expressive than first-order logic.
The first Lindstrom theorem for propositional modal logic was proved by de Rijke [1]. He showed that any abstract logic extending modal logic with finite depth
property or equivalently by preservation under -ultraproducts is equivalent to modal
logic. In [5] van Benthem improved de Rijke result and showed that modal logic is
the strongest logic satisfying compactness and relativization property and is invariant
under bisimulation. Otto and Piro [3] proved the Lindstrom theorem for modal logic
with global modality and guarded fragment of first-order logic by using compactness,
corresponding bisimulation invariance and Tarski union property.
In this talk we will first review the notion of abstract logic for first-order normal
modal logic and show that we can improve three methods of various versions of Lindstrom theorem in [4] to have following results:
Theorem. Any abstract logic L containing first-order normal modal logic is equivalent
to it if and only if
it is invariant under bisimulation and preserved under ultraproducts over ,
it has the L
owenheim-Skolem, compactness and the Tarski union property and is
invariant under bisimulation,
it has the Lowenheim-Skolem and the compactness property and is invariant under
bisimulation.
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We are looking for methods to let us have Lindstrom theorem for first-order classical modal logic (neighbourhood semantics), especially for monotonic case. It should be
noted that Venema and Kurz [2] used the coalgebraic method for proving the Lindstrom
theorem that can be used for propositional neighbourhood modal logic.
References
1. M. de Rijke, A Lindstrom theorem for modal logic, in Modal Logic and Process
Algebra A Bisimulation Perspective, edited by A. Ponse, M. de Rijke and Y.
Venema, CSLI Publications, 1995, pp. 217230.
2. A. Kurz and Y. Venema, Coalgebraic Lindstrom Theorem, in Advances in Modal
Logic, edited by L. Beklemishev, V. Goranko and V. Shehtman, College Publications, 2010.
3. M. Otto and R. Piro, A Lindstrom characterisation of the guarded fragment and
of modal logic with a global modality, in Advances in Modal Logic, edited by C.
Areces and R. Goldblatt, College Publications, 2008.
4. M. Pourmahdian and R. Zoghifard, Lindstrom Theorem for First-Order Normal
Modal Logic, submitted.
5. J. van Benthem, A new modal Lindstrom theorem, Logica Universalis, vol. 1,
2007, pp. 125138.

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Emergent Computational Logics

This workshop is organized by
Bora Kumova
Izmir Institute of Technology, Turkey
Christoph Benzmuller
Free University of Berlin, Germany
Fernando Bobillo
University of Zaragoza, Spain
Antonio Chella
University of Palermo, Italy
Guillermo Simari
National South University, Argentina
Katsumi Inoue
National Institute of Informatics, Japan
Various general logics have been formalised in the history of philosophy and mathematics, like propositional, predicate, higher-order or fuzzy logics. Artificial intelligence
should posses the capability for generating formal logics automatically from any given
data set. Such data could for instance include corpora of information collected in interactions with the environment or any other approach for extracting some logic from data
or statistics. An emergent logic should represent the logic of a particular environment,
from which it was generated. As the environment widens towards the global environment, emergent logics should give up the flexibilities they have retained, in favor to
general properties and ultimately converge to universal logics. Any work related to automated generation of some logic or the automated verification of such logic is welcome.
Application areas for such techniques are hybrid systems of emergent and symbolic systems. Related research is typically found in the literature on computational intelligence
and symbolic artificial intelligence that focuses on logic.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Pei Wang (page 112).

Call for papers

Any work related to automated generation of some logic or the automated verification of such logic is welcome. Application areas for such techniques are hybrid systems
of emergent and symbolic systems. Related research is typically found in the literature
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on computational intelligence and symbolic artificial intelligence that focuses on logic.
Topics of interest include (but are not limited to) the following:
logic discovery
logics generated by computational intelligence
logics with uncertainties
logics extracted from probabilistic and/or possibilistic systems
logics of emergent systems
logics of behaviours
logics of cognitive systems
logics generated by neural systems
logics emerging from evolutionary computation
mining logics
subjective logics
machine learning and logic generation
statistical/probabilistic ontologies
logics of abduction
logics of biological systems
learning logics of dynamic systems
Submissions of extended
to borakumova@iyte.edu.tr.

abstracts

should

be

sent

by

May

1st

2015

Algorithmically Verifiable Quantum Functions vis `

a vis
Algorithmically Computable Classical Functions: A suggested
mathematical perspective for the EPR argument
Bhupinder Singh Anand
Mumbai, India
bhup.anand@gmail.com
We suggest that the paradoxical element which surfaced as a result of the EPR
argument (due to the perceived conflict implied by Bells inequality between the, seemingly essential, non-locality required by current interpretations of Quantum Mechanics,
and the essential locality required by current interpretations of Classical Mechanics)
may reflect merely lack of recognition of classically definable mathematical expressions
that could representas deterministicthe unpredictable characteristics of quantum
behaviour. The anomaly may dissolve if a physicist could cogently argue that:
(i) All properties of physical reality are deterministic, but not necessarily mathematically pre-determinedin the sense that any physical property could have one,
and only one, value at any time t(n), where the value is completely determined
by some natural law which need not, however, be representable by algorithmically
computable expressions (and therefore be mathematically predictable).

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(ii)

There are elements of such a physical reality whose properties at any time t(n) are
determined completely in terms of their putative properties at some earlier time
t(0). Such properties are predictable mathematically since they are representable
by algorithmically computable functions. The values of any two such functions
with respect to their variables are, by definition, independent of each other and
must, therefore, obey Bells inequality. The Laws of Classical Mechanics describe
the nature and behaviour of such physical reality only.
(iii) There could be elements of such a physical reality whose properties at any time
t(n) cannot be theoretically determined completely from their putative properties
at some earlier time t(0).
Such properties are unpredictable mathematically since they are only representable
mathematically by algorithmically verifiable, but not algorithmically computable, functions. The values of any two such functions with respect to their variables may, by
definition, be dependent on each other and need not, therefore, obey Bells inequality.
The Laws of Quantum Mechanics describe the nature and behaviour of such physical
reality. In this paper we formally define such functions, and suggest how they could
provide an alternative perspective from which to view philosophical issues underlying
some current concepts of quantum phenomena such as indeterminacy, fundamental dimensionless constants, conjugate properties, uncertainty, entanglement, EPR paradox,
Bells inequalities, and Schrodingers cat paradox.
References
1. J.S. Bell, On the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen Paradox, Physics, vol. 1, no. 3, 1964,
pp. 195200. Reprinted in Speakable and Unspeakable in Quantum Mechanics, by
J.S. Bell, Cambridge, 2004, p. 1421.
2. D. Bohm, A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden
Variables, I, Physical Review, vol. 85, no. 2, 1952, pp. 166179.
3. D. Bohm, A Suggested Interpretation of the Quantum Theory in Terms of Hidden
Variables, II, Physical Review, vol. 85, no. 2, 1952, pp. 180193.
4. G.J. Chaitin, Godels Theorem and Information, International Journal of Theoretical Physics, vol. 22, 1982, pp. 941954.
5. A. Einstein, B.Y. Podolsky and N. Rosen, Can Quantum-Mechanical Description
of Physical Reality be Considered Complete?, Physical Review, vol. 47(10), 1935,
doi:doi.org/10.1103/PhysRev.47.777.
6. Kurt Godel, On formally undecidable propositions of Principia Mathematica and
related systems I, translated by Elliott Mendelson, 1931. Republished in The
Undecidable, edited by M.Davis, Raven Press, New York, 1965.
7. S.C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, North Holland, 1952.
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8. C.R. Murthy, An Evaluation Semantics for Classical Proofs, Proceedings of Sixth
IEEE Symposium on Logic in Computer Science, 1991, pp. 96109.
9. E. Schrodinger, Die gegenwrtige Situation in der Quantenmechanik,
Naturwissenschaftern, vol. 23, pp. 807812, 823823, 844849, 1935. English translation by J.D. Trimmer, The present situation in Quantum Mechanics, Proceedings
of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 124, 1980, pp. 323338.
10. S. Goldstein et al., Bells Theorem, Scholarpedia, vol. 6(10), 2011, p. 8378,
doi:10.4249/scholarpedia.8378.
11. A. Turing, On computable numbers, with an application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 1936, in The Undecidable, edited by M. Davis, Raven Press, New York, 1965.
12. F. Waaldijk, On the foundations of constructive mathematics, Web paper, 2003.
13. L. Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, 1937. Reprinted
by MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, USA, 1978.
14. B.S. Anand, Evidence-Based Interpretations of PA, Proceedings of the Symposium on Computational Philosophy at the AISB/IACAP World Congress, University
of Birmingham, UK, 2012.
15. B.S. Anand, A suggested mathematical perspective for the EPR argument, presented at the Workshop on Logical Quantum Structures at 4th World Congress
and School on Universal Logic, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013.

Fuzzy-Syllogistic Reasoning with Ontologies

Kumova and Mikhail Zarechnev
Bora I.

Izmir
Institute of Technology, Izmir,
Turkey
borakumova@iyte.edu.tr, smikhailzarechnev@iyte.edu.tr
The Fuzzy Syllogistic System (FSS) is our attempt to develop an application for
automated reasoning. As a core of the reasoning mechanism we used deductive scheme
known as categorical syllogism. During the FSS a project implementation a
mathematical model of whole syllogistic system was developed and it was designed the
algorithm for calculating any syllogistic properties like truth or falsity for a particular
syllogism. After structural analysis of syllogisms, 25 valid syllogistic structures out
of 256 possible combinations were found. Since the vast majority of possible forms
of syllogism are invalid, we had to introduce the term of fuzzy-syllogistic reasoning
(FSR) to generalize reasoning scheme and extend the possible number of valid syllogistic
structures. According to the structure of syllogism we applied the fuzzyfication in
two ways by using fuzzy quantifiers and defining fuzzy sets. After implementation of
fuzzyfication, the FSS became more flexible in terms of quantity of possible quantifiers,
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which has been increased, and numbers of valid syllogistic forms. The developed system
can be applied for different domains as a major component of reasoning mechanism.
The main aim of our current project is to implement the syllogistic reasoning under
ontology to generate new ontology which consist of not only conceptions and relations
between them but the results of performed reasoning. It can be considered from the
viewpoint of internal structure of intelligent agent as a kind of emergent learning process, so it can potentially be used as part of learning component for symbolic and
emergent cognitive architectures.
Since our goal is to analyse relationships in given ontology, on the other hand,
creating of a new ontology is time and resource consuming process, we do not deal with
creating of source ontology directly by ourself and assume that input for FSR is an
existing ontology. Among the various possible ways to construct ontologies for given
domain, the most widely used approaches related to generation of an ontology from textbased sources. There are several open-source tools for ontology generation from text
corpora are available for research purposes, such as Text2Onto, WebKB or DLLearner.
We found that the most convenient for our purposes is the use of Text2Onto, because
it gives us opportunity to generate ontology in automatic mode and the quality of of
the generated ontology satisfies our requirements.
To generate the source ontology it is necessary to prepare text corpora for the given
domain. In case of use of Text2Onto, the text corpora may be a set of plain text
documents, html pages and other unstructured or semistructured text sources. The
integration of this tool with the web search engine seems to be an optimal solution
for collecting and preparing text corpora for given domain. Further, as a result of
successive steps to input data, such as extraction of concepts and properties, we obtain
source ontology for a particular domain, defined by input text corpora. Since as we
have a ready source ontology, we can build a graph of dependencies which reflects
the relationship between concepts in original ontology in a form suitable for applying
the FSR. Having the graph on dependencies as input for FSS, it is possible to perform
reasoning for each triple of conceptions and match each triple with the set of appropriate
syllogistic forms. In some cases, there is ability to remove a conception from the triple,
which represent the middle term in categorical syllogism and actually not included in
conclusion, so this allows to reduce the complexity of ontology and achieve a higher
level of abstraction by removing details.
As was mentioned above, in FSS we operate with 256 possible inference schemes
that allow a some degree of fuzzyfication, so we can consider our system as approach for
approximate reasoning. Generally speaking, inference in approximate reasoning related
to computation with fuzzy sets that represents the meaning of a particular set associated
with fuzzy quantifier. In the current system the fuzzy approach is implemented in two
levels: fuzzy quantifiers and fuzzy sets.
Regarding the categorical syllogism we can apply fuzzy a quantification in very
strict manner. The are 4 possible crisp quantifiers for categorical syllogisms: All, Not
All, Some and Not Some. In certain situations, taking some assumptions, we can
replace one quantifier by another. More specifically, we can introduce 2 quantifiers as
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Almost All and Almost None. Obviously, quantifier Almost All can be considered as
the special case of quantifier Some, in the same way, quantifier Almost None is the
special case of quantifier Not Some. It is possible to introduce some thresholds for
ratio of number of elements satisfying given conditions, to cardinality of whole set, for
example, for quantifier Almost All it should be very close to 1 and for quantifier Almost
None it should be close to 0. Taking this into account we can replace quantifier All
by Some and None by Not Some respectively according to the cardinality of given set.
Our result shows that in some cases we may obtain significant increase in number of
valid syllogistic forms. This approach can be considered as pseudoafuzzy, because
we use fuzzyfication implicitly actually without introducing new quantifiers, we just try
to improve number of valid syllogistic forms based on cardinality input sets.
From the point of view of using fuzzy sets we modified the existing quantifiers. Due
the fact that this approach can be applied only in terms of exclusive logic, we combined
quantifiers Some and Not Some into general quantifier *Some and expanded possible
values of this quantifier to Most, Many, Half, Few, Several. Our next challenge is finding
a method for calculating the ratio of validity for fuzzy quantifiers. The problem can be
solved by defining of membership functions for all fuzzy quantifiers, as in pure fuzzy
solutions.
Despite the fact that we use deductive schemes as a main form of logical inferencing
in proposed solution, it seems that it can be used for applying reasoning in opposite
direction as implicit form of abduction. Actually, after performing FSR for each triple
of conceptions we have obtained a kind of mapping to predefined syllogistic forms.
Considering the fact that structure of each syllogistic form is strictly fixed, based on the
conclusion we can predict what the premises are. In general, for weaker fuzzy quantifiers
we can find out the conditions necessary for them to became more stronger. If given, a
syllogistic structure contains fuzzy quantifiers in premises, for example several, we can
determine the conditions for the replacement of current quantifier on Few or Half.
The designed system have some limitations caused by used logics. Currently we can
use only two premises to infer conclusion, so we have to decompose input data, such as
ontologies, on triple sets. Removing of this restriction will allow the system to became
a universal mechanism for modelling of decision making.
References
1. F. Bobillo and U. Straccia, Fuzzy ontologies and fuzzy integrals, in 11th International Conference on Intelligent Systems Design and Applications, 2011.
2. S. Calegari and D. Ciucci, Using Dynamic Fuzzy Ontologies to Understand Creative Environments, in 7th International Conference on Flexible Query Answering
Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume, vol. 4027, 2006, pp. 404415.
3. S. Calegari and D. Ciucci, Fuzzy Ontology, Fuzzy Description Logics and FuzzyOWL, in 7th International Workshop on Fuzzy Logic and Applications, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 4578, 2007, pp. 118126.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

4. P.C.G. da Costa, K.B. Laskey and KC Chang, PROGNOS: Applying Probabilistic
Ontologies to Distributed Predictive Situation Assessment in Naval Operations;
14th International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium,
2009.
5. H. Ghorbel, A. Bahri and R. Bouaziz, Fuzzy Protege for Fuzzy Ontology Models,
in International Protege Conference, Stanford Medical Informatics, 2009.
6. M. Hazman, S.R. El-Beltagy and A. Rafea, A Survey of Ontology Learning Approaches, in International Journal of Computer Applications, vol. 22(8), 2011,
pp. 3643.
Kumova and H. C
7. B.I.
akr, Algorithmic Decision of Syllogisms, in Trends in
Applied Intelligent Systems, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6097, 2010,
pp. 2838.
Kumova and H. C
8. B.I.
akr, The Fuzzy Syllogistic System, in Advances in Soft
Computing, Lecture Notes in Computer Science Volume, vol. 6438, 2010, pp. 418
427, 2010.
Kumova, Generating Ontologies from Relational Data with Fuzzy-Syllogistic
9. B.I.
Reasoning, in Beyond Databases, Architectures and Structures, Communications
in Computer and Information Science, vol. 521, 2015, pp. 21-32.
10. A. Maedche and S. Staab, Ontology Learning for The Semantic Web, in Intelligent Systems, IEEE, vol. 16, issue 2, pp. 7279, 2005.
11. C. Martinez-Cruz, I.J. Blanco and M.A. Vila, Ontologies versus relational databases:
are they so different? A comparison, Artificial Intelligence Review, vol. 38, issue 4,
2012, pp. 271290.
12. C.A. Yaguinuma, W.C.P. Magalhaes Jr., M.T.P. Santos, H.A. Camargo and M.
Reformat, Combining Fuzzy Ontology Reasoning and Mamdani Fuzzy Inference
System with HyFOM Reasoner, in Enterprise Information Systems, Lecture Notes
in Business Information Processing, vol. 190, 2014, pp. 174189.
13. L.A. Zadeh, Fuzzy Logic and Approximate Reasoning, Synthese, vol. 30, issues 34, 1975, pp. 407-428.
Kumova, Ontology-Based Fuzzy-Syllogistic Reasoning, in
14. M. Zarechnev and B.I.
Current Approaches in Applied Artificial Intelligence, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 9101, 2015, pp. 179-188.
Kumova, Truth Ratios of Syllogistic Moods; submitted to
15. M. Zarechnev and B.I.

IEEE International Conference on Fuzzy Systems, to be held in Istanbul,

Turkey,
in August 25, 2015.
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Can Machines Learn Logics?

Chiaki Sakama
Wakayama University, Wakayama, Japan
sakama@sys.wakayama-u.ac.jp
Katsumi Inoue
National Institute of Informatics, Tokyo, Japan
inoue@nii.ac.jp
To consider the question Can machines learn logics?, suppose the following problem. There is an agent A and a machine M. The agent A, which could be a human
or a computer, is capable of deductive reasoning: it has a set L of axioms and inference rules in classical logic. Given a (finite) set S of formulas as an input, the agent
A produces a (finite) set of formulas T such that T T h(S) where T h(S) is the set
of logical consequences of S. On the other hand, the machine M has no axiomatic
system for deduction, while it is equipped with a machine learning algorithm C. Given
input-output pairs (S1 , T1 ), . . . , (Si , Ti ), . . . (where Ti T h(Si )) of A as an input to M,
the problem is whether one can develop an algorithm C which successfully produces
an axiomatic system K for deduction. An algorithm C is sound with respect to L if it
produces an axiomatic system K such that K L. An algorithm C is complete wrt L if
it produces an axiomatic system K such that L K. Designing a sound and complete
algorithm C is called a problem of learning logics. In this framework, an agent A plays
the role of a teacher who provides training examples representing premises along with
entailed consequences. The output K is refined by incrementally providing examples.
We consider a deduction system L while it could be a system of arbitrary logic, e.g.
nonmonotonic logic, modal logic, fuzzy logic, as far as it has a formal system of inference. Alternatively, we can consider a framework in which a teacher agent A is absent.
In this case, given input-output pairs (Si , Ti ) as data, the problem is whether a machine
M can find an unknown logic (or axiomatic system) that produces a consequence Ti
from a premise Si .
The abstract framework provided in this study has challenging issues of AI including
the questions:
1. Can we develop a sound and complete algorithm C for learning a classical or nonclassical logic L?
2. Is there any difference between learning axioms and learning inference rules?
3. Does a machine M discover a new axiomatic system K such that K F iff L F
for any formula F ?
The first question concerns the possibility of designing machine learning algorithms
that can learn existing logics from given formulas. The second question concerns differences between learning Gentzen-style logics and Hilbert-style logics. The third question
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is more ambitious: it asks the possibility of AIs discovering new logics that are unknown
to human mathematicians.
In this study, we provide simple case studies concerning the first question. To this
end, we represent a formal system L using metalogic programming which allows objectlevel and meta-level representation to be amalgamated (Bowen and Kowalski, 1983).
We also argue the possibility of learning non-deductive inference such as abduction
(Peirce, 1932) or conversational implicature (Grice, 1975). An extended version of this
study will be published in (Sakama and Inoue, 2015).
References
1. K.A. Bowen and R.A. Kowalski, Amalgamating language and metalanguage in
logic programming, in Logic Programming, edited by K. Clark and S.A. Tarnlund,
Academic Press, 1983, pp. 153172.
2. H.P. Grice, Logic and conversation, in Syntax and Semantics, Volume 3: Speech
Acts, edited by P. Cole and J. Morgan, Academic Press, 1975, pp. 4158.
3. C.S. Peirce, Elements of Logic: Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce,
Volume II, edited by C. Hartshorne and P. Weiss, Harvard University Press, 1932.
4. C. Sakama and K. Inoue, Can machines learn logics?, in Proceedings of the 8th
Annual Conference on Artificial General Intelligence, Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence, vol. 9205, Springer, 2015, pp. 341351.

n-Valued Refined Neutrosophic Logic and Its Applications to

Physics
Florentin Smarandache
University of New Mexico, Gallup, USA
smarand@unm.edu
In this paper we present a short history of logics: from particular cases of 2-symbol
or numerical valued logic to the general case of n-symbol or numerical valued logic. We
show generalizations of 2-valued Boolean logic to fuzzy logic, also from the Kleenes
and Lukasiewiczs 3-symbol valued logics or Belnaps 4-symbol valued logic to the most
general n-symbol or numerical valued refined neutrosophic logic. Two classes of neutrosophic norm (n-norm) and neutrosophic conorm (n-conorm) are defined. Examples
of applications of neutrosophic logic to physics are listed in the last section. Similar
generalizations can be done for n-Valued Refined Neutrosophic Set, and respectively nValued Refined Neutrosophic Probability.

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References
1. J. Dezert, Open questions on neutrosophic inference. Neutrosophy and neutrosophic logic, Multiple-Valued Logic: An International Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, 2002,
pp. 439472.
2. D. Dubois, Uncertainty Theories, Degrees of Truth and Epistemic States,
http://www.icaart.org/Documents/Previous Invited Speakers/2011/ICAART2011
Dubois.pdf.
3. D. Rabounski, F. Smarandache and L. Borisova, Neutrosophic Methods in General
Relativity, Neutrosophic Book Series, vol. 10, Hexis, Phoenix, AZ, USA, 78 pages,
2005.
4. D. Rabunski, F. Smarandache and L. Borisova, Netrosofskie metody v obshche
teorii otnositelnosti(Russian), translated from the English edition, Neutrosophic
Methods in the General Theory of Relativity, Hexis, Phoenix, AZ, USA, 105 pages,
2005.
5. U. Rivieccio, Neutrosophic logics: Prospects and problems, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, vol. 159, issue 14, 2008, pp. 18601868.
6. F. Smarandache, Neutrosophic Logic and Set, MSc thesis, http://fs.gallup.unm.
edu/neutrosophy.htm, 1995.
7. F. Smarandache, A Unifying Field in Logics: Neutrosophic Field, Multiple-Valued
Logic: An International Journal, vol. 8, no. 3, 2002, pp. 385438.
8. F. Smarandache, An Introduction to the Neutrosophic Probability Applied in
Quantum Statistics, Bulletin of Pure and Applied Sciences, Physics, vol. 22D,
no. 1, 2003, pp. 1325.
9. F. Smarandache, Neutrosophic Set A Generalization of the Intuitionistic Fuzzy
Set, International Journal of Pure and Applied Mathematics, vol. 24, no. 3, 2005,
pp. 287297.
10. F. Smarandache (editor), Proceedings of the Introduction to Neutrosophic Physics:
Unmatter & Unparticle, Zip Publishing, Columbus, USA, 2011.
11. F. Smarandache, n-Valued Refined Neutrosophic Logic and Its Applications to
Physics, in Annual Fall Meeting of the American Physical Society, Ohio-Region Section, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA, 2013, http://meetings.aps.org/Meeting/OSF13/
Event/205641.
12. Websters Online Dictionary, term Paraconsistent probability {neutrosophic probability}, http://www.websters-online-dictionary.org.
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Utopian Thinking and Logic-s

This workshop is organized by
Thalia Magioglou
EPoPs/FMSH, Paris, France
Following the symposium organized in July 26 at Andros Island, Greece, by Stefaneas (National Technical University of Athens) and Magioglou (EPoPs/FMSH, Paris),
on Logic and Utopia, this workshop focuses on the Plural logics of Utopian thinking. Utopian thinking will addressed from an interdisciplinary perspective.
Utopias as projects of future societies have historically been present since ancient
Greece, with the example of Platos and Aristotles Polities, but the term is created
by Thomas Moore in England. Desire, perfectionism and (im)possibility to become
reality have been some of its aspects in the past, as well as a form of criticism of the
present situation. In this way, they are impregnated by culture, socially and historically
constructed and open to revision. Utopias are also present in a less elaborate way, in
the projects and social representations of political and social actors, part of social and
political identities.
How does utopian thinking use logic?
The concept of logic will be is addressed in its plurality: not only (a) logos, philosophical reasoning and (b) language, but also (c) as social logic of people who are
not experts, knowledgeable or powerful on a particular field, but instead, ordinary
citizens. The workshop focuses particularly on the perspective of the social and political actors in different cultural contexts, in other words, the utopian logic-s of lay or
everyday thinking.
The plural aspect of logic, is present in the notion of utopia, and particularly the
political utopias as prospective of better worlds. The common good, the notion of the
Polis and Demos, will be discussed and confronted to studies that show concrete
initiatives taken by local actors, in the direction of change. What distinguishes utopias
from dystopias could be our representation of the common good, in other words, the
objectives chosen.
Democracy, as well as economy, are examples of utopias related to the rationality of
the modernity. They are imbricated in the contemporary societies to traditions (still active or reinvented) and religion. They allow new combinations, hybrids of meaning that
multiply in the context of global politics, as producers of utopias, moral geographies,
and imaginary identities that we are going to question.
Organizing Dimensions of the debate:
Utopia in Imaginaries, Social representations and everyday/lay thinking
The logic-s of power in everyday and political discourse
Culture and subjectivities in utopias
Utopian Temporalities
Social Logics and forms of reasoning
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The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Jaan Valsiner (page 111).

Call for papers

Abstracts should be sent via email before January 31th 2015
to thalia.magioglou@msh-paris.fr.

Contemporary imaginaries of women elected in positions

of power in the temporality of globalization
`ge Chell
Nade
LAIOS1 , IIAC2 , EHESS3 , Paris, France
nadegechell@reso-femmes.org
The presentation, based on field work and a tradition of political anthropology
(Abel`es), will focus on the link between a neo-liberal form of utopia and the social and
political logic of female elected leaders. These leaders are addressed as ordinary
citizens, who arrive at concrete initiatives and innovative ways of action inspired by
performative imaginaries. These collective imaginaries are embedded in the debate of
sensible topics such as cultural forms of resistance to different types of institutional
violence, as well as new forms of governance, citizenship and social representations of
egalitarian norms. The continuity between discourses, myths of social identity construction related to a common origin will be questioned, as well as a form of pessimism
related to a global menace which is projected toward future societies.

The time-space of the halka, or narrative circle in Marrakech:

utopia or heterotopia?
Rachid Mendjeli
Social Anthropology, EHESS4 /LAS5 , Paris, France
r.mendjeli@gmail.com
This paper questions the plurality of the public space at the place Djema El Fna
of Marrakech, through the concept of halka as time-space of a utopia. The halka
presents a variability of geometries which follow the representations and forms of a
public spectacle. Halka, or circle of the spectators is taking different meanings: spatial,
symbolic and political. The Halka involves two or three narrators and dancers who
1

Laboratoire dAntropologie des Institutions et des Organisations Sociales

Institut Interdisciplinaire dAnthropologie du Contemporain
3

Ecole des Hautes Etudes

en Sciences Sociales
4

Ecole des Hautes Etudes

en Sciences Sociales
5
Laboratoire dAnthropologie Sociale
2

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engage in a form of dialogue with each-other and with the public, in order to encourage
its participation in the story. Finally the public offers a form of retribution to the
artists. These theatrical and chorographical or acrobatic representations use the Halka
as a topos of an ordinary utopia, and will also be considered as possible illustrations of
a heterotopia, or alternatives social logics.
Different materials, such as photos and collective interviews will be used to illustrate
this reflection on the relationship between the body of the artists and the public space,
with its different public languages, as vectors of social logics.

The Oppositional Geometry of Badious Political Revolutions

Alessio Moretti
Nice, France
alemore@club-internet.fr
The philosopher Alain Badiou is known for being a brilliant representative of radical
leftist utopia, joining high-level mathematics and logic (see [2]) to Lacanian, Heideggerian and Marxist philosophical concepts (see [3, 4]). He denounces Western democracy
(as structurally committed to belligerent capitalism) and tries to lay the bases of a
future general revolution. Despite polemics and the accusation of being politically irresponsible, Badious excellent reputation and aura as a contemporary philosopher comes
from the fact that he built an impressive theoretical model of exceptional collective
agency, called theory of Truth procedures (or -scheme), which is based on mathematical concepts and concerns four fields of exceptional action: love, politics, art and
science. In several of his recent texts about politics (notably in [5], p. 31, and [6], p. 70),
Badiou says warningly that in current society there are four segments of people, or
forces (i.e. social groups) to be taken particularly into account: the students, the
young people of the suburbs (banlieues), the common workers and the illegal workers
(clandestine immigrates). Badiou adds: (1) the State makes it, by all means, that
these four groups remain, two by two, deeply unrelated; (2) for the State knows that
the day any two of these four groups enter into deep contact (i.e. communicate and
collaborate), the State as such will run the risk of collapsing under a serious and structured revolution. What Badiou describes here is a situation of opposition, where a
starting oppositional structure for some reason changes, with dramatic political consequences. Since a century, oppositions, which were previously handled formally through
the logical square (which articulates contradiction, contrariety, subcontrariety and
subalternation), are reduced by logicians and analytical philosophers to the concept
of logical negation (i.e. contradiction, forgetting contrariety), therefore relying on a
discussion about the principles of non-contradiction and of excluded-middle.
In this paper we want to offer a formal model of Badious strange but appealing
idea through a new young branch of mathematics: oppositional geometry. This is
an approach to opposition alternative to the logical ones, which gains considerable conceptual power by generalising successfully the otherwise mysterious notions of logical
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square and hexagon (cf. [1, 7, 9, 11, 12]). Oppositional geometry is based on the notion of oppositional bi-simplex of dimension m (simplexes being the geometrical
counterpart of numbers) and originated in the framework of universal logic from a discussion of the roots of paraconsistency (see [8]). The idea here is to read Badious
intriguing remark in terms of the key notions of oppositional geometry: the disunion of
the four political forces will be read as a blue tetrahedron of 4-contrariety, whereas the
active communication (and solidarity) of the same four forces will be read as a green
tetrahedron of subcontrariety. The general problem then becomes: how to think, inside
oppositional geometry, that a blue simplex of contrariety becomes a green simplex of
subcontrariety? This is both interesting and problematic: interesting, because the idea
of a (graded) metamorphosis of opposition is new and commits to a new chapter of
the theory, oppositional dynamics; problematic, because currently it is not yet clear
how to build mathematically such a transformation. In this paper we propose to explore this issue by relying on the notions of oppositional poly-simplex of dimension
m (see [7]) and of hybrid oppositional structure (see [10]). If successful, our enquiry will offer to Badiou a formal model of political revolution which could be called
an Empedoclean lattice of oppositional metamorphosis.
References
1. R. Angot-Pellissier, 2-opposition and the topological hexagon, in The Square
of Opposition. A General Framework for Cognition, edited by J.-Y. Beziau and
G. Payette, Peter Lang, Bern, 2012.
2. R. Angot-Pellissier, The Relation Between Logic, Set-Theory and Topos Theory
as It Is Used by Alain Badiou, in The Road to Universal Logic, Vol. II, edited
by A. Buchsbaum and A. Koslow, Birkhauser, Basel, Switzerland, 2015.
3. A. Badiou, Being and Event, Bloomsbury, London, 2013, French version first published in 1988.
4. A. Badiou, Logics of Worlds. Being and Event II, Bloomsbury, London, 2008,
French version first published in 2006.
5. A. Badiou, La relation enigmatique entre philosophie et politique, Germina, Paris,
2011.
6. A. Badiou and M. Gauchet, Que faire? Dialogue sur le communisme, le capitalisme

et lavenir de la democratie, Philosophie Editions,

Paris, 2014.
7. A. Moretti, The Geometry of Logical Opposition, PhD Thesis, University of Neuchatel,
Switzerland, 2009.

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8. A. Moretti, The Critics of Paraconsistency and of Many-Valuedness and the Geometry of Oppositions, in Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 19(12), Special Issue
on Paraconsistent Logic, edited by K. Tanaka, F. Berto, E. Mares and F. Paoli,
2010.
9. A. Moretti, Why the Logical Hexagon?, Logica Universalis, vol. 6(12), 2012.
10. A. Moretti, Arrow-Hexagons, The Road to Universal Logic, Vol. II, edited
by A. Buchsbaum and A. Koslow, Birkhauser, Basel, Switzerland, 2015.
11. R. Pellissier, Setting n-opposition, Logica Universalis, vol. 2(2), 2008.
12. H. Smessaert, On the 3D visualisation of logical relations, Logica Universalis,
vol. 3(2), 2009.

Utopian thinking in the case of the Greek Youth.

The Use of linguistic connectors for two different logics
Thalia Magioglou
EPoPs1 , FMSH2 , Centre Edgar Morin, IIAC3 , EHESS4 , Paris, France
thalia.magioglou@gmail.com
Utopian thinking is conceptualized in this paper as a form of lay thinking which
aligns an objective of a good or better world , to a positive social identity of a
group/person, and a form of action, drawing from a the societal and cultural political
psychology perspective (http://epops.hypotheses.org), which is inspired by the social representations theory and the advances of cultural psychology (Moscovici; Jodelet;
Valsiner). Democracy, Economy and Religion are approached as hegemonic social representations a notion first used by Moscovici, which has been further questioned by
Magioglou and Obadia in our EHESS seminar in 2014. We have drawn not only on the
work of Moscovici, but have also been in dialogue with the work of Gramsci, Castoriadis
and Abel`es especially when it comes to the importance of these notions for the opposing dynamics of the global-political. The content of these notions can be very elusive,
and still, culturally and historically constructed. They are shared by the members of
a group, as a social representation, are objectified in institutions, rituals, objects, but
still, their vagueness allows the creation of opposing groups and social identities. Their
construction could obey different styles and social logics.
The presentation will focus on results from a longitudinal study conducted with nondirective interviews, on the social representation of democracy in Greece. A discourse
analysis based on the use of linguistic connectors will be presented, following the work of
1

European Political Psychology

Fondation Maison des Sciences de lHomme
3
Institut Interdisciplinaire dAnthropologie du Contemporain
4

Ecole des Hautes Etudes

en Sciences Sociales
2

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Ducrot and Carel in pragmatics. This analysis has revealed two ways of thinking ,
or social logics, used to construct the meaning of democracy. The first is characterized
by the use of oppositions such as but, and negations, the second, is characterized by
the use of connectors of reformulation such as, in other words. These social logics
are associated to utopic representations of democracy as a form of common good,
which oppose each other, but also, more dominant and ideological representations
and logics of the global-political (Abel`es).

Medieval Logic
This workshop is organized by
Rodrigio Guerizoli
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
As scholars are becoming more and more aware, one of logics most fruitful periods filed the five centuries between, roughly speaking, 1100 and 1600. This medieval
tradition on logic exhibits an extraordinary richness extending its reach from creative
reinterpretations of the syllogism, researches on the proprieties of the terms, logical consequence, inference, quantification, formalization, paradoxes, fallacies, to treatments of
the relation between logic and natural languages. Since a couple of decades the material
medieval logicians produced are being object of critical editions, on the basis of which
new researches are on their way. Has little chance of losing who bet that there are quite
a number of interesting logical reasonings waiting for us to be discussed in those texts.
This UNILOG2015 workshop will focus on the various and diversified contributions
logical questions received in the medieval period.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Julie Brumberg-Chaumont (page 83).

Call for papers

We invite scholars to submit abstracts of papers they would like to present (30minutes including discussion) along the following themes:
Consequences
Deduction and Induction
Definition
Epistemic Logic
Fallacies
Formalization
History of Medieval Logic
Inference
Logic and Dialectic
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Logic and Grammar

Logic and Natural Language
Modal Logic
Obligations
Paradoxes
Praedicabilia
Proprietates terminorum
Quantification
Semantic puzzles
Sophismata literature
Square of oppositions
Syllogisms
Syncategoremata
Temporal logic
The scope of logic
Truth and Logic

Abstracts should be sent via e-mail before November 15th 2014 to rguerizoli@ufrj.br,
along with a brief biographical paragraph that includes your institutional affiliation.
Notification of acceptance: December 1st 2015.

Conceivability and possibility in Abelards theory of modality

Irene Binini
Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy
irene.binini@sns.it
Many contemporary philosophers interested in modality face the question whether
or not our ability to conceive, think or imagine is to be taken as a reliable guide for distinguishing what is possible from what is not. The origin of the idea that conceivability
could entail or provide evidence for possibility is usually backtracked to modern
philosophers, as in the case of Hume or Descartes (see [2] and [4]). Yet, conceivabilitybased accounts of possibility are to be already found in some medieval logicians (see [1]
on this), and I think that a similar idea can be found, in an early stage of development,
in Abelards theory of modality.
In Aristotelian modal theory, a property, in order to belong necessarily to a subject, had to be either an essential property or a proprium of the subject. Late ancient
philosophers, from Porphyry to Boethius, considered these accidental but necessary
predications of a subject [such as being able to laugh for a man] as being, although
inseparable in actu, still separable in the mind, through reason, from their subject (see
[3] on this). They admitted, then, the conceivability of a man unable to laugh, i.e. of
things which were considered impossible in Aristotelian modal theory. Martin stated
in [3] that, for these authors, this account of conceivability (understood as conceptual
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separability) did not entail possibility in any sense. However, I want to show that
Abelard admitted a connection between conceivability and possibility, and agreed that
there is a sense of possibility in which it is possible that men are not able to laugh, the
justification of which being our ability to conceive or imagine it so. This investigation
of Abelards analysis of propria will lead us to a have a better understanding of the
multiplicity of interpretations he gave to the modality of possibility and, in general, of
his modal semantic.
References
1. L. Alanen and S. Knuuttila, The foundation of Modality and Conceivability
in Descartes and his predecessors, in Modern Modalities, edited by S. Knuuttila,
Kluwer, Dordrecht, 1988, pp. 169.
2. Gendler T. Szab`o and J. Hawthorne, Introduction: Conceivability and possibility,
in Conceivability and possibility, edited by Gendler T. Szab`o and J. Hawthorne,
Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 170.
3. C. Martin, Theories of inference and entailment in the Middle Ages,
PhD Dissertation, Princeton University, Princeton, 1999.
4. A. Vaidya, The epistemology of modality, in The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta, 2011.

The Medieval Octagons: Analogies and Differences

Juan Manuel Campos Bentez
rita Universidad Auto
noma de Puebla, Puebla, Me
xico
Beneme
juancamposb@hotmail.com
The Medieval Octagons of opposition and equivalence for sentences with quantified
predicates, quantified modal sentences and sentences in oblique case present a strong
analogy respect to its logical form. In this paper I present the Medieval Octagons using
a special notation designed by Walter Redmond. This notation allows us to identify
common features present in the three octagons. The basic pattern, which is in common
to the three octagons, is the quantification of predicates. This is the Octagon, where
h stands for human and a for animal . Brackets and parentheses are particular
and universal quantifiers respectively. / stands for internal negation.
(h)(a)
(h)[a]
[h](a)
[h][a]

(h)/(a)
(h)/[a]
[h]/(a)
[h]/[a]

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The octagon in the genitive case presents this form:
R(h)(d)[r]
R(h)[d][r]
R[h](d)[r]
R[h][d][r]

R(h)/(d)[r]
R(h)/[d][r]
R[h]/(d)[r]
R[h]/[d][r]

where h stands for human, d for donkey, r for the predicate to run and
R stands for the special relation of the genitive case, and encapsulate the
expression inside in order to be taken as a unit. R(h)(d) means of every human
every donkey, it constitutes the subject of the sentence being run or is running
the predicate. The common pattern is shown by brackets and parentheses. But I will
also show the differences among the Medieval Octagons.

Logical Consequence in Avicennas Theory

Saloua Chatti
University of Tunis, Tunis, Tunisia
salouachatti@yahoo.fr
How does Avicenna view and define the consequence relation in his system? To
answer this question, I will consider especially his hypothetical logic. Unlike al-Farab,
who presents some hypothetical arguments comparable to the Stoics ones, Avicenna
presents a whole theory about the hypothetical syllogism, which almost duplicates the
categorical syllogistic when the conditional propositions are considered and contains
mixed premises, when the disjunctive propositions are introduced.
However, his analysis of the implication considers several meanings, which are more
or less strong depending on the kind of link between the antecedent and the consequent. He thus holds a weak meaning called ittifaq (translated by chance connection) which looks more like a conjunction and a strong meaning called luz
um, which
involves a strong and causal relation between the antecedent and the consequent. In
addition, he also introduces universal and particular quantifications in his hypothetical
logic by using the words kullama (whenever) and qad yak
un (maybe). When the
word kullama is used as in whenever the sun rises, it is daytime there is either a
perpetual or a necessary connection between the antecedent and the consequent. While
the word qad yak
un does not express such a strong relation between the two elements
of the conditional.
So it seems natural to say that the luz
um corresponds to the universal quantified conditional proposition expressed by (s)(P s Qs) or (t)(P t Qt) if
one quantifies on times as in N. Reschers interpretation). But is the luz
um what
Avicenna means by the consequence relation? Despite its strength and the fact that
Avicenna calls this kind of implication the real implication, it does not seem to be
the consequence relation in his theory. At best, the universal quantification is a kind
of material consequence relation (in the medieval sense), because of the necessary
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link between the antecedent and the consequent, which makes it truth preserving. But
the real consequence relation is formal and is illustrated by the hypothetical syllogism
itself. For Avicenna deduces conclusions only by means of the hypothetical syllogisms
which contain two premises each, as in categorical syllogistic. These hypothetical syllogisms may contain both conditional and disjunctive propositions and may be viewed
as relevant implications, because of the presence of common variables in the antecedent
and the consequent. However, their validity is not always clear, as we will show in this
contribution. This is due to the lack of formalization and the intuitive character of the
theory.

Non normal modal logics in Thomas Aquinas

Luca Gilli
University of Leuven, Leuven, Belgium
luca.gili.1987@gmail.com
Aquinass theory of future contingents have been largely studied by historians of
philosophy, but little attention has been devoted to the underlying logic of this doctrine.
According to Aquinas, God knows all future contingents. It is necessary that, if God
knows x, then x is the case. From this Aquinas concludes that future contingents are
truly contingent de re, even though the whole of the proposition if God knows x, then
x is the case is necessary. There is, however, a further difficulty, because Aquinas
maintains that whatever God knows, God knows it necessarily. By virtue of the K
axiom (A B) (A B) it follows that if God knows x, x is necessarily
the case (because Aquinass theology supposes the theorem if God knows x, then
necessarily: God knows x). Aquinass claim that future events are truly contingent
may be defended only by rejecting the K axioms. The claim of this paper is that many
semantic observations scattered in Aquinass works support the idea that if we were to
give a possible worlds semantics for Aquinass modal logic, we should have a semantics
that included impossible worlds too. Evidence for this is offered by two texts:
A) While discussing Aristotles proof for the validity of the principle of non-contradiction
(PNC), Aquinas notes that the rejection of the PNC may not be thought, but can
be expressed with words. This expression of the rejection of the PNC is an (impossible) world in which PNC is false. (Aquinass remarks on the impossibility
of thinking something like that may be regarded as a psychological remark on how
our mind is structured; the remark does not rule out impossible worlds).
B) Aquinas talks about imaginabilia as distinct from the possible ways in which God
might have created the world. Among the thing we can think of, there is the change
of the past an event which is incompatible with the PNC.
These texts suggest that Aquinas was open to subscribing to non-normal modal logics.
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Marsilius of Inghens Consequentiae

Graziana Ciola
Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy
graziana.ciola@sns
My talk will focus on Marsilius of Inghens Consequentiae; I will proceed with an
overview of the (still critically unedited) text, then with an analysis of some relevant
aspects of the theory, and collocating Marilius theory of consequence within the contemporary discussions. I will introduce my provisional edition of the text and then
examine some interesting features of Marsilius theory of consequences and its relations
to the contemporary discussions on the subject. I will focus in particular on Marsilius
definition of consequentia bona, and his accounts of formal and material consequences.
I will try to place Marsilius doctrine within the still little known framework of the
XIV century theories of consequences, in particular but (not only) in correlation to

the continental ones (Buridan, PsScotus,

Albert of Saxony). In doing so, on the one
hand, I will try to identify Marsilius probable sources and the positions that have some
influence on him, therefore clarifying some aspects of Marsilius theory. On the other
hand, a more detailed, grounded, and systematic analysis of Marsilius Consequentiae
might be a precious contribution to give a more precise and detailed picture of the
articulation of the complex XIV century debates around consequences.

Where Medieval Logicians Feared to Tread.

Syllogismus falsigraphus according to Medieval Latin Sources
Leone Gazziero
CNRS, Lille, France
leone.gazziero@univ-lille3.fr
Falsigraphies are a very peculiar kind of fallacious reasonings. For one thing, they
are demonstrations of sorts, that is, they are set out, as Aristotle repeatedly says
in his Topics and Sophistical Refutations, in accordance with given science principles
(e.g., geometry or medicine); for another, it takes an expert to expose them (e.g.,
a geometer or a physician). Despite the fact that, both in their capacity as Aristotelian
commentators and as upholder of scientific rigor and consistency, Medieval Logicians
have shown a keen interest in what they called falsigraphic syllogisms, these have not
received all the attention they deserve. Relying on a variety of edited and unedited
sources, we would like to show that the way Medieval authors handled falsigraphies tells
us much about how sophisticated their views were on what counts as sound argument
and why.
In order to do so, we will provide first a classification of falsigraphies as they occur
both in commentaries on Aristotle (namely his Posterior analytics, Topics and Sophistical Refutations) and in logical treatises (summulae and tractatus). We will explore
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then their most distinctive features as well as their relationship with other types of
syllogisms, particularly the critical or inquisitive ones (which they sometimes replace
in medieval taxonomies).
Because of its interest and ubiquity, special attention will be granted to the problem
of the circles quadrature, whose different methods have been discussed in great detail
almost every time (Ancient and) Medieval Logicians have been tackling the issue of
scientific paralogisms.

John Buridan on the Structure of Definitions:

Quaestiones Topicorum I.68
Rodrigo Guerizoli
Federal University of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
rguerizoli@ufrj.br
The paper I would like to present is part of a bigger project, recently started, whose
aim is to reconstruct and to analyze the medieval reception of the Aristotelian theory
of definition in commentaries on the Topics from the 13th and 14th Centuries. In my
talk I would like to focus on the commentary written by John Buridan (ca. 1300-1361)
in the first half of the 14th Century. This commentary has the form of a set of questions
on Aristotles text, and in my paper I shall concentrate in three questions formulated on
the basis of the teaching of Aristotle in the first book of the Topics. Those questions
build a unit, I argue, whose task is to provide reliable answers to three issues concerning
the structure of definitions, namely: a) the problem whether we can express what is
it do be a definition, b) the precise explanation of what definitions are, and c) the
justification of the status of definitions as predicates. I hope that the analysis of those
questions may provide an interesting introduction to the atmosphere of discussions
on the notion of definitions carried out into the tradition of medieval commentaries
on the Topics.

Thomas Manlevelt: Ockham and beyond

Alfred van der Helm
The Hague, Netherlands
alfredvanderhelm@gmail.com
Not much is known of the fourteenth-century logician Thomas Manlevelt, but his
work is remarkable enough. His fame rests chiefly on his parva logicalia, comprising De
suppositionibus, De confusionibus and De consequentiis. Widely popular in the fourteen
hundreds, they were in use as textbooks and commented upon at universities all over
the continent.
In this paper I will rather concentrate on his Questiones libri Porphirii, an extensive
commentary on Porphyrys Isagoge. It is edited in full, with introduction and indices,
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by the presenter of this paper, as volume 113 in the series Studien und Texte zur
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (STGM), Brill, 2014.
Following in the footsteps of William of Ockham, Manlevelt stresses the individual
nature of all things existing in the outside world. In this paper, I will illustrate how
he radically challenges our conceptual framework. He applies Ockhams razor in an
unscrupulous manner to do away with all entities not deemed necessary for preservation.
In the end, Manlevelt even maintains that substance does not exist.
With Manlevelt, early Ockhamism is being pushed to its extremes.
In fact, in his commentary on the Isagoge,Thomas Manlevelt applies the tactics of
extending Ockhamist tenures and insights to any logical, and if need be metaphysical
or theological subject matter. We are confronted with a radical variety of nominalism,
outdoing Ockham in a number of ways. The individualizing tendency is stretched to
its limits on the subjects as well as on the objects side, in an untiring effort to work
out the primacy of the individual over the universal in any kind of detail. Manlevelt
not only stresses the capacity of each individual instance (or token) of a term to stand
for individual things in the outside world, he also stresses the token character of each
instance of rational activity in itself. As each instance of a term be it a genus, a
species, or any of the remaining five universals is an accident of the individual human
mind doing the thinking, our authors singularising of the domain of the universals
is coupled with an accidentalising of this same domain. The link between terms and
reality may thus look disturbingly thin, as the linking takes place on an accidental level
only.

The Origin of the Distribution Doctrine

Mehdi Mirzapour
Iranian Association for Logic, Tehran, Iran
mehdi.mirzapour@gmail.com
In the light of an analytic historical approach, I will try to prove Buridans vital
contribution to the doctrine of distribution which is mostly forgotten or rarely underlined. Buridans version of the doctrine will be presented on the basis of his two strict
criteria used in dividing the common personal supposition. Consequently, It will be described that modern authors version of the distribution doctrine can be understood as
a consistent simplification of Buridans version. We will also explain how different views
and presumptions about the constitutional types of the distribution doctrine cause to
form different historical approaches to the history and origin of the doctrine. Finally,
Peter Geachs and Terence Parsons views about the doctrine will be compared with
the provided conceptual-historical view in this paper. The former will be rejected and
the latter will be accepted solely as a story of the origin of distributed term.
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Paradoxes of Signification
Stephen Read
University of St Andrews, St Andrews, Scotland, UK
slr@st-andrews.ac.uk
In [1], Ian Rumfitt has drawn our attention to a couple of paradoxes of signification,
claiming that although Thomas Bradwardines multiple-meanings account of truth
and signification can solve the first of them, it cannot solve the second. Bradwardines
solution of the paradoxes of truth in his Insolubilia [2] appears to turn on a distinction
between the principal and the consequential signification of an utterance. Whereas,
for example, Socrates utterance of Socrates says something false (and nothing else)
principally signifies that what Socrates said is false, it only consequentially signifies
that what Socrates said is true, as a result of Bradwardines claim that an utterance
signifies everything that follows from it. Thus Socrates utterance is self-contradictory
and so simply false and not true.
Once this distinction between principal and consequential signification is admitted,
however, the second of Rumfitts paradoxes bites and seems to leave Bradwardine with
no response. Both paradoxes were discussed extensively in the fourteenth century in
the decades after Bradwardines treatise was written, by Roger Swyneshed, William
Heytesbury, Robert Fland and Ralph Strode.
It is shown that the distinction between the principal and the consequential signification is made not by Bradwardine but by his opponents, and is not required for
Bradwardines solution to work. In fact, it dissolves on further examination, and the
problematic paradox with it.
References
1. I. Rumfitt, Truth and meaning, Aristotelian Society, vol. 88, 2014, pp. 2155.
2. T. Bradwardine, Insolubilia, edited and translated by S. Read, Dallas Medieval Texts
and Translations series, volume 10, Peeters Publishers, Leuven, Belgium, 2010.

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Philosophy of Computer Science

This workshop is organized by
Petros Stefaneas
Department of Mathematics, School of Applied Mathematical
and Physical Sciences, National Technical University of Athens, Greece
Nicola Angius
Dipartimento di Storia, Scienze dellUomo e della Formazione,
University of Sassari, Italy
The Philosophy of Computer Science is concerned with epistemological, methodological, and ontological analyses of methods and techniques of inquiry involved in
computer science as a discipline. The philosophy of computer science should be carefully distinguished from traditional philosophy of computing, dealing with ontological
and epistemological issues arisen with the discovery of computable functions. The philosophy of computer science focuses on methods, developed in computer science and
software engineering, in the design, specification, programming, verification, implementation, and testing of computational physical machines. As such, the philosophy of
computer science is not to be conceived as a branch of philosophy of mathematics and
philosophy of logics but rather as an independent, separate, discipline sharing interests with the philosophy of mathematics, the philosophy of empirical sciences, and the
philosophy of technology.
Contemporary philosophy of science is divided into as many fields, including the
philosophy of biology, the philosophy of economics, the philosophy of psychology, etc..,
as the types of systems about which a branch of science is devoted to their investigation.
The philosophy of computer science is involved in methodological problems arising
within the investigation of software systems. Many of those problems characterize
inquiries upon several natural systems, as being coessential with any scientific activity;
others are typical of software systems as being human-made systems. In the following,
some of them, which are under the interest of the present workshop, are concisely put
forward.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Raymond Turner (page 109).

Call for papers

We encourage submitting papers possibly addressing one of more of the following
questions:

Among the aims of scientific investigations on natural systems is achieving to some

theory systematizing and justifying the attained knowledge on the studied system.
Can theories of software systems be defined? Are they mathematical or empirical
theories? Which role is played by computational models in the discovery of those
theories?
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Common scientific theories enable one to define law -like statements expressing regular behaviours of the studied systems. Is it feasible to isolate law-like statements
concerning executions of studied computational systems? Under which condition
are they supposed to hold? How are those regularities justified, that is, falsified
and corroborated? Is probability involved in the confirmation of software law-like
statements?

Abstractions and idealizations are widely used in science to simplify and modify
theoretical constructs in order to be able of deriving, from the abstracted and idealized theories, desired consequences, theorems, or laws. Abstraction is, on the other
hand, a key concept in the design, specification and verification of programs. How
are abstraction techniques developed in computer science related to the problems of
abstracting and idealizing mathematical or empirical theories and models in science?

Models, theories, and empirical regularities are sources of scientific explanations of

empirical phenomena. Is explanation a significant philosophical issue in computer
science? What are good explanations of software systems executions? How are
causal process arising at the physical implementing level of a computing system
involved in the explanation of observed executions, especially malfunctions, of such
system?

In the light of the potential answers to the previous questions, what is the epistemological status of computer science? Should it be conceived as an applied mathematical discipline, a scientific discipline, or a technological discipline? What is the
relation, from an epistemological and methodological viewpoint, between computer
science and software engineering?

Beside typical methodological issues, other philosophical topics characterize the philosophy of computer science and concern the ontology of programs and the ontology
of computational processes. What are programs? What are software specifications?
What is the relation, from on ontological point of view, between software and hardware? What are the computing process prescribed by programs and specifications?
Are they the continuum physical processes, or the discrete procedures described by
computational models?

Long abstracts (up to 1000 words) should be sent before 30th of January
to petros@math.ntua.gr.

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Software and causality

Russ Abbott
California State University, Los Angeles, USA
Suppose you are sitting at your computer and press the e key. An e appears
on the screen and in the document. Does the key-press cause the e to appear on the
screen and to be inserted into the text? This seems to fit the Interventionist template
change which key is pressed and the inserted letter will be different. Nevertheless my
inclination would be to say that the key-press does not cause these results.
The way most interactive programs work is that they set up what are sometimes
called listeners. A listener is a chunk of software that is activated whenever a listenedfor event occurs. The listener examines the notification and takes one or another series
of actions.
An analogy may help. Imagine you hear the phone ring, you pick it up, and you
say hello. Did the ringing cause you to perform those actions? I doubt that many
people would say it did.
Causation tends not to be a standard frame of reference in computer science. But
computer scientists and software developers often talk in terms of causal/mechanistic
explanations. One might explain the appearance of the e as follows. The user pressed
the e key, which led to the listener being notified, which led to the program taking
certain actions, etc. The construction led to something happening 1 is understood to
mean something like set up a situation in which something happened.
This way of speaking does not necessarily attribute the something happening
directly to whatever created the situation in which it happened. Room is left for
disengagement between cause and effect. Perhaps one reason for this disengagement is
that there is no physical causation in software. Since software is not physical it cannot
be party to a physical interaction.
This sort of disengagement carries over to our everyday experience. I would say
that flipping a light switch does not cause a light to go on. Flipping the light switch
enables an electric current to flow through a circuit, which leads to the light going on.
The switch itself doesnt have any direct connection to the light.
An Interventionist might respond in three ways.
1. Computer scientists do talk about causal (i.e., because-based) explanations. Interventionist causality is often understood to be a theory of causal explanation rather
than a theory of causation.
2. Interventionist causality is about probabilities rather than physical causation. Smoking does indeed raise the probability of cancer occurring. And pressing the e-key
does indeed raise the probability of an e appearing on the screen. This response
seems to me to be something of a stretch.
3. If you follow the electrical circuits, pressing the e-key is in fact physically connected
to the observed results. Pressing the e-key sends a signal from the keyboard to
1

One might even use the term cause in place of led to, but I dont want that to confuse the situation.

