The Lawyer's Oath he takes on the oath upon being admitted to the practice of law?

It is the very
By J. Jose L. Sabio, Jr. practice of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer. The gravity of the oath is
grounded on two important things: on the gravity of a lawyer's duties and on the
The Oath: The Lawyer's Ideal fact that he makes a solemn promise before God to undertake these duties faithfully.
When a great amount of trust is placed on such an office, then a corresponding
What is an oath? Webster defines it as: A solemn appeal to God, or in a wider sense of integrity and responsibility is expected of those who have taken on that
sense, to any sacred or revered person or sanction for the truth of an affirmation or office. The legal profession is one such office laden with a great amount of trust. In
declaration or in witness of the inviolability of a promise or undertaking. As early the hands of the lawyer is entrusted not only the power to steer the course of some
as Alvarez vs. CFI, the Supreme Court explained its meaning in this wise: client's personal or business future but more importantly, the very nature of the
legal profession presupposes a certain moral burden that demands personal
In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party integrity. As stated by the Supreme Court:
signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully. It
is an outward pledge given by the person taking it, that his attestation or promise is Lawyers are expected to abide by the tenets of morality, not only upon admission to
made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. the Bar but also throughout their legal career, in order to maintain one's good
standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than
Section 17 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that an applicant who has passed just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do
the required examination, or has been otherwise found to be entitled to admission to the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is
the bar, shall take and subscribed before the Supreme Court an oath of office. The wrong. This must be so because vast interests are committed to his care; he is the
new lawyer swears before a duly constituted authority as an attestation that he/she recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client' s property,
takes on the duties and responsibilities proper of a lawyer. More particularly, form 28 reputation, his life, his all.
of the judicial standard forms prescribes the following oath to be taken by the
applicant: A lawyer is said to be the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which
society has entrusted the administration of law and the dispensing of justice. For this
I___________ of ___________ do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the reason, a lawyer's oath impresses upon him the responsibilities of an officer of the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey laws as well as court upon whose shoulders rest the grave responsibility of assisting courts in the
the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor proper, fair, speedy and efficient administration of justice.
consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will delay no In fact, it may be understood that the words contained in the oath of office
man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best summarize the main duties and responsibilities a lawyer is supposed to take on in
of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my the practice of law. In other words, every time an oath of office is taken, the person
clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental making the statement in effect states that in taking on the oath he/she promises to
reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. conscientiously fulfill the duties entrusted to his office. Section 20 of Rule 138
enumerates what these duties are. It is the duty of an attorney -
The taking of this oath is a condition to the admission to practice law and may only
be taken before the Supreme Court by a person authorized by the high court to (a) To maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the
engage in the practice of law. And what is the nature of a lawyer's oath? In the case Constitution and obey the laws of the Philippines;
of Sebastian vs. Calis the Supreme Court held that: A lawyer's oath are not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and kept (b) To observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial
inviolable. The substance and gravity behind these words may be understood in officers;
the light of the substance and gravity behind the oath being taken. In a sense, the
oath embodies the ideals by which a lawyer lives by in the practice of the legal (c) To counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appearing to him to
profession. This is why the lawyer's oath has been likened to a condensed version of be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the
the canons of professional responsibility. This seems to have been confirmed in law;
Endaya vs. Oca, where it was held that: the lawyer's oath embodies the
fundamental principles that guide every member of the legal fraternity. From it (d) To employ, for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to him, such
springs the lawyer's duties and responsibilities that any infringement thereof can means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and never seek to mislead the
cause his disbarment, suspension or other disciplinary actions. judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law;

In the words of the Supreme Court, an oath is any form of attestation by which a (e) To maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to
party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and preserve the secrets of his client, and to accept no compensation in connection with
truthfully. What then does a lawyer promise to perform faithfully and truthfully when his clients' business except from him or with his knowledge and approval;
 grave concern by honorable individuals, among them the late Supreme Court Chief
(f) To abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to Justice Fred Ruiz Castro. In an address before members of the legal profession, he
the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the said:
cause with which he is charged;
Many a legal practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
(g) Not to encourage either the commencement or the continuance of an action and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to become:
or proceeding, or delay any man's cause, from any corrupt motive or interest;
An instigator of controversy, instead of a mediator for concord and a conciliator for
(h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to himself, the cause of the compromise;
defenseless or oppressed;
A virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation, instead of a true exponent of
(i) In the defense of a person accused of crime, by all fair and honorable the primacy of truth and moral justice;
means, regardless of his personal opinion as to the guilt of the accused, to present
every defense that the law permits, to the end that no person may be deprived of A mercenary purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion
life or liberty, but by due process of law. to a litigant's financial posture, instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the
dispensation of equal justice to rich and poor alike.
In order to fulfill these duties, every lawyer is expected to live by a certain mode of
behavior now distilled in what is known as the Code of Professional Responsibility. Though these words were expressed some time ago, yet is is sad to note that Chief
The Code mandates upon each lawyer, as his duty to society, the obligation to obey Justice Ruiz's words still ring loud and true today. The goal of remaining true to the
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Specifically, ideals of the legal profession is hampered by the seemingly irresistible influence and
he is forbidden to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. In pressures of modern day commercialism in almost every facet of human activity and
essence, all that is contained in this Code is succinctly summarized in the oath of endeavor. In various cases, the Supreme Court has denied applicant's petition to
office taken by every lawyer. It is of little surprise to find that in Magdaluyo vs. Nace take the lawyer's oath for grave misconduct or for any serious violation of the
the Supreme Court declares that the lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and canons of professional responsibility which puts in question the applicant's moral
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action. character. Moreover, a reading of the latest rulings of the highest tribunal would
In the case of Businos vs. Ricafort, the Supreme Court also held that: reveal the lawyer's utter disregard, if not disdain, for the lawyer's oath.

By swearing the lawyer's oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the rule In Vitriola vs. Dasig, a case for disbarment against an official of the commission on
of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial administration of higher education charged with gross misconduct in violation of the attorney's oath
justice a vital function of democracy, a failure of which is disastrous to society. for having used her public office to secure financial spoils, the Supreme Court, in
While the duty to uphold the constitution and obey the laws is an obligation imposed ordering respondent's disbarment, held:
upon every citizen, a lawyer assumes responsibilities over and beyond the basic
requirements of good citizenship. As servant of the law, a lawyer ought to make The attorney's oath is the source of the obligations and duties of every lawyer and
himself an example for others to emulate. He should be possessed of and must any violation thereof is a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary
continue to possess good moral character. action. The attorney's oath imposes upon every member of the bar the duty to delay
no man for money or malice.
In Brion Jr. vs. Brillantes, Jr., the Supreme Court also ruled: the lawyer's primary
duty as enunciated in the attorney's oath is to uphold the constitution, obey the laws Said duty is further stressed in Rule 1.03 of the code of professional responsibility.
of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. That duty in its Respondent's demands for sums of money to facilitate the processing of pending
irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of the court. The applications or requests before her office violates such duty, and runs afoul of the
importance and significance in upholding the sanctity of a lawyer's oath have been oath she took when admitted to the bar.
highlighted by the Supreme Court in the various rulings it made involving
disciplinary actions against members of the legal fraternity. The affirmation by a lawyer to uphold the law was the subject in De Guzman vs. De
Dios. In this case where respondent was charged for representing conflicting
The Real World Of The Legal Practice interest, found guilty and suspended for six months, with a warning, the highest
tribunal held:
While it is true that these ideals by which every lawyer swears to live by remain
sublime, the same ideals often hardly motivate some lawyers in the real world of To say that lawyers must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the
legal practice. Instead of high ideals, less honorable reasons and more pragmatic obvious, but such statement can never be over-emphasized. Considering that, 'of all
considerations often financial and material in nature take hold of many a classes and professions, (lawyers are) most sacredly bound to uphold and respect
cynical and hardened lawyer. This has been the cause of lament and expressions of the law', it is imperative that they live by the law.
 reason of his solemn oath to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the
Accordingly, lawyers who violate their oath and engage in deceitful conduct have no doing of any.
place in the legal profession. As a lawyer, respondent is bound by her oath to do no
falsehood or consent to its commission and to conduct herself as a lawyer to the Indeed when an office entrusted with great responsibility and trust by society is
best of her knowledge and discretion. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligation and violated and abused, one finds truth in the expression corruptio optimi pessima (the
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action. corruption of the best is the worst). The words of former Presiding Justice of the
The acts of respondent Atty. De Dios are clearly in violation of her solemn oath as a Court of Appeals Pompeyo Dias cannot find a more relevant application:
lawyer that this court will not tolerate.
There are men in any society who are so self-serving that they try to make law serve
In Sevillano Batac, Jr., et al. vs. Atty. P. Cruz, Jr., the Supreme Court in ordering the their selfish ends. In this group of men, the most dangerous is the man of the law
suspension of respondent, quoted Sec. 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, who has no conscience. He has, in the arsenal of his knowledge, the very tools by
thus: which he can poison and disrupt society and bring it to an ignoble end.

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by supreme court; grounds A Return to Basic Ideals
therefor: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or, other gross With the glaring reality of legal practice evidenced by the increasing numbers of
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of administrative cases filed against lawyers in the Courts, it is no surprise therefore
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is that legal ethics has been prescribed as a subject under the Mandatory Continuing
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any Legal Education (MCLE). Moreover, of the 36 units prescribed under the MCLE, six
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney units pertain to legal ethics. There is clearly a perceived need to instill legal ethics in
for a party to a case without authority so to do. the practice of the legal profession. The pressing need for legal ethics was
highlighted by the Supreme Court in Endaya vs. Oca:
The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. A lawyer, under his oath, For practical purposes, the lawyers not only represent the law; they are the law. With
pledges himself not to delay any man for money or malice and is bound to conduct their ubiquitous presence in the social milieu, lawyers have to be responsible. The
himself with all good fidelity to his client. Such was the pronouncement of the problems they create in lawyering become public difficulties. To keep lawyers
Supreme Court in ordering the disbarment of lawyer who converted the money of his responsible underlies the worth of the ethics of lawyering. Indeed, legal ethics is
client to his own personal use without her consent. The lawyer's oath exhorts law simply the aesthetic term for professional responsibility.
practitioners not to wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. In Young vs. Batuegas, where Undoubtedly, faithful compliance and observance of the canons of the Code of
respondent was suspended for six months for knowingly alleging an untrue Professional Responsibility is the main object of the MCLE. And to ensure success
statement of fact in his pleading, the Supreme Court said, thus: thereof, the Supreme Court, in its various pronouncements in administrative cases
filed against lawyers, has emphasized the lawyer's basic duties and responsibilities.
A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore upon his admission to the bar that he In a more recent ruling, the Supreme Court recapitulated the significance and
will 'do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court' and he shall conduct importance of the oath in this wise: This oath to which all lawyers have subscribed
himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion with all in solemn agreement to dedicate themselves to the pursuit of justice is not a mere
good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients. He should bear in mind that as an ceremony or formality for practicing law to be forgotten afterwards; nor is it mere
officer of the court his high vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that lawyers must uphold and keep
the facts of the case and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at a correct inviolable at all times. By swearing the lawyer's oath, they become guardians of
conclusion. truth and the rule of law, as well as instruments in the fair and impartial
dispensation of justice.
The courts, on the other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from
lawyers appearing and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to Indeed, if the legal profession is to achieve its basic ideal to render public service
defend his client's rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his and serve the ends of justice, there is a need to unceasingly and constantly
client's cause, his conduct must never be at the expense of truth. inculcate professional standards among lawyers. As the Supreme Court in Cordon vs.
Balicanta (supra), said: If the practice of law is to remain an honorable profession
That a lawyer's oath are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, was applied by the and attain its basic ideal, those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets
Supreme Court in Vda. De Rosales vs. Ramos, where a notary public commission was and principles, but should also in their lives accord continuing fidelity to them.
revoked and respondent disqualified from being a notary public, in this manner:
where the notary public is a lawyer, a graver responsibility is placed upon him by
Cayetano v. Monsod Revisited
Leave a reply
Ask any law student to describe what practice of law means, and he or she will is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
invariably quote the definition given by the Supreme Court in Renato L. Cayetano v. modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what
Christian Monsod, et al. (201 SCRA 210 [1991]): was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice
Padillas definition would require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application two or three times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year
of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in the for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the constitutional intent. (at p.
practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. 227; Italics supplied. The dissent is at pp. 230-233)
Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill. (111 With respect to the dissent of Justice Cruz, Justice Paras said that:
ALR 23) (at p. 214)
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all
The issue in the case was whether or not the respondent Monsod, a lawyer, was situations, most individuals, in making uses of the law, or in advising others on what
qualified for appointment as Chair of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), since the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense, perhaps, but we should not
Art. IX-C, Sec. 1[1] of the 1987 Constitution requires that, inter alia, a majority of the lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
COMELEC, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who who has been practicing law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. persons practicing law, without first becoming lawyers. (at p. 227; Italics supplied.
The dissent is at pp. 234-236)
The Court, thru Justice Paras, stated that there seems to be no jurisprudence as to
what constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office (at Parenthetically, the comment of Justice Paras about the acts of persons practicing
p.212), determined that the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in law, without first becoming lawyers appears to open the practice of law to non-
court (at pp. 216-217) and pursuant thereto, found that Monsod was qualified for lawyers. This brings to mind a priest (not Fr. Bernas) with a penchant to pontificate
appointment as COMELEC Chair: about the law (civil, not canon) even though he is not a lawyer:

Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term practice of law, I have been informed that someone who has taken a perpetual vow to dislike me
particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the has asked why I am repeatedly interviewed and asked for opinions on questions of
liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsods past law. I have never held myself out to be a lawyer. I do not need the title. I do not
work experiences as lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of make my living from representing the gripes of others in court, and engorging
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich myself by others quest for the vindication of their rights. It is not my doing that I am
and the poor verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has interviewed and he is not, that my opinions are sought, and that none care for his! I
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. (at pp. 225-226, Italics have studied the law as a scholar of a discipline. For that, you do not need a license.
supplied) You need intelligence and diligence, and you need the recognition of fellow-
academics that you know of what you speak (Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, For the Sake of
The Court cited its definition of practice of law in various other Decisions, calling Rationality. September 30, 2013, Manila Standard Today)
the same as broad (Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio [486 SCRA 10 [2006]; In Re
Letter of UP Law Faculty Entitled Restoring Integrity [AM No. 10-10-4-SC, March Legal ethics is an oxymoron. It was not so much a swipe at the law as at lawyers,
8, 2011]). In the latter case, it held that lawyers when they teach law are considered and the fact is that in the Philippines, as well as in other jurisdictions as well, they
engaged in the practice of law, primarily to underscore their ethical and professional suffer a trust-deficit. People it seems trust embalmers more than they trust lawyers.
responsibilities: This is no laughing matter, at least not for those who care passionately about
serving the ends of justice. x-x-x (Fr. Ranhilio Aquino, Legal Ethics An Oxymoron?
Unlike professors in other disciplines and more than lawyers who do not teach law, June 17, 2013, Manila Standard Today)
respondents are bound by their oath to uphold the ethical standards of the legal The priests acts of rendering legal opinions very well fall within the broad definition
profession. Thus, their actions as law professors must be measured against the same of practice of law. As a non-lawyer, he is engaged in the unauthorized practice of
canons of professional responsibility applicable to acts of members of the Bar as the law, which constitutes indirect contempt (Rule 71, Sec. 3[e]; Ciocon-Reer v. Lubao,
fact of their being law professors is inextricably entwined with the fact that they are AM No. OCA IPI No. 09-3210-RTC [June 20, 2012]; In re Joaquin T. Borromeo, 241
lawyers. SCRA 405[1995]).

What are less well-known, but very thought-provoking, are the opinions of Supreme For some reason, Justice Paras did not address the dissent of Justice Gutierrez (at pp.
Court Justices Padilla, Cruz, and Gutierrez who dissented from the ponencia of Justice 236-243):
Paras in Cayetano v. Monsod. Justice Paras remarked that the dissent of Justice
Padilla:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice of law as authorizing it to promulgate rules concerning xxx pleading, practice, and procedure
a qualification for public office would be settled one way or another in fairly in all courts, the admission to the practice of law xxx Secondly, it has reference to
definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result. the qualification of Members of the Supreme Court, who must have been for fifteen
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian Monsod years or more a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice of law in the
engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his vote behind while on Philippines. In both instances, the practice referred to has always reference to
official leave but not expressing his clear stand on the matter); 4 categorically stated practice in the courts, in fact the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court under its
that he did not practice law; 2 voting in the result because there was no error so rule-making power is called Rules of Court of the Philippines. In the second instance
gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion; one on official leave with no practice of law is equated with judgeship in the lower courts. (Italics supplied,
instructions left behind on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the underscoring ours)
deliberations and the decision.
x-x-x The dissenters, as well as Judge Nitafan, were concerned about the broad definition
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk from my constitutional duty. of practice of law in Cayetano v. Monsod, an interpretation affirmed by the
He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He is a member of Supreme Court (see Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Sagucio, In Re Letter of UP Law Faculty
the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching the term beyond rational Entitled Restoring Integrity [supra]). The definition is now applied not just to the
limits. position of COMELEC Chair or to other Constitutional offices, but to all government
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not dedicated his life positions requiring practice of law as a legal qualification for appointment thereto.
to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where membership in the bar is a
requirement I fail to see how he can claim to have been engaged in the practice of While the Court (at pp. 212-213) held that the practice of law is not limited to the
law. conduct of cases in court, common sense requires that appointees/applicants to
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC chairman but those positions involving the same which Justice Paras calls the traditional or
also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower courts. What kind of Judges stereotyped notion of law practice (at p. 227), should have the necessary exposure
or Justices will we have if their main occupation is selling real estate, managing a to, if not experience in litigation. As well as a practical, and not just
business corporation, serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or theoretical/academic familiarity with the interplay between substantive and
operating a farm with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or procedural laws.
private practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations? As the Court held in OCA v. Ladaga (350 SCRA 326, 331 [2001]), private practice of a
The Constitution uses the phrase engaged in the practice of law for at least ten profession, specifically the legal profession, does not pertain to isolated court
years. The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice envisioned is active appearances; rather, it contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental, intermittent, incidental, seasonal, habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer. And in
or extemporaneous. To be engaged in an activity for ten years requires committed Maderada v. Mediodea (413 SCRA 313, 325 [2003]), the practice of law, though
participation in something which is the result of ones decisive choice. It means that impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a profession or vocation usually
one is occupied and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative capacity and as counsel by
out with intent and attention during the ten-year period. rendering legal advise to others.
x-x-x
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even an Otherwise, The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually
ordinary laymen accepts as having a familiar and customary well-defined meaning. every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not earn his living,
Every resident of this country who has reached the age of discernment has to know, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his activities are incidentally (even
follow, or apply the law at various times in his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not if only remotely) connected with some law, ordinance or regulation. The possible
necessary for the business executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, exception is the lawyer whose income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or
policeman, farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And escorting wrinkled ladies with pubescent pretensions. (dissent of Justice Cruz, at p.
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in the practice 235)
of law?
The Constitution requires having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten But at the end of the day, appointment to these offices is essentially a political
years. It is not satisfied with having been a member of the Philippine Bar for at process.
least ten years. (Italics supplied, underscoring ours.)

In his annotation to Cayetano v. Monsod (at pp. 244-252), Judge Nitafan raised The Law Degree as a prerequisite to practicing law
concerns similar to those of the dissenters, Justices Padilla, Cruz, and Gutierrez:
Wikipedia describes a law degree as an academic degree conferred for studies in
Practice of law is referred to no less than three times in Article VIII of the law. Such degrees are generally preparation for legal careers; but while their
Constitution. First, in reference to the rule-making power of the Supreme Court curricula may be reviewed by legal authority, they do not themselves confer a
license. In the Philippines, a law degree may be a Bachelor of Laws (LLB), or a Juris Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the
Doctor (JD). degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation
of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year
Graduation from a Philippine law school constitutes the primary eligibility subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized
requirement for the Philippine Bar Examination. But this is the general rule which, by the Philippine Government.
throughout the years, has been the subject of various exceptions.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws
Non-law graduates have been allowed to take the Bar Examinations. In fact the 1944 or its equivalent in a foreign law school must also present proof of completion of a
Bar Examinations was topped by two persons Jovito Salonga and Jose Diokno separate bachelors degree.
neither of whom had a law degree at the time they took the Bar. Salonga earned his
from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1946 or after he topped the Since the law course is designed to acquaint the law student with (hopefully) the
Bar; Diokno never returned to his studies at the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of whole spectrum of Philippine law, those who obtain their law degrees from non-
Civil Law. Philippine law schools have to work doubly hard in preparing for the Bar
Examinations, since they studied a different set of laws in law school. But if they are
Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the Bar up to the challenge, the Supreme Court, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1153, is very
Examinations. In a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: much willing to accommodate them.
Application of Adriano M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examinations), the Court
allowed the applicant, a Filipino citizen who obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia And so what happened to Adriano M. Hernandez?
University, New York and who has taken fourth year review courses and other bar
subjects at the Ateneo Law School, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations, considering He passed the 1993 Bar Examinations and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
the fact that in the past, it had allowed Filipinos who have studied law in foreign law 1994, but passed away in 2011 at the young age of 44.
schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 and allowed
them to take the bar examinations, but with the caveat that:
Pass the Bar. Take the Oath. Sign the Roll.
beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW Leave a reply
SCHOOLS TO TAKE THE BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the These are the indispensable requirements that one must fulfil to become a full-
bar examinations must not only have studied law in a local law school but has to fledged lawyer aside from Rule 138, Sections 2, 5, and 6 of the Rules of Court,
present the certifications required under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 in order to which enumerate the various requirements that an applicant to the bar
take the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said examinations must comply with (some of which the Supreme Court justifiably waived
certifications, they shall henceforth not be allowed to take the bar examinations for truly deserving candidates who became Bar topnotchers see previous post).
(emphasis supplied).
Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school The Court recently reiterated the significance of the signing the Attorneys Roll in its
who was allowed to take the Bar Examinations? Resolution in BM No. 2540 (In Re: Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys), where the
petitioner who obtained his law degree in the year 1979, took and passed that years
No. bar examinations and took the Attorneys Oath, failed to sign the Attorneys Roll, and
filed a petition in the year 2012 (or more than 30 years later) to be allowed to do so.
In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in
the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March The Court held that the petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since
9, 2010) the Supreme Court once again allowed Filipino graduates of foreign law 1980, a period spanning more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of
schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions, and amended Attorneys, which may constitute indirect contempt of court and transgresses
Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination, But the Court found that the petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral
all applicants for admission to the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have character when he finally filed the instant Petition to sign the Roll of Attorneys
successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws
or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the Thus the Court granted the petition, but by way of penalty (since technically, the
Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where petitioner cannot be suspended from the practice of law as he is not yet a full-
the degree has been granted. fledged lawyer), he can sign the Roll one year after his receipt of the Resolution and
he must settle a fine of P32,000.00 (P1,000.00 for each year that he was engaged in
Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law the unauthorized practice of law?), with a warning that he should not practice law
school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the during the one-year period.
 the presumption, especially when the denial comes after the rendition of an adverse
The Resolution raises an interesting point concerning Bar Matter No. 1132 judgment. (Sy v. Fairland Knitcraft [2011])
promulgated by the Court in 2002:
But the presumption is not absolute. Rule 138, Section 21 also provides that the
to require all lawyers to indicate their Roll of Attorneys Number in all papers or presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor
pleadings submitted to the various judicial or quasi-judicial bodies in addition to the being shown, require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to
requirement of indicating the current Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) and the IBP produce or prove the authority under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever
Official Receipt or Life Member Number. pertinent to any issue, the name of the person who employed him, and may
thereupon make such order as justice requires.
Strict compliance herewith is hereby enjoined effective immediately
as well as Bar Matter No. 1922, promulgated in 2008: In the event that a lawyers authority to appear on behalf of a client is questioned,
he may present a special power of attorney or memoranda from their client. And the
to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to INDICATE in all pleadings filed latter may even ratify, expressly or impliedly, his unauthorized appearance. (Land
before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the number and date of issue of their Bank v. Pamintuan Development Co. [2005])
MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption, as may be applicable,
for the immediately preceding compliance period. Failure to disclose the required And what happens when an attorney wilfully appears in court without being
information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction of the employed? Rule 138 Section 21 he may be punished for contempt as an officer of
pleadings from the records. (emphasis supplied) the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions, unless said appearance
The petitioner, who does not have a roll number, obviously could not comply with is by leave of court. And under Section 28 of the same Rule, he may be disbarred
the foregoing Bar Matters. But this did not stop him from practicing law until (and or suspended for corruptly and wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
even beyond) the time he filed his petition. case without authority to do so.

The Resolution narrated that the petitioner attended MCLE seminars in 2005, where But if the client is a government-owned and controlled corporation (GOCC), another
he was required to provide his roll number for his compliances to be credited. He set of rules come into play.
could not do so; not having signed the Rolls, has no roll number. And yet it was only
seven years later, in the year 2012, when he filed his petition to be allowed to sign Under Section 10, Chapter 3, Title III, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, it
the Rolls, a lapse of time that did not attract the Courts attention. is the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) which shall act as the
principal law office of all GOCCs. And Section 3 of Memorandum Circular No. 9 issued
The Court notes that it was the petitioner himself, and not a third party (opposing on August 27, 1998 (Prohibiting Government-Owned or Controlled Corporations
counsel, for example) who called its attention to the petitioners failure to sign the (GOCCs) from Referring Their Cases and Legal Matters to the Office of the Solicitor
Rolls, and considered this as a sign of his good faith and moral character. Which General, Private Legal Counsel or Law Firms and Directing the GOCCs to Refer Their
raises the question: how strict are the courts in ensuring compliance with Bar Cases and Legal Matters to the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, Unless
Matters Nos. 1132 and 1922, and related issuances? Otherwise Authorized Under Certain Exceptional Circumstances), enjoins GOCCs to
refrain from hiring private lawyers or law firms to handle their cases and legal
matters. But the same Section 3 provides that in exceptional cases, the written
Unauthorized Appearances of Lawyers conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or the Government Corporate
3 Replies Counsel, as the case may be, and the written concurrence of the COA shall first be
Rule 138, Section 21 of the Rules of Court provides that an attorney is presumed to secured before the hiring or employment of a private lawyer or law firm.
be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no written
power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client. In Phividec Industrial Authority v. Capitol Steel Corporation [2003], the Supreme
Court listed three (3) indispensable conditions before a GOCC can hire a private
As a logical corollary of the presumption that a lawyer is authorized to appear for the lawyer: (1) private counsel can only be hired in exceptional cases; (2) the GOCC
party he represents, it is also presumed that the lawyer is authorized by, and has must first secure the written conformity and acquiescence of the Solicitor General or
conferred with, his client regarding the case before he files an important responsive the Government Corporate Counsel, as the case may be; and (3) the written
pleading for and on behalf of the latter. (Cebu Stevedoring Company Inc. v. Ramolete concurrence of the COA must also be secured.
[1981])
In other words, in order for a lawyer to validly appear as counsel in behalf of a
The presumption in favor of the counsels authority to appear in behalf of a client is GOCC, it is not enough that he has been authorized by said agency or corporation.
a strong one, such that a mere denial by a party that he authorized an attorney to The three indispensable conditions referred to above must also be complied with.
appear for him, in the absence of a compelling reason, is insufficient to overcome
Thus in Santayana v. Alampay [2005] and Vargas v. Ignes [2010] where the services (8) Enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility effectively.,
of lawyers were contracted by a GOCC without, however complying with the three
indispensable conditions above, the Supreme Court imposed the penalties of fine concluded that Bar integration will, among other things, make it possible for the
of P5,000.00 and stern warning on the lawyers who it found guilty of wilfully legal profession to:
appearing in a case without authority to do so.
(1) Render more effective assistance in maintaining the Rule of Law;
(2) Protect lawyers and litigants against the abuse of tyrannical judges and
The Return of Justice Reyes prosecuting officers;
2 Replies (3) Discharge, fully and properly, its responsibility in the disciplining and/or removal
In a Per Curiam Decision dated February 24, 2009, the Supreme Court held retired of incompetent and unworthy judges and prosecuting officers;
Supreme Court Justice Ruben T. Reyes liable for grave misconduct for leaking a (4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within its own
confidential internal document of the Court, fined him the sum of P500,000.00 to be forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it, and assist it to
charged against his retirement benefits, disqualified him from holding any office or maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government including (5) Have an effective voice in the selection of judges and prosecuting officers;
government-owned or controlled corporations, and directed him to show cause why (6) Prevent the unauthorized practice of law, and break up any monopoly of local
he should not be disciplined as a member of the Bar. practice maintained through influence or position;
(7) Establish welfare funds for families of disabled and deceased lawyers;
On August of that year, the Court indefinitely suspended Justice Reyes from the (8) Provide placement services, and establish legal aid offices and set up lawyer
practice of law. Because it is not for a definite period, some lawyers equate reference services throughout the country so that the poor may not lack competent
indefinite suspension to disbarment, the most severe penalty that the Court may legal service;
impose on a lawyer. (9) Distribute educational and informational materials that are difficult to obtain in
many of our provinces;
But in an April 16, 2013 Resolution, the Court reconsidered and lifted Justice Reyes (10) Devise and maintain a program of continuing legal education for practising
indefinite suspension from practicing law. However, it did not lift his disqualification attorneys in order to elevate the standards of the profession throughout the country;
from holding any office or employment in any branch or instrumentality of the (11) Enforce rigid ethical standards, and promulgate minimum fees schedules;
government including government-owned or controlled corporations, and (12) Create law centers and establish law libraries for legal research;
underscored that the lifting of his indefinite suspension from the practice of law (13) Conduct campaigns to educate the people on their legal rights and obligations,
on the importance of preventive legal advice, and on the functions and duties of the
does not include the privilege of respondent to teach in the Mandatory Continuing Filipino lawyer; and
Legal Education (MCLE) program and to become a lecturer in any Philippine Judicial (14) Generate and maintain pervasive and meaningful country-wide involvement of
Academy (Philja) seminars and lectures. the lawyer population in the solution of the multifarious problems that afflict the
He can always teach in law school maybe legal ethics? nation.,

