Form

Follows WHAT ?
The modernist notion of function
as a carte blanche
By Jan MICHL
For the author's summary of the main argument, and a CAVEAT, click HERE*
For a pithy summary by a reader, click here
MOTTO:
"Dear Theo, Will life never treat me decently? I am wracked by despair! My head
is pounding! Mrs. Sol Schwimmer is suing me because I made her bridge as I felt
it and not to fit her ridiculous mouth! That's right! I can't work to order like a
common tradesman! I decided her bridge should be enormous and billowing, with
wild, explosive teeth flaring up in every direction like fire! Now she is upset
because it won't fit in her mouth! She is so bourgeois and stupid, I want to
smash her! I tried forcing the false plate in but it sticks out like a star burst
chandelier. Still, I find it beautiful. She claims she can't chew! What do I care
whether she can chew or not! Theo, I can't go on like this much longer! (...) Vincent"
From Woody Allen's "If the Impressionists Had Been Dentists:
A fantasy exploring the transposition of temperament." (1)

:1: The dictum form follows function has been seen, by partisans
and critics alike, as the gist of the functionalist philosophy of design.
The aim of this essay is to shed light on this still enigmatic phrase,
and, at the same time, on the nature of modernism in architecture
and design. The key question pertaining to the dictum is simple:
has the dictum been really feasible as a design precept? Or, to put it
differently: can the modernist architecture and design as we know it
be said to be the result of this design principle? The answer of the
exponents of modernism was a victorious and unequivocal 'yes'.
They claimed that this new architecture and design were not a
result of stylistic intentions, but of the new anti-formalist precept.
This claim has posed a problem, however. If we happen to accept
such understanding, our discussions and our writing regarding
modernist architecture and design will almost unavoidably be
reduced to repeating, or at best embellishing upon, what
modernists have said about their pursuits. If we, on the other hand,

suspect, that their design precept was not feasible, our reading of
their architecture and design will be necessarily very different.
:2: In the past twenty to thirty years the reading of modernist
architecture and design has gone further and further away from the
modernist self-understanding. Modernism has been exposed to a
variety of criticism, ranging from long-suffering to vitriolic (2-12b).
Both the history of modernist architecture and modernist design
theory have gone through a series of attempts at radical revisions.
Today it is more or less taken for granted that neither architects and
designers (13a), nor engineers (13b, 14a), ever begin - or can ever
begin - from a clean slate, i.e. only from problems at hand (14b).
Examples, models, paradigms, and solutions from the near or
distant past, play an important role in the process of design, as well
as in design education (although there is no general agreement
about the way they do). Reyner Banham's judgment that the
dictum form follows function was an "empty jingle" (2) is more or
less taken for granted today. Despite recent attempts to
substantiate such judgment (13, 15) a basic, rather puzzling
question remains: how could an empty jingle ever have preoccupied
several generations of architects and designers? The discussion and
conclusions offered in this essay build on insights of a number of
scholars and thinkers who in my view succeeded best at penetrating
the core of the matter (16a-24b).

I: The birth and childhood of the

dictum form follows function
:3: Let me begin this discussion by an outline of the historical
background of this elegant three-word resume of functionalism, or
modernism (for the purpose of this discussion I use the two terms
interchangeably).
:4: The dictum form follows function was coined by the American
architect Louis Sullivan in his article "The Tall Office Building
Artistically Considered" published in 1896 (25). In the article
Sullivan presented his approach to the emerging building type he
referred to, in the manner of the time, as 'tall office building' soon
to be called 'skyscraper'. In connection with arguing for his tripartite
concept of skyscraper design and for the upward character of the
structure, Sullivan claimed that his design was a 'natural' result of
an all-pervading law. First he formulated this alleged law in general
terms. He wrote:

It is my belief that it is of the very essence of every problem that it contains and
suggests its own solution. This I believe to be natural law. Let us examine, then,
carefully the elements, let us search out this contained suggestion, this essence
of the problem.

:5: Later in the text, prior to the (originally four-word) dictum

summarizing that law, he put it this way:
All things in nature have a shape, that is to say, a form, an outward semblance,
that tells us what they are, that distinguishes them from ourselves and from each
other. -- Unfailingly in nature these shapes express the inner life, the native
quality, of the animal, tree, bird, fish, that they present to us; they are so
characteristic, so recognizable, that we say, simply, it is 'natural' it should be so.
(...) Unceasingly the essence of things is taking shape in the matter of things,
and this unspeakable process we call birth and growth.(...)

:6: Eventually come the ornate, Whitmanesque passages where

Sullivan formulates his dictum, the "final comprehensive formula" as
he put it:
Whether it be the sweeping eagle in his flight or the open apple-blossom, the
toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the branching oak, the winding stream at its
base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing sun, form ever follows function,
and this is the law. (...) It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic,
of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things
superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that
life is recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the
law. -- Shall we, then, daily violate this law in our art? Are we so decadent, so
imbecile, so utterly weak of eyesight, that we cannot perceive this truth so
simple, so very simple? (...) Is it really then, a very marvelous thing, or is it
rather so commonplace, so everyday, so near a thing to us, that we cannot
perceive that the shape, form, outward expression, design or whatever we may
choose, of the tall office building should in the very nature of things follow the
functions of the building (...)? (25)