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the computer, which triggers the software listener, which triggers the performance
of the pre-programmed actions, which insert an e on the screen and into the
document. At the hardware level, it is all driven in a forward chaining manner. One
thing physically triggers another, which triggers another, etc. But most software
developers dont think in terms of hardware. A hardware explanation would be like
saying that the ringing of the telephone causes you on some physiological level to
pick it up and say hello. And in fact, one might be able to trace the physiological
connection: the sound of the phone, triggered vibrations in the ear, which triggered
nerve firing to the auditory center of the brain, which triggered, . . . which triggered
your picking up the phone and saying hello. But thats not how we think about
our own behavior, and thats not how developers think about software.
Software causality is similar to the mechanism that switches an onrushing railroad
train from one track to another. The central element in software causality is the ifstatement. An if-statement switches the (similarly) onrushing flow of the program to
proceed on one track or the other.
One can trace the functioning of if-statements to hardware multiplexors, which
determine which of two address is put into the computers program counter. But a
multiplexor is a fairly straightforward Boolean circuit. Where is the causality and
decision making? It all comes down to relays, i.e., devices that switch current flows
from one path to another. This is essentially the same situation we saw in the light
switch example. In both cases, the switch doesnt cause the effect; switching a flow
path enables whatever is flowing along the path to cause the effect.
This raises a question for Interventionist causality. Traditionally one takes an interventionist causal relationship as something like a promise that a physical causal chain
connects the cause to the effect. But as in the previous examples, thats not always the
case. The causal action may simply change the world in a way that results in the effect
through other means.
Recently Baumgartner [1] argued that that if A supervenes on B and A can be
shown to be an Interventionist cause of C then it is really B, not A, that is causing
Woodward [2] responded by agreeing with Baumgartners argument but insisting that
it still makes sense to say that A stands in a causal relationship to C.
Its likely that an examination and analysis of software causality can help clarify
our more general understanding of causality.
References
1. M. Baumgartner, Interventionism and Epiphenomenalism, Canadian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 40(3), 2010.
2. J. Woodward, Interventionism and Causal Exclusion, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 2014, doi:10.1111/phpr.12095.
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Syntax and Semantics in Evolved Theories

Mark Addis
Birmingham City University, Birmingham, UK
The paper considers the contribution which syntactic and semantic elements make
to genetic program based theory construction. One major philosophical method of
analysing scientific theories aims at identifying abstract formal structures which all
these theories share. The two principal positions are what are often referred to as
the syntactic and semantic approaches. The former is central to logical positivist philosophy of science and stresses inferential patterns within theories [2]. Theories are
analysed as deductive axiomatic systems (using quantified first order logic plus various
relational extensions) in conjunction with appropriate empirical interpretations of nonlogical terms [3]. The syntactic approach was criticised for either ignoring or distorting
many aspects of theory construction in science [5] and increasingly fell out of favour
as positivism waned. It was gradually replaced by the semantic approach to scientific
theories [4]. On this view theories are abstract specifications of a class of models where
a model is a structure in which a theory is true. This dispute raises the issue of whether
the genetic programs evolved by using the theory language in the pilot work [1] should
be approached by a syntactic or a semantic approach or even by a mixture of both. The
theory language has a syntactic character (whose properties can be specified in a version
of first order logic with suitable extensions) whilst the genetic program operators are
probabilistic. It follows that there are substantial grounds for engaging in the study of
syntactic features where this includes a central (and perhaps even predominant) role
for probabilistically defined ones. More generally, this issue has important implications
for whether the current widespread rejection of syntactic analysis of scientific theories
is well justified.
References
1. M. Addis, F. Gobet, P. Lane and P. Sozou, Computational scientific discovery and
cognitive science theories, in Proceedings of International Association for Computing And Philosophy, conference held in 2014, edited by V. M
uller, 2014. Forthcoming
in Synthese Library, Springer.
2. R. Carnap, Foundations of Logic and Mathematics, in International Encyclopedia
of Unified Science, vol. I, no. 3, University of Chicago Press, 1939.
3. E. Nagel, The Structure of Science: Problems in the Logic of Scientific Explanation,
Harcourt, Brace & World, New York, USA.
4. F. Suppe, The Semantic Conception of Theories and Scientific Realism, University
of Illinois Press, 1989.
5. B. van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, Clarendon Press, 1980.
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Software Theory Change by resilient

near-complete specifications
Balbir Barn, Nikos Gkorogiannis, Giuseppe Primiero
and Franco Raimondi
Middlesex University, UK
Formal specification and formal verification are considered the two essential steps
for determining the degree of software reliability, intended as compliance of any execution of a programs instance with respect to its intended behaviour. Despite progress in
accuracy in both areas, the phenomenon of software malfunctioning is still one of enormous relevance. One way to express malfunctioning of software systems is by referring
to an execution that produces unexpected side-effects, or unexpected postconditions,
see Floridi et al. (forthcoming). Consider a computational systems model as defined
by the relation:
S = < preconditions [p]postconditions >,
which says that given some preconditions, the execution of program variable p necessarily leads to some postconditions. Then, malfunctioning can be expressed as the gap
between the expected postconditions in the above formal description and the result of
tracing an instance of p execution steps. The latter will give the actual behavior of a
running instance of p, to be compared to postconditions in S. When these diverge from
the execution traces, it could be the result of stronger preconditions being implemented,
unexpected execution conditions or weaker postconditions being required by the formal
description.1 To develop a conceptual model describing the dynamics of software change
is crucial for the philosophy of computer science and part of the general task of understanding software as theory, see e.g. [8] and chapter 15 of [10]. The complementary task
for software engineering and formal methods is to develop formal machineries that describe these processes and their handling precisely. Identified preconditions are meant
to guarantee safety of program execution. On the other hand, identifying preconditions
that (may) lead to execution failure allows to define completeness. In [7], the notion
of near-complete specifications is used to describe approximations to complete specifications, through the use of possible errors classification in weakened post-conditions
and an algebra on the possible program states. A similar sense of near-completeness
is offered by approaches to requirements engineering where the relevant specification
description can be marked up with refinements given by possible, admissible or even
acceptable malfunctioning. In this paper, we aim at considering near completeness for
specifications as the approximation to safe program states descriptions, analysed in the
light of the principles of theory change.
1

The topic of software systems resistance to change in the environment as graceful degradation is
a research topic of its own (see e.g. [2, 3]), including reference to hardware and material execution
conditions, and we abstract from it in the present contribution to model specifically the relation of
change in specifications as induced from unexpected postconditions.

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When understanding software as a theory, a model of a correctly functioning computational system S as described above can be taken to mimic the notion of right
theory. In turn, an implementation S1 of S whose execution generates traces in which
the output state diverges from the expected post-conditions
S1 = < preconditions [p]postconditions >

is such that any of the pre-conditions (including the input) may differ from those given
in S and on that basis one execution of p possibly leads to distinct postconditions than
those described by S. We say that S1 is malfunctioning, and the corresponding abstract
specification near-complete, with respect to S if it accommodates possibly faulty states.
Such states might (for various reasons) be accommodated in a new specification S0
which includes them as valid. The process of approximating from the near-complete
specification of S1 to a safe program execution of S0 corresponds to arriving at the right
correct account of a scientific phenomenon. Such analogy strongly relies on:
1. our ability to account for the actual process of software design;
2. a model that accommodates the approximation from near-complete to valid specifications;
3. a conceptual description of how a computational system resists or fails under such
stages of approximations.
Resilience for a computational system can be defined as its (graded) ability to perform a computation (i.e. an implementation of a computational system model) that
is verified correct in view of the formal specification even under varied or perturbated
specifications. This means the implementation reaches an expected, or at least admissible post-condition on a given input, despite a number of initial states of the system are
possibly different from those specified or those expected to be necessary. In the present
paper we offer a conceptual analysis that aims at including all the three of the steps
above. The main contribution consists in offering a notion of resilient software system
from near-complete specifications. In the literature on software change, the process we
are interested in corresponds to preservation of behavioral safety by specification approximation, in order to account for unpredictable or unexpected behavior, see e.g. the
theme of system properties and its dimensions in the taxonomy offered in [4]. Moreover,
various attempts have been made to tackle this notion of resistance (perseverance of
validity) to change. The most common one encountered in this research area is that
of system robustness. One (older) interpretation of robustness is given in terms of the
inability of the system to distinguish between behaviours that are essentially the same,
see [9]. More recently, the term resilience has been used to refer to the ability of a
system to retain functional and non-functional identity and three of its constituents
are given in terms of: the ability to perceive environmental changes; to understand the
implications introduced by those changes; and to plan and enact adjustments intended
to improve the system-environment fit ([5]).
In the present contribution, we endorse the view that instances of software systems
acts under variations of pre-conditions and that a model of computational systems
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implementing resilience should be given as a function
S = < preconditions[v1 , . . . , vn ] [p]postconditions >,
where each vi can be seen as a variation in the set of preconditions which still allows for
an admissible postcondition. The process of theory change that a computational model
undergoes is given by the extension or reduction of the set V of variations that the set
of preconditions is able to absorb while preserving an admissible (for the purposes of
the computation) state satisfying the (varied) postconditions. An unreachable program
state, on the other hand, is given by changing the preconditions set so that one does no
longer satisfy the type of specifications assumed and the post-conditions are no longer
valid. Additionally, a measure of resilience for computational systems can be offered,
based on a metrics of such variations. A resilient system is defined as one that can
accommodate such changes, maintaining program state validity. Our aim, is to offer
a model that describes admissible variations on the preconditions of a valid program
state so as to approximate to an unreachable state, still allowing for a valid output state.
References
1. B. Barn, R. Barn and G. Primiero, Value-sensitive Co-Design for resilient Information Systems, in Proceedings of International Association for Computing And Philosophy, conference help in 2014, forthcoming in Synthese Library Series, Springer.
2. R. Bloem, K. Chatterjee, K. Greimel, T.A. Henzinger and B. Jobstmann, Robustness in the presence of Liveness, in Computer Aided Verification, Lecture
Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6174, edited by Touili, Cook and Jackson, 2010,
pp. 410424.
3. R. Bloem, K. Greimel, T.A. Henzinger and B. Jobstmann, Synthesizing Robust
Systems, Acta Informatica, vol. 51, 2014, pp. 193220.
4. J. Buckley, T. Mens, M. Zenger, A. Rashid and G. Kniesel, Towards a taxonomy
of software change, Journal of Software Maintenance and Evolution: Research and
Practice, vol. 17, issue 5, 2005, pp. 309332.
5. V. De Florio, On the Constituent Attributes of Software and Organisational Resilience, Interdisciplinary Science Reviews, vol. 38, no. 2, Maney Publishing, 2013.
6. L. Floridi, N. Fresco and G. Primiero, On Malfunctioning Software, forthcoming
in Synthese.
7. Q. Loc Le, A. Sharma, F. Craciun and W.-N. Chin, Towards Complete Specifications with an Error Calculus, in NASA Formal Methods, Lecture Notes in Computer
Science, vol. 7871, 2013, pp. 291306.
8. J.H. Moor, Three Myths of Computer Science, British Journal for the Philosophy
of Science, vol. 29(3), 1978, pp. 213222.
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9. D. Peled, Verification for robust specification, in Theorem Proving in Higher Order
Logics, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1275, edited by E. Gunter and A.
Felty, 1997, pp. 231241.
10. W.J. Rapaport, Philosophy of Computer Science, University at Buffalo, The State
University of New York, draft, 20042015.

Philosophical Aspects of Programming Theory Development

Vitalii Gavryluk
European Univerisity of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
vag38@yandex.ua
Mykola Nikitchenko
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
nikitchenko@unicyb.kiev.ua
The following three levels of Computing foundations were proposed in [1]: 1) philosophical, 2) scientific, and 3) formal (mathematical). Here we continue investigations
of this three-level scheme applying it to Programming theory development. For this
case we study interrelations of the levels concentrating on relations of the philosophical
level with the other two levels. It should be noted that the importance of philosophical foundations for information-related disciplines (in particular, for programming) is
widely recognized. Different philosophical systems were proposed for this purpose, for
example, K. Poppers ontology, philosophy of Kuhn and Peirce, specific epistemology
of Hjorland, etc. A short description of philosophical approaches could be found in [2],
philosophical aspects of the main mathematical notions were discussed in [3].
Our approach to Programming theory development [4] is based on Hegels logic [5]
presented in the modified form in [6]. Therefore, the main principles of the approach
are the principle of development from abstract to concrete, the principle of triadic development (thesis antithesis synthesis), and the principle of unity of theory and
practice.
The above-mentioned levels identify three types of notions that constitute the basis
of each level respectively: philosophical level categories (infinite notions in Hegels
terminology), scientific level finite (scientific) notions, and formal level formal
finite (mathematical) notions. Thus, interrelations of the levels are tightly connected
with relations between categories, scientific notions, and formal notions respectively. We
distinguish two transitions between levels: from categories to scientific notions and from
scientific notions to formal notions. The first transition is called finitization and the
second one formalization. The finitization transition transforms categories presented
with the help of Hegels categories universal particular singular into scientific
notions described as integrity of their intensions extensions. The formalization
transition constructs formal intensions and extensions of scientific notions.
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At the philosophical level we start with the following triad of categories: subject
goal means. Then we enrich this triad with two new triads: subject means
means usage and goal means means construction, finally obtaining the following
pentad: subject goal means means usage means construction.
At the scientific level we make finitization of categories of this pentad obtaining
the following pentad of programming notions: user problem program program
execution program construction. We investigate finitization transition between the
levels represented by pairs subjectuser, goalproblem, meansprogram, means usage
program execution, means constructionprogram construction. We also make further
development of the notions of programming pentad, in particular, we specify the notion of program via program pentad : data function function name function
composition function description.
The second transition formalization poses a number of philosophical questions concerning the category of formal, its relation to other categories, expressivity
and limitations of formal notions, etc. Analysis of these questions permits to explain construction of programming models in integrity of their philosophical, scientific
and formal aspects.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko, Constructing Logics oriented on Computing: Philosophical
and Mathematical Aspects, in Handbook of the 4th World Congress and School
on Universal Logic, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013, pp. 291292.
2. D. Bawden, Smoother pebbles and the shoulders of giants: the developing foundations of information science, Journal of Information science, vol. 34, no. 4, 2008,
pp. 415426.
3. I. Vandoulakis and P. Stefaneas, Conceptions of proof in mathematics, in Proof
Evidence, Reliability and Convincingness, URSS Publisher, Moscow, 2013,
pp. 256281.
4. M. Nikitchenko, Theory of Programming, Publishing House of Nizhyn University,
Nizhyn, Ukraine, 2010. (In Ukrainian.)
5. G.W.F. Hegel, Hegels Science of Logic, translated by A.V. Miller, foreword
by J.N. Findlay, G. Allen & Unwin, London, 1969.
6. V. Gavryluk, Theory of Development, Publishing House of European University,
Kyiv, 3 volumes, 20092013. (In Russian.)

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Heinz Zemaneks almost forgotten Contributions

to the Philosophy of Informatics
Stefan Gruner
Department of Computer Science, Universiteit van Pretoria,
Republic of South Africa
sg@cs.up.ac.za
Keywords: Philosophy of Informatics, History of the Philosophy of Informatics.
Whereas philosopher-scientists are and have been well-known throughout the history of ideas, philosopher-engineers were always less-known and standing so-to-say
somewhat in the shadow of history. One of the most famous philosophers of the
20th century, the Austrian Ludwig Wittgenstein (18891951), is hardly remembered
as the engineer and architect which he also was. Vice versa, the German and Austrian computer pioneers Konrad Zuse (19101995) and Heinz Zemanek (19202014) are
widely recognised as (computer)-engineers, considerably less is publicly known about
their (computing)- philosophical thoughts and activities. As far as the public reception
of their computer-philosophical legacies is concerned, it seems fair to say that Konrad Zuse is still better off than Heinz Zemanek, because Zuse always had a strong
history-political lobby (particularly in Germany) who promoted and defended his pioneering legacy against an Anglo-centric history written by the victors after WWII.
For these reasons it was never forgotten that Zuse had not only built the very first
electro-magnetic-mechanical computer which was fully and freely programmable, but
also laid the foundation of the metaphysical doctrine of pan-computationalism with his
essay on Rechnender Raum (computing cosmos), which he claimed to have conceived
mentally already during the 1940s more than twenty years before its printed publication. Pan-computationalism is nowadays a thriving (although i.m.h.o. unscientific)
philosophical-metaphysical ideology particularly in the field of natural or natureinspired computing.
Less known though philosophically more salient than Zuses metaphysical
speculations about a computing cosmos are Heinz Zemaneks early contributions to
the philosophy of computing, because Zemanek was aas far as I knowa the first
philosopher-engineer who had fully grasped the computer-philosophical relevance of the
logical language-philosophy designed by his famous compatriot, Ludwig Wittgenstein.
For this reason, my contribution is focused precisely on Zemaneks early philosophy. To
this end I will briefly recapitulate his main train of computer-philosophical thought
especially from those of his German-language publications which are hardly available
for a wider international audience and emphasise some interesting points or questions
which Zemaneks early computer-philosophical publications left open or un-answered for
the future. However, a comprehensive history of literature and ideas about Zemaneks
contribution to the philosophy of computing is outside the scope of my contribution
and must be left as a to-do for the professional historians from the academic faculty
of the humanities.
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Zemanek had been a prolific writer until his very old age, such that rigorous selection
is needed for the purpose of a short review-contribution with a well-defined focus. In
order to prove the often-forgotten point that the philosophy of informatics is actually
considerably older than it is widely believed to be, I have chosen the year 1975 as the
cut-off date for the recapitulation and discussion of Zemaneks philosophical thoughts.
But which ones of Zemaneks many works from before 1976 should be selected for this
purpose? In one of his later computer-philosophical essays from the year 1993, Zemanek
himself had indicated in hindsight which ones of his own early philosophical
writings he still regarded as noteworthy and relevant: most of them I was able to
retrieve for the purpose of this review.
Those works of Zemanek can be broadly classified into two categories: (A) works in
which Zemanek interpreted informatics very specifically in the light of Wittgensteins
philosophy, and (B) works in which Zemanek interpreted informatics more generally in
the wider context of a cultural philosophy of technology in the broadest sense.
In my conference talk I shall speak about several further details of what I have
briefly sketched in the paragraphs of above. The complete paper, including all the
relevant literature references and due acknowledgments, shall be made available after
the conference.

A Plea for Explanatory Pluralism in Computer Science

Guglielmo Tamburrini
University of Naples Federico II, Naples, Italy
Nicola Angius
University of Sassari, Sassari, Italy
It has been claimed that explanations of the behavior of computing systems is adequately explicated in terms of the mechanistic model of explanation (Piccinini 2007,
Piccinini and Craver 2011). We discuss critically this claim in connection with those
computing systems that are characteristically described as physical systems which carry
out computer programs. First, we point out that many explanations of behavioral patterns observed in those computing systems do not involve causal accounts of the sort
that are required by the mechanistic model of explanation. Moreover, the explanatory
power of these explanations does not depend on (and is not increased by providing) detailed causal stories of observed behavioral patterns. Quite to the contrary, explanatory
power is actually increased by removing a wide variety of details concerning underlying
causal mechanisms. Accordingly, many explanations accounting for those behavioral
patterns that are observed across a wide variety of computing systems and are produced by heterogeneous causal processes should be counted as minimal explanations
(Batterman and Rice 2014) or functional role explanations (Cummins 1975). Finally,
we point out that many model-based explanations of computing system behaviors involve descriptions of computational processes as non-terminating processes, that is, as
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infinite sequences of states which do admit an initial or start state but no termination state. These model-based explanations do not fit the mechanistic model insofar as
mechanistic explanations involve descriptions of mechanisms as sets of entities that are
engaged into processes which connect some start condition to a termination condition.
When addressing explanation requests about computing systems behaviors, computer scientists take advantage of a plurality of models of explanation a including
functional, minimal, and genuinely causal models. The selection of the more appropriate explanatory strategy for answering an explanation request depends on the pragmatic
interpretation of the explanation request (van Fraassen 1980). This pragmatic interpretation hinges, in its turn, on the variety of contexts that are afforded by available
descriptions and models of the computing system. These descriptions and models are
progressively developed by computer scientists in the multifaceted and interrelated activities of specifying, designing, implementing, testing, and predicting the behaviors of
computing systems.
Consider those descriptions that one develops when specifying requirements for computing systems. These specifications express properties that computing systems must
fulfill, insofar as they reflect desiderata of users, programmers or manufacturers. Accordingly, some explanation requests about computing systems behaviors are fruitfully
interpreted in the pragmatic context of the underlying intentions of users. Question
(1) Why was event x observed?
can be contextually interpreted as the request of explaining why event x occurred in
accordance or else in contrast with those intentions. Similarly, question
(2) Why do all observed runs of program P in different computing systems fulfill the
liveness requirement L?
can be contextually interpreted in the context of specification requirements.
Explanations requests that are pragmatically interpreted in the context of human
intentions typically concern technological artifacts: they do not arise in many scientific
domains where the behavior of systems of interest is not shaped by human intentions.
But these differences between explanation needs arising in science and technology, respectively, should not blind one to deep commonalities between strategies that one
adopts to answer explanation requests across science and technology: model-based explanations play a central role in both cases. In particular, to explain behavioral patterns
and events of both technological artifacts and other natural systems whose behaviors
are not influenced by human intentions one often relies on representations of these
systems as dynamical systems.
Computing systems are often profitably modeled as dynamical systems in which
both temporal and state variables are identified with natural numbers. The fact that
explanations of computing system behaviors often draw on discrete dynamical systems
of this sort sheds additional light on the dispensability of a detailed causal story for
the purpose of explaining many behavioral events and patterns of computing systems.
Indeed, from the viewpoint of classical physics, everything moves continuously, including the physical systems which carry out computer programs. However, to explain
behavioral patterns of computing systems this sort of representational accuracy is not
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needed. Actually, it is the lack of representational accuracy characterizing discrete dynamical systems that enables one to achieve greater explanatory power when one wants
to explain why a wide variety of systems, differing from each other in the way of physical components and processes, exhibit the same behavioral patterns qua computing
systems.
References
1. R.W. Batterman and C.C. Rice, Minimal model explanations, Philosophy
of Science, vol. 81(3), 2014, pp.349376.
2. R. Cummins, Functional analysis, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 72(20), 1975,
pp. 741765.
3. G. Piccinini, Computing mechanisms, Philosophy of Science, vol. 74(4), 2007,
pp. 501526.
4. G. Piccinini and C. Craver, Integrating psychology and neuroscience: Functional
analyses as mechanism sketches, Synthese, vol. 183(3), 2011, pp. 283311.
5. B.C. Van Fraassen, The Scientific Image, Oxford University Press, 1980.

Connexive Logics
This workshop is organized by
Hitoshi Omori
City University of New York, USA
Heinrich Wansing
University of Bochum, Germany
Modern connexive logic started in the 1960s with seminal papers by Richard B.
Angell and Storrs McCall. Connexive logics are orthogonal to classical logic insofar as
they validate certain non-theorems of classical logic, namely

Aristotles Theses: (A A), (A A)

Boethius Theses: (A B) (A B), (A B) (A B)

Systems of connexive logic have been motivated by considerations on a content connection between the antecedent and succedent of valid implications and by applications
that range from Aristotles syllogistic to Categorial Grammar and the study of causal
implications. Surveys of connexive logic can be found in:
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1. S. McCall, A History of Connexivity, in Handbook of the History of Logic, edited
by D.M. Gabbay et al., vol. 11: Logic: A History of its Central Concepts, Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2012, pp. 415449.
2. H. Wansing, Connexive Logic, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Fall
2014 Edition, edited by Edward N. Zalta, forthcoming in http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/fall2014/entries/logic-connexive.
Recently, connexive logics have received new attention. This workshop is meant to
present current work on connexive logic and to stimulate future research.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Storrs McCall (page 102).

Call for papers

Any papers related to connexive logics are welcome. Topics of interest include (but
are not limited to) the following:
Historical considerations of the notion of connexivity
Arguments for or against connexive logics
Examinations of existing systems of connexive logics
non-explosiveness of logical consequence
Submissions of extended abstracts (up to five pages) should be sent to both organizers as a pdf file at hitoshiomori@gmail.com and Heinrich.Wansing@rub.de.
Deadline for submission: December 1st, 2014.
Notification of acceptance: December 31st, 2014.

On Arithmetic Formulated Connexively

Thomas Macaulay Ferguson
City University of New York, New York, USA
tferguson@gc.cuny.edu
One of the richest and most tantalizing applications of a non-classical logic is the
matter of how mathematics operates within its scope. The contraclassicality of connexive logics systems endorsing Aristotles Thesis (i.e., (A A)) and Boethius
Thesis (i.e., (A B) (A B)) as theorems entails that the development
of connexive mathematics will be more complex and, arguably, more intriguing
than intuitionistic or relevant accounts. For example, although formally undecidable
sentences in classical Peano Arithmetic remain so with respect to its intuitionistic and
relevant fragments, the situation is much more complicated connexively. Let T be a
classical theory of arithmetic extending Robinson Arithmetic and let GT be its Godel
sentence; then although (GT GT ) is also undecidable in T , this sentenceas an
instance of Aristotles Thesiswill be provable in any connexive arithmetic.
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In this talk, we will make a few observations concerning the formalization of such
a connexive account of arithmetic. Historically, we will consider Lukasiewicz numbertheoretic argument against Aristotles Thesis, namely, that counterexamples to Aristotles Thesis are implied by Euclids Lemma. Furthermore, we will consider some of
the Kneales remarks concerning Aristotles Thesis, in which Aristotles endorsement
of connexive principles is interpreted as a rejection of the Zenonian account of provability and the validity of reductiones ad absurdum. Suggestively, the very concerns the
Kneales attribute to Aristotle form the basis for the hyper-constructive approach to
mathematics endorsed by David Nelson. Hence, the prospects for importing Nelsons
concerns as a foundation for connexive mathematics and their relevance to Heinrich
Wansings Nelson-like connexive logic C will be considered.
From a formal perspective, we will consider quantifier-free extensions of Richard Angells connexive logics PA1 and PA2 and examine weak quantifier-free fragments of arithmetic (protoarithmetical theories with a successor axiom) formulated in these logics.
These formalizations reveal that in any reasonable PA1 theory of arithmetic, bounded
quantificationexpressible in these quantifier-free theorieswill behave pathologically.
Furthermore, given the unary truth operator T of PA2, we may observe that any complete PA2 theory of arithmetic either proves the sentence
n = n T(n = n)
for every natural number n or proves its negation, i.e.,
(n = n T(n = n))
for every natural number n. Complete PA2 theories of arithmetic will thus divide into
those in which identity is always literal (in the sense that every sentence n = n is strictly
true) and those in which identity is always allegorical (in the sense that no such sentence is strictly true).
References
1. R.B. Angell, Tre logiche dei condizionali congiuntivi, in Leggi di natura, modalit`
a,
ipotesi, edited by C. Pizzi, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1978, pp. 156180.
2. J. Lukasiewicz, Aristotles syllogistic from the standpoint of modern formal logic,
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1951.
3. W. Kneale and M. Kneale, The development of logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1962.
4. D. Nelson, Constructible falsity, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 14, no. 1,
1949, pp. 1626.
5. H. Wansing, Connexive modal logic, in Advances in modal logic, vol. 5, edited by
R. Schmidt et al., Kings College Publications, London, 2005, pp. 367383.
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A simple connexive extension of the basic relevant logic BD

Hitoshi Omori
Kyoto University, Kyoto, Japan
hitoshiomori@gmail.com
The name Connexive logic suggests that connexive logic shares a certain motivation with relevant logic. And some attempts are known in the literature by relevant
logicians such as Richard Routley, Chris Mortensen and Ross Brady, at realizing the
connexive theses in relevant logic. The present paper goes in the same direction using
a different approach. The main motivation behind the paper involves a problem formulated by Graham Priest and Richard Sylvan, and considered further by Greg Restall.
In brief, the problem is to find a proof theory for extensions of the basic relevant logic
BD in which the negation is interpreted in terms of a four-valued semantics (i.e. the
so-called American plan). The difficulty lies in finding the appropriate axioms and/or
rules of inference, to capture the corresponding falsity condition for the conditional.
Priest and Sylvan suggested two falsity conditions for the conditional, but the corresponding axioms and/or rules of inference remain unknown. The aim of the paper is
to show that for a certain falsity condition, inspired by the work on connexive logic by
Heinrich Wansing, it is possible to find the corresponding proof theory. The paper also
presents two other non-connexive falsity conditions for which the corresponding proof
theories are available.
References
1. G. Priest and R. Sylvan, Simplified Semantics for Basic Relevant Logic, Journal
of Philosophical Logic, vol. 21, 1992, pp. 217232.
2. G. Restall, Simplified semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals),
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 22, 1993, pp. 481511.
3. G. Restall, Four-valued semantics for relevant logics (and some of their rivals),
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 24, 1995, pp. 139160.
4. H. Wansing, Connexive modal logic, in Advances in Modal Logic, vol. 5, edited
by R. Schmidt et al., Kings College Publications, London, 2005, pp. 367383.

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The Strange Status of The Principle

of Conditional Non-Contradiction
Matthias Unterhuber
University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
matthias.unterhuber@philo.unibe.ch
The Principle of Conditional Non-Contradiction (CNC) asserts that any pair of conditionals of the form and is inconsistent. Two variants of CNC are
the following:
( )
(( ) ( ))

Aristotles Thesis (AT)

Boethiuss Thesis (BT)

The status of principles CNC, AT, and BT and its consequence are in need of
clarification for connexive logics as well as standard conditional logics, where the latter
include (a) Lewiss modal sphere semantics and (b) Adamss probabilistic semantics for
conditionals. Whereas the logical status of CNC and its variants is perfectly clear for
connexive logics connexive logics take principles AT and BT as the cornerstone of
any axiomatization of a logic for conditionals the status of CNC does not seem to
be clear for standard conditional logics. For example, Bennet and Gibbard take CNC
and its variants as valid principles of both (a) and (b) and argue on that basis for a
probabilistic semantics of conditionals in line with Adams.
However, neither CNC nor AT nor BT are valid in these systems. In fact, they
cannot consistently be added to either system. Moreover, the addition of weakened
principles changes Lewiss modal system in essential ways thereby reducing the appeal
and the flexibility of the original formalism. In contrast, in Adams probabilistic semantics the validity of a weakened version of CNC depends on a small point excluding
conditionals which have an antecedent with zero probability making the basis on
which CNC is valid rather arbitrary.
On the other hand, proponents of CNC and its variants, such as connexive logicians,
face a challenge. If as it is customary ( is necessary) is defined by ,
under very weak assumptions AT implies for any . That means that no state of
affairs can obtain with necessity. Thus, the proponent of CNC is faced with two bad
options: either abandoning the latter definition of necessity or sticking with the fact
that the formalism cannot describe any necessary state of affairs in a consistent way.

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Natural deduction for bi-connexive logic

Heinrich Wansing
Ruhr-University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Heinrich.Wansing@rub.de
Both bi-intuitionistic logic and connexive logic have received considerable attention
recently; see, for example, [1, 2, 4]. A bi-intuitionistic system, 2Int, different form the
bi-intuitionistic logic BiInt that is also know as Heyting-Brouwer logic, has been introduced in [3]. In this talk I will present a natural deduction proof system for a connexive
version of 2Int. It combines the use of proofs as well as dual roofs with a connexive
interpretation of the implication and co-implication connectives of 2Int. Moreover, a
formulas-as-types notion of construction is presented for the co-negation, implication,
and co-implication fragment of 2Int. This construction makes use of a two-sorted typed
lambda calculus.
References
1. R. Gore, Dual intuitionistic logic revisited, in Automated Reasoning with Analytic
Tableaux and Related Methods, edited by R. Dyckhoff, Springer Lecture Notes in AI,
vol. 1847, Springer, 2000, pp. 252267.
2. S. McCall, A History of Connexivity, in Handbook of the History of Logic, Volume 11: Logic: A History of its Central Concepts, edited by D.M. Gabbay et al.,
Amsterdam, Elsevier, 2012, pp. 415449.
3. H. Wansing, Falsification, natural deduction, and bi-intuitionistic logic, Journal of
Logic and Computation, published online in July 2013: doi:10.1093/logcom/ext035.
4. H. Wansing, Connexive Logic, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited
by Edward N. Zalta, Fall 2014 Edition, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/
archives/fall2014/entries/logic-connexive.

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Logic and Information

In collaboration with the Society for the Philosophy of Information, this workshop
is organized by
Patrick Allo
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science, Brussels, Belgium
Giuseppe Primiero
Department of Computer Science, Middlesex University, London, UK
The juxtaposition of logic and information is popular as well as controversial: It is
clear that there must be a connection between both, but there is hardly any agreement
about the precise nature of the connection. When we focus on how information can
clarify what logic is about, it is natural to say that valid arguments are just those
arguments where the content of the conclusion does not exceed the combined content
of the premises. Yet, such explanations do not have the same status as more entrenched
truth-conditional and inferential conceptions of logical consequence, which suggests that
information-talk about logic is simply redundant. When, by contrast, we focus on how
logic can clarify the nature and dynamics of information, we turn our attention to
specific developments in philosophical logic, like logics of knowledge and belief and
their many dynamic extensions. While this opens up an entirely new field of formal
investigations often dubbed the dynamic and interactive turn in logic it is less clear
whether such developments establish a special connection between logic and information
(after all, there are plenty of logics of X whose existence and usefulness does not imply
a special connection between logic and what it is used for).
At least since Carnap and Bar-Hillels theory of semantic information, many closer
connections between logic and information have been developed by, amongst others,
Barwise & Perry, Corcoran, and Hintikka. More recently, the simultaneous rise of the
philosophy of information and the dynamic and interactive turn in logic has led to a
revival of the question of how information and logic can be related. In this workshop
we want to approach the subject from the perspective of the philosophy of information,
as well as from a logical perspective, and draw attention to a number of questions that
have received more attention, or have only been individuated in recent years. These
include the possibility of a genuine informational conception of logical consequence, the
relation between informational and computational approaches, the relation between
information and logics of questions, and the difference between (what van Benthem
calls) implicit informational stances in logic like that of intuitionist logic and explicit
stances like that of epistemic logic.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Luciano Floridi (page 92).
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Towards a More Realistic Theory of Semantic Information

Marcello DAgostino
University of Ferrara, Ferrara, Italy
dgm@unife.it
Luciano Floridi
University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
luciano.floridi@oii.ox.ac.uk
According to the theory of semantic information [3, 2], the information content
of a sentence is, roughly speaking, characterized by the set of all relevant states of
the world that it excludes. In his Logic of Scientific Discovery [17], Karl Popper had
put forward a similar idea to characterize the empirical content of a theory, in order
to support his central claim, namely that the most informative scientific theories are
those that are highly falsifiable, while unfalsifiable theories are devoid of any empirical
content:
The amount of positive information about the world which is conveyed by a
scientific statement is the greater the more likely it is to clash, because of its
logical character, with possible singular statements. (Not for nothing do we call
the laws of nature laws: the more they prohibit the more they say.) ([18],
p. 19).
A first straightforward consequence of Bar-Hillel and Carnaps notion of semantic
information is that contradictions, like tomorrow it will rain and it will not rain,
carry the maximum amount of information, since they exclude all possible states. A
second inevitable consequence of the theory is that all logical truths are equally uninformative (they exclude no possible state), which justifies their being labelled as
tautologies. Moreover, in classical logic a sentence is deducible from a finite set
of premises 1 , . . . , n if and only if the conditional (1 . . . n ) is a tautology.
Accordingly, since tautologies carry no information at all, no logical inference can yield
an increase of information. Therefore, if we identify the semantic information carried
by a sentence with the set of all possible states it excludes, we must conclude that,
in any valid deduction, the information carried by the conclusion is contained in the
information carried by the (conjunction of) the premises. While this theory of semantic
information appears to provide a convincing theoretical justification of the persistent
empiricist dogma that deduction is not informative, both these consequences appear to
be at odds with our intuition and clash with the commonsense notion of information,
to the extent that they have been often described as genuine paradoxes of the theory.
As for the first paradox, Bar-Hillel and Carnap were well aware that their theory
sounded counterintuitive in connection with contradictory (sets of) sentences, as shown
by the near-apologetic remark they included in their [3]:
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It might perhaps, at first, seem strange that a self-contradictory sentence, hence
one which no ideal receiver would accept, is regarded as carrying with it the
most inclusive information. It should, however, be emphasized that semantic
information is here not meant as implying truth. A false sentence which happens
to say much is thereby highly informative in our sense. Whether the information
it carries is true or false, scientifically valuable or not, and so forth, does not
concern us. A self-contradictory sentence asserts too much; it is too informative
to be true ([3], p. 229).
Popper had also noticed that his notion of empirical content of a theory worked
reasonably well only for consistent theories. For, all basic statements are potential falsifiers of all inconsistent theories, which would therefore, without this requirement, turn
out to be the most scientific of all. So, for him, the requirement of consistency plays a
special role among the various requirements which a theoretical system, or an axiomatic
system, must satisfy and can be regarded as the first of the requirements to be satisfied by every theoretical system, be it empirical or non-empirical ([18], p. 72). So,
whilst tautologies, purely existential statements and other nonfalsifiable statements assert, as it were, too little about the class of possible basic statements, self-contradictory
statements assert too much. From a self-contradictory statement, any statement whatsoever can be validly deduced ([18], p. 71). In fact, what Popper claimed was that the
information content of inconsistent theories is null, and so his definition of information
content as monotonically related to the set of potential falsifiers was intended only for
consistent ones:
But the importance of the requirement of consistency will be appreciated if
one realizes that a self-contradictory system is uninformative. It is so because
any conclusion we please can be derived from it. Thus no statement is singled
out, either as incompatible or as derivable, since all are derivable. A consistent
system, on the other hand, divides the set of all possible statements into two:
those which it contradicts and those with which it is compatible. (Among the
latter are the conclusions which can be derived from it.) This is why consistency
is the most general requirement for a system, whether empirical or non-empirical,
if it is to be of any use at all ([18], p. 72).
The second paradox is concisely expressed in the following famous quotation from
Cohen and Nagel:
If in an inference the conclusion is not contained in the premises, it cannot be
valid; and if the conclusion is not different from the premises, it is useless; but
the conclusion cannot be contained in the premises and also possess novelty;
hence inferences cannot be both valid and useful ([4], p. 173).
A few decades later Jaakko Hintikka described this paradox as a true scandal of
deduction:
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C.D. Broad has called the unsolved problems concerning induction a scandal
of philosophy. It seems to me that in addition to this scandal of induction
there is an equally disquieting scandal of deduction. Its urgency can be brought
home to each of us by any clever freshman who asks, upon being told that
deductive reasoning is tautological or analytical and that logical truths have
no empirical content and cannot be used to make factual assertions: in what
other sense, then, does deductive reasoning give us new information? Is it not
perfectly obvious there is some such sense, for what point would there otherwise
be to logic and mathematics? ([15], p. 222).
The standard answer to this question has a strong psychologistic flavour. According
to Hempel: a mathematical theorem, such as the Pythagorean theorem in geometry,
asserts nothing that is objectively or theoretically new as compared with the postulates from which it is derived, although its content may well be psychologically new in
the sense that we were not aware of its being implicitly contained in the postulates
([13], p. 9). This implies that there is no objective (non-psychological) sense in which
deductive inference yield new information. This view was severely criticized by Jaakko
Hintikka [14, 15]. As a consequence of the undecidability of first-order logic there is
no algorithm to check whether the information carried by the conclusion is actually
contained in the information carried by the premises. Hence:
What realistic use can there be for measures of information which are such that
we in principle cannot always know (and cannot have a method of finding out)
how much information we possess? One of the purposes the concept of information is calculated to serve is surely to enable us to review what we know (have
information about) and what we do not know. Such a review is in principle impossible, however, if our measures of information are non-recursive ([15], p. 228).
Hintikkas positive proposal consists in distinguishing between two objective and
non-psychological notions of information content: surface information, which may
be increased by deductive reasoning, and depth information (equivalent to Bar-Hillel
and Carnaps semantic information), which may not. While the latter is a sort of
(non-computable) potential information and justifies the traditional claim that logical
reasoning is tautological, the former is an effective notion and vindicates the intuition
underlying the opposite claim. In his view, first-order deductive reasoning does not
increase depth-information, but may increase surface information. Without going into
details,1 we observe here that Hintikkas proposal classifies as non-tautological only
some inferences of the polyadic predicate calculus so leaves the scandal of deduction
unsettled in the domain of propositional logic:
The truths of propositional logic are [. . . ] tautologies, they do not carry any
new information. Similarly, it is easily seen that in the logically valid inferences
1

For a critical exposition of Hintikkas approach see [21]).

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of propositional logic the information carried by the conclusion is smaller or at
most equal to the information carried by the premisses. The term tautology
thus characterizes very aptly the truths and inferences of propositional logic.
One reason for its one-time appeal to philosophers was undoubtedly its success
in this limited area ([15], p. 154).
Hence, in Hintikkas view, for every finite set of Boolean sentences and every
Boolean sentence :
If , the information carried by is included in the information
carried by .
This is highly unsatisfactory, especially since the theory of computational complexity
has revealed that the decision problem for Boolean logic is co-NP-complete [5], that is,
among the hardest problems in co-NP. Although not a proved theorem, it is a widely
accepted conjecture that Boolean logic is practically undecidable, i.e., admits of no
feasible decision procedure.1
Thus, some degree of uncertainty about whether or not a certain conclusion follows
from given premises cannot be, in general, completely eliminated even in the restricted
and simple domain of propositional logic. If we take seriously the time-honoured
and common-sense concept of information, according to which information consists in
reducing uncertainty, we should conclude that in some cases deductive reasoning does
reduce our uncertainty, and therefore increases our information, even at the propositional level. The scandal of deduction has recently received renewed attention leading
to a number of original contributions (e.g., ([19], Ch. 2), and [21, 22, 7, 9, 16, 1].
In this paper we elaborate on ideas put forward in [7, 8, 6] and propose a new
more realistic theory of semantic information that classifies as tautological only a very
restricted class of propositional inferences and (in one of its versions) partially complies
with Poppers view on inconsistency, in that it implies that the information content
of an explicitly inconsistent theory is null. In our view, the scandal of deduction and
the Bar-Hillel-Carnap Paradox are nothing but symptoms of a fundamental difficulty.
This can be described as the mismatch between the central semantic notions in terms
of which the (classical) meaning of the logical operators is defined and the ordinary
notion of information. The classical meaning of the logical operators, as defined by the
standard truth-tables, is specified in terms of alethic notions of truth and falsity that
are obviously information-transcendent. But this is the meaning in terms of which the
notion of semantic information is defined. What we need is a meaning-theory whose
central semantic notions are themselves of an informational nature.
In this vein, we depart from classical semantics and investigate an informational
meaning of the logical operators whereby the meaning of a complex sentence for an
1

This means that every decision procedure for Boolean logic is bound to be superpolynomial in the
worst case. On the other hand, there are very efficient decision algorithms around that work quite
efficiently on average. In [10] Finger and Reis present a very interesting empirical analysis of the
runtime distribution of a variety of decision methods on randomly generated formulas.

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arbitrary agent a is not specified in terms of the alethic notions of truth and falsity,
but solely in terms of the information that the agent actually holds. (For a general
discussion of informational semantics see [1]).) We argue that this informational meaning is captured by a non-deterministic 3-valued semantics whose values 1, 0 and
(undefined) can be naturally described as yes, no and I dont know that was
partially anticipated by W.v.O. Quine in his The Roots of Reference [20] and is essentially different from Kleenes (deterministic) 3-valued semantics. We show how this
semantics allows us to define a notion of actual information which is not only effective,
but also tractable. Tautological inferences, in the strict sense of this semantics, are only
those that do not increase actual information. Informative inferences are those that
essentially require the introduction and manipulation of virtual information, namely
information that is not actually contained (even implicitly) in the premises or in the
conclusion. The depth at which the nested use of virtual information is required to justify the validity of an inference provides a useful and natural measure of informativity
for a propositional inference. For every natural k, and every sentence we characterize
the k-depth information content INF
k () carried by with respect to a fixed domain
of formulae syntactically related to and including at least all its subformulae. More
precisely, we offer two different characterizations.
First, we define INF
k () as the set of k-depth information states about (not
possible worlds) which are ruled out by according to the 3-valued non-deterministic
semantics. By this definition, and for every given , Bar-Hillel and Carnaps semantic
information is shown to be the limit of INF
k as k approaches infinity. By contrast, for
every fixed k, there are valid propositional inferences that do increase k-depth information. This notion of k-depth semantic information solves the scandal of deduction
for propositional logic, but does not solve the Bar-Hillel and Carnap Paradox, for all
k-depth information states are ruled out by a k-depth inconsistency. On the other
hand, Floridis approach to this paradox, based on the veridicality thesis according
to which information encapsulates truth ([11] and [12], chapters 45), is no use in this
context in which the information we are dealing with is weakly semantic (no reference
to the alethic notions of truth and falsity). Therefore, we investigate a second approach
that defines INF
k () as the smallest k-depth information state over that verifies
. When there is no k-depth information state that verifies , that is, is k-depth
inconsistent, INF
k () is undefined. (This situation is conceptually distinct from that
in which is a k-depth tautology and its information content is the empty information
state, namely the information state in which all the formulas in are undefined.) Finally, we discuss quantitative measures of information that can be possibly associated
with these qualitative notions.
References
1. P. Allo and E. Mares, Informational semantics as a third alternative?, Erkenntnis,
vol. 77, no. 2, 2012, pp. 167185.
2. Y. Bar-Hillel and R. Carnap, Semantic Information, British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science, vol. 4, no. 14, 1953, pp. 147157.
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3. R. Carnap and Y. Bar-Hillel, An Outline of a Theory of Semantic Information, in
Language and Information, edited by Y. Bar-Hillel, Addison-Wesley, Reading Mass.
and London, 1953, pp. 221274.
4. M.R. Cohen and E. Nagel, An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1934.
5. S. A. Cook, The complexity of theorem-proving procedures, in STOC 71: Proceedings of the third annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, ACM Press,
New York, 1971, pp. 151158.
6. M. DAgostino, Analytic inference and the informational meaning of the logical
operators, Logique et Analyse, vol. 227, 2014, pp. 407437.
7. M. DAgostino and L. Floridi, The enduring scandal of deduction. Is propositionally logic really uninformative?, Synthese, vol. 167, 2009, pp. 271315.
8. M. DAgostino, M. Finger and D.M. Gabbay, Semantics and proof theory of depthbounded Boolean logics, Theoretical Computer Science, vol. 480, 2013, pp. 4368.
9. M. Duz, The Paradox of Inference and the Non-Triviality of Analytic Information,
Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 39, 2010, pp. 473510.
10. M. Finger and P. Reis, On the predictability of classical propositional logic,
Information, 4, 2013, pp. 6074.
11. L. Floridi, Outline of a Theory of Strongly Semantic Information, Minds and
Machines, vol. 14, no. 2, 2004, pp. 197222.
12. L. Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011.
13. C.G. Hempel, Geometry and Empirical Science, American Mathematical Monthly,
vol. 52, 1945, pp. 717.
14. J. Hintikka, Are logical truths analytic?, The Philosophical Review, vol. 74, no. 2,
1965, pp. 178203.
15. J. Hintikka, Logic, language games and information. Kantian themes in the philosophy of logic, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1973.
16. M. Jago, The content of deduction, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 42,
2013, pp. 317334.
17. K.R. Popper, Logik Der Forschung : Zur Erkenntnistheorie Der Modernen Naturwissenschaft, J. Springer, Vienna, Austria, 1935.
18. K.R. Popper, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, Hutchinson, London, 1959, (English
translation of (17)).
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19. G. Primiero, Information and Knowledge. A Constructive Type-Theoretical Approach, Springer, 2008.
20. W.v.O. Quine, The Roots of Reference, Open Court, Chicago, US, 1973.
21. S. Sequoiah-Grayson, The Scandal of Deduction. Hintikka on the Information
Yield of Deductive Inferences, The Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 37, no. 1,
2008, pp. 6794.
22. G. Sillari, Quantified Logic of Awareness and Impossible Possible Worlds, Review
of Symbolic Logic, vol. 1, no. 4, 2008, pp. 116.

A quantitative-informational approach to logical consequence

Marcos A. Alves
, Jacarezinho, Brazil
State University of Northern Parana
marcosalves@cle.unicamp.br
Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
itala@cle.unicamp.br
We propose a definition of logical consequence based on the quantity of information
present in the set of premises and in the conclusion. As a starting point, we use the
usual languages of classical propositional logic (CPL). Our approach is based on the
quantitative concept of information, developed in the Mathematical Theory of Communication. In this sense, information is a measure of ones freedom of choice when
one selects a message. The quantity of information of the i-th message of a source
F , denoted Ii(F ) , is the numerical value defined by: Ii(F ) =df log2 pi(F ) , where pi(F )
denotes the probability of occurrence of the i-th message of F. The quantity of information in a source F with n elements, denoted by HF , is defined by: HF =df ni=1 pi(F ) Ii(F ) .
Thus, if HC and HD denote the quantities of information in the throw of the coin and
dice, respectively, then HC = 1 and HD 2.58. For developed our approach, initially,
we consider some elements of a usual axiomatic theory of probabilities, indicating some
of its definitions and basic results, which will be used later; these concepts include
the notions of random experiment sample space, and event. A random experiment is
one that, repeated various times, presents different results or occurrences; the sample
space of a random experiment is the set of all possible results of ; an event of a
random experiment is any subset of the sample space of . We define the probabilistic value of an event as usual in literature. Then, we construct a probabilistic
semantics for CPL; we establish a functional relationship, named situation, which consists of an association between the formulae of a CPL language and the events of a
random experiment, from which we define a probability value for each formula of a
given language. The probabilistic value of a formula in a situation f () is a numerical
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value defined from probabilistic value of the event associated to that formula in f ().
Next we introduce the definition of probabilistic logical consequence: a formula is
probabilistic logical consequence of a set of formulae, which is denoted by P ,
if, for every situation f (), P (f ())() P (f ())(), where P (f ())() denotes
the probabilistic value of in f (). In the next step we discuss the notion of quantity
of information present in a formula of a CPL language, such as defined for messages
above. The quantity of information of a formula in a situation f () is a numerical
value that depends of the informational value of the event associated to that formula
in f (). Finally, we propose a quantitative-informational definition of logical consequence, which we call informational logical consequence: a formula is informational
, if, for every
logical consequence of a set of sentences, which is denoted by
situation f (), I(f ())() I(f ())(), where I(f ())() denotes the informational value of in f (). We demonstrate some of the results and properties that follow
from that definition of informational logical consequence. In particular, we show the
existence of arguments which are considered valid according to the classical perspective,
true-functional, but which are invalid from the informational perspective. For example,
modus ponens is informationally invalid, given the possibility that the conclusion of
this argument could possess a greater quantity of information than its set of premises.
Furthermore, we show that the logic underlying informational logical consequence is not
classical, but is, at the least, paraconsistent sensu lato. In addition, we demonstrate
that although it might satisfy the property of transitivity, informational logical consequence is neither reflexive nor monotonic; in other words, it is not a Tarskian logical
consequence.
References
1. M.A. Alves, Logic and Information: An Approach Quantitative Informational to
Logical Consequence, PhD thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Campinas,
Brazil, 2012.
2. H.A. Feitosa and I.M.L. DOttaviano, Um olhar algebrico sobre as traducoes intuicionistas, in CLE Collection, edited by F.T. Sautter and H.A. Feitosa, State
University of Campinas/CLE, Campinas, 2004, pp.5990.
3. C. Shannon and W. Weaver, The Mathematical Theory of Information, University
of Illinois Press, Illinois, USA, 1949.
4. J. Shoenfield, Mathematical Logic, Addison Wesley, 1967.
5. A. Tarski, Logic, Semantics, Metamathematics, Clarendon Press, 1956.

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Logic Informed
Justin Bledin
Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, USA
jbledin@jhu.edu
Do logically valid arguments necessarily preserve truth? Certain inferences involving
informational modal operators and indicative conditionals suggest that truth preservation and good deductive argument come apart. Given this split, I recommend an
alternative to the standard truth preservation view of logic on which validity and good
deductive argument coincide: logic is a descriptive science that is fundamentally concerned not with the preservation of truth, but with the preservation of structural features of information.

Types of Information Pluralism

Neil Coleman and Christopher S. Gifford
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
neil.colman@bristol.ac.uk, chris.gifford@bristol.ac.uk
In this paper we consider the relationship between various kinds of pluralism (alethic,
metaphysical and logical) and their relationship to informational pluralism. In particular, we focus in [1] on this topic. We argue that Allo is committed to an entailment
between Informational Pluralism (IP ) and a particular kind of Logical Pluralism (LP ).
This being the Logical Pluralism of Beall and Restall. We suggest that while a pluralism about semantic information (Semantic Information Pluralism (SIP )) is sensible,
to base this on Beall and Restalls LP is a mistake, as it commits us to an untenable
metaphysics for semantic information. For this reason we consider other motivations
for IP, and settle upon a contextualist account of informational content, which retains
the core elements of Allos account but drops the commitment to cases and a fixed
schema (GIRP). What form this contextualism will take will be discussed at the end of
the paper.
The Logical Pluralism of Beall and Restall suggests that our pre-theoretic Logical
Consequence relation is somehow imprecise or vague (or indeterminate) it is unable
to be captured by a single logic. Rather, while there is a core component of our pretheoretical notion of logical consequence, the Logical Consequence relation is somehow
imprecise or vague (or indeterminate) it is unable to be captured by a single logic.
While we can define the core of validity as follows:
GTT An argument is validx if, and only if, in every casex in which the premises are
true so is the conclusion.
This is not a full account of validity. In addition, we must also specify which cases
we are referring to (possible worlds, situations, constructions etc.). Each legitimate
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specification of a case will result in an equally correct precisification of our pre-theoretic
notion of Logical Consequence. As there is a plurality of distinct types of legitimate
case that complete this schema, we therefore find ourselves with a plurality of logics.
In his paper, Allo aims to show that logical pluralism finds a natural and useful application in a theory of semantic information. Moreover, a pluralism about logic entails
a pluralism about semantic information. Hence, we find ourselves with a schema akin
to that of Beall and Restalls (GTT), the Generalised Inverse Relationship Principle:
GIRP The informational content of a piece of information is given by the set of cases
it excludes.
The principle as stated above is incomplete. In the same way that there are multiple logics, each with a different specification of cases, so too are there many formal
accounts of Informational Content, each resting upon a different specification of cases.
Thus, there is a plurality of informational content, and so too, a plurality of semantic
information.
We suggest that this is a mistake. Underpinning Beall and Restalls Logical Pluralism is independent argument for the imprecise or vague (or indeterminate) nature of
pre-theoretic logical consequence. It is this imprecision or vagueness which forces us to
adopt a schema-plus-cases approach to representing the pluralism. The (GTT) schema
is apt just because it captures the determinate features of validity, and leaves room for
different cases which in turn offer inadequate, but precise completions of the schema.
While this is plausible in the case of logic, we suggest that this approach breaks down
when it is applied to informational content. Informational content is simply not imprecise or vague (or indeterminate) in the same way as validity or logical consequence. As
such, any pluralism discovered in semantic information must have an alternative metaphysical foundation. Moreover, we should not be surprised to find that this pluralism
will not be best outlined using the schema-plus-cases approach of Beall and Restall.
For this reason, we then turn to consider a number of alternative sources of pluralism for semantic information. To do this, we follow Allos lead, and turn to consider
pluralisms in the related areas of logic and truth.
One alternative to Allos proposal is to adopt Pedersens approach he presents in [4],
where he argues for a close fit between the varieties of logical, alethic, and metaphysical
pluralism. We argue that if (IP) entails (LP) then he is committed to Metaphysical
Pluralism (MP).
Pedersens claims that alethic pluralism understood as different ways of being true
and his logical pluralism as different ways of being valid. Pedersen argues for an intimate connection between Alethic Pluralism (AP), (LP), and (MP). We suggest that
Pedersens pluralism provides a more plausible framework underpinning Allos (SIP).
Pedersens variety of metaphysical pluralism is not the only option open to Allo. An
alternative is Prices metaphysical pluralism. We explore whether Prices metaphysical
pluralism is compatible with Allos information pluralism, with a focus on his concern
with naturalistic theory of language use ([5], p. 399), and the relationship between truth
and factuality.
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Thence, on the basis of the commitment to (LP), (IP), and (MP), and Pedersens
distinction between domains of information and domains of reality, we argue that an
informational pluralism akin to the logical pluralism of Beall and Restall is inconsistent
with the fact that their Logical Pluralism is context invariant in the respects that
matter. However, if the information pluralist adopts a context-variance account, then
this inconsistency can be avoided.
If we wish to commit to (SIP), in the manner outlined in Allos article, we suggest
that there is an alternative one that avoids commitment to either the metaphysical
assumptions of Beall and Restall, and the controversial relativism of Pedersen. We can
dub this a kind of methodological pluralism and this is in the spirit of Floridis invocation of levels of abstraction. In brief; it is not the real entities that our formal tools
are representing that entail a pluralism. Rather, it is the way we go about their representation different degrees of abstraction garner different perspectives on the same
phenomenon. We finish with a brief consideration of how the resultant formulation of
IP coheres with the claim that information cannot be defined.
References
1 P. Allo, Logical pluralism and semantic information, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 36, 2007, pp. 659694.
2 J.C. Beall and G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Oxford University Press, 2006.
3 L. Floridi, The Philosophy of Information, Oxford University Press, 2011.
4 N.J.L.L. Pedersen, Pluralism x 3: Truth, logic, metaphysics, Topoi, vol. 2, , 2014,
pp. 259277.
5 H. Price, Metaphysical pluralism, The Journal of Philosophy, vol. 89, 1992,
pp. 387409.