and declared that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional
and legally unobjectionable, within the context of contemporary conditions in the
On the integration of the Philippine Bar
Philippines, has become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal
Leave a reply
profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its
In AM No. 526 (January 9, 1973) the Supreme Court enumerated the purposes of an
public responsibility fully and effectively.
integrated Bar:
Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court pertains to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
(1) Assist in the administration of justice;
Section 2 thereof states the rationale for bar integration:
(2) Foster and maintain on the part of its members high ideals of integrity, learning,
professional competence, public service and conduct;
SEC. 2. Purposes. The fundamental purposes of the Integrated Bar shall be to
(3) Safeguard the professional interests of its members;
elevate the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
(4) Cultivate among its members a spirit of cordiality and brotherhood;
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively.
(5) Provide a forum for the discussion of law, jurisprudence, law reform, pleading,
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is stated in
practice and procedure, and the relations of the Bar to the Bench and to the public,
Section 1 of Rule 139-A:
and publish information relating thereto;
(6) Encourage and foster legal education;
SECTION 1. Organization. There is hereby organized an official national body to
(7) Promote a continuing program of legal research in substantive and adjective law,
be known as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, composed of all persons whose
and make reports and recommendations thereon; and
names now appear or may hereafter be included in the Roll of Attorneys of the The Court exhaustively considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution
Supreme Court. ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9,
As explained by the IBP: 1973. The Court there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all the arguments
The IBP came into being when the Supreme Court created on October 5, 1970 the adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materials and the mass of
Commission on Bar Integration which was tasked not only to ascertain the factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of the Commission on Bar
advisability of integration of the Bar, but even more, to serve as a common vehicle Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Bar is perfectly constitutional and
of the Court and the Bar in fashioning a blueprint for integration and putting the legally unobjectionable.
same into actual operation. Republic Act No. 6397, which became effective Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
September 17, 1971, confirmed the power of the Supreme Court to adopt rules of An Integrated Bar is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must belong, as
court to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar. Then on January 9, 1973, the distinguished from bar associations organized by individual lawyers themselves,
Supreme Court, by a per curiam resolution, pursuant to its constitutional mandate, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the Bar is essentially a process by
ordained the integration of the Bar in accordance with its Rule 139-A, effective which every member of the Bar is afforded an opportunity to do his share in carrying
January 16, 1973. Within the next succeeding months, the IBP was organized. On out the objectives of the Bar as well as obliged to bear his portion of its
February 17, 1973, local chapters all over the country were finally formed and responsibilities. Organized by or under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is
elections for chapter officers were held. Then on March 17, 1973, the first batch of an official national body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
representatives to the IBP House of Delegates composed of 104 delegates therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including
representing the IBP Chapters nationwide convened in Manila and elected its first set the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of
of IBP Governors. the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or
x-x-x professional responsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for
All Attorneys investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for
The IBP is composed of all Philippine attorneys now numbering about 50,000. All discipline or disbarment of the offending member.
persons whose names appear in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court (having The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
qualified for and passed the Bar examinations and taken their attorneys oath, considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as more than
unless otherwise disbarred) are members of the IBP. If any such person does not constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integration imposes upon
agree to join the organization and regulations (such as payments of annual the personal interests and personal convenience of individual lawyers.
membership dues, now fixed at P1,000), he does not become, or he ceases to be, an x-x-x
IBP member, and at the same time his name is removed from the Roll of Attorneys. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of
The effect of the removal is that he ceases to be an attorney. He loses the privilege law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the society at large, were
to practice law in the Philippines. (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to require him to conform to such
In AM No. 1928 (August 3, 1978) the Supreme Court disbarred a lawyer for his regulations as might be established by the proper authorities for the common good,
stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to the IBP despite due notice (two even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to
years later, the Court restored his membership in the Bar): submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have
clothed the public with an interest in his concerns.
The core of the respondents arguments is that the above provisions constitute an On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled, as a pre- The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely deal with
condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of them seriatim.
the IBP and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this 1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without power to
compelled financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, hence,
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and property Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it impinges on his constitutional
guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent concludes, the above right of freedom to associate (and not to associate). Our answer is: To compel a
provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal force lawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional
and effect. freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike his name which he is not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is not among the the Bar examinations. All that integration actually does is to provide an official
justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an administrative nature national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of
pertaining to an administrative body. which every lawyer is a ready a member.
x-x-x Despite the lofty purposes of Bar integration enumerated in AM No. 526, the
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a previous case Supreme Court essentially held in AM No.. 1928 that all that is required of a member
before the Court, entitled Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition thereof is to pay his annual dues:
for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to exchange for their support; the pirating of some candidates by inducing them to
attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to hop or flipflop from one ticket to another for some rumored consideration; all
vote in its elections as he chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is these practices made a political circus of the proceedings and tainted the whole
the payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the States election process.
legitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require The candidates and many of the participants in that election not only violated the
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects By-Laws of the IBP but also the ethics of the legal profession which imposes on all
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program the lawyers. lawyers, as a corollary of their obligation to obey and uphold the constitution and
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to be a the laws, the duty to promote respect for law and legal processes and to abstain
member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the from activities aimed at defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal
police power of the State. system (Rule 1.02, Canon 1, Code of Professional Responsibility). Respect for law is
While the Court emphasized the role of an integrated bar in the discipline and gravely eroded when lawyers themselves, who are supposed to be millions of the
disbarment of an offending lawyer, it is submitted that an integrated bar is not an law, engage in unlawful practices and cavalierly brush aside the very rules that the
indispensable requisite for achieving this purpose. Filipino lawyers have been IBP formulated for their observance.
disciplined and even disbarred by the Supreme Court long before the IBP was The unseemly ardor with which the candidates pursued the presidency of the
established. association detracted from the dignity of the legal profession. The spectacle of
In AM No. 491 (October 6, 1989), the Supreme Court En Banc resolved to annul the lawyers bribing or being bribed to vote one way or another, certainly did not uphold
election of the national officers of the IBP after it verified the reports received by the honor of the profession nor elevate it in the publics esteem.
some Justices: The Court notes with grave concern what appear to be the evasions, denials and
outright prevarications that tainted the statements of the witnesses, including tome
from lawyers who had witnessed or participated in the proceedings and the of the candidates, during the initial hearing conducted by it before its fact-finding
adverse comments published in the columns of some newspapers about the committee was created. The subsequent investigation conducted by this Committee
intensive electioneering and overspending by the candidates, led by the main has revealed that those parties had been less than candid with the Court and seem
protagonists for the office of president of the association, the alleged use of to have conspired among themselves to deceive it or at least withhold vital
government planes, and the officious intervention of certain public officials to information from it to conceal the irregularities committed during the campaign.
influence the voting, all of which were done in violation of the IBP By-Laws which Parenthetically, the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel accommodations to
prohibit such activities delegates narrated by the Supreme Court in AM No, 491 foreshadows the
x-x-x allegations that the airfare, accommodations, and pocket money of some delegates
From all the foregoing, it is evident that the manner in which the principal to the October 2013 national convention and election of officers of the Philippine
candidates for the national positions in the Integrated Bar conducted their campaign Judges Association were shouldered by a certain Maam Arlene.
preparatory to the elections on June 3, 1989, violated Section 14 of the IBP By-Laws
and made a travesty of the idea of a strictly non-political Integrated Bar enshrined Did AM No. 491 cleanse the IBP elections? Consider the Supreme Court En Bancs
in Section 4 of the By-Laws. recently promulgated Resolution in AM No. 13-04-03-SC, etc. (December 10, 2013),
The setting up of campaign headquarters by the three principal candidates (Drilon, the subject matter of which was the May 22, 2013 election for Executive Vice
Nisce and Paculdo) in five-star hotels: The Philippine Plaza, the Holiday Inn and The President of the IBP (Section 7 of Rule 139-A states in part that The Executive Vice
Hyatt the better for them to corral and entertain the delegates billeted therein; the President shall automatically become the President for the next succeeding full
island hopping to solicit the votes of the chapter presidents who comprise the 120- term.), which ominously begins with the following paragraph:
member House of Delegates that elects the national officers and regional governors;
the formation of tickets, slates, or line-ups of candidates for the other elective This is yet another controversy involving the leadership of the Integrated Bar of the
positions aligned with, or supporting, either Drilon, Paculdo or Nisce; the Philippines (IBP) that could have been resolved at the Integrated Bar of the
procurement of written commitments and the distribution of nomination forms to be Philippines level but was instead referred to this Court, taking away precious
filled up by the delegates; the reservation of rooms for delegates in three big hotels, resources that could have been better applied to resolve other conflicts for the
at the expense of the presidential candidates; the use of a PNB plane by Drilon and public interest.
some members of her ticket to enable them to assess their chances among the While the Court did not annul the elections (unlike in AM No. 491; but see the dissent
chapter presidents in the Bicol provinces; the printing and distribution of tickets and of Justice Velasco), it noted that:
bio-data of the candidates which in the case of Paculdo admittedly cost him some
P15,000 to P20,000; the employment of uniformed girls (by Paculdo) and lawyers (by The disposition we give to this case is also partly to quiet these conflicts and to
Drilon) to distribute their campaign materials on the convention floor on the day of deny any reward to further legal controversy. After all, in our April 11, 2013
the election; the giving of assistance by the Undersecretary of Labor to Mrs. Drilon Resolution in A.M. No. 09-5-2-SC and A.C. No. 8292, we created a permanent
and her group; the use of labor arbiters to meet delegates at the airport and escort Committee for IBP Affairs to primarily attend to the problems and needs of a very
them to the Philippine Plaza Hotel; the giving of pre-paid plane tickets and hotel important professional body and to make recommendation for its improvement and
accommodations to delegates (and some families who accompanied them) in strengthening.
Should that initiative still fail, this Court should seriously review the present modality the fact that in the past, it had allowed Filipinos who have studied law in foreign law
of the Integrated Bar. Instead of individual membership, a more functional schools from the strict requirements of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 and allowed
alternative might be organizational membership. This means that voluntary them to take the bar examinations, but with the caveat that:
organizations such as the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG), the Alternative Law
Groups (ALG), the Philippine Bar Association (PBA), the U.P. Women Lawyers Circle beginning next year, the Court WILL NOT ALLOW GRADUATES OF FOREIGN LAW
(WILOCI), and other organizations can coalesce and nominate leaders to comprise a SCHOOLS TO TAKE THE BAR EXAMINATIONS. An applicant who desires to take the
council. Thus, every lawyer will have a mature choice to determine which of these bar examinations must not only have studied law in a local law school but has to
organizations best represents his or her interests. This harmonizes better with their present the certifications required under Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 in order to
right to free association. take the bar examination. Since graduates of foreign law schools cannot submit said
x-x-x certifications, they shall henceforth not be allowed to take the bar examinations
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines has long been beset by leadership crises (emphasis supplied).
The leadership of our Integrated Bar must find a better way of resolving its conflicts Was Adriano M. Hernandez the last Filipino to graduate from a foreign law school
other than elevating these matters to this Court. It cannot fail to show maturity in who was allowed to take the Bar Examinations?
resolving its own conflicts. It behooves the members of the legal profession to avoid
being so litigious that they lose sight of the primordial public interests that must be No.
upheld in every case and conflict that is raised to the level of this Court.
Otherwise, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines will continue to alienate its mass In Bar Matter No. 1153 (Re: Letter of Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza Proposing Reforms in
membership through political contestations that may be viewed as parochial the Bar Examinations through Amendments to Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, March
intramurals from which only a few lawyers benefit. It will be generations of leaders 9, 2010) the Supreme Court once again allowed Filipino graduates of foreign law
who model needless litigation and wasted time and energy. This is not what an schools to take the Philippine Bar, subject to certain conditions, and amended
integrated bar of a noble profession should be. Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With the foregoing in mind let us recall the purposes for bar integration, as
enumerated in AM No. 526 and Section 2 of Rule 139-A, and ask: has the integration Section 5 of the Rule now provides that before being admitted to the examination,
of the Philippine Bar achieved these purposes? all applicants for admission to the bar shall satisfactorily show that they have
successfully completed all the prescribed courses for the degree of Bachelor of Laws
or its equivalent degree in a law school or university officially recognized by the
The Law Degree as a prerequisite to practicing law Philippine Government or by the proper authority in the foreign jurisdiction where
2 Replies the degree has been granted.
Wikipedia describes a law degree as an academic degree conferred for studies in
law. Such degrees are generally preparation for legal careers; but while their Section 5 now also provides that a Filipino citizen who graduated from a foreign law
curricula may be reviewed by legal authority, they do not themselves confer a school shall be admitted to the bar examination only upon submission to the
license. In the Philippines, a law degree may be a Bachelor of Laws (LLB), or a Juris Supreme Court of certifications showing: (a) completion of all courses leading to the
Doctor (JD). degree of Bachelor of Laws or its equivalent degree; (b) recognition or accreditation
of the law school by the proper authority; and (c) completion of all fourth year
Graduation from a Philippine law school constitutes the primary eligibility subjects in the Bachelor of Laws academic program in a law school duly recognized
requirement for the Philippine Bar Examination. But this is the general rule which, by the Philippine Government.
throughout the years, has been the subject of various exceptions.
A Filipino citizen who completed and obtained his or her degree in Bachelor of Laws
Non-law graduates have been allowed to take the Bar Examinations. In fact the 1944 or its equivalent in a foreign law school must also present proof of completion of a
Bar Examinations was topped by two persons Jovito Salonga and Jose Diokno separate bachelors degree.
neither of whom had a law degree at the time they took the Bar. Salonga earned his
from the University of the Philippines College of Law in 1946 or after he topped the Since the law course is designed to acquaint the law student with (hopefully) the
Bar; Diokno never returned to his studies at the University of Santo Tomas Faculty of whole spectrum of Philippine law, those who obtain their law degrees from non-
Civil Law. Philippine law schools have to work doubly hard in preparing for the Bar
Examinations, since they studied a different set of laws in law school. But if they are
Non-graduates of Philippine law schools have also been allowed to take the Bar up to the challenge, the Supreme Court, pursuant to Bar Matter No. 1153, is very
Examinations. In a Resolution of the Supreme Court En Banc dated July 27, 1993 (Re: much willing to accommodate them.
Application of Adriano M. Hernandez to take the 1993 Bar Examinations), the Court
allowed the applicant, a Filipino citizen who obtained a Juris Doctor from Columbia And so what happened to Adriano M. Hernandez?
University, New York and who has taken fourth year review courses and other bar
subjects at the Ateneo Law School, to take the 1993 Bar Examinations, considering
He passed the 1993 Bar Examinations and was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1994, but passed away in 2011 at the young age of 44. Atty. Macaraeg denied Francisco's accusation that he neglected their case. He
pointed out that to push through with the appeal he even advanced some of the
appeal expenses. While he admitted that he failed to submit an appellants' brief, he
Preliminaries averred that the same was actually the fault of his clients who failed to provide the
necessary funds to file said brief. According to him, he constantly reminded
A.C. No. 720, June 17, 2015 Francisco to give him the amount necessary to cover the costs of the transcript and
printing of the appeal brief. He even filed three motions for extension of time to file
FRANCISCO CAOILE, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELINO MACARAEG, Respondent. brief to give Francisco more time to come up with the said payment. Still, Francisco
was unable to pay. Moreover, Atty. Macaraeg was not reimbursed for the amount he
RESOLUTION advanced for appeal expenses.

DEL CASTILLO, J.: On September 22, 1966, this Court referred the Complaint to the Solicitor General
for investigation, report and recommendation.10
Alleging that his lawyer's neglect and dereliction of duty caused the dismissal of his
appeal, complainant Francisco Caoile (Francisco) filed on August 16, 1966 a Proceedings before the Solicitor General
Complaint1 for disbarment against Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg (Atty. Macaraeg).
From March to November 1967, the Solicitor General conducted several hearings.11
Factual Antecedents Thereafter, the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.12 Atty.
Macaraeg submitted his Memorandum on January 18, 1968,13 while Francisco
Francisco, and four others, engaged the services of Atty. Macaraeg to represent submitted his Memorandum on March 25, 1968.14
titiem in Civil Case No. 11119, an action for recovery of ownership filed before the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Lingayen, Pangasinan. After the CFI rendered In November 1972, the Office of the Solicitor General again summoned the parties to
judgment against them, Francisco and his co-defendants decided to appeal their appear before it.15 Notably, the return of the subpoena served upon Atty. Macaraeg
case before the Court of Appeals (CA). contained a notation, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Marcelino Macaraeg is now deceased.
Accordingly, Atty. Macaraeg filed a notice of appeal. Thrice he moved for extension
of time to file appellants' brief. In his last motion for extension,2 he alleged that he (illegible)
was already in the process of doing the finishing touches on the brief and just Signature
needed to have it printed. Yet, the extended period expired without Atty. Macaraeg wife16
filing any brief. Hence, upon motion of the opposing party, the CA dismissed the Subsequently, this case was transferred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
appeal.3 The dismissal became final and executory on December 13, 1963.4 (IBP).

Francisco averred that they were unaware of the dismissal of their appeal until they Report and Recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
were served with the CFI's writ of execution5 and a notice of sale at public auction6
of their property in 1965. After confirming with the CA that they indeed lost the case, In an Order17 dated May 8, 1990, the IBP notified the parties to manifest whether
Francisco confronted Atty. Macaraeg who informed him that they lost the case they are still interested in prosecuting the case, or whether supervening events have
because they failed to pay him in full.7 transpired rendering the case moot and academic. The IBP received no response. On
November 17, 1997, the IBP again sent notices to the parties to appear,18 but the
Hence, this administrative complaint against Atty. Macaraeg for neglect and notices were unclaimed. Subsequently, the IBP, through an Order19 dated
dereliction of duty. November 27, 2001, directed the heirs of Atty. Macaraeg to submit a certified true
copy of his death certificate to no avail as the copy thereof sent to the said heirs was
In his Answer,8 Atty. Macaraeg averred that Francisco and his co-defendants did not returned to sender.
pay in full for his services in filing the appeal. Anent the pacto de retro sale which
Francisco and his wife executed in his favor supposedly to cover the balance of his Finally on October 19, 2011, Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero (Commissioner
professional fees, Atty. Macaraeg claimed that it was Francisco who insisted on its Cachapero) of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP came up with a Report
execution, and that, contrary to Francisco's claim, it was intended as payment for his and Recommendation.20 Noting the long period of time that the Complaint has been
services while representing Francisco before the CFI, and not as payment for his pending, he stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
services in filing the appeal. Atty. Macaraeg also claimed that, in any case, Francisco For unknown reasons, this case x x x lingered [quite some time] in the Commission.
did not honor the said pacto de retro sale as the possession of the lot was never It was filed on August 16, 1966 in the Supreme Court and x x x subsequently found
turned over to him.9 its way [to] the Commission where it was initially assigned to a Commissioner. In the
first week of October 2011, the undersigned, who was tasked to prepare the excused himself from the case. The Code of Professional Responsibility allows a
resolution, received the folder and the records of the case. counsel to withdraw his services for a good cause, including the client's failure to
comply with the retainer agreement.24 Indeed, Atty. Macaraeg violated Rule 12.03.
Records show that on May 8, 1990, then Commissioner Ernesto L. Pineda wrote the
parties asking them to manifest within x x x (10) days from notice whether x x x Nevertheless, while the actuation of Atty. Macaraeg warrants the imposition of a
they are still interested in prosecuting this case, and whether supervening events penalty, supervening circumstances call for the dismissal of this administrative case.
have transpired which rendered the resolution moot or academic. The Commission
received no response from either litigant, hence this resolution.21cralawlawlibrary The Supreme Court Law List shows that Atty. Macaraeg was admitted to the Bar on
Anent the merits of the Complaint, Commissioner Cachapero ruled that Atty. November 6, 1933.25 Records reveal that he was already 60 years old when the
Macaraeg neglected the cause of his clients when he thrice moved for extension of hearings in this disbarment case were held in 1967. Hence, he would have been 108
time within which to file his brief. However, he did not file any, reasoning out that years old by this time. It is also noteworthy that the subpoena issued by the Solicitor
the non-filing was due to his clients' failure to give him the necessary funds. General in 1972 contains a handwritten note that Atty. Macaraeg had already died.
Commissioner Cachapero opined that the said excuse cannot stand. He thus found Thereafter, nothing more was heard from either party despite notice. Under these
Atty. Macaraeg to have violated Rule 12.03 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional circumstances, it is safe to assume that the complainant had already lost interest in
Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary pursuing this disbarment case against Atty. Macaraeg and that there is truth in the
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda handwritten notation in the return of the subpoena that Atty. Macaraeg had already
or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation passed away. In Apiag v. Cantero,26 the Court dismissed the administrative case
for his failure to do so. against therein respondent and no longer imposed any sanction against him in view
Accordingly, Commissioner Cachapero recommended that Atty. Macaraeg be of his death during the pendency of said case.cralawred
suspended from the practice of law for a period of two years.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Complaint for Disbarment against Atty.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-17422 dated February 13, 2013, the IBP Board of Marcelino Macaraeg is hereby DISMISSED.
Governors adopted and approved the findings of Commissioner Cachapero with the
modification that the penalty be reduced to a suspension of one SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
year.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Mendoza, and Jardeleza,*JJ., concur.
The Court's Ruling

Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility EN BANC

provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014
connection therewith shall render him liable.
A considerable length of time had elapsed from the time Atty. Macaraeg' filed the FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA, Petitioner, v. CHIEF JUSTICE MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO,
notice of appeal on August 30, 1962 up to the time he filed the third motion for THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL AND EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA,
extension of time to file brief on October 5, 1963. Despite the passage of such time, JR., Respondents.
however, Atty. Macaraeg still failed to file the brief, which resulted in the dismissal of
his clients' appeal. Suffice it to state that a motion for extension to file an appellant's DECISION
brief carries with it the presumption that the applicant-lawyer will file the pleading
within the requested extended period. Failure to dojo without any reasonable excuse MENDOZA, J.:
violates the Code of Professional Responsibility.23
Once again, the Court is faced with a controversy involving the acts of an
While Atty. Macaraeg attributed the non-filing of the brief to his clients' failure to independent body, which is considered as a constitutional innovation, the Judicial
give the amount necessary for filing the same, he should have, as aptly stated by and Bar Council (JBC). It is not the first time that the Court is called upon to settle
Commissioner Cachapero, shown a more mindful and caring attitude towards the legal questions surrounding the JBCs exercise of its constitutional mandate. In De
cause of his clients by advancing the payment. Besides, the facts of this case show Castro v. JBC,1 the Court laid to rest issues such as the duty of the JBC to
that his clients were making partial payments in their efforts to comply with their recommend prospective nominees for the position of Chief Justice vis--vis the
obligation to him and were not deliberately refusing to pay him. In fact, as claimed appointing power of the President, the period within which the same may be
by Atty. Macaraeg himself, Francisco even insisted that they enter into a pacto de exercised, and the ban on midnight appointments as set forth in the Constitution. In
retro sale in order for them to fully pay him for the services he rendered in Chavez v. JBC,2 the Court provided an extensive discourse on constitutional intent as
connection with their civil case in the CFI. In fact, if Atty. Macaraeg truly believed to the JBCs composition and membership.
that the necessary funds from his clients were not forthcoming, he could have
This time, however, the selection and nomination process actually undertaken by the the objection to Jardelezas integrity as posed by Chief Justice Sereno. According to
JBC is being challenged for being constitutionally infirm. The heart of the debate lies the JBC, Chief Justice Sereno questioned Jardelezas ability to discharge the duties of
not only on the very soundness and validity of the application of JBC rules but also his office as shown in a confidential legal memorandum over his handling of an
the extent of its discretionary power. More significantly, this case of first impression international arbitration case for the government.
impugns the end-result of its acts - the shortlist from which the President appoints a
deserving addition to the Highest Tribunal of the land. Later, Jardeleza was directed to one of the Courts ante-rooms where Department of
Justice Secretary Leila M. De Lima (Secretary De Lima) informed him that Associate
To add yet another feature of novelty to this case, a member of the Court, no less Justice Carpio appeared before the JBC and disclosed confidential information which,
than the Chief Justice herself, was being impleaded as party respondent. to Chief Justice Sereno, characterized his integrity as dubious. After the briefing,
Jardeleza was summoned by the JBC at around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon.
The Facts
Jardeleza alleged that he was asked by Chief Justice Sereno if he wanted to defend
The present case finds its genesis from the compulsory retirement of Associate himself against the integrity issues raised against him. He answered that he would
Justice Roberto Abad (Associate Justice Abad) last May 22, 2014. Before his defend himself provided that due process would be observed. Jardeleza specifically
retirement, on March 6, 2014, in accordance with its rules,3 the JBC announced the demanded that Chief Justice Sereno execute a sworn statement specifying her
opening for application or recommendation for the said vacated position. objections and that he be afforded the right to cross-examine her in a public hearing.
He requested that the same directive should also be imposed on Associate Justice
On March 14, 2014, the JBC received a letter from Dean Danilo Concepcion of the Carpio. As claimed by the JBC, Representative Niel G. Tupas Jr. also manifested that
University of the Philippines nominating petitioner Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), he wanted to hear for himself Jardelezas explanation on the matter. Jardeleza,
incumbent Solicitor General of the Republic, for the said position. Upon acceptance however, refused as he would not be lulled into waiving his rights. Jardeleza then put
of the nomination, Jardeleza was included in the names of candidates, as well as in into record a written statement6 expressing his views on the situation and requested
the schedule of public interviews. On May 29, 2014, Jardeleza was interviewed by the JBC to defer its meeting considering that the Court en banc would meet the next
the JBC. day to act on his pending letter-petition. At this juncture, Jardeleza was excused.

It appears from the averments in the petition that on June 16 and 17, 2014, Later in the afternoon of the same day, and apparently denying Jardelezas request
Jardeleza received telephone calls from former Court of Appeals Associate Justice for deferment of the proceedings, the JBC continued its deliberations and proceeded
and incumbent JBC member, Aurora Santiago Lagman (Justice Lagman), who to vote for the nominees to be included in the shortlist. Thereafter, the JBC released
informed him that during the meetings held on June 5 and 16, 2014, Chief Justice the subject shortlist of four (4) nominees which included: Apolinario D. Bruselas, Jr.
and JBC ex-officio Chairperson, Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno (Chief Justice Sereno), with six (6) votes, Jose C. Reyes, Jr. with six (6) votes, Maria Gracia M. Pulido Tan with
manifested that she would be invoking Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-0094 against him. five (5) votes, and Reynaldo B. Daway with four (4) votes. 7cralawred
Jardeleza was then directed to make himself available before the JBC on June 30,
2014, during which he would be informed of the objections to his integrity. As mentioned in the petition, a newspaper article was later published in the online
portal of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, stating that the Courts Spokesman, Atty.
Consequently, Jardeleza filed a letter-petition (letter-petition)5 praying that the Theodore Te, revealed that there were actually five (5) nominees who made it to the
Court, in the exercise of its constitutional power of supervision over the JBC, issue an JBC shortlist, but one (1) nominee could not be included because of the invocation of
order: 1) directing the JBC to give him at least five (5) working days written notice of Rule 10, Section 2 of the JBC rules.
any hearing of the JBC to which he would be summoned; and the said notice to
contain the sworn specifications of the charges against him by his oppositors, the In its July 8, 2014 Resolution, the Court noted Jardelezas letter-petition in view of the
sworn statements of supporting witnesses, if any, and copies of documents in transmittal of the JBC list of nominees to the Office of the President, without
support of the charges; and notice and sworn statements shall be made part of the prejudice to any remedy available in law and the rules that petitioner may still wish
public record of the JBC; 2) allowing him to cross-examine his oppositors and to pursue.8 The said resolution was accompanied by an extensive Dissenting
supporting witnesses, if any, and the cross-examination to be conducted in public, Opinion penned by Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion,9 expressing his respectful
under the same conditions that attend the public interviews held for all applicants; disagreement as to the position taken by the majority.
3) directing the JBC to reset the hearing scheduled on June 30, 2014 to another date;
and 4) directing the JBC to disallow Chief Justice Sereno from participating in the The Petition
voting on June 30, 2014 or at any adjournment thereof where such vote would be
taken for the nominees for the position vacated by Associate Justice Abad. Perceptibly based on the aforementioned resolutions declaration as to his availment
of a remedy in law, Jardeleza filed the present petition for certiorari and mandamus
During the June 30, 2014 meeting of the JBC, sans Jardeleza, incumbent Associate under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Justice Antonio T. Carpio (Associate Justice Carpio) appeared as a resource person to Restraining Order (TRO), seeking to compel the JBC to include him in the list of
shed light on a classified legal memorandum (legal memorandum) that would clarify nominees for Supreme Court Associate Justice vice Associate Justice Abad, on the
grounds that the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno acted in grave abuse of discretion His lack of knowledge as to the identity of his accusers (except for yet again, the
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in excluding him, despite having garnered verbal information conveyed to him that Associate Justice Carpio testified against
a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position. him) and as to the nature of the very accusations against him caused him to suffer
from the arbitrary action by the JBC and Chief Justice Sereno. The latter gravely
Notably, Jardelezas petition decries that despite the obvious urgency of his earlier abused her discretion when she acted as prosecutor, witness and judge, thereby
letter-petition and its concomitant filing on June 25, 2014, the same was raffled only violating the very essence of fair play and the Constitution itself. In his words: the
on July 1, 2014 or a day after the controversial JBC meeting. By the time that his sui generis nature of JBC proceedings does not authorize the Chief Justice to assume
letter-petition was scheduled for deliberation by the Court en banc on July 8, 2014, these roles, nor does it dispense with the need to honor petitioners right to due
the disputed shortlist had already been transmitted to the Office of the President. He process.10cralawred
attributed this belated action on his letter-petition to Chief Justice Sereno, whose
action on such matters, especially those impressed with urgency, was discretionary. B. The JBC committed grave abuse of discretion in excluding Jardeleza from the
shortlist of nominees, in violation of its own rules. The unanimity requirement
An in-depth perusal of Jardelezas petition would reveal that his resort to judicial provided under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 does not find application when a
intervention hinges on the alleged illegality of his exclusion from the shortlist due to: member of the JBC raises an objection to an applicants integrity. Here, the lone
1) the deprivation of his constitutional right to due process; and 2) the JBCs objector constituted a part of the membership of the body set to vote. The lone
erroneous application, if not direct violation, of its own rules. Suffice it to say, objector could be completely capable of taking hostage the entire voting process by
Jardeleza directly ascribes the supposed violation of his constitutional rights to the the mere expediency of raising an objection. Chief Justice Serenos interpretation of
acts of Chief Justice Sereno in raising objections against his integrity and the manner the rule would allow a situation where all that a member has to do to veto other
by which the JBC addressed this challenge to his application, resulting in his arbitrary votes, including majority votes, would be to object to the qualification of a
exclusion from the list of nominees. candidate, without need for factual basis.