:7: The dictum was mentioned a couple of times by Sullivan himself

five years later in his "Kindergarten Chats", a series of 52 'Socratic'
dialogues between a wise architect and his inquisitive student,
published as weekly installments in a US architectural journal. The
fact that the dictum did not figure more prominently in
the Chats may have had to do with the fact that it was explicitly
challenged half a year after its publication in 1896, in a speech and
an article by Sullivan's former long-time partner Dankmar Adler
(26), with whom Sullivan fell out at that time (it was in fact Adler
who in his article cut the dictum down to three words by omitting
the word "ever"). Later, in the 1910s, the dictum was quoted
approvingly by several architectural writers discussing Sullivan's
work (27a, 27b). Sullivan himself drew attention to it again in his
memoirs of 1924, published under the ostentatious title The
Autobiography of an Idea. There the dictum was mentioned though without much elaboration - as the hub of his design

philosophy. Sullivan wrote that in the beginning of the 1880s he was

putting to the test a formula that he had evolved
through a long contemplation of living things, namely that form follows function,
which would mean, in practice, that architecture might again become a living art,
if this formula were but adhered to. (27c)

:8: First limited to the circle of Sullivan's friends and admirers, the
dictum seems to have become a catchword among the American
modernists only in the mid-1930s, after the 1935 publication of the
first Sullivan biography written by Hugh Morrison (28) which
included an extensive discussion of Sullivan's architectural theory.
Already a year later, in a book on American industrial design (29),
Sullivan was referred to as the "author of an overquoted axiom
about form and function". The slogan appears to have entered
Europe via England in the late 1930s with the British publication of
C. W. Behrendt's important book Modern Building (30), connecting
the European and American modernist developments, first published
in the US (31); here were not only design theories of Sullivan but
also of his predecessor Greenough presented, and enthusiastically
discussed. (Admittedly, Walter Gropius mentioned both Sullivan's
dictum and its author already in 1934 in a London lecture (31a), but
this was more of an aside; besides it appears that Gropius learned
of the dictum only after his emigration from Germany; at any rate,
it seems fairly certain that at the Bauhaus, the dictum itself, in
contrast to the philosophy which it summarizes, was virtually
unknown.) Since the mid-1930s in the US, and late 1940s in
Europe, Sullivan's dictum then started to be used as a shorthand
summary of the ambitions of the modernist architects and
designers. It summed up the modernist claim that the Modern
Epoch was pregnant with new, preordained forms, a new,
predestined aesthetics intrinsic to this Epoch, implying that the
primary duty of the modernist designer, overshadowing all his other
duties and loyalties, was to serve as a kind of midwife (32, 19a) for
this new objective aesthetics, which was deemed independent of
anybody's taste preferences.

II: Modernists adopt the notion of

function
:9: Although Sullivan was the father of the dictum it was not he who
introduced the notion of function into architectural discourse. It
seems that the notion came to be applied to architecture sometime
around 1750 in Venice in Italy, in the architectural doctrines of the
Italian Jesuit Padre Carlo Lodoli (33, 34). Father Lodoli was an

important figure in the cultural circles of Venice of that time (35).

Among others he was the first to collect paintings of the Italian
primitives, i.e. late Gothic and early Renaissance painters, at a time
when these pictures were considered practically worthless (36).
Lodoli was intensely interested in the theory of architecture and
came later to be called the Socrates of architecture, not only
because he repeatedly questioned the accepted architectural truths
of the day, but also because he himself did not leave any
architectural treatise. His ideas and theories survived thanks to two
books, one written by Francesco Algarotti, one of his critics, and the
other by his admirer Andrea Memmo (37, 38). According to these
writers Lodoli was very critical of what he considered as overuse of
ornament and decoration both in contemporary, and in much of the
older architecture (this was the dawn of the neo-classicist reaction
to rococo). As one of these writers put it the cornerstone of Lodoli's
teaching was the maxim that nothing should be put on show (in
rapresentazione) that was not in function (in funzione), that is, a
working part of the structure (33). It is further probable that Lodoli
also introduced the notion of organic architecture (33, 34), which
for him was an architecture based on functional, or rational,
considerations. The Lodolian theories of architecture were included
later in the 18th century in a book about famous architects written
by Francesco Milizia (39). It was presumably through this popular
book that Horatio Greenough (1805-1852), the American neoclassicist sculptor living in Florence, came to learn sometime in the
1830s or 1840s about Lodoli and his notion of function.
:10: Being a neo-classicist, Greenough (34) spent most of his adult
life in Italy. It is probable that he came also into contact with
contemporary French natural sciences, and Georges Cuvier's works
on comparative anatomy, where the notion of function played a key
role. Greenough wrote several essays on architecture and design in
the 1840s, in which he criticized contemporary historicism and
argued for a program of reform in which the notion of function
would play a central role. To exemplify his ideal he referred often to
forms found in Nature, which he explicitly considered God's work.
He claimed for example that
God's world has a distinct formula for every function, and we seek in vain to
borrow shapes; we must make shapes, and can only effect this by mastering the
principles.

He maintained also that one of the most important principles found

in nature, that human designers should appropriate and master,
was "the principle of unflinching adaptation of forms to functions."
(40) Here we can note that Sullivan's later dictum form follows
function expressed much the same principle, the main difference

being that Greenough himself never hit on such a condensed,

felicitously alliterative formulation.
:11: Around the middle of the century the ideas expressed by
Greenough were very much in the air in Europe as well. Both the
French architect Violett-le-Duc and the German architect Gottfried
Semper were influenced by George Cuvier's functional
classifications, which informed much of the collections in Cuvier's
Muse d'Histoire Naturelle in Paris, and both architects explicitly
held these classifications and analyses as models for the study of
buildings and useful artefacts (41). Their role as ideologists of a
new architecture was, however, different from that of Greenough
and Sullivan. In contrast to the latter two, who can be said to have
been pure ideologists, both Viollet-le-Duc and Semper brought off
serious historical studies.
:12: The architectural thinking of Greenough and Sullivan had an
explicit metaphysical frame of reference. Both authors were
influenced by their countryman Ralph Waldo Emerson, the principal
representative of an American philosophical position known as
transcendentalism. Poetic and speculative at the same time, this
trend of thought had its roots in the German Romantic philosophy of
Schelling and Hegel, mediated through the work of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge. Greenough and Emerson met in the 1830s in Florence
and continued their contacts in later years (42, 43). Emerson
claimed to be interested in what he called "metaphysics of
architecture" by which he meant an architecture that was a result of
necessity, in contrast with architecture based on arbitrary and
capricious choices. In his essay on "Nature" he wrote: "Nature who
made the mason, made the house" (44) - a formulation suggesting
a vision of 'natural' architecture endowed with 'natural' forms
(whatever that may have meant). In a newer study Sullivan's
architectural work and thought was also described as
transcendentalist (45).