Procedural theory of analytic information

Marie Du
z

VSB Technical University of Ostrava, Czech Republic

marie.duzi@gmail.com
The classical theory of semantic information (ESI ), as formulated by Bar-Hillel and
Carnap in 1952, does not give a satisfactory account of the problem of what information, if any, analytically and/or logically true sentences have to offer. According to
ESI, analytically true sentences lack informational content, and any two analytically
equivalent sentences convey the same piece of information. Does this mean that they
are equally informative? Moreover, mathematical sentences are true or false independently of worlds and times. Does this mean that mathematics is not informative?
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ESI predicts them to be. So much the worse for ESI as a general theory of information,
as many others, for instance Allo (2007) and Sequoiah-Grayson (2006) have pointed
out.
These problems are connected with Cohen and Nagels paradox of inference. This
paradox arises because of the tension between (a) the validity (legitimacy) of an inference, and (b) the utility of an inference. One can reformulate the problem posed by the
paradox thus: How can (deductive) logic function as a useful epistemological tool? For
an inference to be legitimate, the recognition of the premises as true must already have
accomplished what is needed for the recognition of the truth of the conclusion; but if
the conclusion is to be useful the recognition of its truth should not take place already
when the truth of the premises is ascertained. The conclusion of a valid argument
is true in a superset of the set of possible worlds in which all the premises are true.
Equivalently, the set of possible worlds excluded by the conclusion is a subset of the set
of possible worlds excluded by the premises. In this sense it is true that the empirical
semantic content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises,
which explains why we do not gain any novel piece of empirical information by validly
inferring the conclusion of a sound argument.
The paradox of inference is an instance of the broader problem of the usefulness
of analytically true sentences, because every deductively valid argument with premises
P1 , . . . , Pn and conclusion P corresponds to an analytically true conditional sentence
of the form, if P1 and . . . and Pn , then P . The narrow aim of this paper is to offer a
principled solution to the paradox of inference. The challenge is to explain how the
validity and the utility of a deductive argument do not cancel one another out. I will
present a solution based on a distinction between two kinds of information: empirical
(factual) and analytic (procedural). The broad scope of this paper, however, is to offer a
no less principled account of why analytic information is far from being trivial. This is
to say that the semantic framework within which the paradox of inference is solved is not
tailored to that paradox only: the framework is of a much wider scope than that. The
scope extends to proposing criteria for comparing the yield of analytic information of
analytically true sentences and of equivalent sentences involving empirical expressions.
My starting-point is the characterization of information as being objective and semantic, as found in Floridi (2004). I am going to investigate information that encapsulates its truthfulness, and is independent of any informee. Thus I adopt a realist view of
meaning and information. In particular, I am not going to deal with the counterpart of
the scandal of deduction put forward in Hintikka (1970), which is Bar-Hillel-Carnaps
paradox of contradictory sentences. Since a contradictory sentence denotes a proposition that excludes all possible worlds, it should be the most informative one possible.
Yet, since knowledge presupposes truth, I presume that the sentence has to be true in
order to provide useful information.
Declarative sentences are informative due to their meanings. I construe meanings
as structured hyperintensions, modeled in my background theory Transparent Intensional Logic as so-called constructions. These are abstract, algorithmically structured
procedures whose constituents are executed subprocedures. My main thesis is that
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procedures are the vehicles of information. Hence, although analytically true sentences
provide no empirical information about the state of the world, they convey analytic
procedural information, in the shape of constructions prescribing how to arrive at the
truths in question. Moreover, even though analytically equivalent sentences have equal
empirical content, their analytic content may be different. Finally, though the empirical
content of the conclusion of a valid argument is contained in the premises, its analytic
content may be different from the analytic content of the premises and thus convey a
new piece of information.
The paradox of inference arises if only the propositions, or truth-values (in the case
of mathematical arguments), denoted by the premises and conclusion are considered,
and evaporates if considering instead the procedures expressed by the premises and
the conclusion. I will show what one learns when validly inferring a conclusion from
true premises. While the product of the procedure assigned to the conclusion as its
meaning is informationally contained in the premises, the procedure itself need not be
(namely, whenever the argument is non-circular). Provided it is not so contained, then
what learnt when drawing the conclusion is a new procedure producing the relevant
proposition/truth-value. This procedural approach also maps out how to solve the
broader problems why and how analytically true sentences are informative, and why
and how analytically equivalent sentences can yield different information. Not only
that; based on the notion of (literal) procedural meaning, it is smooth sailing defining
the difference between the analytic and the logical validity of sentences and arguments,
and specifying the analytic content of sentences. Given the added complexity involved
in the fine-grained individuation of analytic information, it is sensible to further investigate the informational aspects of algorithmically structured procedural meanings, and
the aspects that affect the epistemic utility of valid arguments. I will examine a criterion for comparing information yield based on the notion of meaning refinement and
a criterion based on the set-theoretic inclusion of analytic contents. Yet, other criteria
involving analytic content remain still an open issue. The complexity of the work going
into building such a procedural theory of information is almost certain to guarantee that
complications we are currently unaware of will crop up. A sensible approach will be
to further develop the theory by including provability logic and the theory of complexity.
References
1. P. Allo, Logical pluralism and semantic information, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 36, 2007, pp. 659694.
2. L. Floridi, Outline of a theory of strongly semantic information, Minds & Machines, vol. 14, 2004, pp. 197222.
3. J. Hintikka, Surface information and depth information, in Information and Inference, edited by J. Hintikka and O. Suppes, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1970, pp. 263297.
4. S. Sequoiah-Grayson, Information flow and impossible situations, Logique
et Analyse, vol. 196, 2006, pp. 371398.
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Depth-bounded Probability Logic: A preliminary investigation

Hykel Hosni
London School of Economics, London, UK
h.hosni@gmail.com
Marcello DAgostino
` di Ferrara, Italy
Dipartimento di Economia e Management, Universita
marcello.dagostino@unife.it
Tommaso Flaminio
` dellInsubria, Varese, Italy
DISTA1 , Universita
tommaso.flaminio@gmail.com
Probability is traditionally the tool of choice for the quantification of uncertainty.
Yet, over the past few decades, a number of arguments have been put forward
to the effect that probability fails to capture intuitively reasonable patterns of belief.
One such argument, which has recently been revived, is due to Ellsberg, who in turn
reworks previous examples by Keynes and Knight. The gist of the argument is the
observation that whilst probability is suitable for the quantification of uncertainty (i.e.
lack of knowledge), it fails to represent ignorance (i.e. lack of reliable information on
which one should base their probabilistic assessment).
Unfortunately however, the contribution of this research strand to the foundations
of uncertain reasoning is heavily hindered by the lack of rigour which characterises the
key part of the criticism. In particular, it is often said that in cases of interest agents
do not possess enough information to define a probability for their decision problem.
Whilst this conveys interesting intuitions, it is certainly far from being clear enough for
theoretical purposes.
In response to this, the first goal of our investigation is to put the question concerning
the adequacy of probabilistic reasoning on a rigorous logical footing. Not only logic
provides a suitably precise language to achieve this, but also provides us with a sharp
diagnostic tool for identifying the root of the inadequacy of the probability norm. To
grasp the idea, recall that a probability function over the (finite) propositional language
L is a map P SL [0, 1] satisfying:
(P1) if

then P () = 1,

(P2) if

( ) then P ( ) = P () + P (),

where SL is the set of sentences built from L as usual, SL2 is the classical notion
of consequence and , SL. It is apparent that probability is constrained by logical consequence, and in particular, tautologies must get probability 1. This conflicts
with the basic results in computational complexity, and in particular with the general
1

Dipartimento di Scienze Teoriche e Applicate

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intractability of the SAT problem. This means that probability (via P1) imposes to
agent i a requirement that i may not be in a position to actually satisfy. If our concern
is to quantify uncertainty for decision-making purposes this is a most serious drawback.
This diagnosis, however, suggests promptly that we can insist on the rational belief component of probability whilst adapting the underlying consequence relation to
the inferences we can expect realistic agents to be able to do in practice. A natural candidate for the formal counterpart of the intuitive idea of realistic agents, is to consider
a plurality of consequence relations 1 , 2 , . . . each representing the inferential ability
of one particular type of agent, namely the type of agent which is characterised by the
relation k . This matches the idea that in the real world, not all agents are equally
capable when it comes to making inferences.
Over the past years DAgostino and co-authors have put forward the framework of
depth-bounded Boolean logics to capture precisely this intuition. The idea is to define
a hierarchy of consequence relations which approximate, and asymptotically coincide
with, classical logic. The key property of interest is that each element in the hierarchy
is polynomial, with complexity increasing at each subsequent step in the hierarchy.
The goal of our investigation then is to flesh out the framework of depth-bounded
probability logic by identifying a hierarchy of rationality conditions that we impose
on the belief measure adopted by an agent whose reasoning is bounded by a given k .

20 Years of Inconsistent Mathematics

This workshop is organized by
lez
Luis Estrada-Gonza
Institute for Philosophical Research, UNAM, Mexico
sar Jime
nez
Carlos Ce
n, UNAM, Mexico
Facultad de Estudios Superiores Cuautitla
2015 marks the 20th anniversary of the publication of Chris Mortensens book Inconsistent Mathematics. Inconsistent Mathematics has been a very important and
influential book, and contributed to the most recent wave of systematic studies on
inconsistent mathematics in particular and non-classical mathematics in general.
Besides his technical contribution in studying and developing several inconsistent
mathematical theories, Mortensen contributed to the philosophy of mathematics in
several ways, for example by advancing arguments for the idea that mathematicality
lies deeper than consistency, completeness or primeness, and he favored (at least partial)
functionality as closer to the essence of mathematics.
Moreover, 2015 marks the 70th birthday of Chris Mortensen, which makes 2015
doubly significative and a great opportunity to discuss in this workshop Mortensens
main contributions to logic, mathematics and philosophy.
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The invited keynote speaker is this workshop is Maarten Mc Kubre-Jordens (102).

Call for papers

Any contribution on inconsistent mathematics, whether on their technical or foundational aspects, are welcome. Particular topics of interest include, but are not limited
to, the following:
Technical work on inconsistent arithmetics, paraconsistent set theories, inconsistent
calculi of infinitesimals, paraconsistent categorial logic, inconsistent geometry, and
other branches of inconsistent mathematics.
Relative interpretability between inconsistent mathematical theories and classical
or other non-classical mathematical theories; in general, comparisons between inconsistent mathematics and other kinds of mathematics.
Metamathematics of inconsistent mathematics.
Combinations of inconsistent and other kinds of mathematics.
Paraconsistent approaches to foundational, ontological, and epistemological problems in the philosophy of mathematics.
Scientific, technological, and philosophical applications of inconsistent mathematics.
Chris Mortensens contributions to formal philosophy.
Abstracts of about 500 words should be sent via e-mail as a pdf file no later than
January 31th 2015 to Inconsistent.Maths.UNILOG2015@gmail.com.
Authors will be notified by February 28th.

Round Table: Past, Present and Future

of Inconsistent Mathematics
Coordinator: Thomas Macaulay Ferguson
Participants: Diderik Batens, Jc Beall, Ross T. Brady, Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano
and Graham Priest

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On the limitations of nave set theory with non-classical logics

lez
Luis Estrada-Gonza
noma de Me
xico, Me
xico City, Me
xico
Universidad Nacional Auto
loisayaxsegrob@gmail.com
Morgan Thomas, in [1], has recently shown that a family of nave set theories based
on LP and other related logics suffer from serious expressive limitations. At first sight
these results could seem a serious drawback for the prospects of inconsistent mathematics, since these nave set theories either lack even the most elementary concepts needed
to express basic notions of classical mathematics or are nearly trivial. Thomas takes
care not to draw such strong conclusions on the possibility of inconsistent mathematics,
but some readers might still be tempted. I will argue that these results suggest instead
a different, non-foundation role of set theory in non-classical mathematics.
Reference
1. Nick (Morgan) Thomas, Expressive limitations of nave set theory in LP and minimally inconsistent LP, The Review of Symbolic Logic, vol. 7(2), 2014, pp. 341350.

Hermeneutical and genetic-epistemological glances

at paraconsistent category theory
sar Jime
nez
Carlos Ce
noma de Me
xico, Me
xico City, Me
xico
Universidad Nacional Auto
ccesarjj@hotmail.com
There are various ways of building paraconsistent logics. Dualizations of intuitionistic logical systems is a now well-known strategy to achieve this goal. For several reasons,
spelling out this process in category theoretical terms seems to be one of the most common ways to go. Nevertheless, it is not quite clear how enlightening or epistemologically
fruitful this technique is.
Under what constraints shall we proceed for a given case and how might be the best
way to interpret the system obtained and the process itself? Does this shed light on
the purported foundational role of categorial logics or some sort of broad mathematical
pluralism?
To address these issues I will try to assess an example of dualization following Russian philosopher Andrei Rodins hermeneutic insights about the differences between
the formal and categorial methods of theory building and drawing on Jean Piagets
epistemological reconstruction of Category Theory.
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Freges Puzzle
This workshop is organized by
Marco Ruffino
State University of Campinas, Brazil
The purpose of this workshop is to bring together people working on several aspects and implications of the so-called Freges Puzzle (i.e., the puzzle about cognitive
differences between true identity statements that Frege classically presents as the main
motivation for the recognition of senses as semantic values besides references). There
are problems of all sorts both in the formulation of the puzzle and in Freges solution
of the puzzle. But if Freges solution is rejected (i.e., if we eliminate senses) then a new
problem arises for Millianism in explaining cognitive differences between co-referential
expressions. The workshop should discuss all these many problematic aspects and the
main alternative solutions that have been proposed.
The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Eros Corazza (page 86).

Freges Puzzle: Much Ado about Nothing?

Emiliano Boccardi
State University of Campinas, Brazil
emiliano.boccardi@gmail.com
In her paper Can Frege Pose Freges Puzzle, Stavroula Glezakos argues for the
claim that, unless one presupposes the theoretical notion of sense, there is no in-principle
epistemic divide between sentences of the form a = a and a = b. It would follow
that Freges puzzle cannot be used to argue in favour of senses, as Frege has done, on
pain of circularity. Here I argue that a criterion of name identity based on the notion
of explicit co-reference can be specified that does not presuppose the notion of sense.
I show how such criterion is plausibly implicitly at work in setting up the puzzle, and
that it can be deployed to rescue Frege from the accusation of circularity.

Freges Puzzle and Millianism

Stefano Predelli
University of Nottingham, UK
stefano.predelli@nottingham.ac.uk
Non-descriptivist (and a fortiori Millian) approaches to proper names are prima
facie compelled to provide analyses of the cognitive value of proper names alternative
to Freges sense-baes solution. Probably the most popular strategy in this respect has
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appealed to the idea of pragmatically conveyed content, as in the many versions of a
broadly Gricean explanation of Freges puzzle.
Possibly as an addition to this strategy (but perhaps also as an alternative to it),
I defend a few syntactically oriented Millian approaches to the cognitive value of the
use of proper names. In particular, these appeal (i) to the shape of a proper names
articulation (as in richly articulated names such as The Holy Roman Empire), (ii) to
the etymological background for the use of a proper name (in turn grounded on the
resources of the so-called historical explanation theory of names), and (iii) to the idea
of non truth-conditional meaning.

Freges Puzzle: Can we Pose it on Freges behalf ?

Marco Ruffino
State University of Campinas, Brazil
ruffinomarco@gmail.com
In this paper I first review the main elements of the so-called Freges Puzzle, and
argue that there is something odd in the argument that Frege builds based on it: Frege
first rejects a possible hypothesis for the nature of identity in order to make plausible the
distinction between sense and reference. But, after the distinction is made, the rejected
hypothesis is the only one compatible with it after all. Next, I discuss Glezakos (2009)
position regarding the Puzzle. I argue that, although she does point out something
quite important, we do not have to accept her conclusion that there is no puzzle that
can be formulated in neutral terms.

In What Sense (Statement) of the Puzzle is Problematic?

Ludovic Soutif
Ponthifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
lsoutif@gmail.com
In this paper I take issue with Glezakoss (2009) account of why Freges puzzle is
unpuzzling. On her view, Freges statement of the puzzle how can sentences of the
form a = a and a = b, if true, differ in cognitive value if they express the same semantic
content/are made true by the same objects self-identity? should not be considered
any puzzling either because it is question-begging, or because, suitably posed, it does
not even arise in the first place. I argue that if, as she takes it, Freges statement is
problematic it is not because it is on the whole question-begging, but because it rests
upon a couple of unsupported assumptions; the assumptions that i) there is no typetoken ambiguity on the proper way of stating the puzzle, and ii) it is of the (sentence)
forms themselves one may sensibly say they differ in cognitive value.
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Wettstein on Freges Puzzle

David Suarez-Rivero
State University of Campinas, Brazil
darisua@gmail.com
In this talk I focus my attention on the proposal given by Howard Wettstein in 1980
to the cognitive phenomenon stated by Gottlob Frege in his paper On sense and reference. I offer three arguments in order to show that his answer does not resolve this
phenomenon. Particularly, I defend three ideas: first, it is legitimate that philosophical
semantics, in contrast with what Wettstein defends, provides an answer to the cognitive
phenomenon; second, Wettstein does not conceive Freges argument correctly by considering it generates a semantic theory from a purely cognitive phenomenon; third, the
dissolution supplied by Wettstein is assumed by Frege when he states the phenomenon.

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9 Sessions
Universal
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Melvin Fitting (page 91).

Homotopy theoretical aspects of abstract logic

Peter Arndt
University of Regensburg, Regensburg, Germany
peter.arndt@mathematik.uni-regensburg.de
Categories whose objects are logics and whose morphisms are translations typically
come with one or several natural notions of when a translation should be called an
equivalence. This datum of a category with a distinguished class of morphisms, also
called a homotopical category, is all one needs to form an (, 1)-category and import
a wealth of notions and techniques from homotopy theory.
We will start the talk by presenting the homotopy theoretical point of view on Tarski
style logics. On a category of Tarski style logics and translations there are two natural
notions of weak equivalence:
Definition. One can call a translation f (S, ) (S , ) a weak equivalence, if
f() f() (i.e. it is a conservative translation) and if for every formula
in the target there exists a formula in the image of f which is logically equivalent to
(it has dense image).
Definition. One can call a translation f (S, ) (S , ) an equivalence, if there exists
a translation g (S , ) (S, ) such that f (g()) and g(f ()).
We will the introduce the notions of homotopical categories and (, 1)-categories
and show that taking any of the above notions of equivalence, the corresponding (, 1)category is complete and cocomplete and that one is a reflexive sub-(, 1)-category of
the other. The (, 1)-category of logics and weak equivalences is 0-truncated. By a result of Mariano/Mendes [2] the subcategory of congruential logics is locally presentable
in the sense of (, 1)-categories.
We will then present a variety of approaches to, and perspectives on, abstract logic
suggested by the homotopy theoretical view point:
A fixed (, 1)-category of logics can be presented by different models, e.g. different
categories with classes of weak equivalences, and possibly additional structures. There
are several natural candidates for models of Tarskian logics.
The fact that the categories presented before are 0-truncated is due to the fact that
we only asked for provability and did not distinguish different proofs. Once we do
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this, we get a refined structure of an (, 2)-category. Further refinements to (, n)categories might be attained by considering relations between proofs, e.g. via type
theory.
One can further try to devise homotopical invariants of logics and try to compare
the various approaches to abstract logic through Tannaka theoretic or other (, 1)categorical view points.
Most of this talk will cover selected topics from the article [1], additionally we will
answer some questions posed in this article.
References
1. P. Arndt, Homotopical categories of logics, in The Road to Universal Logic,
Festschrift for the 50th Birthday of Jean-Yves Beziau, vol. I, Birkhauser, 2014,
pp. 1358.
2. H. Mariano and C. Mendes, Towards a good notion of categories of logics,
in arXiv:1404.3780.

Applied Ontology, Logical Pluralism and the Logical Constants

Stefano Borgo
Laboratory for Applied Ontology, ISTC1 , CNR2 , Trento, Italy
stefano.borgo@cnr.it
Oliver Kutz
Institute for Knowledge and Language Engineering, University of Magdeburg, Germany
okutz@ovgu.de
We discuss the interplay between applied ontology and philosophical logic in the
study of constants in logical pluralism. Logical pluralism and the role and meaning of
logical constants have been discussed in recent years from many philosophical angles.
We propose to pursue a different line of analysis, where logical constants are selected
and motivated in the light of their contribution to ontological needs as clarified in
Applied Ontology (AO). This leads to some further considerations on logical pluralism.
Generally speaking, AO aims to make clear the assumptions on which a modelling
approach or the interpretation of a collection of data rely. On the one hand, AO focuses
on frameworks to represent, ontologically analyse, and logically reason about (possibly
complex) systems from a given perspective (task or application domain). On the other
hand, AO focuses on frameworks that an agent uses to understand what is and what is
not to be represented. This latter perspective, called foundational, aims to be general
1
2

Institute of Cognitive Science and Technology

Italian National Research Council

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Sessions
and independent from tasks and domains. AO is strongly intertwined with logic since
it relies on logic to improve conceptual clarity, robustness of the analysis as well as
consistency of the result.
Our starting observation is that the AO perspective and its methodology can be
fruitfully applied to logic itself. In particular, we focus on the analysis, from the AO
viewpoint, of the role of the logical constants in different logical systems. In this context,
a certain view on logical pluralism follows from the adopted AO perspective. The
ontological analysis of logical languages and of their use in ontological modelling leads
to the identification of a framework that homogeneously motivates the co-existence of
logics (pluralism) and guides the distinction between logical and non-logical constants.

Expanding non-classical logics

Rodolfo C. Ertola Biraben
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
rcertola@cle.unicamp.br
We deal with connectives considered by some authors as Skolem, Moisil, Smetanich,
Rauszer and Kuznetsov. We also consider a connective similar to the Delta connective
used in fuzzy logic.
We mostly work in the context of intuitionistic logic. However, we also consider
some substructural logics.
We work at the propositional, first order, and propositionally quantified level. In
all those levels, we particularly consider whether the addition of a given connective
constitutes a conservative expansion.
We consider both syntactic and semantic aspects. Syntactically, it is often not
enough to add axioms, even if the corresponding class of algebras is a variety. A rule is
sometimes necessary and there are two options: a local or a global rule. The behavior
of the corresponding logics is different, for example, concerning the deduction theorem.
From the semantic point of view, these two options correspond to two different ways
of defining the notion of consequence: a truth-preserving or a truth-degree-preserving
way, which, in general, do not coincide.
From a historical point of view, there will be some remarks concerning an old paper
by Skolem.

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Logical Structures as Formal Objects

Yaroslav Kokhan
Institute of Philosophy, Kyiv, Ukraine
yarkaen@gmail.com
Bourbaki claimed that axiomatic method in mathematics leads to investigation of
mathematical structures. One could define a mathematical structure as an ordered mtuple A = <A1 , . . . , Ap ; R1 , . . . , Rq>, where m = p + q, A1 , . . . , Ap are the basic sets of the
structure A, and R1 , . . . , Rq are the main relations of A, which belongs as elements to
some elements of the scale of sets S = S(A1 , . . . , Ap ), i. e., the least set of sets such that
0) A1 , . . . , Ap S; 1) if M S, then power-set P(M ) S; 2) if M1 , . . . , Mn S, then
M1 . . . Mn S for any n > 0.
So every mathematical structure is a system of relations on some sets of initial objects. The examples are the models and the propositional algebra. But many logical
systems are sets of rules rather than relations: the formal languages, calculi, algorithms,
and formal systems are such systems. We could take a rule as a separate theoretic object, different from a relation, because some rules (such as algorithm commands and
impelings from logical pragmatics) are not relations themselves but stimulae. The general form of a rule, defined on a cartesian product M1 . . . Mn Mn+1 is one of the
following two: i) A1 , . . . , An B1 , . . . , Bm , ii) F1 (a1 ), . . . , Fn (an ) G1 (b1 ), . . . , Gm (bm ),
where Ai /ai Mi , Bj /bj Mn+1 (i n, j m) and denotes the transition from premisses A1 , . . . , An or F1 (a1 ), . . . , Fn (an ) of the rule to one of its conclusions B1 , . . . , Bm
or G1 (b1 ), . . . , Gm (bm ).
Now we can define a logical structure as an ordered m-tuple
L =<A1 , . . . , Ap ; r1 , . . . , rq >, where m = p + q, A1 , . . . , Ap are the basic sets of the structure L, and r1 , . . . , rq are the main rules of L, which are defined on some elements of
the scale of sets S = S(A1 , . . . , Ap ). The most typical kind of a logical structure is a
calculus. Lets define a calculus as a logical structure such that its every main rule
is defined on some cartesian product of its certain basis elements. Let be empty
set, K be an arbitrary alphabet, and be a grammar, i. e., set of formation rules;
then calculus L = <; , K> is a formal language (here we take elements of K as 0-ary
formation rules). Let then A be a set of axioms such that A (K), and Rt be a set of
transformation rules; then C = <; , Rt , K, A> is a logical structure of that kind they
usually call in logical syntax a calculus itself; we could name it a deductive system.
Markovian normal and Turings machine algorithms are also logical structures but not
calculi in our general sense. Posts canonical calculi and formal systems in the sense of
Curry and of Smullyan are calculi according to the above definition.

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Sessions

Logical consequence and measuring of semantic information

via distributive normal forms
Bruno Ramos Mendonc
a
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
bruno.ramos.mendonca@gmail.com
In this presentation we will analyze different attempts to describe logical consequence via a theory of semantic information. As one of its central goals, a theory of
semantic information has to provide the ways of measuring both the amount of information expressed in a sentence as well as the amount preserved in valid implications.
In this presentation we are concerned with the works by Bar-Hillel and Carnap (1952,
1953) and Hintikka (1965, 1970) on the field. These authors suggest that the measure
of semantic information of a sentence is a function of the informational measures of
the clauses composing the distributive normal form of . Further, they define information of in terms of the probability of . As we can define at least two different
notion of probability, they suggest both the notions of depth and surface information,
the former dealing with the absolute probability of the sentence and the latter with
an epistemologically relativized notion of probability. Although these attempts are
highly suggestive, we claim they need reformulation. Firstly, as far as we are concerned
with the classical consequence relation, an adequate theory needs to be committed with
Bar-Hillel-Carnaps paradox of semantic information. Furthermore, for an adequate
description of the processes of achieving new information through proofs, an adequate
theory needs to block the thesis that valid arguments have null information. None of
those proposals jointly achieve both the expected results. In order to improve BarHillel and Carnaps and Hintikkas proposals, we claim that an adequate informational
characterization of logical consequence needs to look also for other logical properties
associated with the distributive normal forms. Secondly, we claim that Rantala and
Tselishchevs (1987) objection that Hintikkas surface information only applies to a
specific method of deduction needs to be taken seriously.
References
1. Y. Bar-Hillel and R. Carnap, An Outline of A Theory of Semantic Information,
Research Laboratory of Electronics MIT, Cambridge, 1952.
2. Y. Bar-Hillel and R. Carnap, Semantic information, The British Journal for the
Philosophy of Science, vol. 4, no. 14, 1953, pp. 147157.
3. J. Hintikka, Distributive normal forms in first-order logic, in Studies in Logic and
the Foundations of Mathematics, edited by J.N. Crossley and M.A.E. Dummett,
Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1965, pp. 4891.
4. J. Hintikka, Surface information and depth information, in Information and Inference, edited by J. Hintikka and P. Suppes, Springer, Netherlands, 1970, pp. 263297.
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5. V. Rantala and V. Tselishchev, Surface information and Analiticity, in Jaakko
Hintikka, edited by R.J. Bogdan, Springer, Netherlands, 1987, pp. 7790.

Logic as Universal Language and its Limit: Solution

to the Problems of Quantification over Types and Orders
in Type Theory
Raclavsky

Jir
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
raclavsky@phil.muni.cz
Russells doctrine that logic is all-encompassing (1903, 191013) faced a challenge
when Russell met Russells paradox and then Russell-Myhill paradox. Russell was thus
led to impose serious restriction on his logic. He firstly exposed a sort of simple theory
of types (1903) and, after abandoning it, he developed his ramified theory of types
(RTT; 1908, 191013). The hierarchy of propositions and propositional functions in
RTT was justified by Vicious Circle Principle (VCP) which says that no proposition or
propositional function can be in the range of its own variables. Consequently, his logic
ceased to be a genuine universal language.
After proving his Undefinability theorem, a result of his considerations related to the
Liar paradox, Tarski (1933/1956) suggested another hierarchy, that of languages and
T-predicates. Tarskis abandonment of the idea of universal logical language became a
part of the conventional wisdom of modern logic: we do use meta-languages, our logic
is thus limited.
Recent philosophical logic attempts to dismiss hierarchies. For a clear exposition of
a criticism of hierarchies see Kripke (1975), Priest (1987/2006). The criticism involves
also an idea I am going to examine in this paper, namely that a type theorist should
quantify over type-levels (i.e. types / orders). Some (false) method of quantification
over type-levels has been already used for a criticism of RTT and its applications (cf.,
e.g., Priest 1987/2006, Hart 2009).
But the idea goes back to Godels review of Russells logic (1944). Godel in fact
claimed that the very formulation of RTT (cf., e.g., Russells No proposition or propositional function can quantify over the type it belongs to) violates its own rules RTT
is thus self-refuting. The very same point was elaborated by Fitch (1946) as a form
of an ad hominem argument; Mostowski (1946) read it as an unconvincing attack on
RTT, but Fitch (1947) did not confirm having such an aim. However, Fitch (1964)
patently condemned Russells and Tarskis hierarchies for their incapability to provide
a logic which could serve as a universal language. Priest (1987/2006) elaborated such
criticism further, rejecting all hierarchical approaches as expressively incomplete. He
endeavours to avoid any meta-language (for a certain recent investigation see Weber
2014).

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After providing an overview of the crucial motives in the debate, I offer solutions
to the problems. For that purpose I utilize my modification of Tich
ys RTT (1988) as
a framework. The main problems are concerned with: i. the proper method (if any)
of quantifying over orders, ii. the proper method (if any) of quantifying over types, iii.
the method (if any) of quantifying over all entities, iv. formulation of RTT without
violating its own rules, v. the sense in which RTT can be a universal logical language.
Finally, we briefly compare our results with similar attempts to solve some of the
problems within type theories which are developed and utilized in computer science.
This point is more important than it may seem: type theories are, inter alia, implemented in various theorem provers, which are contemporary realizations of the logical
calculus rationator dreamt by Leibniz.

A Metalogical Exploration of Logical Structures

and their Cognitive Relevance
Serge Robert and Janie Brisson
du Que
bec, Montreal, Canada
Universite
robert.serge@uqam.ca, brisson.janie@gmail.com
Logical systems are the expression of the consequences of logical structures. In
such structures, some are order structures and others are algebraic structures. For
example, classical propositional logic is the set of the consequences of an integration of
the Boolean lattice (as an order structure on conditionals) and of the Boolean algebra
(on disjunctions and conjunctions).
This paper holds that order structures make us order statements and so, are epistemically relevant for the expression of succession, inference, correlation or causality.
On the other hand, logical algebras are tools that we use for representing systems of
categories of entities. The psychology of reasoning has shown, in the last decades, that
laypersons tend to make systematic fallacies on conditionals (namely, the affirmation
of the consequent and the denial of the antecedent fallacies), treating conditionals ()
as biconditionals (), and on inclusive disjunctions (), treating them as exclusive disjunctions (). We also hold that in inferences on incompatibilies ( ), people tend
also to make fallacies, treating them as exclusive disjunction on negated propositions
(P Q). We are now, by the way, conducting experiments on such fallacies on incompatibilities. We have also already shown that all these previous fallacies can be
modeled as invalid crushes of Klein groups. We will now show that such crushes imply
an invalid use of the Boolean lattice, by an inversion of its irreversible order, and of
the Boolean algebra, by a reduction of its tree-like structure to pairs of dichotomous
oppositions. So, the learning of classical propositional logic, through its adequate use
of the two Boolean structures, makes people cognitively more performant: the Boolean
lattice allows the discovery of multiple antecedents in conditionals and so, of multiple
possible causes to an effect; the Boolean algebra allows tree-like categorizations that
avoid too simple oppositional dichotomous categorizations.
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Given that conditionals, disjunctions and incompatibilities are all translatable one
into the other, we show that the Boolean algebra and the Boolean lattice are each
other representable by the other structure, so that all the previous fallacies can be
viewed as various forms of reductions of the antisymmetric structure of classical logic
to a symmetric structure. Doing so, the fallacies are cognitive shortcuts that put an
overload of information in the premises of inferences.
The structural approach to logic is a metalogical standpoint that makes of nonclassical logics variations on order structures or on algebraic structures. From this
standpoint, our study of the relation between the Boolean structures, the fallacies as
simplifications of these structures and their cognitive consequences, will allow us to explore some non-classical structures, in which some Boolean properties are not respected,
like in non-reflexive or non-contrapositive order structures, or in non-idempotent or
non-distributive algebras. Through this structural exploration, we can identify some
of the cognitive functions of these non-classical structures, their possible fallacious use
and some cognitive effects of these fallacies. From this structural approach, we draw
important pedagogical consequences on the teaching of logic.

From Deductive Systems of Logic to Logic of Information

Marcin J. Schroeder
Akita International University, Akita, Japan
mjs@aiu.ac.jp
Deductive systems of logic are built with the use of logical consequence, which in
the axiomatic form introduced by Tarski in the early 1930s is a finite character closure
operator on the set of sentential formulas associated with the underlying it algebraic
form of logical calculus (e.g. sentential calculus). Axioms building the association
depend on particular choice of the rules of inference. For instance, one of the additional
axioms imposed on the consequence operator makes the subsets closed with respect to
the consequence closure operator (Cn-closed subsets) also closed with respect to the
rule of modus ponens. In the algebraic form this restricts the Cn-closed subsets to
filters in the Boolean algebra generated by the logical operations.
Language, natural or formal, artificial is a natural context for the study of information, which was conceived in the analysis of communication. However, the concept
of information becomes a powerful tool for interdisciplinary inquiry in multiple contexts when it is defined in a more general way without any restrictions associated with
languages. The author in his earlier publications introduced and elaborated on a very
general definition of information. Information was defined in terms of the categorical
opposition of the one and many, as that which makes one out of many either by a selection or by a structure binding the variety into a whole. The definition was subsequently
used to formulate a theory for the concept of information in terms of closure spaces,
i.e. sets equipped with a closure operator on its subsets.

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Sessions
The fundamental role is played in this theory by the complete lattice of closed
subsets of a set (the variety in which unity is identified). The level of (direct product)
irreducibility of this lattice is associated with the level of integration of information [1].
The lattice of closed subsets defining an information system can be associated with the
algebraic structure of syllogistic and therefore was considered a candidate for the logic
of information in the algebraic sense under some restricting conditions on the closure
operator [2]. However, this restriction imposed on the closure operator (existence of
an orthocomplementation on the lattice of closed subsets) was quite strong, excluding
some of most interesting instances of information systems.
In this paper a generalization of logic from its traditional linguistic context to arbitrary information systems is achieved by using an extension of Tarskis concept of
consequence operator to the case when the place of the Boolean algebra structure generated by the logical functors of sentential calculus is taken by the complete lattice
of closed subsets for the closure operator defining an information system. The fact
whether this lattice admits an orthocomplementation or not is here irrelevant, therefore there is no restriction for information systems at all. The approach presented in
this paper can be used to analyze the logic of computation in its traditional Turing
machine understanding, as well as in its generalized formulations, for instance in terms
of geometric constructions [3].
References
1. M.J. Schroeder, Quantum Coherence without Quantum Mechanics in Modeling
the Unity of Consciousness, in QI 2009, LNAI 5494, edited by P. Bruza et al.,
Springer, Berlin, 2009, pp. 97112.
2. M.J. Schroeder, Search for Syllogistic Structure of Semantic Information, Journal
of Applied Non-Classical Logics, vol. 22, 2012, pp. 83103.
3. M.J. Schroeder, Computing as Dynamics of Information: Classification of Geometric Dynamical Information Systems Based on Properties of Closure Spaces, in
RIMS Kokyuroku, no. 1873, Algebra and Computer Science, edited by A. Yamamura, Research Institute for Mathematical Sciences, Kyoto University, Kyoto, 2014,
pp. 126134.

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Universal Logical Hermeneutics

Elena Shulga
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
elena.shulga501@gmail.com
According to Boguslaw Wolniewicz [2, p. 254255] there are two kinds of hermeneutics: intuitive and logical one. Intuitive hermeneutics consists in just guessing what the
author in question had in mind and tried to convey that to the reader. Such way of
interpreting philosophical texts does not differ essentially from a philological interpretation of the texts of pure poetry. Another way of interpretation is represented by logical
hermeneutics being the set of rules and of criteria to govern the logical interpretation
of philosophical systems. Here the system means a set of pronouncements stemming
either from a definite author or from a particular book and its unity consists in the fact
that it is the expression of the beliefs either of one man or one group of men and is the
collective work of a philosophical school on record.
The method of logical interpretation of a philosophical system S is aimed to its
axiomatization, i.e. to such transformation of a system that it becomes one in which
everything (except the axioms themselves) is semantically determinate and deductively
complete. To make this we need firstly to point out a definite theory T dealing with
the same subject-matter as the system in question and secondly to provide a definite
rules of translation (a dictionary) to map the propositions of the systems in to formulas
of the language L(T ) of the theory T and thus to eliminate the ambiguities present in
the system S. Indeed, different theories may be chosen to that purpose and different
rules of translation would be adopted. The crucial moment is that as an instrument for
interpreting the system S a given theory T may be more appropriate than another T
and a particular set of rules better than another one.
Besides the many troubles on that way there is one more problem concerning the
notion of the theory T . Any theory presupposes a logical system laying in its foundation and Wolniewicz by default supposes that it is a classical one. But from the history
of philosophy one perfectly knows the troubles occurring while we trying to interpret
contradictions in particular philosophical theories, e.g. in M.Heideggers works. As is
generally known such troubles we sometimes would overcome by employing paraconsistent logical systems. Hence, maybe it is worth in such cases employ (in the framework
of logical hermeneutic interpretation) some theory T based on paraconsistent logic.
Moreover, it seems that in any particular case the question should arises concerning
the exploitation of the particular logical system underlying the definite theory T which
we choose for logical interpretation. Any logical system is a theory of some subject area
and thus if we construe a philosophical theory trying to obtain its logical interpretation
then we from the very beginning owe to take into account specificity of the universe
of discourse. And before we start the process of logical interpretation it is worth to
ponder over this issue as the first thing.

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Anyway, taking into account that universal logic regards the common issues of logical systems it seems that we can speak of universal logic hermeneutics (modifying
Wolniewiczs term of logical hermeneutics) when analyzing the aspects of the appropriateness of one or another logical system for the aims of logical interpretation of philosophical theories. This is especially important in case of logical hermeneutic evaluation
of the same philosophical system because they may have different validity because two
different interpretations be really of different hermeneutic value if our choice against
the background of logical system will be wrong: it would simply lead to triviality.
Nevertheless, sometimes just the choice of non-classical logical system for interpretation of a philosophical theory gives us a side benefit. For example, according to
Wolniewicz there are at least four parameters to be taken into account where the first
is the relative size of the set A of the propositions interpreted to the whole set of the
propositions of the system S. This parameter may be represented by the fraction A/S
which is called the reach of an interpretation. An interpretation A2 will be better than
interpretation A1 if it has a greater reach, i.e. if A1 /S < A2 /S. And if we will use for
interpretation the paraconsistent system of da Costa paraconsistent first-order logic C1=
(cf. [1]) which, in essence, contains the classical first-order predicate calculus C0= , then
a paraconsistent interpretation A2 will be better than a classical interpretation A1 because we will have A1 /S < A2 /S due to the immediate inclusion of classical propositions
into the set of paraconsistent propositions.
References
1. N.C.A. da Costa, Paraconsistent Mathematics, in Frontiers of Paraconsistent
Logic, edited by D. Batens, C. Mortensen, G. Priest and J.-P. van Bendegem,
Research Studies Press, Baldock, Hartfordshire, UK, 2000, pp. 166179.
2. B. Wolniewicz. Logic and Metaphysics, Znak-Jezyk-Rzeczywistosc, Warszawa, 1999.

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Geometrical formulation of a class of consequence structures

lcio Gonc
Ede
alves de Souza
o Paulo
Department of Philosophy, University of Sa
edelcio.souza@usp.br
Keywords: consequence structures, generalized closure structures, invariants, orbits.
A consequence structure is a pair (X, Cn) such that Cn is an operation on (X),
the power set of X. The consequence operator Cn satisfies the following conditions:
(i) inclusion: A Cn(A); (ii) idempotency: Cn(Cn(A)) = Cn(A) and (iii) monotonicity: if A B, then Cn(A) Cn(B).
We consider a class of consequence structures such that the consequence operator
satisfies also: (iv) emptyness: Cn() = and (v) union property: if {Ai }iI is a class
of subsets of X, then Cn(iI Ai ) = iI Cn(Ai ). Structures (X, Cn) of this kind will
be called generalized closure structures.
Consider a group (G, , e) acting on a set X. We denote by g(x) the result of the
action of g G in x X. Therefore, we have (g g )(x) = g(g (x)) and e(x) = x. If
x X, we define the G-orbit of x as the set G(x) = {g(x) g G}. If A X, we define
G(A) = {G(a) a A}. We call A a G-invariant if A = G(A). It is easy to see that
G(A) is G-invariant, and it is the least G-invariant that contains A. Notice that all
G-invariants is an union of G-orbits. In fact:
G(A) = G(a).
aA

Moreover, the set of G-orbits is a partition of X. We can see G(A) as an operation

on (X):
(X) (X), A G(A)

G
= G(A).
So, we have the following results.
is a generalized closure
Proposition. If a group (G, , e) acts on a set X, then (X, G)
structure.
We are going to prove the converse of the proposition above.
Proposition. If (X, Cn) is a generalized consequence structure, there exists a group

(G, , e) acting on X such that Cn = G.

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A surprising consequence of pluralism about logical consequence

Erik Stei
t Bonn, Germany
Rheinische Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universita
stei@uni-bonn.de
Generally, in case of a disagreement between two or more theorists about the correct
analysis of a specific subject area, there seem to be at least three basic options: exactly
one of the theorists is right, none of them is right, or in some way or other more
than one of them are right. The philosophy of logic can be seen as an instance of this
general case as each of these options has been defended regarding the factual plurality of
logical systems. Following Susan Haacks typology ([2], p. 221), logical monists claim
that there is just one correct system of logic, instrumentalists hold that there is no
correct logic because the notion of extra-systematic correctness is inappropriate for
logic, while, finally, according to logical pluralists there is more than one correct system
of logic. Jc Bealls and Greg Restalls [1] recent formulation of logical pluralism in
terms of pluralism about logical consequence (plc) started a lively discussion about
the scope, the viability, and the aims of this view. In my talk, I focus on an argument
against plc brought up by Graham Priest [3] and also discussed by Stephen Read [4].
Beall and Restall make room for different instances of validity resulting from
different specifications of cases in their Generalized Tarski Thesis ([1], p. 29): An
argument is validx if and only if, in every casex in which the premises are true, so is
the conclusion. Given different classes of cases, an argument that is valid in one class
of cases K1 may fail to be so in a different class of cases K2 . The idea of Priests argument against plc (see [3], p. 203) is that there might be a case or situation s about
which we are reasoning and that is both in K1 and K2 . The question that arises is
whether one should reason according to the notion of validity appropriate for K1 or for
K2 . Apparently, we cannot use both as there will be some inference valid in K1
but not K2 . Now, Priest asks, suppose that we know (or assume) holds in s; are
we, or are we not entitled to accept that does? ([3], p. 203) Reads [4] challenge
takes the argument further: what if there is a genuine conflict between the notions of
validity resulting from K1 and K2 insofar as is valid in K1 , while is valid in
K2 ? In response to similar arguments, Beall and Restall [1] admit that, in some cases
of this kind, they are committed to rejecting one of the logics in question (see, e.g.,
[1], p. 117). I argue that, given further assumptions explicitly made Beall and Restall
themselves, Priests and Reads arguments can be made more general. It seems that,
from an epistemological point of view, plc leads to the surprising consequence that one
cannot be pluralist about logical consequence.
References
1. Jc Beall and G. Restall, Logical Pluralism, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006.
2. S. Haack, Philosophy of Logics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 1978.
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3. G. Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Clarendon Press, Oxford, UK, 2006.
4. S. Read, Review of Logical Pluralism, Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, https:
//ndpr.nd.edu/news/25030-logical-pluralism, 2006.

Cognition
The invited keynote speaker is this session is Vinod Goel (page 93).

Theories of Questions and Contemporary Direct Democracy

ski and Jerzy W. Ochman
ski
Przemyslaw Krzywoszyn

Adam Mickiewicz, Poznan, Poland

drpk@wp.pl, jwo@amu.edu.pl
The aim of the talk is to analyze basic conceptions concerning the structure and classifications of questions formulated within institutions of direct democracy. Of course,
in referenda of all kinds we deal exclusively with simple yes-no questions. However,
these questions can also be divided in different types following various criteria, including, for instance, the intentions or aims of a given referendum (i.e. decision-making,
public consultations, surveys), the structures of the questions asked, and their presuppositions. There are also cases in which numerous yes-no questions are posed in a
single referendum. Obviously, such a situation requires a different interpretation of the
answers.
Another problem that we will examine is the structure and status of answers. It
is worth emphasizing that within the institutions of direct democracy, the questions
posed can have four possible answers yes, no, none of the above (NOTA) and/or a
refusal to vote. To address this issue, the usefulness of certain non-reductionistic conceptions of questions elaborated by Polish School of Logic is briefly discussed. A few
significant examples of questions and the interpretations of results from real referenda
are presented in order to highlight some important issues concerning the institutions
of modern democracy. Finally, the problem of the systematic reconstruction of presupposed civic competencies required in a model democratic society is briefly analyzed.

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Sessions

Logical Aspects of Computational Creativity

in the Music Domain
hnberger
Kai-Uwe Ku
ck, Osnabru
ck, Germany
University of Osnabru
kkuehnbe@uos.de
Oliver Kutz
University of Magdeburg, Magdeburg, Germany
okutz@ovgu.de
Human creativity can be found in many contexts of human life, i.e. we find creativity
not only in science and art, but also in all sorts of daily problem solving. Nevertheless,
computational approaches towards creativity are considered to be one of the hard problems in computer science and artificial intelligence. This presentation uses conceptual
blending (Fauconnier and Turner, 2003) in order to show that many interesting aspects
of creativity in music can be modeled using this psychologically motivated approach.
Conceptual blending is a theory that merges two input domains in a non-trivial way in
a blend space that inherits properties from both domains.
A computational approach of concept blending requires a formal foundation. We
propose a computational variant of a further development of Gougens interpretation
of concept blending as a colimit construction (Goguen, 1999). Based on this framework
we will examine the following two application scenarios in the music domain:
Given two harmonic styles (idioms) of music in form of sets of cadences (or more
general: chord progressions), blending the two styles yields a new harmonic style
which allows the creative harmonization of melodies.
Given a particular harmonic style (idiom) of music in form of a small set of cadences
(or more general: chord progressions), blending chord progressions produces an
extension of the given style that is novel and interesting.
For the underlying representation of chords and chord progressions a simple feature
logic is used. This allows the computation of the blend space in a two-stage process
(given two musical input styles): in order to compute Goguens generic space (i.e. a
generalization), Heuristic-Driven Theory Projection (HDTP) computes anti-instances
of the input conceptualizations by restricted higher-order anti-unification (Schwering
et al., 2009). Candidates for the generic space are used to compute in a second step
a blend space via a colimit construction. The blended space combines features of the
input spaces and results in a novel and interesting musical style.
References
1. G. Fauconnier and M. Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the
Minds Hidden Complexities, Basic Books, New York, 2003.
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2. A. Schwering, U. Krumnack, K.-U. K
uhnberger and H. Gust, Syntactic principles
of heuristic-driven theory projection, Cognitive Systems Research, vol. 10, no. 3,
2009, pp. 251269.
3. J. Goguen, An introduction to algebraic semiotics, with application to user interface design, in Computation for Metaphors, Analogy and Agents, edited by C.L.
Nehaniv, Springer, 1999, pp. 242291.

On the Role of Universal Logic in Concept Invention

Oliver Kutz
University of Magdeburg, Germany
okutz@ovgu.de
Fabian Neuhaus
University of Magdeburg, Germany
fneuhaus@ovgu.de
hnberger
Kai-Uwe Ku
ck, Germany
University of Osnabru
kkuehnbe@uos.de
In this talk, we will discuss the role of universal logic in concept invention. We will
in particular motivate conceptual blending theory as one seminal approach, originating
in cognitive science, to model concept invention formally.
Conceptual blending has been employed very successfully to understand the process
of concept invention, studied particularly within cognitive psychology and linguistics.
However, despite this influential research, within computational creativity little effort
has been devoted to fully formalise these ideas and to make them amenable to computational techniques. Unlike other combination techniques, blending aims at creatively
generating (new) concepts on the basis of input theories whose domains are thematically distinct but whose specifications share structural similarity based on a relation of
analogy, identified in a generic space, called base ontology.
The creative and imaginative aspects of blending are summarised by [1] as follows:
[. . . ]the two inputs have different (and often clashing) organising frames, and
the blend has an organising frame that receives projections from each of those
organising frames. The blend also has emergent structure on its own that cannot
be found in any of the inputs. Sharp differences between the organising frames of
the inputs offer the possibility of rich clashes. Far from blocking the construction
of the network, such clashes offer challenges to the imagination. The resulting
blends can turn out to be highly imaginative.
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Our approach to concept invention via conceptual blending is inspired by methods rooted in cognitive science (e.g., analogical reasoning), ontological engineering, and
algebraic specification. Specifically, we will introduce the basic formalisation of conceptual blending as given by [2] and discuss some of the aspects of universal logic that go
into this framework, including a pluralistic approach to logic.
We will moreover illustrate how the distributed ontology language DOL (see [5]
for a sketch of the language and [4] for the theoretical background) can be used to
declaratively specify blending diagrams and to compute colimits as a basis for novel
concepts. Finally, we will illustrate the potential of formalised conceptual blending for
computational creativity as outlined in [3].
References
1 G. Fauconnier and M. Turner, The Way We Think: Conceptual Blending and the
Minds Hidden Complexities, Basic Books, 2003.
2 J.A. Goguen and D.F. Harrell, Style: A Computational and Conceptual BlendingBased Approach, in The Structure of Style: Algorithmic Approaches to Understanding Manner and Meaning, Springer, 2009.
3 O. Kutz, J. Bateman, F. Neuhaus, T. Mossakowski and M. Bhatt, E pluribus unum:
Formalisation, Use-Cases, and Computational Support for Conceptual Blending,
in Computational Creativity Research: Towards Creative Machines, Thinking Machines, edited by T.R. Besold, M. Schorlemmer and A. Smaill, Atlantis/Springer,
2014.
4 O. Kutz, T. Mossakowski and D. L
u`Icke, Carnap, Goguen and the Hyperontologies: Logical Pluralism and Heterogeneous Structuring in Ontology Design, Logica
Universalis, vol. 4(2), special issue on Is Logic Universal?, 2010, pp. 255333.
5 T. Mossakowski, M. Codescu, F. Neuhaus and O. Kutz, The distributed ontology,
modelling and specification language DOL, in The Road to Universal Logic
Festschrift for the 50th birthday of Jean-Yves Beziau, vol. II, Studies in Universal
Logic, Birkhauser, 2015.

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Toward Logical Models of Understanding: Axiology,

Logical Pragmatics, Pragmatic Logics, What Else?
Maria N. Svyatkina and Valery B. Tarassov
Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Moscow, Russia
maria.svyatkina@gmail.com, vbulbov@yahoo.com
Savoir cest bien. Comprendre, cest encore mieux. (P. Langevin)
Understanding is a trans-disciplinary area (understanding of language expressions,
understanding of behavior, understanding of situation) that deals with cognitive processes concerning the assimilation of new content and its inclusion into the system
of existing ideas and concepts. Up to now logical structure of understanding is not
clear, and the main advances are related to text interpretation and understanding in
hermeneutics. Here we outline a logical approach to general understanding systems
based on pragmatic logics, theory of values and a variety of evaluations.
In this context we take a special interest in Ch.S.Peirces ideas concerning relationships between logics, information and semiotics [1] which bring about the arrival and
intensive development of both Logical Pragmatics and Pragmatic Logics. The former is
associated with the pragmatic truth theory, whereas the latter supposes an axiological
consideration of logical concepts, the specification of pragmatic truth values and the
application of effectiveness principle in the form of pragmatic maxim.
An important contribution of the Father of Pragmatism consists in considering
logic as a normative science and defining truth as the good of logic. On the one hand,
pragmatic approach gives us a functional (or axiological) interpretation of truth where
some proposition or belief is true, if it has some utility (enables the attainment of useful
practical result). To differ from descriptive correspondence theory, here the nature of
truth is attributed to the reason of truth and supposes the transition from prescriptive proposition (norm) to reality (see Figure 1). Here the opposition DescriptionPrescription clarifies the meaning of the opposition Truth-Value.

Truth (Description)

Reality
Object

Proposition
Utility (Prescription)

Figure 1: The Opposite Status of Classical Truth and Utility. Truth is the correspondence between reality object and proposition giving its description; inversely, Utility is
the correspondence between prescription and reality object (the usefulness of norm).
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On the other hand, a well-known Peirces definition of truth as the concordance of
an abstract statement with the ideal limit towards which endless investigation would
tend. . . [1] or even more radical sentence by W. James [2] that truth is the expedient
in the way of our thinking anticipated modern theories of approximated, incomplete,
partial, gradual truth.
The next step on the way from logical semantics to logical pragmatics was made by
Polish scientists K. Ajdukiewich, a founder of Pragmatic Logic [3] and T. Kotarbinsky,
the author of Praxiology, as well as by Russian logician A.A. Iwin [4], who constructed
the logics of values and evaluations.
Another Russian logician, B. Pyatnitsyn, who specified the class of pragmatic logics,
is worth mentioning. Typical cases of pragmatic logics are inductive and probabilistic
logics; more recent examples encompass various modal logics such as epistemic, doxastic, deontic, preference, decision, communication logics. All these logics express the
relationships between some standards given by modalities and their use in practice.
The treatment of understanding in hermeneutics associated understanding with values (already W. Dilthey told about the close relation between understanding and evaluation).
So we develop a logical approach to understanding based on logical pragmatics,
pragmatic logics and evaluation primitives such as goal, action, norm, rule,
agreement, etc. Since understanding is an evaluation on the basis of some standard
(or norm), a necessary condition for understanding is the existence of such standard.
The interpretation as a stage of understanding is mainly reduced to the search for the
standard of evaluation and justification of its application to real-world situation. In
their turn, explanations are reasoning processes enabling understanding facility. Moreover, von Wrights teleological explanation [5] is the procedure of understanding itself.
Here, from an evaluation related to agents goal and a proposition describing causal
relation between this goal and required resources, a new proposition about agents
normative actions is inferred.
A variant of unified lattice-based modeling of logical pragmatics for modal evaluations is presented in [6]. Our future work will focus on granular logical pragmatics to
model understanding levels.
References
1. Ch.S. Peirce, Collected Papers, edited by C. Hartshorne, P. Weiss, A.W. Burks,
vol. 18, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA,
19651967.
2. W. James, The Meaning of Truth, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, USA,
1975.
3. K. Ajdukiewicz, Pragmatic Logic, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Warsaw, Poland,
1974.
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4. A.A. Iwin, Foundations of the Theory of Argumentation, Vlados, Moscow, 1997 (in
Russian).
5. G.H. von Wright, Explanation and Understanding, Cornell University Press, Ithaca,
NY, USA, 2004.
6. V.B. Tarassov and A.V. Borisov, Logical Modeling of Agents Cognitive and Communicative Characteristics: a Unified Approach, in Proceedings of the 10th National Conference in Artificial Intelligence, Obninsk, Russia, September 2528, 2006,
vol. 3, PhisMathLit, Moscow, 2006, pp. 916928 (in Russian).