Jardelezas Position C. Having secured the sufficient number of votes, it was ministerial on the part of
the JBC to include Jardeleza in the subject shortlist. Section 1, Rule 10 of JBC-009
For a better understanding of the above postulates proffered in the petition, the provides that a nomination for appointment to a judicial position requires the
Court hereunder succinctly summarizes Jardelezas arguments, as affirmative vote of at least a majority of all members of the JBC. The JBC cannot
follows:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary disregard its own rules. Considering that Jardeleza was able to secure four (4) out of
six (6) votes, the only conclusion is that a majority of the members of the JBC found
A. Chief Justice Sereno and the JBC violated Jardelezas right to due process in the him to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice.
events leading up to and during the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014. When
accusations against his integrity were made twice, ex parte, by Chief Justice Sereno, D. The unlawful exclusion of the petitioner from the subject shortlist impairs the
without informing him of the nature and cause thereof and without affording him an Presidents constitutional power to appoint. Jardelezas exclusion from the shortlist
opportunity to be heard, Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process. In turn, has unlawfully narrowed the Presidents choices. Simply put, the President would be
the JBC violated his right to due process when he was simply ordered to make constrained to choose from among four (4) nominees, when five (5) applicants
himself available on the June 30, 2014 meeting and was told that the objections to rightfully qualified for the position. This limits the President to appoint a member of
his integrity would be made known to him on the same day. Apart from mere verbal the Court from a list generated through a process tainted with patent constitutional
notice (by way of a telephone call) of the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 violations and disregard for rules of justice and fair play. Until these constitutional
against his application and not on the accusations against him per se, he was infirmities are remedied, the petitioner has the right to prevent the appointment of
deprived of an opportunity to mount a proper defense against it. Not only did the JBC an Associate Justice vice Associate Justice Abad.
fail to ventilate questions on his integrity during his public interview, he was also
divested of his rights as an applicant under Sections 3 and 4, Rule 4, JBC-009, to wit: Comment of the JBC
Section 3. Testimony of parties. The Council may receive written opposition to an
applicant on the ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may On August 11, 2014, the JBC filed its comment contending that Jardelezas petition
receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with lacked procedural and substantive bases that would warrant favorable action by the
due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and Court. For the JBC, certiorari is only available against a tribunal, a board or an officer
to offer countervailing evidence. exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.11 The JBC, in its exercise of its
mandate to recommend appointees to the Judiciary, does not exercise any of these
Section 4. Anonymous Complaints. Anonymous complaints against an applicant functions. In a pending case,12 Jardeleza himself, as one of the lawyers for the
shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause government, argued in this wise: Certiorari cannot issue against the JBC in the
sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the implementation of its policies.
Council may direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant to comment
thereon in writing or during the interview.
In the same vein, the remedy of mandamus is incorrect. Mandamus does not lie to Lastly, the JBC rued that Jardeleza sued the respondents in his capacity as Solicitor
compel a discretionary act. For it to prosper, a petition for mandamus must, among General. Despite claiming a prefatory appearance in propria persona, all pleadings
other things, show that the petitioner has a clear legal right to the act demanded. In filed with the Court were signed in his official capacity. In effect, he sued the
Jardelezas case, there is no legal right to be included in the list of nominees for respondents to pursue a purely private interest while retaining the office of the
judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for Solicitor General. By suing the very parties he was tasked by law to defend,
appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that ones name be Jardeleza knowingly placed himself in a situation where his personal interests
included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. Ones inclusion in the collided against his public duties, in clear violation of the Code of Professional
shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the JBC. Responsibility and Code of Professional Ethics. Moreover, the respondents are all
public officials being sued in their official capacity. By retaining his title as Solicitor
Anent the substantive issues, the JBC mainly denied that Jardeleza was deprived of General, and suing in the said capacity, Jardeleza filed a suit against his own clients,
due process. The JBC reiterated that Justice Lagman, on behalf of the JBC en banc, being the legal defender of the government and its officers. This runs contrary to the
called Jardeleza and informed him that Chief Justice Sereno would be invoking fiduciary relationship shared by a lawyer and his client.
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 due to a question on his integrity based on the way he
handled a very important case for the government. Jardeleza and Justice Lagman In opposition to Jardelezas prayer for the issuance of a TRO, the JBC called to mind
spoke briefly about the case and his general explanation on how he handled the the constitutional period within which a vacancy in the Court must be filled. As
same. Secretary De Lima likewise informed him about the content of the impending things now stand, the President has until August 20, 2014 to exercise his
objection against his application. On these occasions, Jardeleza agreed to explain appointment power which cannot be restrained by a TRO or an injunctive suit.
himself. Come the June 30, 2014 meeting, however, Jardeleza refused to shed light
on the allegations against him, as he chose to deliver a statement, which, in Comment of the Executive Secretary
essence, requested that his accuser and her witnesses file sworn statements so that
he would know of the allegations against him, that he be allowed to cross-examine In his Comment, Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa Jr. (Executive Secretary)
the witnesses; and that the procedure be done on record and in public. raised the possible unconstitutionality of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, particularly
the imposition of a higher voting threshold in cases where the integrity of an
In other words, Jardeleza was given ample opportunity to be heard and to enlighten applicant is challenged. It is his position that the subject JBC rule impairs the bodys
each member of the JBC on the issues raised against him prior to the voting process. collegial character, which essentially operates on the basis of majority rule. The
His request for a sworn statement and opportunity to cross-examine is not supported application of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 gives rise to a situation where all that a
by a demandable right. The JBC is not a fact-finding body. Neither is it a court nor a member needs to do, in order to disqualify an applicant who may well have already
quasi-judicial agency. The members are not concerned with the determination of his obtained a majority vote, is to object to his integrity. In effect, a member who
guilt or innocence of the accusations against him. invokes the said provision is given a veto power that undermines the equal and full
participation of the other members in the nomination process. A lone objector may
Besides, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 10, JBC-009 are merely directory as shown by the then override the will of the majority, rendering illusory, the collegial nature of the
use of the word may. Even the conduct of a hearing to determine the veracity of JBC and the very purpose for which it was createdto shield the appointment
an opposition is discretionary on the JBC. Ordinarily, if there are other ways of process from political maneuvering. Further, Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 may be
ascertaining the truth or falsity of an allegation or opposition, the JBC would not call violative of due process for it does not allow an applicant any meaningful
a hearing in order to avoid undue delay of the selection process. Each member of opportunity to refute the challenges to his integrity. While other provisions of the JBC
the JBC relies on his or her own appreciation of the circumstances and qualifications rules provide mechanisms enabling an applicant to comment on an opposition filed
of applicants. against him, the subject rule does not afford the same opportunity. In this case,
Jardelezas allegations as to the events which transpired on June 30, 2014 obviously
The JBC then proceeded to defend adherence to its standing rules. As a general rule, show that he was neither informed of the accusations against him nor given the
an applicant is included in the shortlist when he or she obtains an affirmative vote of chance to muster a defense thereto.
at least a majority of all the members of the JBC. When Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
009, however, is invoked because an applicants integrity is challenged, a The Executive Secretary then offered a supposition: granting that the subject
unanimous vote is required. Thus, when Chief Justice Sereno invoked the said provision is held to be constitutional, the unanimity rule would only be operative
provision, Jardeleza needed the affirmative vote of all the JBC members to be when the objector is not a member of the JBC. It is only in this scenario where the
included in the shortlist. In the process, Chief Justice Serenos vote against Jardeleza voting of the body would not be rendered inconsequential. In the event that a JBC
was not counted. Even then, he needed the votes of the five (5) remaining member raised the objection, what should have been applied is the general rule of a
members. He only got four (4) affirmative votes. As a result, he was not included in majority vote, where any JBC member retains their respective reservations to an
the shortlist. Applicant Reynaldo B. Daway, who got four (4) affirmative votes, was application with a negative vote. Corollary thereto, the unconstitutionality of the said
included in the shortlist because his integrity was not challenged. As to him, the rule would necessitate the inclusion of Jardeleza in the shortlist submitted to the
majority rule was considered applicable. President.
Other pleadings
II
On August 12, 2014, Jardeleza was given the chance to refute the allegations of the
JBC in its Comment. He submitted his Reply thereto on August 15, 2014. A few hours WHETHER OR NOT THE ISSUES RAISED AGAINST JARDELEZA BEFIT QUESTIONS OR
thereafter, or barely ten minutes prior to the closing of business, the Court received CHALLENGES ON INTEGRITY AS CONTEMPLATED UNDER SECTION 2, RULE 10 OF
the Supplemental Comment-Reply of the JBC, this time with the attached minutes of JBC-009.
the proceedings that led to the filing of the petition, and a detailed Statement of
the Chief Justice on the Integrity Objection.13 Obviously, Jardelezas Reply II.
consisted only of his arguments against the JBCs original Comment, as it was filed
prior to the filing of the Supplemental Comment-Reply. WHETHER OR NOT THE RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IS AVAILABLE IN THE COURSE OF
JBC PROCEEDINGS IN CASES WHERE AN OBJECTION OR OPPOSITION TO AN
At the late stage of the case, two motions to admit comments-in- APPLICATION IS RAISED.
intervention/oppositions-in-intervention were filed. One was by Atty. Purificacion S.
Bartolome-Bernabe, purportedly the President of the Integrated Bar of the III.
Philippines-Bulacan Chapter. This pleading echoed the position of the
JBC.14cralawred WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER JARDELEZA MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE SHORTLIST OF
NOMINEES SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT.
The other one was filed by Atty. Reynaldo A. Cortes, purportedly a former President
of the IBP Baguio-Benguet Chapter and former Governor of the IBP-Northern Luzon. The Courts Ruling
It was coupled with a complaint for disbarment against Jardeleza primarily for
violations of the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting
interests.15cralawred I Procedural Issue: The Court
has constitutional bases to assume
Both motions for intervention were denied considering that time was of the essence jurisdiction over the case
and their motions were merely reiterative of the positions of the JBC and were
perceived to be dilatory. The complaint for disbarment, however, was re-docketed as A - The Courts Power of Supervision
a separate administrative case. over the JBC

The Issues Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides for the creation of the JBC.
The Court was given supervisory authority over it. Section 8
Amidst a myriad of issues submitted by the parties, most of which are interrelated reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
such that the resolution of one issue would necessarily affect the conclusion as to
the others, the Court opts to narrow down the questions to the very source of the Section 8.
discord - the correct application of Section 2, Rule 10 JBC-009 and its effects, if any,
on the substantive rights of applicants. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme
Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice,
The Court is not unmindful of the fact that a facial scrutiny of the petition does not and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the
directly raise the unconstitutionality of the subject JBC rule. Instead, it bewails the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
unconstitutional effects of its application. It is only from the comment of the representative of the private sector. [Emphasis supplied]
Executive Secretary where the possible unconstitutionality of the rule was brought to
the fore. Despite this milieu, a practical approach dictates that the Court must As a meaningful guidepost, jurisprudence provides the definition and scope of
confront the source of the bleeding from which the gaping wound presented to the supervision. It is the power of oversight, or the authority to see that subordinate
Court suffers. officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the rules governing the
conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising
The issues for resolution are:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such
rules, nor do they have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not
I. observed, they may order the work done or redone, but only to conform to such
rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of execution of the act. They have
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT CAN ASSUME JURISDICTION AND GIVE DUE COURSE no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
TO THE SUBJECT PETITION FOR CERTIORARI AND MANDAMUS (WITH APPLICATION followed.16cralawred
FOR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER).
Based on this, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC covers the branch or instrumentality of the government, even if the latter does not exercise
overseeing of compliance with its rules. In this case, Jardelezas principal allegations judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.19cralawred
in his petition merit the exercise of this supervisory authority.
In a case like this, where constitutional bearings are too blatant to ignore, the Court
B- Availability of the Remedy of Mandamus does not find passivity as an alternative. The impasse must be overcome.

The Court agrees with the JBC that a writ of mandamus is not available. Mandamus II Substantial Issues
lies to compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty, but not to
compel the performance of a discretionary duty. Mandamus will not issue to control Examining the Unanimity Rule of the
or review the exercise of discretion of a public officer where the law imposes upon JBC in cases where an applicants
said public officer the right and duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any integrity is challenged
matter in which he is required to act. It is his judgment that is to be exercised and
not that of the court.17 There is no question that the JBCs duty to nominate is The purpose of the JBCs existence is indubitably rooted in the categorical
discretionary and it may not be compelled to do something. constitutional declaration that [a] member of the judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence. To ensure the fulfillment
C- Availability of the Remedy of Certiorari of these standards in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to
screen aspiring judges and justices, among others, making certain that the
Respondent JBC opposed the petition for certiorari on the ground that it does not nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably best for
exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Under Section 1 of Rule 65, a writ of appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the
certiorari is directed against a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function. possibility of extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and,
Judicial functions are exercised by a body or officer clothed with authority to more importantly, to the ineligible or disqualified.
determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are with respect to
the matter in controversy. Quasi-judicial function is a term that applies to the action In the performance of this sacred duty, the JBC itself admits, as stated in the
or discretion of public administrative officers or bodies given the authority to whereas clauses of JBC-009, that qualifications such as competence, integrity,
investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and draw probity and independence are not easily determinable as they are developed and
conclusions from them as a basis for their official action using discretion of a judicial nurtured through the years. Additionally, it is not possible or advisable to lay down
nature.18 It asserts that in the performance of its function of recommending iron-clad rules to determine the fitness of those who aspire to become a Justice,
appointees for the judiciary, the JBC does not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial Judge, Ombudsman or Deputy Ombudsman. Given this realistic situation, there is a
functions. Hence, the resort to such remedy to question its actions is improper. need to promote stability and uniformity in JBCs guiding precepts and principles. A
set of uniform criteria had to be established in the ascertainment of whether one
In this case, Jardeleza cries that although he earned a qualifying number of votes in meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and
the JBC, it was negated by the invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity in heart expected of him and his office. Likewise for the sake of transparency of its
violation of his right to due process guaranteed not only by the Constitution but by proceedings, the JBC had put these criteria in writing, now in the form of JBC-009.
the Councils own rules. For said reason, the Court is of the position that it can True enough, guidelines have been set in the determination of competence,20
exercise the expanded judicial power of review vested upon it by the 1987 probity and independence,21 soundness of physical and mental condition,22
Constitution. Thus:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary and integrity.23cralawred

Article VIII. As disclosed by the guidelines and lists of recognized evidence of qualification laid
down in JBC-009, integrity is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
Section 1. The judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower an applicants good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct,
courts as may be established by law. and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. That is why proof of an applicants
reputation may be shown in certifications or testimonials from reputable government
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies officials and non-governmental organizations and clearances from the courts,
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine National Bureau of Investigation, and the police, among others. In fact, the JBC may
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or even conduct a discreet background check and receive feedback from the public on
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, the merits of which shall be
Government. verified and checked. As a qualification, the term is taken to refer to a virtue, such
that, integrity is the quality of persons character.24cralawred
It has been judicially settled that a petition for certiorari is a proper remedy to
question the act of any branch or instrumentality of the government on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any
The foregoing premise then begets the question: Does Rule 2, Section 10 of JBC-009, the JBC acceded to Jardelezas demand to make the accusations against him public.
in imposing the unanimity rule, contemplate a doubt on the moral character of an At the outset, the JBC declined to raise the fine points of the integrity question in its
applicant? original Comment due to its significant bearing on the countrys foreign relations and
national security. At any rate, the Court restrains itself from delving into the details
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary thereof in this disposition. The confidential nature of the document cited therein,
which requires the observance of utmost prudence, preclude a discussion that may
SEC. 2. Votes required when integrity of a qualified applicant is challenged. - In every possibly affect the countrys position in a pending dispute.
case where the integrity of an applicant who is not otherwise disqualified for
nomination is raised or challenged, the affirmative vote of all the Members of the Be that as it may, the Court has to resolve the standing questions: Does the original
Council must be obtained for the favorable consideration of his nomination. invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 involve a question on Jardelezas
integrity? Does his adoption of a specific legal strategy in the handling of a case
A simple reading of the above provision undoubtedly elicits the rule that a higher bring forth a relevant and logical challenge against his moral character? Does the
voting requirement is absolute in cases where the integrity of an applicant is unanimity rule apply in cases where the main point of contention is the
questioned. Simply put, when an integrity question arises, the voting requirement professional judgment sans charges or implications of immoral or corrupt behavior?
for his or her inclusion as a nominee to a judicial post becomes unanimous instead
of the majority vote required in the preceding section.25 Considering that JBC-009 The Court answers these questions in the negative.
employs the term integrity as an essential qualification for appointment, and its
doubtful existence in a person merits a higher hurdle to surpass, that is, the While Chief Justice Sereno claims that the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009
unanimous vote of all the members of the JBC, the Court is of the safe conclusion was not borne out of a mere variance of legal opinion but by an act of disloyalty
that integrity as used in the rules must be interpreted uniformly. Hence, Section 2, committed by Jardeleza in the handling of a case, the fact remains that the basis for
Rule 10 of JBC-009 envisions only a situation where an applicants moral fitness is her invocation of the rule was the disagreement in legal strategy as expressed by
challenged. It follows then that the unanimity rule only comes into operation when a group of international lawyers. The approach taken by Jardeleza in that case was
the moral character of a person is put in issue. It finds no application where the opposed to that preferred by the legal team. For said reason, criticism was hurled
question is essentially unrelated to an applicants moral uprightness. against his integrity. The invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity traces its
roots to the exercise of his discretion as a lawyer and nothing else. No connection
Examining the questions of was established linking his choice of a legal strategy to a treacherous intent to
integrity made against Jardeleza trounce upon the countrys interests or to betray the Constitution.

The Court will now examine the propriety of applying Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 Verily, disagreement in legal opinion is but a normal, if not an essential form of,
to Jardelezas case. interaction among members of the legal community. A lawyer has complete
discretion on what legal strategy to employ in a case entrusted to him28 provided
The minutes of the JBC meetings, attached to the Supplemental Comment-Reply, that he lives up to his duty to serve his client with competence and diligence, and
reveal that during the June 30, 2014 meeting, not only the question on his that he exert his best efforts to protect the interests of his client within the bounds
actuations in the handling of a case was called for explanation by the Chief Justice, of the law. Consonantly, a lawyer is not an insurer of victory for clients he
but two other grounds as well tending to show his lack of integrity: a supposed extra- represents. An infallible grasp of legal principles and technique by a lawyer is a
marital affair in the past and alleged acts of insider trading.26cralawred utopian ideal. Stripped of a clear showing of gross neglect, iniquity, or immoral
purpose, a strategy of a legal mind remains a legal tactic acceptable to some and
Against this factual backdrop, the Court notes that the initial or original invocation of deplorable to others. It has no direct bearing on his moral choices.
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 was grounded on Jardelezas inability to discharge the
duties of his office as shown in a legal memorandum related to Jardelezas manner As shown in the minutes, the other JBC members expressed their reservations on
of representing the government in a legal dispute. The records bear that the whether the ground invoked by Chief Justice Sereno could be classified as a
unanimity rule was initially invoked by Chief Justice Sereno during the JBC meeting question of integrity under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009.29 These reservations
held on June 5, 2014, where she expressed her position that Jardeleza did not were evidently sourced from the fact that there was no clear indication that the
possess the integrity required to be a member of the Court.27 In the same meeting, tactic was a brainchild of Jardeleza, as it might have been a collective idea by the
the Chief Justice shared with the other JBC members the details of Jardelezas chosen legal team which initially sought a different manner of presenting the countrys
manner of framing the governments position in a case and how this could have arguments, and there was no showing either of a corrupt purpose on his part.30
been detrimental to the national interest. Even Chief Justice Sereno was not certain that Jardelezas acts were urged by
politicking or lured by extraneous promises.31 Besides, the President, who has the
In the JBCs original comment, the details of the Chief Justices claim against final say on the conduct of the countrys advocacy in the case, has given no signs
Jardelezas integrity were couched in general terms. The particulars thereof were that Jardelezas action constituted disloyalty or a betrayal of the countrys trust and
only supplied to the Court in the JBCs Supplemental Comment-Reply. Apparently, interest. While this point does not entail that only the President may challenge
Jardelezas doubtful integrity, it is commonsensical to assume that he is in the best entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she is held by the public
position to suspect a treacherous agenda. The records are bereft of any information in the place where she is known.38 Hence, lawyers are at all times subject to the
that indicates this suspicion. In fact, the Comment of the Executive Secretary watchful public eye and community approbation.39cralawred
expressly prayed for Jardelezas inclusion in the disputed shortlist.
The element of willingness to linger in indelicate relationships imputes a weakness
The Court notes the zeal shown by the Chief Justice regarding international cases, in ones values, self-control and on the whole, sense of honor, not only because it is
given her participation in the PIATCO case and the Belgian Dredging case. Her efforts a bold disregard of the sanctity of marriage and of the law, but because it erodes the
in the determination of Jardelezas professional background, while commendable, publics confidence in the Judiciary. This is no longer a matter of an honest lapse in
have not produced a patent demonstration of a connection between the act judgment but a dissolute exhibition of disrespect toward sacred vows taken before
complained of and his integrity as a person. Nonetheless, the Court cannot consider God and the law.
her invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 as conformably within the
contemplation of the rule. To fall under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, there must be On the other hand, insider trading is an offense that assaults the integrity of our vital
a showing that the act complained of is, at the least, linked to the moral character of securities market.40 Manipulative devices and deceptive practices, including insider
the person and not to his judgment as a professional. What this disposition trading, throw a monkey wrench right into the heart of the securities industry. When
perceives, therefore, is the inapplicability of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 to the someone trades in the market with unfair advantage in the form of highly valuable
original ground of its invocation. secret inside information, all other participants are defrauded. All of the mechanisms
become worthless. Given enough of stock market scandals coupled with the related
As previously mentioned, Chief Justice Sereno raised the issues of Jardelezas alleged loss of faith in the market, such abuses could presage a severe drain of capital. And
extra-marital affair and acts of insider-trading for the first time only during the June investors would eventually feel more secure with their money invested elsewhere.41
30, 2014 meeting of the JBC. As can be gleaned from the minutes of the June 30, In its barest essence, insider trading involves the trading of securities based on
2014 meeting, the inclusion of these issues had its origin from newspaper reports knowledge of material information not disclosed to the public at the time. Clearly, an
that the Chief Justice might raise issues of immorality against Jardeleza.32 The allegation of insider trading involves the propensity of a person to engage in
Chief Justice then deduced that the immorality issue referred to by the media fraudulent activities that may speak of his moral character.
might have been the incidents that could have transpired when Jardeleza was still
the General Counsel of San Miguel Corporation. She stated that inasmuch as the JBC These two issues can be properly categorized as questions on integrity under
had the duty to take every possible step to verify the qualification of the Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009. They fall within the ambit of questions on integrity.
applicants, it might as well be clarified.33cralawred Hence, the unanimity rule may come into operation as the subject provision is
worded.
Do these issues fall within the purview of questions on integrity under Section 2,
Rule 10 of JBC-009? The Court nods in assent. These are valid issues. The Availability of Due Process
in the Proceedings of the JBC
This acquiescence is consistent with the Courts discussion supra. Unlike the first
ground which centered on Jardelezas stance on the tactical approach in pursuing In advocacy of his position, Jardeleza argues that: 1] he should have been informed
the case for the government, the claims of an illicit relationship and acts of insider of the accusations against him in writing; 2] he was not furnished the basis of the
trading bear a candid relation to his moral character. Jurisprudence34 is replete with accusations, that is, a very confidential legal memorandum that clarifies the
cases where a lawyers deliberate participation in extra-marital affairs was integrity objection; 3] instead of heeding his request for an opportunity to defend
considered as a disgraceful stain on ones ethical and moral principles. The bottom himself, the JBC considered his refusal to explain, during the June 30, 2014 meeting,
line is that a lawyer who engages in extra-marital affairs is deemed to have failed to as a waiver of his right to answer the unspecified allegations; 4] the voting of the JBC
adhere to the exacting standards of morality and decency which every member of was railroaded; and 5] the alleged discretionary nature of Sections 3 and 4 of JBC-
the Judiciary is expected to observe. In fact, even relationships which have never 009 is negated by the subsequent effectivity of JBC-010, Section 1(2) of which
gone physical or intimate could still be subject to charges of immorality, when a provides for a 10-day period from the publication of the list of candidates within
lawyer, who is married, admits to having a relationship which was more than which any complaint or opposition against a candidate may be filed with the JBC
professional, more than acquaintanceship, more than friendly.35 As the Court has Secretary; 6] Section 2 of JBC-010 requires complaints and oppositions to be in
held: Immorality has not been confined to sexual matters, but includes conduct writing and under oath, copies of which shall be furnished the candidate in order for
inconsistent with rectitude, or indicative of corruption, indecency, depravity and him to file his comment within five (5) days from receipt thereof; and 7] Sections 3
dissoluteness; or is willful, flagrant, or shameless conduct showing moral to 6 of JBC-010 prescribe a logical, reasonable and sequential series of steps in
indifference to opinions of respectable members of the community and an securing a candidates right to due process.
inconsiderate attitude toward good order and public welfare.36 Moral character is
not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.37 To have a good The JBC counters these by insisting that it is not obliged to afford Jardeleza the right
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristic of being good. It is to a hearing in the fulfillment of its duty to recommend. The JBC, as a body, is not
not enough that he or she has a good reputation, that is, the opinion generally required by law to hold hearings on the qualifications of the nominees. The process
by which an objection is made based on Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 is not judicial, the whole, disciplinary proceedings are actually aimed to verify and finally
quasi-judicial, or fact-finding, for it does not aim to determine guilt or innocence akin determine, if a lawyer charged is still qualified to benefit from the rights and
to a criminal or administrative offense but to ascertain the fitness of an applicant privileges that membership in the legal profession evoke.
vis--vis the requirements for the position. Being sui generis, the proceedings of the
JBC do not confer the rights insisted upon by Jardeleza. He may not exact the Notwithstanding being a class of its own, the right to be heard and to explain ones
application of rules of procedure which are, at the most, discretionary or optional. self is availing. The Court subscribes to the view that in cases where an objection to
Finally, Jardeleza refused to shed light on the objections against him. During the June an applicants qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither negates
30, 2014 meeting, he did not address the issues, but instead chose to tread on his nor renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of JBC to recommend. This holding is
view that the Chief Justice had unjustifiably become his accuser, prosecutor and not an encroachment on its discretion in the nomination process. Actually, its
judge. adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the exercise of its
discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is
The crux of the issue is on the availability of the right to due process in JBC afforded the chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of
proceedings. After a tedious review of the parties respective arguments, the Court the situation it faces, thereby guarding the body from making an unsound and
concludes that the right to due process is available and thereby demandable as a capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not expected to
matter of right. strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an
applicant. Just the same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the
The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. dictates of fairness for the only test that an exercise of discretion must surmount is
Indeed, they are distinct from criminal proceedings where the finding of guilt or that of soundness.
innocence of the accused is sine qua non. The JBCs constitutional duty to
recommend qualified nominees to the President cannot be compared to the duty of A more pragmatic take on the matter of due process in JBC proceedings also
the courts of law to determine the commission of an offense and ascribe the same to compels the Court to examine its current rules. The pleadings of the parties
an accused, consistent with established rules on evidence. Even the quantum of mentioned two: 1] JBC-009 and 2] JBC-010. The former provides the following
evidence required in criminal cases is far from the discretion accorded to the JBC. provisions pertinent to this case:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