III: 'Functions': do they precede forms?

:13: After this short historical survey, let us take an analytic look at
the notion of function. In the discussions about the dictum form
follows function it was in the main the verb 'follow' that kept
attracting attention ("does it - can it - should it follow function?"
was the usual question) while the word function itself was as a rule
considered unproblematic. But is it really? The formula form follows
function hides a remarkable claim, namely that function is
something that precedes form, that it exists independently of form,

that it is there before form emerges. Forms, in other words, can be

said to follow functions only if we consider functions to be entities
that precede, and predate, forms. Only then does it make sense to
urge the designer to make functions his starting point, to make
forms follow functions. But is there really such a thing as function
that exists prior to form? No contemporary science, natural or
social, uses the notion of function in the sense functionalist
designers and architects did. No matter whether these sciences deal
with material objects or immaterial phenomena, the scientific notion
of function always refers to what an existing object or phenomenon
does within a certain context. Whether we wonder about the
function of the heart in human physiology, or the function of facades
in a townscape, hearts and facades have to exist before anybody
starts wondering about their functions. In both natural and social
sciences form predates function: the notion of function is born from
observing existing forms or phenomena. In functionalist design
theory, on the other hand, it is exactly the other way around:
function is claimed to predate form.
:14: Sullivan conceived his dictum as an all-pervasive natural law. It
is important to stress that the dictum is difficult to square with the
Darwinian (or Neo-Darwinian) explanation of functional adaptations
in nature, as has been recently pointed out by architectural
historians (46, 47). The Darwinian theory of natural selection is
mechanistic, not teleological; it does entirely without postulating an
intending, designing agent. According to this theory, small incidental
variations in the physical and behavioral makeup of offspring of the
same litter produce variations in their ability to adapt to a particular
habitat. The individuals that happen to be better adapted to the
particular environment have more chance, through no effort of their
own, to survive to adulthood and have offspring, which inherit the
advantageous variations; these offspring in turn are exposed to the
further pressure of natural selection. The specific habitat operates
as the selecting factor, while inheritance accumulates the selected,
i.e. advantageous, variations. In this way, in the course of
generations, design-like adaptations slowly develop. The Darwinian
way of interpreting seemingly purposeful phenomena in nature as a
result of natural selection is obviously an argument against, rather
than for, the Sullivan formula. According to Darwinian biologists,
forms, or rather small incidental modifications in forms always
appear first, while function, i.e. the functional exploitation of the
modified forms, emerges afterwards - if at all. The astonishing
functional adaptations found in nature are in other words not
explained by reference to beneficial fiats of a Higher Intelligence but
by reference to the habitat-related mechanism of natural selection.
If architects and designers were to take seriously the modernist
exhortation to follow principles found in nature, the mechanism of

natural selection would then suggest, paradoxically, the opposite of

what the modernists propounded: not that designers should start
from 'function' and arrive at the allegedly only possible formal
solution pertaining to such function, but rather that they should
start from forms at hand and see how any of them could be used,
whether unchanged or redesigned, to solve the particular task. This
is something, one could argue, every architect and designer has
been doing since the time immemorial (cf. my article "On seeing
design as redesign").
:15: It should be also noted that Greenough wrote before Darwin's
theory of natural selection appeared on the scene, and that Sullivan
wrote when Darwinism was temporarily in shambles. Darwinian
biology was consolidated only in the 1930s and 1940s (48). In other
words, neither Greenough and Sullivan nor later functionalists can
really be accused of having misunderstood modern biology. This,
however, does not mean that pre-functionalist and functionalist
design philosophy had the bad luck of following too closely an
erroneous understanding of nature during its own time. No
modernists of the 19th or the 20th century were unwitting followers
of either pre-scientific or scientific concepts of the day (49). There
seems to be a good deal of vested interest in embracing these
theories, as I will argue below.

IV: Actual functioning or intended functioning?

:16: It could be objected that there is no intrinsic reason why the
notion of function as used by architects and designers should
conform to that of scientists, and that there are many good reasons
why it does not: scientists qua scientists are observers of things,
while architects and designers are doers, makers of things. The
latter's notion of function, the argument could go, can be
reasonably expected to stand closer to the doer's notion of purpose
than to the observer's notion of function. And indeed to begin with,
the functionalist notion of function seems to be employed as a
synonym for 'purpose'. Could this be the reason why function is
considered to precede form? "Form follows purpose" seems to make
better sense. We know that both pre-functionalists and
functionalists of the period between the First and Second World War
used the notion of function and the notion of purpose more or less
interchangeably, and that is to some extent also the case in the
design discussions until today. We further know that even in our
day-to-day language we use the notion of function in two different