Revision and Logical Neutrality

(or: a plea for ecumenical reasons)
Jack Woods
Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
j.e.woods@gmail.com
What grounds are there for revising our logic? One natural suggestion is that we
should move from a logical theory L to L when L does better than L in terms of
simplicity, ontological leanness (Occams razor), explanatory power, a low degree of
ad hocness, unity, [and] fruitfulness. ([6], p. 147) This is to apply relatively familiar
standards of theory choice to the case of logic.1
There are special difficulties in the case of logic, however, since our choice of a logical
theory impacts the background theory in which we carry out our theory choice.2 It is
by no means obvious that we can have a logically neutral account of how L and L meet
these criteria. Certain ways of developing these criteria are not logically neutral as I
sketch below.
I will address (a) whether there are any general logic-neutral criteria for the adequacy
of a logic and (b) whether there are any adequacy-based limits to logical revision. I will
argue that there is a type of answer to (a) on the basis of a substantive and plausible
answer to (b). In other work, I have argued that a logic adequate to meet Fefermans
demand that a logic support sustained ordinary reasoning (in the sense of sustained
ordinary mathematical reasoning) must obey all three standard structural rules. It
must be monotonic, reflexive, and transitive and possess a substantive version of the
deduction theorem. This gives the guts of an answer to (b) which would allow for a
hedged answer to (a) that there are logically neutral criteria on the assumption that
all reason- able logics share a certain set of basic laws.
As an example of how criteria might fail to be logically neutral, consider the dispute
between Neil Tennant and John Burgess about the explanatory power of Tennants
1
2

This sort of view is also argued for in [7, 2].

This objection, framed as an objection to Quinean and Goodmanian reactive equilibrium accounts
of justication of logic, was first developed in [9] and followed up on by [8].

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relevantistic logic CR . We have two competing logics, CR and classical, and two criteria of theory goodness: explanatory power, here cashed out as the ability to recapture
ordinary non-pathological mathematical reasoning and fruitfulness, here cashed out
in terms of how much information about a theorem a proof provides. By the lights of
classical logic , classical logic and CR are more or less on a par with respect to explanatory power and CR dominates classical logic with respect to fruitfulness.1 However, by
the lights of CR , classical logic dominates CR with respect to explanatory power and,
lets say, they are more or less on a par with respect to fruitfulness. So as far as weve
cashed out explanatory power and fruitfulness, they are not logic neutral since it is
possible to construct a case where changing the background logic yields different results
on how well the logics under consideration meet them.
If we are classical logicians, what should we do? Given that by classical logics
lights, CR is an improvement, it would seem we have a strong reason to revise down
from CR . However, we know in advance that once we are working with CR , we will no
longer be able to generate the reason that got us to re- vise down from classical logic. In
fact, it is not beyond the pale that once we have revised down, we have a strong reason
to readopt classical logic. Call the evaluation of two logics unstable if by the lights of
one logic L, another logic L is more adequate, but conversely by the lights of L , L is
superior. When we have an unstable evaluation, we cannot simply apply the standard
chose the more adequate logic since this standard fluctuates with the proposed logic
chosen. The problem is familiar from [4], but even more dramatic in the case of logic
since logic is such a fundamental part of our evaluative apparatus.
There are a cluster of important issues here. In a prima facie reasonable dispute
between two logics, do we have any logic neutral criteria by which to evaluate proposed
revisions of our logic? If so, do we have enough to arbitrate the dispute? If not, is
there a sense in which we could work with partisan criteria? Perhaps we can proceed
by working within the intersection of the two logics.2 It would then seem that there
is a lower bar on how far down we could revise since extreme sublogics of, say, classical
logic will be virtually guaranteed to be inferior to classical logic by their own lights. For
example, since CR is a sublogic of classical, the resulting appraisal would be that we
ought not to abandon classical logic. This seems too quick, but it is not clear that there
is a more reasonable way to proceed in evaluating a proposed change of logic. Should
we proceed the same in all cases of logical revision or do some differences one logic
being a sublogic of another, for example - demand a different method of evaluation?

The reason for this has to do with a cut-elimination theorem which guarantees that the only classical
mathematical proofs we lose are pathological. This theorem only has an actual classical proof, i.e.
which only has a proof which utilizes cut-elimination. If its right, there is a CR proof. But the CR
theorist is not allowed to presume this since they do not accept the reasoning that guarantees its
existence. From the standpoint of justifying a cut-elimination theorem from below, we must use
CR. But there is not and may never be an actual CR proof.
2
Theres an interesting issue about what this is. I will assume for now it means the intersection of
their derivability relations.

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In my view, there is currently much confusion on these issues. For example, [1]
gives a classical proof that we can develop bivalent model theory in a weak metatheory.
Interesting as this is, it is entirely irrelevant to the sort of worries mooted here. And
still others have attempted to show that in the special context of (set-theoretic) model
theory, they can appeal to non-logical principles (such as the law of excluded middle,
suitably interpreted) so as to prove the adequacy of their account in non-special contexts [3]. But the justication of this claim is still given in classical logic, which is only
adequate justication on the presumption that Field is right. So this justication is by
no means suasive. At best, these responses reveal the pervasiveness and inevitability
of near classical thinking, even in non-classical contexts. If this is right, then there
is good reason to think that the vast preponderance of work advocating adopting a
deviant logic simply misses the point. So shall I argue.1
References
1. A. Bacon, Non-Classical Metatheory for Non-Classical Logics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 42, no. 2, 2012, pp. 335355.
2. O. Bueno and M. Colyvan, Logical Non-Apriorism and the Law of Non-Contradiction,
in The Law of Non-Contradiction: New Philosophical Essays, edited by B. ArmourGarb, J.C. Beall, and G. Priest, Oxford University Press, 2004, pp. 256175.
3. H. Field, Saving Truth from Paradox, Oxford University Press, 2008.
4. D. Lewis, Immodest Inductive Methods, Philosophy of Science, vol. 38, no. 1,
1971, pp. 5463.
5. R.K. Meyer, Proving Semantical Completeness Relevantly for R, Logic Group Research Paper, 1985.
6. G. Priest, Doubt Truth to be a Liar, Oxford University Press, 2006.
7. M. Resnik, Mathematics as a Science of Patterns, Oxford University Press, 1997.
8. S. Shapiro, The Status of Logic, in New Essays on the A Priori, edited by P.
Boghossian and C. Peacocke, Oxford University Press, 2000, pp. 333366.
9. C. Wright, Inventing Logical Necessity, in Language, Mind and Logic, edited by J.
Butterfield, Cambridge University Press, 1986, pp. 187209.

Some have argued that the demand that we develop the metatheory of a weak logic in a logic no
stronger than the proposed logic is misplaced [5]. If right, this would show that Bacon and Fields
work [1, 3] is largely unnecessary.

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Sessions

Modal
The invited keynote speaker is this session is Una Stojnic.

A recipe for safe detachment

Mathieu Beirlaen
t Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Ruhr-Universita
Mathieu.Beirlaen@rub.de
Let the unconditional obligation OB denote It ought to be that B; and let the
conditional obligation O(B A) denote If A, then it ought to be that B. Unconditional obligations OB can be rewritten as conditional obligations the condition of which
vacuously holds, i.e. O(B ).
For n 2 the following detachment rule permits the derivation of an unconditional
obligation from one or more conditional obligations:
A1 , O(A2 A1 ), O(A3 A2 ), . . . , O(An An1 ) OAn

(D)

(D) is intended as a rule for safe detachment. That is, an agent deriving a number of
unconditional obligations via (D) is meant to be able to jointly fulfill these obligations
given the circumstances. Note that applications of the more common rules of factual
detachment (from A and O(B A) to infer OB) and deontic detachment (from OA
and O(B A) to infer OB) are special instances of (D). (To see how (D) encompasses
the deontic detachment rule, note that the latter is equivalent to from O(A ) and
O(B A) to infer OB.)
The special turnstile is there to warn the reader that (D) is a defeasible rule.
Despite its intuitive appeal, it has been argued that (D) fails in a number of cases,
including (but not restricted to) the following:
(i) Violations. If the obligation Op is violated, i.e. if p is the case, then we do not
want to infer Op from O(p q) and q.
(ii) Specificity cases. Of the two obligations O(p q) and O(p q r), the latter is
more specific: whereas the former is triggered whenever q is the case, the latter is
triggered only in the more specific context q r. In such more specific contexts,
we want to detach only the more specific obligation Op, and not the less specific
obligation Op.
(iii) Irresolvable conflicts. Consider the obligations O(p q) and O(p r), none of
which is more specific than the other. Then if both q and r are the case, we
wish to detach neither Op nor Op, since we cannot possibly fulfill both of these
obligations.
Although cases like (i)-(iii) have been well-studied in isolation, what is lacking is a
good general account which tells us when exactly it is safe to detach an obligation in
the possible presence of violations and conflicting (possibly more specific) obligations.
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In such a more general setting, a number of new and interesting problems arise, giving
rise to different strategies for the defeasible application of (D). Consider, for instance,
the set {p, r, s, O(pq r s), O(q r)}. The two obligations in this set are in conflict,
as we cannot jointly fulfill both. O(p q r s) is more specific than O(q r), but
the former obligation is violated in view of p. Given this set of formulas, one way
to proceed is to detach neither of these obligations. A slightly less cautious strategy
is to first remove violated obligations, and next to apply (D) in view of the remaining
obligations (in the absence of further conflicts). The latter strategy would permit the
detachment of Oq, whereas the former would not.
Taking into consideration a wide number of existing and new examples, I present a
number of strategies for applying (D) in such a way that all and only unproblematic
obligations are detached, so that all detached obligations can be jointly fulfilled by the
agent.

Transworld Identity: Some Questions and Some Answers

Hanife Bilgili

Istanbul
University, Istanbul,
Turkey
Even though the roots of modal logic go back to Aristotles philosophy, various
problems has emerged concerning the metaphysics of modality as its semantics has
been formally founded in the second half of the 20th century. Among these problems,
the problem of transworld identity has been one of the most significant ones. The
problem in a nutshell is that as properties of an object changes from one world to
another, whether it is possible for that object to retain its identity; and if it does,
whether we can have a criterion that allows us to say that it is still the same object.
The problem is obviously related to the problem of essentialism. One can relate the
problem of transworld identity strictly or remotely to many logical principles, but
the principle of indiscernibility of identicals is generally the one the problem has been
discussed with.
This study aims at giving a brief introduction to the problem of transworld identity
as it is stated by Chisholm in his article Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some
Questions, and some answers to these questions given by Hintikka, and some more
follow-up questions by Quine this time in the transtemporal realm in Worlds Away,
redesigned as a reply to Hintikkas theory.

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Counterfactuals within Scientific Theories

Samuel C. Fletcher
Ludwig Maximilian University, Munich, Germany
Samuel.Fletcher@lrz.uni-muenchen.de
The language of our scientific theories is rife with alethically modal statements. The
truth of counterfactual conditionals concerning matters that scientific theories describe,
however, is not adequately given by the application of standard possible world semantics. As developed by Lewis and others, this semantics depends on entertaining possible
worlds with miracles, worlds in which laws of nature, as described by science, are violated. This is clearly unacceptable if one is interested in evaluating certain counterfactuals not as sentences broadly of natural language, but more narrowly as propositions
concerning only the connections between possibilities warranted by particular scientific
theories.
It is clear that many scientific theories do describe with mathematical precision the
possibilities they warrant, and the practice of science itself often involves introducing
additional structure on these possibilities to represent relevant similarities among them.
These structures include so-called uniformities, which are used to introduce the concept
of a uniformly continuous variation. Any uniform space a collection with a uniformity turns out to be a model of Lewis system of spheres (equivalently, his similarity
measures), in particular his modal logic VWU. If the uniformity is separating the
uniform-structure analog of the Hausdorff condition from topology then the corresponding system of spheres (similarity measure) yields Lewis modal logic VCU. (For
both cases in general, the so-called Limit Assumption does not hold.) The possible
worlds, however, are all consistent with the scientific theory of interest, so evaluating
counterfactuals using them does not require entertaining miracles.
The analysis here is in a sense the reverse of that often found in presentations of
modal logic: instead of providing a system of axioms or inference rules for sentences with
various modal operators, and then proceeding to find mathematical models thereof, my
approach is instead to look to the practice of the mathematical sciences, identifying
the kinds of structures placed on the models of a scientific theory that are used, if
only unsystematically, in alethetically modal scientific reasoning, and then point out
that these structures allow one to define counterfactual conditions satisfying familiar
axioms.
The advantage of this approach is that it provides the means to answer (at least in
part) one of the difficult questions about possible worlds semantics: whence the similarity measure? Even in discourse internal to a scientific theory, there will typically be
no canonical notion of similarity amongst the models of that theory. Nevertheless, the
context of investigation can often determine which features of these models are relevant
for answering a given question, and a similarity measure can then be constructed to
respect these relevant features.

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As an example of application, I consider the possibilities described by the theory of
general relativity relativistic spacetimes and the context of empirically adequate
approximation and idealization, e.g., evaluating counterfactuals such as, If our universe
were to have the (idealized) properties {Pi }, then our cosmological measurements would
not be too different than they are. In such cases, the relevant notion of similarity can
be determined by approximation of classes of certain observable quantities for certain
observers described within these cosmological models.

Reflexive Insensitive Modal Logics

David R. Gilbert and Giorgio Venturi
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
gilbert.dave.r@gmail.com, gio.venturi@gmail.com
This talk deals with modal logics that are rendered insensitive to the presence or
absence of reflexivity in the accessibility relation by a suitable modification of the
standard semantics. In [1] a sound and compete axiomatization of the minimal logic
for such a semantics was provided. This result was improved by [2], accounting for the
analogs of T, S4 and S4.3. In this paper, we show how to associate a normal modal
logic L with its reflexive insensitive counterpart, which we call L , and give general
theorems describing the conditions under which characterization results for L follow
from the analogs for L.
We will show that different normal modal logics can be associated to the same
reflexive insensitive logic and that the translation process is inextricably linked to the
admissibility of the rule . These facts will give rise to a general framework
explaining the previous results in [1, 2], and allow us to extend them in full generality.
The first theorem in this direction is the following.
Theorem. Let K + be a normal modal logic axiomatized by the addition of to K.
Furthermore, assume K + admits the rule and it is sound and complete
with respect to some class of frames C. Then K + is sound and complete with
respect to all C , such that C C (where C C if and only if any frame in one
class is obtained from a frame in the other class by adding and/or removing reflexive
arrows).
We will also present some results in the case where the rule is not
admissible, shedding light on the connection between modifications of the standard semantics and the admissibility of rules.
References
1. J. Marcos, Logic of essence and accident, Bulletin of the Section of Logic, vol. 34(1),
2005, pp. 4356.
2. C. Steinsvold, Completeness for various logics of essence and accident, Bulletin
of the Section of Logic, vol. 37(2), 2008, pp. 93101.
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Sessions

Questions de Valeur et de Concept (Matters of Value

and of Concept)
Tony Marmo
University of Brazil, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
marmo.tony@gmail.com
Keywords: Philosophy and History of Logic, modal logic, many-valued logics, Gn hierarchies, philosophical logic.
Inspired by A. Tarskis works, in the late 1970s G. Priest proposed a new technique
to build a hierarchy of logics, called Gn , which he considered a re-foundation of normal
modal logic. That was before G. Priest himself adhered to some form of paraconsistent
logic, and his views at the time reflected a belief in the primacy of contemporary classic
logic. By a brief retrospective of the questions of both modal and many-valued logics,
we argue, on historical, philosophical and technical grounds, that his previous classicist
proposals deeply diverge from what Lewis had in mind and yield an entirely different and
non-modal logic. We treat normal modal logics as infinite-valued logics and suggest that
their finite-valued extensions are simpler and more promising alternatives to Priests
re-foundation, like Beziaus basic logics.

Completeness for some Beziau logics

Krystyna Mruczek-Nasieniewska and Marek Nasieniewski
, Poland
Department of Logic, Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun
mruczek@uni.torun.pl, mnasien@umk.pl
In [1], J.-Y. Beziau defined a paraconsistent logic Z by a translation into the language of the modal logic S5, where negation is understood as it is possible that not.
Equivalently, such a negation can be understood as it is not necessary, and was used
by K. Godel in [2].
In [5, 6, 7, 8, 9] some extensions of Beziaus result were given. In particular, completeness results for selected cases of Beziau logics were given in [8]. In [9] a connection
between two classes of logics, considered respectively in [6, 7] was proposed, this result corresponds to a Segerberg theorem determining a connection between normal and
regular modal logics.
In the present paper some further completeness results for Beziau style logics, obtained by non-normal worlds semantics, will be proposed.
References
1. J.-Y. Beziau,The paraconsistent logic Z, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 15,
2006, pp. 99111.
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2. K. Godel, An interpretation of the intuitionistic propositional calculus, first published in 1933, in Collected Works, Volume 1: Publications 19291936 , edited
by S. Feferman, Oxford University Press, 1986, pp. 300303.
3. S. Jaskowski, Rachunek zda
n dla systemow dedukcyjnych sprzecznych, Studia
Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sect. A, vol. I, no. 5, 1948, pp. 5777.
In English: Propositional Calculus for Contradictory Deductive Systems, Studia Logica, vol. 24, 1969, pp. 143157. Other English version: A Propositional
Calculus for Inconsistent Deductive systems, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7,
1999, pp. 3556.
4. S. Jaskowski, O koniunkcji dyskusyjnej w rachunku zda
n dla systemow
dedukcyjnych sprzecznych, Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunensis, Sect. A,
vol. I, no. 8, 1949, pp. 171172. In English: On the discussive conjunction
in the propositional calculus for inconsistent deductive systems, Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, 1999, pp. 5759.

5. J.Marcos,
Nearly every normal modal logic is paranormal, Logique et Analyse,
vol. 48, nos. 189192, 2005, pp. 279300.
6. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska and M. Nasieniewski, Syntactical and Semantical Characterization of a class of Paraconsistent Logics, Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
vol. 34, no. 4, 2005, pp. 229248.
7. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska and M. Nasieniewski, Paraconsistent logics obtained
by J.-Y. Beziaus method by means of some non-normal modal logics, Bulletin
of the Section of Logic, vol. 37, nos. 34, 2008, pp. 185196.
8. Beziaus logics obtained by means of quasi-regular logics, Bulletin of the Section
of Logic, vol. 38, nos. 34, 2009, pp. 189203.
9. K. Mruczek-Nasieniewska and M. Nasieniewski, A Segerberg-like Connection
between certain Classes of Propositional Logics, Bulletin of the Section of Logic,
vol. 42, nos. 12, 2013, pp. 4352.
10. K. Segerberg, An Essay in Classical Modal Logic, volumes I and II, Filosofiska
Foreningen Och Filosofiska Institutionen Vid Uppsala Universitet, Uppsala, Sweden,
1971.

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Sessions

Modal Logics of Partial Quasiary Predicates

Oksana Shkilniak
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
me.oksana@gmail.com
Modal logics recently have found many applications in various fields, including theoretical and applied computer science, philosophy, linguistics. Traditional modal logics
are usually based on classical predicate logic. However, classical logic has some fundamental restrictions which dont allow taking into account sufficiently incompleteness,
partiality and uncertainty of information. This leads to a problem of construction of
new program-oriented logical formalisms based on wide classes of partial mappings over
nominative data. Composition-nominative logics (CNL) [1] could be such a formalism.
Composition-nominative modal logics (CNML) combine traditional modal logics and
CNL of quasiary predicates. Their important variant, modal transitional logics (MTL),
can adequately represent changes and development of subject-domains. In this paper
we consider pure first-order MTL of partial quasiary predicates without monotonicity
restriction. (MTL of equitone (monotone) quasiary predicates were studied in e.g. [2].)
Transitional modal system (TMS) is a central concept of MTL: it is an object ((S,
R, Pr, C ), Fm, Jm), where S is a set of states of the universe, R is a set of relations
on states S S (i.e. transition relations), Pr is a set of predicates over state data,
C is a set of compositions on predicates; Fm is a set of formulas of the language,
Jm is an interpretation mapping of formulas on states. We distinguish multimodal
(MMS) and temporal (TmMS) transitional modal systems, among MMS we specify
general and epistemic TMS. For MMS, we have a number of basic modalities Ki with
corresponding transition relations i , therefore R = {i i I}. For general TMS, there
is one basic modality ( can be defined in terms of ) and R = {}. For TmMS, we
consider and as basic compositions, and R = {}. Along with modalities, basic
compositions of pure first-order MTS contain those of pure first-order CNL (see [1]):
n
logical connectives and , renominations Rxv11,...,v
,...,xn and quantification x.
We define languages and semantic models of MTL and investigate their semantic
properties; it is shown that modalities can be carried over renominations, and interaction between modalities and quantifiers is described. Significant difference between
MTL of monotone and non-monotone predicates is demonstrated: as an example, the
converse Barcan formula (i.e. formula x x ) is not valid in the case of nonmonotone predicates, however (see [2]), this formula is valid in the case of monotone
predicates. Properties of logical consequence relations for sets of formulas, specified
with states, are considered. Basing on these properties, corresponding sequent calculi
can be constructed.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko and S. Shkilniak, Applied Logic, Publishing House of Taras Shevchenko
National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, 2013.
2. O. Shkilniak, Semantic Models and Sequent Calculi of Transitional Modal Logics,
Computer Mathematics, vol. 1, 2013, pp. 141150.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Infinitary Modal Logic for Convergence in Distance Spaces

Iskender
Tasdelen
Anadolu University, Eskisehir, Turkey
itasdelen@anadolu.edu.tr
Some infinitary modalities, such as the common knowledge operator of epistemic
logic and the always operator of temporal logic are well known. In [1], an infinitary
diamond operator and Kripke structures equipped with distance functions have been
put to work.
To develop a modal logic on these distance-structures (or, d-structures), we make
use of an infinitary modal propositional language, L , with infinitary disjunctions and
conjunctions; unary possibility operators r for each r R; and an essentially infinitary
modal propositional convergence operator . Given a d-structure:
r is true at w iff is true at a world w with a distance less than r from w, and
((i )iN , ) is true at a world w iff there is a sequence of i -worlds with finite
distances from w and converging to a -world w with some finite distance from w.
Let K 1 be the logic semantically characterized as the set of all L -propositions valid
in the class of all Kripke d-structures. We prove some properties of the logics based on
K 1 .
On an intuitive interpretation of , the proposition ((i )iN , ) means that the
infinite sequence of propositions (i )iN denotes an infinite number of tasks that can
be accomplished (from the point of view of the inhabitants of w) in a period of time
ending possibly with a state of affairs including . By having such interpretations,
becomes also a useful notion of possibility.
Reference
Tasdelen, A Counterfactual Analysis of Infinite Regress Arguments, Acta Ana1. I.
lytica, vol. 29, no. 2, 2014, pp. 195213.

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Sessions

Paraconsistency
The invited keynote speaker os this session is Juliana Bueno-Soler (page 83).

Paraconsistent Dynamic Epistemology

Can Baskent
University of Bath, Bath, UK
can@canbaskent.net
Dynamic epistemic logics study knowledge updates and changes within the context
of modal epistemic logic. The underlying logic in these cases is almost always classical, and the model is updated to eliminate the inconsistencies. The inconsistencies
are eliminated as they render the theory trivial in classical logic. However, if the underlying logic can allow non-trivial inconsistencies without collapsing the model, the
classical methodology to update the epistemic model may not work. Because, some
inconsistencies may not lead to trivialities, some inconsistencies may not trivialize the
epistemology of the agents.
In this paper, we introduce a modal paraconsistent logic of public announcements. In
public announcement logic, an external and a truthful announcement is made. Then,
the model is updated by removing the states that contradict the announcement. In
classical logic, keeping the states that agree with the announcement and removing
the states that contradict the announcement are identical. However, in paraconsistent
logic (and in many other non-classical logics), they are not. In this paper, we stipulate
a methodology of dynamic updates where the agents keep the states that agree with
the announcement. Some of those states might as well satisfy the negation of the
announcement (hence causing inconsistencies). We model this situation by using a
dynamic modal logic with a very versatile semantics, i.e. the topological semantics.
First, by using a variety of tools from topology, we define homeomorphic and homotopic models: the models that preserve the truth under some certain public announcements. Then, we generalize these models, and construct paraconsistent models
in which public announcements and updated models are defined. Finally, we reduce
the paraconsistent public announcement logic to paraconsistent modal logic by giving
some reduction schemes which are familiar from public announcement logic.
This work relates to rationality of paraconsistent players where two strategies that
were once unified in the case of classical logic become more visible and distinct. Moreover, by extending an earlier work, we observe that topological semantics provide a
broader framework in which a variety of dynamic epistemic notions surface. Also, this
work presents an alternative to the well-known belief revision paradigm.
Paraconsistent dynamic epistemology finds a wide variety of applications in computer science where it can be possible to allow imperfect but rational agents, and the
security protocols of the agents are required to work under inconsistencies.

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A Panoramic View over the Dualization of Intuitionistic Logic

nica Borja Macas
Vero
rita Universidad Auto
noma de Puebla, Puebla, Me
xico
Beneme
vero0304@gmail.com
When someone wants to study an object, from a scientific point of view, one tries
to find the most innovative tools to do so. If the object does not show at first sight its
charms, then we put our glasses on for look better and we even look for more sensitive
and fine tools to dissect it and study it in detail. In the study process, we discover what
the object is but also what the object is not. In fact, through the study of an object,
we discover related objects and we even invent new objects.
In this moment, the object in my mind is intuitionistic logic. Since the first formal systems for this logic appeared around 1930, it became the engine of much of the
research in the area of non-classical logics. We strive to find different ways to characterize it and nowadays there are several proof theory systems and semantics for it.
In the process of studying this logic, a myriad of systems that resemble it have been
discovered; yet an even larger number of systems that look like opposing systems has
been revealed, somehow these are dual systems.
The main objective of this work is to identify the state of the art of the dualization
of intuitionistic logic and the role of paraconsistent logics in it. But as Brunner and
Carnielli states in [1], the question of the purported duality between intuitionistic and
paraconsistent ways of thinking arises from time to time, but the notion of duality
involved in the discussion is far from clear, and thus the question could hardly be
considered as solvable.
However, I have read many others interested in the same issue. Different researchers
around the world have shown their efforts in order to clarify these notions and to create
not only a dual intuitionist logic but also a whole hierarchy of them. Let see the
approach taken by Brunner and Carnielli [1], Urbas [5], Queiroz [3], Gore [2], Shramko
[4], Kamide [6], just to mention some examples.
The question now is how do we compare their results. Some of them have proceeded
in a syntactical way some others in a semantical one; some focused in an interesting
fragment of the language some others took the full language, etc. Variants are many,
we identify the way they present intuitionistic logic, the notions of duality they use and
finally we try to present them in an organized manner to get a good picture of them.
References
1. A.B.M. Brunner and W.A. Carnielli, Anti-intuitionism and paraconsistency, Journal of Applied Logic, vol. 3, no. 1, 2005, pp. 161184.
2. R. Gore, Dual intuitionistic logic revisited, in Automated Reasoning with Analytic
Tableaux and Related Methods, edited by Roy Dyckhoff, Springer, 2000, pp. 252267.
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Sessions
3. G.S. Queiroz, Sobre a dualidade entre intuicionismo e paraconsistencia (On the
duality between intuitionism and paraconsistency), 1997, Doctoral Thesis, Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Brazil.
4. Y. Shramko, Dual intuitionistic logic and a variety of negations: The logic of
scientific research, Studia Logica, vol. 80, no. 23, 2005, pp. 347367.
5. I. Urbas, Dual-intuitionistic logic, Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 37,
no. 3, 1996, pp. 440451.
6. N. Kamide, A note on dual-intuitionistic logic, Mathematical Logic Quarterly,
vol. 49, no. 5, 2003, pp. 519524.

Quasi hybrid logic: Semantics and Proof Theory

Diana Costa and Manuel A. Martins
CIDMA1 , Department of Mathematics, University of Aveiro, Portugal
dianafcosta@ua.pt, Martins@ua.pt
The aim of this talk is to present a paraconsistent version of hybrid logic, which we
call quasi-hybrid logic. It combines two perspectives: hybrid logic [2] and paraconsistent
logic [6]. The worlds semantics with nominals for this logic allows (local) inconsistencies
without explosion. In order to obtain that, a model is defined with two different
valuations: one for positive literals, and another for negative literals. The existence
of Robinson diagrams in hybrid logic is crucial, since it enables the representation of
models as sets of hybrid formulas and then it is possible to evaluate a model with regard
to its number of inconsistencies.
We will also discuss proof-theoretical aspects of quasi-hybrid logic. There are
tableaux systems and Hilbert systems for quasi-classic logic and for hybrid logic (see
[4, 5] and [1], respectively). The challenge is how to combine the proof systems features
of both of them.
References
1. C. Areces and B. ten Cate, Hybrid logics, in Handbook of Modal Logic, edited
by P. Blackburn, J. van Benthem and F. Wolter, Studies in Logic and Practical
Reasoning series, Elsevier, 2007.
2. P. Blackburn, Representation, reasoning and relational structures: a hybrid logic
manifesto, Logic Journal of the IGPL, vol. 8(3), 2000, pp. 339365.
3. D. Costa and M.A. Martins, Paraconsistency in hybrid logic, Technical Report
available at http://sweet.ua.pt/martins/phl14.pdf, submitted.
1

Center for Research and Development in Mathematics and Applications

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

4. A. Hunter, Reasoning with conflicting information using quasi-classical logic,
Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 10, 2000, pp. 677703.
5. A. Hunter, A Semantic Tableau Version of First-Order Quasi-Classical Logic,
in Proceedings of the 6th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, 2001, pp. 544555.
6. C.A. Middelburg, A survey of paraconsistent logics, in arXiv:1103.4324, 2011,
20 pages.

Belnaps logic as a logic of experts

Martnez Ferna
ndez
Jose
University of Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
jose.martinez@ub.edu
Belnaps logic (also called first-degree entailment) is the most influential four-valued
logic. Its operators generalize the strong Kleene truth tables (we take {0, 1, , } as the
set of truth values):
0
1

1
0

0
1

0 1
0 0
0 1
0
0

The semantic values in this logic have usually been read either as alethic truth values
or as epistemic ones, giving rise to different interpretations and applications of the logic.
We will focus on the epistemic readings, where the values represent the quality of the
information about the status of the sentence: when the sources of evidence all speak
in favor of a sentence, its value is 0; when all sources of evidence are against the truth
of a sentence, the value assigned is 1; when there is no information about a sentence,
the value assigned is , and is reserved for sentences which have some sources of
information giving evidence in favor of them and some sources of information providing
evidence against them.
Even though Belnaps logic gives an important set of valid arguments and has very
interesting formal properties, when one looks at the definition of the operators from a
philosophical perspective some of the assignations of truth values look prima facie unjustified. Consider = 0. On the epistemic interpretation, if there is no information
about p and contradictory information about q, one should draw the conclusion that
all the evidence is against p q. We want to argue that this assignment of truth values
(as well as the dual = 1) is an anomaly (as was originally recognized by Belnap
himself and later on by Camp in Confusion, Harvard U. P., 2002, pp. 154157).

276

Sessions
In the talk we will consider the specific case where the sources of information are
experts that give their opinion on the truth value of sentences. The aim of the talk is to
analyze in detail how the logic of each expert can be combined into a logic for the group
of experts. Some of the well-motivated combinations will take us to Belnaps logic and
will give a natural interpretation for the (in those cases apparent) anomaly, other combinations will create logics different from Belnaps. As an example, if each expert uses
a strong Kleene logic with semantic values E = {0, 1, }, then a natural combination of
the logics into a group logic will use as semantic values non-empty subsets of E. Once
the details of the semantics are given, it can be proved that the seven-valued logic that
is generated coincides with Belnaps logic and has no anomalous assignation of semantic
values.

Some Results on 3-valued Paraconsistent Logic Programming

Kleidson Eglicio
Carvalho da Silva Oliveira
and Marcelo Coniglio
CLE1 and IFCH2 , State University of Campinas, Brazil
kecso10@yahoo.com.br, coniglio@cle.unicamp.br
In the XX century, with the development of several different types of logical reasoning and formalization of a wide variety of non-classical logics, an important area of
Logic, namely Logic Programming, was intensively developed both theoretically and in
concrete applications in different branches of Artificial Intelligence. The study of Logic
Programming based on paraconsistent logics is more delicate than it seems, and several
important theorems cannot be direct translated from Classical First-Order Logic to
paraconsistent logic, as sometimes is assumed. Thus, based on the studies initiated in
[4] and continued in [2] about the foundations of Paraconsistent Logic Programming
based on different paraconsistent logics in the hierarchy of the Logics of Formal Inconsistency (LFIs, see [1]), we show in this talk some results on the theory of clausal
resolution of a system of Logic Programming defined over the three-valued paraconsistent first-order logic LPT1 (see [3]). A suitable definition of Herbrand models for
this logic is also proposed, and a useful version of the Herbrand Theorem is also obtained. It is worth observing that LPT1 is equivalent to the first-order version of da
Costa-DOttavianos logic J3, as well as to the first order LFI known as LFI1* (see [3]).
References
1. W.A. Carnielli, M.E. Coniglio and J. Marcos, Logics of Formal Inconsistency, in
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by D. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, Springer,
2007, pp. 193.
1
2

Centro de L
ogica, Epistemologia e Historia da Ciencia.
Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

2. M.E. Coniglio, On 3-valued and 4-valued first-order logics for information systems,
to appear.
3. M.E. Coniglio and L.H.C. Silvestrini, An alternative approach for quasi-truth,
Logic Journal of the IGPL, vol. 22, 2014, pp. 387410.
4. T.G. Rodrigues, Sobre os Fundamentos da Programacao Logica Paraconsistente (in
English: On the Foundations of Paraconsistent Logic Programming), Masters Dissertation, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas, State University of Campinas,
Brazil, 2010.

Vasilievs ideas for non-Aristotelian logics:

insight towards paraconsistency
Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano
State University of Campinas, Campinas, SP, Brazil
itala@cle.unicamp.br
Evandro Lus Gomes
, Maringa
, PR, Brazil
State University of Maringa
elgomes@uem.br
As is well-known, Nicolai Alexandrovich Vasiliev1 (18801940), professor of philosophy at the Imperial University of Kazan and also educated as a medical doctor, was a
distinguished logician and philosopher noted for defending a bold non-classical logicotheoretical project. His contributions to the field may be related to the many-valued,
intensional and paraconsistent approaches. Furthermore, Vasiliev describes a methodology which anticipates not only the most salient aspects of the metalogical methods
dear to present day logic, but also aspects of what is today known as universal logic.2
In the first years of the last century, Vasiliev published four papers in Russian
(Vasiliev 1910, 1911, 1912 [2003], 1913), in which he argues not only for the derogation
of the Principle of the Excluded Middle the Law of the Excluded Third and of
the Principle of Non-Contradiction, but also proposes a complete revision of classical
traditional logic. Although Vasiliev never completely developed his ideas by making
1
2

Sometimes also translated as Vasilev, Vassilieff and even Wassilieff.

Nowadays universal logic can be seen as a general theory of logics, but also can be conceived as
an actual field of theoretical inquiry. Its objective is understand the common substratum to all
known particular logics through the analysis of the notion of logical consequence and the minimum
requisites to the completeness of these systems. Beziau and Costa-Leite (2005, p. 5) argue: In the
same way that universal algebra is a general theory of algebraic structures, universal logic is a general
theory of logical structures. During the 20th century, numerous logics have been created intuitionistic
logic, modal logic, many-valued logic, relevant logic, paraconsistent logic, non monotonic logic, etc.
Universal logic is not a new logic, it is a way of unifying this multiplicity of logics by developing
general tools and concepts that can be applied to all logics.

278

Sessions
clear all the logical features of the systems of logic resulting from his suggestions, we
believe that his ideas outline an ingeniously conceived paraconsistent approach.
Vasiliev delivered a summary of his theories at the 5th International Congress of
Philosophy, held in Naples in 1924, in whose proceedings a three-page abstract by
Vasiliev appears. However, in this publication (Vasiliev, 1925) Vasilievs ideas do not
have the same clarity as they do his papers from a decade earlier.
The restricted circulation of Vasilievs works seems to explain why his ideas had
so little influence on the foundational debates in logic at the time he was writing and,
specifically, on the emergence of non-classical logics. His first paper, Vasiliev (1910),
was positively reviewed by S.I. Hessen the year it appeared (Hessen 1910), and a year
afterward it was discussed in a negative review by K.A. Smirnov (Smirnov, 1911).
Although Vasilievs works were included by Church in his celebrated A Bibliography of
Symbolic Logic (Church, 1936), it was only after 1962 that Vasilievs ideas began to
become known in the international philosophical community (Smirnov, 1962; Comey
1965; Arruda 1977; DOttaviano apud Arruda, 1990, p. xiii; Vasiliev, 2003).
At the end of the 1970s, Vasilievs works attracted the attention of da Costas
followers in Brazil. Ayda I. Arruda formalized Vasilievs ideas for an imaginary logic
and prepared a Brazilian translation of some of his works (specifically, Vasiliev 1910,
1912, 1913), which was finally published under the editorship of Itala M. Loffredo
DOttaviano (Arruda, 1990). This publication allowed Vasilievs ideas to be studied
and debated in the logical-philosophical community in Brazil. In other studies, Arruda
introduces systems of imaginary logic V1, V2, and V3 which are constructed and
presented formally, resulting in a careful interpretation of Vasilievs statements and
suggestions (Arruda, 1977 and 1980; Vasiliev, 2003).1
In this paper, we intend to analyze some of Vasilievs main theses on non-Aristotelian
logic, in order to show that many of his ideas match those of present-day paraconsistent
positions. Considered from a historical perspective, Vasilievs contributions to the
history of logic have great intentional value, and contain many original ideas and insights
that can be developed in various directions.
Despite the derogation of the Principle of Non-Contradiction being part of the setting in which a paraconsistent logico-theoretical posture can be established, this aspect
is not in itself conclusive. Therefore, we emphasize that the overpassing of the ex falso
is a sufficient condition for declaring a logico-theoretical system paraconsistent. In this
regard, the postulate of the absolute difference between the true and the false introduced by Vasiliev forestalls his imaginary logic from trivialization. The imaginary logic
described by Vasiliev lacks the Principle of Non-Contradiction and is thus non-trivial,
but it is also consistent due to the Principle of Non-Self-Contradiction. Therefore it
clearly fulfills the conditions for being one of the first and richest outlines of the paraconsistent approach to have appeared before the working out of the first paraconsistent
logic systems, in the strict sense, with the works of Jaskowski (1948 [1949] and da Costa
1

It is not our objective in this work to present the technical details of the imaginary systems of logic
proposed by Arruda.

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(1963, 1974).
Vasiliev thus figures among the great scholars who envisioned a program of development, of concepts, of questions, and of methods, by means of which the progress of
logic in the 20th century would take its route.
References
1. A.I. Arruda, A survey of paraconsistent logic, Studies in Logic and the Foundations of Mathematics, Mathematical Logic in Latin America, Proceedings of the IV
Latin American Symposium on Mathematical Logic (1978), vol. 99, edited by A.I.
Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa and R. Chuaqui, Elsevier, 1980, pp. 141.
2. A.I. Arruda, On the imaginary logic of N.A. Vasilev, Studies in Logic and the
Foundations of Mathematics, Non-Classical Logics, Model Theory and Computability, vol. 89, edited by A.I. Arruda, N.C.A. da Costa and R. Chuaqui, Elsevier, 1977,
pp. 324.
3. A.I. Arruda, N. A. Vasilev: a forerunner of paraconsistent logic, Philosophia
Naturalis, vol. 21, 1984, pp. 427491.
4. A.I. Arruda, N. A. Vasilev e a logica paraconsistente, Colecao CLE, vol. 7, Centro de
Logica, Epistemologia e Historia da Ciencia, Universidade Estadual de Campinas,
Campinas, SP, Brazil, 1990.
5. V.A. Bazhanov, Towards the reconstruction of the early history of paraconsistent
logic: the prerequisites of N. A. Vasilievs imaginary logic, Logique et Analyse,
vols. 161163, 1998, pp. 1720.
6. V.A. Bazhanov N. A. Vasilev and his imaginary logic, Kanon+, Reabilitatsiia,
Moscow, 2009.
7. V.A. Bazhanov (2011). The dawn of paraconsistency: Russias logical thought
in the turn of XX century, Manuscrito Revista Internacional de Filosofia,
vol. 34(1), Campinas, SP, Brazil, 2011, pp. 8998.
8. J.-Y. Beziau, A. Costa-Leite, What is universal logic?, in Handbook of the First
World Congress and School on Universal Logic, UNILOG05, chapter 2, edited by
J.-Y. Beziau e A. Costa-Leite , Montreux, Switzerland, 2005, page 5.
9. A. Church, A Bibliography of Symbolic Logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 1(1), 1936, pp. 121216.
10. D.D. Comey, Review of Smirnov, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 30(3),
pp. 368370, 1965.
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11. N.C.A. da Costa, Sistemas Formais Inconsistentes [in English: Inconsistent Formal Systems], Thesis for Full Professorship in Mathematical Analysis and Superior
Analysis, Faculdade de Filosofia, Ciencias e Letras, Universidade Federal do Parana,
Curitiba, Brazil, 1964.
12. N.C.A. da Costa (1974), On the theory of inconsistent formal systems, Notre
Dame Journal of Formal Logic, vol. 15(4), pp. 497510.
13. E.L. Gomes, (2013) Sobre a historia da logica paraconsistente e o trabalho de da
Costa: o estabelecimento da Logica Paraconsistente [in English: On the history
of paraconsistency and da Costas work: the establishment of paraconsistent logic],
PhD Thesis in Philosophy, Institute of Philosophy and Human Sciences, Centre
for Logic, Epistemology and the History of Science, State University of Campinas,
Brazil, 2013.
14. S.I. Hessen, kniga vtora, Logos, 1910, pp. 287288.
15. S. Jaskowski (1948), Rachunek zdah dla systemow dedukcyjnych sprezecznych [in
French: Un Calcul des Propositions pour les Syst`emes Deductifs Contradictoires],
Studia Societatis Scientiarum Torunesis, vol. 1(5), section A, pp. 5577.
16. S. Jaskowski, A propositional calculus for inconsistent deductive systems, Logic
and Logical Philosophy, vol. 7, Toru
n, Poland, 1910, pp. 3556.

17. K.A. Smirnov, Kritika i bibliografia, Zurnal

Ministerstva Narodnago Prosvesceni
a,
novaa seria, vol. XXXII(3), 1911, pp. 144154.
18. V.A. Smirnov, Logiceskie vzglady N. A. Vasileva [in English: The logical views
of N. A. Vasiliev]. In Ocerki po istorii logiki v Rossii [in English: Essays in the
history of logic in Russia], Izdatelstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, Moscow, 1962,
pp. 242257.
19. N.A. Vasilev, O castnyh suzdenialh, o treugolnike protivopoloznostej, o zakone
isklucennog cetvertogo, Ucenie zapiski Kanzanskogo Universiteta, 42 pages, 1910.
20. N.A. Vasilev, Voobrazaemaa logika: konspekt lektsii, 6 pages, 1911.

21. N.A. Vasilev (1912). Voobrazaemaa (nearistoteleva) logika. Zurnal

Ministerstva
Narodnago Prosvescenia, vol. 40, pp. 207246.
22. N.A. Vasilev, Logika i metalogika, Logos, vols. 23, 1913, pp. 5358.
23. N.A. Vasilev, Imaginary (non-aristotelian) logic, in Atti del Quinto Congresso
Internazionale di Filosofia, edited by Guido Della Valle, 1925, pp. 107109.
24. N.A. Vasilev, Imaginary (non-aristotelian) logic, Logique et Analyse, vol. 46(182),
translated by R. Vergauwen and Evgeny A. Zaytsev, Brussels, Belgium, 2003,
pp. 127163.
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A Paraconsistent Formalization of Nicolaus Cusanuss

Logical-Philosophical Method in De Docta Ignorantia
Eugen Russo
` degli Studi di Salerno, Salerno, Italy
Universita
e.russo63@studenti.unisa.it
Cusanus thought has received much scholarly attention in the past decades; yet,
although Cusanus paradox-centered philosophy is relevant for the historical development of paraconsistent logic (as Priest argued), his method has not been examined in
light of these recent logical developments (except by Ursic I argue, unsatisfactorily). Accordingly, I show that Cusanus method developed in De Docta Ignorantia
(14381440) is rigorous enough to allow for formal treatment, and I carry out a formalization of its main part.
Cusanus fundamental insight around which he builds his philosophical method of
learned ignorance in De Docta Ignorantia can be explained by considering an object X
that is by definition unnameable and unthinkable our language and thought cannot
grasp it. Yet, unnameable is also a name, and thus both applies and does not apply
to X; we can conjoin X is unnameable (D1) with its negation: X is unnameable and
X is nameable (D2), which is true; still, unnameable and nameable is again only a
name, and thus both applies and does not apply.
We can conjoin D2 with its negation to form D3, then add its own negation, etc.
ad infinitum: X can be named by means of this infinite series. In general terms, if
we cannot think of, or grasp, X, then it will also break any rule that says we cannot
think of it or grasp it; thus, paradoxically, we can; yet any fixed formulation, positive
or negative, is only true as part of an infinite series in which at each step the negation
of the content of the previous step is added. Cusanus calls this paradoxical object X
God, building his philosophical theology on its properties; he employs a neoplatonic
hierarchy of perfection to rank the infinite series of names of God which results.
My formalization uses and extends Priests 3-valued logic LP (V = {1, i, 0},
D = {1, i}). Take any infinite set S and an asymmetric binary relation R so that
xy S, (x = y), x R y. We define GS x = (x S). This, in Cusan language, corresponds to God is x; by means of it we generate an infinite set of names of God from S:
NS = {x S v(GS x) = i} (equivalent to NS = {x (x S) (x S)}). We can generate
paradoxical elements in S by Priests Inclosure Schema: e.g. Xmax : x S, Xmax R x,
and Xmin : x S, x R Xmin . These are names for God: v(GS Xmax ) = v(GS Xmin ) = i.
Further, they can be proven to coincide: Xmax = Xmin . An examination of all elements in
will reveal the same properties as Cusanus describes at each stage of his argument (the
maximum coincides with minimum, God is and is beyond the coincidence of opposites,
etc.)
In conclusion, such applications show that paraconsistent logics are a crucial tool
for investigating paradoxical constructions such as Cusanus proposes, valuable not only
in terms of the inherent philosophical interest of such questions but also for proper
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accounts of the methods of some past philosophers: Cusanus, and likely other more
unconventional logicians and philosophers, in Western and non-Western traditions.

Logics of trial and error mathematics:

dialectical and quasi-dialectical systems
Luca San Mauro and Jacopo Amidei
Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa, Italy
luca.sanmauro@sns.it, jacopo.amidei@sns.it
Duccio Pianigiani and Andrea Sorbi
` di Siena, Siena, Italy
Universita
duccio.pianigiani@unisi.it, andrea.sorbi@unisi.it
Formal systems represent mathematical theories in a somewhat static way, in which
axioms of the represented theory have to be defined from the beginning, and no further
modification is permitted. As is clear, this representation is not comprehensive of all
aspects of real mathematical theories. In particular, these latter as often argued,
starting from the seminal work of Lakatos (see [2]) are frequently the outcome of a
much more dynamic process than the one captured by formal systems. For instance, in
defining a new theory, axioms can be chosen through a trial and error process, instead
of being initially selected.
Dialectical systems, introduced by Roberto Magari in [4], are apt to characterize
this dynamic feature of mathematical theories (see [3] for a similar, yet non equivalent,
characterization). The basic ingredients of these systems are a number c, encoding a
contradiction; a computable function h, that tells us how to derive consequences from a
finite set of statements D; and a proposing function f , that proposes statements to be
accepted or rejected as provisional theses of the system. Call final theses those theses
that are eventually accepted by the system.
In this paper, we prove several results concerning dialectical systems, mostly by using recursion-theoretic tools. In particular, we offer a degree theoretic characterization
of dialectical sets, i.e. those sets that are the sets of final thesis for some dialectical
system. We prove that all dialectical sets are Turing equivalent to some computable
enumerable set.
Then, in order to better analyze the intended semantic of dialectical systems, that is
to say, to study how Magaris proposal fits the idea of trial and error processes in mathematics, we introduce a more general class of systems, that of quasi-dialectical systems.
These are systems that naturally embeds a certain notion of revision. We prove that
quasi-dialectical sets lie in the same Turing-degrees of dialectical sets, hence showing
that in some sense they display the same computational power. Nonetheless, we
conclude by proving that quasi-dialectical sets and dialectical sets are different, and by
showing their respective place in the Ershov hierarchy (see [1]).

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References
1. C.J. Ash and J. Knight, Computable Structures and the Hyperarithmetical Hierarchy,
North-Holland, 2000.
2. I. Lakatos, Proofs and Refutations, Cambridge University Press, 1976.
3. R.G. Jeroslow, Experimental logics and 20 theories, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 4, no. 3, 1975, pp. 253267.
4. R. Magari, Su certe teorie non enumerabili, Annali di Matematica Pura ed Applicata, vol. 98, no. 1, 1974, pp. 119152.

Studies on da Costas paraconsistent differential calculus

Marcelo Reicher Soares
o Paulo State University, Bauru, Brazil
Sa
reicher@fc.unesp.br
Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
itala@cle.unicamp.br
When the interpretation of what is now known as Integral Differential Calculus was
first introduced by Leibnitz and Newton in 1684 and 1687, respectively, the notion
of infinitesimal permeated its fundaments and this fundamental notion brought severe
critics to the fundaments of the then new-born Infinitesimal Calculus. In 1872 with
the rigorous definition of real number given by Karl W.T. Weierstrass (18151897) it
owed a precise definition of the concept of limit, which became a fundament of the
presentation of Integral Differential Calculus. The concept of infinitesimal remained latent until 1966, when A. Robinson presented the fundaments of what would be known
as Non-standard Analysis, which, with methods from the Modern Mathematical Logic,
constructed a convenient structure to the development of Integral Differential Calculus
by departing, as originally conceived by Newton and Leibnitz, from the infinitesimal. In
the year 2000, Newton C. A. da Costa presented the paraconsistent differential calculus,
whose underlying set theory and logic are, respectively, da Costas paraconsistent set
theory CHU1 and paraconsistent predicate calculus with equality C=1 . Its structure
consists in a hyperring A and the quasi-ring A*, that extend the set R of the real
numbers. In 2004, T.F. Carvalho presents, under the orientation of I.M.L. DOttaviano,
his PhD thesis which studies and improves the calculus proposed by da Costa, he
presents da Costas definitions for the basic concepts, proves some new theorem that
generalize important classical result and presents some applications of these results,
particularly in which relates to differential calculus. In the present work, we intend to
give a new version to the paraconsistent differential calculus in order to prepare the
environment to a paraconsistent integral calculus.
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Sessions

Clarifying some rationality criteria of AGM-like Paraconsistent

Belief Revision
Rafael Testa
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
rafaeltesta@cle.unicamp.br
Marcelo Coniglio
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
coniglio@cle.unicamp.br
rcio Ribeiro
Ma
o Paulo, Sa
o Paulo, Brazil
University of Sa
marciomr@usp.br
Belief revision is the process of changing beliefs to take into account a new piece of
information. The AGM system, most influential work in this area of study, adopts the
following rationality criteria (Gardenfors and Rott, 1995):
(i) where possible, epistemic states should remain consistent;
(ii) any sentence logically entailed by beliefs in an epistemic state should be included
in it;
(iii) when changing epistemic states, loss of information should be kept to a minimum;
(iv) beliefs held in higher regard should be retained in favour of those held in lower
regard.
The strong relation among those criteria will be discussed the focus is to set the
opposition between the first and the third criteria (consistency and minimality), specially rose in systems of AGM-like Paraconsistent Belief Revision (developed by Testa,
Coniglio and Ribeiro). The point to be elucidated is that AGM imposes unnecessarily
strong criteria for revision according to an economic standard of rationality, and paraconsistency can model a more interesting system. The exposition is designed to be of
interest to researchers in diverse related fields.
References
1. P. Gardenfors and H. Rott, Belief revision, Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming, vol. IV, Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning, 1995,
pp. 35132.
2. R.R. Testa, Revisao de Crencas Paraconsistente baseada em um Operador Formal
de Consistencia, in English: Paraconsistent Belief Revision based on a Formal Consistency Operator), PhD Thesis, UNICAMP, Campinas, Brazil, 2014.
3. R.R. Testa, M.E. Coniglio and M. Ribeiro, Two systems of Paraconsistent Belief
Revision, to be published, 2015.
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The inapplicability of (selected) paraconsistent logics

Rafal Urbaniak
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Gdansk University, Gdansk, Poland
rfl.urbaniak@gmail.com
Pawel Sinilo
University of Bristol, Bristol, UK
psinilo87@gmail.com
In some cases one is provided with inconsistent information and has to reason about
various consistent scenarios contained in that information, assuming no inconsistency
is actually true. Our goal is to argue that the so-called filtered paraconsistent logics
are not the right tool to handle such cases and that the problems generalize to a large
class of paraconsistent logics.
A wide class of paraconsistent (inconsistency-tolerant) logics is obtained by filtration: adding conditions on the classical consequence operation (one example is weak
Rescher-Manor consequence: is such consequence of just in case follows classically
from at least one maximally consistent subset of ). We start with surveying the most
promising candidates and comparing their strength. Then we discuss the mainstream
views on how non-classical logics should be chosen for an application and argue that
none of these allows us to chose any of the filtered logics for action-guiding reasoning with inconsistent information, roughly because such a reasoning has to start with
selecting possible scenarios and such a process does not correspond to any of the mathematical models offered by filtered paraconsistent logics. Finally, we criticize a recent
attempt to defend explorative hypothetical reasoning by means of weak Rescher-Manor
consequence operation by Meheus et al.

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Argumentation
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Christian Straer (page 107).

Fallacy and virtue argumentation

Iovan Drehe
Institute of Computer Science, Romanian Academy, Iasi, Romania
drehe iovan@yahoo.com
The text of your abstract here. In 1970, Charles Leonard Hamblin, with his book,
Fallacies, re-appraised fallacy theory and signaled the need of going beyond what he
called the standard treatment. In more recent studies on argumentation theory there
has been an interest in approaching themes in argumentation from the perspective of
virtue theory (Cohen, 2009; Aberdein, 2010), following and building on similar approaches in virtue ethics (Anscombe, 1958, etc.) or virtue epistemology (Sosa, 1991;
Zagzebski, 1996, etc.).
In this paper I plan to propose a way of modeling a theory of fallacy that draws its
inspiration from both the recent work on the virtue theoretic approach in argumentation
and the work of Aristotle (mainly the Nicomachean Ethics, but also the Topics and
the Sophistical Refutations). At first, I will discuss the way fallacy can be seen as
argumentational vice in the view of Andrew Aberdein (Aberdein, 2014). Following
this I will argue for the need of clarification regarding what exactly is virtue/vice
defined as a disposition. Then, I will pass on and propose that with argumentational
virtues modeled after Aristotles concept of practical wisdom (Nicomachean Ethics
VI, 5 etc.), one can use, in addition to the concept of vice proposed by Aberdein,
the concepts of practical syllogism (Nicomachean Ethics VI, 5; VII, 3-4 etc.) and
incontinence/akrasia (Nicomachean Ethics VII, 13 etc.) to draw up the general lines
of a theory of fallacy specific to the virtue theoretic approach in argumentation: the
concept of fallacy being better described in certain cases in terms of incontinence
rather than vice (some Aristotelian observations on the difference between the two
may be relevant in this case Nicomachean Ethics VII, 1 etc.). This will be illustrated
along the way with examples of practical syllogisms and how the major premises in them
are superseded as a result of a process of decision making. This process may be rational
(continence) or irrational (incontinence) when it comes to the selection and usage of
argumentative means. Also, the process may have a positive/good/moral (virtuous)
purpose or the opposite (vicious). Along these lines two topics shall be addressed:
1. the distinction between sophisms and paralogisms;
2. whether incontinence is by necessity conducive to vice.