The Court, however, could not accept, lock, stock and barrel, the argument that an SECTION 1. Evidence of integrity. - The Council shall take every possible step to
applicants access to the rights afforded under the due process clause is verify the applicant's record of and reputation for honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
discretionary on the part of the JBC. While the facets of criminal42 and irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards. For this
administrative43 due process are not strictly applicable to JBC proceedings, their purpose, the applicant shall submit to the Council certifications or testimonials
peculiarity is insufficient to justify the conclusion that due process is not thereof from reputable government officials and non-governmental organizations,
demandable. and clearances from the courts, National Bureau of Investigation, police, and from
such other agencies as the Council may require.
In JBC proceedings, an aspiring judge or justice justifies his qualifications for the
office when he presents proof of his scholastic records, work experience and SECTION 2. Background check. - The Council may order a discreet background check
laudable citations. His goal is to establish that he is qualified for the office applied on the integrity, reputation and character of the applicant, and receive feedback
for. The JBC then takes every possible step to verify an applicant's track record for thereon from the public, which it shall check or verify to validate the merits thereof.
the purpose of determining whether or not he is qualified for nomination. It
ascertains the factors which entitle an applicant to become a part of the roster from SECTION 3. Testimony of parties.- The Council may receive written opposition to an
which the President appoints. applicant on ground of his moral fitness and, at its discretion, the Council may
receive the testimony of the oppositor at a hearing conducted for the purpose, with
The fact that a proceeding is sui generis and is impressed with discretion, however, due notice to the applicant who shall be allowed to cross-examine the oppositor and
does not automatically denigrate an applicants entitlement to due process. It is to offer countervailing evidence.
well-established in jurisprudence that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are
sui generis in that they are neither purely civil nor purely criminal; they involve SECTION 4. Anonymous complaints. - Anonymous complaints against an applicant
investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers, not the trial of an shall not be given due course, unless there appears on its face a probable cause
action or a suit. 44 Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely sufficient to engender belief that the allegations may be true. In the latter case, the
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Council may either direct a discreet investigation or require the applicant to
Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the comment thereon in writing or during the interview. [Emphases Supplied]
proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members
who, by their misconduct, have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted While the unanimity rule invoked against him is found in JBC-009, Jardeleza urges
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. In such the Court to hold that the subsequent rule, JBC-010,46 squarely applies to his case.
posture, there can be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.45 On Entitled as a Rule to Further Promote Public Awareness of and Accessibility to the
Proceedings of the Judicial and Bar Council, JBC-010 recognizes the need for Anent the interpretation of these existing rules, the JBC contends that Sections 3 and
transparency and public awareness of JBC proceedings. In pursuance thereof, JBC- 4, Rule 10 of JBC-009 are merely directory in nature as can be gleaned from the use
010 was crafted in this wise:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary of the word may. Thus, the conduct of a hearing under Rule 4 of JBC-009 is
permissive and/or discretionary on the part of the JBC. Even the conduct of a hearing
SECTION 1. The Judicial and Bar Council shall deliberate to determine who of the to determine the veracity of an opposition is discretionary for there are ways,
candidates meet prima facie the qualifications for the position under consideration. besides a hearing, to ascertain the truth or falsity of allegations. Succinctly, this
For this purpose, it shall prepare a long list of candidates who prima facie appear to argument suggests that the JBC has the discretion to hold or not to hold a hearing
have all the qualifications. when an objection to an applicants integrity is raised and that it may resort to other
means to accomplish its objective. Nevertheless, JBC adds, what is mandatory,
The Secretary of the Council shall then cause to be published in two (2) newspapers however, is that if the JBC, in its discretion, receives a testimony of an oppositor in a
of general circulation a notice of the long list of candidates in alphabetical order. hearing, due notice shall be given to the applicant and that shall be allowed to cross-
examine the oppositor.47cralawred
The notice shall inform the public that any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof. Again, the Court neither intends to strip the JBC of its discretion to recommend
nominees nor proposes that the JBC conduct a full-blown trial when objections to an
SECTION 2. The complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten application are submitted. Still, it is unsound to say that, all together, the
(10) legible copies, together with its supporting annexes. It shall strictly relate to the observance of due process is a part of JBCs discretion when an opposition to an
qualifications of the candidate or lack thereof, as provided for in the Constitution, application is made of record. While it may so rely on other means such as
statutes, and the Rules of the Judicial and Bar Council, as well as resolutions or character clearances, testimonials, and discreet investigation to aid it in forming a
regulations promulgated by it. judgment of an applicants qualifications, the Court cannot accept a situation where
JBC is given a full rein on the application of a fundamental right whenever a persons
The Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or integrity is put to question. In such cases, an attack on the person of the applicant
opposition against him. The candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof necessitates his right to explain himself.
within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires.
The JBCs own rules convince the Court to arrive at this conclusion. The subsequent
SECTION 3. The Judicial and Bar Council shall fix a date when it shall meet in issuance of JBC-010 unmistakably projects the JBCs deference to the grave import of
executive session to consider the qualification of the long list of candidates and the the right of the applicant to be informed and corollary thereto, the right to be heard.
complaint or opposition against them, if any. The Council may, on its own, conduct a The provisions of JBC-010, per se, provide that: any complaint or opposition against
discreet investigation of the background of the candidates. a candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days thereof; the
complaint or opposition shall be in writing, under oath and in ten (10) legible copies;
On the basis of its evaluation of the qualification of the candidates, the Council shall the Secretary of the Council shall furnish the candidate a copy of the complaint or
prepare the shorter list of candidates whom it desires to interview for its further opposition against him; the candidate shall have five (5) days from receipt thereof
consideration. within which to file his comment to the complaint or opposition, if he so desires; and
the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
SECTION 4. The Secretary of the Council shall again cause to be published the dates
of the interview of candidates in the shorter list in two (2) newspapers of general The Court may not close its eyes to the existence of JBC-010 which, under the rules
circulation. It shall likewise be posted in the websites of the Supreme Court and the of statutory construction, bears great weight in that: 1] it covers any complaint or
Judicial and Bar Council. opposition; 2] it employs the mandatory term, shall; and 3] most importantly, it
speaks of the very essence of due process. While JBC-010 does not articulate a
The candidates, as well as their oppositors, shall be separately notified of the date procedure that entails a trial-type hearing, it affords an applicant, who faces any
and place of the interview. complaint or opposition, the right to answer the accusations against him. This
constitutes the minimum requirements of due process.
SECTION 5. The interviews shall be conducted in public. During the interview, only
the members of the Council can ask questions to the candidate. Among other things, Application to Jardelezas Case
the candidate can be made to explain the complaint or opposition against him.
Nearing the ultimate conclusion of this case, the Court is behooved to rule on
SECTION 6. After the interviews, the Judicial and Bar Council shall again meet in whether Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process in the events leading up
executive session for the final deliberation on the short list of candidates which shall to, and during, the vote on the shortlist last June 30, 2014.
be sent to the Office of the President as a basis for the exercise of the Presidential
power of appointment. [Emphases supplied] The JBC gives great weight and substance to the fact that it gave Jardeleza the
opportunity to answer the allegations against him. It underscores the fact that
Jardeleza was asked to attend the June 30, 2014 meeting so that he could shed light earlier time? Is not the Council empowered to take every possible step to verify the
on the issues thrown at him. During the said meeting, Chief Justice Sereno informed qualification of the applicants? It would not be amiss to state, at this point, that the
him that in connection with his candidacy for the position of Associate Justice of the confidential legal memorandum used in the invocation of the unanimity rule was
Supreme Court, the Council would like to propound questions on the following issues actually addressed to Jardeleza, in his capacity as Solicitor General. Safe to assume
raised against him: 1] his actuations in handling an international arbitration case not is his knowledge of the privileged nature thereof and the consequences of its
compatible with public interest;48 2] reports on his extra-marital affair in SMC; and indiscriminate release to the public. Had he been privately informed of the
3] alleged insider trading which led to the show cause order from the Philippine allegations against him based on the document and had he been ordered to respond
Stock Exchange.49cralawred thereto in the same manner, Jardelezas right to be informed and to explain himself
would have been satisfied.
As Jardeleza himself admitted, he declined to answer or to explain his side, as he
would not want to be lulled into waiving his rights. Instead, he manifested that his What precisely set off the protest of lack of due process was the circumstance of
statement be put on record and informed the Council of the then pendency of his requiring Jardeleza to appear before the Council and to instantaneously provide
letter-petition with the Court en banc. When Chief Justice Sereno informed Jardeleza those who are willing to listen an intelligent defense. Was he given the opportunity
that the Council would want to hear from him on the three (3) issues against him, to do so? The answer is yes, in the context of his physical presence during the
Jardeleza reasoned out that this was precisely the issue. He found it irregular that he meeting. Was he given a reasonable chance to muster a defense? No, because he
was not being given the opportunity to be heard per the JBC rules. He asserted that was merely asked to appear in a meeting where he would be, right then and there,
a candidate must be given the opportunity to respond to the charges against him. subjected to an inquiry. It would all be too well to remember that the allegations of
He urged the Chief Justice to step down from her pedestal and translate the his extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading sprung up only during the June 30,
objections in writing. Towards the end of the meeting, the Chief Justice said that both 2014 meeting. While the said issues became the object of the JBC discussion on June
Jardelezas written and oral statements would be made part of the record. After 16, 2014, Jardeleza was not given the idea that he should prepare to affirm or deny
Jardeleza was excused from the conference, Justice Lagman suggested that the his past behavior. These circumstances preclude the very idea of due process in
voting be deferred, but the Chief Justice ruled that the Council had already which the right to explain oneself is given, not to ensnare by surprise, but to provide
completed the process required for the voting to proceed. the person a reasonable opportunity and sufficient time to intelligently muster his
response. Otherwise, the occasion becomes an idle and futile exercise.
After careful calibration of the case, the Court has reached the determination that
the application of the unanimity rule on integrity resulted in Jardelezas Needless to state, Jardelezas grievance is not an imagined slight but a real rebuff of
deprivation of his right to due process. his right to be informed of the charges against him and his right to answer the same
with vigorous contention and active participation in the proceedings which would
As threshed out beforehand, due process, as a constitutional precept, does not ultimately decide his aspiration to become a magistrate of this Court.
always and in all situations require a trial-type proceeding. Due process is satisfied
when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to Consequences
explain or defend himself.50 Even as Jardeleza was verbally informed of the
invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009 against him and was later asked to To write finis to this controversy and in view of the realistic and practical fruition of
explain himself during the meeting, these circumstances still cannot expunge an the Courts findings, the Court now declares its position on whether or not Jardeleza
immense perplexity that lingers in the mind of the Court. What is to become of the may be included in the shortlist, just in time when the period to appoint a member
procedure laid down in JBC-010 if the same would be treated with indifference and of the Court is about to end.
disregard? To repeat, as its wording provides, any complaint or opposition against a
candidate may be filed with the Secretary within ten (10) days from the publication The conclusion of the Court is hinged on the following pivotal
of the notice and a list of candidates. Surely, this notice is all the more conspicuous points:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
to JBC members. Granting ex argumenti, that the 10-day period51 is only applicable
to the public, excluding the JBC members themselves, this does not discount the fact There was a misapplication of the unanimity rule under Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-
that the invocation of the first ground in the June 5, 2014 meeting would have raised 009 as to Jardelezas legal strategy in handling a case for the government.
procedural issues. To be fair, several members of the Council expressed their
concern and desire to hear out Jardeleza but the application of JBC-010 did not form While Jardelezas alleged extra-marital affair and acts of insider trading fall within
part of the agenda then. It was only during the next meeting on June 16, 2014, that the contemplation of a question on integrity and would have warranted the
the Council agreed to invite Jardeleza, by telephone, to a meeting that would be held application of the unanimity rule, he was not afforded due process in its
on the same day when a resource person would shed light on the matter. application.

Assuming again that the classified nature of the ground impelled the Council to The JBC, as the sole body empowered to evaluate applications for judicial posts,
resort to oral notice instead of furnishing Jardeleza a written opposition, why did the exercises full discretion on its power to recommend nominees to the President. The
JBC not take into account its authority to summon Jardeleza in confidence at an
sui generis character of JBC proceedings, however, is not a blanket authority to requirement. While an oppositor-member can recuse himself or herself, still the
disregard the due process under JBC-010. probability of annulling the majority vote of the Council is quite high.

Jardeleza was deprived of his right to due process when, contrary to the JBC rules, he Second, integrity as a ground has not been defined. While the initial impression is
was neither formally informed of the questions on his integrity nor was provided a that it refers to the moral fiber of a candidate, it can be, as it has been, used to
reasonable opportunity to prepare his defense. mean other things. In fact, the minutes of the JBC meetings in this case reflect the
lack of consensus among the members as to its precise definition. Not having been
With the foregoing, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been defined or described, it is vague, nebulous and confusing. It must be distinctly
included in the shortlist submitted to the President for the vacated position of specified and delineated.
Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose not from the unconstitutionality of
Section 2, Rule 10 of JBC-009, per se, but from the violation by the JBC of its own Third, it should explicitly provide who can invoke it as a ground against a candidate.
rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process. By no means does the Court Should it be invoked only by an outsider as construed by the respondent Executive
intend to strike down the unanimity rule as it reflects the JBCs policy and, Secretary or also by a member?
therefore, wisdom in its selection of nominees. Even so, the Court refuses to turn a
blind eye on the palpable defects in its implementation and the ensuing treatment Fourth, while the JBC vetting proceedings is sui generis and need not be formal or
that Jardeleza received before the Council. True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a trial type, they must meet the minimum requirements of due process. As always, an
nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed to observe applicant should be given a reasonable opportunity and time to be heard on the
the minimum requirements of due process. charges against him or her, if there are any.

In criminal and administrative cases, the violation of a partys right to due process At any rate, it is up to the JBC to fine-tune the rules considering the peculiar nature
raises a serious jurisdictional issue which cannot be glossed over or disregarded at of its function. It need not be stressed that the rules to be adopted should be fair,
will. Where the denial of the fundamental right of due process is apparent, a decision reasonable, unambiguous and consistent with the minimum requirements of due
rendered in disregard of that right is void for lack of jurisdiction.52 This rule may well process.
be applied to the current situation for an opposing view submits to an undue
relaxation of the Bill of Rights. To this, the Court shall not concede. As the branch of One final note.
government tasked to guarantee that the protection of due process is available to an
individual in proper cases, the Court finds the subject shortlist as tainted with a vice The Court disclaims that Jardelezas inclusion in the shortlist is an endorsement of
that it is assigned to guard against. Indeed, the invocation of Section 2, Rule 10 of his appointment as a member of the Court. In deference to the Constitution and his
JBC-009 must be deemed to have never come into operation in light of its erroneous wisdom in the exercise of his appointing power, the President remains the ultimate
application on the original ground against Jardelezas integrity. At the risk of being judge of a candidates worthiness.
repetitive, the Court upholds the JBCs discretion in the selection of nominees, but its
application of the unanimity rule must be applied in conjunction with Section 2, WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, it is hereby declared that
Rule 10 of JBC-010 being invoked by Jardeleza. Having been able to secure four (4) Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza is deemed INCLUDED in the shortlist submitted
out of six (6) votes, the only conclusion left to propound is that a majority of the to the President for consideration as an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court vice
members of the JBC, nonetheless, found Jardeleza to be qualified for the position of Associate Justice Roberto A. Abad.
Associate Justice and this grants him a rightful spot in the shortlist submitted to the
President. The Court further DIRECTS that the Judicial and Bar Council REVIEW, and ADOPT,
rules relevant to the observance of due process in its proceedings, particularly JBC-
Need to Revisit JBCs 009 and JBC-010, subject to the approval of the Court.
Internal Rules
This Decision is immediately EXECUTORY. Immediately notify the Office of the
In the Courts study of the petition, the comments and the applicable rules of the President of this Decision.
JBC, the Court is of the view that the rules leave much to be desired and should be
reviewed and revised. It appears that the provision on the unanimity rule is vague SO ORDERED.cralawlaw library
and unfair and, therefore, can be misused or abused resulting in the deprivation of
an applicants right to due process. Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., and Carpio, JJ., no part.
Primarily, the invocation of the unanimity rule on integrity is effectively a veto Villarama, Jr., J., on official leave.
power over the collective will of a majority. This should be clarified. Any assertion by Velasco, Jr., (Acting Chairperson), J., joins the dissent of J, Leonen.
a member after voting seems to be unfair because it effectively gives him or her a Leonardo-De Castro, J., please see my separate opinion concurring with the ponencia
veto power over the collective votes of the other members in view of the unanimous of Justice Mendoza and the separate opinion of Justice Brion.
Brion, J., pls. see separate concurring opinion. respondents full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an answer which,
Peralta, J., see separate opinon in corporating explanation of vote. nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court had committed a
Bersamin, J., also join the separate opinion of J. De castro & J. Brion. reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order reconsidering its
Del Castillo, J., I dissen on sole grground the decision may affect independence of previous order of dismissal of Salvadors complaint and in denying the motion to
JBC. reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on forgetfulness
Perlas-Bernabe, J., joins the dissent of J. Leonen. because of his other commitments. Whether it be the first or the second ground, the
Leonen, J., I dissent, see separate opinion. fact remains that the respondent did not comply with his duty to file an answer in
Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of diligence was compounded by his erroneous
belief that the trial court committed such error or grave abuse of discretion and by
FIRST DIVISION his continued refusal to file an answer even after he received the Court of Appeals
decision in the certiorari case. There is no showing whatsoever that he further
[Adm. Case No. 4103. September 7, 1995.] assailed the said decision before this Court in a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court to prove his claim of overzealousness to challenge the trial courts
VERONICA S. SANTIAGO, BENJAMIN Q. HONTIVEROS, MR. SOCORRO F. MANAS, and order. Neither was it shown that he alleged in his motion to lift the order of default
TRINIDAD NORDISTA, Complainants, v. ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS, Respondent. that the complainants had a meritorious defense. And, in his appeal from the
judgment by default, he did not even raise as one of the errors of the trial court
Amado R. Fojas for and in his own behalf. either the impropriety of the order of default or the courts grave abuse of discretion
in denying his motion to lift that order. Pressure and large volume of legal work
provide no excuse for the respondents inability to exercise due diligence in the
SYLLABUS performance of his duty to file an answer. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his
full attention diligence, skill, and competence, regardless of its importance and
whether he accepts it for a fee for free.
1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; LAWYERS; OWES FIDELITY TO CLIENTS CAUSE
AND MUST BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM. It is 3. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY THE FACT THAT THE CLIENTS CAUSE IS A
axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every LOSING CAUSE. The respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, Case No. 3526-V-91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the
subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he claims therein for damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and declaring the complainants act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal.
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve This claim is a mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the
the client with competence and diligence, and champion the latters cause with respondent was so convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion seasonably informed the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients Professional Responsibility expressly provides: A lawyer, when advising his client,
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be shall give a candid and honest opinion on the merits and probable results of the
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. This clients case, neither overstating nor understating the prospects of the case. Then
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why he
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded from an attorney, it is lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer simply delay the disposition of the civil case.
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession. DECISION

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT EXCUSED BY REASONS OF PRESSURE AND LARGE VOLUME
OF LEGAL WORK. In his motion for reconsideration of the default order, the DAVIDE, JR., J.:
respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly invoking
forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work, while in his
Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable neglect due In their letter of 8 September 1993, the complainants, former clients of the
to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. Certainly, respondent, pray that the latter be disbarred for "malpractice, neglect and other
"overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal work" on the offenses which may be discovered during the actual investigation of this complaint."
other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first presupposes the
They attached thereto an Affidavit of Merit wherein they specifically respectively, of the FEUFA. They allegedly expelled from the union Paulino Salvador.
allege:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library The latter then commenced with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a
complaint (NCR-OD-M-90-10-050) to declare illegal his expulsion from the union.
1. That we are Defendants-Appellates [sic] in the Court of Appeals Case No. CA-
G.N. CV No. 38153 of which to our surprise lost unnecessarily the aforesaid Petition In his resolution of 22 November 1990, Med-Arbiter Tomas Falconitin declared illegal
[sic]. A close perusal of the case reveals the serious misconduct of our attorney on Salvadors expulsion and directed the union and all its officers to reinstate
record, Atty. Amado Fojas tantamount to malpractice and negligence in the Salvadors name in the roll of union members with all the rights and privileges
performance of his duty obligation to us, to defend us in the aforesaid case. That the appurtenant thereto. This resolution was affirmed in toto by the Secretary of Labor
said attorney without informing us the reason why and riding high on the trust and and Employment.
confidence we repose on him either abandoned, failed to act accordingly, or
seriously neglected to answer the civil complaint against us in the sala of Judge Subsequently, Paulino Salvador filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Teresita Capulong Case No. 3526-V-91 Val. Metro Manila so that we were deduced Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172, a complaint against the complainants herein
[sic] in default. for actual, moral, and exemplary damages and attorneys fees, under Articles 19, 20,
and 21 of the Civil Code. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 3526-V-91.
2. That under false pretenses Atty. Fojas assured us that everything was in
order. That he had already answered the complaint so that in spite of the incessant As the complainants counsel, the respondent filed a motion to dismiss the said case
demand for him to give us a copy he continued to deny same to us. Only to disclose on grounds of (1) res judicata by virtue of the final decision of the Med-Arbiter in
later that he never answered it after all because according to him he was a very NCR-OD-M-90-10-050 and (2) lack of jurisdiction, since what was involved was an
busy man. Please refer to Court of Appeals decision dated August 17, 1993. intra-union issue cognizable by the DOLE. Later, he filed a supplemental motion to
dismiss.
3. That because of Atty. Amado Fojas neglect and malpractice of law we lost
the Judge Capulong case and our appeal to the Court of Appeals. So that it is only The trial court, per Judge Teresita Dizon-Capulong, granted the motion and ordered
proper that Atty. Fojas be disciplined and disbarred in the practice of his profession. the dismissal of the case. Upon Salvadors motion for reconsideration, however, it
reconsidered the order of dismissal, reinstated the case, and required the
In his Comment, the respondent admits his "mistake" in failing to file the complainants herein to file their answer within a non-extendible period of fifteen
complainants answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91, but he alleges that it was cured days from notice.
by his filing of a motion for reconsideration, which was unfortunately denied by the
court. He asserts that Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 was a "losing cause" for the Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a motion for reconsideration and
complainants because it was based on the expulsion of the plaintiff therein from the dismissal of the case. This motion having been denied, the respondent filed with this
Far Eastern University Faculty Association (FEUFA) which was declared unlawful in Court a petition for certiorari, which was later referred to the Court of Appeals and
the final decision in NCR-OD-M-90-10-050. Thus," [t]he unfavorable judgment in the docketed therein as CA-G.R. SP No. 25834.
Regional Trial Court is not imputable to [his] mistake but rather imputable to the
merits of the case, i.e., the decision in the Expulsion case wherein defendants Although that petition and his subsequent motion for reconsideration were both
(complainants herein) illegally removed from the union (FEUFA) membership Mr. denied, the respondent still did not file the complainants answer in Civil Case No.
Paulino Salvador. . . ." He further claims that the complainants filed this case to 3526-V-91. Hence, upon plaintiff Salvadors motion, the complainants were declared
harass him because he refused to share his attorneys fees in the main labor case he in default, and Salvador was authorized to present his evidence ex-parte.
had handled for them. The respondent then prays for the dismissal of this complaint
for utter lack of merit, since his failure to file the answer was cured and, even The respondent then filed a motion to set aside the order of default and to stop the
granting for the sake of argument that such failure amounted to negligence, it ex-parte reception of evidence before the Clerk of Court, but to no avail.
cannot warrant his disbarment or suspension from the practice of the law profession.
Thereafter, the trial court rendered a decision ordering the complainants herein to
The complainants filed a Reply to the respondents Comment. pay, jointly and severally, plaintiff Salvador the amounts of P200,000.00 as moral
damages; P50,000.00 as exemplary damages or corrective damages; and
Issues having been joined, we required the parties to inform us whether they were P65,000.00 as attorneys fees; plus cost of suit.
willing to submit this case for decision on the basis of the pleadings they have filed.
In their separate compliance, both manifested in the affirmative. The complainants, still assisted by the respondent, elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals, which, however, affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court.
The facts in this case are not disputed.
The respondent asserts that he was about to appeal the said decision to this Court,
Complainants Veronica Santiago, Benjamin Hontiveros, Ma. Socorro Manas, and but his services as counsel for the complainants and for the union were illegally and
Trinidad Nordista were the President, Vice-President, Treasurer, and Auditor, unilaterally terminated by complainant Veronica Santiago.
The core issue that presents itself is whether the respondent committed culpable Certainly, "overzealousness" on the one hand and "volume and pressure of legal
negligence, as would warrant disciplinary action, in failing to file for the work" on the other are two distinct and separate causes or grounds. The first
complainants an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91 for which reason the latter were presupposes the respondents full and continuing awareness of his duty to file an
declared in default and judgment was rendered against them on the basis of the answer which, nevertheless, he subordinated to his conviction that the trial court
plaintiffs evidence, which was received ex-parte. had committed a reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in issuing an order
reconsidering its previous order of dismissal of Salvadors complaint and in denying
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for every the motion to reconsider the said order. The second ground is purely based on
person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline employment, forgetfulness because of his other commitments.
1 subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Once he
agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and Whether it be the first or the second ground, the fact remains that the respondent
must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. 2 He must serve did not comply with his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V-91. His lack of
the client with competence and diligence, 3 and champion the latters cause with diligence was compounded by his erroneous belief that the trial court committed
wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. 4 Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion such error or grave abuse of discretion and by his continued refusal to file an answer
to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his clients even after he received the Court of Appeals decision in the certiorari case. There is
rights, and the exertion of his utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be no showing whatsoever that he further assailed the said decision before this Court in
taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied. 5 This a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court to prove his claim of
simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and overzealousness to challenge the trial courts order. Neither was it shown that he
defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to alleged in his motion to lift the order of default that the complainants had a
assert every such remedy or defense. 6 If much is demanded from an attorney, it is meritorious defense. 10 And, in his appeal from the judgment by default, he did not
because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties even raise as one of the errors of the trial court either the impropriety of the order of
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer default or the courts grave abuse of discretion in denying his motion to lift that
who performs his duty with diligence and candor not only protects the interest of his order.
client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain
the respect of the community to the legal profession. 7 Pressure and large volume of legal work provide no excuse for the respondents
inability to exercise due diligence in the performance of his duty to file an answer.
The respondent admits that it was his duty to file an answer in Civil Case No. 3526-V- Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention diligence, skill, and
91. He justifies his failure to do so in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee for
free.
[I]n his overzealousness to question the Denial Order of the trial court, 8 [he]
instead, thru honest mistake and excusable neglect, filed a PETITION FOR All told, the respondent committed a breach of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
CERTIORARI with the Honorable Court, docketed as G.R. No. 100983. . . . Responsibility which requires him to serve his clients, the complainants herein, with
diligence and, more specifically, Rule 18.03 thereof which provides: "A lawyer shall
And, when the Court of Appeals, to which G.R. No. 100983 was referred, dismissed not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
the petition, he again "inadvertently" failed to file an answer" [d]ue to honest therewith shall render him liable."cralaw virtua1aw library
mistake and because of his overzealousness as stated earlier. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw
library The respondents negligence is not excused by his claim that Civil Case No. 3526-V-
91 was in fact a "losing cause" for the complainants since the claims therein for
In their Reply, the complainants allege that his failure to file an answer was not an damages were based on the final decision of the Med-Arbiter declaring the
honest mistake but was "deliberate, malicious and calculated to place them on the complainants act of expelling Salvador from the union to be illegal. This claim is a
legal disadvantage, to their damage and prejudice" for, as admitted by him in his mere afterthought which hardly persuades us. If indeed the respondent was so
motion to set aside the order of default, his failure to do so was "due to volume and convinced of the futility of any defense therein, he should have seasonably informed
pressure of legal work." 9 In short, the complainants want to impress upon this Court the complainants thereof. Rule 15.05, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
that the respondent has given inconsistent reasons to justify his failure to file an Responsibility expressly provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
answer.
A lawyer, when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest opinion on the
We agree with the complainants. In his motion for reconsideration of the default merits and probable results of the clients case, neither overstating nor understating
order, the respondent explained his non-filing of the required answer by impliedly the prospects of the case.
invoking forgetfulness occasioned by a large volume and pressure of legal work,
while in his Comment in this case he attributes it to honest mistake and excusable Then too, if he were unconvinced of any defense, we are unable to understand why
neglect due to his overzealousness to question the denial order of the trial court. he took all the trouble of filing a motion to dismiss on the grounds of res judicata and
lack of jurisdiction and of questioning the adverse ruling thereon initially with this 3. ID.; INFORMATION PROFESSIONALLY OBTAINED BY ATTORNEY FROM CLIENT IS
Court and then with the Court of Appeals, unless, of course, he meant all of these to SACRED. Information so received is sacred to the employment to which it
simply delay the disposition of the civil case. Finally, the complainants were not pertains, and to permit it to be used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the
entirely without any valid or justifiable defense. They could prove that the plaintiff interest of the adverse party, is to strike at the element of confidence which lies at
was not entitled to all the damages sought by him or that if he were so, they could the basis of, and affords the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client.
ask for a reduction of the amounts thereof.
4. ID.; ID. The mere relation of attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney
We do not therefore hesitate to rule that the respondent is not free from any blame from accepting the opposite partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what
for the sad fate of the complainants. He is liable for inexcusable negligence. information was received by him from his first client.

WHEREFORE, ATTY. AMADO R. FOJAS is hereby REPRIMANDED and ADMONISHED to 5. ID.; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT IS FOUNDED ON PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
be, henceforth, more careful in the performance of his duty to his clients. POLICY. The relation of attorney and client is founded on principles of public
policy, on good taste. The question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties,
SO ORDERED. but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With
these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Ceasars wife, not only to keep
Padilla, Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur. inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
Attorneys fees / attorney-client relationship
6. ID.; RETAINING FEE, WHAT IS. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an
EN BANC attorney or counsel to insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act
for the client. It is intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being
[G.R. No. L-961. September 21, 1949.] retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of
receiving pay from him, and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express
BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, Petitioner, v. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. understanding to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the
FRANCISCO, JACOB ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, Respondents. services contemplated; its payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to
pay his attorney for the services which he has retained him to perform."cralaw
Delgado, Dizon & Flores for Petitioner. virtua1aw library

Vicente J. Francisco for Respondents. 7. ID.; INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM CLIENT BY A MEMBER OF THE FIRM. An
information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is
SYLLABUS information imparted to the firm.