senses, one of which is synonymous with 'purpose'. When speaking,

for example, about the function of car tires, we may have in mind
the original intention with which they were produced, that is
securing a soft, quiet and safe ride. Alternatively, we may by
function mean their actual performance, i.e. how the tires perform,
independently of the original intention. We may then find that they
not only fail to fulfill thoroughly the intended objective, but that
they in addition produce a lot of unintended things: they wear out,
are exposed to punctures, are exceedingly laborious to change,
create severe disposal problems, etc (50).
:17: Let us call these two different meanings of the notion of
function the intended functioning and the actual functioning.
:18: The actual functioning would then refer to what scientists have
in mind when they use the term function: what something (a form,
a phenomenon) does, or how it behaves or performs, no matter
whether that was or was not the part of an original intention or,
indeed, whether or not there was any intention at all. The notion
of intended functioning would, on the other hand, refer to
the purpose of an artefact, or to someone's performancerelated intention. 'Function' in this sense would then be a word for
an intended performance, no matter whether the intention has been
or has not been realized.
:19: Obviously, the question of whether form 'follows' or precedes
function depends on which of the two meanings of the word
'function' we have in mind. If we speak of function in the sense
of actual functioning, then form is always there prior to function. In
other words, since the notion of 'function' is here derived from
observing an existing form, the conclusion must be that form
always precedes 'function' (in this sense) - or, which is the same,
'function' (in this sense) always follows form. If we on the other
hand by function understand intended functioning then form is yet
to be found; in this sense then (and only in this sense) form can be
said to follow function.
:20: What then can we make of the notion of function as used in
Sullivan's dictum? It is obvious that form follows function cannot be
understood as 'form follows actual functioning' because the
statement would simply make no sense; it is evident that actual
functioning refers to the performance of an already existing form.
:21: So the dictum form follows function makes obviously sense
only if we understand it as "form follows intended functioning". But
can "form follows intended functioning"- or simply "form
follows purpose"- be the true meaning of "form follows function"?
Our answer would be 'no'. Admittedly, in the designer's world the

intention, plan or purpose is always there before the form is

created; products are always conceived, designed and
manufactured with this or that purpose in mind. But "purpose" does
not seem to fit here either. If we choose to understand Sullivan's
dictum as suggesting that forms of buildings and products should
follow the purpose the buildings and products are intended to be
used for, we have a reasonable statement - but a pretty trivial one.
Could a slogan such as "form follows intended purpose" have ever
become a battle cry? Could anybody have ever bothered to disagree
with such a goal? The main problem, however, is that if we choose
to understand the dictum this way, its most intriguing dimension namely its promise of objective forms, forms independent of both
the user's and the designer's aesthetic preferences - will disappear.
And as the vision of the objective-because-intrinsic forms vanishes,
the whole functionalist criticism of historicism and eclecticism in
architecture and design, in fact the whole functionalist moral
superiority, looses its footing. The reason for that would be that if
we start speaking of purposes of buildings and products, it is
obvious that purposes of things are purposes of human beings, that
purpose is simply a word referring to someone's wishes, demands
and preferences. Not only could be the idea that form follows
human wishes, demands and preferences, hardly be taken for a new
design principle entirely different from those of the 19th century
(there is little doubt that in any neo-baroque facade of the last
century the forms followed purposes in this sense). Above all, such
understanding of the word function, or purpose, would only
reinforce the legitimacy of demands of human users, clients, or
builders, on architects and designers.
:22: We have to conclude, therefore, that "purpose" (or "intended
functioning") can hardly be the true meaning of the functionalist
notion of function because functionalism stands and falls with the
idea of an objective starting point of design. Were it not for that
allegedly objective starting point claimed to be entirely independent
of our subjective wishes, demands and preferences, functionalists
could hardly insist, as they did, that they were coming forth with a
radical alternative to historicism and eclecticism. Without such an
objective starting point functionalism would be merely a change in
style.
:23: Unless, of course, the notion of function is taken to refer not to
purposes of flesh-and-blood humans, but to Purposes with a capital
P.

V: 'Function' as the gist of the

functionalist design metaphysics
:24: Indeed, the key to the functionalist notion of function seems to
be the finding that the notion does not refer to any commonsense
concept at all, and that it is a denizen of a separate reality. Since
this separate reality is part and parcel of the functionalist design
philosophy, I will refer to this philosophy as functionalist design
metaphysics.
:25: Although some writers did touch upon the metaphysical
dimension of modernist thinking, referring to Plato in connection
with the functionalist architecture and design (3, 51-54), this side of
functionalism has until recently (45, 55, 56) remained largely
unexplored. Excepting David Pye's critical observations (17),
architectural writers including most of the recent ones (8, 46, 5760) still tend to interpret the notion of function as a direct or
indirect reference to use and to the common sense world of users.
Our contention is that the notion of function as employed by
functionalists has nothing to do with what a flesh and blood person
in fact wants a building or a product to do, or look like. Rather, it is
a word for what the person ought to want a building or a product to
do, or look like - according to the putative purposes (or rather
Purposes) of supra-human entities such as "Modern Epoch". Once
one becomes alert to it, it is not difficult to discover that not only
the pre-functionalist writings of Greenough and Sullivan but also the
modernist design philosophy is set in a time-honored metaphysical
framework. Pre-functionalists were quite explicit when suggesting
what authority was to warrant the existence of those objective
forms, independent of taste. They kept referring to entities such as
"God", "creator", "infinite creative spirit", "essence", "nature", etc
(40, 61). Functionalists proper, those of the 1920s and 1930s, did
not refer to God but rather to demands of the "Zeitgeist", "Modern
Epoch" or "Machine Age". Whether references were to God, Nature
or History (references to the Zeitgeist, Epoch or Age are of course
references to the authority of History) they referred to Purposes of
an other-than-human Intelligence. Such Purposes, in not being
human purposes, were allegedly no longer subjective but objective,
and as such they sanctioned the vision of objective design.
:26: Two illustrations: In the functionalist texts the notion of
function manifests itself in the above sense, as an "objective
demand" with various degrees of obviousness. In a text by the
Bauhaus director Walter Gropius it was suggested rather than
articulated, when he wrote in 1926:

... the Bauhaus seeks - by the means of systematic theoretical and practical
research into the formal, technical and economic fields - to derive the form of an
object from its natural functions and limitations. (...) Research into the nature of
objects leads one to conclude that forms emerge from a resolute consideration of
all the modern methods of production and construction and of modern materials.
(62)

Gropius seemed to be emphasizing here that not all demands were

to be evaluated equally - only those which the architect deemed
"natural" or "objective", those which existed purportedly apart from
the subjective preferences of users.
:27: At other times the metaphysical pedigree of the notion of
function is more evident. When the American industrial designer
Walter Dorwin Teague wrote in 1940 about function in his
ideological oeuvre Design This Day, to begin with it sounded as if
the notion referred for the human user and his wishes: Teague's
'function' seems to be a synonym with "user's demand". But soon
'function' abandons its ties with the human user and becomes an
object's destiny (incidentally an idea close to that of Sullivan):
The function of a thing is its reason for existence, its justification and its end, by
which all its possible variations may be tested and accepted or rejected. It is a
sort of life-urge thrusting through a thing and determining its development. It is
only by realizing its destiny, and revealing that destiny with candor and
exactness, that a thing acquires significance and validity of form. This means
much more than utility, or even efficiency: it means a kind of perfected order we
find in natural organisms, bound together in such rhythms that no part can be
changed without wounding the whole. (32; cf. also 54)

:28: Since it refers to a metaphysical rather than a common sense

world, the notion of function is by necessity opaque. Teague himself
complained about the elusiveness of the notion, writing of "the
difficulty of accurately defining a function, and definition's habit of
retreating before our very approach." Functionalists maybe
perceived this very elusiveness as a tell-tale sign of a close contact
with fundamental metaphysical magnitudes, and therefore as
something positive (63). Also the functionalist references to
functional and aesthetic perfection (50), where perfection is
apparently taken to be a feasible aim of design effort, should
perhaps be understood as appeals to the existence of Higher Order
or Higher Intelligence, i.e. to metaphysical warrants (cf. 39, 64-69).
:29: To recapitulate, we can say that the functionalist notion of
function did not refer to the world of preferences, wishes and
demands of human users, but rather to alleged Purposes, Intents,
and Plans of such non-human entities as Nature or History. I
contend then that the functionalist claim that function exists prior to
form is logically consistent only when the notion of function is
understood as an "objective purpose" or "objective demand"

imputed either to God, to Nature or to History, i.e. to an other-thanhuman, or "Higher" Intelligence. It is only in this capacity that the
functionalist notion of function can be shown to be independent of
functional and aesthetic preferences of human clients. The
requirement that function ought to be the starting point of design
now makes sense, because function becomes an objective rather
than a subjective demand. In other words, it is only within the
framework of what we called the functionalist design metaphysics
that the functionalist notion of function, and the dictum form follows
function, makes sense.

VI: The new vision - and its end

:30: It is not difficult to imagine the fascination which the promise
of an epoch of seamless unity of both functional and aesthetic
worlds must have exercised on the young designer. True functional
solutions would be identical with true formal solutions, since each
and every function was meant to have one - and only one - solution
proper to it, and, consequently, only one proper form. The
modernist designer was now employing neither old forms (as
historicists did) nor devising new forms (as the pseudo-modern,
"modernistic" designers did (51, 70)) but uncovering and
revealing functional forms, i.e. the ones inherent in the problems at
hand. As the Russian artist Vladimir Tatlin put it in the 1920s:
"Neither the old, nor the new, but the necessary." (71) To do
otherwise would lead at best to a kind of masquerade (72-74), at
worst it would be plain dishonesty (75). Such functional forms (the
functionalist designer would have argued) were the very opposite of
formalist architecture of the historicist and eclectic architects, since
that architecture was a result of disregard of the fact that formal
solutions were congenital to functional problems. It was considered
morally reprehensible to opt for forms other than those that were
purportedly intrinsic or inherent, to 'functions'.
:31: Furthermore, since functional forms do not, by definition,
emerge as a consequence of pleasing the aesthetic preferences of
users, the situation in which some people would like such forms,
some would be indifferent to them, while others would positively
dislike them, would simply not obtain. One could safely assume that
since such forms were not developed in order to appeal to anybody
in particular, they would be acceptable, perhaps even pleasing, to
everyone in general, regardless of the person's social or cultural
background. Functional forms simply do not appeal to taste,
because they are a matter of truth - and truth does not pander to
taste. As it was put by a writer of modernist persuasion in the late