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References
1. Andrew Aberdein, Fallacy and argumentational vice, in Virtues in Argumentation: Proceedings of the 10th International Conference of Ontario Society for the
Study of Argumentation (May 2225, 2013), edited by Dima Mohammed and Marcin
Lewinski, Ontario Society for the Study of Argumentation, Windsor, Canada, 2014.
2. Andrew Aberdein, Virtue in argument, Argumentation, vol. 24(2), 2010,
pp. 165179.
3. G.E.M. Anscombe, Modern Moral Philosophy, Philosophy, vol. 33, 1958,
pp. 119.
4. Daniel H. Cohen, Keeping an open mind and having a sense of proportion as virtues
in argumentation, Cogency, vol. 1(2), 2009, pp. 4964.
5. Ernest Sosa, Knowledge in Perspective, Cambridge University Press, 1991.
6. Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski, Virtues of the Mind, Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Epistemic dialogical logic with possibility of revision

Hanna Karpenko
Lille 3 University, Lille, France
hannakarpe@gmail.com
In the present article I try to find logical systems and tools which allow construction of epistemic logic which can integrate the belief revision theory and, eventually,
resolve some problems of belief revision theory itself. Classically, in epistemic logics [1],
knowledge is understood as list of true propositions that, once obtained, could not be
revised any more. The set of epistemic alternatives shrinks from the moment the new
knowledge is obtained. In information theory such understanding of knowledge corresponds to hard information. Despite this fact, in less formal epistemology the variety
of understandings of knowledge persists and informs in different theories. In particular,
Epistemic Contextualism claims that every knowledge-claim could change depending
on context.And, consequently, what we considered as an instance of knowledge, could
be reconsidered as non belonging to knowledge the next moment of evaluation.
Belief Revision Theory displays better than classical epistemic logics the possibility
of revision. I try to introduce the variant of logic for belief revision, which combines
some results of AGM with dialogical logic and does a bit more, namely:
(i) By the fact of being developed in dialogical frame, the system accounts for the
interactive character of belief change.
(ii) Dialogical logic is a sort of game-theoretical semantic, where every step in logical
reasoning is represented as the result of dialogue between Opponent and Proponent. Dialogical logic claims integrate the pragmatic aspect of interaction into
logical analysis.
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(iii) By the fact of using the Constructive Type Theory, the system decreases the gap
between object-language and metalanguage.
(iv) Constructive Type Theory is a system for logical and linguistic analysis which does
not have syntax-semantic distinction, and, respectively, does not have metalanguage, being self-explanatory in its proper object language.
(v) By the fact of using the instrument of bracketing of previously acquired beliefs,
the system allows to account for the history of belief change in every concrete
case.
Reference
1. J. Hintikka, Knowledge and Belief: An Introduction to the Logic of the Two Notions,
Cornell University Press, 1962.

A Unified Framework for Different Types of Normative Conflicts

Joke Meheus
Ghent University, Ghent, Belgium
Joke.Meheus@UGent.be
It is commonly known that Standard Deontic Logic leads to triviality when applied
to normative conflicts (sets of obligations and/or permissions that cannot be jointly
satisfied). Over the past three decades, a large variety of logics have been developed
that can handle conflicts of the form OA OA (see, for instance, the items in the
list of references). Other forms of normative conflicts have been largely ignored or are
reduced to conflicts of the form OA OA.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, I shall argue that, in order to do justice to
the nature of normative conflicts, one should distinguish between different types of conflicts and that some of these should not be reduced to conflicts of the form OA OA.
Next, I shall show that, even if one allows for multiple forms of normative conflicts,
it is possible to handle them within a unified framework. The framework that I shall
present will be based on rather simple Kripke models. The two main characteristics
of the semantics will be that the models allow for gluts and/or gaps for one or more
connectives and that, for each premise set, the semantic consequence relation is defined
with respect to a specific selection of the models of the premise set. Finally, I shall discuss the advantages of this type of semantics as compared to other kinds of semantics
that have been used for this purpose, such as neighbourhood semantics.
References
1. N.C.A. da Costa and W. Carnielli, On paraconsistent deontic logic, Philosophia,
vol. 16, 1986, pp. 293305.
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2. L. Goble, Multiplex semantics for deontic logic, Nordic Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 5, 2000, pp. 113134.
3. L. Goble, Preference semantics for deontic logic. Part I: Simple models, Logique
et Analyse, vols. 183184, 2003, pp. 383418.
4. L. Goble, Normative conflicts and the logic of ought, No
us, vol. 43, no. 3, 2009,
pp. 450489.
5. S. O. Hansson, Deontic logic without misleading alethic analogies, Logique et
Analyse, vol. 31, 1988, pp. 337370.
6. J. F. Horty, Moral dilemmas and nonmonotonic logic, Journal of Philosophical
Logic, vol. 23, 1994, pp. 3565.
7. J. F. Horty, Reasoning with moral conflicts, No
us, vol. 37, 2003, pp. 557605.
8. F. Jackson, On the semantics and logic of obligation, Mind, vol. 94, 1985, pp. 117
195.
9. L. Z. Puga, N.C.A. da Costa, and W. Carnielli, Kantian and non-kantian logics,
Logique et Analyse, vols. 121122, 1988, pp. 39.
10. B. Van Fraassen, Values and the hearts command, Journal of Philosophy, vol. 70,
1973, pp. 519.

What does The Slingshot needs to shoot?:

Slingshots Arguments and Plural Logics
o Daniel Dantas de Oliveira
Joa
Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil
dantas.joaodaniel@gmail.com
The family of arguments called Slingshots Arguments receive this name in (Barwise and Perry, 1981) due to the minimal machinery used and its cogent consequence.
Usually seen as a kind of collapsing argument, the argument consists in proving that,
once you suppose that there are some items that are references of sentences (as facts
or situations, for example), these items collapse into just two items: The True and The
False. In this talk were going to focus in what is this machinery, i.e., in what are the
essential ingredients that the argument use to prove this conclusion.
In (Dunn, 1988) the author shows how to characterize the Slingshot by way of three
devices. As he points out the argument makes use of: (i) Indiscernibility of Identicals,
(ii) a certain notion of Replacement and (iii) a term forming operator. If this is correct
then term forming operators and terms play an important role in the construction of
the argument. In (Oliver and Smiley, 2013) the authors defend the thesis that there is
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such thing as Plural Phenomena in the language and, particularly, a term may denote
plurally several things at the same time. The main point of this presentation is to analyze if the argument can also be recovered in the context of Plural Logics if we change
the concept of terms to a slightly different notion such as plural terms. It is expected
that this investigation leads us to an answer to the question: What does the Slingshot
needs to shoot?
References
1. J. Barwise and J. Perry, Semantic innocence and uncompromising situations,
Midwest studies in philosophy, vol. 6, no. 1, 1981, pp. 387404.
2. J.M. Dunn, The impossibility of certain higher-order non-classical logics with extensionality, in Philosophical Analysis, edited by D.F. Austin, Springer, 1988,
pp. 261279.
3. A. Oliver and T. Smiley, Plural Logic, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013.

Dia-Logics and Dia-Semantics: a Bilattice-Based Approach

Valery B. Tarassov
Bauman Moscow State Technical University, Moscow, Russia
vbulbov@yahoo.com
About one hundred years ago Russian scientist N.A. Vasiliev introduced a twoleveled logical structure: Logic and Meta-Logic (interior logic or event logic together
with exterior logic or affirmation logic) [1]. According to Vasiliev, we ought to make
difference between two levels of knowledge: 1) an empirical level based on real-worlds
events; 2) a conceptual level depending on our thinking (see [2]). In other words, the
structure of Logic is influenced by selected ontology (in modern Computer Science and
Artificial Intelligence sense), whereas Meta-Logic is often seen as Truth Logic. Following
this tradition, we take a two-leveled structure including Logic and Dia-Logic.
The sources of dialogue paradigm in logic rise to ancient Greek thinkers, specifically
to the representatives of sophist school. For instance, the invention of such fields as
eristic the art of contest, disputation and polemics and rhetoric together with
eloquence techniques and argumentation systems is due to Protagor and Prodick.
Later on, Socrates and Plato introduced dialectics the art of conversation in order to find truth by opposing and coordinating individual beliefs. In his turn, Aristotle
developed the fundamentals of disputation theory; in this context, such his logical writings as Topics, Rhetorics, on Sophistical Refutations are of special concern. These deep
dialogue traditions were supported by Middle-Aged schools of rhetoric and disputation,
hermeneutics and argumentation, and so on.
Unfortunately in the course of several centuries dialogue paradigm in science got
weaker and weaker. In the logic of New Age monologue took the place of dialogue. The
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reflection of lonely thinker substituted beliefs exchange in the dialogue, and the foundations of logical theories were related to the laws of individual thinking and reasoning.
In this context, Hegels dialectics based on self-evolution of ideas is quite opposite to
Socrates and Platos dialectics.
The revival of dialogue tradition in XXth century was initiated by Russian philosopher and linguist M.M. Bakhtin who introduced the term Dialogic [3]. In his
opinion, Dialogic is based on dialogical relations and/or takes into account dialogical
context.
Nowadays the term Dialogic is used at least in two different senses. By Dialogics in a wide sense we denote a multi-disciplinary area aimed at creating the general
dialogue theory that is based on the principle of considering dialogue as a universal communication unit and necessary prerequisite for cooperation and mutual understanding
between agents.
By Dia-Logic in a narrow sense we mean a branch of modern logic based on dialogical
representations or related to logical analysis of dialogues. Here two main ways of
constructing dialogical models are possible: from dialogues to logics and vice versa
from logics to dialogues.
On the one hand, the subject of Dia-Logic is the development and use of dialogue
concepts and models in modern logics and logical semantics, in particular the creation
of dialogue logics, dialogue games, game-theoretic semantics and so on. Here the key
issue was the renewal of dialogical (or dialectical) viewpoint in logic by P. Lorenzen
(see [4,5]), the author of seminal paper Logik und Agon (the Greek word agon means
game, contest), as well as the introduction of game-theoretical semantics by J.Hintikka
[6]. Recently such trend as computational dialectics has appeared to simulate and
implement formal dialogue structures.
On the other hand, Dia-Logic deals with logical modeling of communicative acts,
collective beliefs, co-ordination processes, argumentation procedures, negotiations, commitments, etc. In this context, various dialogue logics, argumentation models, illocutive
logics are constructed. Besides, Dia-Logic is closely related to such trends as informal
logic, Toulmins collective logic, Tards social logic, social semantics of agents communication language, etc.
To specify dialogic semantics (dia-semantics) we use the analogy with Belnaps approach [7] and introduce two basic dia-logical lattices: negotiation (search for consensus) lattice C and its dual disputation lattice D. Minimal dialogic semantics is easily
obtained as Cartesian product of two-valued semantics.
Let us denote by 1 and 2 two agents taking part in the dialogue (in argumentation
theory these agents are called the proponent and the opponent respectively). We shall
represent the appropriate truth values sets as primitive lattices V1 = {T1 , F1 } for the
agent 1 and V2 = {T2 , F2 } for the agent two. It is easy to construct the new product
lattice V1 V2 viewed as shared semantic space. Thus, we obtain a primitive dia-logical
semantics as the direct product of semantics for agent 1 and agent 2.
If the dialogue is considered as agents negotiation unit to obtain their consensus or make compromise decision, then the order relation on V1 V2 may be seen
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T1

(T1,T2)

T2
(T1,F2)

F1

F2

C4

(T1,F2)

(F1,T2)

(F1,F2)

(F1,F2)

D4

(T1,T2)

(F1,T2)

Figure 1: Construction of primitive consensus lattice C4 and transition to disputation

lattice D4 by 90o rotation
as the consensus order C . The semantics of basic consensus (negotiation) logic can be
specified by the consensus lattice C4 given by the following Hasse diagram in figure 1.
Let us give the explanation of basic dia-semantics. Here we denote (T1 , T2 ) =
T, (T1 , F2 ) = I, (F1 , T2 ) = E, (F1 , F2 ) = F . Let (T1 , T2 ) = T be concerted truth (the
truth for both agents that means the elaboration of their agreement), (T1 , F2 ) = I
internal truth (the agreement is based on the belief of the first agent), (F1 , T2 ) = E
external truth (the agreement is based on the belief of the second agent), (F1 , F2 ) = F
concerted falsity or falsity for both agents (any agreement between agents is not
possible or mutual refusal from beliefs co-ordination is fixed). In other words, here the
values T and F are viewed as consensus points in agents negotiation, and the values I
and E are referred as contrariety points in agents disputation.
Here (F1 , F2 ) C (T1 , F2 ) C (T1 , T2 ); thus, the concerted (collective) truth for both
agents is better than internal (individual) truth, and the latter is better than concerted
falsity. The designated value of the dialogic C4 is (T1 , T2 ) = T . If we rotate the lattice
C4 by 90o , then we obtain the disputation lattice D4 (Figure1) with the order relation
D (the win-loss ordering).
In this case the argumentation semantics may be used, for instance, T1 argument
found, and F2 no counter-argument. Then (T1 , F2 ) is interpreted as win of the
first agent lost of the second agent, because the first agent has found an irrefutable
argument; (F1 , T2 ) inverse situation (loss of the first agent win of the second
agent); (T1 , T2 ) as draw (arguments of both agents are mutually refutable); (F1 , F2 )
as mutual refusal from the disputation.
Now let us develop a bilattice-based approach to dia-semantics. The concepts of
bilattice and prebilattice were proposed by M. Ginsburg [8] and M. Fitting [9] respectively.
Primarily, we introduce the triple [0, 1]2 , C , D called a bi ordered dia logical
set (BODS). If the components of BODS [0, 1], C and [0, 1], D form complete
lattices, then this bi-ordered set becomes a dia logical prebilattice. Finally, if two
different order relations are linked by Fittings negation operation f , that satisfies the
conditions:
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

&

&

77
7)

17

)7

)7
)1

))
D

77
71

11

7)
1)

))

'

'

Figure 2: Examples of dia-logical bilattices: a) simple minimal dia-logical bilattice 4;

b) bilattice 9
1) v, w [0, 1], v C w f v C f w (monotonicity by C ),
2) v, w [0, 1], v D w f v D f w (anti-monotonicity by D ),
3) v [0, 1], (v) = v (involution),
then we obtain a dia logical bilattice (DBL). Some examples of DBL are shown by
double Hasse diagrams in figure 2.
A minimal dia-logical bilattice to model the dialogues under certainty is 4, and a
bilattice 9 allows us to take into account the case of uncertainty (or doubt). So the truth
values in 9 form the set V9 = {(T1 , T2 ), (T1 , N2 ), (T1 , F2 ), (N1 , T2 ), (N1 , N2 ), (N1 , F2 ),
(F1 , T2 ), (F1 , N2 ), (F1 , F2 )}, where (T1 , N2 ) truth for the first agent, doubt for
the second agent; (N1 , T2 ) doubt for the first agent, truth for the second agent;
(N1 , N2 ) doubt for both agents, (N1 , F2 ) doubt for the first agent, falsity for
the second agent, (F1 , N2 ) falsity for the first agent, doubt for the second agent.
In this case we get three consensus points (T1 , T2 ), (N1 , N2 ), (F1 , F2 ) and six opposition
points. The preference structure by C has the form
(F1 , F2 ) C (N1 , F2 ) C (T1 , F2 ) C (T1 , N2 ) C (T1 , T2 ).
Basic operations over dia-logic bilattices were specified, and their properties were
studied. Our future work will be related to granular and fuzzy structures (see [10,11])
in dia-logics.
References
1. N.A. Vasiliev, Logic and Meta-Logic, in Logos, vol. 1/2, 1912-1913, pp. 5381.
2. L. Puga, N.C.A. da Costa, On the Imaginary Logic of N.A. Vasiliev, in Mathematical Logic Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3, 1988, pp. 205211.
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Sessions
3. M.M. Bakhtin, The Dialogic Imagination, Texas UP, Austin, 1981.
4. P. Lorenzen, K. Lorenz, Dialogische Logik, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt, 1978.
5. E.C.W. Krabbe, Dialogue Logic, in Logic and the Modalities in the 20th Century,
Handbook of the History of Logic, edited by D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods, vol.7,
Elsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 665704.
6. J. Hintikka, Logic, Language-Games and Information: Kantian Themes in the Philosophy of Logic, Clarendon and Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1973.
7. N. Belnap, A Useful Four-Valued Logic, in Modern Uses of Multiple-Valued Logic,
edited by J.M. Dunn and G. Epstein, D. Reidel, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1977,
pp. 837.
8. M. Ginsberg, Multivalued Logics: a Unified Approach to Reasoning in AI, Computer Intelligence, vol. 4, 1988, pp. 256316.
9. M. Fitting, Bilattices and the Theory of Truth, Journal of Philosophical Logic,
vol. 19, 1989, pp. 225256.
10. V.B. Tarassov, Product Lattices, Bilattices and Some Extensions of Negations,
Triangular Norms and Triangular Conorms, in Proceedings of the International
Conference on Fuzzy Sets and Soft Computing in Economics and Finance (FSSCEF2004, Saint Petersburg, June 1720, 2004), vol. 1, IMP, Mexico, 2004, pp. 272
282.
11. M.N. Svyatkina, V.B. Tarassov, On Granules and Granular Structures for MultiValued Logics, in Handbook of the 4th World Congress and School on Universal
Logics (UNILOG2013, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, March 29April 07, 2013), edited by
J.-Y. Beziau et al., Editora Kelps, Goiania, 2013, pp. 297300.

Application of Argumentation in Generalization Problems

Vadim Vagin, Marina Fomina and Oleg Morosin
National Research University, Moscow Power Engineering Institute,
Moscow, Russia.
vagin@appmat.ru, m fonina2000@mail.ru, oleg@morosin.ru
Intelligent decision support systems (IDSS) often contain inconsistent and conflicting information [1]. The methods of the classical logics cannot be applied for inconsistent knowledge bases as they do not provide mechanisms of revision of previously
made conclusions. We propose to use the argumentation for dealing with conflicts and
inconsistency in data and to apply it for enhancing the quality of classification models
of generalization algorithms.
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Argumentation gives us much more instruments for modelling plausible reasoning.
From well known formalisms of the argumentation theory, we use the theory of defeasible
reasoning proposed by J. Pollock [2] and apply the first order logic. In the classical
argumentation theory only qualitative answer pro et con is possible, i.e. whether
the argument is acceptable or not. For solving this problem, it is proposed to use the
mechanism of justification degrees [3]. A justification degree is a numerical assessment
of argument plausibility.
As the practical application of the argumentation theory, the modified algorithm for
calculating justification degrees to improve the quality of classification models, obtained
by generalization algorithms, is proposed [4]. There is a number of machine learning
algorithms that are able to solve the problem of inductive concept formation on the
basis of analyses of real data presented in the form of database tables. Thereby the
machine learning algorithms based on learning sets build classification rules that can
be further used to identify a class to which an object belongs.
Let O = {o1 , o2 , ..., oN } be a set of N objects that can be represented in an IDSS.
Each object is characterized by K attributes: a1 , a2 , ..., aK . Quantitative, qualitative, or
scaled attributes can be used[1]. Among a set O of all objects represented in a certain
IDSS, separate a set V of positive objects related to some concept (a class) and W is a
set of negative objects not concerned with this concept (a class). We will consider the
case where O = V W, V W = . Let a learning set U = {x1 , x2 , ..., xn } be a non-empty
subset of objects O such that U V W .
Thus, the concept was formed if one manages to build a decision rule that for any
example from a learning set U indicates whether this example belongs to the concept
or not. The algorithms that we study form a decision in the form of production rules.
The decision rule is correct if, in further operation, it successfully recognizes the objects
that originally did not belong to a learning set. The generalization algorithms build a
generalized concept as a set of decision rules R. It is known that the main criterion of
the quality for a built generalized concept (i.e. a decision rule set R) is a successful
classification of a test set of examples (examples not entering into a learning set U ) by
the given decision rules. It is proposed to use the argumentation methods for obtaining
an improved set R*, that is able to classify test examples with a greater accuracy than
the original set R.
The quality of a decision rule set R depends, primarily, on the representativeness
and consistency of a learning set U . The basic idea is to divide the learning set of
examples U into two subsets U1 and U2 , such that U1 U2 = U , U1 U2 = , and to produce separate learning on each of these subsets using any generalization algorithm that
generates classification rules of the form of production rules. It it is proposed to use the
methods of argumentation for obtaining an improved classification model, combining
the results of a separate learning on U1 and U2 . Let decision rule sets R1 and R2 using
some generalization algorithm(in particular, algorithms C.4.5(Quinlan) [5], CN2(Clark
and Boswell) [6] and GIRS(Vagin, Fomina and Kulikov) [7] can be used) be built for
learning sets U1 and U2 . Our task is to form a consistent set R* that combines rules
from both sets R1 and R2 . The method of combining multiple sets of decision rules in
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a conflict-free set of rules by defining justification degrees for all defeasible rules in such
a way that all conflicts arising in a learning set becomes solvable was proposed. This
method using the GIRS algorithm as a basic generalization algorithm was successfully
implemented and tested on MONKs Problems from UCI Repository of Machine Learning Datasets (Information and Computer Science University of California)[8]. The use
of argumentation allowed to enhance the classification accuracy on 7.86% (from 74.31%
to 82.17%) for the given problem.
Application of argumentation methods for the generalization problem allowed to
enhance the classification accuracy for test problems. Furthermore, it was analyzed the
influence of noise on the classification accuracy. The use of argumentation for noisy
data as well significantly improved classification results.
References
1. V. Vagin, E. Golovina, A. Zagoryanskaya and M. Fomina, Exact and Plausible Inference in Intelligent Systems, FizMatLit, Moscow, 2014, pg. 714 (in Russian).
2. J. Pollock, Oscar a General Purpose Defeasible Reasoner, Journal of Nonclassical Logics, vol. 6, 1996, pp. 89113.
3. J. Pollock, Defeasible reasoning with variable degrees of justification, Artificial
Intelligence, vol. 133, 2001, pp. 233282.
4. V.N. Vagin, O.L. Morosin, Modeling defeasible reasoning for argumentation, Proceedings of BRICS-CCI2013 1st BRICS Countries Congress on Computational
Intelligence and CBIC2013 11th Brazilian Congress on Computational Intelligence, Recife, Brazil, 2013, pp. 304309.
5. J.R. Quinlan C4.5: Programs for Machine Learning, Morgan Kaufmann Publishers,
1993, pg. 302.
6. P. Clark and R. Boswell, Rule Induction with CN2: Some Recent Improvements,
Machine Learning Proceedings of the Fifth European Conference (ESWL-91),
Springer-Verlag, 1991, pp. 151163.
7. V. Vagin, M. Fomina and A. Kulikov, The Problem of Object Recognition in the
Presence of Noise in Original Data, 10th Scandinavian Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (SCAI), 2008, pp. 6067.
8. C. Merz, UCI Repository of Machine Learning Datasets, Information and Computer Science University of California, available in http://archive.ics.uci.edu/
ml.

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Language
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Ernest Lepore (page 94).

A quest for new quantum words: reasons

Selma Coecke
Oxford University, Oxford, UK
selma.coecke@gmail.com
With the help of the two preliminary surveys carried out with CERN1 physicists,
which indicated that natural language is inadequate to think, communicate and educate
about quantum reality across disciplines, we want to investigate which concepts and
corresponding new words would make spoken language better suited for this purpose,
by, for example, reducing the information loss when explaining the quantum formalism
with ordinary language. An effort in this direction was already initiated by David Bohm
with a language called Rheomode. We will present pedagogical arguments for such an
enlarged language in order to deal with quantum realm.

On Assigning
Sylvain Lavelle
ICAM Paris, Center for Ethics, Technology and Society,

Ecole
des Hautes Etudes
en Sciences Sociales, Paris, France
sylvain.lavelle@icam.fr
The relation of words to objects is a key issue in the history of logic, especially
after the analytic turn as initiated by Frege (Sinn und Bedeutung). It can be said
that almost all the great philosophers of logic from Frege to Kripke had to deal with
the issue of the sense / reference relation. A reference is basically the relation of
one linguistic expression to one extra-linguistic reality, while the sense is the way one
linguistic expression relates to one extra-linguistic reality (like in Freges distinction
between the Morning Star and the Evening Star). For the sake of clarity, a reference
can be divided into a specific function of designation (identifying or indicating one
thing that an expression relates to) and a generic function of denotation (designating
one thing and predicating something of that thing). For instance, in the sentence The
snow is white, The snow designates one real entity while white does not designate but
actually denotes the whiteness. The relation of one expression to its reference remains
a complex problem that splits into several logical options in semantics as well as in
pragmatics. From the semantic side, the reference is something that can be described
in view of an interpretation (denoting in Russells terms); from the pragmatic side, it
1

European Organization for Nuclear Research.

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Sessions
is something that can be produced by an action (referring in Strawsons terms). In
this paper, I assume that the issue of the sense/reference relations inherited from Frege
can be shaped in another way in the light of an approach of general logic as opposed
to special logic (Lavelle (2015) Elements of Special and General Logic). Special logic
focuses respectively on the semantic and pragmatic stakes of the True or the Non-True
while general logic, as an example of non-classical logic, broadens the spectrum to some
other values than the True, such as the Good, the Beautiful or the Useful. This does
not mean that a proposition or a statement is true, good, beautiful or useful as such,
but its content can be interpreted in terms of true or false (Verus / Falsus, V/F), good
or bad (Bonus / Malus, B/M), beautiful or ugly (Pulcher / Deformis, P/D), or useful of
free (Utilise / Gratis, U/G). This equals making the difference between a multi-valued
logic and an alter-valued logic that is grounded on this broader spectrum of values.
In this respect, like in Freges, the reference is something that a linguistic expression
refers to, while the sense is the way the expression refers to the reference. But unlike in
Freges, the way the expression refers is not only the sense as such, but a kind of mediate
relation that I propose to term assignation, to be distinguished from the assignment
in model theory. An assignation is the semantic or pragmatic operation of selecting one
specific relation of the sense to the reference that allows giving one specific category
of interpretation to a proposition or a statement (epistemic, ethical, aesthetical, or
technical). Assignation is a kind of relation that, so to speak, is located in between
the sense and the reference in that it conditions the interpretation of one sentence. For
instance, in The snow is white, one can make an epistemic interpretation in terms of
True or False, but one can also make an aesthetical interpretation in terms of Beautiful
or Ugly. There is nothing in the sentence as such, be it its nature, its form or its
content, that indicates what kind of interpretation should prevail, but the operation
of assignation. This relation of assigning could be named differently depending on the
logical framework that one adopts: annotation in Mills lexicon (between connotation
and denotation), or attension in Carnaps (between intension and extension). The
notion of assignation also implies that the difference between semantics and pragmatics
is relative since the operation of assigning merges interpretation with action.

Natural language and proof-theoretic semantics:

denotational ghosts in inferential machine
Ivo Pezlar
Masaryk University, Brno, The Czech Republic
pezlar@phil.muni.cz
In the domain of formal semantics the general meaning as use approach is almost
exclusively limited to artificial languages (i.e., non-empirical discourse). Lately, however, this began slowly to change and attempts of providing proof-theoretic semantics
for natural languages (i.e., empirical discourse) started to appear as well. In this paper
we review some of the state of the art approaches to natural language analysis from the
proof-theoretic semantics point of view.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

We are using the term proof-theoretic semantics very loosely here to encompass
not only the traditional Dummett-Prawitz paradigm, but in general all approaches
that are shunning away from the orthodox model-theoretic semantics and adhering to
the general idea that meaning is rather something to be done (constructed, executed,
computed. . . ) and not just some inert entity awaiting to be denoted. In other words,
we will focus on those theories that see meaning as a certain procedure.
More specifically, we review Rantas Type-Theoretical Grammar [4] and Sundholms
approach [5] (both based on Martin-Lofs Constructive Type Theory (CTT) [3]), Wieckowskis approach [7, 8] (based on CTT and subatomic systems for natural deduction),
Francez and Dyckhoffs approach [1, 2] (based on natural deduction) and our own approach (based on modified version of Tich
ys Transparent Intensional Logic (TIL) [6]).
However, as we will show, some of these approaches still suffer from denotational
pollution in various degrees (as was already pointed out by Francez and Dyckhoff in
[2]). Our task will be to locate and examine these denotational ghosts in otherwise
inferential machine and, hopefully, get rid of them.
References
1. N. Francez, Views of proof-theoretic semantics: reified proof-theoretic meanings,
Journal of Logic and Computation, 2014.
2. N. Francez and R. Dyckhoff, Proof-theoretic semantics for a natural language fragment, Linguistics and Philosophy, vol. 33, no. 6, 2010, pp. 447477.
3. P. Martin-Lof, Intuitionistic Type Theory, Studies in Proof Theory, Bibliopolis,
1984.
4. A. Ranta, Type-theoretical Grammar, Indices, Clarendon Press, 1994.
5. G. Sundholm, Proofs as acts versus proofs as objects: Some questions for Dag
Prawitz, Theoria, vol. 64, nos. 23, 2000, pp. 187216.
6. P. Tich
y, The Foundations of Freges Logic, Foundations of Communication, de
Gruyter, 1988.
7. B. Wieckowski, A constructive type-theoretical formalism for the interpretation
of subatomically sensitive natural language constructions, Studia Logica, vol. 100,
no. 4, 2012, pp. 815853.
8. B. Wieckowski, Refinements of subatomic natural deduction, Journal of Logic and
Computation, 2014.
300

Sessions

Linguistic Crisp and Symbolic Logics in Mathematics

and Derivations
i S
Zeka
en
Istanbul Technical University, Istanbul,

Turkey
zsen@itu.edu.tr
Unfortunately, mathematics is regarded as one of the most difficult aspects in any
education system. Today, in scientific and technological developments and innovative
thinking elements are all dependent on the logical aspects two of which are the most significant important in mathematics, namely, crisp and symbolic logic principles. Mathematics cannot be thought without logic and especially formal logic for applications in
various disciplines such as physics, engineering and any quantitative science. Today,
the basis of computers and specifically software cannot be achieved if the principles
of logic are not well digested either during formal educational system or as practical
rational and approximate reasoning by careful people even though they may not have
systematic education. In the rational logical thinking the three most important sequential steps are first linguistic expressive power, deductions and finally the formal proof of
the set forth hypotheses. The scientific researches start with critical review of previous
articles in search and identification of logical statements (propositions with antecedent
and consequent parts), their discussion, improvement, modification or complete denial
with innovative suggestions and finally the applications and verification for final proof,
which may be achieved through mind, laboratory or field observations.
Prior to the mathematical logical initiation in the history its proper foundation has
developed along the arithmetic (theoretical and rational relationships in the natural
numbers) and geometry, which had the fundamental logical deductions. This is the
main reason why the geometry has long historical development than the mathematical
formulations, axioms and deductions, which have started in concentrative manner after
the 19th century. Formal arithmetic references started with the pioneering work of
Peano (1889) with a set of axioms and based on the logical system of Boole. Katz (1998)
stated the flaws in Euclid geometrical axioms. In the scientific arena for the relativistic
theory of Einstein the Euclid geometry could not represent the physical facts, and
therefore, a new geometrical perspective is sought and then Riemann geometry came
to play role for description of the physical natural events.
Provided that the meaning of each word that refers to objects is known, it is then
possible to convert it to a set presentation either in crisp or fuzzy logical domains
(Sen, 2013). Conversion of the words and their linguistic interrelationships through the
grammatical structure of each language appear in the form of logical statements, which
are called propositions. These statements form the foundation of the mathematics and
whoever understands the content of the statements s/he is able to translate it into
mathematical symbols as symbolic logic that has been first suggested by the pioneering
work of Al-Khwarizmi (780-850) the father of algebra. Contemporary work in the
foundations of mathematics often focuses on establishing which parts of mathematics
can be formalized in particular formal logic.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

This article provides the basic systematic steps for mathematical formula derivation
based on crisp logical principles, which are translated to symbolic logic leading to
mathematical equations that are used in science and technology.

Communication is Possible according to a New Interpretation

of Solipsism
S
afak Ural

Logic Application and Research Association, Istanbul,

Turkey
Solipsism in its traditional form says that communication is impossible. It is indeed
true that we cannot communicate, if communication is taken in its traditional form.
New interpretation of solipsism could give us some new opportunities for understanding
language, physical things and communication.

Illocutionary Logic, Discourse Pragmatics

and Universal Grammar
Daniel Vanderveken
du Que
bec, Trois-Rivie
`res, Canada
Universite
Daniel.Vanderveken@gmail.com
Until now philosophers and logicians have overall studied illocutionary acts that
individual speakers attempt to perform at a single moment of utterance. Could we
enrich logic so as to deal with entire discourse? Wittgenstein and Searle pointed out
difficulties. Most conversations lack a proper conversational purpose; their background
is indefinitely open. However the ability to converse is part of linguistic competence. In
my view there are four universal conversational goals: the descriptive, the deliberative,
the declaratory and the expressive goals that correspond to the four possible directions
of fit between words and things and that are achieved in the conduct of any discourse.
Illocutionary logic can study the formal structure and dynamics of such language games
because a system of constitutive rules underlies their conduct. I will compare my
approach to others as regards methodology and issues.
Like Montague, I believe that pragmatics should use the resources of formalisms and
philosophical logic in order to construct a theory of meaning and use. I will explain
how to further develop intensional and illocutionary logics, the logic of attitudes and
of action in order to characterize our ability to converse. One important issue is to
analyze the logical form of intentional actions and to explicate the minimal rationality
of speakers and the generation of individual and collective speech act tokens in discourse.
Are there universal transcendent features that any natural language must possess
in order to provide for its human speakers adequate means of expression and of communication of their conceptual thoughts? As Frege, Austin and Searle pointed out,
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Sessions
illocutionary acts are the primary units of meaning and communication in the use
of language. In my view discourse protagonists do not only mean to perform at the
moment of their utterances individual illocutionary acts directed towards facts of the
world like assertions, promises, directives, votes and thanks. They also mean to pursue
language games with a proper conversational goal like explanations, theoretical and
practical debates, negotiations, elections and exchange of salutations. Such language
games are second level illocutionary acts that are most often collective and last during an interval of time. It is in the very attempted performance of illocutionary acts
that human agents express and communicate their conceptual thoughts. Whoever attempts to perform an illocutionary act represents its felicity conditions. For this reason,
speech act theory and illocutionary logic contribute to the theory of linguistic universals in formulating the necessary and universal laws governing felicity conditions. I will
argue that the logical form of illocutionary acts imposes certain formal constraints on
the logical structure of a possible natural language as well as on the mind of competent
speakers. Certain logical, ontological, syntactic, semantic and pragmatic features are
universal because they are indispensable. Moreover, in order to perform and understand illocutionary acts, competent interlocutors must have certain abilities which are
traditionally related to the faculty of reason. The theory of felicity of illocutions fixes
limits and imposes a logical order to possible human thoughts, actions and experiences.

Logic and Sense

Urszula Wybraniec-Skardowska
University of Opole, Poland
skardowska@gmail.com
Each logic, natural or scientific, uses appropriate language, more strictly its
sensible expressions expressions having sense, a logical sense. The contemporary
logic, logic of language, can define the sense strictly with regard to some general aspects
of development of cognition of the world and, at the same time, contributing to an
explication of one of the most important traditional philosophical problems: Language
adequacy of our knowledge in relation to cognition. For any language L the adequacy
could be achieved first of all if some general conditions of logical meaningfulness of the
language L are satisfied. They are immediately connected with the logical sense of its
expressions.
In logic we can distinguish three kinds of sense of expressions of language L:
syntactic sense, when expressions of L are well-formed; it is defined in syntax of L,
and, in accordance with Carnaps and Freges distinction, two kinds of semantic sense:
intensional sense, when expressions of L have a meaning, intension; it is defined in
intensional semantics of L,
extensional sense, when expressions of L have a denotation, extension; it is defined
in extensional semantics of L.
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In the paper, formal-logical considerations relate to syntax and bi-level intensional
and extensional semantics of language L characterized categorially in the spirit of some
ideas of Husserl (19001901), Lesniewski (1929, 1930), Ajdukiewicz (1935, 1960) and in
accordance with Freges ontological canons (1892), Boche
nskis motto: syntax mirrors
ontology and some ideas of Suszko (1958, 1960, 1964, 1968): language should be a linguistic scheme of ontological reality and simultaneously a tool of its cognition. In the
logical conception of language L outlined in the paper, expressions of L have syntactic, intensional and extensional senses and satisfy some general conditions of language
adequacy. The adequacy ensures their unambiguous syntactic and semantic senses and
mutual, syntactic and semantic compatibility, correspondence guaranteed by the acceptance of a postulate of categorial compliance. From the postulate three principles of
compositionality follow: one syntactic and two semantic already known to Frege. In
the paper, they are applied to some expressions with quantifiers.
Language adequacy connected with the logical sense described in the logical conception of language is, of course, an idealization, but only expressions with high degrees
of precision and adequacy, after due justification, may become theorems of science.

Paradox
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Ekaterina Kubyshkina (page 94).

Paraconsistent intuitionistic logic for future contingents

Doukas Kapantais
Academy of Athens, Athens, Greece
dkapa@academyofathens.gr
I put forward some models of intuitionistic logic (I call them S-models), such that
they can capture the fundamental anti-realist intuition, according to which propositions
do not exist out there, but need to be accounted for by what occasionally is or is not
the case. Consequently, no sentence in these models can be either true or false, unless
there is a matter of fact accounting either for its truth or for its falsity. Indeterministic
events, in the same models, are events, for which there is actually no matter of fact
accounting either for the sentence describing them, or for the negation of that sentence.
I test the way these models behave with respect to indeterministic universes by
testing how they behave with respect to Aristotles Sea-Battles paradox in De Interpretatione, vol. 9.
The model is a septuple W, f, R, D, V, , now, whereon:
W is a non-empty set of worlds.
f assigns a positive or negative integer to the elements of W.
R orders W into a partial order.
D assigns a non-constant domain of elements to each world.
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V assigns a set of atomic sentences to each world. [All worlds are complete as far as
atomic sentences are concerned. Atomic sentences and truth-tables are supposed to
completely determine whatever can be described without any reference to moments
other than the present.]

settles the truth-value of sentences about whether a sentence is true in a world

of the model; it reads, w forces p and is equivalent to, p is true in w. [NB.
Sentences with this connective make part of the worlds of the model itself. So the
model contains its own metalanguage.]
now is a higher-order function picking up the world that stands for the actual
present.
The models heavily depend on Beths condition for disjunction:1
w forces p q if, and only if, there is a bar B for w, and, in each world of B, either
p is forced or q is forced.
The solution in a nutshell: Maximality of worlds with respect to the present makes
either There is a Sea-Battle or There is no Sea-Battle belonging to every possible
tomorrow. Thus the disjunction Either there is a Sea-Battle or not belongs to every
possible tomorrow. By applying the Beth condition for disjunction, There will be a
Sea-Battle tomorrow or not, unlike its disjuncts, becomes true at present.
Notice that the underlying logic is not classical. The Excluded Middle is falsified,
whenever there is no future bar, where an event is either established or made impossible.
Consider, There will be a Sea-Battle in the future or not. The disjunction is truthvalueless in case there is a maximal linear path passing through the actual present, and
upon which no Sea-Battle ever happens, but all the worlds of the path have access to
future worlds where some Sea-Battle happens.

The Role of Paradoxes in Belles-Lettres

Valeri Zlatanov Lichev
Institute for the Study of Societies and Knowledge,
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Sofia, Bulgaria
vlichev@yahoo.com
The founder of structural linguistics F. Saussure noted that language is a peculiar
algebra. His followers used to develop this idea by borrowing of elements from formal
logical and mathematical languages. In this way they made attempts to reveal the deep
structures of any text regardless of its genre.
One of disadvantages of the structural paradigm is the examination of the text as
a closed system. However, from it does not follow that formal logical analyses are
inapplicable to certain works of art. They are especially compelling in cases when some
1

As in E. Beth, Semantic Construction of Intuitionistic Logic, Kon. Nederlandse Ac. Wetenschappen

afd. Letteren: Mededelingen, vol. 19(11), 1956, pp. 357388.

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authors put into their texts paradoxes in order to give the reader a sign to interpret the
meanings, encoded in the vertical structure of the text. As G. Deleuze noted, there is
a logic of sense, but it is yet not sufficiently studied.
Using of paradoxes in belles-lettres is motivated by the writers desire to denote
something without its direct naming. As P. Abelard noted, when someone says: There
is no rose, in the mind of the addressee does not arise the idea of nothing, but of a
rose. Contemporary French philosopher J. Derrida is engaged with the same problem:
How to say the things without saying them.
For illustration of the role of paradoxes in literary text can be pointed out the tragedy
Hamlet. In explicit form Shakespeare introduced them in the conversation between his
main character and the clown (gravedigger). The first misunderstanding between them
stems from Hamlets question: Whose graves this? The clown answers: Mine.
After that he explicates his statement: You lie out ont (grave), sir, and therefore tis
not yours. For my part, I do not lie int, yet it is mine. The sophisticated gravedigger
uses two meanings of the verb to lie: 1) to be in a horizontal position; 2) to say
something which is not true, in order to avoid the liars paradox. Hamlet exposes his
manoeuvre: Thou dost lie int, to be int and say it is thine. Tis for the dead, not for
the quick; therefore thou liest. At the beginning of his play, Shakespeare also resorted
to paradox, but in an encoded form that requires interpretation. In Logique du sens G.
Deleuze points out the paradoxical nature of the beginning of communication, but he
does not spot this problem in Shakespeares play. Horatio tries to engage the Ghost in
conversation by four commands:
1)
2)
3)
4)

If thou hast any sound, or use of voice, speak to me!;

If there be any good thing to be done. . . speak to me!;
If thou art privy to thy countrys fate. . . speak!;
Or if thou hast uphoarded in thy life extorted treasure. . . speak of it!

The Ghosts silence is a negative answer. After it every other attempt to start a
conversation with him is senseless from the position of propositional two-valued logic.
From the three-valued logic of action, developed by G.H. von Wright, the situation
is different. The Ghosts silence could be interpreted as an abstention from speech
act, not as an inability to speech. On this basis the reader could formulate the ban
that probably was imposed on the Ghost in the realm of the dead: You are allowed
to appear before the people to whom you are not allowed to speak, but you are not
allowed to appear before your son to whom you are allowed to speak. Resolution of
this problem requires an intervention of a third person, who can convey the unspoken
hypothetical message to the absent person.
Other examples of paradoxes can be discovered in works of R. Musil, Th. Gautier,
A. Schnitzler, S. Beckett, etc.
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Sessions

Condorcet Paradox and Program Logics

Raja Natarajan
Tata Institute of Fundamental Research, Mumbai, India
raja@tifr.res.in
The theory of social choice is based on several ideas from formal logic. On the
other hand, applications of results from the former to the later do not seem to be
largely prevalent till now. There seem to be many interesting interconnections between
results in the theory of social choice and formal logic in the context of reasoning in
programming language semantics. We examine results from voting theory, which studies individual and collective social choice and aggregation of the choices. In particular
we demonstrate an interesting correspondence between the Condorcet Paradox from
voting theory and formal program logics in theoretical computer science.
References
1. A.K. Sen, Collective Choice and Social Welfare, Holden-Day, 1970.
2. K. Suzumura, Rational Choice, Collective Decisions and Social Welfare, Cambridge
University Press, 1983.
3. G. Winskel, The Formal Semantics of Programming Languages, MIT Press, 1993.

On How Kelsenian Jurisprudence and Intuitionistic Logic help

to avoid Contrary-to-Duty paradoxes in Legal Ontologies
Alexandre Rademaker
IBM Research, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
alexrad@br.ibm.com
Edward Hermann Haeusler
PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
hermann@inf.puc-rio.br
Classical Logic has been widely used as a basis for ontology creation and reasoning
in many knowledge specific domains. These specific domains naturally include Legal
Knowledge and Jurisprudence. As in any other domain, consistency is an important
issue for legal ontologies. However, due to their inherently normative feature, coherence
(consistency) in legal ontologies is more subtle than in other domains. Consistency, or
absence of logical contradictions, seems more difficult to maintain when more than
one law system can judge a case. This is called a conflict of laws. There are some
legal mechanisms to solve these conflicts, some of them stating privileged fori, other
ruling jurisdiction, etc. In most of the cases, the conflict is solved by admitting a law
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hierarchy or a law precedence. Even using these mechanisms, coherence is still a major
issue in legal systems. Each layer in this legal hierarchy has to be consistent. Since
consistency is a direct consequence of how one deals with logical negation, negation is
also a main concern of legal systems. Deontic Logic, here considered as an extension
of Classical Logic, has been widely used to formalize the normative aspects of the
legal knowledge. There is some disagreement on using deontic logic, and any of its
variants, to this task. Since a seminal paper by Alchourron, the propositional aspect
has being under discussion. In this case, laws are not to be considered as propositions.
This is in fully agreement with Hans Kelsen jurisprudence. On a Kelsenian approach
to Legal Ontologies, the term Ontologies on laws is more appropriate than Law
ontology. In previous works we showed that Classical logic is not adequate to cope
with a Kelsenian based Legal Ontology. Because of the ubiquitous use of Description
Logic for expressing ontologies nowadays, we developed an Intuitionistic version of
Description Logic particularly devised to express Leagal Ontologies. This logic is called
iALC.
In this work we show how the iALC avoids some Contrary-to-duty paradoxes, as
Chisholms paradoxes and its variants. For each of these paradoxes we provide an
iALC model. Finally we discuss the main role of the intuitionistic negation in this
issue, finding out that its success may be a consequence of its paracomplete logical
aspect. An investigation on the use of other paracomplete logics in accomplish a logical
basis for Kelsenian legal ontologies is highly motivated.

On paradoxical and non-paradoxical systems of propositions

referring to each other
Denis I. Saveliev
Moscow State University, Russia
d.i.saveliev@gmail.com
As well-known, all classical paradoxes involve a kind of self-reference. A paradox
without any self-reference was proposed by Yablo twenty years ago in [1] (for a subsequent discussion see [26]). This new paradox can be considered as an unfolding of the
paradigmatic Liar Paradox: it consists of propositions indexed by natural numbers such
that each of the propositions states all propositions with greater indices are wrong.
Our purpose is to investigate arbitrary systems of propositions some of which state that
some others are wrong, and to learn which of these systems are paradoxical and which
are not. For this, we introduce a first-order finitely axiomatized theory of a language
with one unary and one binary predicates, T and U . Heuristically, variables mean
propositions, T x means x is true, and U xy means x states that y is wrong. The
theory is 02 but not 02 . We study which model-theoretic operations preserve or do not
preserve the theory, and provide a natural classification of its models. Furthermore,
we say that a model (X, U ) is non-paradoxical iff it can be enriched to some model
(X, T, U ) of this theory, and paradoxical otherwise. E.g. a model of the Liar Paradox
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Sessions
consists of one reflexive point, a model of the Yablo Paradox is isomorphic to natural
numbers with their usual ordering, and both are paradoxical. Generalizing these two
instances, we note that any model with a transitive U without maximal elements is
paradoxical. On the other hand, any model with a well-founded U 1 is not. We show
that the paradoxicality (and hence non-paradoxicality) is a 11 but not elementary property, and provide a classification of non-paradoxical models.
References
1. S. Yablo, Paradox without self-reference, Analysis, vol. 53(4), 1993, pp. 251252.
2. T.E. Forster, The Significance of Yablos Paradox without Self-Reference, manuscript,
1996.
3. G. Priest, Yablos Paradox, Analysis, vol. 57(4), 1997, pp. 236242.
4. R. Sorensen, Yablos Paradox and kindred infinite liars, Mind, vol. 107, 1998,
pp. 137155.
5. Jc Beall, Is Yablos paradox non-circular?, Analysis, vol. 61(3), 2001,
pp. 176187.
6. T.E. Forster, Yablos Paradox and the Omitting Types Theorem for Propositional
Languages, manuscript, 2012.
7. J. Barwise and J. Etchemendi, The Liar: An Essay in Truth and Circularity, Oxford
University Press, 1987.
8. J. Barwise and L.S. Moss, Vicious Circles, CSLI Lecture Notes, vol. 60, 1996.
9. C.C. Chang and H.J. Keisler, Model Theory, 3rd revised edition, North-Holland,
1990.
10. A. Gupta, Truth, in The Blackwell Guide to Philosophical Logic, edited
by L. Goble, Blackwell, 2001.

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Sorites Paradox and the Need for Many-Valued Logics

e
pa
nek
Jan St
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
honza.stepanek@mail.muni.cz
Sorites paradoxes are a class of paradoxical arguments which arise as a result of using
vague terms such as heap or bald. While precise terms have sharp boundaries of
application, vague terms lack such precise boundaries.
With vague terms there are objects to which:
a) the vague term applies,
b) the vague term doesnt apply, and
c) it is uncertain whether vague term applies or not (so called borderline cases).
In borderline cases it is uncertain whether the vague term in question applies to them
or not. Moreover, this uncertainty cannot be resolved by any enquiry.
Since there are three aforementioned classes into which we can divide objects in a
range of significance of any vague term, it might be tempting to use three-valued logic
to deal with sorites paradoxes. This way we can ascribe exactly one truth value to all
sentences of sorites paradox and we dont need resort to either supervaluationism or
subvaluationism.
Another approach to solving sorites paradoxes is based on an intuition that vagueness is a matter of degree and logic of vagueness should reflect that with different
degrees of truth. If A measures 190 cm and B 195 cm then sentence B is tall seems
to be truer than A is tall. Fuzzy logic therefore takes advantage of its infinitely many
truth values.
In my talk I will critically assess many-valued logics and fuzzy logic. My goal is to
show that these approaches to sorites paradoxes either have presuppositions that their
proponents wouldnt assent to or that they generate more problems than they claim to
resolve.

Towards non-classical approaches to circular definitions

Shawn Standefer
Auburn University, Auburn, USA
shawn@standefer.net
The standard theory of definitions says that definitions must be eliminable and
conservative. Anil Gupta and Nuel Belnap have developed a theory of circular and
interdependent definitions that rejects the eliminability requirement. Their theory is a
generalization of the revision theory of truth, and as with truth, the theory of definitions
has focused on the classical scheme. Gupta and Belnap remark that the moves that
have been made in response to the semantic paradoxes can be mirrored with circular
definitions, which includes adopting a non-classical logic. There are has not been much
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Sessions
investigation of non-classical approaches to circular and interdependent definitions.
In this talk, we will motivate the study of circular definitions in non-classical settings,
starting to fill the theoretical gap. We see three main payoffs to such non-classical
theories of definitions. The first is that they may provide additional material with
which to compare theories of truth. Second, the consequences of various theories can
be explored in a setting removed from the particular philosophical debates surrounding
truth. Third, it will illuminate general logical features of circular definitions, showing
which features of circular definitions are dependent on their circularity and which on
the choice of semantic scheme. We then motivate some desiderata for non-classical
theories of definitions. We will close by presenting some results for three-valued schemes,
focusing on a strong Kleene theory.

An Analysis of Bach-Peters Sentences

Byeong-uk Yi
University of Toronto, Toronto, Canada
b.yi@utoronto.ca
Most analyses of quantifiers and determiners have serious difficulties in dealing with
Bach-Peters sentences (Bach, [1]; McCawley, [5]), such as
(1) The piloti who shot at itj hit the Migj that chased himi .
(1) involves the so-called crossing coreference: the two definite descriptions in (1) involve
pronominal reference (it and him) to each other. So neither of them can be taken to
have a wider scope under which the other falls. In this paper, I present analyses of BachPeters sentences that respect the crossing coreference by adopting (and extending) the
liberal notion of quantifier formulated by Lindstrom [4].
I formulate two equivalent analyses of (1). On both analyses, (1) involves a single
quantifier (or determiner) amounting to the combination of the two occurrences of the.
On the first analysis, which results from generalizing Russells analysis of the for double
the constructions, (1) involves a triadic quantifier, Qthethe , that combine with three
2-place predicates:
(2)

a. Qthethe (R, S, T ),

where R, S and T are 2-place predicates abbreviating x, y [is.a.pilot(x) shot.at(x, y)],

y, x [is.a.Mig(y) chased(x, y)] and x, y hit(x, y), respectively. On the second
analysis, (1) involves a binary determiner, Dthethe , a functor that combines with two
predicates to yield a 2nd -order predicate:
(2)

b. Dthethe (R, S)(T ).

This analysis results from liberalizing generalized quantifier theory by allowing polyadic
determiners, determiners that can combine with multiple predicates. Now, we can
analyze the quantifier and determiner as follows:
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Definition.
a. Qthethe =df X, Y, Z xy[zw(Xzw Y wz z = x w = y) Zxy].
b. Dthethe =df X, Y Z xy[zw(Xzw Y wz z = x w = y) Zxy].
(Here X, Y and Z are 2nd -order 2-place variables.) On both analyses, (1) is true if
and only if (a) a pilot shot at a Mig that chased him, (b) no other pilot and Mig were
in the same relation and (c) the pilot hit the Mig.
These analyses generalize the usual, Russellian analyses of the to double the constructions without reducing them to single the constructions. And they agree with the
Russellian analyses on degenerate double the constructions, those that do not involve
genuine crossing, such as (3a) and (3b):
(3)

a. The piloti who shot at the Mig that chased himi hit the Mig that chased
himi .
b. The pilot who shot at itj hit the Migj that chased the pilot who shot at itj .

Karttunen [3] takes (1) to abbreviate either (3a) or (3b). But I think (1) has a
reading on which it is not equivalent to either. On this reading, which is analyzed in
(2a) and (2b), (1) implies (3a) and (3b), but not vice versa. My analyses also differ
from that of Hintikka and Saarinen [2], on which (1) is true as long as there are a pilot
and a Mig such that (i ) the Mig is the only one that chased the pilot, (ii ) the pilot
is the only one who shot at the Mig and (iii ) the pilot hit the Mig. On this analysis,
(1) might be true while there are multiple pilot and Mig pairs that satisfy these three
conditions.
References
1. E. Bach, Problominalization, Linguistic Inquiry, vol. 1, no. 1, 1970, pp. 121122.
2. J. Hintikka and E. Saarinen, Semantic games and the Bach-Peters paradox, Theoretical Linguistics, vol. 2, no. 1, 1975, pp. 120.
3. L. Karttunen, Definite descriptions with crossing coreference: a study of the BachPeters paradox, Foundations of Language, vol. 7, no. 2, 1971, pp. 157182.
4. P. Lindstrom, First-order predicate logic with generalized quantifies, Theoria,
vol. 32, no. 3, 1966, pp. 186195.
5. J.D. McCawley, Where do noun phrases come from?, in Readings in English
Transformational Grammar, edited by R.A. Jacobs and P.S. Rosenbaum, Ginn &
Co., Waltham, MA, USA, 1970, pp. 166183.

312

Sessions

Tools and Results

The invited keynote speaker of this session is Rodrigo Freire (page 93).

Fixing Truth Values for Arithmetical Sentences

Edgar Luis Bezerra de Almeida and Rodrigo de Alvarenga Freire
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
edgar@cle.unicamp.br, freire@unicamp.br
While the subject matter of ring theory is usually interpreted in any structure that
satisfies the axioms of rings, others mathematical contents are in general presented
with some privileged interpretation in mind. As a paradigmatic case of the latter we
have the arithmetic, in which we agree with Meadows [2] that There appears to be
an almost universal belief amongst mathematicians and philosophers that the language
and practice of arithmetic does refer to a unique structure. Assuming that arithmetic
has unique interpretation, a question that naturally arises is: How can we justify our
access to this interpretation? Certainly no such justification lies in the formal system
itself.
As a consequence of this scenario, we have that the validity of sentences of the rings
theory can be identified with the derivability of these sentences in the formal system,
while for the sentences of arithmetic this identification does not hold. Moreover, fixing
an interpretation for the arithmetic implies that every sentence of arithmetic must
assume a truth value in this interpretation. Therefore, the subsequent question is: How
can we justify the possibility that every sentence of arithmetic has a truth value?
We treat this issue by considering the approach of Freire [1] in the context of set
theory, and adapted them to arithmetic: The truth values of arithmetic propositions
are fixed by the principles that govern the behavior of the most basic arithmetical
components, the numbers and operations over these numbers. We defend that such
principles are associated with the practice of elementary arithmetic, and they must be
correct with respect to the history of this discipline, and are themselves neither a formal
system nor a substitute for the formal apparatus, among others desirable characteristics.
With this approach, arithmetic has a privileged interpretation because the truth
values of its sentences are based on principles governing the discipline, which does not
occur with the theory of rings and other formal systems. Furthermore, to provide
an answer to the initial question, this approach also provides a means for conducting
investigations regarding the truth values of sentences of arithmetic that are formally
undecidable.

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References
1. R. de A. Freire, Interpretation and truth in Cantors set theory, submitted.
2. T. Meadows, What can a categoricity theorem tell us?, The Review of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 6, no. 3, 2013, pp. 524544.