1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; RELATION OF ATTORNEY AND CLIENT, WHEN EXISTS. 8. ID.; PROFESSIONAL CONFIDENCE, EXPIRATION OF. Professional confidence once
"To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment.
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not
necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for; 9. ID.; COURTS; JURISDICTION, EXTENT OF SUMMARY. The courts have summary
neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the jurisdiction to protect the rights of the parties and the public from any conduct of
case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business attorneys prejudicial to the administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the
affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity courts over attorneys is not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected
with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney by them but embraces authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may
voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional be incumbent upon them in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from
employment must be regarded as established . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library the general principles of equity and policy, will always look into the dealings
between attorneys and clients and guard the latter from any undue consequences
2. ID.; ATTORNEY IS INHIBITED TO ACT ON BEHALF OF BOTH PARTIES. There is no resulting from a situation in which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the
law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting attorneys in express terms from same principle whether the undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to
acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy whose interests are opposed to appear, to answer declaration.
each other, but such prohibition is necessarily implied in the injunctions as provided
in section 26 (e), Rule 123 and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 of the Rules of Court. 10. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; AS OFFICERS OF THE COURTS. Attorneys are officers of
the court where they practice, forming a part of the machinery of the law for the
administration of justice and as such subject to the disciplinary authority of the court
and to its orders and directions with respect to their relations to the court as well as "From the papers you submitted to me in connection with civil case No. 70075 of the
to their clients. Court of First Instance of Manila, entitled Blandina Gamboa Hilado v. S. J. Assad, I
find that the basic facts which brought about the controversy between you and the
defendant therein are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
DECISION
"(a) That you were the equitable owner of the property described in the
complaint, as the same was purchased and/or built with funds exclusively belonging
TUASON, J.: to you, that is to say, the houses and lot pertained to your paraphernal estate;

"(b) That on May 3, 1943, the legal title to the property was with your husband,
It appears that on April 23, 1945, Blandina Gamboa Hilado brought an action against Mr. Serafin P. Hilado; and
Selim Jacob Assad to annul the sale of several houses and lot executed during the
Japanese occupation by Mrs. Hilados now deceased husband. "(c) That the property was sold by Mr. Hilado without your knowledge on the
aforesaid date of May 3, 1943.
On May 14, Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita filed an answer on behalf of the
defendant; and on June 15, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and Rodrigo registered "Upon the foregoing facts, I am of the opinion that your action against Mr. Assad will
their appearance as counsel for the plaintiff. not ordinarily prosper. Mr. Assad had the right to presume that your husband had the
legal right to dispose of the property as the transfer certificate of title was in his
On October 5, these attorneys filed an amended complaint by including Jacob Assad name. Moreover, the price of P110,000 in Japanese military notes, as of May 3, 1943,
as party defendant. does not quite strike me as so grossly inadequate as to warrant the annulment of
the sale. I believe, lastly, that the transaction cannot be avoided merely because it
On January 28, 1946, Attorney Francisco entered his appearance as attorney of was made during the Japanese occupation, nor on the simple allegation that the real
record for the defendant in substitution for Attorneys Ohnick, Velilla and Balonkita purchaser was not a citizen of the Philippines. On this last point, furthermore, I
who had withdrawn from the case. expect that you will have great difficulty in proving that the real purchaser was other
than Mr. Assad, considering that death has already sealed your husbands lips and
On May 29, Attorney Dizon, in the name of his firm, wrote Attorney Francisco urging he cannot now testify as to the circumstances of the sale.
him to discontinue representing the defendants on the ground that their client had
consulted with him about her case, on which occasion, it was alleged, "she turned "For the foregoing reasons, I regret to advice you that I cannot appear in the
over the papers" to Attorney Francisco, and the latter sent her a written opinion. Not proceedings in your behalf. The records of the case you loaned to me are herewith
receiving any answer to this suggestion, Attorneys Delgado, Dizon, Flores and returned.
Rodrigo on June 3, 1946, filed a formal motion with the court, wherein the case was
and is pending, to disqualify Attorney Francisco. "Yours very truly,

Attorney Franciscos letter to plaintiff, mentioned above and identified as Exhibit A, (Sgd.) "VICENTE J. FRANCISCO."cralaw virtua1aw library
is in full as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"VJF/Rag.
"VICENTE J. FRANCISCO
In his answer to plaintiffs attorneys complaint, Attorney Francisco alleged that
"Attorney-at-Law about May, 1945, a real estate broker came to his office in connection with the legal
separation of a woman who had been deserted by her husband, and also told him
1462 Estrada, Manila (Francisco) that there was a pending suit brought by Mrs. Hilado against a certain
Syrian to annul the sale of a real estate which the deceased Serafin Hilado had made
"July 13, 1945 to the Syrian during the Japanese occupation; that this woman asked him if he was
willing to accept the case if the Syrian should give it to him; that he told the woman
"Mrs. Blandina Gamboa Hilado that the sales of real property during the Japanese regime were valid even though it
was paid for in Japanese military notes; that this being his opinion, he told his visitor
"Manila, Philippines he would have no objection to defending the Syrian;

"My dear Mrs. Hilado:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph That one month afterwards, Mrs. Hilado came to see him about a suit she had
instituted against a certain Syrian to annul the conveyance of a real estate which
her husband had made; that according to her the case was in the hands of Attorneys
Delgado and Dizon, but she wanted to take it away from them; that as he had known following rules accord with the ethics of the legal profession and meet with our
the plaintiffs deceased husband he did not hesitate to tell her frankly that hers was approval:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
a lost case for the same reason he had told the broker; that Mrs. Hilado retorted that
the basis of her action was not that the money paid her husband was Japanese "In order to constitute the relation (of attorney and client) a professional one and not
military notes, but that the premises were her private and exclusive property; that merely one of principal and agent, the attorneys must be employed either to give
she requested him to read the complaint to be convinced that this was the theory of advice upon a legal point, to prosecute or defend an action in court of Justice, or to
her suit; that he then asked Mrs. Hilado if there was a Torrens title to the property prepare and draft, in legal form such papers as deeds, bills, contracts and the like."
and she answered yes, in the name of her husband; that he told Mrs. Hilado that if (Atkinson v. Howlett, 11 Ky. Law Rep. (abstract), 364, cited in Vol. 88, A. L. R., p. 6.)
the property was registered in her husbands favor, her case would not prosper
either; "To constitute professional employment it is not essential that the client should have
employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion . . . It is not
That some days afterward, upon arrival at his law office on Estrada street, he was necessary that any retainer should have been paid, promised, or charged for;
informed by Attorney Federico Agrava, his assistant, that Mrs. Hilado had dropped in neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the
looking for him and that when he, Agrava, learned that Mrs. Hilados visit concerned case about which the consultation was had. If a person, in respect to his business
legal matters he attended to her and requested her to leave the "expediente" which affairs or troubles of any kind, consults with his attorney in his professional capacity
she was carrying, and she did; that he told Attorney Agrava that the firm should not with the view to obtaining professional advice or assistance, and the attorney
handle Mrs. Hilados case and he should return the papers, calling Agravas attention voluntarily permits or acquiesces in such consultation, then the professional
to what he (Francisco) already had said to Mrs. Hilado; employment must be regarded as established . . ." (5 Jones Commentaries on
Evidence, pp. 4118-4119.)
That several days later, the stenographer in his law office, Teofilo Ragodon, showed
him a letter which has been dictated in English by Mr. Agrava, returning the "An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
"expediente" to Mrs. Hilado; that Ragodon told him (Attorney Francisco) upon lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his clients preliminary statement of
Attorney Agravas request that Agrava thought it more proper to explain to Mrs. his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
Hilado the reasons why her case was rejected; that he forthwith signed the letter clients pleadings, or advocating his clients cause in open court." (Denver Tramway
without reading it and without keeping it for a minute in his possession; that he Co. v. Owens, 20 Colo., 107; 36 P., 848.)
never saw Mrs. Hilado since their last meeting until she talked to him at the Manila
Hotel about a proposed extrajudicial settlement of the case; "Formality is not an essential element of the employment of an attorney. The
contract may be express or implied and it is sufficient that the advice and assistance
That in January, 1946, Assad was in his office to request him to handle his case of the attorney is sought and received, in matters pertinent to his profession. An
stating that his American lawyer had gone to the States and left the case in the acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting in
hands of other attorneys; that he accepted the retainer and on January 28, 1946, behalf of his client in pursuance of a request by the latter." (7 C. J. S., 848- 849; see
entered his appearance. Hirach Bros. & Co. v. R. E. Kennington Co., 88 A. L. R., 1.)

Attorney Francisco filed an affidavit of stenographer Ragodon in corroboration of his Section 26 (e), Rule 123 of the Rules of Court provides that "an attorney cannot,
answer. without the consent of his client, be examined as to any communication made by
the client to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of professional
The judge trying the case, Honorable Jose Gutierrez David, later promoted to the employment;" and section 19 (e) of Rule 127 imposes upon an attorney the duty "to
Court of Appeals, dismissed the complaint. His Honor believed that no information maintain inviolate the confidence, and at every peril to himself, to preserve the
other than that already alleged in plaintiffs complaint in the main cause was secrets of his client." There is no law or provision in the Rules of Court prohibiting
conveyed to Attorney Francisco, and concluded that the intercourse between the attorneys in express terms from acting on behalf of both parties to a controversy
plaintiff and the respondent did not attain the point of creating the relation of whose interests are opposed to each other, but such prohibition is necessarily
attorney and client. implied in the injunctions above quoted. (In re De la Rosa, 27 Phil., 258.) In fact the
prohibition derives validity from sources higher than written laws and rules. As has
Stripped of disputed details and collateral matters, this much is undoubted: That been aptly said in In re Merron, 22 N. M., 252, L.R.A., 1917B, 378, "information so
Attorney Franciscos law firm mailed to the plaintiff a written opinion over his received is sacred to the employment to which it pertains," and "to permit it to be
signature on the merits of her case; that this opinion was reached on the basis of used in the interest of another, or, worse still, in the interest of the adverse party, is
papers she had submitted at his office; that Mrs. Hilados purpose in submitting to strike at the element of confidence which lies at the basis of, and affords the
those papers was to secure Attorney Franciscos professional services. Granting the essential security in, the relation of attorney and client."cralaw virtua1aw library
facts to be no more than these, we agree with petitioners counsel that the relation
of attorney and client between Attorney Francisco and Mrs. Hilado ensued. The That only copies of pleadings already filed in court were furnished to Attorney
Agrava and that, this being so, no secret communication was transmitted to him by
the plaintiff, would not vary the situation even if we should discard Mrs. Hilados administration of justice." (John H. Wigmores Evidence, 1923, Sections 2285, 2290,
statement that other papers, personal and private in character, were turned in by 2291.)
her. Precedents are at hand to support the doctrine that the mere relation of
attorney and client ought to preclude the attorney from accepting the opposite Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
partys retainer in the same litigation regardless of what information was received by attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern
him from his first client. rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
"The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client unprofessional practice. (Strong v. Int. Bldg., etc.; Assn, 183 Ill., 97; 47 L.R.A., 792.)
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the clients opponent applies equally even It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As has been said in
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as
was revealed to the attorney by the client." (Christian v. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional standard. With these
Hawaii, 533, Footnote 7, C.J. S., 828.) thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesars wife, not only to keep inviolate
the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-
"Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party, in litigation, had dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
formerly represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney
acquired from his former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the So without impugning respondents good faith, we nevertheless can not sanction his
attorney to represent the adverse party." (Brown v. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F. taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who had sought and obtained legal
994.) . advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent any injustice to the plaintiff but
to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of the courts and of the bar. Without
"In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former condemning the respondents conduct as dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do
client, it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the believe that upon the admitted facts it is highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to
former clients affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the bring the profession, of which he is a distinguished member, "into public disrepute
subsequent litigation on the attorneys knowledge thereof." (Body v. Second Judicial and suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice."cralaw virtua1aw library
Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
There is in legal practice what is called "retaining fee," the purpose of which stems
"This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on from the realization that the attorney is disabled from acting as counsel for the other
terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in side after he has given professional advice to the opposite party, even if he should
the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he decline to perform the contemplated services on behalf of the latter. It is to prevent
acquired no knowledge which could operate to his clients disadvantage in the undue hardship on the attorney resulting from the rigid observance of the rule that a
subsequent adverse employment. Pierce v. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl., 201, separate and independent fee for consultation and advice was conceived and
Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.) authorized. "A retaining fee is a preliminary fee given to an attorney or counsel to
insure and secure his future services, and induce him to act for the client. It is
Communications between attorney and client are, in a great number of litigations, a intended to remunerate counsel for being deprived, by being retained by one party,
complicated affair, consisting of entangled relevant and irrelevant, secret and well of the opportunity of rendering services to the other and of receiving pay from him,
known facts. In the complexity of what is said in the course of the dealings between and the payment of such fee, in the absence of an express understanding to the
an attorney and a client, inquiry of the nature suggested would lead to the contrary, is neither made nor received in payment of the services contemplated; its
revelation, in advance of the trial, of other matters that might only further prejudice payment has no relation to the obligation of the client to pay his attorney for the
the complainants cause. And the theory would be productive of other unsalutary services which he has retained him to perform." (7 C.J.S., 1019.)
results. To make the passing of confidential communication a condition precedent; i.
e., to make the employment conditioned on the scope and character of the The defense that Attorney Agrava wrote the letter Exhibit A and that Attorney
knowledge acquired by an attorney in determining his right to change sides, would Francisco did not take the trouble of reading it, would not take the case out of the
not enhance the freedom of litigants, which is to be sedulously fostered, to consult interdiction. If this letter was written under the circumstances explained by Attorney
with lawyers upon what they believe are their rights in litigation. The condition Francisco and he was unaware of its contents, the fact remains that his firm did give
would of necessity call for an investigation of what information the attorney has Mrs. Hilado a formal professional advice from which, as heretofore demonstrated,
received and in what way it is or it is not in conflict with his new position. Litigants emerged the relation of attorney and client. This letter binds and stops him in the
would in consequence be wary in going to an attorney, lest by an unfortunate turn of same manner and to the same degree as if he personally had written it. An
the proceeding, if an investigation be held, the court should accept the attorneys information obtained from a client by a member or assistant of a law firm is
inaccurate version of the facts that came to him. "Now the abstinence from seeking information imparted to the firm. (6 C. J., 628; 7 C. J. S., 986.) This is not a mere
legal advice in a good cause is by hypothesis an evil which is fatal to the fiction or an arbitrary rule; for such member or assistant, as in our case, not only
acts in the name and interest of the firm, but his information, by the nature of his
connection with the firm is available to his associates or employers. The rule is all
the more to be adhered to where, as in the present instance, the opinion was DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
actually signed by the head of the firm and carries his initials intended to convey the
impression that it was dictated by him personally. No progress could be hoped for in For our resolution is the verified complaint, written in the vernacular and dated 21
"the public policy that the client in consulting his legal adviser ought to be free from August 2002, of siblings Shirley Loria Toledo and Rosie Loria Dajac against
apprehension of disclosure of his confidence," if the prohibition were not extended to respondent Judge Alfredo E. Kallos, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
the attorneys partners, employers or assistants. of Legazpi City, Branch 10, for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code.
The fact that petitioner did not object until after four months had passed from the
date Attorney Francisco first appeared for the defendants does not operate as a Prior to his appointment as a judge in March 1995,1 Judge Kallos was complainants'
waiver of her right to ask for his disqualification. In one case, objection to the counsel of record in Civil Case No. 4879 filed with the RTC of Legazpi City, Branch 4,
appearance of an attorney was allowed even on appeal as a ground for reversal of involving the recovery of hereditary shares with damages. On 25 March 1979, a
the judgment. In that case, in which throughout the conduct of the cause in the judgment was rendered ordering the defendants to, among other things, turn over to
court below the attorney had been suffered so to act without objection, the court herein complainants, the plaintiffs therein, the possession and ownership of the total
said: "We are all of the one mind, that the right of the appellee to make his objection area of 4,514 square meters of "lot 2082 Albay Cadastre." On appeal, the decision
has not lapsed by reason of failure to make it sooner; that professional confidence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals and became final and executory on 16
once reposed can never be divested by expiration of professional employment." December 1985.2
(Nickels v. Griffin, 1 Wash. Terr., 374, 321 A. L. R., 1316.)
Several years thereafter, or in February 2002, the respondent filed in the same
The complaint that petitioners remedy is by appeal and not by certiorari deserves action, Civil Case No. 4879, before the RTC of Legazpi, Branch 4, an Omnibus
scant attention. The courts have summary jurisdiction to protect the rights of the Motion3 praying, inter alia, for the issuance an order constituting in his favor an
parties and the public from any conduct of attorneys prejudicial to the attorney's lien to the extent of one-third over the lot awarded in favor of the
administration of justice. The summary jurisdiction of the courts over attorneys is complainants representing his attorney's fee. He based his motion on a written
not confined to requiring them to pay over money collected by them but embraces contingency agreement on attorney's fees for professional services rendered
authority to compel them to do whatever specific acts may be incumbent upon them whereby he is entitled to one-third share of what would be awarded to the
in their capacity of attorneys to perform. The courts, from the general principles of complainants. He claimed that this agreement had already been implemented when
equity and policy, will always look into the dealings between attorneys and clients "one of the three (3) lots levied upon by the sheriff to answer for the award of
and guard the latter from any undue consequences resulting from a situation in damages was given to (him) as his one-third share while the other two lots went to
which they may stand unequal. The courts act on the same principle whether the the plaintiffs as their two-third share - [as] evidenced by the Definite Deed of Sale
undertaking is to appear, or, for that matter, not to appear, to answer declaration, and Transfer Certificate of Titles Nos. T-77728, T-77458 and T-77459." However, he
etc. (6 C.J., 718; 7 C.J.S., 1005.) This summary remedy against attorneys flows from misplaced a copy of said written agreement.
the fact that they are officers of the court where they practice, forming a part of the
machinery of the law for the administration of justice and as such subject to the In the meantime, or on 5 September 2002, the complainants filed before this Court,
disciplinary authority of the court and to its orders and directions with respect to through the Office of the Court Administrator, the subject verified complaint. Here,
their relations to the court as well as to their clients. (Charest v. Bishop, 137 Minn., complainants pray for three things. First, they pray for an order directing the
102; 162, N.W., 1062, Note 26, 7 C. J. S., 1007.) Attorneys stand on the same footing respondent to stop demanding his "1/3 share attorney's fees." They assert that the
as sheriffs and other court officers in respect of matters just mentioned. respondent has no basis for his claim because he failed to show in court proof of the
alleged written contingency fee agreement. They also belie respondent's insistence
We conclude therefore that the motion for disqualification should be allowed. It is so in his Omnibus Motion that the said agreement had already been implemented
ordered, without costs. when, on execution, one of three lots levied upon by the sheriff was given to him as
his 1/3 share. They emphasize that all the lots levied by the sheriff were given to
Moran, C.J., Ozaeta, Paras, Feria, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes and Torres, JJ., them. However, the respondent "forced" them to sign a Deed of Absolute Sale on 16
concur. January 1990 involving a parcel of land valued in the document at P10,000, but
actually worth more than P500,000, in payment of his attorney's fees. While they did
not want to sign the document because respondent appeared in their case only
[A.M. NO. RTJ-05-1900 - January 28, 2005] during execution, they were constrained to do so for fear that something adverse
might happen to their case, as the respondent so warned them. The latter told them
SHIRLEY LORIA TOLEDO and ROSIE LORIA DAJAC, Complainants, v. JUDGE ALFREDO that they would not have won the case were it not for his services.
E. KALLOS, Respondent.
The complainants thus seek, as their second prayer, the recovery of the property
RESOLUTION involved in said Deed of Absolute Sale. They argue that pursuant to Article 1491(5)
of the Civil Code, lawyers are prohibited from buying their client's properties when he can be allowed only fair and reasonable attorney's fees under Canon 20 of the
the same are still the object of litigation. To prove that the respondent was still their Code of Professional Responsibility. As to this, the Court Administrator stated:
counsel when the sale took place, the complainants attached to their complaint the
Motion to Terminate Services dated 23 June 1994, which was based on respondent's On the question of whether respondent violated Article 1491(5) of the Civil Code, the
being remiss in his duties and responsibilities as their lawyer, and the Order of the Court Administrator found that this may be fairly resolved in an investigation, there
court dated 29 June 1994, approving the termination. being a factual dispute, and recommended that the complaint be referred to an
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals pursuant to Section 3, Rule 140 of the Rules
Third, the complainants pray for the removal of the respondent from his position as of Court. On the basis of this recommendation, we referred the matter to Associate
RTC judge for his alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge. Justice Jose Mendoza of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.
In his Comment dated 25 November 2002, the respondent denies the allegations
against him and asserts that he is only claiming what is due him. He vehemently
denies that he appeared in the case only during the execution stage, pointing to the In his Report,6 Justice Mendoza found that the respondent indeed represented the
Minutes of Hearing and the Order, both dated 05 October 1973, which show that he complainants in Civil Case No. 4879. Like the Court Administrator, he expresses the
entered his appearance as counsel for the complainants as early as 5 October 1973, view that the act of demanding attorney's fees for services rendered is not a ground
or two months after the complaint was filed. He continuously handled the case from for administrative sanction. He finds that when the respondent made the demand,
then on, as shown by copies of the minutes of the hearings and orders issued by the he did so as a lawyer who obtained a favorable judgment for his client, and not as a
RTC, until a favorable judgment was rendered on 25 March 1979 and the subject judge. As a lawyer, it is but just that he be fairly compensated for his services. And
properties were levied upon on execution to satisfy the judgment. He insists that he his filing of a claim for attorney's fees in Civil Case No. 4879 was an appropriate
was never remiss in the performance of his duties and responsibilities as legal remedy. Considering the pendency of such claim, Justice Mendoza recommends
complainants' counsel. the suspension of the determination of the instant administrative complaint until the
rendition of a final judicial ruling on the matter of respondent's attorney's fees; thus:
The respondent further alleges that the existence of the agreement on attorney's
fees was admitted by complainant Shirley Loria Toledo as evidenced by the order As the said issue is still being litigated in the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case No.
issued by the court on 01 March 2002, which states that Ms. Toledo came to the 4879, it is the view of the undersigned that the complaint is still premature '.
court informally informing it that she had a copy of the contract on attorney's fees.4
In other words, the complaint is not yet ripe for administrative evaluation. The
As regards the Deed of Absolute Sale, respondent admits that he was still hearing on the matter being conducted by the court below should be allowed to run
complainants' lawyer when the lot was transferred in his name. The lot was given to its course as that court is the appropriate forum for a ruling on the dispute'.
him by the complainants and their mother, pursuant to their written contingency
agreement, as his 1/3 share in the three parcels of land levied upon by the sheriff to 'To make a determination at this time on whether the respondent violated Article
settle the accrued rentals awarded in the second paragraph of the dispositive 1491 (A) would be to preempt the lower court in its resolution of the issue. Any
portion of the decision. He did not pay for it. The figure appearing on the document recommendation by the undersigned in this administrative case and subsequent
was written only to facilitate the transaction. He never compelled the complainants resolution by the Honorable Supreme Court on the matter would certainly affect or
and their mother to sell to him the parcel of land. Neither did he tell them that influence the thinking of the trial court before which the matter is pending. In such a
nothing would happen to their case without him. case, it will be unfair to either party. At any rate, the party who would feel aggrieved
might still elevate the decision to the higher courts.
Finally, the respondent asserts that his claim for attorney's fees is still being litigated
in Civil Case No. 4879. Thus, the instant complaint is premature. This recommendation is not without precedent. In the case of Spouses De Leon v.
Hon. Bonifacio, Adm. Case No. 4467, October 10, 1997, the then Deputy Court
In their Rejoinder dated 7 January 2003, the complainants insist that there is no Administrator, Hon. Reynaldo Suarez, recommended the dismissal of the case for
basis for respondent's claim for attorney's fees for the following reasons: (1) the being judicial in nature or, at least, premature'.
respondent failed to present the agreement on attorney's fees; (2) attorney's fees
were not awarded by the RTC or the Court of Appeals; and (3) Civil Case No. 4879 is In this case, the respondent is not being charged for his acts or decisions as a judge.
in its execution stage. Rather, he has been charged for dealing with the property of his client which is
prohibited by law. Nevertheless, the principle is the same, in that, the matter is still
After evaluating the pleadings submitted by the parties, the Court Administrator judicial in nature.
found5 that respondent was, indeed, complainants' counsel in Civil Case No. 4879,
and he should therefore be compensated for his services. The act of demanding We agree with Justice Mendoza.
payment for his attorney's fees is not a ground for administrative liability. However,
It is fundamental that a claim for attorney's fees may be asserted either in the very While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless,
action in which the services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action.7 is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. So, also, he
The respondent chose to file his claim for attorney's fees in the same case in which must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due. In
he served as counsel for the complainants. As mentioned, this is a proper remedy Albano v. Coloma, this Court has said:
under our jurisdiction and is preferred to an independent action as it avoids
multiplicity of suits. Besides, the right to recover attorney's fees is but an incident of "Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed
the case in which the services of counsel have been rendered. Moreover, the court for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill,
trying the case is to a certain degree already familiar with the nature and extent of acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and
the lawyer's services8 and is in a better position to decide the question of fees. energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt
on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after
Undisputably, respondent's claim for attorney's fees is under litigation. We find in putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he represents, he
the records an Order dated 7 January 2004 issued in Civil Case No. 4879 which himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid.
granted respondent's prayer for "1/3 share of attorney's fees in the proceeds of It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's
litigation" as claimed in his Omnibus Motion dated 14 February 2002. This Order is services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves
the subject of a motion for reconsideration by the complainants, as stated in condemnation."
respondent's Manifestation dated 24 January 20049 filed in the investigation
proceedings conducted by Justice Mendoza. Also part of the records is respondent's It should be stressed in this connection that the absence of a written contract will
Affidavit dated 1 December 2003, filed in the same investigation proceedings, not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship that justifies the
alluding to the complainants' filing of a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus in the collection of attorney's fees for professional services rendered. Documentary
Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 80090, seeking to reverse the Order of formalism is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the
the trial court denying complainants' Motion to Dismiss respondent's Omnibus contract may be express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the
Motion. advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent
to his profession.16 Hence, with or without a contingency agreement between the
We, therefore, find no cogent reason for us to resolve complainants' first two issues complainants and the respondent, the trial court must determine the propriety of
raised in the verified complaint, for they are inextricably inherent in the claim of the respondent's claim for attorney's fees and the reasonable amount thereof.
respondent in his Omnibus Motion, which is pending judicial determination. Since
respondent's claim for attorney's fees in the main case has not yet become final, the The third issue raised in the verified complaint deserves a short shrift. No evidence
objection of prematurity obtains, as a contrary holding may be preemptive of a final was presented to prove respondent's alleged abusive conduct unbecoming a judge.
judicial determination of factual and evidentiary matters inherent in the claim.10 The complainants do not dispute the fact that the respondent was not yet a judge
Clearly, the reliefs asked by the complainants are judicial in nature.11 And, if only for when the assailed action or conduct was allegedly committed by him. As such, and
an orderly administration of justice, the proceedings in Civil Case No. 4879 should be to that extent, there is no reason to bind him by the strict standards of the Code of
allowed to continue and take its course, and the claim of the respondent judicially Judicial Conduct for acts committed as counsel to a case prior to his appointment as
settled first. a judge.

But while we give deference to the wisdom of the trial court to initially decide WHEREFORE, the instant administrative complaint is DISMISSED for being premature
respondent's claim for attorney's fees, we deem it appropriate to reiterate certain and for lack of merit.
principles governing the payment of attorney's fees and impart our observations on
the instant claim. Foremost of these principles is that the act of demanding SO ORDERED.
attorney's fees for services rendered is not a ground for an administrative sanction.
On the contrary, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility allows lawyers Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
to charge fair and reasonable fees. As long as a lawyer honestly and in good faith
serves and represents the interest of the client, he should have a reasonable
compensation for his service.12 SECOND DIVISION

Lawyers are thus as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice on the part [G.R. No. 90983. September 27, 1991.]
of their clients as the clients are against abuses on the part of counsel. The duty of
the court is not only to see that lawyers act in a proper and lawful manner, but also LAW FIRM OF RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, JUDGE
to see that lawyers are paid their just and lawful fees.13 Thus, in J.K. Mercado and GENARO C. GINES, Presiding Judge of Branch XXVI, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial
Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. v. De Vera, 14 citing Albano v. Coloma,15 we Region, San Fernando, La Union, and BENGSON COMMERCIAL BUILDING, INC.,
stressed: Respondents.
Raymundo A. Armovit and Rafael R. Armovit for Petitioner.
Atty. Armovit then moved, apparently for the hearing of his motion to recognize
Pacifico C. Yadao for Private Respondent. attorneys lien, and thereafter, the trial court issued an order in the tenor as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SYLLABUS When this case was called for hearing on the petition to record attorneys charging
lien, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay appeared for the petitioners.

1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS FEES; CONTINGENT FEES; REASONABLE IN CASE Atty. Armovit informed the Court that they are withdrawing the petition considering
AT BAR. Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. It is true that attorneys fees that they are in the process of amicably settling their differences with the plaintiff,
must at all times be reasonable; however, we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for which manifestation was confirmed by Atty. Yadao as well as the plaintiffs, Romualdo
"twenty percent of all recoveries" to be reasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, Bengson and Brenda Bengson, who are present today.
(No. L-24163, April 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 1090), this Court awarded the agreed fees
amid the efforts of the client to deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel In view of this development, the petition to record attorneys charging lien, the same
vein, we are upholding Atty. Armovits claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the being in order and not contrary to law, morals and public policy, as prayed for by
contingent fee agreement amid the private respondents own endeavors to evade Attys. Armovit and Aglipay, it is hereby withdrawn. The parties, therefore are hereby
its obligations. directed to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.