twenties, "... from the standpoint of modern architecture the

question of taste may be altogether out of date ..." (64). Functional
forms (the functionalist designer would have maintained) were
therefore creating a common visual language across a variety of
boundaries, including the time-boundary: since such forms were not
related to any fashion they could not go out of fashion either. They
would not age, because they were essentially timeless (30, 76). The
functional language of forms was making it finally possible to bring
to an end the wasteful use of resources, implied in the fashionbased changes of forms, as well as the aesthetic masquerade of
false facades, driven by the chase for social prestige. Functionalism
(in the eyes of the functionalists themselves) was simply showing
the way back to natural, necessary forms appropriate for the
Present, i.e. Modern Epoch.
:32: This vision of objective forms was enticing to the designer who
espoused it, for personal as well professional reasons. The vision
offered him a new, exciting and flattering role: making him a vehicle
of the Zeitgeist it abolished his previous status of an expert servant
ministering to sometimes refined but mostly pedestrian demands of
users. The exercise of the profession was now infused with a new
sense of purpose, creating a strong sense of solidarity. The
functionalist architects and designers would now perceive
themselves as instruments through which the true formal language
of the Modern Epoch would be brought forth. They conceived of
themselves as a vanguard, bringing about a new world which had
started to grow from within the confines of the old one.
Functionalists would easily recognize themselves in what the
German philosopher G. W. F. Hegel described as "world-historical
men" (Hegel's philosophy was in fact instrumental in preparing the
ground for, among other things, the functionalist design
metaphysics; cf. (77-82). In his Lectures on the Philosophy of
History Hegel wrote that world-historical men
... were thinking men, who had an insight into the requirements of the time what was ripe for development. This was the very truth for their age, for their
world; the species next in order, so to speak, and which was already formed in
the womb of time. It was theirs to know the nascent principle; the necessary,
directly sequent step in progress, which their world was to take; to make this
their aim, and to expand their energy in promoting it. World-historical men - the
Heroes of an epoch - must, therefore, be recognized as its clear-sighted ones;
their deed, their words, are the best of that time. (...) They are great men
because they willed and accomplished something great; not a mere fancy, a mere
intention, but that which met the case and fell in with the needs of the age. (83)

:33: Although their vision had political implications, functionalists

thirsted more for artistic liberty then for political power. The utopian
vision of unity of functional and aesthetic solutions promised them
exactly that kind of freedom. In suggesting that the aesthetic

demands of the market were illegitimate or by definition

questionable, functionalist architects and designers proclaimed in
effect their artistic autonomy and joined (mentally, that is) the
coveted ranks of fine artists, as Brent Brolin convincingly argued in
his book Flight of Fancy (16). Modernist architects and designers
were re-enacting the liberation process through which painters and
sculptors arrived at the status of "fine" artists. Painters and
sculptors came to consider themselves to be definitely liberated
from the demands of conventional taste after the Romantic
philosophy of art in the decades before and after 1800, defined art
as an original product of a genius, a product not only independent
of the preferences of the public, but usually in opposition to it (16a,
16b, 84). In this way it came about that art which previously was
important for the sake of the buyer, the user or the client, started
now to be considered more and more important for its own sake. In
a similar fashion, and after the model of fine artists, architects and
designers began to consider themselves to be liberated from the
traditional duty to please the aesthetic, symbolic, institutional and
other demands of their clients.

VII: The user's new identity

:34: As the modernist designer's claims to authority increased, the
user's status became more and more precarious. Direct references
to users, or clients, when they appear in the functionalist texts, are
almost invariably of an edifying bent, suggesting that the modernist
architect is in possession of authority to decide what is best for
them, both in the functional and in the aesthetic sense. In fact, to
be defined as a user worthy of the functionalist architect's attention
one had first to qualify as Modern Man, i.e. a person whose likes
and dislikes were practically identical to those of the modernist
architect himself. The functionalist references to users never
suggested a readiness to consider the users' wishes, demands and
needs on their own merits (86). The individual client, who was until
the arrival of modernism thought to have a legitimate say in both
functional and aesthetic matters, was from now on his way to
become an unperson. This was only logical: since forms were
claimed to be intrinsic to functional solutions, there was no reason
to take the form-, or function-related preferences of clients and
users seriously. On the contrary, there were good reasons to reject
such preferences as irrelevant (unless they were those of the
Modern Man). If the user happened not to like the 'functional
forms', it was considered to be the user's problem - not the
designer's. Seen from the perspective of the functionalist design
metaphysics, this was after all a rational attitude to take.

:35: In the functionalist architect's eyes, the forms he 'brought

forth' had no addressee, and they were not to have one either: they
were not aimed at any particular individuals, or any particular public
- just as forms of leaves of grass, or of a snail's house (a
functionalist would argue) were not meant for any public. The visual
articulation of buildings and products was in principle never meant
to appeal, in any sense of the word, to those who were to use them,
or to see them: functionalists conceived of their buildings and
objects as natural expressions of 'functions', as a function of
'functions', so to speak. Forms were not thought of as part of visual
communication since communication entails use of conventional,
known, and ultimately 'historical', forms (87, 88, 88a). This
probably explains why functionalists did without the notion
ofaesthetic function: they did not consider the visual side of
buildings and objects as something to be useful: "How can forms
growing organically from within take notice of the user's likes and
dislikes?" might a functionalist object. Not surprisingly, the public,
more often than not, found the new consciously 'unappealing'
architecture and design to be - unappealing.

VIII: Impact on the designer

- and the designer's impact
:36: Before finally coming to an outline of a non-modernist
interpretation of the modernist architecture and design, let me
touch upon two concrete effects - upon designers and architects
themselves - of the functionalist upgrading of their status to that of
an instrument of Higher Intelligence. One is the problem of practical
uncertainty, or rather confusion, about what the designer's new role
in the design process really consisted in. The other has to do with
the different consequences of functionalist artistic innovations.
:37: The designer who accepted 'function' as the objective starting
point of the design process was led to see his own work as an
objective process, and to understand the solutions deemed
successful as a result of necessity. Since functionalist design
philosophy claimed that the essence of designing was the search for
intrinsic solutions, the adherent of the functionalist design
philosophy was precluded from understanding that the 'intrinsic
solutions' he arrived at were based on his own choices and that he not functions, materials, constructions, or the modern epoch - was
responsible for those solutions. The more he trusted that the
functional starting point guaranteed an objective aesthetics, the less
he understood that his formal solutions were in fact addressed to