A Contextual Definition of an Abstraction Operator

in Second-Order Logic
Henrique Antunes
Campinas State University, Campinas, Brazil
herique.antunes@gmail.com
The method of contextual definitions is a very important tool for improving the
expressiveness of particular logistic systems while at the same time maintaining the
syntax of the relevant systems unchanged. It was employed, for instance, by Russell
in his theory of definite descriptions and it is at the core of Martin-Quines theory
of virtual classes and relations which explains how a considerable amount of class
talk can be recast in first-order logic and some of its extensions without assuming any
specific set-theorical principle.
Contextual definitions can also serve important philosophical purposes related to
ontological reductionism: They can be used to show that, where ostensible references
are made to a specific kind of entity by a particular theory T , such references can
be paraphrased away by contextual means in order to reveal that T has in fact no
commitment to the existence of those entities.
In this talk I shall first consider the significance of the method of contextual definitions in general for both technical and philosophical purposes. I will then give a
developed example of how it can employed to increase the expressive power of a classical deductive system of second-order logic with an unrestricted comprehension axiomschema. It will be shown that a contextual definition can be given for an abstraction
operator [... ] that allows us to build second-order terms out of formulas of the
relevant language, and that the expected axioms and rules of inference governing these
terms can be simulated in the deductive system on the basis of the proposed definition.

314

Sessions

Updates in Logic
Guillaume Aucher
University of Rennes 1, INRIA, Rennes, France
guillaume.aucher@irisa.fr
We generalize the framework of substructural logics based on the ternary semantics
introduced by Routley and Meyer in 1973. The aim is to capture various logic-based
formalisms dealing with common sense reasoning and logical dynamics introduced in
artificial intelligence. With this objective in mind, we interpret the ternary relation of
this ternary semantics as a sort of update: the first argument of the ternary relation
is interpreted as an initial situation, the second as an informative event and the third
as the resulting situation after the occurrence of the informative event. Within this
framework, we define two update logics, the second only playing a technical role. The
generality of our framework allows us to extend and generalize existing results about
decidability and correspondence theory for substructural logics.
Our first update logic generalizes the usual substructural language with new structural and logical connectives that can express more properties of the ternary relation
(viewed as an update). In that respect, we introduce three structural connectives ,1 , ,2
and ,3 that are evaluated at the three different points of the ternary relation and we
introduce their corresponding logical connectives i , i , i for i {1, 2, 3}. We briefly
introduce formally below a simplified version of our logical framework without modalities.
If P is a given set of propositional letters, formulas , are built inductively from
P and the connectives i , i , i for i = 1, 2, 3, and structures X, Y are built inductively
from formulas and the structural connectives ,1 , ,2 and ,3 . For example, (X ,1 Y ) ,3 Z
is a structure. Then, the semantics for 1 , 1 , 1 and ,1 is defined as follows. A model
M = (W, R, I) is a triple where W is a non-empty set, R is a ternary relation on W ,
and I W 2P is a valuation mapping. The truth conditions are defined as follows.
Let M be a model with x W and let p P . Then,
M, x p
M, x 1

iff
iff

M, x 1

iff

M, x 1

iff

M, x X ,1 Y

iff

p I(x)
there are y, z W such that Rxyz,
M, y and M, z
for all y, z W such that Rxyz,
if M, y then M, z
for all y, z W such that Rxyz,
if M, z then M, y
there are y, z W such that Rxyz,
M, y X and M, z Y

The truth conditions of the connectives i , i , i for i = 2, 3 are defined similarly,

but are evaluated w.r.t. the second and the third argument of the ternary relation R
respectively. As one can easily notice, the usual connectives of substructural logic ,
and correspond to our connectives 1 , 2 and 3 .
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For this first update logic, we give a sequent calculus, a natural deduction calculus
and a display calculus. We show that cut elimination holds for the display calculus. It
turns out that our sequent calculus and our natural deduction calculus are generalizations of the non-associative Lambek calculus and our display calculus is a generalization
of the modal display calculus (introduced by Wansing in 1994). For example, the inference rules of our sequent calculus for the substructural connectives {i , i , i i = 1, 2, 3}
are the following:

X Y
(X ,i Y ) i

[( ,i )]
[ i ]

X
X

(X ,i )
X j

[]
Y
[( j ,i Y )]

( ,i X)
X k

X [] Y
[(X ,i k )] Y

X
X

where (i, j, k) {(1, 2, 3), (2, 3, 1), (3, 1, 2)} and where [X] (or []) is a structure
which contains the structure X (respectively the formula ) as a substructure. As one
can easily notice, if we omit the subscripts i, j, k in these inference rules, we obtain the
non-associative Lambek calculus.
Our method to prove the completeness of our calculi is new, we use a specific Henkin
construction. This new method combined with the generality of our framework allows
us to prove a Sahlqvist-like correspondence result for substructural logics. To obtain
this result, we define a second update logic more expressive than our first update logic.
It is a temporal logic evaluated on models where the ternary relation is split into two
binary relations. The (first-order) frame correspondents of axioms and inference rules
(of a specific form) are obtained in two steps. First, we translate them into the temporal
language of our second update logic by adapting techniques introduced by Kracht for
display calculi. Second, if these translations are Sahlqvist formulas, we translate them
into their (first-order) frame correspondents thanks to the standard Sahlqvist algorithm
for temporal logic. Doing so, we contribute to developing a basic correspondence theory
for substructural logics.

316

Sessions

Computability of unification and admissibility in contact logics

Philippe Balbiani
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse University,
Toulouse, France
Philippe.Balbiani@irit.fr
dem Gencer
C
ig
Istanbul Ku
ltu
r University, Faculty of Science and Letters,

y/Istanbul, Turkey
Bakrko
c.gencer@iku.edu.tr
The unification problem in a logical system L can be formulated as follows: given a
formula (X1 , . . . , Xn ), determine whether there exists formulas 1 , . . ., n such that
(1 , . . . , n ) L.
The research on unification was motivated by the admissibility problem: given
a rule from (X1 , . . . , Xn ), infer (X1 , . . . , Xn ), determine whether for all formulas
1 , . . ., n , if {(1 , . . . , n ) L, then (1 , . . . , n ) L.
In [9], Rybakov proved that there exists a decision procedure for determining whether
a given rule is admissible in intuitionistic propositional logic. Later on, Ghilardi in [7, 8]
proved that intuitionistic propositional logic has a finitary unification type and extended
this result to K4. See also [5, 6].
Contact logics are logics for reasoning about the contact relation between regular
subsets in a topological space. See [2]. In contact logics, formulas are built from simple
formulas of the form C(a, b) and a b where a and b are terms in a Boolean language
using the Boolean constructs , and , the intuitive reading of C(a, b) and a b
being the regular regions denoted by a and b are in contact and the regular regions
denoted by a and b are equal.
The main semantics of contact logics are the contact algebras of the regular subsets
in a topological space (see [3, 4]). But contact logics have also received a relational
semantics that allow to use methods from modal logic for studying them. See [1].
In this setting, one important issue is the mechanization of reasoning in contact
logics. Since admissible rules can be used to improve the performance of any algorithm
that handles provability, it becomes natural to consider admissibility and unification
within the context of contact logics.
In this talk, we will examine variants of contact logics. The central results in this
talk are the following: the admissibility problem and the unification problem are decidable in contact logics; contact logics have a unitary unification type.
References
1. P. Balbiani and T. Tinchev, Boolean logics with relations, Journal of Logic
and Algebraic Programming, vol. 79, 2010, pp. 707721.
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2. P. Balbiani, T. Tinchev and D. Vakarelov, Modal logics for region-based theories
of space, Fundamenta Informatic, vol. 81, 2007, pp. 2982.
3. G. Dimov and D. Vakarelov, Contact algebras and region-based theory of space:
a proximity approach I, Fundamenta Informatic, vol. 74, 2006, pp. 209249.
4. G. Dimov and D. Vakarelov, Contact algebras and region-based theory of space:
a proximity approach II, Fundamenta Informatic, 74, 2006, pp. 251282.
5. C
. Gencer, Description of modal logics inheriting admissible rules for K4, Logic
Journal of the IGPL, vol. 10, 2002, pp. 401411.
6. C
. Gencer and D. de Jongh, Unifiability in extensions of K4, Logic Journal
of the IGPL, vol. 17, 2009, pp. 159172.
7. S. Ghilardi, Unification in intuitionistic logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 64, 1999, pp. 859880.
8. S. Ghilardi, Best solving modal equations, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
vol. 102, 2000, pp. 183198.
9. V. Rybakov, A criterion for admissibility of rules in the model system S4
and the intuitionistic logic, Algebra and Logic, vol. 23, 1984, pp. 369384.

Librationist Motives and Perspectives

Frode Bjrdal
Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Norte, Natal, Brazil
University of Oslo, Oslo, Norway
bjordal.frode@gmail.com
Keywords: Sedationism, Bialethism, Mathematicalism, Denumerabilism, Expressionism.
Librationism is officially most fully published in [2], but the arxived [3] which
was lectured upon by invitation at the Steklov Institute of Mathematics in Moscow on
September the 4th and at the Mathematics Department of the Universidade Federal
da Bahia in Salvador, Brazil, on October the 16th develops more precisely with
consequences for how it accounts for fundamental, i.e. important, mathematical and
philosophical matters.
We relate how plus the Skolem-Fraenkel Postulation (SF P ) interprets ZF C by
extending an interpretation of ZF by [4] in a system weaker than ZF with collection
minus extensionality; this sharpens a result of Dana Scott. does not commit to
the consistency of something as strong as ZF C, and maybe we should rest with
as a much weaker system in the spirit of Fefermans attitude that classical set theory
is as medieval theology. Notice that by [2] is fully impredicative. On the other
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Sessions
hand, + SF P X , where SF P X is an arguably plausible extension of SF P , may even
interpret ZF C + there are X inaccessible cardinals (if such systems are consistent),
in an essential countable framework on the last point compare [1] and superseded
publications dating back to 2004 as well as [7]; recent results show that X may be
replaced by arbritrary Mahlo-cardinals.
Distinguish between theorems about a system and theorems in a system by using
thesis for the latter usage and maintain the previous usage. Formula A is an antithesis
of a system iff the negjunction (negation) A is a thesis of it, and A is a nonthesis of a
system iff it is not a thesis of it. S is an extension of T iff all theses of T are theses of S,
and a sedation of T iff no thesis of S is an antithesis of T . S is a sedate extension of T
iff it is a sedation and an extension of T . Sedationism is the view that we should only
accept sedate, proper extensions of classical logic. The alphabet of is and ., and
symbols of just those strings of these that count as powers of two if is taken as 1
and . as 0 in the binary numerical system; combining the Peirce arrow (dualized later
by Sheffer) and Lukasiewicz notation strategy we understand the formulas posits
by the appropriate strings of symbols (as by the definitions and formation rules and
elementary number theoretic concatenation definition) of to be the finite von Neumann ordinals of L so denoted where is the level of Godels constructible hierarchy
needed for our semantic construction a` la [6] ([5] and descendents merit comparison);
it is sufficient for to be a 3 -admissible ordinal. thinks it has the language of set
theory minus identity plus truth predicate T and enumerator sign e. The latter pins
down an enumeration from the finite von Neumann ordinals of to any universal set
(denumerabilism), and the former connects to a semantic predicate; these both use the
internal Godel coding which mirrors the external coding invoked above in a manner
so that all sets have names (expressionism). is a sedate, proper extension of classical predicate logic, and deals with paradoxes in a novel manner. The mathematicalist
point of view supported is that mathematics is more fundamental than logic. A is a
maxim of iff A is a thesis of and A is a nonthesis of , and a minor iff a thesis
of and an antithesis of . has novel regulations and prescriptions; unlike classical
inference rules the regulations of are sensitive to whether antecedent theses are maxims or minors, and prescriptions are similarly unlike traditional axioms. We consider
a super-formal and contentual system; the former is on account of its countenance of
infinitary regulations and the latter on account of its expressionistic treatment of free
variables (noemata) as names.
References
1. F. Bjrdal, Considerations Contra Cantorianism, in The LOGICA Yearbook 2010,
edited by M. Pelis and V. Puncochar, College Publications, London, 2011, pp. 4352.
2. F. Bjrdal, Librationist Closures of the Paradoxes, Logic and Logical Philosophy,
vol. 21 , no. 4, 2012, pp. 323361.
3. F. Bjrdal, Elements of Librationism, 2014, arXiv:1407.3877.
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4. H. Friedman, The Consistency of Classical Set Theory Relative to a Set Theory
with Intuitionistic Logic, The Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 38, no. 2, 1973,
pp. 315319.
5. A. Gupta, Truth and Paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11, no. 1,
1982, pp. 160.

6. HHerzberger,
Notes on Naive Semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11,
no. 1, 1982, pp. 61102.
7. T. Skolem, Axiomatized Set Theory, in From Frege to Godel: A Source Book in
Mathematical Logic, 18791931 , edited by J. van Heijenort, Harvard University
Press, 1967, pp. 291301.

Lambda Theory: to a Zero-Order Logic with Quantifiers

Laurent Dubois
University of Brussels, Belgium
laurent.dubois@ulb.ac.be
Keywords: nothing, void, empty set, null-class, zero-order logic.
In this talk, we present an important consequence of the introduction of a new
constant called Lambda in order to represent the object nothing or void into a
standard set theory: the possibility of the existence of a zero-order logic with quantifiers.
The Lambda theory is expressed in the standard first-order logic. It means that the
quantified variables x, y, z . . . must be instantiated by first-order objects.
Second-order logic, in addition to individuals, quantifies variables that range over
relations (properties) and functions too.
Second-order logic is extended by higher-order logics and type theory.
In the other direction, we have the zero-order logic. It is often assimilated to propositional calculus because quantification is not possible on variables of propositions. But
zero-order logic is sometimes also presented as a first-order logic without quantifiers.
A finitely axiomatizable zero-order logic is isomorphic to the propositional logic. With
axiom schema, it is a more expressive system than propositional logic (cf. the system
of primitive recursive arithmetic).
As a consequence of the introduction of Lambda in the language of a standard firstorder logic, we think that we can consider the possibility of the existence of a zero-order
logic with quantifiers that range over pre-elements only. As pre- element, is a zeroorder entity. Indeed, appears to be the smallest constituent that can be added to a
set theory.
In this case, propositional calculus becomes the fundamental structure of any logic.

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Sessions

Duality, self-duality and generalized quantifiers

o
Pedro Alonso Amaral Falca
o Paulo, Sa
o Paulo, Brazil
Universidade de Sa
pedroalonsofalcao@gmail.com
We make some observations on the theory of generalized quantifiers; in particular
we observe that, for any n, there are no self-dual n 0 quantifiers.

Foundations of semantic and syntactic proofs in the context

of metatheories
Alfredo Roque de Oliveira Freire Filho
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
alfrfreire@gmail.com
This presentation aims to put into perspective the semantic and syntactic proofs
of meta-theoretical results. On the one hand, we seek to clarify which means a result
grounded in model theoretical techniques and, on the other hand, we develop the argument that there is a real gain in the exposure of a syntactic proof. More specifically,
we have based our discussion on the two proofs of relative consistency between ZFC
and NBG: first, the widely used semantic proof, second, the syntactic proof given by
Schoenfield in 1954.

Cosmic Logic. On the Conway-Kochen Free Will Theorem

Yvon Gauthier
Department of Philosophy, University of Montreal, Montreal, Canada
yvon.gauthier@umontreal.ca
In two papers (see 1 and 2), Conway and Kochen propose the idea that the free
will of experimenters in Quantum Mechanics is a reflection of an objective free will of
the quantum-mechanical world (which they call Nature!). I discuss the cosmological
implications of their view and introduce a general no-go theorem for a deterministic interpretation of the multiverse. The radical indeterminist standpoint prohibits
cloning or reduplication not only at the quantum-mechanical level, but also on the
cosmological scale of an infinite multiverse. The general no-cloning theorem (see 3)
states that there are no homeomorphic images of macro-or microphysical objects in a
multidimensional universe with the cardinality of the continuum. The internal logic
of the proof uses set-theoretic combinatorial arguments revisited by Brouwers and
Bishops topological arguments. The constructivization is achieved by introducing the
notion of a local complementation which operates in the interaction of a local observer,
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the fixed-point observer, and any local or non-local observable system. In that context,
measurement from a cosmo-logical point of view is essentially finitistic to the extent
that experimental and computational procedures must produce finite results even in
an infinite multiverse landscape. Those results are naturally expressed by polynomials
with their internal logic designed to account for the content of mathematical, physical
and physico-mathematical theories.
References
1. J. Conway and S. Kochen, The Free Will Theorem, Foundations of Physics,
vol. 36, 2006, pp. 14411473.
2. J. Conway and S. Kochen, The Strong Free Will Theorem, Notices of the American
Mathematical Society, vol. 56, 2009, pp. 226232.
3. Y. Gauthier, A General No-Cloning Theorem for an Infinite Multiverse, Reports
on Mathematical Physics, vol. 72, 2013, pp. 191-199.

Normalisation in substructural term calculi

and Nenad Savic

Silvia Ghilezan, Jelena Ivetic

University of Novi Sad, Novi Sad, Serbia
gsilvia@uns.ac.rs, jelenaivetic@uns.ac.rs, nsavic@uns.ac.rs
The resource control lambda calculus, proposed in [3], is a term calculus with explicit
control of resources obtained by introducing operators for duplication and erasure of
variables, which encode the structural rules of contraction and thinning in the typed
term calculus. Substructural term calculi are obtained by imposing restrictions on
the syntax of the resource control lambda calculus along with appropriately modified
operational semantics and the type assignment rules. These substructural term calculi
are computational interpretations of substructural logics [1], namely of relevant and
affine logic.
In this paper, we study normalisation properties of the proposed substructural term
calculi. We prove the strong normalisation of the simply typed calculi. Further, we
prove the characterisation of strong normalisation by means of strict types, a particular
subset of intersection types.
We also discuss connections with other term calculi that extend Curry-Howard correspondence to substructural logics [2, 5]. This paper represents a continuation of the
investigation reported at UNILOG 2013 [4].
References
1. P. Schroder-Heister and K. Dosen, Substructural Logics, Oxford University Press,
1993.
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Sessions
2. D.M. Gabbay and R.J.G.B. de Queiroz, Extending the Curry-Howard interpretation to linear, relevant and other resource logics, The Journal of Symbolic Logic,
vol. 57, 1992, pp. 13191365.
3. S. Ghilezan, J. Ivetic, S. Likavec and P. Lescanne, Intersection Types for the Resource Control Lambda Calculi, in 8th International Colloquium on Theoretical
Aspects of Computing (ICTAC), Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6916,
Springer, 2011, pp. 116134.
4. J. Ivetic and P. Lescanne, Computational interpretations of some substructural
logics, 4th World Congress on Universal Logic (UNILOG), 2013.
5. H. Wansing, Formulas-as-types for a hierarchy of sublogics of intuitionistic propositional logic, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence, vol. 619, Springer, 1990,
pp. 125145.

Transreal Proof of the Existence of Universal Possible Worlds

Walter Gomide
, MT, Brazil
Federal University of Mato Grosso, Cuiaba
waltergomide@yahoo.com
Tiago S. dos Reis
Federal Institute of Education, Science and Technology
of Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
tiago.reis@ifrj.edu.br
James A.D.W. Anderson
University of Reading, Reading, UK
j.anderson@reading.ac.uk
Transreal arithmetic is total, in the sense that the fundamental operations of addition, subtraction, multiplication and division can be applied to any transreal numbers
with the result being a transreal number [1]. In particular division by zero is allowed.
It is proved, in [3], that transreal arithmetic is consistent and contains real arithmetic.
The entire set of transreal numbers is a total semantics that models all of the semantic
values, that is truth values, commonly used in logics, such as the classical, dialectic,
fuzzy and gap values [2]. By virtue of the totality of transreal arithmetic, these logics
can be implemented using total, arithmetical functions, specifically operators, whose
domain and counterdomain is the entire set of transreal numbers.
Taking Wittgensteins comments on logical space as a starting point, we develop a
mathematically well defined notion of logical space. We begin by defining a Cartesian
co-ordinate frame with a countable infinitude of transreal axes. We notionally tie
each axis to a distinct, atomic proposition. With this arrangement every point is a
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distinct possible world whose co-ordinates are the semantic values of its propositions.
Furthermore the points composing the whole of this space bijectively map the set of
all possible worlds. In other words, each one of all possible worlds is a unique point
in this world space. This allows us to rigorously apply topology to problems involving
all possible worlds, including all logics because these appear in some possible worlds.
Thus we provide both a universal metalogic and a foundation for particular universal
logics.
We then introduce a more abstract space by taking each point in world space, that
is we take each possible world, and use it as an axis in a very high dimensional space
of functions. We call a particular subset of this space proposition space. In proposition
space a given point, that is a given proposition, has, as co-ordinates, its semantic value
in each possible world. When we apply mathematical or logical operations in this
proposition space we are operating on all possible worlds at the same time.
We use linear transformations to define accessibility relations in world space and
to define logical transformations in proposition space. In proposition space we define
necessity and possibility as appear in modal logics and we establish a criterion to
distinguish whether a proposition is or is not classical. In world space we establish our
main result.
We extend standard results of topology to transreal spaces and prove that, in world
space, there is a dense set of, at least countably many, hypercyclic, possible worlds
that approximate every possible world, arbitrarily closely, by repeated application of a
single, linear operator the backward shift. In other words we prove the existence of
a countable infinitude of worlds which approximate every possible world by repeated
application of a single operator. That is we prove the existence of universal, possible
worlds.
Proving existence is useful but it leaves many questions open. We mention just two.
Are there any classical, hypercyclic worlds? Is there a construction for any hypercyclic
world?
References
1. J.A.D.W. Anderson, N. Volker and A.A. Adams, Perspex machine viii: Axioms of
transreal arithmetic, Vision Geometry XV, volume 6499, Proceedings of SPIE1 ,
edited by Longin Jan Lateki, David M. Mount and Angela Y. Wu, 2007,
pp. 2.12.12.
2. J.A.D.W. Anderson and W. Gomide, Transreal arithmetic as a consistent basis for paraconsistent logics, in Proceedings of World Congress on Engineering
and Computer Science, vol. 1, International Association of Engineers, 2014,
pp. 103108.
3. T.S. dos Reis and J.A.D.W. Anderson, Construction of the transcomplex numbers
from the complex numbers, in Proceedings of World Congress on Engineering and
Computer Science, vol. 1, International Association of Engineers, 2014, pp. 97102.
1

SPIE is the International Society for Optics and Photonics.

324

Sessions

Modelling choice sequences of high types

Farida Kachapova
Auckland University of Technology, Auckland, New Zealand
farida.kachapova@aut.ac.nz
Choice sequences play an important role in intuitionistic mathematics, where a
function is regarded as a construction process rather than a completed object. The
value of a choice sequence, or a freely growing sequence, can be generated effectively for
each input, though the generating algorithm might be unknown to the creating subject.
A lawless sequence is a choice sequence such that at any moment of its construction
only its initial sequence is known and nothing is known about its future values. The
theory of lawless sequences is inconsistent with classical logic.
Most research on choice sequences is done in intuitionistic analysis FIM, for sequences of natural numbers. The consistency proofs for theories with choice sequences
use specific intuitionistic models such as topological, Kripke and Beth models (see,
for example, [1]). A Beth model well represents the idea of a freely growing sequence
because in this model a choice sequence is incomplete at any moment and can grow
differently along different paths.
Bernini [2] introduced intuitionistic n-functionals, which are choice sequences of high
types (where the type n = 1, 2, 3, . . .). Thus, a 1-functional is a usual choice sequence of
natural numbers and an (n + 1)-functional is a freely growing sequence of n-functionals.
Here we consider the following main properties of choice sequences of high types (in
these formulas F n , Gn , . . . are variables for n-functionals and F n , G n , Hn , . . . are variables
for lawless n-functionals):
the axiom of density: xF n F n (y < x)(F(y) = F (y));
the principle of open data: (Hn ) xG n [(y < x)(G(y) = H(y)) (G)], where
formula has no parameters with types > n and Hn is the only parameter of with
type n;
the axiom of choice with uniqueness: x!Gn (x, G) F m x(x, F (x)(0)mn1 ),
where n < m and formula has no parameters with types > m .
We create a model for intuitionistic n-functionals to prove the consistency of the
theory with the aforementioned axioms. Beth model Bs (s 1) is constructed recursively
for all functionals of types s; nodes at each level of the models tree are made of finite
sequences of functionals from previous levels. This model also proves the consistency
of the theory of the creating subject in the language of n-functionals.
The soundness proof for the model Bs is carried out in the classical typed theory.
References
1. D. van Dalen, An interpretation of intuitionistic analysis, Annals of Mathematical
Logic, vol. 13, 1978, pp. 143.
2. S. Bernini, A very strong intuitionistic theory, Studia Logica, vol. 35, no. 4, 1976,
pp. 377385.
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Decidable Fragments of First Order Logic

G
odel Incompleteness Property
Mohamed Khaled
Central European University, Budapest, Hungary
rutmohamed@yahoo.com
The founding of the theory of cylindric algebras, by Tarski, was a conscious effort
to create algebras out of first order predicate calculus. Let n . The classes of noncommutative cylindric algebras (N CAn ) and weakened cylindric algebras (W CAn ), of
dimension n, were introduced by Nemeti as examples of decidable fragments of first
order logic with n variables. In this article, we give new proofs for the known facts, due
to Nemeti, that the classes N CAn and W CAn are both decidable and have the finite
model property. We also prove that the free algebras Frm N CAn and Frm W CAn are
not atomic for every finite m 0. In other words, the corresponding fragments of first
order logic have (weak) Godel incompleteness property.

A Modified Quasi-Set Theory without Identity

Daniel Molto
University of York, UK
dm639@york.ac.uk
Various philosophers have argued, for a variety of reasons, that the relation of
identity, that is absolute identity the relation that holds between a thing and itself
and a thing and nothing other than itself, either does not exist or does not apply
to certain classes of objects. The latter view has recently found proponents in the
philosophy of science (Krause 1992, Krause and French 2006, 2010). Following on a
suggestion from Schrodinger (1952), Decio Krause and Steven French have argued that
identity does not apply to the fundamental particles of quantum physics. Krause and
French go into great technical detail in support of their case. They develop a formal
axiomatized system, which they call quasi-set theory. In so doing, they show that
an alternative to ZF set theory can be provided which does not presuppose that every
entity in a domain of discourse is identical with itself. This is an important achievement,
as quasi-set theory can be used to show that notions such as that of a cardinal number
can be made sense of without appealing to identity (see also Domenech and Holik
2007). In what follows I will show how Krause and Frenchs quasi-set theory might be
further developed in order to provide support for a stronger thesis, that the relation of
absolute identity does not exist at all. This thesis is most famously associated with the
late Peter Geach (1972, 1973, 1980, 1991), and I shall call it GT, for Geachs Thesis,
in his honour. The central objection to GT is that it is incompatible with classical
semantics. By modifying quasi-set theory I will show that a non-classical semantics can
be developed which is compatible with GT, and therefore answer the objections against
this thesis.
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Sessions

A Generalization of Kuznetsovs Theorem and Its Consequences

Alexei Muravitsky
Northwestern State University, Natchitoches, USA
alexeim@nsula.edu
Let L be a propositional language with the connectives , , , and a countable
set Var of propositional variables. The metavariables for L-formulas are A, B, etc.
Expanding L by modality , we obtain language L , and expanding L by modality
, language L . The set of L-formulas, L -formulas and L -formulas are denoted
respectively by F m, F m , and F m . Also, we will need an axillary language, L ,
which is obtained by adding the modalities and to L. Accordingly, the set of
L -formulas is denoted by F m . The letters , , etc., are used as metavariables
for formulas of L , L , and L . (Since formulas of these languages will not be used
in one and the same context, confusion is unlikely.)
The following logics are in focus: Int (formulated in L), KM and K4.Grz (both
formulated in L ), as well as Grz (defined in L ); see [5]. Also, if L is one of these logics,
we consider the lattice NExtL of its normal extensions. We remind that L is said to be a
normal extension of L, if both are defined in the same language, L L , and L is closed
under the inference rules postulated in L. We assume that substitution and modus
ponens are among the postulated inference rules of the logics under consideration. In
addition to these rules, the rule / (necessitation rule) is postulated for K4.Grz
and Grz.
We define S (in L ) to be a KM-sublogic if S KM and S is closed under substitution and modus ponens. A numerous examples of KM-sublogics can be found in [4].
For instance, one of the KM-sublogics is mHC; cf. [1, 4]. The following theorem is
a slight generalization of Kuznetsovs theorem of the equipollence of Int and KM;
cf. [2, 5].
Theorem 1. Let S be a KM-sublogic. Then, for any set {A} of L-formulas,
S + A Int + A.
Now we introduce the following translations:
t F m F m
s F m F m
T F m F m
tr F m F m ,

(Godel-McKinsey-Tarski translation; see [5], p. 160.)

(splitting; see [5], p. 165.)
(translation T ; see [5], p. 178.)
where tr = s T.

Briefly, the first three of these translations can be described as follows:

t p t() t() t() t() (t() t()) t()
s s(A) = A s() = ( s()) s() = s()
T p T() T() T() T() (T() T()) T() T()
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Accordingly, for any {t, s, T , tr } and a suitable set of formulas, we define
() = {() }.
Further, we define the mappings:

Int + Grz + t()

mHC + K4.Grz + tr()
mHC + {A mHC + A}
K4.Grz + { F m K4.Grz + s()}.

It is well known that is an isomorphism; see e.g. [3], Proposition 1. Also, it was
announced in [1], Section 3, and proved in [4], Corollary 6, that is an isomorphism.
Using Theorem 1 and that and are isomorphisms, we obtain the following.
Theorem 2. In the diagram below mappings and are join epimorphisms and the
diagram is commutative.

NExtmHC NExtK4.Grz

NExtInt NExtGrz
Theorem 2 resembles Theorem of [3], which also states commutative of the diagram
of the normal extensions of the logics Int, Grz, KM and GL (formulated in L ).
Indeed, the proof of Theorem 2 implements the same idea which the proof of Theorem
of [3] does.
Since KM is a normal extension of mHC, in view of Theorem of [3] and Theorem 1,
[mHC, KM] 1 (Int) and [K4.Grz, GL] 1 (Grz).
We conclude formulating the following problems:
Problem 1. Is it true that 1 (Int) = [mHC, KM]?
Problem 2. Is it true that, for any L NExtInt, 1 (L) = [mHC + L, KM + L]?
Problem 3. Is it true that 1 (Grz) = [K4.Grz, GL]?
Problem 4. Is it true that for any M NExtGrz, 1 (M ) = [K4.Grz + M, GL + M ]?
References
1. L. Esakia, The modalized Heyting calculus: a conservative modal extension of the
intuitionistic logic, Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics, vol. 16, nos. 3-4, 2006,
pp. 349366.
2. A.V. Kuznetsov, The proof-intuitionistic propositional calculus, Dokl. Akad. Nauk
SSSR, vol. 283, no. 1, 1985, pp. 2730 (in Russian). English translation: Soviet
Math. Doklady, vol. 32, no. 1, 1985, pp. 2730.
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Sessions
3. A.V. Kuznetsov and A.Y. Muravitsky, On superintuitionistic logics as fragments
of proof logic extensions, Studia Logica, vol. 45, no. 1, 1986, pp. 7799.
4. T. Litak, Constructive modalities with provability smack, in Leo Esakia on Duality in Modal and Intuitionistic Logics, edited by G. Bezhanishvili, Springer, 2014,
pp. 187216.
5. A. Muravitsky, Logic KM: A Biography, in Leo Esakia on Duality in Modal and
Intuitionistic Logics, edited by G. Bezhanishvili, Springer, 2014, pp. 155185.

Logics of Non-Deterministic Quasiary Predicates

Mykola Nikitchenko and Stepan Shkilniak
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
nikitchenko@unicyb.kiev.ua, sssh@unicyb.kiev.ua
Logics of quasiary predicates naturally arise when partial predicates over partial
variable assignments are considered. Such logics are generalizations of traditional logics of n-ary predicates. In [1, 2] main properties of logics over partial single-valued
(deterministic) predicates were studied. Here we investigate properties of many-valued
(non-deterministic) quasiary predicates and their special cases.
Logics of such predicates are defined in the following way. Let V be a set of names
(variables) and A be a set of basic values (urelements). Partial mappings from V to
A are called nominative sets; their class is denoted VA (in traditional terms nominative
sets are partial variable assignments). The class of non-deterministic (many-valued)
predicates over VA is denoted P rN DV,A . Then an algebra
x
n
AP rN DV,A = P rN DV,A , , , Rxv11,...,v
,...,xn , ,

with such operations (called compositions) as disjunction , negation , renomination

n
x
Rxv11,...,v
,...,xn , and existential quantification is defined. The compositions are defined
in the style of Kleenes strong connectives using technique described in [3]; parameters
x, x1 , . . . , xn , v1 , . . . , vn belong to V , n 0. Such algebras (for various A) form a semantic
base of a logic of non-deterministic quasiary predicates. Formulas of the logic are terms
of these algebras. Interpretations are defined in a usual way.
For a predicate p P rN DV,A its truth and falsity domains are denoted T (p) and
F (p) respectively; the image of d VA under p is denoted p[d].
A predicate p P rN DV,A is
single-valued (has gaps) if T (p) F (p) = ;
glut (dual to single-valued) if T (p) F (p) =VA;
monotone if p[d1 ] p[d2 ] for any d1 , d2 VA such that d1 d2 ;
antitone (dual to monotone) if p[d2 ] p[d1 ] for any d1 , d2 VA such that d1 d2 .
Obtained predicate classes are denoted P rV,A , P rGV,A , P rM V,A , and P rAV,A respectively. These classes (for various A) form a semantic base for corresponding logics
of non-deterministic quasiary predicates.
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The following consequence relations are required to catch adequately specifics of
these classes:
logical consequence ;
truth domains consequence T ;

falsity domains consequence F ;

truth-falsity domains consequence

TF

The main obtained results for the defined logics of non-deterministic quasiary predicates are the following:
it is proved that predicate classes P rV,A , P rGV,A , P rM V,A , and P rAV,A form subalgebras of AP rN DV,A ;
properties of these sub-algebras are studied;
properties of consequence relations , T , F , and TF are investigated;
sound and complete calculi of a sequent type are constructed for the considered
logics.
The constructed logics are more adequate for specification of software systems because they are semantics-based logics that reflect such system properties as quasiarity,
partiality, and non-determinism.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko and S. Shkilniak, Mathematical logic and theory of algorithms, Publishing house of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, 2008. (In
Ukrainian.)
2. S. Shkilniak and M. Nikitchenko, Composition-Nominative Logics of Partial Quasiary
Functions and Predicates, in Handbook of the 4th World Congress and School on
Universal Logic, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 2013, pp. 335337.
3. A. Avron, A. Zamansky, in Non-deterministic semantics for logical systems, in
Handbook of Philosophical Logic, edited by D. Gabbay and F. Guenther, vol. 16,
2nd edition, Springer, Netherlands, 2011, pp. 227304.

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Sessions

Predictive Competitive Model Game Trees

Cyrus F. Nourani
Technical University of Berlin, Germany
Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, Vancouver, Canada
cyrusfn@alum.mit.edu
Competitive game tree modeling and predictive game logic is briefed. The techniques are developed on descriptive game models and compatibility is characterized.
Specific game models are presented to illustrate the techniques. Minimal prediction is
a technique defined since the authors model- theoretic planning project. It is a cumulative nonmonotonic approximations attained with completing model diagrams on what
might be true in a model or knowledge base. A predictive diagram for a theory T is a
diagram D(M ), where M is a model for T , and for any formula q in M , either the function f q {0, 1} is defined, or there exists a formula p in D(M ), such that T p proves
q; or that T proves q by minimal prediction. A generalized predictive diagram is a
predictive diagram with D(M ) defined from a minimal set of functions. The predictive
diagram could be minimally represented by a set of functions f1 , . . . , fn that inductively
define the model. The free trees we had defined by the notion of provability implied
by the definition, could consist of some extra Skolem functions g1 , . . . , gl that appear at
free trees. The f terms and g terms, tree congruences, and predictive diagrams then
characterize fragment deduction with free trees. The predictive diagrams are applied
to discover models for game trees. The techniques are developed on a descriptive game
logic where model compatibility is characterized on von Neumann, Morgenstern, Kuhn
VMK game descriptions model embedding and game goal satisfiability.
Definition 1. A VMK game function situation consists of a domain N H, where N
is the set of natural numbers, H a set of game history sequences, and a mapping pair
g, f . f maps function letters to (agent) functions and g maps pairs from N H to
{t, f}.
We can state preliminary theorems on VMK sequent action games. Basic agent logic
soundness and completeness areas were examined by the first author on e.g. (Nourani
1996,1999). Making preliminary assumptions on VMK game situations let us examine
soundness and completeness questions. Let us consider stratification as the process
whereby generic diagrams are characterized with recursive computations on action sequent functions on game trees. Example conclusions are:
Theorem 1. A set of first order definable game tree goals G is attainable iff there
exists an predictive diagram for the logical consequences to G on the game tree model.
Theorem 2. There is a sound and complete action sequent logic on VMK game situations provided
(i) VMK action sequent language is a countable infinitary language fragment.
(ii) The information partitions are definable on a countable generic diagram.
(iii) Game tree node ordinal is definable with a countable conjunction on the generic
diagrams.
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References
1. C.F. Nourani and O. Schulte, Multiagent Decision Trees, Competitive Models,
and Goal Satisfiability, Proceedings of Third International Conference on Digital
Information and Communication Technology and its Applications, The Society of
Digital Information and Wireless Communications Publications, Ostrava, Czech
Republic, 2013.
2. C.F. Nourani, Slalom Tree Computing A Computing Theory for Artificial Intelligence, A.I. Communications, vol. 9, no. 4, IOS Press, Amsterdam, 1996.
3. O. Schulte and J. Delgrande, Representing von Neumann-Morgenstern Games in
the Situation Calculus, Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence, vol. 42(1
3), Special Issue on Multi-Agent Systems and Computational Logic, 2004, pp. 73
101.
4. C.F. Nourani, A Descriptive Computing, in Information Sciences Forum, Leipzig,
German, March 2009. Systems Sciences Journal, Forsyth Academy Publications,
Glasgow, Scotland, UK.
5. C.F. Nourani and O. Schulte, Competitive Models, Descriptive Computing, and
Nash Games, Association for Computing Machinery, Oxford, Mississipi, USA,
2013.
6. J.F. Nash, Non-cooperative games, Annals of Mathematics, vol. 54, 1951, pp. 286
295.
7. C.F. Nourani, Infinitary Multiplayer Games, Utrecht, 1999. Proceedings of European Summer Meeting of the Association For Symbolic Logic, The Bulletin of
Symbolic Logic, vol. 6, no. 1,2000.

Harmonizing involutive and constructive negations

Mattia Petrolo
Paris 1 Panthe
on-Sorbonne, Paris, France
IHPST Universite
mattia.petrolo@univ-paris1.fr
Paolo Pistone
Roma Tre, Roma, Italy
Universita
heighteight@gmail.com
It is well known that in linear logic it is possible to define two distinct forms of
consistency on the basis of the two constants for false: and 0. Strong consistency
is defined as is not provable, while weak consistency as 0 is not provable. It can be
easily shown that the first entails the second, but the reverse does not hold. So for
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example, the set {a, a } is not -consistent, but it is 0-consistent. In classical logic, 0
is equivalent to , so the distinction does not hold. In intuitionistic logic, it is even
impossible to express -inconsistency.
The significance of these two forms of consistency is here investigated by exploiting
the two kinds of negations arising in this setting: A = A and A0 = A 0. The
aim of this work is twofold. First, we investigate the possibility of making involutive
(thus respecting classical principles) and constructive (thus respecting intuitionistic
principles) negations co-exist in a natural deduction framework. One of the interesting
features of such a setting is that it allows to avoid the well-known collapse obtained
when classical and intuitionistic negations are mixed in a single system. Secondly, we
justify our framework along proof theoretic lines.

Fuzzy Syllogisms
Gerald S. Plesniewicz
Moscow Power Engineering Institute, Moscow, Russia
salve777@mail.ru
Traditionally, the connectives in Aristotelian logic (AL) are denoted by a, e, i , o
and mean inclusion, disjointedness, non-void intersection, and non-inclusion of sets, i.e.
we have for any interpretation .:
P a Q x[(x P (x Q))],
P e Q x[(x P x Q)],
P i Q x[x P x Q],
P o Q x[x P (x Q)].
In propositional Aristotelian logic (PAL) set variables P and Q are replaced with
propositional variables p and q.Then in PAL we define for any interpretation .:
p a q = (p q),
p e q = (p q),
p i q = p q,
p o q = p q.
It is easy to prove that the problem of logical consequence for AL is reduced to the
same problem for PAL. Let us introduce fuzzy propositional Aristotelian logic (FPAL).
It has the same syntax as for PAL and has the following semantics:
p a q = 1 min{p,1 q},
p e q = 1 min{p,q},
p i q = min{p,q},
p o q = min{p,1 q}.
Let s, t [0,1], s t and be a FPAL statement.Then s t is called an estimate
(for the statement ). Estimates can be considered as statements of a crisp logic with
fuzzy interpretation. By definition, s t is true if and only if the double inequality
s t takes place. The logic eFPAL of estimates has the relation = of logical
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consequence: for a set E of estimates and an estimate , E = if and only if there is
no interpretation such that all E are true and is false. But eFPAL has also the
relation =s of strong logical consequence: E = s s t if and only if E = s
t but it is not true that E = s t when s < s or t < t. It is clear that s and t
are defined uniquely.
For example, let us consider the strong logical consequence
a p i q c, b q a r d =s g p i r h.
Then g and h functionally depend on a, b, c and d. It turns out that g = min{a, b}
if a + b >1 otherwise = 0, and h = max{c, d} if c + d <1 otherwise = d. One can consider
a p i q c, b q a r d g p i r h as a sound rule of inference in eFPAN.
We say that this rule is the fuzzy syllogism with the pattern iai and the parameters a,
b, c, d. In general, let , , {a, e,i , o, a*, o* } where * denotes the inversion of
binary relation. Then the rule a p q c, b q r d g p r h is the
fuzzy syllogism with the pattern and the parameters a, b, c, d. The task consists
in finding of g andh for all fuzzy algorithms. Clearly, there are exactly 63 = 216
of functions g (andh ). However, it is enough to find only 6 of them. In fact, there
are simple dependences between them.
Clearly that a p a q b 1 b p o q 1 a and a p e q b 1 b p
i q 1 a.Therefore, we can exclude from consideration the syllogisms with patterns
containing the symbols a and e; thus, only 33 = 27 syllogisms remain. It easy to reduce
them to syllogisms with 6 patterns: aai , aaa* , iaa, iai , iii , a*ai . Here are the
functions g and h for these syllogisms:
gaai = min{1 c, d};
haai = 1;
gaaa = 1 d;
haaa = 1;
giaa = b if a + b > 1, or 1c if a + b 1 and c + d <1, or 0 if a + b 1 and c + d 1;
hiaa = 1a if a + b >1, or max{d,1a} if a + b 1;
giai = min{a, b} if a + b > 1, or 0 if a + b 1;
hiaa = max{c, d} if c + d <1, or d if c + d 1;
giii = min{a, b};
hiii = max{c, d} if b > c and a > d, or c if b c and a > d, or d if b > c and a d, or 0 if
b c and a d;
haai = 0;
haai = min{a, b} if a + b > 1, or 0 if a + b 1.
We have found the functions g and h using the method of analytical tableaux for
inference in eFPAN.

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Sessions

On various concepts of ultrafilter extensions

of first-order models
Nikolai L. Poliakov and Denis I. Saveliev
Moscow State University, Russia
gelvella@mail.ru, d.i.saveliev@gmail.com
There exist two known concepts of ultrafilter extensions of first-order models. One
comes from modal logic, where it has firstly appeared for binary relations in [1], was used
to characterize modal definability [2], and later was generalized to n-ary relations and
studied in [3, 4]. Another one comes from algebra of ultrafilters, a technique of extending semigroups by ultrafilters over them, which was used in various Ramsey-theoretic
results of number theory, algebra, and dynamics, see [5]. Recently this approach was
generalized to arbitrary first-order models in [6], where it was shown that the extended

model relates to the original one, roughly, in the same manner as the StoneCech
compactification to the underlying space.
Here we firstly observe that the operation of ultrafilter extension itself can be extended, in the same way, to ultrafilters over the underlying model-theoretic structure.
This leads to the concept of generalized models consisting not of relations and operations but rather of ultrafilters over them. Furthermore, the proposed construction
allows to describe both aforementioned concepts of ultrafilter extension uniformly and,
moreover, observe a spectrum of possible types of ultrafilter extensions. Finally, we
establish new facts on formulas preserved under ultrafilter extensions, provide topological characterizations of the extensions, and describe their interplay with operations of
relation algebra, generalizing results of [6, 7].
References
1. E.J. Lemmon and D. Scott, An Introduction to Modal Logic, Blackwell, Oxford,
1977.
2. J. van Benthem, Notes on modal definability, Notre Dame Journal of Formal
Logic, vol. 30(1), 1988, pp. 2035.
3. R. Goldblatt, Varieties of complex algebras, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
vol. 44, 1989, pp. 173242.
4. V. Goranko, Filter and ultrafilter extensions of structures: universal-algebraic aspects, manuscript, 2007.

5. N. Hindman and D. Strauss, Algebra in the StoneCech

Compactification, second
edition, Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co. KG, 2012.
6. D.I. Saveliev, Ultrafilter extensions of models, Lecture Notes in AICS, Springer,
vol. 6521, 2011, pp. 162177. An expanded version in The Infinity Project Proceedings, edited by S.-D. Friedman et al., CRM Documents, vol. 11, Barcelona, 2012,
pp. 599616.
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7. D.I. Saveliev, On two concepts of ultrafilter extensions of binary relations, preprint,
2014.

Periodicity vs reflexivity in revision theories

Edoardo Rivello
University of Torino, Torino, Italy
rivello.edoardo@gmail.com
Revision sequences were introduced in 1982 by Herzberger and Gupta (independently) as a set-theoretical tool in formalising their respective theories of self-referential
truth. Since then, revision has developed in a general method for the analysis of theoretical concepts, with several applications in many areas of logic and philosophy, like
rational belief, circular definitions, theories of truth and meaning, and others (Loewe,
2006, provides a survey).
Revision sequences are understood as iterations of some fixed function, called the
revision operator, and are usually formalised in set theory as ordinal-length sequences.
This move from finite iterations to transfinite ones has to face with the problem of what
to do at limit stages. The process of revision is no longer determined by the iterated
application of the revision operator from some starting point: we have to add the limit
rule as a further parameter in order to specify a revision process, and this addition
affects the entire revision theory by an element of (usually unwelcomed) arbitrariness.
A common idea of revision process is shared by all revision theories, but specific
proposals can differ in the limit rule they suggest and in the philosophical analysis of
the introduced arbitrariness. Two prominent proposals in the literature on revision
are Herzbergers (1982) and Gupta-Belnaps (1993): they are representative of two
quite opposite ways of handling arbitrariness in revision sequences (deterministic vs
non-deterministic limit rules) and show different mathematical features, which we can
resume under the properties of periodicity and reflexivity, respectively.
In this talk we will concentrate on the role played by periodicity and reflexivity in
connection with the appraisal of both deterministic and non-deterministic limit rules.
This study aims for a critical use of the method of revision in philosophy and, in particular it aims to avoid the risk, in performing a revision-theoretic analysis, of ascribing
to the object of the analysis, for instance the concept of truth, properties which depend
on the mathematical tool.
We will isolate a notion of cofinally dependent limit rule, encompassing both
Herzbergers and Belnaps ones, to study periodicity and reflexivity in a common framework and to contrast them both from a philosophical and from a mathematical point
of view. We establish the equivalence of weak versions of these properties with the
revision-theoretic notion of recurrent hypothesis and draw from this fact some observations about the problem of choosing the right limit rule when performing a revisiontheoretic analysis.

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Sessions
References
1. A. Gupta and N. Belnap, The Revision Theory of Truth, MIT Press, Cambridge,
MA, USA, 1993.
2. A. Gupta, Truth and paradox, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11, no. 1, 1982,
pp. 160.
3. H.G. Herzberger, Notes on naive semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, vol. 11,
no. 1, 1982, pp. 61102.
4. B. Lowe, Revision Forever!, in Conceptual Structures: Inspiration and Application, 14th International Conference on Conceptual Structures, ICCS 2006, Aalborg,
Denmark, July 1621, 2006, edited by H. Scharfe et al., Springer-Verlag, 2006,
pp. 2236.

Embedding of First-Order Nominal Logic

into Higher-Order Logic
Alexander Steen and Max Wisniewski1
Freie Universitt Berlin, Berlin, Germany
a.steen@fu-berlin.de, max.wisniewski@fu-berlin.de
Nominal logic, also referred to as hybrid logic, is a general term for extensions
of ordinary modal logics that introduce a new sort of atomic formulae, the so called
nominals. These nominals are only true at one possible world and false at every other
world. The shifter, denoted @, can be used to evaluate the truth of a formula at a given
world corresponding to nominal i as in @i . The simplest of those nominal extensions
including the above ingredients is often denoted H [4]. Early nominal logics originated
from Arthur Priors research on tense logics [7] and were, since then, heavily researched,
most notably by Robert Bull, Robert Blackburn [4] and Valentin Goranko [9].
Classical higher-order logic (HOL) (also known as Churchs Simple Theory of Types
[5]) is an expressive formal system that allows quantification over arbitrary sets and
functions. Its semantics is meanwhile well-understood [2] and several sophisticated
automated theorem provers for HOL (with respect to Henkin semantics) exist (e.g.
LEO-II, Satallax, Isabelle).
We employ an embedding for quantified (first-order) ordinary modal logic into HOL
(see [1]) and appropriately augment it for the sound and complete embedding of firstorder nominal logic (FONL). The embedding approach suggests that FONL can be
regarded a fragment of classical higher-order logic and thus allows the out-of-the-box
automation of the here discussed nominal logic using common HOL automated theorem
provers.
1

This work has been supported by the German National Research Foundation (DFG) under grant BE
2501/11-1 (LEO-III).

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As a proof of concept, we implemented the above embedding for first-order nominal
tense logic, a quantified version of the nominal tense logic used by Blackburn [4], as a
theory in Isabelle/HOL and a TPTP problem file in THF format [8]. The embedding
implementation was successfully applied to automatically prove certain correspondence
theorems between frame conditions and axiom schemes, including those of regular modal
logic and those which can only be expressed within the extended expressivity of nominal
logic [3]. Further experiments could be expanded to more complex applications, e.g.
for formalizations from the field of linguistics and philosophy.
The self-imposed restriction to first-order quantification within the embedding is
somewhat artificial: Second-order or even higher-order quantification could easily be
reduced to the quantification of the HOL meta-logic. But since the semantics of higherorder notions of nominal logics is not immediately clear, the formal treatment of higherorder quantification in the nominal logic context is further work [6].
Already existing automated theorem provers, such as hylotab, htab and spartacus
are restricted to propositional nominal logic and subjacent modal logic K. In contrast,
our embedding allows the flexible adjustment of the underlying modal logic (by imposing frame conditions at meta-logic level) and the addition of further modal operators.
References
1. C. Benzm
uller, L. Paulson, Quantified Multimodal Logics in Simple Type Theory,
Logica Universalis, vol. 7(1), 2013, pp. 720.
2. C. Benzm
uller, D. Miller, Automation of Higher-Order Logic, Handbook of the
History of Logic, vol. 9, Elsevier, 2014.
3. P. Blackburn, Representation, reasoning, and relational structures: a hybrid logic
manifesto, Logic Journal of IGPL, vol. 8(3), 2000, pp. 339365.
4. P. Blackburn et al., Handbook of Modal Logic, Studies in Logic and Practical Reasoning, Elsevier Science, 2006.
5. A. Church, A Formulation of the Simple Theory of Types, The Journal of Symbolic
Logic, vol. 5(2), 1940, pp. 5668.
6. M. Wisniewski and A. Steen, Embedding of Quantified Higher-Order Nominal
Modal Logic into Classical Higher-Order Logic, in Proceedings of the 1st Automated
Reasoning in Quantified Non-Classical Logics (ARQNL), 2014.
7. A.N. Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford University Press, 1968.
8. C. Benzm
uller, F. Rabe, G. Sutcliffe, THF0 the core of the TPTP language for
classical higher-order logic, in Proceedings of the 4th International Joint Conference
on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR), 2009.
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9. V. Goranko, Temporal Logic with Reference Pointers, in Proceedings of the 1st
International Conference on Temporal Logic (ICTL), Lecture Notes on Artificial
Intelligence, vol. 827, Springer, 1994.

Philosophy
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Jc Beall (page 80).

Between triviality and informativeness Identity: Its logic

and its puzzles
Bazzoni
Andre
University of California, Berkeley, USA
bazzoni@berkeley.edu
This work is supported by FAPESP (Brazil).
D. Lewis (Logic Matters, 1972, pp. 192193) famously affirmed that there is never
any problem about identity. We never have. Identity is utterly simple and unproblematic. However, philosophers and logicians seem to be very far from giving up thinking
about identity and the various persisting puzzles it raises.
This talk will address the logical nature of the identity relation in model-theoretical
terms. I shall introduce a simple generalization of the binary identity relation, and
starting from the unary case we will be able to see in a clearer way the trivial flavor
of identity as observed by Lewis. Specifically, the present treatment will show why
standard definitions of identity are typically circular: (generalized) identities are (given
some model M for the underlying language) mere echoes of the domain M of M.
The unary case (i.e., self-identity) seems to give room to no puzzle at all. As Lewis
himself puts it, [e]verything is identical to itself; nothing is ever identical to anything
except itself (ibid.). Lewis view could thus be taken as the view that identity is really
self-identity. It will be shown, however, that there are formal reasons to consider higher
arities as well. One reason is that M may be echoed not only through the repetition
of its elements, as in the case of generalized identity whose members are tuples such
as (a), (a, a), (a, a, a), etc. (for a M ), but also through function applications such
as f M M , g M 2 M , h M 3 M , etc. The unary case is simply the special case
in which the function is the zero-ary identity function, whereas the standard binary
relation is the unary identity function, and so on.
This kind of function application is not necessarily problematic, though, if we keep
the functional notation in the language as well. For instance, in the case of Freges
identity puzzle (cf. Sinn und Bedeutung, 1892), we could argue that there can only
be any cognitive difference between a = a and a = b, if b is not a constant but rather
some function application such as f (c), where c may then be a constant. This requires,
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of course, that different constants denote different individuals of M . I shall briefly discuss 5.53 of Wittgensteins Tractatus (1922) (identity of object [should be expressed]
by identity of sign) in connection with a recent paper by B. Rogers and K.F. Wehmeier;
as well as Freges own initial conception (in his Begriffsscrift, 1879) of identity as a relation between symbols.
It is thus when one allows different constants to denote the same object that identity
begins (at best) to have informative content, and (at worst) to generate persistent
philosophical puzzles. I shall discuss the relation between this point and the role of
identity in natural languages, still bearing on Frege (1892). I shall suggest that the
shift from the trivial logic of identity to the actual functioning of identity statements
in natural language should be accompanied by a corresponding shift in our traditional
conception of an individual in the first place. In brief, we should search for a notion
of individual occurrence as the basic notion on top of which individuals simpliciter
are built up. This in turn would allow us to distinguish identity as a relation holding
between identical occurrences, and identity as a relation holding between (possibly
different) occurrences of the same individual simpliciter. I shall finally discuss how this
treatment could lead to a general method of solving standard identity puzzles found in
the literature.

Logic and Metaphysics

Ahmet Ayhan C
itil
Istanbul 29 Mays University, Istanbul,

Turkey
acitil@29mayis.edu.tr
From Platos Sophist and Kants Critique of Pure Reason to Freges Foundations
of Arithmetic and Wittgensteins Tractatus the nature of the relation between what is
and what can be stated or represented in formal-logical system has always been one
of the most fundamental problems for both logicians and metaphysicians. Within the
last couple of decades we witness a revitalization of this issue because a wide variety of
philosophical projects which somehow rest on some sort of a logical foundation tends
to reach some universal result about reality. To give a few examples, these projects
range from Alain Badious theory of subject which takes set theory as ontology to
Timothy Williamsons argument concerning necessary existents which takes modal logic
as metaphysics, or from John Searles social ontology which takes the semantics of
speech acts as its starting point to Graham Priests real contradictions as limits of
thought which takes non-classical (dialethic) logic as the right logic. At this presentation
we try to investigate the possibility of putting any limitations to such transitions from
what is logical to what is ontological relying on the ontological foundations of the
formal-logical objects themselves. To this end we focus on what a formal-logical object
is and try to uncover if they rest on anything non-formal. We defend the view that a
formal-logical object is constructed whenever a finite set of signs is ordered in a finite
sequence by means of the order of natural numbers within the topos (Tr. mekan) of pure
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constructions which as well rest on the intuitive senses (Ger. Sinne) of One, Two and
Three. Formal-logical objects rest ontologically on the natural numbers which should
be taken to be a priori objects existing independently of and prior to any formal-logical
construction. We conclude the paper with some philosophical consequences of the
results we have reached in our investigation.