SO ORDERED. 2
DECISION
However, upon the turnover of the money to the private respondent, Mrs. Brenda
Bengson (wife of Romualdo Bengzon) delivered to Atty. Armovit the sum of
SARMIENTO, J.: P300,000.00 only. Atty. Armovit protested and demanded the amount of P552,000.00
(twenty percent of P2,760,000.00), for which Mrs. Bengzon made assurances that he
will be paid the balance.
Before the Court is Atty. Raymundo Armovits claim for attorneys fees against the
private Respondent. On November 4, 1988, however, Atty. Armovit received an order emanating from the
trial court in the tenor as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
It appears that Atty. Armovit was engaged as counsel for the private respondent in a
complaint to have an extrajudicial foreclosure of certain properties by the During the hearing on the petition to record attorney s charging lien on October 11,
Government Service Insurance System declared null and void; that the parties 1988, Attys. Armovit and Aglipay withdrew their petition to record attorneys
allegedly agreed that the private respondent shall pay P15,000.00 as initial charging lien, which was duly approved by the Court, after which the Court directed
compensation and twenty percent in contingent fees; that after trial, the defunct the parties to comply faithfully with their respective obligations.
Court of First Instance rendered judgment annulling foreclosure and ordering the
Government Service Insurance System to restructure the private respondents loan; In compliance with the Order of this Court, the plaintiff submitted a pleading
that thereafter, the System appealed; that on appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed denominated as compliance alleging that petitioner (Atty. Armovit) has already
the decision of the lower court; and that the Appellate Courts judgment has since received from the plaintiff the sum of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency, as and by
attained finality. way of attorneys fees. With the receipt by the petitioner from the plaintiff of this
amount, the latter has faithfully complied with its obligation.
It also appears that when Atty. Armovit sought execution with the court a quo, he
was informed by Romualdo Bengzon, president of the respondent corporation, that WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court dated October 11, 1988 approving the
the firm had retained the services of Atty. Pacifico Yadao. He was also informed that withdrawal of the petition to record attorney s charging lien, on motion of the
the company would pay him the agreed compensation and that Atty. Yadaos fees petitioner, is now final.
were covered by a separate agreement. The private respondent, however, later
ignored his billings and over the phone, directed him allegedly not to take part in the SO ORDERED. 3
execution proceedings. Forthwith, he sought the entry of an attorneys lien in the
records of the case. The lower court allegedly refused to make the entry and on the Reconsideration having been denied, Atty. Armovit went to the Court of Appeals on a
contrary, issued an order ordering the Philippine National Bank to "release to the petition for certiorari and prohibition.
custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Bengzon and or Atty. Pacifico Yadao" 1 the sum of
P2,760,000.00 (ordered by the Court of Appeals as rentals payable by the
Government Service Insurance System).chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
On August 25, 1989, the Court of Appeals 4 rendered judgment dismissing the c.) the execution and signing of a final retainer agreement complete with all
petition. Reconsideration having been likewise denied by the Appellate Court, Atty. necessary details. 7
Armovit instituted the instant appeal.
(While the parties agreement speaks of "a final retainer agreement" 8 to be
Shortly thereafter, we required the private respondent to comment. executed later, it does not appear that the parties did enter into a "final" agreement
thereafter.)
The private respondent did not materially traverse Atty. Armovits chronicle of
events but added: that the private respondent hired the petitioner after the The private respondents version however is that while it may be true that the
Government Service Insurance System had answered and that it was Atty. Benjamin agreed compensation was twenty percent of all recoveries, the parties later agreed
Bernardino who prepared the complaint; that for his appearances, Atty. Armovit was on a compromise sum approved allegedly by the trial court, per its Order of October
paid a total of P108,000.00, not to mention "beach resort accommodations" ; 5 that 11, 1988.
Atty. Armovit did not inform the private respondent that the court had rendered
judgment which they would have appealed; that they lost an appeal on account of
Atty. Armovits indiscretion; that they forthwith engaged the services of another The Court is inclined to believe that Atty. Armovit never agreed on the compromise
lawyer, Atty. Yadao; and that it was the latter who prepared the brief in the Court of sum of P300,000.00. It is true that he did agree to withdraw his motion to annotate
Appeals (on GSISs appeal). attorneys lien, but because the parties were "in the process of amicably settling
their differences" 9 and not because Atty. Armovit had agreed to accept a lower
The private respondent also alleged that it opposed Atty. Armovits effort to record amount as full payment. There is nothing, on top of that, in Atty. Armovits
his attorneys lien on grounds of alleged nullity of the retainer agreement, Atty. manifestation that would suggest that he was accepting the sum of P300,000.00 as
Armovits negligence, and because of excessive fees demanded. The private agreed final payment, other than the fact that an agreement was supposedly
respondent also insisted that the retainer agreement was signed by only one of certain. We quote:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
seven directors, and it could not mind the corporation. Atty. Armovit, in any event,
had also been allegedly more than sufficiently compensated. ATTY. ARMOVIT:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The private respondent alleged that Atty. Armovit had been paid P300,000.00 an Your Honor, we would like to manifest in Court that we served notice to the counsel
amount approved by the court, and an amount he accepted and for which he is of the plaintiff, Bengson Commercial Building, a copy of the petition to record
allegedly estopped from claiming a higher amount. The order of the court has the attorneys charging lien, and together with the president of the corporation, Mr.
effect of res judicata, the private respondent claimed, as well as a compromise Romualdo Bengson, and his wife, Mrs. Brenda Bengson, we have discussed the
agreement which is immediately executory. problem and we all agreed to settle the matter amicably and as proof, and there is a
certainty that this settlement we have in principle agreed upon is an earnest one at
The disposition of the Court of Appeals was that since the receipt evidencing this time, this representation is withdrawing his petition to record charging lien.
payment to Atty. Armovit of the sum of P300,000.00 "was without any qualification
as advance or partial or incomplete," 6 the intention of the parties was that it ATTY. YADAO:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
was full payment. The Appellate Court also noted Atty. Armovits withdrawal of his
motion to record attorneys lien and figured that Atty. Armovit was satisfied with the No objection, Your Honor, because we have to agree with Atty. Armovit. I am in full
payment of P300,000.00.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red accord with this. 10

The only issue is whether or not Atty. Armovit is entitled to the sum of P252,000.00 There is nothing there that would indicate Atty. Armovits willingness to accept, in
more, in addition to the sum of P300,000.00 already paid him by the private fact, a lower figure in consideration of his withdrawal of his request to enter
Respondent. attorneys lien. What the Court takes his statement to mean is that he was
withdrawing his request on the certainty that the private respondent would pay him
There is no question that the parties had agreed on a compensation as the money, presumably, under more becoming circumstances.
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
The Court does not therefore see how the private respondent can hold Atty. Armovit
a) P15,000.00 by way of acceptance and study fee, payable within five (5) days to have been in estoppel.chanrobles law library : red
from date;
The fact that Atty. Armovit did not, after all, accept the sum of P300,000.00 as final
b) 20% contingent fee computed on the value to be recovered by favorable compensation is indeed indicated by the behavior of the private respondent, through
judgment in the cases; and Mrs. Romualdo Bengson, when she assured Atty. Armovit that the balance was
forthcoming. 11 According to Mrs. Bengson, she wished the rest of the Bengsons to
witness the final payment and when the occasion was present, wished for a agreement. It has been held that initial fees and fees paid in the progress of
postponement on account of "All Saints Day." 12 litigation are independent of the contingent fees. 17

The parties never therefore amended their original agreement, and what appears to That the retainer agreement was never approved by the board of the corporation is
the Court is a clear effort on the part of a client, with the apparent approval of the also a poor excuse because the fact of the matter is that the private respondent did
trial court, to renege on a valid agreement with its lawyer. deliver to Atty. Armovit the sum of P300,000.00 in partial payment, and the private
respondent can not now deny him the balance by alleging lack of authority of the
The Court believes that the trial court, in accepting the private respondents Bengson spouses.
"compliance" as a final payment of Atty. Armovits fees, was guilty of a grave abuse
of discretion. The private respondent had nothing with which to comply, and the Contingent fees are valid in this jurisdiction. 18 It is true that attorneys fees must at
parties, as manifested by Atty. Armovit, were "in the process [merely] of amicably all times be reasonable; 19 however, we do not find Atty. Armovits claim for "twenty
settling their differences." 13 percent of all recoveries" to be unreasonable. In the case of Aro v. Naawa, 20
decided in 1969, this Court awarded the agreed fees amid the efforts of the client to
It is apparent furthermore that the trial judge himself was out to deny Atty. Armovit deny him fees by terminating his services. In parallel vein, we are upholding Atty.
the agreed compensation. In his order of October 4, 1988, he Armovits claim for P252,000.00 more pursuant to the contingent fee agreement
commanded:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library amid the private respondents own endeavours to evade its obligations.

The PNB is hereby ordered and directed to release to the custody of Mr. Romualdo F. Several times, we have come down hard on erring practitioners. We will not however
Bengson and/or Atty. Pacifico Yadao, counsel for the plaintiff, the sum of Two Million be slow either, in coming to the rescue of aggrieved brother-lawyers in protecting
Seven Hundred Sixty Thousand Pesos (P2,760,000.00), Philippine Currency for the the integrity of the bar from unscrupulous litigants.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
satisfaction of the rentals of the Bengson Building against the GSIS. 14 chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

in spite of the fact that Atty. Armovit had remained the private respondents counsel WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is GRANTED. The private respondent
of record. It is fundamental that unless a lawyer has been validly discharged, his is ORDERED to pay the petitioner the sum of P252,000.00. Costs against the private
authority to act for his client continues and should be recognized by the court. 15 Respondent.

The fact that the receipt evidencing payment by the private respondent of the IT IS SO ORDERED.
amount of P300,000.00 "was without any qualification as advance or partial or
incomplete," 16 as the Court of Appeals noted and the Court of Appeals took to Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Regalado, JJ., concur.
mean "full payment", will not weaken Atty. Armovits demand for the balance. There
is nothing in that receipt that will suggest that it was full payment either, and the
fact that Atty. Armovit accepted it does not mean that he was satisfied that it was THIRD DIVISION
final payment. The fact of the matter is that the private respondent had assured him
that the balance was forthcoming. [G.R. No. 91958. January 24, 1991.]

The private respondent can not justifiably downplay Atty. Armovit as negligent (for WILFREDO D. LICUDAN and CRISTINA LICUDAN-CAMPOS, Petitioners, v. THE
failing to appeal) or his demand for fees excessive (that he had been paid enough). HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and ATTY. TEODORO O. DOMALANTA, Respondents.
Atty. Armovit, after all, succeeded in obtaining a favorable decision for his client, and
although his prayer for various damages were denied, he succeeded in obtaining a Arnold V . Guerrero & Associates, for Petitioners.
substantial award (P1,900,000.00 in unpaid rentals) for his client. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals sustained his theory. It should be noted that the private respondent Teodoro O. Domalanta for and on his behalf as private Respondent.
had in fact stood to lose substantial properties on foreclosure Atty. Armovit not
only restored to the private respondent its foreclosed properties, he succeeded in
having the private respondents loans restructured and the Government Service DECISION
Insurance System pay rentals. No client can ask a better result from a
lawyer.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Obviously, the private respondents effort to downgrade Atty. Armovits performance
is a wild, if not cheap, shot of a client out to evade its obligations to its lawyer. The
fact that Atty. Armovit may have been paid substantially (in initial fees) while the The practice of law is a profession rather than trade. Courts must guard against the
case was dragging is no justification for denying him the full amount under their charging of unconscionable and excessive fees by lawyers for their services when
engaged as counsel. Whether or not the award of attorneys fees in this case is c) And that all damages accruing to plaintiffs to be paid by the defendant is for
reasonable, being in the nature of contingent fees, is the principal issue. the undersigned counsel." (Annex "H" of the Petition, Rollo, p. 54)

This petition for renew on certiorari assails:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library On September 19, 1979, the trial court handling Civil Case No. Q-12254 ordered the
annotation at the back of TCT No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City of the
1) The Decision of the public respondent dated September 12, 1989 which respondent lawyers Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 signed
dismissed the petitioners appeal thereby upholding the reasonableness of the by petitioner Wifredo Licudan and Aurelio Licudan on his own behalf and on behalf of
respondent lawyers lien as attorneys fees over the properties of his clients; and his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos. The said trial courts Order, being
one of two Orders being essentially challenged in this petition, is reproduced
2) The Resolution of the public respondent dated January 30, 1990 which below:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
"Before the court for consideration is a Petition for Attorneys Lien filed by Atty.
The grounds relied upon by the petitioners are as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Teodoro D. Domalanta, counsel for the plaintiff, praying that his attorneys fees be
annotated as a lien at the back of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register
"The respondent Court, in upholding the entitlement of private respondent-attorney of Deeds of Quezon City, subject matter of this case.
on the attorneys fees he claimed, decided the question in a manner not in accord
with law or with the applicable decisions of this Honorable Tribunal. For the protection of the plaintiffs, the court required the plaintiff Aurelio Licudan as
well as his son to appear this morning. Plaintiff Aurelio Licudan together with his son
"The respondent Court, in refusing to renew and determine the propriety, Wilfredo Licudan, who appears to be intelligent and in fact he speaks (the) English
reasonableness and validity of the attorneys fees claimed by the private language well, appeared. Both Aurelio and Wilfredo Licudan manifested that they
respondent-attorney, departed from the usual course of judicial have freely and voluntarily signed the Contract for Professional Services, dated
proceedings.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red August 30, 1979 and notarized before Notary Public Amado Garrovillas as Doc. No.
32, Page 8, Book No. XIX, Series of 1979.
"The respondent Court, in failing to declare the attorneys fees claimed by the private
respondent-attorney as unconscionable, excessive, unreasonable, immoral and Considering the manifestation of plaintiff, Aurelio Licudan and Alfredo (sic) Licudan
unethical, decided the question in a way not in accord with law and with applicable that they have entered freely and voluntarily in the said contract of professional
decisions of this Honorable Tribunal." (Petition, pp. 12-13; Rollo, pp. 16-17) services, let the same be annotated at the back of TCT 818 of the Register of Deeds
of Quezon City, upon payment of the required legal fees." (CA Decision, pp. 7-8;
The following are the antecedent facts pertinent to the case at bar:chanrob1es Rollo, pp. 36-37)
virtual 1aw library
The Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 differs from the earlier
The respondent lawyer was retained as counsel by his brother-in-law and sister, the contractual provisions in that it entitled the respondent lawyer to one-third (1/3) of
now deceased petitioners parents, spouses Aurelio and Felicidad Licudan. His the subject property or 90.5 square meters and provided for usufructuary rights over
services as counsel pertained to two related civil cases docketed as Civil Case No. Q- the entire lot in question in favor of the respondent lawyers son, Teodoro M.
12254 for partition and Civil Case No. Q-28655 for a sum of money in connection Domalanta, Jr. for an agreed consideration. (Annex "J" of the Petition; Rollo, p. 59)
with the redemption of the property subject matter of the two cases covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 818 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. In both On July 25, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion ex parte to amend the Order
cases, the respondent lawyer obtained a judgment in favor of his clients. dated September 19, 1979 so as to conform with an additional professional fee
covering 31 square meters more of the lot for services rendered in Civil Case No. Q-
On August 13, 1979, the respondent lawyer filed a Petition for Attorneys Lien with 28655 as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 executed by
Notification to his Clients which substantially alleged that his clients executed two Aurelio Licudan in favor of the respondent lawyer.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
written contracts for professional services in his favor which provided
that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph On September 6, 1985, the trial court ordered the respondent lawyer to submit a
subdivision plan in conformity with his attorneys fees contract under which one-
"a) The undersigned counsel is entitled to own 97.5 square meters of the third (1/3) of the property or 90.5 square meters was alloted to him.
plaintiffs share of the lot in question.
On September 23, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration
b) The undersigned counsel shall have a usufructuary right for a period of ten praying for the amendment of the Order dated September 19, 1979 to conform with
(10) years of plaintiffs share of the lot in question. the Deed of Absolute Sale dated May 1, 1983 which was executed after the
annotation of the original attorneys lien of 90.5 square meters.
On September 30, 1985, the trial court denied the motion on the ground that the "WHEREFORE, this Court has no alternative but to set aside its orders of 29 August
respondent lawyer cannot collect attorneys fees for other cases in the action for 1986 and 3 October 1986 and declare its Orders of 19 September 1979 and 21
partition. October 1985 irrevocably final and executory." (CA Decision, p. 5; Rollo, p. 34)

On October 4, 1985, the respondent lawyer filed a second motion for reconsideration On Appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondent lawyer by
of the Order dated September 6, 1985 explaining that what he sought to be included dismissing the appeal and the prayed for writ of preliminary injunction. Their
in the Order dated September 19, 1979 is the additional attorneys fees for handling subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, the petitioners filed the
the redemption case which was but a mere of offshoot of the partition case and instant petition.
further manifesting that the additional 31 square meters as compensation for the
redemption case must be merged with the 90.5 square meters for the partition case
to enable the said respondent lawyer to comply with the Order dated September 6, The petitioners fault the respondent Court for its failure to exercise its inherent
1985 which directed him to submit a subdivision plan as required. power to review and determine the propriety of the stipulated attorneys fees in
favor of the respondent lawyer and accuse the respondent lawyer of having
On October 21, 1985, the trial court issued the second Order being assailed in this committed an unfair advantage or legal fraud by virtue of the Contract for
petition. The said Order reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph Professional Services devised by him after the trial court awarded him attorneys
fees for P1,000.00 only instead of respecting the trust and confidence of the highest
"Acting on the Second Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Teodoro Domalanta level reposed on him considering the close blood and affinal relationship between
and finding the same to be justified, let an attorneys lien be annotated in the title of him and his clients.
the property for 31 square meters as attorneys fees of said Atty. Teodoro Domalanta
in addition to the original 90.5 square meters." (CA Decision, p. 8; Rollo, p. 37) The petitioners contend that under the award for professional services, they may
have won the case but would lose the entire property won in litigation to their uncle-
On August 22, 1986, more than ten (10) months after the Orders of September 6, lawyer. They would be totally deprived of their house and lot and the recovered
1985 and October 21, 1985 had become final and executory, the petitioners as damages considering that of the 271.5 square meters of the subject lot, the
substituted heirs of the respondent lawyers deceased clients filed a motion to set respondent lawyer is claiming 121.5 square meters and the remaining portion of 150
aside orders on the ground that the award of professional fees covering 121.5 square meters would also go to attorneys fees since the said portion pertains to the
square meters of the 271.5 square meter lot is unconscionable and excessive. lawyers son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years.

After the respondent lawyer filed his Opposition to the above petitioners motion, the The aforesaid submissions by the petitioners merit our consideration.
lower court, on August 29, 1986, finding that the petitioners as substituted plaintiffs
are not in full agreement with the respondent lawyers claim for attorneys fees, set It is a well-entrenched rule that attorneys fees may be claimed in the very action in
aside its Orders dated September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985. which the services in question have been rendered or as an incident of the main
action. The fees may be properly adjudged after such litigation is terminated and the
On September 16, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion for reconsideration subject of recovery is at the disposition of the court. (see Camacho v. Court of
stressing the fact that the payment of the professional services was pursuant to a Appeals, 179 SCRA 604 [1989]; Quirante v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 169 SCRA
contract which could no longer be disturbed or set aside because it has already been 769 [1989]).
implemented and had since then become final. This motion was denied on October
3, 1986. It is an equally deeply-rooted rule that contingent fees are not per se prohibited by
law. They are sanctioned by Canon 13 of the Canons of Professional Ethics and
On November 15, 1986, the respondent lawyer filed a motion to set aside the orders Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the recently promulgated Code of Professional
dated August 29, 1986 and October 3, 1986 reiterating his position that the Orders Responsibility. However, as we have held in the case of Tanhueco v. De Dumo (172
of September 6, 1985 and October 21, 1985 have become final and are already SCRA 760 [1989]):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
implemented. The respondent lawyer further asked for the modification of the
October 21, 1985 Order to reflect 60.32 square meters instead of 31 square meters ". . . When it is shown that a contract for a contingent fee was obtained by undue
only since the stipulation in the Additional Contract for Professional Services entitled influence exercised by the attorney upon his client or by any fraud or imposition, or
him to 60.32 square meters.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary that the compensation is clearly excessive, the Court must and will protect the
aggrieved party. (Ulanday v. Manila Railroad Co., 45 Phil. 540 [1923]; Grey v. Insular
After the petitioners Opposition to the said motion was filed, the trial court, on Lumber Co., 97 Phil. 833 [1955]).
February 26, 1987, rendered an Order with the following dispositive
portion:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph In the case at bar, the respondent lawyer caused the annotation of his attorneys
fees lien in the main action for partition docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12254 on the
basis of a Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979. We find
reversible error in the Court of Appeals holding that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph c) The importance of the subject matter;

"When the reasonableness of the appellees lien as attorneys fees over the d) The skill demanded;
properties of his clients awarded to him by the trial court had not been questioned
by the client, and the said orders had already become final and executory, the same e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
could no longer be disturbed, not even by the court which rendered them (Taada v. proferred case;
Court of Appeals, 139 SCRA 419)." (CA Decision p. 7; Rollo, p. 36)
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the
On the contrary, we rule that the questioned Orders dated September 19, 1979 and IBP Chapter to which he belongs;
October 21, 1985 cannot become final as they pertain to a contract for a contingent
fee which is always subject to the supervision of the Court with regard to its g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the
reasonableness as unequivocally provided in Section 13 of the Canons of client from the service;
Professional Ethics which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
"13. Contingent Fees.
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
A contract for a contingent fee, where sanctioned by law, should be reasonable
under all the circumstances of the case including the risk and uncertainty of the j) The professional standing of the lawyer."cralaw virtua1aw library
compensation, but should always be subject to the supervision of a court, as to its
reasonableness." (Emphasis supplied). A similar provision is contained under Section 24, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court which partly states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
There is no dispute in the instant case that the attorneys fees claimed by the
respondent lawyer are in the nature of a contingent fee. There is nothing irregular "SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys; agreement as to fees. An attorney
about the execution of a written contract for professional services even after the shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable
termination of a case as long as it is based on a previous agreement on contingent compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of
fees by the parties concerned and as long as the said contract does not contain the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing
stipulations which are contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy or of the attorney . . . A written contract for services shall control the amount to be paid
public order.chanrobles law library therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Although the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979 was
apparently voluntarily signed by the late Aurelio Licudan for himself and on behalf of All that the respondent lawyer handled for his deceased sister and brother-in-law
his daughter, petitioner Cristina Licudan-Campos and by the petitioner Wilfredo was a simple case of partition which necessitated no special skill nor any unusual
Licudan who both manifested in open court that they gave their free and willing effort in its preparation. The subsequent case for redemption was admittedly but an
consent to the said contract, we cannot allow the said contract to stand as the law offshot of the partition case. Considering the close blood and affinal relationship
between the parties involved considering that the rule that in the presence of a between the respondent lawyer and his clients, there is no doubt that Atty.
contract for professional services duly executed by the parties thereto, the same Domalanta took advantage of the situation to promote his own personal interests
becomes the law between the said parties is not absolute but admits an exception - instead of protecting the legal interests of his clients. A careful perusal of the
that the stipulations therein are not contrary to law, good morals, good customs, provisions of the contract for professional services in question readily shows that
public policy or public order (see Philippine American Life Insurance Company v. what the petitioners won was a pyrrhic victory on account of the fact that despite
Pineda, 175 SCRA 416 [1989]; Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 111 [1989]). the successful turnout of the partition case, they are now practically left with nothing
of the whole subject lot won in the litigation. This is because aside from the 121.5
Under Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall charge square meters awarded to Atty. Domalanta as attorneys fees, the said contract for
only fair and reasonable fees. In determining whether or not the lawyers fees are professional services provides that the remaining portion shall pertain to the
fair and reasonable, Rule 20-01 of the same Code enumerates the factors to be respondent lawyers son by way of usufruct for ten (10) years. There should never
considered in resolving the said issue. They are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw be an instance where a lawyer gets as attorneys fees the entire property involved in
library the litigation. It is unconscionable for the victor in litigation to lose everything he
won to the fees of his own lawyer.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
The respondent lawyers argument that it is not he but his son Teodoro M.
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; Domalanta, Jr. who is claiming the usufructuary right over the remaining portion of
the subject lot is inaccurate. The records show that the matter of usufruct is tied up 2. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS FEES; REASONABLENESS OR UNCONSCIONABLE
with this case since the basis for the said usufructuary right is the contract for CHARACTER THEREOF, MAY BE REGULATED BY THE COURT. In Radiowealth
professional services the reasonableness of which is being questioned in this Finance Co., Inc. v. International Corporate Bank, petitioner Radiowealth questioned
petition. We find the ten-year usufruct over the subject lot part and parcel of the the reasonableness of the amount of attorneys fees therein and asked whether this
attorneys fees being claimed by the respondent lawyer. Court has the power to modify the attorneys fees previously agreed upon by the
parties under a valid contractual stipulation. The Court ruled there as follows: "As a
In resolving the issue of reasonableness of the attorneys fees, we uphold the time- basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify or
honoured legal maxim that a lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and change even an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding
dignity of the legal profession so that his basic ideal becomes one of rendering attorneys fees is conceded. The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed
service and securing justice, not money-making. For the worst scenario that can by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyers
ever happen to a client is to lose the litigated property to his lawyer in whom all freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to
trust and confidence were bestowed at the very inception of the legal controversy. undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and
We find the Contract for Professional Services dated August 30, 1979, second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits
unconscionable and unreasonable. The amount of P20,000.00 as attorneys fees, in himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
lieu of the 121.5 square meters awarded to the respondent lawyer and the ten-year determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorneys fees
usufructuary right over the remaining portion of 150 square meters by the stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the
respondent lawyers son, is, in the opinion of this Court, commensurate to the courts (Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos
services rendered by Atty. Domalanta. v. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409 [1972]; Rolando v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz v.
Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court
Court of Appeals decision of September 12, 1989 is hereby REVERSED and SET may nevertheless reduce attorneys fees though fixed in the contract when the
ASIDE. Atty. Domalanta is awarded reasonable attorneys fees in the amount of amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena v.
P20,000.00. Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. v. Eastern
Scott Paper Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe v. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425 [1959];
SO ORDERED. Turner v. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. v. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986
[1929]). For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur. such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorneys fees in the
form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable
(Philippine Engineering Co. v. Green, 48 Phil. 466)."cralaw virtua1aw library
SECOND DIVISION
3. ID.; ID.; WHEN IN THE NATURE OF LIQUIDATED DAMAGES; MUST BE
[G.R. No. 97006. February 9, 1993.] AWARDED IN FAVOR OF THE LITIGANT; CASE AT BAR. It is worthwhile recalling
what Polytrade v. Blanco has to say on the matter of attorneys fees, to wit: "To be
ERNESTO F. ROLDAN and MARIETTA A. ROLDAN, Petitioners, v. THE COURT OF borne in mind is that the attorneys fees here provided is not, strictly speaking, the
APPEALS and COMMERCIAL CREDIT CORPORATION OF DAVAO, Respondents. attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney and client spoken of and regulated
by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys fees here are in the nature of liquidated
Rodolfo B. Ta-asan, for Petitioners. damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal clause. It has been said
that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law, morals, or public order, it is
Honesto A. Cabarroguis for Private Respondent. strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys fees so provided are awarded in
favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not counsel, who is the
judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by execution."
SYLLABUS

DECISION
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; PETITION FOR REVIEW ON CERTIORARI;
LIMITED ONLY TO QUESTIONS OF LAW. Settled is the rule, that in petitions for
review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised NOCON, J.:
since factual findings of the Court of Appeals are deemed conclusive on the Supreme
Court subject to certain exceptions.
"While in bed the sick mans lying,
While in Court your clients cause youre trying,
Seeking appellate review, the matter was elevated to the Court of Appeals which
Thats the time to get your fee. dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit 3 and so with their Motion for
Reconsideration. 4
For, when the sick man has recovered,
Hence, this petition.
And the lawsuits won or smothered
Petitioners do not dispute the facts but only that portion of the findings of fact of the
He will never think of thee." 1 trial court, as affirmed by the appellate court on the alleged exhorbitant attorneys
fees, excessive liquidated damages and usurious interest on the loan.
Petitioners spouses Ernesto and Marietta Roldan claim that the attorneys fees
claimed by the private respondent, Commercial Credit Corporation of Davao City, Settled is the rule, that in petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
being gargantuan, exhorbitant and unconscionable, should be proportionately only questions of law may be raised since factual findings of the Court of Appeals
reduced on the basis of quantum meruit. Private respondent Commercial Credit are deemed conclusive on the Supreme Court subject to certain exceptions. 5
Corporation of Davao demurs and states that the amount is reasonable or
conscionable considering the difficulty it has encountered in collecting from the Thus, the issues raised by petitioners on (1) the alleged lack of basis for liquidated
petitioners. damages imposed as a penalty for litigation as determined by the trial court and (2)
the alleged usurious interests rate they were charged on the contract of loan as
Culled from private respondents statement of facts are the following antecedents of evidenced by the promissory note has been disposed of by the trial court and the
this case. On June 7, 1971, petitioners purchased fifteen (15) trucks on installment Court of Appeals. Thus, the findings of fact are binding on
basis for P1,250,000.00 from private Respondent. Since they could not fully pay their Us.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
obligation, private respondent sued them on November 21, 1981. On July 28, 1987,
the trial court rendered its decision, which in its dispositive portion reads as The matter, however, of the attorneys fees gargantuan, exhorbitant and
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph unconscionable as alleged by petitioners is what this Court will rule upon.

"IN VIEW WHEREOF, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the defendants to pay in This is not the first time that the amount of attorneys fees has been questioned. In
solidum the plaintiff the following sums:chanrobles law library Radiowealth Finance Co., Inc. v. International Corporate Bank, 6 petitioner
Radiowealth questioned the reasonableness of the amount of attorneys fees therein
1. Five Hundred Seventy Nine Thousand Five Hundred Sixty Seven Pesos and and asked whether this Court has the power to modify the attorneys fees previously
Thirteen Centavos representing the principal balance with interest at 12% to be agreed upon by the parties under a valid contractual stipulation.
computed from November 24, 1981 until fully paid;
The Court ruled there as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
2. Twenty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Five and Forty Three Centavos
representing the past due charges as of November 23, 1981 with interest of 12% per "As a basic premise, the contention of petitioners that this Court may alter, modify
annum to be computed from November 24, 1981 until fully paid; or change even an admittedly valid stipulation between the parties regarding
attorneys fees is conceded. The high standards of the legal profession as prescribed
3. One Hundred Ninety Three Thousand One Hundred Sixty Nine Pesos and by law and the Canons of Professional Ethics regulate if not limit the lawyers
Seventy Two Centavos representing liquidated damages as of November 23, 1981 freedom in fixing his professional fees. The moment he takes his oath, ready to
with interest of 12% per annum to be computed from November 24, 1981 until fully undertake his duties first, as a practitioner in the exercise of his profession, and
paid; second, as an officer of the court in the administration of justice, the lawyer submits
himself to the authority of the court. It becomes axiomatic therefore, that power to
4. Attorneys fees equivalent to 25% of the total amount due in favor of the determine the reasonableness or the unconscionable character of attorneys fees
plaintiff; stipulated by the parties is a matter falling within the regulatory prerogative of the
courts (Panay Electric Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 456 [1982]; De Santos
5. Two Hundred Fifty Pesos and Seventy Five Centavos representing the value v. City of Manila, 45 SCRA 409 [1972]; Rolando v. Luz, 34 SCRA 337 [1970]; Cruz v.
of the check which was drawn by the defendant, accepted by the plaintiff and Court of Industrial Relations, 8 SCRA 826 [1963]). And this Court has consistently
dishonored by the drawee bank. ruled that even with the presence of an agreement between the parties, the court
may nevertheless reduce attorneys fees though fixed in the contract when the
6. Costs of suit. amount thereof appears to be unconscionable or unreasonable (Borcena v.
Intermediate Appellate Court, 147 SCRA 111 [1987]; Mutual Paper Inc. v. Eastern
SO ORDERED." 2 Scott Paper Co., 110 SCRA 481 [1981]; Gorospe v. Gochango, 106 Phil. 425 [1959];
Turner v. Casabar, 65 Phil. 490 [1938]; F.M. Yap Tico & Co. v. Alejano, 53 Phil. 986
[1929]). For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents
such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect to attorneys fees in the It is my clients fervent wish and desire that your client will favorably consider our
form of penalty provided that they are not unreasonable or unconscionable proposal to, satisfy their respective claims and interests.
(Philippine Engineering Co. v. Green, 48 Phil. 466)." 7 (Emphasis supplied)
x x x
Before We proceed any further, it is worthwhile recalling what Polytrade v. Blanco 8
has to say on the matter of attorneys fees, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
2. Reply of Atty. Cabarroguis of even date: 11
"To be borne in mind is that the attorneys fees here provided is not, strictly
speaking, the attorneys fees recoverable as between attorney and client spoken of "Atty. R. Taa-san
and regulated by the Rules of Court. Rather, the attorneys fees here are in the
nature of liquidated damages and the stipulation therefor is aptly called a penal Brgly Bldg. Davao City
clause. It has been said that so long as such stipulation does not contravene law,
morals, or public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The attorneys fees so Re: Your letter (Roldan Case) can we meet over coffee tomorrow at JALTAN Coffee
provided are awarded in favor of the litigant, not his counsel. It is the litigant, not Shop along A. Pichon St? Please confirm.
counsel, who is the judgment creditor entitled to enforce the judgment by
execution." 9 (Emphasis supplied)chanrobles virtual lawlibrary Regards.