the aesthetic sensitivities and artistic preferences of his own peers,

plus a minority of others, endowed with "cultural capital" (96), who
shared these sensitivities and preferences.
:38: Due to the functionalist dominance of design education since
the 1950s, the education of would-be architects and designers was
geared mainly to tastes and needs of their own privileged group,
and to those of clients with avant-garde tastes (20b). Not
surprisingly, most newly educated architects and designers ended
up being able to design for kindred spirits only. Like their
functionalist grandparents, who trusted that they arrived at an
objective aesthetics, the new generations of architects also tended
to refuse conscious thought of considerations of institutional status
and social prestige in buildings and products; they believed as well
that their aesthetic solutions, purportedly intrinsic to the tasks at
hand, had taken care of everything worth taking care of. Students
were too seldom reminded that the raison d'(tre of architecture
and design has always been to make buildings and products
meaningful to their owners and users (97) and that the owners' and
users' need for signs of social or institutional belonging has always
been, and will no doubt always remain, the prime engine of any
design culture (98).
:39: Whether the functionalist artistic innovations turned out to
have positive or negative impact in the end, seems to have
depended largely on whether the functionalist objects and
functionalist solutions came to be imposed on the users, or whether
they were offered to them as a part of broader choices. As long as
the works of the modernist architects and designers remained a
part of a market economy, as was the case with objects of industrial
design or family houses, the commercial culture seems to have
effectively contained and defused modernist attempts at making the
users embrace the modernists' own aesthetic and other values.
Under such circumstances the innovative modernist designs
contributed to, rather than restrained, or replaced, the plurality of
stylistic choices. The functionalist mental set proved devastating
only where the modernist solutions were imposed on the users, i.e.
where users were left with no choice because administrative
decision-making, for various reasons, replaced the working of the
market. Often the modernist artistic visions were inflicted on the
captive audience of the socially weak sections of the population who
were utter strangers to the sophisticated abstract aesthetics the
modernists themselves relished. The notorious formalism of Le
Corbusier's urban visions, and their pervasive influence on various
large-scale housing projects until the 1970s, is probably the prime
example the ultimately inhuman, alienating consequences of an

undiscriminating foray of architects into the field of artistic

autonomy.
:40: In these and similar contexts one comes to think of Vincent
van Gogh of our motto, whom Woody Allen turned into a dentist
cursed with a mind of an autonomous artist.

IX: Anti-formalist - or out-and-out

formalist?
:41: How to interpret the concrete physical results of the
functionalist design metaphysics, i.e. the new forms of functionalist
buildings and objects? We have already suggested our conclusion:
Functionalist architecture and design were results of
an artistic, style-obsessed crusade, driven by
distinctly formalist objectives. It will be remembered, however, that
functionalists themselves always claimed the very opposite: The
aesthetics of their buildings and artefacts was objective and free of
formalism because they did not choose the forms of their
architecture and design, but only mediated them on behalf of the
Machine Age, Zeitgeist, or the Modern Epoch.
:42: Now, what are we to make of such claims? If our aim is to
penetrate the phenomenon of functionalism, I propose that this
functionalist self-understanding be taken altogether seriously. I
submit that there are two mutually exclusive but in the end equally
justifiable answers to the question of whether the extant
functionalist architecture and design is to be seen as an antiformalist, or rather as a formalist, exercise. The answers depend on
where one stands in relation to the functionalist design
metaphysics. The reason for the differing views seems to be that
those who do not embrace the functionalist design philosophy feel
no obligation to interpret the functionalist buildings and products in
agreement with that design philosophy, while the believers are
bound to perceive and understand the functionalist buildings and
products only and solely through that philosophy alone. So when
functionalists kept emphasizing that they were not interested in
forms for the sake of forms, this was a true statement - but it was
true exclusively with regard to their monistic belief that functions
and forms are indissolubly bound together, as the form-followsdictum suggests. The self-understanding of functionalists was
simply a descriptive statement of what they were prescribed to do
and achieve according to their design metaphysics - not a result of
reflection about what they actually achieved. As all strong believers,
they were mentally bound to operate within the confines of their all-

encompassing belief, perceiving the outcome of their beliefs in

terms of these beliefs only.
:43: On the other hand, if one belongs to those who fail to share, or
no longer share, the doctrines of functionalist design metaphysics,
the perspective changes dramatically. One is left to one's own
commonsense judgment, and perceives the modernist architecture
and design from the outside, i.e., no longer from within the theory.
In this 'un-enlightened', common sense perspective, functionalist
architecture and design presents itself as a strikingly formalist,
stylistic, exercise in which architects and designers devised for their
buildings and objects a 'no-choice', utilitarian-like style of dress - a
style the gist of which was a sophisticated game of pretending not
to pretend. With the collapsing of consensus support for modernism
since the 1960s, also some former adherents of the modernist
design metaphysics came to see their movement from the outside
of their design philosophy, something which brought many 'new'
observations (10, 89, 90). The leading modernists, however, such
as Gropius or Mies, never ceased to see themselves as, so to speak,
chief midwives in the Zeitgeist maternity ward.
:44: The fact of acceptance or rejection of the functionalist design
metaphysics seems to operate as a kind of mental switch: either the
switch is on, and the things functionalists said about their own
architecture and design appear to fit; or the switch is off, and
nothing whatsoever seems to agree. There appears to be no
intermediate position here. This switch analogy may be refined into
an analogy with the 3-D 'interactive' posters, prints and postcards
popular in mid-1990s, which showed flat, seemingly abstract
printed patterns, or collage-like forms without any obvious
meaning. One was invited to 'break into' the picture, that is, to
stare through the surface in a special way; when successful, one
was able to discern, thanks to the previous computer manipulation
of the pattern, completely new and strikingly three-dimensional
constructs, almost as persuasively plastic as the live objectlandscapes around. But it was a vision that had to be conjured up
by a conscious and strenuous effort, and was easily lost again. In a
similar fashion, one may catch a glimpse of the functionalist
architecture and design in its intended non-formalist state of being
only when one consciously attempts to conjure up and recreate the
mental world of the design metaphysics for which it was created (cf.
remarks by Mumford (3) and Fitch (53) on the 'Platonic' nature of
Mies' architecture).
:45: In the world of the functionalist design metaphysics there was,
naturally, no sanctioned room for notions such as influence or
visual modelsfrom architectural and design history, i.e. for the facts

which play an essential role in the work of every single designer.