Multidimensional Questions in Knowledge Dynamics:

A Study in Diachronic Logic
ska, Piotr Le
Katarzyna Gan-Krzywoszyn
sniewski
and Malgorzata Le
sniewska
, Poland
Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznan
katarzyna.gan.krzywoszynska@gmail.com, grus@amu.edu.pl,
remiz@amu.edu.pl
The primary and pervasive significance of knowledge lies in its guidance of action:
knowing is for the sake of doing. And action, obviously, is rooted in evaluation.
C. I. Lewis
Diachronic logic was introduced by Roman Suszko in [11] as a systematic study of
transformations in epistemological oppositions E-oppositions for short in standard set-theoretic settings. An E-opposition is therefore an ordered pair of the form
S, O, where S is called the subject (the mind ) and O is the object (the world for
the mind ). The main component of the subject is a formalized language. The object
(model) correlated with the subject is a model of the language. The model-theoretic
semantics allows one to define the relation of consequence in a given language; for example, two players (namely a machine and its environment) within the framework
of game semantics and/or computational logic form of an E-opposition. Two extensions of diachronic logic are presented from the point of view of the practical turn in
logic [2]. The first is axiological. Following the famous formula by C.I. Lewis [8], the
concepts of change, development and progress are explicated by means of hierarchical knowledge systems, i.e. structures of the form: S = T, R, h, where T is a set of
transformations of E-oppositions, h is a hierarchy of values in S, and R is a relation
over T . The second extension an erotetic one carries with it a lesson from the
methodological analysis of evolutionary developmental biology. The so-called singleinterrogative (or individual-interrogative) approach to scientific problems appears to be
somewhat inadequate. Hence E-oppositions with multidimensional questions (interrelated interrogatives) should be consistently elaborated. Relevant concepts related to
erotetic non-rationality (i.e. irrationality and counterrationality) are briefly sketched
out.

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References
1. G. Fusco, M. Lesniewska, L. Congiu and G. Bertorelle, Population Genetic Structure of a Centipede Species with High Levels of Developmental Instability, 2015,
PLoS ONE 10(6): e0126245, doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0126245.
2. D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods, The Practical Turn in Logic, in Handbook of Philosophical Logic, vol. 13, edited by D.M. Gabbay and F. Guenthner, Springer, Dordrecht, 2005, pp. 15122.
3. K. Gan-Krzywoszy
nska and P. Lesniewski, An Erotetic Hexagon: Oppositions as a
Basis for the Logic of Questions, in New Dimensions of the Square of Opposition,
edited by J.-Y. Beziau and K. Gan-Krzywoszy
nska, Philosophia Verlag, Analytica,
2015, pp. 359382.
4. M. Lesniewska, L. Bonato, A. Minelli and G. Fusco, Trunk Abnormalities in the
Centipede Stigmatogaster subterranea Give Insight into Late-Embryonic Segmentation, Arthropod Structure & Development, vol. 38(5), 2009, pp. 417426.
5. M. Lesniewska, Morphological Anomalies in Haplophilus subterraneus (Shaw, 1794)
(Chilopoda: Geophilomorha), 2012, Kontekst Publishing House.
6. M. Lesniewska, L. Bonato and G. Fusco, Morphological Anomalies in a Polish
Population of Stigmatogaster subterranea (Chilopoda, Geophilomorpha): a MultiYear Survey, Soil Organisms, vol. 81, 2009, pp. 347358.
7. P. Lesniewski and A. Wisniewski, Reducibility of Questions to Sets of Questions:
Some Feasibility Results, Logique et Analyse 173-174-175, 2001, pp. 93111.
8. C.I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, Open Court Publishing Company, 1946.
9. A.C. Love, The Erotetic Organization of Developmental Biology, in Towards a
Theory of Development, edited by A. Minelli and T. Pradeu, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014.
10. G.F. Scott, Developmental Biology, Sinauer Associates, Sunderland, MA, USA,
2010.
11. R. Suszko, Formal Logic and the Development of Knowledge, in Problems in the
Philosophy of Science, edited by I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave, North-Holland, 1968,
pp. 210227.
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Is self-evidence evident?
u
c
ven
Ozg
Gu
Istanbul University, Istanbul,

Turkey
ozgucistanbul.edu.tr
This talk focuses on the notion of self-evidence. It is usually understood that a selfevident proposition is the one that does not need any explanation or argument. One, a
priori knows a self-evident propositions truth and this proposition is not derived from
any other propositions. Thus it may said that a self-evident proposition is evident
to everyone. But we also know that some self-evident propositions are thought to be
so, while others evaluate those propositions not self-evident. Then what is to be a
proposition to be self-evident? Does self-evidence depends on the agents theoretical
inclinations? Are there types of self-evident propositions? Are there fixed conditions
that makes a proposition self-evident? Is it more appropriate to use being taken selfevident instead of being self-evident ? Is self-evidence a pragmatic consideration?
I will deal those questions in order to argue that self-evidence is a certain degree
subjective notion that plays a necessary role in the logical deductions.

The meaninglessness of algebraic-semantics

Rational Agents WITH-IN Logic and its Semantics
Satoru Hanada
Graduate School of Letters(M1), Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan
shanada3007@eis.hokudai.ac.jp
In this presentation, I would like to make it clear that any logical system and its
semantics which are object-languages do not contain any meaning through examining
algebraic-semantics.
I first explain the term WITH-IN briefly. What I want to say by this quickie may
be understood by comparing the phrase construct from within. In case of the latter
phrase, it focuses on the inside of a given system. I think, however, the domain of logic
is not confined merely in the system. It is rather extended to the outside. On the other
hand, we can think of anything only inside the language. Therefore, to make these
conditions clear, I use the term with and in with subtle connection.
I would like to examine a summation of algebraic-semantics:
Algebraic-semantics merely substitutes equations and inequalities of algebra
for axioms and rules of logical system.
In other words, algebraic-semantics is paraphrase for the given logical system. And
vice versa. Moreover, from the algebraic-semantics for LJ, finite model property and
Stones representation theorem, we cannnot get the algebraic-semantics for LJ.
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I think, this is the fact, however, there is no problem. Through making a clear distinction between object-language and meta-language, it will be easy to understand that
logical system and its semantics do say nothing but themselves (operability). However,
Rational Beings can find their meanings in meta-languages and in the world.

The Inseparability of Lingua Universalis

from Calculus Ratiocinator
Priyedarshi Jetli
Tata Institute of Social Sciences, Tuljapur, India
pjetli@gmail.com
Historians of logic have made great use of Leibnizs distinction between a lingua universalis (lu) and a calculus ratiocinator (cr ). In [4] Hintikka states: On the one hand,
Leibniz proposed to develop a [. . . ] lingua characteristica which was to be a universal
language of human thought [. . . ] On the other hand, [. . . ] a calculus ratiocinator [. . . ]
as a method of symbolic calculation which would mirror the process of human reasoning (p. ix). Hintikka describes two parallel streams of the development of modern logic:
Boole, Peirce and Schroder developed calculus ratiocinator and Frege concentrated on
lingua characteristica (p. ix). Heijenoort (in [7]) defends Freges Begriffsschrift ([3])
against the criticism of Schroder: unlike Boole, his logic is [. . . ] not merely a calculus
ratiocinator, but a lingua characterica. If we come to understand what Frege means by
this opposition, we shall gain a useful insight into the history of logic ([7], p. 324); and
However, the opposition between calculus ratiocinator and lingua characterica goes
much beyond the distinction between the propositional calculus and quantification theory (ibid., p. 325). {All underlining is mine for emphasis.}
In [6] Peckhaus questions the opposition of these two as indicated by the question
mark in the title. I argue that the historians of logic are somewhat misled and that
Aristotle, Leibniz, Boole and Frege, employed the integrated inseparability of cr and
lu rather than an opposition in their works.
Aristotle begins [1] with: First we must state the subject of the enquiry [. . . ] it is
about demonstrative understanding. Next, we must determine what a proposition is,
what a term is, and what a deduction is [. . . ] (24a ). This is a perfect introduction
to the integration of cr and lu. The purpose of logic is to lay down the rules for valid
deduction, but to understand these rules we must first construct a lu through which we
will formulate the types of deduction and the rules for valid deduction. Aristotle provides the rules for determining validity of syllogisms, this is cr, and these are sustained
until today. It is also clear to Aristotle that without the ideography, without knowing
what is the major term, minor term and the middle term, these rules cannot even be
stated; hence, lu and cr are inseparably linked.
Leibniz in [5] stated this inseparable link clearly in a letter to Remond: I should
still hope to create a universal symbolistic [specieuse generale] in which all truths of
reason would be reduced to a kind of calculus. At the same time this could be a kind
of universal language or writing [. . . ] (1715). A lu then is a necessary condition for cr.
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Boole stated in [2]:
That which renders Logic possible, is the existence in our minds of general
notions, [. . . ] The theory of Logic is thus intimately connected with that of
Language. A successful attempt to express logical propositions by symbols, the
laws of whose combinations should be founded upon the laws of the mental
processes which they represent, would, so far, be a step toward a philosophical
language (1847, pp. 45).
This integration of laws of thought with language is the inseparability of cr from lu.
Freges in [3] has a beginning reminiscent of Aristotle:
In apprehending a scientific truth we pass, as a rule, through various degrees
of certitude. [. . . ] a general proposition comes to be more and more securely
established [. . . ] through chains of inferences [. . . ] The most reliable way to
carry out a proof [. . . ] is to follow pure logic. My initial step was to attempt to
reduce the concept of ordering in a sequence to that of logical consequence [. . . ]
I had to bend every effort to keep the chain of inferences free of gaps. [. . . ] I
found the inadequacy of language to be an obstacle; [. . . ] This deficiency led me
to the idea of the present ideography (1879, pp. 56).
Frege begins proof theory as a component of cr, but in developing a cr for sequences
he finds the inadequacy of the language used by the mathematicians at his time; so he
moves to his notational ideography which is the lu that became necessary for him to
carry out the cr.
In conclusion, contrary to the claims of some historians of logic that cr and lu are
in opposition, we find that as far as the greatest logicians Aristotle, Leibniz, Boole and
Frege are concerned, they all, amazingly, in synchronicity, begin with cr as the core of
logic, but then quickly realize that attaining any adequate cr is impossible without a
well worked out ideography provided through the construction of an lu. An lu then is
a necessary condition for cr, hence lu and cr are never in opposition.
References
1. Aristotle, Prior Analytics, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, vol. 1, translated by
A.J. Jenkinson, edited by J. Barnes, Princeton University Press, 1984, pp. 39-113.
2. George Boole, The Mathematical Analysis of Logic: Being an Essay Towards a
Calculus of Deductive Reasoning, Macmillan, Barclay and Macmillan, Cambridge,
1847.
3. Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift, 1879. In From Frege to Godel: A Source Book of
Mathematical Logic, 1879-1931, translated by Stefan Bauer-Mengelberg, edited by
Jean van Heijenoort, Excel Press, New York, pp. 182, 1967.
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4. Jaako Hintikka, Lingua Universalis vs. Calculus Ratiocinator, Kluwer Academic
Publishers, Dordrecht, Netherlands, 1997.
5. Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Letters to Nicolas Remond (1714-1715), edited by Leroy
E. Loemker, 1989, pp. 654660.
6. Volker Peckhaus, Calculus ratiocinator vs. characteristica universalis? The two
traditions in logic, revisited, in History and Philosophy of Logic, vol. 25, 2004,
pp. 314.
7. Jean van Heijenoort, Logic as calculus and logic as language, Synthese, vol. 17,
1967, pp. 324330.

Universal-Particular Relationship in Solipsist Logic

Vedat Kamer

Istanbul
University, Istanbul,
Turkey
vkamer@istanbul.edu.tr
Safak Urals solipsist ontology allows us to understand the way our consciousness
and language work, as well as their relations with physical things. One of main points in
this redefinition is the space conception. Space conceptions make it possible both to
define physical things in terms of my consciousness and re-evaluate the subject-object
relationship from a new perspective.
Safak Urals solipsist ontology gives us a chance to investigate universal and particular relationship from a different point of view. With solipsist ontology we can construct
an inferential system based on language. Our goal is to indicate the relation of language
and logic from point of solipsist ontology.

A meta-theoretical interpretation of the logical square

and hexagon of opposition
Vladimir Lobovikov
Institute of Philosophy and Law of Ural Branch of Russian Academy
of Sciences, Yekaterinburg, Russia
vlobovikov@mail.ru
Below I submit novel interpreting the square and hexagon as meta-theoretical ones
organizing logical interconnections among the notions inconsistent, consistent, incomplete, complete, a-priori, and a-posteriori in a system of meta-theoretical
knowledge.
Let the symbol t stand for a theory based on classical logic. Let the symbol
INCONS(t) stand for the meta-theoretical statement t is logically inconsistent. The
symbol CONS(t) stands for the meta-theoretical statement t is logically consistent.
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COMP(t) stands for the statement t is logically (semantically) complete. INCOMP(t)
stands for the statement t is logically (semantically) incomplete. APOSTERIOR(t)
stands for the statement t is a-posteriori (empirical) one, i.e. t is either logically inconsistent or logically (semantically) incomplete. APRIOR(t) stands for the statement
t is non-empirical (a-priori) one, i.e. t is logically consistent and logically (semantically) complete. The paper submits quite a new thesis that the above mentioned
six meta-theoretical statements make up the following logical square and hexagon of
opposition.

Figure 1: The square-and-hexagon-of-opposition of the meta-theoretical statements

In this graphic model the relations of logical contradiction (contradictory-ness) are
represented by the lines crossing the square. The relations of logical subordination
(logical consequence) are represented in the picture 4 by the arrows. The relation of
logical contrariety (contrary-ness) is represented by the upper horizontal line of the
square. The relation of logical sub-contrariety (sub-contrary-ness) is represented by the
lower horizontal line of the square.
This square graphically represents the knowledge of several famous meta-theorems
as a logically organized system. According to this graphical model, the first-orderpredicate-logic and the propositional one belong to the set of a priori theories. On the
contrary the formal arithmetic theory (investigated by Godel) belongs to the set of a
posteriori ones.
Obviously, in the times of Aristotle, Leibniz, and Cant it was impossible to create
the above-presented meta-theoretical interpretation of the square of opposition as the
empirical basis for such creation did not exist in their times: the relevant meta-theorems
had not been proved yet. The set of proofs of meta-theorems necessary and sufficient for
making up the empirical basis of the above-submitted meta-theoretical interpretation
of the square appeared only in XX century.
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The logic of David Humes Dialogues concerning

natural religion
Stanley Tweyman
York University, Canada
stweyman@yorku.ca
The topic discussed in Parts 10 and 11 of David Humes Dialogues Concerning
Natural Religion is whether the design of the world supports the claim that the designer
of the world is a benevolent being. The one who defends this position is Cleanthes; the
one who opposes it is Philo. Throughout Philos critical comments, at no point does
he claim that he has now refuted the benevolence claim. By applying formal logic to
their respective positions, I am able to show the precise point at which the benevolence
claim has been refuted, and why the remainder of Part 11 continues as it does.
These two Parts of the Dialogues, therefore, can be seen to have a pentimento
like character, wherein the full appreciation of the Humes position requires that we go
beyond the words on the page to the underlying logic.

Philosophical Significance of Title of Lindenbaums

Maximalization Theorem
ski
Jan Wolen
w, Poland
Academy of Information, Technology and Management, Rzeszo
j.wolenski@iphils.uj.edu.pl
The Lindenbaum maximalization theorem (LMT) says:
(*) Every consistent set of sentences has its maximally consistent extension.
This theorem has numerous applications in metalogic and metamathematics, for example, in proving the completeness theorem for first-order logic by the Henkin method
or as the main formal background for the theory of degrees of completeness. Other,
recently even more important, use of LMT consists in its comparison with other maximalization principles or the axiom of choice. From this perspective, (LMT) is interesting
for reverse mathematics. On the other hand, (LMT) seems to have an importance for
some problems of the philosophy of logic. Tarski and Lindenbaum proved in the 1930s
that classical propositional logic (CPL) is the only maximal consistent extension of intuitionistic propositional logic IPL (and, a fortiori, so-called intermediate logics located
between IPL and CPL). If one considers CPL as an extension of IPL and not claim
that the latter is the logic, the former can be considered as the absolute logic.
Since (LMT) goes via the consequence operation it is syntactic in its character.
This situation does not change in predicate logic (PL). On the other hand, the analysis
of propositional calculus cannot be automatically extended to PL, because it is not
Post-complete. Hence, a semantic aspect becomes important in PL also in the case of
(LMT). In general, the collection of truths in a given model M is always maximally
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consistent. If we take Peano arithmetic as the critical theory, the existence of nonstandard models as associated with incompleteness, shows that the pragmatic aspect
cannot be eliminated from the concept of the standardness. Thus, the concepts of
the standard model and the intentional model are equivalent (or functions at least as
homonyms). Consequently, this fact justifies Tarskis observation that the concept of
truth is meaningless for purely formal (non-interpreted) systems. Although (LMT)
assures that we have many possible Lindenbaums extension in arithmetic, the choice
between alternatives cannot be fully justified even by semantics.

Computation
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Ahmet C
evik (page 85).

NP system and Mimp-graph association

Vaston Gonc
alves da Costa
s Regional Catala
o,
Universidade Federal de Goia
o, GO, Brazil
Catala
vaston@ufg.br
Edward Hermann Haeusler, Marcela Quispe Cruz
and Jefferson de Barros Santos
lica do Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
Pontifcia Universidade Cato
hermann@puc-rio.br, mcruz@inf.puc-rio.br,
jefferson.b.santos@gmail.com
Since reasoners/provers logic-based carry with them the production of exponentially
size proofs, which can hamper the presentation of proofs in feasible time, it is important the use of methods that reduce the size of the generated proofs. It is well know
that the use of techniques based on graphs can deal with the compression of logical
proofs which can be employed during the construction of proofs. Mimp-graph is a new
structure to represent proofs through references rather than copy. This structure was
initially developed for minimal propositional logic but the results have been extended
to first-order logic. Mimp-graph preserves the ability to represent any Natural Deduction proof and its minimal formula representation is a key feature of the mimp-graph
structure, it is easy to distinguish maximal formulas and an upper bound in the length
of the reduction sequence to obtain a normal proof. Thus a normalization theorem
can be proved by counting the number of maximal formulas in the original derivation. The strong normalization follow as a direct consequence of such normalization,
since that any reduction decreases the corresponding measures of derivation complexity. Sharing for inference rules is performed during the process of construction of the
graph. This feature is very important in order to be used in automatic theorem provers.
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In [1] and [2] it is presented a new deductive system, denominated Np, that shows to
be more effective to be implemented in automatic theorem proofers. The major difference in this system, compared to the traditional ones, is that it makes use of Peirce
rule instead of the classical absurd rule. A worth of mentioning case is the Glivenko
theorem for the minimal implicational system Np. It was proved that the implicational
fragment with the Peirce rule is normalizable, therefor has a sub-formula principle, and
besides that all classical proof can be viewed as a intuitionistic proof except for the
final part, that has only Peirces rules. In this paper we will presented a association between Np system and mimp-graph as well the main properties that this association has.
References
1. V.G. da Costa, W. Sanz, E.H. Haeusler and L.C. Pereira, Peirces Rule in a Full
Natural Deduction System, Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science,
vol. 256, 2009, pp. 518, doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2009.11.002.
2. L.C. Pereira, E.H. Haeusler, V.G. da Costa and W. Sanz, A new normalization
strategy for the implicational fragment of classical propositional logic, Studia Logica, vol. 96, issue 1, 2010, pp. 95108, doi:10.1007/s11225-010-9275-1.

On non-standard finite computational models

Edward Hermann Haeusler
PUC-Rio, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
edward.haeusler@gmail.com
In 1924, Tarski proved that the many existing and well-known definitions of finite
set are equivalent. Tarksi mentioned Peano-finiteness, Dedekind-finiteness and some
inductive definitions due to Russell, Sierpi
nski and Kuratowski. A first fact to be noted
is that he had to use the Axiom of Choice in his proof. Another fact is that, due to the
duality between finite and infinite, when defining one of these concepts the respective
dual is obtained by means of negations.This role played by the negation adds a logical
dimension to this discussion. Thus, besides the Axiom of Choice, the fact that we
are inside Intuitionistic or Classical Set Theory has consequences on the relationship
among the many mathematical definitions of finiteness. We have to conclude that
finiteness is a relative notion in mathematics. Relative is used to denote when the
variation in the position of an observer implies variation in properties or measures on
the observed object. We know from Skolems theorem that some notions are relative.
For example, we have some models where R is countable, some where it is not. This
fact depends on the position of the observer. In this specific case it may depend on
whether he/she is inside the model or not. This internal/external point-of-view is
the simplest case analysis. Based on the fact that finiteness is a relative concept in
mathematics, we intend to start a discussion on the role of finiteness in the Theory
of Computation by fixing the finiteness concept used in a Turing-machine definition.
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For example, by choosing the Dedekind definition of finite we have Turing-Dedekind
machines and hence, Turing-Dedekind computable functions. Some Turing-Dedekind
machines when observed outside the model have infinite set of states and/or infinitely
long transition-tables. However, they are finite when observed from inside the model.
We show many other non-standard finite computational models.
We use Topos Theory to provide the models and Local Set Theory to express the
properties that are internally and externally interpreted. There is a slight analogy with
Malament-Hog(g)art space. In General Relativity, different observers have different
notions of finite time, in LST, different models have different notions of finiteness.
In both cases, the notion of computability is different. Finally we remark the strong
consequence that the existence of Natural Numbers object (NNO) in the Topos has.
When the model has a NNO the finiteness notions collapse into Peano-finite and the
computational models collapse to standard ones.

New Insights into Minimum Satisfiability

`
Felip Manya
IIIA-CSIC, Bellaterra, Spain
felip@iiia.csic.es
Chu-Min Li
de Picardie Jules Verne, Amiens, France
MIS, Universite
chu-min.li@u-picardie.fr
Minimum Satisfiability (MinSAT) is the problem of finding an interpretation that
minimizes (maximizes) the number of satisfied (falsified) clauses in a multiset of Boolean
clauses, where a clause is a disjunction of literals, and a literal is either a propositional
variable or a negated propositional variable [2]. MinSAT is an optimization variant of
the Propositional Satisfiability (SAT) problem, and is also considered to be the dual
problem of the Maximum Satisfiability (MaxSAT) problem [3].
It is well-known that SAT offers a generic problem solving paradigm for solving
decision problems, and nowadays it is often applied in fields as diverse as hardware verification, bioinformatics and planning. Given the success of SAT-based problem solving,
the Artificial Intelligence community has recently investigated whether MaxSAT and
MinSAT can be used as generic problem solving paradigms for solving optimization
problems. As a result, several works have shown that both MaxSAT and MinSAT are
suitable formalisms for modeling and solving certain combinatorial optimization problems [1,5]. Nevertheless, the solving techniques and encodings to be used in MinSAT
are usually different from the ones used in MaxSAT.
In this talk we focus on recent advances in MinSAT solving. In particular, we concentrate on modeling and inference results that we have investigated, and we compare
our solutions with the solutions proposed for MaxSAT.
Regarding modeling, we first present how some relevant optimization problems are
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encoded to MinSAT, and we show that the space complexity of the resulting MinSAT
encodings is smaller than the complexity of the corresponding MaxSAT encodings.
Then, we report on an empirical investigation that provides evidence that MaxSAT
and MinSAT are complementary generic problem solving paradigms for optimization.
Regarding inference, we describe how to compute a MinSAT solution with an inference system [4]. In other words, our aim is to define an inference rule that when applied
to a multiset of clauses is able to derive as many empty clauses (i.e.; contradictions)
as the maximum number of clauses that can be falsified in . Unfortunately, the resolution rule the inference rule commonly used to detect contradictions in SAT is
unsound for MinSAT because it preserves satisfiability but not the number of falsified
clauses.
We first define a resolution-style inference rule that preserves the number of falsified
clauses when the premises of the rule are replaced by its conclusions. Then, we prove
that such a rule provides a complete inference system for MinSAT; i.e., the application
of the rule a finite number of times, following a given strategy, derives as many empty
clauses as the maximum number of clauses that can be falsified in a MinSAT instance.
Acknowledgments: Research partially supported by the Ministerio de Economa y
Competividad project CO-PRIVACY TIN2011-27076-C03-03, and the Generalitat de
Catalunya grant AGAUR 2014-SGR-118. The first author was supported by Mobility
Grant PRX14/00195 of the Ministerio de Educacion, Cultura y Deporte.
References
1. J. Argelich, A. Cabiscol, I. Lynce, and F. Many`a, Efficient encodings from CSP into
SAT, and from MaxCSP into MaxSAT, Multiple-Valued Logic and Soft Computing,
vol. 19, no. 13, 2012, pp. 323.
2. R. Kohli, R. Krishnamurti, and P. Mirchandani, The minimum satisfiability problem, Journal of Discrete Mathematics, vol. 6, no. 2, 1994, pp. 275283.
3. C.M. Li and F. Many`a, MaxSAT, hard and soft constraints, in Handbook of
Satisfiability, edited by A. Biere, H. van Maaren and T. Walsh, IOS Press, 2009,
pp. 613631.
4. C.M. Li and F. Many`a, An Inference Scheme for MinSAT, in Proceedings
of IJCAI-2015, AAAI Press, 2015, in press.
5. C.M. Li, Z. Zhu, F. Many`a and L. Simon, Optimizing with minimum satisfiability,
Artificial Intelligence, vol. 190, 2012, pp. 3244.

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Behavioral equivalence of equivalent hidden logics

Manuel A. Martins
CIDMA1 , Department of Mathematics, University of Aveiro, Portugal
Martins@ua.pt
Sergey Babenyshev
Siberian Institute of Fire Safety, Zheleznogorsk, Russia
sergey.babenyshev@gmail.com
This work advances a research agenda which has as its main aim the application of
Abstract Algebraic Logic (AAL) methods and tools to the specification and verification
of software systems.
It is based on a generalization of the notion of abstract deductive system to handle
multi-sorted deductive systems which differentiate visible and hidden sorts. The main
results are obtained by generalizing properties of the Leibniz congruence the central
notion in AAL.
In this talk we discuss the relationship between the behavioral equivalence of equivalent hidden logics. We also present a necessary and sufficient intrinsic condition for
two hidden logics to be equivalent.
References
1. S. Babenyshev and M.A. Martins, Deduction-detachment theorem in hidden klogics, Journal of Logic and Computation, vol. 24(1), 2014, pp. 233255.
2. W.J. Blok and D. Pigozzi, Algebraizable Logics, Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 77, no. 396, 1989.
3. W.J. Blok and D. Pigozzi, Abstract algebraic logic and the deduction theorem,
preprint
available
at
https://orion.math.iastate.edu/dpigozzi/papers/
aaldedth.pdf, 2001.
4. M.A. Martins, Closure properties for the class of behavioral models, Theoretical
Computer Science, vol. 379(12), 2007, pp. 5383.
5. M.A. Martins, A. Madeira and L.S. Barbosa, A Coalgebraic Perspective on Logical
Interpretations, Studia Logica, vol. 101(4), 2013, pp. 783825.

Center for Research and Development in Mathematics and Applications

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Theorems of Tarski and G

odels Second
Incompleteness Computationally
Saeed Salehi
Department of Mathematics, University of Tabriz, Iran
School of Mathematics,
Institute for Research in Fundamental Sciences IPM, Tehran, Iran
salehipour@tabrizu.ac.ir, saeedsalehi@ipm.ir
The (first and second) Incompleteness Theorems of Kurt Godel are among the most
significant mathematical results in the twentieth century; these theorems not only concern (and are about some properties of reasoning in) mathematics, but also affect philosophy and computer science. In [2] the author argued that the first incompleteness
theorem is the un-effective version of Godels Completeness Theorem, in the sense that
the completeness theorem is equivalent to the existence of a consistent completion of
every consistent theory and the incompleteness theorem is equivalent to the existence
of a computable enumerable and consistent theory whose no consistent completion can
be computable enumerable. Let us note that the completion procedure preserves decidability, i.e., any consistent and decidable theory can be extended to a complete,
consistent and decidable theory (see [4] or [2]).
In this talk we will argue that Tarskis theorem on the undefinability of Truth in
sufficiently expressive languages is equivalent to Godels (semantic form of the) first
incompleteness theorem relativized to definable oracles. Then we will move forward to
proving Godels Second Incompleteness Theorem by elementary methods using the concepts from computability theory. Since Godels second theorem (inability of sufficiently
strong theories to prove [a statement of] their own consistency) is not robust with respect to the notion of consistency, its proof is much more delicate and elegant than the
proof of the first theorem; indeed the proof appears in very few places (see [1] a review
of the first edition of [3]). Though, some book proofs (in the words of Paul Erdos) for
the first incompleteness theorem exist in the literature, a nice and neat proof (understandable to the undergraduates or amateur mathematicians) for the second theorem is
missing. Here, we will present a proof for this theorem from computational viewpoint
which will be based on finitizing the theory presented in [2] used for proving the first
theorem.
To be more precise, in [2] there was introduced an undecidable (and consistent)
theory T which can be completed to a computable enumerable and consistent theory;
a consistent and computable enumerable extension of it, called S, is essentially undecidable (cf. [4]) in the sense that no consistent and computable enumerable extension
of S could be complete. This is essentially the Godel-Rosser Incompleteness Theorem.
Relativizing this theorem to definable oracles we get Tarskis theorem on the undefinability of truth, which on its face value has nothing to do with (oracle) computations.
As another new result we will see that a finitely axiomatized theory Q can interpret
S, but at a high cost and that is accepting Churchs Thesis as to the equivalence of
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the informal notion of computability with the formal notion of recursivity. A couple of
gains are the ability to prove
(1) Churchs Theorem on the undecidability of (provability in) first-order logic, and
(2) Godels Second Incompleteness Theorem for sufficiently strong and sufficiently expressive theories.
In the latter a new proof for this great theorem is provided by elementary (computation theoretic) methods. The main idea is that by formalizing Godels first incompleteness theorem for computable enumerable (and consistent) theories that contain
(the finite theory) Q we can prove that the theories which prove the statement no
consistent and computable enumerable extension of Q is complete cannot prove their
own (standard) consistency.
References
1. S. Salehi, Review of the first edition of [3], Zentralblatt MATH (Zbl 1154.03002).
2. S. Salehi, Godels Incompleteness PhenomenonComputationally, Philosophia
Scienti, vol. 18, no. 3, 2014, pp. 2237.
3. P. Smith, An Introduction to Godels Theorems, Cambridge University Press, 2nd
edition, 2013.
4. A. Tarski (in collaboration with A. Mostowski and R.M. Robinson), Undecidable
Theories, NorthHolland, 1953 (reprinted by Dover Publications in 2010).

Algebraic and Logical Operations on Operators:

One Application to Semantic Computation
ll Guibert and Jean-Pierre Descle
s
Benot Sauzay, Gae
1
2
Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, France
STIH and LaLIC , Universite
benoit.sauzay@gmail.com, gaell.guibert@wanadoo.fr,
jean-pierre.descles@paris-sorbonne.fr
Different domains use operators without giving a clear definition. For instance:
operators in vector spaces and in Hilbert spaces; in the theory of partial equations:
the nabla operator ; in analysis, the laplacian operator , where = 2 , etc. In
chemistry, the Focks matrix approximates the operator energy of a quantum system. Logic uses different operators: connectors, modal operators, quantifiers. The
psychology uses also operators (Piaget, Frey. . . ). In linguistics, the notion of operator
is important but it is not always well defined; for instance, in the categorial grammars,
the instances of categories are operators with functional types (Churchs type); the
1
2

Sens, Texte, Informatique, Histoire.

Langues, Logiques, Informatique, Cognition.

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linguist S.K. Shaumyan systematically used the abstract operators (combinators) of
Currys Combinatory Logic.
The concept of operator is not exactly the same as that of a function in set theory.
From now on, let us reserve the word operator to denote function-as-operation-process
concept, and function and map for the set-of-ordered-pairs concept (cf. J.R. Hindley
and J.P. Seldin, Lambda-Calculus and Combinators: An Introduction, 2008).
In computer science and formal systems, we have at least three different approaches:
Churchs -calculus, Currys Combinatory Logic, and an algebraic approach with Cartesian Closed Categories. In Currys approach, complex operators are built by abstract
operators, called combinators, used to compose different operators, by intrinsic ways,
that is: compositions and transformations of operators are independent of any interpretation given to these operators by specific domains. Our approach starts from the
Cartesian Closed Categories. We generalize the algebraic work of Lawvere, by an introduction of different types and different sorts of objects. In this paper, we present a
study about close connection between typed combinatory logic (CL) and an algebraic
approach of operators.
We introduce types generated from a set S of sorts (or basic types). The symbol
n designates a natural integer; (i) a function (or a word on S) from an ordered set
[n] = {1, 2, . . . , n} = [l()], into S, represents a (cartesian) type; (ii) if and are
types, then is also a type (i.e. a functional type). All the types defined on S are
generated by the rules (i) and (ii). A S-coprojectif f is a map from the set [l()] to
the set [l()], such that f o = (where o designates the functional composition
in set theory). T[K0 ] is the set of all S-coprojectifs. A space of complex operators
T[] is defined from a given set of basic operators. The set of complex operators
T[] is algebraically structured by two more abstract T-operations, called greffe,
noted O, and intrication, noted . The symbol s designates an element of S and
designates a type on S; by X we consider a set (i.e. a domain of objects) on that the
operators act. If the map is identified to the sequence of images: s1 , . . . , sn , then:
X = X s1 x...xX sn , where X si is a set of objects of the same sort si . An operator s
with the type s is an element of T[]; it is such that, to this operator is associated
a family of function ()s (i.e. contravariant operation) from X to X s for a given
domain X. A multioperator is an element (or an arrow) of T[]; it is such that it
generates functions () (i.e. contravariant operation) from the set X to X . This
multioperator is built up by the T-operations of greffe and intrication, from
different operators si (components of the multioperator ), where = s1 s2 . . . sn .
We proved the following proposition: the set T[] of multioperators, built up from a
set of operators, is the smallest set such that:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
(iv)

T[];
T[K0 ] T[], where T[K0 ] is the set of all S-coprojectifs;
T[] is closed under O and , which are associative;
each multioperator of T[] is built by O and from and the S-coprojectifs of
T[K0 ].
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Sessions
To the T-operations O and correspond combinators of Combinatory Logic (CL).
The forms of these combinators will be given in the paper. Specific graph structures,
called treilles, are associated to the constructions of multioperators; these structures
are not trees, but they are analog to DOAGs (Directed Oriented Acyclic Graphs) in
computing theory.
A semantic study of natural languages leads to a formal analysis of lexical units
(verbs and prepositions) by means of operators, multioperators and operands, with
different types, and composition of theses operators and multioperators, by combinators
or greffe and intrication. These analyses are presented by means of treilles
structures. We will give some examples of such formal computation.

Completeness
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Mara Manzano (page 95).

Metatheory of Tableau Systems

Tomasz Jarmuz ek
, Poland
Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun
jarmuzek@umk.pl
Tableau proofs have a number of advantages in comparison to other proof methods.
They can often be conducted automatically and countermodels are often delivered by
failed proofs. The advantages are most evident in comparison to standard axiomatic
proofs. The chief disadvantage of the tableau method is its intuitiveness, which is
extremely problematic in proving soundness and completeness of tableau consequence
systems with respect to some semantic consequence relation.
In our talk a perfectly formal account is presented of the question of the tableaux
as well as tableau proofs. The approach we propose turns out to be quite successful
in dealing with such metalogical problems as soundness and completeness, which will
be demonstrated. The account we present extends ideas described in such works as
[1, 2, 3]. And we especially extrapolate the tableau method for modal logic, delivered
in the work [2] on other kinds of sentential calculi as well as calculi of names.
We begin with a logic, which is to be identified with a particular consequence relation, described semantically. The outcome is a collection of tableau rules that determine
together with a concept of tableau proof a tableau consequence relation. Such a collection is called a tableau system. Hence, tableau proofs are regarded a syntactical
concept, even if the tableau procedure requires some extensions of the formal language
in question. All the tableau concepts we construct are set-theoretical, the graph concept
of tableau proof turns out merely didactic presentation of purely formal concepts. And
we define generally formal concepts: (a) tableau rule, (b) open, closed and maximal
branch, (c) open, closed and complete tableau and (d) branch consequence relation.
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By means of such general, formal concepts we are in a position to deliver exact
conditions to be satisfied by collections of tableau rules defining tableau systems. In
the general metatheory of tableaux we deliver the proofs of metatheorems are included
to the effect that equality of the semantical consequence relation and the tableau consequence relation follows from those conditions to be satisfied.
The above mentioned theorem is to be applied to constructions of tableau systems,
if the systems are to be sound and complete with respect to a semantical structure.
When describing tableau systems we simply apply general concepts and make sure the
rules we formulate meet the formal conditions. If it is the case we immediately obtain
a sound and complete calculus.
The theory we deliver covers sentential calculi as well as calculi of names. In our
talk we present main metatheoretical concepts, the chief metatheoretical theorem and
show some instructive examples of application.
References
1. T. Jarmuzek, Formalizacja metod tablicowych dla logik zda
n i logik nazw (Formalization of tableau methods for propositional logics and for logics of names),
Wydawnictwo UMK, Toru
n, 2013.
2. T. Jarmuzek, Tableau Metatheorem for Modal Logics, in Recent Trends in Philosphical Logic, edited by R. Ciuni, H. Wansing and C. Willkomennen, Springer, 2013,
pp. 105128.
3. T. Jarmuzek, Tableau System for Logic of Categorial Propositions and Decidability, Bulletin of The Section of Logic, vol. 37, nos. 34, 2008, pp. 223231.

On the Source of the Notion of Semantic Completeness

Enrico Moriconi
University of Pisa, Pisa, Italy
enrico.moriconi@unipi.it
Keywords: Completeness, Natural Deduction, Sequent Calculi.
In this talk we examine how the notion of semantic completeness emerged from
the entanglement of model theory and proof theory which characterized logical investigations in the first Thirties of the last century. We emphasize the fundamental role
played in this process by K. Godel, who basically introduced that notion in the form
then become dominant, carving it out from the clear distinction between syntactic and
semantic analysis of a formal system. In his thesis, in fact, he was able to perform the
main step from what was a simple operative distinction between two different points
of view to a theoretical distinction between two different approaches to the study of
formal theories.
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Sessions
We emphasize that other metatheorical notions such as, for instance, consistency,
categoricity, syntactic completeness focus, each in their own specific way, on the relationship between a formal deductive theory and the field of scientific investigation
(concerning geometry, number theory, analysis, etc.) of which it was expected to become the theory. We stress the role played by what can be called the descriptive
completeness of an axiomatic formal theory, which basically requires that the informal
theory be what afterwards will be named the intended model of the formal theory.
When confronted with semantic completeness, on the other hand, it is not immediately
clear what the corresponding field of scientific investigation consists of, beyond an
elusive reference to the realm of logic. We note that this fact can help to understand why
Godels work of 1930 remained by and large disregarded within the logic community.
In the second part of the talk we maintain that the link to the pre-godelian notion
of completeness which we referred to as descriptive completeness is at the root of
the introduction of the natural deduction calculi by G. Gentzen. Both in his thesis
and in the 1936 consistency proof for the elementary number theory, the completeness
question for the formal system is resumed in the question: Is anything missing?.
To this end, in the latter paper he conducted a detailed analysis of the way in which
in his formal system it was possible to formalize the proof of Euclids classic theorem
on prime numbers. On this basis he maintained that he had succeeded in providing
the most possible complete list of the inference forms and methods of conceptual
definitions usually employed in the elementary number theory. No analogous adequacy
or completeness question is asked by Gentzen with respect to the formal systems (the
natural deduction and the sequent calculi) he provided to formalize the quantificational
theory. We argue that this gap is motivated by his conviction of the non-existence of
a realm of first-order logical truths to be captured by his calculi. There is no informal
area of investigation that his formal calculi are intended to model. His reference, in
this case, was constituted by an informal set of valid quantificational inference schemata
determined by the patterns of reasoning actually employed by mathematicians. The
point of building the natural deduction calculi was precisely to show that it was possible to formalize the valid quantificational inference schemata which are more or less
implicit in mathematical practice. This was the kind of completeness he was aiming
to achieve by means of his new calculi, which was a long way from the question of
semantic completeness. However, the way the rules of the natural deduction calculi
analyse the correct inferences associated with each individual logical operator was not
completely analytical. In fact, Gentzens inferential approach mixed the formalization
of the meanings of the logical operators with an account of the consequence relation.
Moving from natural deduction calculi to sequent calculi, Gentzen aimed to separate
the task of determining the meaning of logical constants from the question of accounting
for the inferential features of the deductive system.
Lastly, we emphasize that by devising the sequent calculi Gentzen introduced still
another notion of completeness, which pertains the relationship among the rules of the
system. By proving the eliminability of the Cut rule, the Hauptsatz proves that the
activity of logical analysis suffices to demonstrate the truth of all logical consequences
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of previously analysed truths. In other words, it proves that the Cut-free fragment of
sequent calculi is able to emulate any mathematical reasoning that does not depend on
the principles of any specific mathematical theory.

About Syntactic Analogues to Proof

of the Completeness Theorem
Sergey Pavlov
Institute of Philosophy, Moscow, Russia
s.pavlov@iph.ras.ru
Syntactic analogues to proof of semantic completeness meta-theorems for some logics
are proposed. They are based on the replacement of semantic assertions of the form
A has value v k , for the corresponding formulas Jk (A) with Jk -operator. The Jk operators (introduced by J. Rosser and A. Turquette) are exploited in the proofs of
semantic completeness theorems of a number of truth-complete logics.
Proof of the completeness due to Kalmar is preceded with the proof of lemma 1 [1],
which is generalized to the n-valued case.
Lemma 1. Let A be a wff, S1 , S2 , ..., Sm be pairwise distinct variables in A, and, for
S1 , S2 , . . . , Sm , a distribution of logical values is given.
Suppose that for every wff B: B is Ji (B), if B has value v i .
A .
Then S1 , S2 , ..., Sm
In the proof of this lemma the semantic statements of the form B has value v k
are used, which in turn correspond to the formula Jk (B), with Jk -operator belonging to the syntax of logic L. Thus the phrase for S1 , S2 , ..., Sm a distribution of
logical values is given corresponds to for S1 , S2 , ..., Sm a distribution of Jk -formulas
(Jk1 (S1 ), Jk2 (S2 ), ..., Jkm (Sm )) is given, which will replace the previous one. We get
the following reformulation of Lemma 1.
Lemma 1*. Let A be a wff, S1 , S2 , ..., Sm be pairwise distinct variables in A, and, for
S1 , S2 , ..., Sm a distribution of Jk -formulas
(Jk1 (S1 ), Jk2 (S2 ), ..., Jkm (Sm )) is given. Suppose that for every wff B:
B is Jk (B), if for B formula Jk (B) is accepted.
A .
Then S1 , S2 , ..., Sm
Lets define the syntactic analogue of a valid formula.
Definition 1. A wff A is called the W -formula iff for all possible distributions of Jk formulas (Jk1 (S1 ), Jk2 (S2 ), . . . , Jkm (Sm )) for variables S1 , S2 , ..., Sm , that occurred in
A, there are the following inferences in the logic L:
(Jk1 (S1 ), Jk2 (S2 ), . . . , Jkm (Sm )) J1 (A).
Theorem 1. If a wff A is a W -formula of L, then A is a theorem of L.

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Sessions
Lets consider a class of logics whose language have some unary operators Oi , where
(1 i n):
1) Suppose we have a language of logics Ln , with unary c1a and binary c2b connectives,
with metavariables A, B for wffs and let the classic logic CL (, , ) hold for formulas
Oi (A).
The next necessary conditions for obtaining the desired results will be determined
by the following below lemmas which we need to prove in the logic Ln :
2) For each i (1 i n) there exists m (1 m n), such that
Oi (A) Om (c1a A).
3) For each i, k (1 i, k n) there exists m (1 m n), such that
(Oi (A) Ok (B)) Om (A c2b B).
4) ((O1 (B) O1 (A)) . . . ((On (B) O1 (A)) O1 (A)) . . . ).
5) There are rules of inference: O1 (A)/A and A/O1 (A), in which O1 is the designated
operator.
Lets replace Ji -formulas for formulas Oi (A) in Lemma 1* and Definition 1.
As the result we have syntactic analogues to proof of the completeness theorem.
Theorem 2. If a wff A is a W -formula of Ln , then A is a theorem of Ln .
Lets define a class of logic in which conditions 15 are proved.
Definition 2. A logic submitted in an axiomatized form that meets the above conditions 15 will be called an AF-logic.
Finally, lets note that, for example, the axiomatizations of Lukasiewicz logic L3 and
Bochvar logic B3 belong to the class of AF-logics, in contrast to Heyting logic H3 .
Reference
1. E. Mendelson, Introduction to Mathematical Logic, D. Van Nostrand, Princeton,
1964.

Atomic systems in proof-theoretic semantics and the problem

of completeness
Thomas Piecha and Peter Schroeder-Heister
bingen, Germany
University of Tu
thomas.piecha@uni-tuebingen.de, psh@uni-tuebingen.de
Within proof-theoretic semantics [2] in the tradition of Prawitz and Dummett the
validity of atomic formulas is usually defined in terms of derivability of these formulas
in atomic systems. Such systems can be sets of atomic formulas or sets of atomic rules
like production rules. One can also allow for atomic rules which can discharge atomic
assumptions, or for higher-level atomic rules which can discharge assumed atomic rules.
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The validity of complex formulas is then explained with respect to atomic systems.
Further use of atomic systems is made in explaining logical consequence and the logical
constant of implication. An implication A B is valid with respect to an atomic
system if and only if for all extensions of that system it holds that whenever A is valid
with respect to an extension then also B is valid with respect to it. The dependence
on extensions guarantees that validity is monotone with respect to atomic systems. It
has been conjectured that intuitionistic logic is complete for certain notions of validity
of this kind.
In our talk we will present negative as well as positive completeness results (cf. [1])
for some of these notions of validity. First, we consider validity based on atomic systems
of production rules. We show by a counterexample that intuitionistic propositional logic
is not complete for this notion of validity. In addition, the counterexample shows that
validity is not closed under substitution. To be on a par with intuitionistic derivability,
which is closed under substitution, we then consider a strengthened notion of validity
which is closed under substitution by definition. Failure of completeness of intuitionistic
logic can in this case be shown by an indirect proof of the existence of a counterexample.
Second, we consider validity with respect to atomic systems of arbitrary higher-level
atomic rules. Completeness holds for the two fragments of disjunction-free and negative
(A) formulas of intuitionistic propositional logic. As our main result we show that full
intuitionistic logic is, however, not complete for validity based on higher-level rules.
The validity-based approach in proof-theoretic semantics will be opposed to a view
of atomic systems as (inductive) definitions of atomic formulas. In this case, the situation is very different, since extending a definition changes in general what has been
defined originally. When atomic systems are considered as definitions, one does not
have monotonicity of derivability with respect to extensions. Furthermore, derivability
in atomic systems is no longer transitive. This is in contradistinction to validity, which
is a monotone consequence relation with respect to non-definitional atomic systems.
Our talk concludes with a proposal for a hybridization of validity-based semantics with
the definitional approach to (higher-level) atomic systems.
References
1. T. Piecha, W. de Campos Sanz and P. Schroeder-Heister. Failure of Completeness
in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, Journal of Philosophical Logic, DOI 10.1007/s10992014-9322-x, 2014.
2. P. Schroeder-Heister, Proof-Theoretic Semantics, in The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, Winter 2012 Edition, edited by E.N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.
edu/archives/win2012/entries/proof-theoretic-semantics, 2012.

362

Sessions

History
The invited keynote speaker of this session is Samet B
uy
ukada (page 84).

Adorno and Logic

Ben Fulman
Centre for Philosophy, Religion and Social Ethics
Institute for Christian Studies, Toronto, Ontario, Canada
ben.fulman@gmail.com
The dichotomy of Continental and Analytical philosophy proved to be less than
fruitful when it comes to the formers ability to contribute to the discussion about Logic.
Often, continental philosophys understanding of logic seems superficial or redundant to
their philosophical goal. At times, a different kind of logic arises out of the philosophical
analysis, such in the case of G.W.F. Hegel and his dialectical logic: another form of
logic which differs from formal logic as a study of form, nonetheless an intriguing one
since it incorporates form and content in its analysis (2010: 751). At first, it might
seem that Hegel rejects formal logic as the basic formation of thinking; however an
examination of one of his later epigones might reveal that things are not as simple
as they seem. In this line of argument I shall focus mainly on the thoughts of the
Jewish-German Philosopher, Theodor W. Adorno, one of the leading members of what
is known as the Frankfurt School, the twentieth century most influential traditions
in continental philosophy, which could be helpful in adding depth and color to our
conception of logic.
It is a consensus that Logic is concerned with the principles of valid inference
(1971: 1), and that the two branches of logic: formal logic and philosophical logic,
although somewhat different, aim at articulating what makes arguments consistent or
inconsistent, valid or invalid, sound or unsound (1989: 1). However, One can wonder
whether a continental philosopher, such as Adorno, can be put to the scrutinizing test
of the above principles of logic. For example, can we even judge a statement of a continental philosopher and ascribe a truth value to it? The problem arises, first, out of
what is deemed as continental philosophy use of ambiguous terms, fragmented writings,
non-linear narratives (or argumentations), and the reliance on non-discursive elements,
which analytical philosophy tries to avoid, for instance: Adorno (and Horkheimers)
Dialectic of Enlightenment (1947) [non-linear arguments] or Adornos Minima Moralia
(1951) [fragmented writings]. And second, it seems as though Adorno rejects the principle of non-contradiction, deductive and systematic thought, as he adopts a dialectical
logic [the acceptance of two contradictory statements or concepts] which might condemn him to irrationality, as argued by Hans Albert (1977c: 286-7).
This lecture argues that Adorno did not repudiate Logic as such, but on the contrary,
he thought greatly of it. Nonetheless, Adorno had several reservations to the extent
one can actually rely solely on logic as its unexamined axiom. I examine Adornos
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understanding of logic in his Introduction (1977a) to The Positivist Dispute in German
Sociology (1977) and his essay from the same volume On the Logic of the Social Sciences
(1977b). From these articles we can delineate the reason why Adorno was accused in
rejecting the principle of non-contradiction: first, Adorno asserts there is no method
devoid of content, no intellect without the sensuous, therefore: logic is inseparable from
knowledge; second, knowledge is in fact an object of inquiry which is contradictory
[Adorno based this on his analysis of modern society (an object according to Adorno)
as antagonistic]; and thus if we assume that thought and object are identical, then we
must accept two contradictory statements about the same object (1977a: 4).
Actually, Adorno isnt dispensing logic, but logic as a facade, a semblance for equating different theories since they all share the same method of logic. Instead of merely
demarcating Adorno as professing a type of irrationalism as Hans Albert does (1977c:
287), since Adornos account presumably entails the adoption of two contradictory
statements, I would claim that what Adorno is offering us is an open logical method
of thinking. This method of thinking pays respect to the material which holds contradictions in it, and which prevents us in adopting an identificatory logic [object and
subject are identifiable]. Yet, it points to a different time when no contradiction in
the object might mean a logic that is rational in the sense that the proposition A=A
will be true. Perhaps then we will arrive at utopia: a non-antagonistic society [thus: a
non-contradictory object].
References
1. G.W.F. Hegel, The Science of Logic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010.
2. W. and M. Kneale, The Development of Logic, Oxford University Press, London,
1971.
3. S. Wolfram, Philosophical Logic: An Introduction, Routledge Press, London and
New York, 1989.
4. T.W. Adorno and M. Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical Fragments, translated by E.F.N. Jephcott, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 2002.
5. T.W. Adorno, Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life, translated by
E.F.N. Jephcott, Verso Press, London and New York, 2010.
6. H. Albert, A Short Surprised Postscript to a Long Introduction, in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby,
Heinemann Educational Book, London, 1977c, pp. 283288.
7. T.W. Adorno, Introduction, in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby, Heinemann Educational Book, London,
1977a, pp. 168.
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Sessions
8. T.W. Adorno, On the Logic of the Social Sciences, in The Positivist Dispute in
German Sociology, translated by Glyn Adey and David Frisby, Heinemann Educational Book, London, 1977b, pp. 105123.

Intensionality: uncomfortable but necessary in the history of

logic
Joan Casas-Roma, Antonia Huertas and M. Elena Rodrguez
Universitat Oberta de Catalunya, Barcelona, Spain
(jcasasrom, mhuertass, mrodriguezgo)@uoc.edu
Mara Manzano
University of Salamanca, Spain
mara@usal.es
In classical first-order logic intension plays no role. It is extensional by design since
it models the reasoning needed in mathematics. But formalizing aspects of natural
language or everyday reasoning needs something richer, something intensional; namely,
a semantics accepting the idea of multiple reference for terms. Formal systems in which
intensional features can be represented are generally referred to as intensional. The
first steps to work out these questions were made purely syntatically by Barcan, and
Carnap was the first one to give a semantics for the extension/intension method. With
Kripke (1963), the now standard possible world became established. This framework
was a major event in the history of logic, and one that has always been an area of close
contact between logic and metaphysics, something that continues to this day (see, for
example, Kripke (2013)). An important constraint on intensional logic has been the
desire to have intensional systems which retain as much extensionality as possible, the
traditional ideal behind first-order predicate logic. The pioneering semantics of Kripke
endows each world with its own domain of individuals. Extensionalism comes in here
with some difficult consequences:

Although constants are given intensions, variables are given only extensions, which
amounts to non-uniformly taking variables to be rigid designators.

Predication is extensional, even when its argument is a constant bearing an intension.

Extensionalism is also a driving force behind the counterpart-theoretic approach to

quantified modal logic by Lewis (1968), who considers the nonextensionality of modal
logic a historical accident that can be overcome. In Lewiss approach, the need for
a tracing principle is denied, as individuals are strictly world-bound. Tracing individuals across different worlds is catered for a context-dependent counterpart relation
between inhabitants of different worlds. Afterwards, in the system of Montague, a
typed lambda-calculus, constants may have non-constant intensions, but variables are
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stil rigid designators. Fitting (2004) gives a readable account of the difficulties facing the most common frameworks of quantified modal logic and related intensional
issues, criticizing both the idea of variables as rigid designators and counterpart theory.
Against this background he introduces his first-order intensional logic. But as in many
other intensional systems, object variables are distinguished from intension variables,
again reducing ease of use. To sum up, both intensional logic and quantified modal
logic have been affected by a number of technical issues. The purpose of this work will
be to systematically study and classify intensional logic systems and the logical problems they solve and they still maintain. Both philosophical and technical issues will be
considered. The final goal is to produce a conceptual map representing the different
elements, issues, and problems related to the lack of expressivity in the logical history
of intensionality.
References
1.

M.C. Fitting, First-order intensional logic, Annals of Pure and Applied Logic,
vol. 127, 2004, pp. 171193.

2.

S. Kripke, Semantical considerations on modal logics, in Acta Philosophica Fennica, vol. 16, 1963, pp. 183194.

3.

S. Kriple, Reference and Existence: The John Locke Lectures, Oxford University
Press, 2013.

4.

D. Lewis, Counterpart theory of quantified modal logic, Journal of Philosophy,

vol. 65, 1968, pp. 113126.

The First Studies on Algebraic Logic in Turkey

lu
Adnan Omerustao
g

Uskudar University, Istanbul,

Turkey
Adnan.Omerustaoglu@uskudar.edu.tr
The studies of Salih Zeki are important in the introduction of algebraic logic in
Turkey. He published his lectures he gave on logic in Dar
ulf
unun under the title Mzan Tefekk
ur, and here he introduced in detail the algebraic logic which was developed
by George Boole. According to Salih Zeki, there are three points of view in logic:
Mantk- s
ur (formal logic), mantk- musavver (quantificational logic), mantk- isar
(algebraic logic). Among these, he adopted algebraic logic and while explaining it, he
entirely adhered to George Booles system. Those who study algebraic logic accept
that the functioning of the human mind is based on mathematical grounds, therefore
thinking is essentially a mathematical process, and they argue that algebraic symbols
and operations should be used in analyzing logical expressions.
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Sessions

Various conceptions of science in the light of the distinction

between characteristica universalis and calculus ratiotinator
David Svodoba
Charles University, Prague, Czech Republic
svoboda@ktf.cuni.cz
In our opinion Leibnizs distinction between characteristica universalis and calculus
ratiotinator corresponds to Berkeleys distinction between two uses of our language,
communicative and instrumental. We use language communicatively, if we have a
certain object in mind and due to this fact our propositions have an appropriate content.
We use it instrumentally, on the other hand, if we use our symbols blindly, i.e. no
content is being connected with them and manipulating them we want only to reach
some goal.
Berkeleys distinction enables us to characterize various concepts of science. In an
old Aristotelian conception is scientific discourse understood communicatively. Science
has its object and its propositions have a real content. Deep changes in a mathematical
praxis in the modern times led to a gradual revision of this semantic monism. These
changes are closely connected with emergence of algebra in which our language started
to be used not only communicatively. Symbols used in algebraic operations (first of all
symbols of imaginary numbers) evoke in us no idea and that is why they seem to have
no content. in a different Mathematicians thus started to believe that language has not
only communicative nature, but also instrumental or calculative function. We can meet
a strict application of this distinction among the Cambridge algebraics (namely in the
work of G. Peacock). According to them we use language instrumentally in algebra
only, a communicatively in the subordinated sciences (arithmetic, geometry, dynamics, mechanics). This semantic dualism can be found in the work of D. Hilbert who
distinguishes two kinds of formulae (finitary and infinitary) or in the works of logical
positivists who distinguish between analytical and synthetical judgments. Problems
connected with this semantic dualism are overcome by W.V. Quine whose pragmatism is paradoxically in a way a return to the old Aristotelian semantic monism.
However, it is not a restoration of old theoretical ideal of science but installation of
a new scientific paradigm. According to Quine language is not used communicatively
(we do not contemplate anything) but in all contexts instrumentally only. Modern science is according to Quine an instrument by means of which we implant a manageable
structure into flux of experience.