Private respondents counsel must have forgotten this as evident from the following H Cabarroguis
exchange of letters between the parties, as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
11-16-90"
1. Letter of Atty. Ta-asan to Atty. Cabarroguis dated November 16, 1990: 10
3. Letter of Atty. Ta-asan to petitioner Marietta A. Roldan dated November 17,
"ATTY. HONESTO A. CABARROGUIS 1990: 12

Hacalex Bldg., Brokenshire "MRS. MARIETTA A. ROLDAN

Complex, A. Pichon St., MacArthur Highway, Matina,

Davao City, Philippines Davao City, Philippines

Dear Mrs. Roldan,
Dear Atty. Cabarroguis,
I wish to inform you of the outcome of my conference with Atty. Honesto A.
Greetings:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Cabarroguis, legal counsel of the Commercial Credit Corporation (CCC), last Saturday
November 17, 1990. During the conference, we made known to Atty. Cabarroguis
This is with reference to CA-G.R. CV No. 15939 entitled Commercial Credit your previous proposal which I laid down in writing. However, Atty. Cabarroguis
Corporation of Davao v. Ernesto F. Roldan and Marietta A. Roldan. My client, Mr. & suggested some modifications. He has made the following
Mrs. Roldan, have sought my intercession instructing me to present to you a proposal:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
proposal to amicably settle the above entitled case.

My client wishes to make the following proposal:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library x x x

x x x
2. The attorneys fees of Atty. Cabarroguis has not been altered. He is to be
paid the full amount of P577,320.20 with P100,000.00 as initial downpayment. The
2. To pay P50,000.00 pesos cash downpayment and balance with real remaining balance can be paid in installments. You can make a proposal as to when
properties located in Mlang, Cotabato, Philippines, to be paid to the plaintiffs you can fully satisfy his fees provided that you put up either a surety bond or real
counsel for his attorneys fees and other legal fees. property located in Davao City commensurate to the amount of your obligation;"

x x x x x x
 Twenty-five (25%) percent of the balance of the Promissory Note due which the trial
4. Letter of Atty. Cabarroguis to Atty. Ta-asan dated November 29, 1990: 13 court pegged at P579,576.13 is P579.576.13 x 0.25 = P144,894.03, which amount
would be due the private respondent NOT its counsel as attorneys fees. It is
"Atty. Rodolfo Ta-asan, Jr. clear that the liquidated damages and other charges are not to be included for
computation of the attorneys fees. The reason why respondents counsel came up
Davao City with his attorneys fees of P577,320.20 is that he erroneously added the liquidated
damages and other charges and interests due to the balance of the promissory note
Re: CCC of Davao v. Ernesto to get the total due to which he applied the 25% stipulated fee.

Roldan, et. als. WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Petition is partially granted. The private
respondent is hereby AWARDED attorneys fees in the amount of ONE HUNDRED
Dear Atty. Ta-asan, FORTY FOUR THOUSAND, EIGHT HUNDRED NINETY FOUR PESOS AND THREE
CENTAVOS (P144,894.03). The other awards of the trial court, as affirmed by the
Further to our conference yesterday afternoon and previous ones in connection with respondent Court of Appeals, are hereby RETAINED.
captioned case, I just came back from the office of the Register of Deeds of Davao
City where I checked the partial list of 334-titles in the name of Marietta A. Roldan SO ORDERED.
which was furnished me by said office and which I showed you yesterday.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado and Campos, Jr., JJ., concur.
x x x

FIRST DIVISION
May I suggest that the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) which is
ready and available be paid to me immediately by your clients, in partial payment of [G.R. NO. 160334 : September 11, 2006]
my fees from them and from my client. In turn, I could do a lot to help them get the
waivers they are requesting from my clients through me. However, with all of these GUENTER BACH, Petitioner, v. ONGKIKO KALAW MANHIT & ACORDA LAW OFFICES,
lots available in Davao City to be levied upon on execution or to be the subject- Respondent.
matter of your proposed settlement, we shall in the meantime, disregard their offer
of lots in Mlang to settle an otherwise favorable judgment already by the Court of DECISION
Appeals."cralaw virtua1aw library
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
x x x
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse the Decision1 dated 8 October
2003 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74445, entitled, "Ongkiko Kalaw
Private respondents counsels glaring cupidity is beyond Us. It could be that private Manhit & Accorda Law Offices v. Guenter Bach."
respondent might have contracted with its counsel that the latter would get the 25%
attorneys fees stipulated in the promissory note as his attorneys fees. 14 The The facts as culled from the records of the case are as follows:
record however, does not show such an agreement. But even if this were so, it is no
excuse for Atty. Cabarroguis, private respondents counsel, to act in such a manner On 7 November 1994, petitioner Guenter Bach engaged the services of respondent
as to evoke disgust from non-members of the Bar. law firm Ongkiko Kalaw Manhit & Accorda Law Offices to represent him in a Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
A lawyer is to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession 15 and one who Makati City, Branch 143, docketed as Civil Case No. 95-224. The parties signed a
acts like a middleman always out on grabs for what he can get certainly lessens the "Fee Agreement," for the legal services to be rendered by respondent. The provision
dignity of the legal profession. for payment of the legal services reads:

The trial court found:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph (a) seven and one-half (7 - % ) of all cash recoveries, including damages, interests,
attorney's fees and costs; as well as
"4. That one of the terms of Promissory Note is that in case of litigation, . . .the
makers and indorsers shall in addition pay 25% of the amount due as attorneys fees (b) five percent (5 %) of the market value of all properties awarded to [the
and 33 1/3 more of the principal due and unpaid as liquidated damages . . . (Exh. petitioner] by the court or obtained through the compromise agreement, valued at
"F-2")" the time of recovery.2
However, on 5 December 1995, respondent withdrew its appearance as counsel of On 24 January 2002, the RTC rendered its judgment in favor of the respondent, the
petitioner, due to policy differences. On 18 December 1995, respondent sent the dispositive portion of which reads:
termination billing3 for the services they rendered and billed petitioner the total
amount of P1,000,000.00 plus 2% interest for every month of delay in payment, WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
based on the provision for termination of services stated in their Fee Agreement, plaintiff and against the defendant and the latter is hereby ordered to pay the
thus: following:

(C) Interest for late payment 1. The amount of P750,000.00 as plaintiff's lawful fees for services rendered under
Civil Case No. 95-224, plus interest at the rate of 2% per month from the date of
All fees mentioned herein are payable within seven (7) days from receipt of our demand until paid;
statement of account. It is understood that all late payments shall be subject to
interest payment at the rate of 2 % per month of delay, a fraction of a month being 2. P700,000.00 representing billable time which was spent in prosecuting this case;
considered as one month, counted from the date the fees shall fall due, without
need of prior demand. 3. P50,000.00 as and litigation expenses, and

xxxx 4. Costs of suit.12

(F) Termination Clause Not satisfied, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which modified the RTC
Decision, thus:
It is understood that you may terminate our services at any time. In such an event,
we shall be entitled to collect fees for legal services already performed and results WHEREFORE, Based on the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is PARTLY
obtained based on quantum meruit."4 GRANTED and the appealed January 24, 2002 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City-Branch 148 in Civil Case No. 99-514 is hereby MODIFIED. Accordingly,
On 7 March 1996, respondent filed with the RTC a Notice5 of Charging Lien over the the award of P700,000.00 representing billable time allegedly spent in the
properties of the spouses Bach. prosecution of the case a quo is hereby DELETED. All other aspects of the appealed
DECISION are UPHELD.13
On 5 February 1997, the RTC issued an Order6 directing the annotation of the
charging lien in the amount of P1,000,000.00 on all the titles of the spouses Bach's Hence, this Petition filed by petitioner Guenter Bach raising the following issues to
personal and real properties enumerated in the notice of charging lien. wit:

On 11 February 1999, respondent received a copy of the Order7 dated 8 June 1998, WHETHER OR NOT UNDER THE CONCEPT OF QUANTUM MERUIT, THE AMOUNT OF
granting petitioner's Motion to Withdraw his petition in Civil Case No. 95-224. P750,000.00 AS FEES FOR SERVICES RENDERED WITH INTEREST PEGGED AT 2% A
MONTH FROM DATE OF DEMAND UNTIL FULLY PAID IS REASONABLE
Despite respondent's demands for his legal fees, petitioner failed and refused to pay.
Thus, respondent filed a Complaint8 for a sum of money also before the RTC of WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS LEGAL BASIS TO AWARD P50,000.00 AS AND FOR
Makati, Branch 148, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-514. Respondent prayed for the LITIGATION EXPENSES AND COSTS OF SUIT.14
payment of the following: P1,000,000.00 as the latter's lawful fees for services
rendered in Civil Case No. 95-224, plus 2% interest from date of final demand until On the first issue, petitioner contends that the P750,000.00 awarded to the
paid; P250,000.00 as exemplary damages; P200,000.00 representing billable time respondent by way of quantum meruit, with interest of 2% a month from date of
spent in prosecuting the case, plus another P150,000.00 for any appeal taken; and demand until fully paid, is excessive, unreasonable and confiscatory. Thus, petitioner
P50,000.00 as litigation expenses and the cost of suit. prays for reduction of the same.

Within the period for filing an Answer, petitioner filed a Motion9 to dismiss on the Both the Court of Appeals and the trial court approved the attorney's fees in the
ground that respondent's claim had already been paid, waived, abandoned or total amounts of P750,000.00 plus 2 % interest for the services rendered by
otherwise extinguished. Petitioner contended that prior to respondent's withdrawal respondent in Civil Case No. 95-224. In this regard, the rule is that the issue of the
as counsel in Civil Case No. 95-224, petitioner had already paid respondent's reasonableness of attorney's fees based on quantum meruit is a question of fact,
services in the total amount of P200,000.00. On 9 August 1999, the Motion to and well-settled is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the lower courts
Dismiss was denied10 by the RTC for lack of merit. Petitioner failed to file his are entitled to great weight on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong
Answer; thus, he was declared in default and respondent was allowed to present its and cogent reasons. The findings of the Court of Appeals by itself, which are
evidence ex parte.11 supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the
Supreme Court.15 Thus, in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of review the We have identified the circumstances to be considered in determining the
findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme reasonableness of a claim for attorney's fees as follows: (1) the amount and
Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule, namely: (1) when the character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of
grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on misapprehension of the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill
facts; (5) when the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making the findings and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional
the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9)
to the admissions of both the appellee and the appellant; (7) when the findings are whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may
contrary to the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not.19
specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the
petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the
respondent; (10) when the findings of facts are premised on the supposed absence following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:
of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the Court of
Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, (a) the time spent and extent of services rendered or required;
which if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.16 Exceptions (4)
and (11) are present in the case at bar, and so this Court shall make its own (b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
determination of the facts relevant for the resolution of the case.
(c) the importance of the subject matter;
Ordinarily, therefore, we would have remanded this case for further reception of
evidence as to the extent and value of the services rendered by respondent to (d) the skill demanded;
petitioner. However, so as not to needlessly prolong the resolution of a
comparatively simple controversy, we deem it just and equitable to fix in the present (e) the probability of losing other employment as a result of the acceptance of the
recourse a reasonable amount of attorney's fees in favor of respondent. proffered case;

There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees (f) the customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal Chapter to which he belongs;
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept,
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid (g) the amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
by the losing party to the prevailing party.17 from the service;

The issue in this case concerns attorney's fees in the ordinary concept. Generally, (h) the contingency or certainty of compensation;
the amount of attorney's fees due is that stipulated in the retainer agreement which
is conclusive as to the amount of the lawyer's compensation. In the absence thereof, (i) the character of the employment, whether occasional or established;
the amount of attorney's fees is fixed on the basis of quantum meruit, i.e., the andcralawlibrary
reasonable worth of the attorney's services. Courts may ascertain also if the
attorney's fees are found to be excessive, what is reasonable under the (j) the professional standing of the lawyer.
circumstances.18 In no case, however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more
than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to respondent as compensation for their
which provides: services on quantum meruit, based on the factors abovequoted, it is proper to
consider all the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case.
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's fees; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall
be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable It is undisputed that respondent firm had rendered services as counsel for the
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject - matter petitioners in Civil Case No. 95-244. The services rendered consist of the following:
of the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional
standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as 1. Respondent was able to annotate a notice20 of lis pendens on the property of
expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony Spouses Bach in Caloocan City covered by TCT No. C-12112, thereby preventing
and base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for easy disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach;
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. (Underscoring supplied.)
2. Respondent was likewise able to annotate a notice21 of lis pendens on the
property of Spouses Bach in Pasig City covered by TCT No. 48223, thereby 17. Respondent prepared a Reply35 to comments on opposition of petitioner;
preventing disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach;
18. Respondent was able to secure an Order36 from the said court freezing the
3. Further, respondent annotated a notice22 of lis pendens on the property of United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB) account in the name of petitioner's wife,
Spouses Bach in Dasmarinas, Cavite covered by TCT No. T-339282, thereby Luzviminda Bach, containing about P6,500,000.00, representing the balance of the
preventing disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach; proceeds from the sale of their conjugal property in Pasig City;

4. Additionally, respondent annotated a notice23 of lis pendens on the property of 19. Respondent represented petitioner in numerous hearings in Civil Case No. 95-
Spouses Bach in Tanza, Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-255263, thereby preventing 224, evidenced by the signatures of the lawyers of respondent Law Firm in the
disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach; minutes dated 25 April 1995, 27 April, 1995, 14 June 1995, 27 June 1995, 1 August
1995, 11 August 1995, 22 September 1995,10 October 1995, 17 October 1995, 1
5. Respondent also worked on the annotation of the notice24 of lis pendens on the December 1995, 7 December 1995, 29 March 1996 and 16 January 1997;37
property of Spouses Bach in Makati, covered by TCT No. S-62541, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach; 20. Conducted several preliminary and post litigation conferences in the proceedings
for preliminary injunction leading to the freezing of the bank account of the parties;
6. Respondent worked on the annotation of a notice of lis pendens on the property of andcralawlibrary
Spouses Bach in Dasmarias, Cavite, covered by TCT No. T-380848, thereby
preventing disposition of the property by Luzviminda Bach; 21. Prepared and sent out numerous letters to third parties and entities to protect
the interest of petitioner and notices to petitioner updating him of the status of the
7. Respondent annotated a notice25 of lis pendens on the property of Spouses Bach case and the courses of action taken by respondent Law Firm.38
situated in Tagaytay City, covered by TCT No. P-705, thereby preventing disposition
of the property by Luzviminda Bach; In sum, the services rendered by the respondent as enumerated above and as
admitted39 by Atty. Mario Ongkiko during the ex parte hearing, consist of annotating
8. Respondent filed the Petition26 for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and notice of lis pendens on the conjugal properties of petitioner and his wife; filing the
Dissolution of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains of petitioner with his wife; Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; preparing and filing various pleadings
and documents relevant to the case; obtaining a freeze order of petitioner's funds in
9. Respondent prepared an affidavit27 in favor of petitioner attesting to the fact of the UCPB; attending hearings in Civil Case No. 05-224, and sending notices to
petitioner's marriage and their properties acquired during his marriage with petitioner updating the latter of the status of the case. Nothing in Civil Case No. 95-
Luzviminda Bach: 224 so far appears complicated and no extra ordinary skill was needed for lawyers of
respondent Law Firm to accomplish what they had done in the case before they
10. Respondent prepared an ex parte motion28 to declare petitioner's wife to have withdrew their appearance. We do not find herein a situation so intricate that
waived her right to file answer for failure to file the same within the period granted demands more than a careful scrutiny of the legal matters involved. These are
by law and to direct the public prosecutor to determine whether or not a collusion simply the normal duties of a lawyer that he is bound by law to render to his clients
exist; with utmost fidelity for which his client must not be burdened to pay an extra price.
It bears stressing that at the time respondent firm withdrew their appearance due to
11. Respondent prepared a Petition29 for appointment of a receiver and to compel policy differences with petitioner, the case was still in its initial stage.
petitioner's wife to render an accounting;
Guided by the above yardstick and so much of the pertinent data as are extant in
12. Other services included the filling of several oppositions30 to certain motions the records of this case and in the exercise of our sound discretion, we hold that the
filed by petitioner's wife; amount of P500,000.00 is a reasonable and fair compensation for the legal services
rendered by respondent to the petitioner.
13. Respondent filed a motion31 to set the case for preliminary investigation;
The imposition of legal interest on the amount payable to private respondent as
14. Respondent filed an ex parte motion32 to declare petitioner's wife in default; attorney's fees is unwarranted. Even as we agree that parties can freely stipulate on
the terms of payment, still the imposition of interest in the payment of attorney's
15. Respondent submitted a supplemental comment33 on the motion for leave to fees is not justified. In the case of Cortes v. Court of Appeals,40 we ruled that Article
withdraw funds from Certificate of Participation filed by petitioner's wife; 220941 of the Civil Code does not even justify the imposition of legal interest on the
payment of attorney's fees as it is a provision of law governing ordinary obligations
16. Respondent filed a manifestation and motion34 praying the court to direct and contracts. It deleted the 6% interest imposed by the appellate court on the
petitioner's wife to designate her lead counsel in the case;
payment of attorney's fees. It ratiocinated by citing Mambulao Lumber Co. v.
Philippine National Bank,42 thus: Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in awarding expenses of litigation. Article
2208, paragraphs 2, 5 and 11, of the Civil Code, authorize the recovery of such fees
Contracts for attorney's services in this jurisdiction stands upon an entirely different "(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate x x x
footing from contracts for the payment of compensation for any other services. x x x or to incur expenses to protect his interest; x x x (5) Where the defendant acted in
[A]n attorney is not entitled in the absence of express contract to recover more than gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just and
a reasonable compensation for his services; and even when an express contract is demandable claim; x x x and (11) In any other case where the court deems it just
made, the court can ignore it and limit the recovery to reasonable compensation if and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered."
the amount of the stipulated fee is found by the court to be unreasonable. This is a Considering the fact that respondent was drawn into this litigation by petitioner to
very different rule from that announced in section 1091 of the Civil Code with protect and defend their interest and taking into account the services already
reference to the obligation of contracts in general, where it is said that such rendered by respondent to petitioner, the sum of P30,000.00 as expenses of
obligation has the force of law between the contracting parties. Had the plaintiff litigation and cost of suit would be reasonable under the premises.
herein made an express contract to pay his attorney an uncontingent fee of
P2,115.25 for the services to be rendered in reducing the note here in suit to WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS to the
judgment, it would not have been enforced against him had he seen fit to oppose it, effect that the attorney's fees awarded to respondent is REDUCED to P500,000.00,
as such a fee is obviously far greater than is necessary to remunerate the attorney the legal interest of 2% on the amount due to respondent is DELETED, and the
for the work involved and is therefore unreasonable. In order to enable the court to award of litigation expenses is REDUCED to P30,000.00.
ignore an express contract for attorney's fees, it is necessary to show, as in other
contracts, that it is contrary to morality or public policy (Art.1255, Civil Code). It is SO ORDERED.
enough that it is unreasonable or unconscionable. (Emphases supplied.)
Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Ynares-Santiago, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., JJ.,
We have held that lawyering is not a moneymaking venture and lawyers are not concur.
merchants.43 Law advocacy, it has been stressed, is not capital that yields profits.
The returns it births are simple rewards for a job done or service rendered. It is a
calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom from
THIRD DIVISION
governmental interference, is impressed with a public interest, for which it is subject
to State regulation.44
[G.R. NO. 183385 : February 13, 2009]
A lawyer is not merely the defender of his client's cause and a trustee of his client's
EVANGELINA MASMUD (as substitute complainant for ALEXANDER J. MASMUD),
cause of action and assets; he is also, and first and foremost, an officer of the court
Petitioner, v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (First Division) and ATTY.
and participates in the fundamental function of administering justice in society.45 It
ROLANDO B. GO, JR., Respondents.
follows that a lawyer's compensation for professional services rendered are subject
to the supervision of the court, not just to guarantee that the fees he charges and
RESOLUTION
receives remain reasonable and commensurate with the services rendered, but also
to maintain the dignity and integrity of the legal profession to which he belongs.
NACHURA, J.:
Upon taking his attorney's oath as an officer of the court, a lawyer submits himself
to the authority of the courts to regulate his right to charge professional fees.46
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 assailing the Decision2 dated
October 31, 2007 and the Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
Though we reduced the award of attorney's fees and disallowed the imposition of
in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279.
interest thereon, the fact that an attorney plays a vital role in the administration of
justice underscores the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a
The facts of the case are as follows:
means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal profession. A lawyer
is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition of fraud on the
On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud's (Evangelina) husband, the late Alexander J.
part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of
Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint3 against First Victory Shipping Services and
the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner; it is
Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent disability benefits, medical
also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With his capital consisting only
expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in
Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.
expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial
tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape payment of his just
In consideration of Atty. Go's legal services, Alexander agreed to pay attorney's fees
compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in him to secure
on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total monetary claims as
justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.47
settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of appeal. It was likewise In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with motion
agreed that any award of attorney's fees shall pertain to respondent's law firm as to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. In her comment, Evangelina
compensation. manifested that Atty. Go's claim for attorney's fees of 40% of the total monetary
award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting the
monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive portion of the decision, as quoted in On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order7 granting Atty. Go's motion, the fallo
the CA Decision, reads: of which reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the [First Victory WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the substitute
Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A.] jointly and severally liable to pay complainant's initial payment of 20% to movant-counsel of the monetary claims as
[Alexander's] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of US$60,000.00 and paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorney's fees due movant-
his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine currency at the prevailing counsel (or the amount of P839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all the monies that
rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to pay further the amount of may still be paid to substitute complainant Evangelina Masmud.
P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary damages and attorney's
fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award. Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the amount of
P677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the lien.
[Alexander's] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack of basis.
SO ORDERED.8
SO ORDERED.4
Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the NLRC. On
Alexander's employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a Resolution9 dismissing the appeal for lack of
Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC, merit.
Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer's fees to Evangelina, Atty.
Go caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered a Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari .10 On
Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander's employer. The employer subsequently October 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision11 partially granting the petition. The
filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an Order dated dispositive portion of the decision reads:
October 26, 2004.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Resolutions dated January 31,
On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with modification. The 2006 and July 18, 2006 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the
award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted.5 Alexander's employers filed a Attorney's fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go, Jr. is declared fully compensated
petition for certiorari 6 before this Court. On February 6, 2006, the Court issued a by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has already received.
Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.12
Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go moved for
the execution of the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA. The surety Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the CA
bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the surety company issued a Resolution13 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check amounting to
P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said amount to Hence, the instant petition.
Evangelina.
Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:
On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount of
P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go the THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN
sum of P680,000.00. ITS DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER 2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6 JUNE 2008
INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS RESPONDENT LAWYER'S CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%)
Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney's lien alleging OF THE MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEY'S FEES.14
that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid only
the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney's fees, thus, In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal compensation
leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney's of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
fees.
There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be
attorney's fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid considered in assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should
by the losing party to the prevailing party,15 such that, in any of the cases provided receive.rl Canon 20, Rule 20.01 of the said Code provides:
by law where such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the
Civil Code, the amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation
or as part thereof.16 Rule 20.01. - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:
Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney's fees, or the compensation that
Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her (a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;
husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;
Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should
govern Atty. Go's compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed (c) The importance of the subject matter;
retainer contract.
(d) The skill demanded;
Article 111 of the said Code provides:
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
ART. 111. Attorney's fees. - (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages the proffered case;
culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of the wages recovered.rbl rl l lbrr (f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
Chapter to which he belongs;
Contrary to Evangelina's proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals with the
extraordinary concept of attorney's fees. It regulates the amount recoverable as (g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing from the service;
party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer
by his client for the legal services he rendered.17 (h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in (i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
determining Atty. Go's compensation. The said Rule provides:
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. - An attorney shall be
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject matter of court in order that clients may be protected from unjust charges.22 The amount of
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing contingent fees agreed upon by the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel
of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert will be paid for his legal services only if the suit or litigation prospers. A much higher
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for get nothing if the suit fails.23 The Court finds nothing illegal in the contingent fee
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina's husband. The CA committed no error of
unconscionable or unreasonable.18 law when it awarded the attorney's fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an
equivalent of 39% of the monetary award.
The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee.
The contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled
found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.19 Attorney's fees are is the rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight
unconscionable if they affront one's sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.20 on appeal and will not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are
The decree of unconscionability or unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a absent in the case at bench. The findings of the CA, which are supported by
contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery. It merely justifies the fixing by the substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of review by the Supreme
court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's services.21 Court.24

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he
should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the
reduction of the award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a before this Court, Spouses de Guzman died in a vehicular accident. Thereafter, they
vital role in the administration of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his were substituted by their children, namely: Rosella de Guzman-Bautista, Lellani de
honorarium lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability Guzman, Arleen de Guzman, and Philip Ryan de Guzman (respondents).4
of the legal profession. A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against
injustice or imposition of fraud on the part of his client as the client is against abuse On September 8, 2009, petitioner filed the Motion to Determine Attorneys Fees5
on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to ensure that a lawyer before the RTC. He alleged, among others, that he had a verbal agreement with the
acts in a proper and lawful manner, but also to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. deceased Spouses de Guzman that he would get 25% of the market value of the
With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous subject land if the complaint filed against them by Chong would be dismissed.
cost not only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the Despite the fact that he had successfully represented them, respondents refused his
protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to written demand for payment of the contracted attorneys fees. Petitioner insisted
escape payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the that he was entitled to an amount equivalent to 25% percent of the value of the
best in him to secure justice for his client, he himself would not get his due.25 subject land on the basis of quantum meruit.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Decision dated October 31, 2007 and the On November 23, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed order denying petitioners
Resolution dated June 6, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 96279 are motion on the ground that it was filed out of time. The RTC stated that the said
hereby AFFIRMED. motion was filed after the judgment rendered in the subject case, as affirmed by this
Court, had long become final and executory on October 31, 2007. The RTC wrote
SO ORDERED. that considering that the motion was filed too late, it had already lost jurisdiction
over the case because a final decision could not be amended or corrected except for
clerical errors or mistakes. There would be a variance of the judgment rendered if his
THIRD DIVISION claim for attorneys fees would still be included.