Such notions were in the functionalist eyes related to the old world
of 'falsehood', 'masquerade', 'deception' and 'untruth'. But in the
everyday commonsense world in which, but not for which, the
functionalist architecture and design were created, and in which
they were bound to operate, the extrinsic sources of the aesthetic
imagery in functionalism are not difficult to find.
:46: Two such sources are well documented: we know that to begin
with, the European functionalists took many visual clues from ship
design and from industrial structures such as North-American cornsilos and factory buildings (which they learnt about through tiny
photographic reproductions) (17b). We know further that they later
took even more clues from the abstract aesthetic idioms of
contemporary painting and sculpture of which all of them had, in
one way or another, a first-hand knowledge (92). To a non-believer
the existence of these two sources would be enough to suggest that
the genesis of the modernist forms was at variance with the
rule form follows function: in both cases either ready-made forms,
or a ready-made aesthetics, rather than "formless" problems, were
used as points of departure. But if we ask, as Reyner Banham asked
(17b), how it came about that "a design school could look like a
factory, or an apartment block in Paris could resemble an
automobile plant in the Detroit suburbs", or why many villa-facades
reminded one of huge abstract geometric paintings or reliefs (91),
again, two very different answers can be given, depending on the
position of the switch.
:47: If the switch is on, such schools, apartment blocks or villas
would not be perceived as a sign of formalism, simply because
modernists had proclaimed technical buildings and later also
abstract art (92) to be a genuine, organic expression of the Modern
Epoch. As a consequence, the aesthetic references to ship design,
to factory buildings or to abstract art, ubiquitous in functionalist
architecture and design, would not be perceived as a sign that
functionalist practice was at variance with the functionalist theory
but, on the contrary, as a proof that the theory worked just fine. It
would be read as a sign that the Zeitgeist of the Modern Epoch was
expressing itself through the designer, exactly as it was supposed to
(30, 92-95). - "After all, was not the dictum form follows
function only a principle, the adherence to which was to secure the
kind of design proper to its own time? So what is the problem?" - a
modernist designer might point out. The functionalist design
philosophy, by standing on a metaphysical rather than empirical
basis, could obviously accommodate any conflict with its basic
principles, and survive unscathed in the believer's mind. (This is,
admittedly, an unbeliever's statement.)

:48: There is hardly any doubt that functionalists had vested

interests in the design philosophy that cast them as a modern
aristocracy in the new scheme of things. Until recently (18b, 20b,
85) most of the literature on modernism was partisan and seldom
pointed this out (the subject of interests vested in revolutionary
visions is nowhere as unpopular as among the revolutionaries
themselves). Still, unless we approach the design philosophy of
functionalists as an expression of their aspirations qua designers
and architects, I am afraid we will be reduced to devising variations
on their 'determinist' self-understanding. Interpretations that
explain the functionalist architecture deterministically, i.e. only as
'footprints' of outer formative forces (new functions, new materials,
new technology, new age) or of external ideas (scientism, logical
positivism, technological utopianism, totalitarian ideas of the 1920s
and 1930s, etc.) - tend to become a replay of the functionalist claim
that their architecture was the expression of historical necessity. I
want to suggest that the master-key to understanding
functionalism, relevant to historians of design and design educators
alike, is not to be sought in any 'determining factors' but rather in
intentions, aspirations, and dreams of those who espoused the
design philosophy that explicitly denied any role to intentions,
aspirations and dreams in design. Not that the approaches exploring
the role of outer circumstances do not bring new insights - they
definitely do. But such explorations will truly contribute to our
understanding of the modernist theory of design and of the
modernist buildings and artefacts only when we will have first
understood that both the 'determinist' philosophy and the
'determinist' self-understanding of functionalists was a part and
parcel of their effort to jettison the user.

X: Conclusion
:49: The functionalist notion of function, which begot the name of
functionalism, was instrumental in creating an impression, more
rampant among architects and designers than among the public,
that functionalism represented and safeguarded the user's interests
in the course of the design process. Our closer look at the notion of
function, and the dictum form follows function, showed why this
impression was mistaken. The functionalist notion of function did
not refer to the world of users but to the realm of what we called
the functionalist design metaphysics, where the business of forms
was to express 'functions' conceived by supra-human entities. In
the reality of our day-to-day world, however, where architects and
designers are bound to live and act, no matter how lofty are the
design philosophies they profess, the functionalist notion of function

operated as a carte blanche: having been empty the notion of

function made the architects and designers free to define it in ways
that always legitimized their own aesthetic priorities. To answer our
introductory question, we can say that in our commonsense world
the dictumform follows function proved infeasible as a design
precept for objective design. Not only did it fail to bring the
promised end to formalism. On the contrary, it inaugurated and
legalized an era of a surreptitiously formalist approach to
architecture and design. The dictum was a summary of the design
philosophy that brought about a victory of the 19th century idea of
art for art's sake - in the wake of a phony war against that very
idea.
:50: Unless we see the crux of the dictum in its furtive promise of
artistic autonomy, the success of the functionalist philosophy of
design among architects and designers would be difficult to
understand. [*]

***

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