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Jerzy Lo
s and the Origin of Temporal Logic
Tomasz Jarmuz ek
, Poland
Nicolaus Copernicus University, Torun
jarmuzek@umk.pl
Marcin Tkaczyk
John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin, Lublin, Poland
tkaczyk@kul.pl
A significant number of books and papers, concerning the origin of temporal logic,
have been published by prominent publishing houses and prestigious journals for twenty
five years. In vast majority of those works Arthur Norman Prior has been considered
the inventor or the discoverer of temporal logic, whereas Jerzy Los has not even been
mentioned (e.g. [5, 6, 7, 8]). However, having recognized Priors contribution be crucial
and irreplaceable, one should admit fairly that it is Los who invented the logic of time.
That means particularly that (a) Los constructed, described and examined the first
mature calculus of temporal logic, and (b) Prior was aware of and inspired by Los ideas
when beginning his own works in the field.
The objective of this paper is to justify those claims. Among others, in the paper we
reconstruct the original temporal system of logic, presented by Los. It is a well known
fact that, when beginning his tense logic manifesto, Arthur Norman Prior ([10, 11])
was inspired by John Findlay. Findlays text is only a small footnote on some vague
possibility to incorporate tense conventions into modal logic ([1]). On the other hand
Los pioneering work is not usually even being mentioned within the context.
It has been well established that Priors work on temporal logic began in 1953,
whereas Hizs review was published as early as 1951 ([2]).
Finally Prior himself admitted that, when beginning his programme and when
preparing his Time and Modality ([9]), he had known Hizs review and was influenced
by Los ideas ([10], pp. 212213). And in his late work Los paper has even been placed
in the bibliography, even if nowhere else ([11], p. 161). The more Los influence over
Prior and the whole temporal logic gets obvious, the more mysterious the textbooks
are which refuse to mention the true founder of the logic of time.
References
1. J.N. Findlay, Time: a treatment of some puzzles, Australasian Journal of Psychology and Philosophy, vol. 19, 1941, pp. 216235.
2. H. Hiz, Review of J. Los, Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonow Milla, The
Journal of Symbolic Logic, vol. 16, 1951, pp. 5859.
3. T. Jarmuzek and A. Pietruszczak, Completeness of minimal positional calculus,
Logic and Logical Philosophy, vol. 13, 2004, pp. 147162.
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Sessions
4. J. Los, Podstawy analizy metodologicznej kanonow Milla, Annales Universitatis
Mariae Curie-Sklodowska, vol. 2.5.F, 1947, pp. 269301.
5. P. hrstrm and P.F.V. Hasle, A. N. Priors rediscovery of tense logic, Erkenntnis,
vol. 39, 1993, pp. 2350.
6. P. hrstrm and P.F.V. Hasle, Temporal Logic: From Ancient Ideas to Artificial
Intelligence, Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordrecht, 1995.
7. P. hrstrm and P.F.V. Hasle, A. N. Priors logic, in Handbook of the History of
Logic, vol. 7, edited by D.M. Gabbay and J. Woods, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2006,
pp. 399446.
8. P. hrstrm and P.F.V. Hasle, Modern temporal logic: the philosophical background, in Handbook of the History of Logic, vol. 7, edited by D.M. Gabbay and
J. Woods, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 2006, pp. 447498.
9. A.N. Prior, Time and Modality, Clarendon Press, 1957.
10. A.N. Prior, Past, Present, and Future, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1967.
11. A.N. Prior, Papers on Time and Tense, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1968.
12. J. Slupecki, St. Lesniewskis Protothetics, Studia Logica, vol. 1, 1953, pp. 45113.
13. M. Tkaczyk and U. Wybraniec-Skardowska, Logika polska, in Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej, edited by A. Maryniarczyk, vol. 1, Lublin, Poland, 2011, pp. 880890.

Pierre de La Ram
ee as a logician Pontoneer
Ruxandra Irina Vulcan
University Paris-IV Sorbonne, Paris, France
irivulcana@gmail.com
The Meaning of Ramus, a major Logician of the XVIth Century, changes according
to the point of view: insignificant in relation to the contemporary formal Logic, but
linchpin between the Middle Age and the Modernity, it is the methodical Argumentation, gathering Logic with Rhetoric, which gives his Pontoneers Signification. The
Presentation proposes then to explain the main Shifts and Adaptations of the ramist
System. The new Interest for Aristoteles Topics consisted in the thinking of the Probable against that of Certanties, Truth and Arguments of Authorities ; favorable for
Diversity and Novelties, the loci allow an analytical Access to Experience, well necessary during the Period of Discoveries. La Ramee makes yet of inventio of the loci,
fruit of the new humanist Rhetoric, his logical Battle Horse. Used as argumenta, he
transforms them in Tools of the iudicium; he bounds so the Topics to the Organons
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Analytics in a global Logic, unifying both the natural Logic with Syllogistic, Induction with Deduction, dialectical ars disserendi with rhetorical Figurs and Colours.
Without interdisciplinar Barriers more, the Ramism unifies knowledges in a pacifist Encyclopedism, especially thanks wellknown students of the Academy of Herborn, Alsted,
Althusius and Comenius.

Algebra and Category

The invited keynote speaker of this workshop is Olivia Caramello (page 85).

Composition-Nominative Logics as Institutions

Alexey Chentsov and Mykola Nikitchenko
Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, Ukraine
chentsov@ukr.net, nikitchenko@unicyb.kiev.ua
Composition-nominative logics (CNL) are program-oriented algebra-based logics.
They are constructed according to the principles of development from abstract to concrete, priority of semantics, compositionality, and nominativity [1]. Many-sorted algebras of partial mappings form a semantic base of CNL. Mappings are defined over
classes of nominative data considered in integrity of their intensional and extensional
components [2]. The hierarchy of nominative data induces a hierarchy of CNL. We
identify the propositional and nominative levels of CNL. The latter level is subdivided
on quasi-ary and hierarchic-ary sublevels. These sublevels are further subdivided on
logics of pure predicates, logics of predicates, and program logics [3]. The logics of
quasi-ary and hierarchic-ary mappings can be considered generalizations of classical
predicate logics.
Theory of institutions presents a powerful formalism for structuring theories over
logical systems [4, 5]. Its applications demonstrate importance of this formalism for
studying semantic properties of programming and specification languages, databases,
ontologies, cognitive linguistics, etc.
Here we present different types of composition-nominative logics as institutions. We
study properties of presented formalisms and compare them with institutional presentations of classical logic.
References
1. M. Nikitchenko and S. Shkilniak, Mathematical Logic and Theory of Algorithms,
Publishing House of Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv, Kyiv, 2008 (In
Ukrainian.)
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Sessions
2. M. Nikitchenko and A. Chentsov, Basics of Intensionalized Data: Presets, Sets,
and Nominats, Computer Science Journal of Moldova, vol. 20, no. 3(60), 2012,
pp. 334365.
3. M. Nikitchenko and V. Tymofieiev, Satisfiability in composition-nominative logics, Central European Journal of Computer Science, vol. 2, no. 3, 2012, pp. 194
213.
4. T. Mossakowski, J. Goguen, R. Diaconescu and A. Tarlecki, What is a Logic?, in
Logica Universalis: Towards a General Theory of Logic, edited by Jean-Yves Beziau,
Birkhauser, Basel, 2007, pp. 111133.
5. R. Diaconescu, Institution-Independent Model Theory, Birkhauser Basel, 2008.

Algebraizable Logics and a functorial encoding of its morphisms

o Pinto and Hugo Luiz Mariano
Darllan Conceic
a
o Paulo,
Institute of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Sa
o Paulo, Brazil
Sa
darllan@ime.usp.br, hugomar@ime.usp.br.com
Research supported by FAPESP, under the Thematic Project LOGCONS: Logical consequence, reasoning and computation (number 2010/51038-0).
This work presents some results about the categorial relation between logics and
its categories of structures. A (propositional, finitary) logic is a pair given by a signature and Tarskian consequence relation on its formula algebra. The logics are the
objects in our categories of logics; the morphisms are certain signature morphisms
that are translations between logics [1, 3]. Morphisms between algebraizable logics
[2] are translations that preserves algebraizing pairs [4]. Recall that in the theory of
Blok-Pigozzi, to each algebraizable logic a = (, ) is canonically associated a unique
quasivariety QV (a) in the same signature (its algebraic codification). So given
a = (, ), a = ( , ) and f a a morphism of algebraizable logics, we have the
functor f Str Str (M (M )f ) such that commutes over Set and restricts
over its quasivarieties f QV (a ) QV (a); in this vein we show that morphisms of
(Lindenbaum) algebraizable logics can be completely encoded by certain functors defined on the quasivariety canonically associated to the algebraizable logics, more precisely, there is a anti-isomorphism between morphisms of (Lindenbaum) algebraizable
logics and functors of quasivarieties associated with theses logics. It is not difficult to
see that this kind of functor f QV (a ) QV (a) has a left adjoint: we suspect that, at
least under some conditions, this left adjoint has a connection with a G
odel translation
generalized .
The functorial codification of logical morphisms is useful in the development of a categorial approach to the representation theory of general logics [5]. We intend research
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local-global principle for the logic consequence relatively to the class of Lindenbaumalgebraizable logics and study closure properties by constructions like products and
filtered colimits, among others. We intent to use this local-global approach to study
meta-logic properties like Craig interpolation property and Beth property and apply in our representation theory of logics.
References
1. P. Arndt, R.A. Freire, O.O. Luciano and H.L. Mariano, A global glance on categories in Logic, Logica Universalis, vol. 1, 2007, pp. 339.
2. W.J. Blok and D. Pigozzi, Algebraizable logics, Memoirs of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 396, American Mathematical Society, Providence, USA, 1989.
3. V.L. Fernandez, M.E. Coniglio, Fibring algebraizable consequence systems, in
Proceedings of Workshop on Combination of Logics: Theory and Applications, edited
by W.A. Carnielli, F.M. Dionsio and P. Mateus), 2004, pp. 9398.
4. H.L. Mariano and C.A. Mendes, Towards a good notion of categories of logics,
arXiv.org, http://arxiv.org/abs/1404.3780, 2014, 10 pages.
5. H.L. Mariano and D.C. Pinto, Representation theory of logics: a categorial approach, arXiv.org, http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2429, 2014, 10 pages.

Separator Method for Constructing Canonical Types

of Formulas
Olga Gerasimova and Ilya Makarov
Department of Data Analysis and Artificial Intelligence,
Higher School of Economics, National Research University,
Moscow, Russia
olga.g3993@gmail.com, iamakarov@hse.ru
Keywords: Many-Valued Logic, Closed Class, Canonical Type.
We present a new method of finding the canonical types of formulas based on threevalued projection logic functions. The method is focused on separation of all tuples
of values for variables into disjoint sets. For every such set we take its own simple
canonical type that identifies this set. Combining the results for each set we obtain the
required canonical type for a closed class.
Projection Logic and Canonical Forms
This article deals with a projection logic P3,2 of three-valued logic functions of several
variables including single variable case defined on the set {0, 1, 2} and taking values in
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Sessions
the set {0, 1} [1]. If we consider a closed class of P3,2 , and allow all of its functions possess
only values from {0, 1}, then we would obtain a projection of a closed class of threevalued logic, which itself is a closed class relative to Boolean logic. Two formulas are
called equivalent if they represent equal functions. If we could assign to every arbitrary
formula F some special formula C(F ) such that for every two equivalent formulas F1 , F2
the equality C(F1 ) = C(F2 ) holds as the graphical coincidence of two symbolic raws,
then we may say about existence of a canonical type of formulas. The full disjunctive
normal form (FDNF) and Zhegalkins polynomial are well-known examples of canonical
types.
Separator Method
The separator method is designed to construct canonical types for formulas based on
functions of many-valued projection logic. At first, we separate all the tuples between
values on the projection consisting of {0, 1}n tuples and the remainder, which
contain at least one value 2, combining each part by conjunction with indicators
I of the conditions mentioned above. In the FDNF such indicators of tuples were
conjunctions of variables and their negations. For P3,2 maximal conjunctions of unary
functions are ja (xi ) = I(xi = a) [2].
Secondly, we combine the projection and the remainder by addition by modulo 2 or
disjunction.
f n = prf n I{i, xi {0,1}} / f n I{i, xi =2}
The functions of P3,2 are determined by tuples on which they are equal to 1. Fixing
a tuple we obtain that all indicators except one possess value 0, so we may combine
them by non-trivial functions that preserve constants 0 and 1 such as and .
For the remainder we separate tuples by some partition and for every part we
construct a simple canonical type combining some functions into conjunctions and preserving property to indicate tuples of values for the variables. In such a conjunction
variables can be repeated in general functions.
Some classes represent functions such that the equality f (1 ) = 1 implies
f (i ) = 1, i = 1, , k for some tuples i . We use indicators for such sets of tuples
and Eulers formulas for the union of intersecting sets to preserve the uniqueness of a
canonical type. This procedure allows us to associate well-known results from P2 with
the problems of many-valued logic closed classes.
References
1. D. Lau, Function algebras on finite sets, Springer Monographs in Mathematics,
Springer, Berlin, Germany, 2006.
2. I. Makarov, Existence of finite total equivalence systems for certain closed classes
of 3-valued logic functions, Logica Universalis, vol. 9, no. 1, 2015, pp. 126.
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On non-deterministic algebras
Ana Claudia de Jesus Golzio and Marcelo Coniglio
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
anaclaudiagolzio@yahoo.com.br, coniglio@cle.unicamp.br
The conflict between incomplete, vague, imprecise and/or inconsistent real-word information, on the one hand, and the principle of truth-functionality, on the other, motivated A. Avron and I. Lev to introduce in [1] the so-called non-deterministic matrices
(Nmatrices for short), a generalization of the usual matrix semantics. In an Nmatrix,
the truth-value of a complex formula can be chosen non-deterministically out of some
non-empty set of options. That is, Nmatrices are based on non-deterministic algebras,
in contrast with the usual logical matrices, which are based on standard algebras.
The notion of non-deterministic algebras was introduced in Computer Science in
order to deal with nondeterminism. For instance, non-deterministic algebras were proposed to recognize terms from absolutely free algebras.
Several propositional logics can be semantically characterized by a single logic matrix, but the characteristic matrix of many of them is infinite, and so it is not a good
decision procedure for these logics. Nmatrices, by its turn, allow to replace, in many
cases, an infinite characteristic matrix by a finite characteristic matrix and thus obtain
properties such as decidability.
In this paper we propose the study of Nmatrices (and the underlying non-deterministic
algebras) from the point of view of Universal Algebra. Thus, after introducing the
category of non-deterministic algebras, some concepts such as product, subalgebra,
congruence, quotient algebra and ultra product are studied in the non-deterministic
context.
One of the goals of this research is the possibility of obtain a kind of algebrization,
by adapting the Blok and Pigozzis techniques to the non-deterministic algebras, for
logics which do not admit an algebraic analysis in this sense, such as (some of the)
Logics of formal inconsistency.
Reference
1. A. Avron and I. Lev, Canonical Propositional Gentzen-type Systems, in Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on Automated Reasoning (IJCAR
2001), edited by R. Gore, A. Leitsch and T. Nipkow, Lecture Notes in Artificial
Intelligence, vol. 2083, Springer, 2001, pp. 529544.

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Sessions

The Category TrCx and some results

Angela Pereira Rodrigues Moreira and Itala M. Loffredo DOttaviano
State University of Campinas, Campinas, Brazil
angela.p.rodrigues4@gmail.com, itala@cle.unicamp.br
In [3], da Silva, DOttaviano and Sette proposed, in 1999, a very general definition
for the concept of translation between logics.
Coniglio in [2] introduced the concept of meta-translations, which are functions
between languages that preserve certain properties of the domain logic. In [1] we find
a simplified version of the concept of meta-translation, named contextual translation.
The contextual translations are a special class of translations between logics defined as
in [3].
In [3] the authors introduced the category Tr whose arrows are translations between
logics and objects are the logics. The objective of this work was to characterize and
study some properties of the category TrCx, whose arrows are as contextual translations between logics and objects are the logics. Furthermore, we established a relation
between the TrCx and the Tr.
References
1. W.A. Carnielli, M.E. Coniglio and I.M.L. DOttaviano, New dimensions on translations between logics, in Proceedings of the II World Congress on Universal Logic,
UNILOG07, Xian, China, 2007, pp. 4454.
2. M.E. Coniglio, Towards a stronger notion of translation between logics, Manuscrito
Revista Internacional de Filosofia, vol. 28, no. 2, 2005, pp. 231262.
3. J.J. da Silva, I.M.L. DOttaviano and A.M. Sette, Translations between logics, in
Models, Algebras and Proofs, edited by X. Caicedo and C.H. Montenegro, Marcel
Dekker, New York, USA, 1999, pp. 435448.

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Morita-equivalences for MV-algebras

Anna Carla Russo
University of Salerno, Salerno, Italy
anrusso@unisa.it
Olivia Caramello
University of Paris-Diderot, Paris, France
olivia@ihes.fr
This talk is based on [2] and [3]. We generalize to a topos-theoretic setting two classical categorical equivalences arising in the context of MV-algebras: Mundicis equivalence [4] between the category of MV-algebras and the category of lattice-ordered
abelian groups with strong unit (`-u groups, for short) and Di Nola-Lettieris equivalence [3] between the category of perfect MV-algebras and the category of lattice-ordered
abelian groups (`-groups, for short), not necessarily with strong unit. We show that
these generalizations yield respectively a Morita-equivalence between the theory MV of
MV-algebras and the theory Lu of `-u groups and a Morita-equivalence between the theory of perfect MV-algebras and the theory of `-groups. These Morita-equivalences allow
us to apply the bridge technique of [1] to transfer properties and results from one theory
to the other, obtaining new insights which are not visible by using classical techniques.
Among the results obtained by applying this methodology to Mundicis equivalence,
we mention a bijective correspondence between the geometric theory extensions of the
theory MV and those of the theory Lu , a form of completeness and compactness for the
infinitary theory Lu , a logical characterization of the finitely presentable `-groups with
strong unit and a sheaf-theoretic version of Mundicis equivalence. In the case of Di
Nola-Lettieris equivalence, after observing that the two theories are not bi-interpretable
in the classical sense, we identify, by considering appropriate topos-theoretic invariants,
three levels of bi-intepretability holding for particular classes of formulas: irreducible
formulas, geometric sentences and imaginaries. Lastly, by investigating the classifying
topos of the theory of perfect MV-algebras, we obtain various results on its syntax and
semantics also in relation to the cartesian theory of the variety generated by Changs
MV-algebra, including a concrete representation for the finitely presentable models of
the latter theory as finite products of finitely presentable perfect MV-algebras. Among
the results established on the way, we mention a Morita-equivalence between the theory of lattice-ordered abelian groups and that of cancellative lattice-ordered abelian
monoids with bottom element.
References
1. O. Caramello, The unification of Mathematics via Topos Theory, arXiv:math.CT/
1006.3930, 2010.
2. O. Caramello and A.C. Russo, The Morita-equivalence between MV-algebras and
lattice-ordered abelian groups with strong unit, Journal of Algebra, vol. 422, 2015,
pp. 752787.
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Sessions
3. O. Caramello and A.C. Russo, Perfect MV-algebras and lattice-ordered abelian
groups: a topos theoretic perspective, arXiv:math.CT/1409.4730, 2014.
4. A. Di Nola and A. Lettieri, Perfect MV-algebras are categorically equivalent to
abelian l-groups, Studia Logica, vol. 88, no. 3, 1994, pp. 467490.
5. D. Mundici, Interpretation of AF C -Algebras in Lukasiewicz Sentential Calculus,
Journal of Functional Analysis, vol. 65, no. 1, 1986, pp. 1563.

Dialectica Categories, Cardinalities of the Continuum

and Combinatorics of Ideals
Samuel G. da Silva
Federal University of Bahia, Salvador, BA, Brazil
samuel@ufba.br
Valeria de Paiva
NLU Research Lab, Nuance Communications, Inc., Sunnyvale, CA, USA
valeria.depaiva@gmail.com
We propose to revisit some old work of Andreas Blass ([1, 2]) connecting Dialectica
categories ([3, 4, 5]), considered as models of Linear Logic, to tools of Vojtas ([9]) that
relate cardinal invariants via inequalities. We sharpen these results in the light of new
developments in Set Theory (such as those introduced in [7] and described in [8]).
As a study case, we investigate how certain cardinals defined in terms of ideals (see,
e.g., [6], p. 32) are naturally encompassed by this approach at least in the specific
situation where those ideals are defined in terms of pre-orders (i.e., reflexive, transitive
binary relations).
References
1. A. Blass, Questions and Answers A Category Arising in Linear Logic, Complexity Theory and Set Theory, in Advances in Linear Logic , edited by J.-Y. Girard, Y.
Lafont and L. Regnier, London Mathematical Society Lecture Note Series, vol. 222,
London, 1995, pp. 6181.
2. A. Blass, Propositional Connectives and the Set Theory of the Continuum, CWI
Quarterly (Special issue for SMC 50 jubilee), no. 9, 1996, pp. 2530.
3. V. de Paiva, A dialectica-like model of linear logic, in Category Theory and Computer Science, edited by D.H. Pitt, D.E. Rydeheard, P. Dybjer, A. Pitts and A.
Poigne, Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 389, Springer, 1989, pp. 341356.
4. V. de Paiva, The Dialectica Categories, PhD Thesis, Computer Laboratory, University of Cambridge, 1990.
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5. V. de Paiva, Dialectica and chu constructions: Cousins?, Theory and Applications
of Categories, no. 7, 2006, pp. 127-152.
6. M. Hrusak, Combinatorics of filters and ideals, in Set Theory and Its Applications,
edited by L. Babinkostova, A.E. Caicedo, S. Geschke and M. Scheepers, Contemporary Mathematics, vol. 533, American Mathematical Society, Providence, RI, USA,
2011, pp. 2969.
7. J. Moore, M. Hrusak and M. Dzamonja, Parametrized principles, Transactions
of American Mathematical Society, vol. 356, no. 6, 2004, pp. 22812306.
8. D. Rangel, Aplicacoes de Princpios Combinatorios em Topologia Geral, MSc
Dissertation, Universidade Federal da Bahia, Salvador, BA, Brazil, 2012.
9. P. Vojtas, Generalized Galois-Tukey-connections between explicit relations on classical objects of real analysis, in Set Theory of the Reals, Israel Mathematical Conference Proceedings, vol. 6, Bar-Ilan University, pp. 619-643, 1993.

Categorical Logic Approach to Formal Epistemology

Vladimir L. Vasyukov
Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia
vasyukov4@gmail.com
Formal approaches to epistemology (which include logical epistemology, computational epistemology and modal operator epistemology etc.) either proceed axiomatically
or concentrate on learning and knowledge acquisition using toolboxes from logic and
computability theory.
It seems that we can extend the field of logical epistemology investigations exploiting systems of categorical logics rather than the propositional logics where deductive
categories consist of formulas as objects and coded proofs as arrows (cf. [1]). In such
categories for any object-formula A there is a special identity arrow 1A A A and
transitivity of proofs is expressed by means of the composition operation which being
applied to arrows f A B and g B C generates an arrow g f A C (in
essence, a composition is a form of cut rule). Besides that, in deductive categories the
following equations take place: f 1A = f, 1B f = f, (h g) f = h (g f ) for any
f A B, g B C, h C D. Operations on arrows are considered as rules of inference and there is given a formula T (truth). For example, we can introduce a binary
operation (= if. . . then) for forming the implication A B of two given formulas A
and B simultaneously introducing the following operations on arrows
gT AB
f AB
f T A B
gs A B
together with the additional identities f
g T C D.

378

= f, g s = g for any f A B and

Sessions
Modal operation K (= its known, that) for forming modal formula KA would
be introduced the same way in deductive categories. Additional new arrows will be
depended on the accepted modal axioms. In particular, introducing an arrow dAB
K(A B) KA KB and a partial unary operation on arrows:
f AB
f T A
nec(f ) T KA Kf KA KB
we obtain (adding respective identities on arrows e.g. (dAB nec(f ))s = K(f s ) for f T
A B) a category equivalent of normal epistemic modal logic epistemic bicartesian
closed deductive category ECBC.
But to consider different agents of knowledge we have to introduce operations of the
type Kx A, Ke A, Kz A, . . . and in this case we need a family of knowledge operations of
different agents i.e. parameterized epistemic operations. Here helps one more category
construction so-called functors. A functor F between two deductive categories C, D is
a function assigning to any formula A of C a formula F(A) of D, and any arrow f A B
of C an arrow F(f ) F(A) F(B), such that F(1A ) = 1F(A) , F(g f ) = F(g) F(f ).
If now we construe the system of (endo)functors between C and C then as formulas
Kx A, Ky A, Kz A we will take the result of functors actions Kx (A), Ky (A), Kz (A) with
parameters x, y, z. Besides, formulas-objects of the type Kx (A) Ky (B) and inferences of the type Kx (A) Kx (A) Ky (B) Ky (B) (i.e. the knowledge situations
caused by actions of different agents) might be derived. Moreover, to obtain a category of K-functors we introduce arrows Kxy (A, B) Kx (A) Ky (B) which are the
compositions of the arrows Kxy (A) Kx (A) Ky (A), Ky (f ) Ky (A) Ky (B) as well
as arrows Kx (f ) Kx (A) Kx (B), Kxy (B) Kx (B) Ky (B) and Ky (f ) Kxy (A) =
Kxy (B) Kx f = Kxy (A, B).
Degrees of belief which Bayesians identifies with the probability also could be introduced in ECBC but transforming it into a 2-category where 2-arrows are parameterized
by these degrees of belief. A 2-arrow can be depicted as a bygon (cf. [1]).
Kx (f )



?
Kx (A)
Kx (B)
P r(Kx (g)Kx (f ))

Kx (g)

6


i.e. the shape of 2-morphism P r(Kx (g)Kx (f )) Kx (f ) Kx (g) between morphisms

Kx (f ), Kx (g) Kx (A) Kx (B) where P r(Kx (g)Kx (f ) is the the conditional probability. We can horizontally compose 2-morphisms
Kx (f )
Kx (h)





Kx (A)
Kx (C)
P r(Kx (g)Kx (fK))x (B) P r(Kx (i)Kx( h))

Kx (g)




Kx (i)

6


to obtain a 2-morphism
P r(Kx (i)Kx (h)) P r(Kx (g)Kx (f )) Kx (f ) Kx (i)
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

and vertically compose them
'Kx (f )
$

P r(Kx (g)Kx (f ))

?
Kx (g)
- K
Kx (A)
x (B)

P r(Kx (h)Kx (g))

6

&
%
Kx (h)
to obtain a 2-morphism
P r(Kx (i)Kx (h)) + P r(Kx (g)Kx (f )) Kx (f ) Kx (i).

References
1. J.C. Baez, Introduction to n-Categories, in Proceedings of 7th Conference
on Category Theory and Computer Science, Lecture Notes in Computer Science,
vol. 1290, edited by E. Moggi and G. Rosolini, Springer, Berlin, 1997, pp. 133,
also in arXiv:q-alg/9705009.
2. J. Lambek and P.J. Scott, Introduction to Higher Order Categorical Logic, Cambridge University Press, 1986.

380

10 Contest: the Future of Logic

Modern logic (starting with George Boole at the mid of the XIX century) changed
the world, it led to new understanding of reasoning, language, mathematics. It gave
new directions in philosophy and gave birth to computation.
After 150 years we may wonder what is the future of so successful a science, nowadays
much of the time in the shadow of its multifaceted offsprings
This contest wants to promote a reflexion on what can be the future of logic considering its 150-years history. Here are a few questions:
1) Will or can logic give a better understanding to sciences / fields such as physics,
biology, economics, music, information?
2) How will evolve the internal life of logic, its objectives and tools?
3) How will develop the interactions between logic and philosophy, logic and mathematics, logic and computation?
To take part to the contest submit a paper of 10 to 15 pages by March 31st, 2015
to unilog.contest2015@gmail.com.
Previous Winners of UNILOG contest are:
Carlos Caleiro and Ricardo Goncalves
UNILOG2005 = Identity between logical structures
Till Mossakowski, Razvan Diaconescu and Andrzej Tarlecki
UNILOG2007= Translations between logical systems
Vladimir Vasyukov
UNILOG2010 = Combination of logics
Nate Ackerman
UNILOG2013 = Logical Theorems

The best papers will be selected for presentation in a special session during the event
and a jury will decide during the event who are the winners: gold, silver and bronze
medals.
Members of the Jury are Walter Carnielli (president), Patrick Blackburn and John
Corcoran.
The prize will be offered by Anne Matzener, representative of Birkhauser.

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Investigations into a Polynomial Calculus for Logics

Rodrigo de Almeida
Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
almahed@msn.com
In this work, ideas going back to Zhegalkins article On the Technique of Calculating Propositions in Symbolic Logic (1927) are presented, along with results broadening
their scope. Zhegalkin interprets the Propositional logic (PL) fragment found in Section
A, Part I of Whitehead and Russells Principia Mathematica as having truth-values
in Z/2Z, connecting Boolean valuations and proof calculus through an arithmetic of
propositions, also designing rudimentary criteria for the satisfiability of given formulae. This approach is reminiscent of the contemporary idea of furnishing satisfiability
problems as a problem of finding zeroes for systems of polynomials, representing wffs,
in a polynomial ring. Restating such problems as a problem of finding roots provides
great flexibility to decision procedures, and all-purpose economy as shown by W. A.
Carnielli in [1, 2, 3]. Thus, the method of finding roots is paramount and lies among
our principal concerns in the present work.
As already suggested by W. A. Carnielli in [1], Hilberts Nullstellensatz is a general and powerful result which can be explored for this purpose, also extending such
treatment to many-valued logic. Nonetheless, a clear limitation is that the general statement of the theorem assumes an algebraically closed field, while no finite field GF (pk )
can be algebraically closed: let a1 , a2 , . . . , apk GF (pk ) be all its elements, then the
polynomial (x a1 )(x a2 )(x apk ) + 1 has no roots in GF (pk ). We then need to
consider the Nullstellensatz case-by-case, having a criterion for the shape of a polynomial f = f (x1 , . . . , xn ) provided the existence of simultaneous zeroes with g1 , . . . , gm
vanishing f or, in contraposition terms, if we want to decide that a given set of polynomials f, g1 , . . . , gm has no simultaneous zeroes provided that there is no way to write
f k = ni=1 hi gi given any hi polynomials in the same field, what seems to be hard.
A method using Grobner basis has been also proposed, and here we explore other
methodologies giving criteria for the existence of simultaneous zeroes relying on information about the set of polynomials in hand, hence without having to consider a too
general expressiveness as above in many cases.
References
1. W.A. Carnielli, Polynomial Ring Calculus for logical inference, CLE e-Prints,
vol. 5, no. 3, 2005, http://www.cle.unicamp.br/e-prints/vol_5,n_3,2005.html.
2. W.A. Carnielli, Polynomizing: Logic Inference in Polynomial Format and the
Legacy of Boole, CLE e-Prints, vol. 6, no. 3, 2006, http://www.cle.unicamp.
br/e-prints/vol_6,n_3,2006.html.
382

Contest: the Future of Logic

3. W.A. Carnielli, Formal polynomials, heuristics and proofs in logic, Logical Investigations, vol. 16, Institute of Philosophy, Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010,
http://iph.ras.ru/uplfile/logic/log16/LI-16_carnielli.pdf, pp. 280294.

The Future of Logic as a Geometry

of Scientific Thought
Walter Gomide
, Brazil
Federal University of Mato Grosso, Cuiaba
waltergomide@yahoo.com
James Anderson
Reading University, Reading, England, UK
james.a.d.w.anderson@btinternet.com
Tiago Reis
Federal Institute of Rio de Janeiro, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil
What is Logic? It is not an easy task to answer that question without assuming
some perspectives of what logic should be. According to the tradition that goes from
Aristotle to Frege, Logic can be seen as the science of valid argument: logic teach us
how to perform a reasoning without committing any fallacies; logic will give us the laws
that govern the concept of logical consequence, though this characterisation seems to
contain a vicious circle, namely, by defining Logic by means of the adjective logical,
which is used in the expression logical consequence. But, by considering that logic
is the realm of knowledge that offers the concept of validity of an argument, Logic
can be defined as the branch of human activity in which we are concern with the laws
of thought and their consequences.
Then, by assuming such a conception of logic, we can ask what be the future of logic.
In other words, how logic can preserve this status of being the science of thought and,
at the same time, be expanded so that its concepts and laws can be seen as fruitful
to the other sciences. Could a logical concept be interesting to physics, for instance,
without being only an instrumental for good or valid reasoning? Our answer to this is to
considering logic as geometry which mediates scientific descriptions and problem
solving. More precisely, logic can be seen as special vector algebra in logical space.
With this approach, we see that the future of logic can be glimpsed: logic will be a
science of thought that can be useful to other sciences, not only as a source of valid
arguments, but as a realm that can directly describe their concepts of numbers and
vectors.
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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

The Future of Logic (and Ethics)

Matt LaVine
University at Buffalo, Buffalo, USA
SUNY College at Potsdam, Potsdam, USA
mattlavi@buffalo.edu
Questions about the future of logic, as well as the future of ethics, are asked far
less often than questions about the future of philosophy, generally. I think asking more
of the former will make some of those concerned about the answers to the latter feel
much better. Building off of Corcoran (1989), which claims that the ethics of the
future must accord logic a more central and explicit role, this paper argues that the
philosophy of the future must accord the connection between logic and ethics a more
central and explicit role. The support for this claim has three main facets:
(1) A history of logic since Boole and De Morgan which places great emphasis on
Kripke, Marcus, and Prior. I connect the history to the claim by arguing that
Marcus and Priors views, which directly connect logic and ethics, are much more
satisfactory than Kripkes attitude toward these issues.
(2) The content of Corcoran (1989).
(3) Examples drawn from extending our attention to non-deductive logics in addition
to the infinitely-more studied deductive systems.

The Future of Logic: Foundation-Independence

Florian Rabe
Jacobs University, Bremen, Germany
florian.rabe@gmail.com
Throughout the 20th century, the automation of formal logics in computers has
created unprecedented potential for practical applications of logic most importantly
the mechanical verification of mathematics and software. But the high cost of these
applications makes them infeasible but for a few flagship projects, and even those are
negligible compared to the ever-rising needs for verification. We hold that the biggest
challenge in the future of logic will be to enable applications at much larger scales and
simultaneously at much lower costs.
This will require a far more efficient allocation of resources. Wherever possible,
theoretical and practical results must be formulated generically so that they can be
instantiated to arbitrary logics; this will allow reusing results in the face of todays
multitude of diverging logical systems. Moreover, the software engineering problems
concerning automation support must be decoupled from the theoretical problems of
designing logics and calculi; this will allow researchers outside or at the fringe of logic
to contribute scalable logic-independent tools.
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Contest: the Future of Logic

Anticipating these needs, the author has developed the MMT framework. It offers a
modern approach towards defining, implementing, and applying logics that focuses on
modular design and logic-independent results. This paper summarizes the ideas behind
and the results about MMT. It focuses on showing how MMT provides a theoretical
and practical framework for the future of logic.

Unified Logic, an Alternative for Combining Logics

Mohammad Shafiei
IHPST1 , University of Paris 1, Paris, France
Mohammad.Shafiei@malix.univ-paris1.fr
The aim of this note is to defend the possibility of unifying logics instead of combining them so that the philosophical insights, which are supposed to be fulfilled, play
role from the outset and in the process of originating, not that they come to stage after
technical issues and in order to interpret them. I am to argue for the feasibility of this
project both from philosophical and technical points of view.
The philosophical method on the basis of which I am to argue that a unified logic is
feasible is phenomenology. I will benefit from some of phenomenological ideas, which I
am going to discuss in the presentation, besides the dialogical approach which provides
us with a powerful tool to formulate semantics for different systems of logic and to
explain the insights behind them.
I begin from the observation that for most of the logical systems it is true that
each of them contains some genuine insights about logical relations and, disregard
their probably inadequate extension from a strict phenomenological point of view, they
formulated some basic notions which would otherwise remain ambiguous. Then the
first task of unifying logics is to recognize these insights.
Therefore, it is clear that no pre-given technique to unify logics is possible, for in
any case original philosophical considerations are needed. Then, in order to show the
feasibility of this project what can be done is to show it in practice. This is the main
task of my presentation.
I will formulate a logic which gathers insights, I mean phenomenologically admissible
ones namely those obtained through ideation and eidetic variation, which are so far
represented in various logics. I will present an axiomatic version of such a unified logic
and I will also introduce a dialogical semantics for it.
In an important way the logic I will articulate should be considered as a proof of
concept not necessarily as an introduction of the true unified logic.
No prediction is possible in the spontaneous activities of science, but as a plausible
future I will be going to conclude that to realize the phenomenological idea of a unified
logic is in principle possible and some techniques achieved during the past century,
above all the dialogical semantics, could help in this respect.
1

Institute for History and Philosophy of Sciences and Technology

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Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

It is nevertheless worth mentioning that such a project would not be in conflict with
developing polarities of logical systems. The point is that if logic and philosophy would
be supposed to be tied together it would hardly be by means of plural logical systems,
rather a unified logic is required and it is now, having the achievements of the 20th
century at hand, not far from possible.

The Future of Logic

Hartley Slater
University of Western Australia, Perth, Australia
hartley.slater@uwa.edu.au
The future of Logic will be one without any self-referential paradoxes. It will even
lack the so-called paradoxes of material and strict implication. This will be achieved
through the extension of the Lambda Calculus to the formalisation of that-clauses
referring to propositions. And that will also allow sentences involving empty or indexical terms to be included in those covered. For such sentences can still express
propositions, even if different propositions might not then have different syntactic expressions. As a result Tarskis and Godels Theorems will be relegated to academic
curiosities. Above all, Logic will cease to be the mathematical study of arrangements
of sentences, and return to being a moral science concerned to hold fast the standard
meaning of sentences.

Triggering a Copernican Shift in Logic

through Sequenced Evaluations
Erik Thomsen
Charles River Analytics, Cambridge, MA, United States
ethomsen@cra.com
Over the past fifty years, the fabric of our society has been radically transformed by
successful logic-based applications. In todays world, logic chips (i.e., CPUs) and the
logic-grounded software that controls them support nearly all socio-economic infrastructure, from banking to defense. These global computing applications are the major
arena where logic as a body of knowledge meets, and is tested against reality.
Although classical first- order logic (FOL) appears to work perfectly for truth functional applications such as computer chip design where propositions are guaranteed to
have a truth value (i.e., a positive XOR negative charge), inference problems characteristic of widely used logic-grounded software technologies [6], and representation problems characteristic of logic-based research into natural language understanding [3] suggest that there are foundational areas in logic that are not yet completely understood.
386

Contest: the Future of Logic

In some cases, issues in foundational areas became the source of software restrictions.
For example, the expressivity of database languages such as SQL was restricted to
avoid the sorts of impredicativity paradoxes to which higher order logics are exposed
[1]. In other cases, foundational issues became a source of serious software errors. For
example, the conflation of wffs and evaluable propositions led to erroneous aggregates
in large data sets such as found at the World Bank and other large organizations where
many of their wffs are unevaluable. These real world issues point to existing unresolved
foundational issues in FOL including evaluability and identity and substitution.
At the center of logics foundations is the characterization of the components of a
proposition as argument and predicate. From Aristotle to Boole, Frege, and Russell,
the consensus view of both components has been referential. That is to say arguments
and predicates refer to entities in their respective domains in the world. Arguments
refer to substances or objects; predicates refer to properties or attributes. First order
logic (FOL) was built with this referential view as a foundation.
Using examples drawn from Booles The Laws of Thought, this essay proposes a
novel view of the notions of argument and predicate, treating them as temporal differences in evaluation sequencing and not as static differences in domain (i.e., objects vs.
attributes). We show that this new foundational view supports for four main beneficial
changes to FOL that would improve FOLs internal consistency, its integration with
other abstract disciplines, and its external applicability.
1. Wffs can be disentangled from evaluable propositions so that all and only those
wffs that are determined to be evaluable are granted status as propositions for which
bi-valence is thereby guaranteed. Moreover, the variety of ways in which a wff may not
be evaluable provides a richer notion of negation and context-sensitive meaning than
is explicit in FOL. The distinction between evaluable and unevaluable wffs can also be
used to resolve the liar in a novel way that meets constraints imposed by [2].
2. Higher order quantification may be recast as first-order logic assertions where the
concepts used as predicates in one assertion are used as arguments in another. This
simplifies a significant amount of logical apparatus without sacrificing expressivity.
3. By separating typing from use, and by treating logical operators as those operators that apply to any type, FOL and computation can be tightly integrated. And the
reason for the existence of mathematical facts such as the Irrationals can actually be
explained when grounded in a suitably modified interpretation of FOL.
The relationships between logical propositions and their physical representations
can be expanded to include multiple internal physical representations (e.g., different
memory locations) for the same internal logical proposition supporting applied research
in database optimization and theoretical research in para-consistent (e.g., contractionfree) logic as well as non-verbal and non-linguistic representations that support research
in context-sensitive natural language understanding.

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References
1. A.V. Aho and J.D. Ullman, Universality of Data Retrieval Languages, in Proceedings of the 6th ACM SIGACT-SIGPLAN Symposium on Principles of Programming
Languages, 1979, pp. 110119.
2. J. Barwise and J. Etchemendy, The liar: An essay on truth and circularity, Oxford
University Press, 1989.
3. J. Berant, A. Chou, R. Frostig and P. Liang , Semantic Parsing on Freebase from
Question-Answer Pairs, in Empirical Methods on Natural Language Processing,
2013, pp. 15331544.
4. G. Boole, An investigation of the laws of thought: on which are founded the mathematical theories of logic and probabilities, Dover Publications, 1854.
5. E.F. Codd, A relational model of data for large shared data banks, in Communications of the ACM, 1970, p. 13.
6. E. Thomsen, OLAP solutions: building multidimensional information systems, John
Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, USA, 2002.

388

Part IV
Publishers, Sponsors and Partners

389

11 Book Exhibition
During the event there will be a book exhibition with the following publishers:

Birkhauser

Springer

Oxford University Press

College Publications

Peter Lang

World Scientific

Cambridge University Press

391

12 Sponsors and Partners

Logic Application and Research Association, Istanbul,

Turkey

Istanbul
University, Faculty of Letters, Department of Philosophy, Istanbul,
Turkey

Istanbul
University, Institute of Logic, Istanbul,
Turkey

Supreme Council for Culture, Language and History, Atat

urk Culture Centre, Ankara,
Turkey

Bogazici University, Istanbul,

Turkey

Mimar Sinan Fine Arts University, Istanbul,

Turkey

Istanbul
Technical University ITU, Istanbul,
Turkey

B
ulent Ecevit University, Zonguldak, Turkey

Y
uz
unc
u Yl University, Van, Turkey

Point Hotel,

Izmir
Institute of Technology IZTECH, Izmir,
Turkey

Municipality of Sisli, Istanbul,

Turkey

Istanbul
Center for Mathematical Sciences, Istanbul,
Turkey

National Technical University of Athens NTUA, Athens, Greece

Association for Symbolic Logic ASL

Brazilian Logic Society SBL

Brazilian Academy of Philosophy ABF

Tata Institute of Fundamental Research TIFR, Mumbai, India

Federal University of Rio de Janeiro UFRJ, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil

Marie Curie Actions, European Commission, 7th Framework Programme

National Council of Scientific and Technological Development CNPq, Brazil

National Scientific and Technical Research Council CONICET, Argentina

393

Index of Authors

Omerustao
glu, Adnan, 366
C
itil, Ahmet Ayhan, 340

C
etres, Halil Ibrahim,
3
C
evik, Ahmet, 85, 349
Sen, Zekai, 301
epanek, Jan, 310
St

Bispo Dias, Diogo, 130

Bjrdal, Frode, 318
Blackburn, Patrick, 15, 22, 381
Bledin, Justin, 230
Bobillo, Fernando, 178
Bonino, Guido, 118
Borgo, Stefano, 244
Borja Macas, Veronica, 274
Brady, Ross T., 4, 131, 237
Brisson, Janie, 249
Brumberg-Chaumont, Julie, 83, 193
Buchsbaum, Arthur, 3
Bueno-Soler, Juliana, 83
Buldt, Bernd, 24

Abbott, Russ, 204

Ackerman, Nate, 15
Addis, Mark, 206
Allo, Patrick, 19, 127, 221
Alves, Marcos A., 228
Amidei, Jacopo, 283
Amini, Majid, 116
Anand, Bhupinder S., 179
Anderson, James, 383
Anderson, James A.D.W., 323
Angius, Nicola, 202
Antunes, Henrique, 314
Arazim, Pavel, 129
Arndt, Peter, 15, 20, 243
Aucher, Guillaume, 315
Avron, Arnon, 4

Caleiro, Carlos, 4
Campos Bentez, Juan M., 195
Caramello, Olivia, 85, 376
Carnielli, Walter, 4, 133, 145, 381
Carrara, Massimiliano, 134, 170
Casas-Roma, Joan, 365
Chantilly, Catherine, 3
Chell, Nad`ege, 189
Chella, Antonio, 178
Chentsov, Alexey, 370
Chiffi, Daniele, 170
Ciola, Graziana, 198
Coecke, Bob, 25
Coecke, Selma, 298
Coleman, Neil, 230
Conceicao Pinto, Darllan, 371
Coniglio, Marcelo, 26, 277, 285, 374
Corazza, Eros, 239
Corcoran, John, 27, 381
Corraza, Eros, 86
Correia Machuca, Manuel, 30
Costa, Diana, 275

B
uy
ukada, Samet, 84
Baskent, Can, 3, 273
Babenyshev, Sergey, 353
Balbiani, Philippe, 317
Barn, Balbir, 207
Basti, Gianfranco, 79
Batens, Diderik, 130, 237
Bazzoni, Andre, 339
Beall, Jc, 15, 80, 237
Beirlaen, Mathieu, 265
Bellucci, Francesco, 117
Benzmuller, Christoph, 178
Beziau, Jean-Yves, 3, 15
Bilgili, Hanife, 266
Binini, Irene, 194

DAgostini, Franca, 16
395

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

uc, 3, 343
G
uven, Ozg
Gabbay, Dov, 4
Gan-Krzywoszy
nska, Katarzyna, 3, 341
Gauthier, Yvon, 321
Gavryluk, Vitalii, 210
Gazziero, Leone, 198
Gencer, C
igdem, 317
Gerasimova, Olga, 372
Ghilezan, Silvia, 322
Gifford, Christopher S., 230
Gilbert, David, 268
Gilli, Luca, 197
Giovagnoli, Raffaela, 154, 157
Gkorogiannis, Nikos, 207
Goel, Vinod, 93, 256
Golzio, Ana Claudia de Jesus, 374
Gomes, Evandro Lus, 278
Gomide, Walter, 323, 383
Gorisse, Marie-Hel`ene, 41
Gruner, Stefan, 212
Guerizoli, Rodrigio, 193
Guerizoli, Rodrigo, 199
Guibert, Gaell, 355

DAgostino, Marcello, 222, 235

DOttaviano, Itala M.L., 228, 237, 278,
284
da Costa, Vaston, 349
da Mata, Jose Verssimo Teixeira, 123
da Silva, Jairo Jose, 147
da Silva, Samuel G., 377
Dang Van, Bao Long, 171
Daniel Vanderveken, 302
de Almeida, Edgar L. B., 313
de Almeida, Rodrigo, 382
De Cesaris, Alessandro, 135
De Florio, Ciro, 170
de Oliveira, Joao Daniel Dantas, 290
de Paiva, Valeria, 377
de Souza, Edelcio G., 254
Descles, Jean-Pierre, 355
Dodig-Crnkovic, Gordana, 87
dos Reis, Tiago S., 323
Dragalina-Chernaya, Elena, 89, 115
Drehe, Iovan, 287
Duz, Marie, 232
Dubois, Laurent, 320
Dunn, Michael, 4

Hacnebioglu, Ismail
Latif, 43
Haeusler, Edward, 349, 350
Haeusler, Edward Hermann, 307
Hanada, Satoru, 343
He, Huacan, 4
Hedblom, Maria M., 166
Heinemann, Anna-Sophie, 120
Heyninck, Jesse, 107
Hosni, Hykel, 235
Huertas, Antonia, 365

Ernie Lepore, 56
Ertola Biraben, Rodolfo C., 245
Estrada-Gonzalez, Luis, 32, 236, 238
Falcao, Pedro, 321
Ferguson, Thomas, 34
Ferguson, Thomas Macaulay, 216, 237
Ficara, Elena, 37, 120
Fitting, Melvin, 91, 243
Flaminio, Tommaso, 235
Fletcher, Samuel C., 267
Floridi, Luciano, 92, 222
Fomina, Marina, 295
Franchette, Florent, 155
Freire Filho, Alfredo Roque de Oliveira,
321
Freire, Rodrigo, 93, 313
Freire, Rodrigo de A., 313
Fulman, Ben, 363

Ierodiakonou, Katerina, 43
Indrzejczak, Andrzej, 44
Inoue, Katsumi, 178, 185
Isaac, Manuel Gustavo, 46
Ivetic, Jelena, 322
Jager, Gerhard, 4
Jacquette, Dale, 48
Jarmuzek, Tomasz, 368
396

Index of Authors
Jarmuzek, Tomasz, 357
Jaspers, Dany, 50
Jenny, Matthias, 136
Jetli, Priyedarshi, 344
Jimenez, Carlos Cesar, 236, 238

Marmo, Tony, 269

Martnez Fernandez, Jose, 276
Martins, Manuel A., 275, 353
Max, Ingolf, 64, 125
Max, Ingolf , 138
Mazurkiewicz, Stany, 140
McCall, Storrs, 102, 216
Meheus, Joke, 289
Mendjeli, Rachid, 189
Mendonca, Bruno Ramos, 247
Mezzadri, Daniele, 124
Miller, David, 141
Mion, Giovanni, 3, 32
Mirzapour, Mehdi, 200
Moktefi, Amirouche, 67, 115
Molto, Daniel, 326
Moreira, Angela P.R., 375
Moretti, Alessio, 190
Moriconi, Enrico, 358
Morosin, Oleg, 295
Mruczek-Nasieniewska, Krystyna, 269
Muravitsky, Alexei, 327
Murawski, Roman, 103, 115

K
uhnberger, Kai-Uwe, 257, 258
Kachapova, Farida, 325
Kamer, Vedat, 3, 346
Kapantais, Doukas, 304
Karpenko, Hanna, 288
Khaled, Mohamed, 326
Kokhan, Yaroslav, 246
Korkmaz, Oguz, 3
Koslow, Arnold, 4
Kovac, Srecko, 51
Krumnack, Ulf, 166
Krzywoszy
nski, Przemyslaw, 3, 256
Kubyshkina, Ekaterina, 94, 304
Kumova, Bora, 178
181
Kumova, Bora I.,
Kutz, Oliver, 166, 244, 257, 258
Landgren, Per, 122
Lavelle, Sylvain, 298
LaVine, Matt, 384
Lesniewska, Malgorzata, 341
Lesniewski, Piotr, 341
Lemaire, Juliette, 115
Lenzen, Wolfgang, 55
Lepore, Ernest, 94
Li, Chu-Min, 351
Lichev, Valeri Zlatanov, 305
Lobovikov, Vladimir, 346
Lopes, Marcos, 159

Nemeti, Istvan, 4
Nasieniewski, Marek, 269
Natarajan, Raja, 3, 307
on
Nazl In
u, Nazl, 3
Neuhaus, Fabian, 166, 258
Nikitchenko, Mykola, 210, 329, 370
Nourani, Cyrus F., 331
Ochma
nski, Jerzy W., 256
Ochs, Eduardo, 69
Oliveira, Kleidson, 277
Olteteanu, Ana-Maria, 167
Omori, Hitoshi, 215, 218

Matzener, Anne, 381

Mc Kubre-Jordens, Maarten, 102
Magioglou, Thalia, 188, 192
Makarov, Ilya, 372
Many`a, Felip, 351
Manzano, Mara, 60, 95, 357, 365
Marcos, Joao, 101, 169
Mariano, Hugo Luiz, 371

Pavlov, Sergey, 360

Pawlowski, Pawel, 143
Penchev, Vasil, 162
Penchev, Vasil Dinev, 161
Pencheva, Venelina, 162
Peron, Newton, 26
397

Handbook of the 5th World Congress and School of Universal Logic

Petrolo, Mattia, 332
Pezlar, Ivo, 299
Pianigiani, Duccio, 283
Piecha, Thomas, 361
Pierce, David, 3, 72
Pistone, Paolo, 332
Plesniewicz, Gerald S., 333
Poliakov, Nikolai L., 335
Pourmahdian, Massoud, 176
Predelli, Stefano, 239
Priest, Graham, 104, 237
Primiero, Giuseppe, 207, 221

Schroeder, Marcin J., 250

Schroeder-Heister, Peter, 361
Schumann, Andrew, 174
Shafiei, Mohammad, 125, 385
Sher, Gila, 4
Shkilniak, Oksana, 271
Shkilniak, Stepan, 329
Shulga, Elena, 252
Silva, Marcos, 125
Simari, Guillermo, 178
Sinilo, Pawel, 286
Slater, Hartley, 386
Smarandache, Florentin, 186
Soares, Marcelo Reicher, 284
Sorbi, Andrea, 283
Soutif, Ludovic, 240
Standefer, Shawn, 310
Starikova, Irina, 104, 165
Steen, Alexander, 337
Stefaneas, Petros, 3, 167, 202
Stei, Erik, 255
Stojnic, Una, 105, 265
Straer, Christian, 107, 287
Suarez-Rivero, David, 241
Svodoba, David, 367
Svyatkina, Maria N., 260
Szekely, Gergely, 74

Quispe-Cruz, Marcela, 349

Rabe, Florian, 384
Raclavsk
y, Jir, 248
Rademaker, Alexandre, 307
Raimondi, Franco, 207
Read, Stephen, 201
Reis, Tiago, 383
Rene Gazzari, 38
Ribeiro, Marcio, 285
Ripley, David, 175
Rivello, Edoardo, 336
Robert, Serge, 249
Rodrguez, M. Elena, 365
Rodrigues, Abilio, 133, 145
Ruffino, Marco, 239, 240
Russo, Anna Carla, 376
Russo, Eugen, 282

Tasdelen, Iskender,
272
Tamburrini, Guglielmo, 213
Tanaka, Koji, 150
Tarassov, Valery B., 260, 291
Testa, Rafael, 285
Thomsen, Erik, 386
Tkaczyk, Marcin, 368
Trafford, James, 151, 168
Turken, Alper, 152
Turner, Raymond, 109
Tweyman, Stanley, 348

Sakama, Chiaki, 185

Salehi, Saeed, 354
Saloua, Chatti, 196
San Mauro, Luca, 283
Santos, Jefferson, 349
Santos, Paulo, 159
Sanz, Wagner de Campos, 144, 146
Sauzay, Benot, 355
Saveliev, Denis I., 308, 335
Savic, Nenad, 322
Schang, Fabien, 146, 168
Schneider, Stefan, 166

Unterhuber, Matthias, 219

Ural, Safak, 3, 302
Urbaniak, Rafal, 143, 286
398

Index of Authors
Wansing, Heinrich, 4, 215, 220
Wisniewski, Max, 337
Wole
nski, Jan, 348
Woods, Jack, 262
Woods, John, 76
Wybraniec-Skardowska, Urszula, 303

Vagin, Vadim, 295

Valsiner, Jaan, 111, 189
van Benthem, Johan, 4
van der Helm, Alfred, 199
Vandoulakis, Ioannis M., 167
Vasyukov, Vladimir, 4
Vasyukov, Vladimir L., 378
Veale, Tony, 111, 165
Venturi, Giorgio, 268
Vulcan, Ruxandra Irina, 369

Yi, Byeong-uk, 311

Zardini, Elia, 153
Zarebski, David, 163
Zarechnev, Mikhail, 181
Zoghifard, Reihane, 176

Wang, Pei, 112, 178

399