G.R. No. 191247, July 10, 2013 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC for lack of
merit. Hence, this petition.
FRANCISCO L. ROSARIO, JR., Petitioner, v. LELLANI DE GUZMAN, ARLEEN DE
GUZMAN, PHILIP RYAN DE GUZMAN, AND ROSELLA DE GUZMAN BAUTISTA, The Issues
Respondents.
This petition is anchored on the following grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
DECISION
I
MENDOZA, J.:
THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR IN DENYING THE MOTION TO
DETERMINE ATTORNEYS FEES ON THE GROUND THAT IT LOST JURISDICTION OVER
THE CASE SINCE THE JUDGMENT IN THE CASE HAS BECOME FINAL AND
EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeks to set
aside the November 23, 20091 and the February 11, 20102 Orders of the Regional
II
Trial Court, Branch 7, Manila (RTC), in Civil Case No. 89-50138, entitled "Loreta A.
Chong v. Sps. Pedro and Rosita de Guzman," denying the Motion to Determine
THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS CLAIM FOR
Attorney's Fees filed by the petitioner.
ATTORNEYS FEES WOULD RESULT IN A VARIANCE OF THE JUDGMENT THAT HAS
LONG BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The Facts
III
Sometime in August 1990, Spouses Pedro and Rosita de Guzman (Spouses de
Guzman) engaged the legal services of Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. (petitioner) as
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THAT THE FINALITY OF THE DECISION
defense counsel in the complaint filed against them by one Loreta A. Chong (Chong)
DID NOT BAR PETITIONER FROM FILING THE MOTION TO RECOVER HIS ATTORNEYS
for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages involving a
FEES.6nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
parcel of land in Paraaque City, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No.
1292, with an area of 266 square meters, more or less. Petitioners legal services
Petitioner claims that Spouses de Guzman engaged his legal services and orally
commenced from the RTC and ended up in this Court.3 Spouses de Guzman,
agreed to pay him 25% of the market value of the subject land. He argues that a
represented by petitioner, won their case at all levels. While the case was pending
motion to recover attorneys fees can be filed and entertained by the court before
and after the judgment becomes final. Moreover, his oral contract with the deceased The attorneys fee which a court may, in proper cases, award to a winning litigant is,
spouses can be considered a quasi-contract upon which an action can be strictly speaking, an item of damages. It differs from that which a client pays his
commenced within six (6) years, pursuant to Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Because counsel for the latters professional services. However, the two concepts have many
his motion was filed on September 8, 2009, he insists that it was not yet barred by things in common that a treatment of the subject is necessary. The award that the
prescription.7 court may grant to a successful party by way of attorneys fee is an indemnity for
damages sustained by him in prosecuting or defending, through counsel, his cause
For their part, respondents counter that the motion was belatedly filed and, as such, in court. It may be decreed in favor of the party, not his lawyer, in any of the
it could no longer be granted. In addition, the RTC had already resolved the issue instances authorized by law. On the other hand, the attorneys fee which a client
when it awarded the amount of ?10,000.00 as attorneys fees. Respondents further pays his counsel refers to the compensation for the latters services. The losing
assert that the law, specifically Article 2208 of the Civil Code, allows the recovery of party against whom damages by way of attorneys fees may be assessed is not
attorneys fees under a written agreement. The alleged understanding between their bound by, nor is his liability dependent upon, the fee arrangement of the prevailing
deceased parents and petitioner, however, was never put in writing. They also aver party with his lawyer. The amount stipulated in such fee arrangement may, however,
that they did not have any knowledge or information about the existence of an oral be taken into account by the court in fixing the amount of counsel fees as an
contract, contrary to petitioners claims. At any rate, the respondents believe that element of damages.
the amount of 25% of the market value of the lot is excessive and unconscionable.8
The fee as an item of damages belongs to the party litigant and not to his lawyer. It
The Courts Ruling forms part of his judgment recoveries against the losing party. The client and his
lawyer may, however, agree that whatever attorneys fee as an element of damages
Preliminarily, the Court notes that the petitioner filed this petition for review on the court may award shall pertain to the lawyer as his compensation or as part
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court because of the denial of his motion to thereof. In such a case, the court upon proper motion may require the losing party to
determine attorneys fees by the RTC. Apparently, the petitioner pursued the wrong pay such fee directly to the lawyer of the prevailing party.
remedy. Instead of a petition for review under Rule 45, he should have filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 because this case involves an error of The two concepts of attorneys fees are similar in other respects. They both require,
jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court. as a prerequisite to their grant, the intervention of or the rendition of professional
services by a lawyer. As a client may not be held liable for counsel fees in favor of
Moreover, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts which prohibits his lawyer who never rendered services, so too may a party be not held liable for
direct resort to this Court unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the attorneys fees as damages in favor of the winning party who enforced his rights
lower tribunals.9 In this case, petitioner should have first elevated the case to the without the assistance of counsel. Moreover, both fees are subject to judicial control
Court of Appeals (CA) which has concurrent jurisdiction, together with this Court, and modification. And the rules governing the determination of their reasonable
over special civil actions for certiorari.10 Even so, this principle is not absolute and amount are applicable in one as in the other.14 [Emphases and underscoring
admits of certain exceptions, such as in this case, when it is demanded by the supplied]
broader interest of justice.11
In the case at bench, the attorneys fees being claimed by the petitioner refers to
Indeed, on several occasions, this Court has allowed a petition to prosper despite the the compensation for professional services rendered, and not as indemnity for
utilization of an improper remedy with the reasoning that the inflexibility or rigidity damages. He is demanding payment from respondents for having successfully
of the application of the rules of procedure must give way to serve the higher ends handled the civil case filed by Chong against Spouses de Guzman. The award of
of justice. The strict application of procedural technicalities should not hinder the attorneys fees by the RTC in the amount of P10,000.00 in favor of Spouses de
speedy disposition of the case on the merits.12 Thus, this Court deems it expedient Guzman, which was subsequently affirmed by the CA and this Court, is of no
to consider this petition as having been filed under Rule 65. moment. The said award, made in its extraordinary concept as indemnity for
damages, forms part of the judgment recoverable against the losing party and is to
With respect to the merits of the case, the Court finds in favor of petitioner. be paid directly to Spouses de Guzman (substituted by respondents) and not to
petitioner. Thus, to grant petitioners motion to determine attorneys fees would not
In order to resolve the issues in this case, it is necessary to discuss the two concepts result in a double award of attorneys fees. And, contrary to the RTC ruling, there
of attorneys fees ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary sense, it is the would be no amendment of a final and executory decision or variance in judgment.
reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for legal services rendered.
In its extraordinary concept, it is awarded by the court to the successful litigant to be The Court now addresses two (2) important questions: (1) How can attorneys fees
paid by the losing party as indemnity for damages.13 Although both concepts are for professional services be recovered? (2) When can an action for attorneys fees
similar in some respects, they differ from each other, as further explained for professional services be filed? The case of Traders Royal Bank Employees Union-
below:cralavvonlinelawlibrary Independent v. NLRC15 is instructive:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
As an adjunctive episode of the action for the recovery of bonus differentials in to the conclusion that the six-year prescriptive period within which to file an action
NLRC-NCR Certified Case No. 0466, private respondents present claim for attorneys based on such oral contract under Article 1145 of the Civil Code had already lapsed.
fees may be filed before the NLRC even though or, better stated, especially after its
earlier decision had been reviewed and partially affirmed. It is well settled that a As a lawyer, private respondent should have known that he only had six years from
claim for attorneys fees may be asserted either in the very action in which the the time petitioners refused to sign the contract for legal services and to
services of a lawyer had been rendered or in a separate action. acknowledge that they had engaged his services for the settlement of their parents
estate within which to file his complaint for collection of legal fees for the services
With respect to the first situation, the remedy for recovering attorneys fees as an which he rendered in their favor. [Emphases supplied]
incident of the main action may be availed of only when something is due to the
client. Attorneys fees cannot be determined until after the main litigation has been At this juncture, having established that petitioner is entitled to attorneys fees and
decided and the subject of the recovery is at the disposition of the court. The issue that he filed his claim well within the prescribed period, the proper remedy is to
over attorneys fees only arises when something has been recovered from which the remand the case to the RTC for the determination of the correct amount of
fee is to be paid. attorneys fees. Such a procedural route, however, would only contribute to the
delay of the final disposition of the controversy as any ruling by the trial court on the
While a claim for attorneys fees may be filed before the judgment is rendered, the matter would still be open for questioning before the CA and this Court. In the
determination as to the propriety of the fees or as to the amount thereof will have to interest of justice, this Court deems it prudent to suspend the rules and simply
be held in abeyance until the main case from which the lawyers claim for attorneys resolve the matter at this level. The Court has previously exercised its discretion in
fees may arise has become final. Otherwise, the determination to be made by the the same way in National Power Corporation v. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay:18
courts will be premature. Of course, a petition for attorneys fees may be filed before
the judgment in favor of the client is satisfied or the proceeds thereof delivered to In the event of a dispute as to the amount of fees between the attorney and his
the client. client, and the intervention of the courts is sought, the determination requires that
there be evidence to prove the amount of fees and the extent and value of the
It is apparent from the foregoing discussion that a lawyer has two options as to when services rendered, taking into account the facts determinative thereof. Ordinarily,
to file his claim for professional fees. Hence, private respondent was well within his therefore, the determination of the attorneys fees on quantum meruit is remanded
rights when he made his claim and waited for the finality of the judgment for holiday to the lower court for the purpose. However, it will be just and equitable to now
pay differential, instead of filing it ahead of the awards complete resolution. To assess and fix the attorneys fees of both attorneys in order that the resolution of a
declare that a lawyer may file a claim for fees in the same action only before the comparatively simple controversy, as Justice Regalado put it in Traders Royal Bank
judgment is reviewed by a higher tribunal would deprive him of his aforestated Employees Union-Independent v. NLRC, would not be needlessly prolonged, by
options and render ineffective the foregoing pronouncements of this Court. taking into due consideration the accepted guidelines and so much of the pertinent
[Emphases and underscoring supplied] data as are extant in the records.19 [Emphasis supplied]

In this case, petitioner opted to file his claim as an incident in the main action, which With respect to petitioners entitlement to the claimed attorneys fees, it is the
is permitted by the rules. As to the timeliness of the filing, this Court holds that the Courts considered view that he is deserving of it and that the amount should be
questioned motion to determine attorneys fees was seasonably filed. based on quantum meruit.

The records show that the August 8, 1994 RTC decision became final and executory Quantum meruit literally meaning as much as he deserves is used as basis for
on October 31, 2007. There is no dispute that petitioner filed his Motion to determining an attorneys professional fees in the absence of an express agreement.
Determine Attorneys Fees on September 8, 2009, which was only about one (1) year The recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit is a device that
and eleven (11) months from the finality of the RTC decision. Because petitioner prevents an unscrupulous client from running away with the fruits of the legal
claims to have had an oral contract of attorneys fees with the deceased spouses, services of counsel without paying for it and also avoids unjust enrichment on the
Article 1145 of the Civil Code16 allows him a period of six (6) years within which to part of the attorney himself. An attorney must show that he is entitled to reasonable
file an action to recover professional fees for services rendered. Respondents never compensation for the effort in pursuing the clients cause, taking into account
asserted or provided any evidence that Spouses de Guzman refused petitioners certain factors in fixing the amount of legal fees.20
legal representation. For this reason, petitioners cause of action began to run only
from the time the respondents refused to pay him his attorneys fees, as similarly Rule 20.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility lists the guidelines for
held in the case of Anido v. Negado:17 determining the proper amount of attorney fees, to wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

In the case at bar, private respondents allegation in the complaint that petitioners Rule 20.1 A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
refused to sign the contract for legal services in October 1978, and his filing of the fees:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
complaint only on November 23, 1987 or more than nine years after his cause of
action arising from the breach of the oral contract between him and petitioners point
a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client against abuse on the part of
required;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper
and lawful manner; it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees. With
b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not
only in money but in expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection
c) The importance of the subject matter;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation. It would be ironic if after putting forth the best in
d) The skill demanded;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary him to secure justice for his client he himself would not get his due.22

e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the The Court, however, is resistant in granting petitioner's prayer for an award of 25%
proffered case;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary attorney's fees based on the value of the property subject of litigation because
petitioner failed to clearly substantiate the details of his oral agreement with
f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Spouses de Guzman. A fair and reasonable amount of attorney's fees should be 15%
chapter to which he belongs;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of the market value of the property.

g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court grants the Motion to
from the service;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Determine Attorney's Fees filed by petitioner Atty. Francisco L. Rosario, Jr. Based on
quantum meruit, the amount of attorney's fees is at the rate of 15% of the market
h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary value of the parcel of land, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1292, at the
time of payment.
i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
SO ORDERED.
j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petitioner unquestionably rendered legal services for respondents deceased parents
in the civil case for annulment of contract and recovery of possession with damages.
He successfully represented Spouses de Guzman from the trial court level in 1990
FIRST DIVISION
up to this Court in 2007, for a lengthy period of 17 years. After their tragic death in
2003, petitioner filed a notice of death and a motion for substitution of parties with
G.R. NO. 158361 : April 10, 2013
entry of appearance and motion to resolve the case before this Court.21 As a
consequence of his efforts, the respondents were substituted in the place of their
INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. FRANCISCO B. JOAQUIN, JR. and
parents and were benefited by the favorable outcome of the case.
RAFAEL SUAREZ, Respondents.
As earlier mentioned, petitioner served as defense counsel for deceased Spouses de
DECISION
Guzman and respondents for almost seventeen (17) years. The Court is certain that
it was not an easy task for petitioner to defend his clients cause for such a long
BERSAMIN, J.:
period of time, considering the heavy and demanding legal workload of petitioner
which included the research and preparation of pleadings, the gathering of
To avoid unjust enrichment to a party from resulting out of a substantially performed
documentary proof, the court appearances, and the various legal work necessary to
contract, the principle of quantum meruit may be used to determine his
the defense of Spouses de Guzman. It cannot be denied that petitioner devoted
compensation in the absence of a written agreement for that purpose. The principle
much time and energy in handling the case for respondents. Given the considerable
of quantum meruit justifies the payment of the reasonable value of the services
amount of time spent, the diligent effort exerted by petitioner, and the quality of
rendered by him.
work shown by him in ensuring the successful defense of his clients, petitioner
clearly deserves to be awarded reasonable attorneys fees for services rendered.
The Case
Justice and equity dictate that petitioner be paid his professional fee based on
quantum meruit.
Under review is the decision the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on November 8,
2002,1 disposing:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The fact that the practice of law is not a business and the attorney plays a vital role
in the administration of justice underscores the need to secure him his honorarium
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated August 26, 1993 of the
lawfully earned as a means to preserve the decorum and respectability of the legal
Regional Trial Court, Branch 13, Manila in Civil Case No. R-82-2434 is AFFIRMED with
profession. A layer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice,
Modification as to the amounts awarded as follows: defendant-appellant IHC is would submit Weston for DBP's consideration.12 As a result, DBP cancelled its
ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Joaquin P700,000.00 and plaintiff-appellant Suarez previous guaranty through a letter dated December 6,
P200,000.00, both to be paid in cash. 1971.13chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED. On December 13, 1971, IHC entered into an agreement with Weston, and
communicated this development to DBP on June 26, 1972. However, DBP denied the
Antecedents application for guaranty for failure to comply with the conditions contained in its
November 12, 1971 letter.14chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
On February 1, 1969, respondent Francisco B. Joaquin, Jr. submitted a proposal to the
Board of Directors of the International Hotel Corporation (IHC) for him to render Due to Joaquin's failure to secure the needed loan, IHC, through its President
technical assistance in securing a foreign loan for the construction of a hotel, to be Bautista, canceled the 17,000 shares of stock previously issued to Joaquin and
guaranteed by the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP).2 The proposal Suarez as payment for their services. The latter requested a reconsideration of the
encompassed nine phases, namely: (1) the preparation of a new project study; (2) cancellation, but their request was rejected.
the settlement of the unregistered mortgage prior to the submission of the
application for guaranty for processing by DBP; (3) the preparation of papers Consequently, Joaquin and Suarez commenced this action for specific performance,
necessary to the application for guaranty; (4) the securing of a foreign financier for annulment, damages and injunction by a complaint dated December 6, 1973 in the
the project; (5) the securing of the approval of the DBP Board of Governors; (6) the Regional Trial Court in Manila (RTC), impleading IHC and the members of its Board of
actual follow up of the application with DBP3; (7) the overall coordination in Directors, namely, Felix Angelo Bautista, Sergio O. Rustia, Ephraim G. Gochangco,
implementing the projections of the project study; (8) the preparation of the staff for Mario B. Julian, Benjamin J. Bautista, Basilio L. Lirag, Danilo R. Lacerna and
actual hotel operations; and (9) the actual hotel Hermenegildo R. Reyes.15 The complaint alleged that the cancellation of the shares
operations.4chanroblesvirtualawlibrary had been illegal, and had deprived them of their right to participate in the meetings
and elections held by IHC; that Barnes had been recommended by IHC President
The IHC Board of Directors approved phase one to phase six of the proposal during Bautista, not by Joaquin; that they had failed to meet their obligation because
the special board meeting on February 11, 1969, and earmarked P2,000,000.00 for President Bautista and his son had intervened and negotiated with Barnes instead of
the project.5 Anent the financing, IHC applied with DBP for a foreign loan guaranty. Weston; that DBP had canceled the guaranty because Barnes had failed to release
DBP processed the application,6 and approved it on October 24, 1969 subject to the loan; and that IHC had agreed to compensate their services with 17,000 shares
several conditions.7chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of the common stock plus cash of P1,000,000.00.16chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On July 11, 1969, shortly after submitting the application to DBP, Joaquin wrote to IHC, together with Felix Angelo Bautista, Sergio O. Rustia, Mario B. Julian and
IHC to request the payment of his fees in the amount of P500,000.00 for the services Benjamin J. Bautista, filed an answer claiming that the shares issued to Joaquin and
that he had provided and would be providing to IHC in relation to the hotel project Suarez as compensation for their "past and future services" had been issued in
that were outside the scope of the technical proposal. Joaquin intimated his violation of Section 16 of the Corporation Code; that Joaquin and Suarez had not
amenability to receive shares of stock instead of cash in view of IHC's financial provided a foreign financier acceptable to DBP; and that they had already received
situation.8chanroblesvirtualawlibrary P96,350.00 as payment for their services.17chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

On July 11, 1969, the stockholders of IHC met and granted Joaquin's request, On their part, Lirag and Lacerna denied any knowledge of or participation in the
allowing the payment for both Joaquin and Rafael Suarez for their services in cancellation of the shares.18chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
implementing the proposal.9chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Similarly, Gochangco and Reyes denied any knowledge of or participation in the
On June 20, 1970, Joaquin presented to the IHC Board of Directors the results of his cancellation of the shares, and clarified that they were not directors of IHC.19 In the
negotiations with potential foreign financiers. He narrowed the financiers to Roger course of the proceedings, Reyes died and was substituted by Consorcia P. Reyes,
Dunn & Company and Materials Handling Corporation. He recommended that the the administratrix of his estate.20chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Board of Directors consider Materials Handling Corporation based on the more
beneficial terms it had offered. His recommendation was Ruling of the RTC
accepted.10chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Under its decision rendered on August 26, 1993, the RTC held IHC liable pursuant to
Negotiations with Materials Handling Corporation and, later on, with its principal, the second paragraph of Article 1284 of the Civil Code, disposing
Barnes International (Barnes), ensued. While the negotiations with Barnes were thusly:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
ongoing, Joaquin and Jose Valero, the Executive Director of IHC, met with another
financier, the Weston International Corporation (Weston), to explore possible WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and jurisprudence, the Court hereby
financing.11 When Barnes failed to deliver the needed loan, IHC informed DBP that it orders the defendant International Hotel Corporation to pay plaintiff Francisco B.
Joaquin, the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00) and to pay issuance of the shares of stock was ultra vires for having been issued as
plaintiff Rafael Suarez the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00); that the consideration for future services.
said defendant IHC likewise pay the co-plaintiffs, attorney's fees of P20,000.00, and
costs of suit. Anent how much was due to Joaquin and Suarez, the CA explained
thusly:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
IT IS SO ORDERED.21chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
This Court does not subscribe to plaintiffs-appellants' view that defendant-appellant
The RTC found that Joaquin and Suarez had failed to meet their obligations when IHC IHC agreed to pay them P2,000,000.00. Plaintiff-appellant Joaquin's letter to
had chosen to negotiate with Barnes rather than with Weston, the financier that defendant-appellee F.A. Bautista, quoting defendant-appellant IHC's board
Joaquin had recommended; and that the cancellation of the shares of stock had been resolutions which supposedly authorized the payment of such amount cannot be
proper under Section 68 of the Corporation Code, which allowed such transfer of sustained. The resolutions are quite clear and when taken together show that said
shares to compensate only past services, not future ones. amount was only the "estimated maximum expenses" which defendant-appellant
IHC expected to incur in accomplishing phases 1 to 6, not exclusively to plaintiffs-
Ruling of the CA appellants' compensation.This conclusion finds support in an unnumbered board
resolution of defendant-appellant IHC dated July 11, 1969:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Both parties appealed.22chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
"Incidentally, it was also taken up the necessity of giving the Technical Group a
Joaquin and Suarez assigned the following errors, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary portion of the compensation that was authorized by this corporation in its Resolution
of February 11, 1969 considering that the assistance so far given the corporation by
DESPITE HAVING CORRECTLY ACKNOWLEDGED THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FULLY said Technical Group in continuing our project with the DBP and its request for
PERFORMED ALL THAT WAS INCUMBENT UPON THEM, THE HONORABLE JUDGE guaranty for a foreign loan is 70% completed leaving only some details which are
ERRED IN NOT ORDERING THAT:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary now being processed. It is estimated that P400,000.00 worth of Common Stock
would be reasonable for the present accomplishments and to this effect, the
A. DEFENDANTS WERE UNJUSTIFIED IN CANCELLING THE SHARES OF STOCK President is authorized to issue the same in the name of the Technical Group, as
PREVIOUSLY ISSUED TO PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS; AND follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

B. DEFENDANTS PAY PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS TWO MILLION SEVEN HUNDRED PESOS P200,000.00 in common stock to Rafael Suarez, as associate in the Technical Group,
(sic) (P2,700,000.00), INCLUDING INTEREST THEREON FROM 1973, REPRESENTING and P200,000.00 in common stock to Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., also a member of the
THE TOTAL OBLIGATION DUE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS.23chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Technical Group.

On the other hand, IHC attributed errors to the RTC, as It is apparent that not all of the P2,000,000.00 was allocated exclusively to
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary compensate plaintiffs-appellants. Rather, it was intended to fund the whole
undertaking including their compensation. On the same date, defendant-appellant
I. IHC also authorized its president to pay-appellant Joaquin P500,000.00 either in cash
or in stock or both.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS HAVE
NOTBEEN COMPLETELY PAID FOR THEIR SERVICES, AND IN ORDERING THE The amount awarded by the lower court was therefore less than what defendant-
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT TO PAY TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00) appellant IHC agreed to pay plaintiffs-appellants. While this Court cannot decree that
AND FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) TO PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS FRANCISCO the cancelled shares be restored, for they are without a doubt null and void, still and
B. JOAQUIN AND RAFAEL SUAREZ, RESPECTIVELY. all, defendant-appellant IHC cannot now put up its own ultra vires act as an excuse
to escape obligation to plaintiffs-appellants. Instead of shares of stock, defendant-
II. appellant IHC is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellant Joaquin a total of P700,000.00 and
plaintiff-appellant Suarez P200,000.00, both to be paid in cash.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN AWARDING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS ATTORNEY'S FEES
AND COSTS OF SUIT.24chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Although the lower court failed to explain why it was granting the attorney's fees,
this Court nonetheless finds its award proper given defendant-appellant IHC's
In its questioned decision promulgated on November 8, 2002, the CA concurred with actions.25chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
the RTC, upholding IHC's liability under Article 1186 of the Civil Code. It ruled that in
the context of Article 1234 of the Civil Code, Joaquin had substantially performed his Issues
obligations and had become entitled to be paid for his services; and that the
In this appeal, the IHC raises as issues for our consideration and resolution the issue posed here is whether the conclusions drawn by the CA were correct under the
following:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary pertinent laws.

I 2. Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code cannot be the source of IHC's
obligation to pay respondents IHC argues that it should not be held liable because:
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN AWARDING (a) it was Joaquin who had recommended Barnes; and (b) IHC's negotiation with
COMPENSATION AND EVEN MODIFYING THE PAYMENT TO HEREIN RESPONDENTS Barnes had been neither intentional nor willfully intended to prevent Joaquin from
DESPITE NON-FULFILLMENT OF THEIR OBLIGATION TO HEREIN PETITIONER complying with his obligations.

II IHC's argument is meritorious.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS IS CORRECT IN AWARDING ATTORNEY'S Article 1186 of the Civil Code reads:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
FEES TO RESPONDENTS26chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Article 1186. The condition shall be deemed fulfilled when the obligor voluntarily
IHC maintains that Article 1186 of the Civil Code was erroneously applied; that it had prevents its fulfillment.
no intention of preventing Joaquin from complying with his obligations when it
adopted his recommendation to negotiate with Barnes; that Article 1234 of the Civil This provision refers to the constructive fulfillment of a suspensive condition,32
Code applied only if there was a merely slight deviation from the obligation, and the whose application calls for two requisites, namely: (a) the intent of the obligor to
omission or defect was technical and unimportant; that substantial compliance was prevent the fulfillment of the condition, and (b) the actual prevention of the
unacceptable because the foreign loan was material and was, in fact, the ultimate fulfillment. Mere intention of the debtor to prevent the happening of the condition, or
goal of its contract with Joaquin and Suarez; that because the obligation was to place ineffective obstacles to its compliance, without actually preventing the
indivisible and subject to a suspensive condition, Article 1181 of the Civil Code27 fulfillment, is insufficient.33chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
applied, under which a partial performance was equivalent to non-performance; and
that the award of attorney's fees should be deleted for lack of legal and factual The error lies in the CA's failure to determine IHC's intent to pre-empt Joaquin from
bases. meeting his obligations. The June 20, 1970 minutes of IHC's special board meeting
discloses that Joaquin impressed upon the members of the Board that Materials
On the part of respondents, only Joaquin filed a comment,28 arguing that the Handling was offering more favorable terms for IHC, to
petition was fatally defective for raising questions of fact; that the obligation was wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
divisible and capable of partial performance; and that the suspensive condition was
deemed fulfilled through IHC's own actions.29chanroblesvirtualawlibrary xxx

Ruling At the meeting all the members of the Board of Directors of the International Hotel
Corporation were present with the exception of Directors Benjamin J. Bautista and
We deny the petition for review on certiorari subject to the ensuing disquisitions. Sergio O. Rustia who asked to be excused because of previous engagements. In that
meeting, the President called on Mr. Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. to explain the different
1. IHC raises questions of law negotiations he had conducted relative to obtaining the needed financing for the
hotel project in keeping with the authority given to him in a resolution approved by
We first consider and resolve whether IHC's petition improperly raised questions of the Board of Directors.
fact.
Mr. Joaquin presently explained that he contacted several local and foreign financiers
A question of law exists when there is doubt as to what the law is on a certain state through different brokers and after examining the different offers he narrowed down
of facts, but, in contrast, a question of fact exists when the doubt arises as to the his choice to two (2), to wit: the foreign financier recommended by George Wright of
truth or falsity of the facts alleged. A question of law does not involve an the Roger Dunn & Company and the offer made by the Materials Handling
examination of the probative value of the evidence presented by the litigants or by Corporation.
any of them; the resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.30 When there is no dispute as to the facts, the After explaining the advantages and disadvantages to our corporation of the two (2)
question of whether or not the conclusion drawn from the facts is correct is a offers specifically with regard to the terms and repayment of the loan and the rate of
question of law.31chanroblesvirtualawlibrary interest requested by them, he concluded that the offer made by the Materials
Handling Corporation is much more advantageous because the terms and conditions
Considering that what IHC seeks to review is the CA's application of the law on the of payment as well as the rate of interest are much more reasonable and would be
facts presented therein, there is no doubt that IHC raises questions of law. The basic much less onerous to our corporation. However, he explained that the corporation
accepted, in principle, the offer of Roger Dunn, per the corporation's telegrams to
Mr. Rudolph Meir of the Private Bank of Zurich, Switzerland, and until such time as The party claiming substantial performance must show that he has attempted in
the corporation's negotiations with Roger Dunn is terminated, we are committed, on good faith to perform his contract, but has through oversight, misunderstanding or
one way or the other, to their financing. any excusable neglect failed to completely perform in certain negligible respects, for
which the other party may be adequately indemnified by an allowance and
It was decided by the Directors that, should the negotiations with Roger Dunn deduction from the contract price or by an award of damages. But a party who
materialize, at the same time as the offer of Materials Handling Corporation, that the knowingly and wilfully fails to perform his contract in any respect, or omits to
funds committed by Roger Dunn may be diverted to other borrowers of the perform a material part of it, cannot be permitted, under the protection of this rule,
Development Bank of the Philippines. With this condition, Director Joaquin showed to compel the other party, and the trend of the more recent decisions is to hold that
the advantages of the offer of Materials Handling Corporation. Mr. Joaquin also the percentage of omitted or irregular performance may in and of itself be sufficient
informed the corporation that, as of this date, the bank confirmation of Roger Dunn to show that there had not been a substantial
& Company has not been received. In view of the fact that the corporation is racing performance.37chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
against time in securing its financing, he recommended that the corporation
entertain other offers. By reason of the inconsequential nature of the breach or omission, the law deems
the performance as substantial, making it the obligee's duty to pay.38 The
After a brief exchange of views on the part of the Directors present and after hearing compulsion of payment is predicated on the substantial benefit derived by the
the clarification and explanation made by Mr. C. M. Javier who was present and who obligee from the partial performance. Although compelled to pay, the obligee is
represented the Materials Handling Corporation, the Directors present approved nonetheless entitled to an allowance for the sum required to remedy omissions or
unanimously the recommendation of Mr. Joaquin to entertain the offer of Materials defects and to complete the work agreed upon.39chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Handling Corporation.34chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Conversely, the principle of substantial performance is inappropriate when the
Evidently, IHC only relied on the opinion of its consultant in deciding to transact with incomplete performance constitutes a material breach of the contract. A contractual
Materials Handling and, later on, with Barnes. In negotiating with Barnes, IHC had no breach is material if it will adversely affect the nature of the obligation that the
intention, willful or otherwise, to prevent Joaquin and Suarez from meeting their obligor promised to deliver, the benefits that the obligee expects to receive after full
undertaking. Such absence of any intention negated the basis for the CA's reliance compliance, and the extent that the non-performance defeated the purposes of the
on Article 1186 of the Civil Code. contract.40 Accordingly, for the principle embodied in Article 1234 to apply, the
failure of Joaquin and Suarez to comply with their commitment should not defeat the
Nor do we agree with the CA's upholding of IHC's liability by virtue of Joaquin and ultimate purpose of the contract.
Suarez's substantial performance. In so ruling, the CA applied Article 1234 of the
Civil Code, which states:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary The primary objective of the parties in entering into the services agreement was to
obtain a foreign loan to finance the construction of IHC's hotel project. This objective
Article 1234. If the obligation has been substantially performed in good faith, the could be inferred from IHC's approval of phase 1 to phase 6 of the proposal. Phase 1
obligor may recover as though there had been a strict and complete fulfillment, less and phase 2, respectively the preparation of a new project study and the settlement
damages suffered by the obligee. of the unregistered mortgage, would pave the way for Joaquin and Suarez to render
assistance to IHC in applying for the DBP guaranty and thereafter to look for an able
It is well to note that Article 1234 applies only when an obligor admits breaching the and willing foreign financial institution acceptable to DBP. All the steps that Joaquin
contract35 after honestly and faithfully performing all the material elements thereof and Suarez undertook to accomplish had a single objective to secure a loan to fund
except for some technical aspects that cause no serious harm to the obligee.36 IHC the construction and eventual operations of the hotel of IHC. In that regard, Joaquin
correctly submits that the provision refers to an omission or deviation that is slight, himself admitted that his assistance was specifically sought to seek financing for
or technical and unimportant, and does not affect the real purpose of the contract. IHC's hotel project.41chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Tolentino explains the character of the obligor's breach under Article 1234 in the Needless to say, finding the foreign financier that DBP would guarantee was the
following manner, to wit:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary essence of the parties' contract, so that the failure to completely satisfy such
obligation could not be characterized as slight and unimportant as to have resulted
In order that there may be substantial performance of an obligation, there must in Joaquin and Suarez's substantial performance that consequentially benefitted IHC.
have been an attempt in good faith to perform, without any willful or intentional Whatever benefits IHC gained from their services could only be minimal, and were
departure therefrom. The deviation from the obligation must be slight, and the even probably outweighed by whatever losses IHC suffered from the delayed
omission or defect must be technical and unimportant, and must not pervade the construction of its hotel. Consequently, Article 1234 did not apply.
whole or be so material that the object which the parties intended to accomplish in a
particular manner is not attained. The non-performance of a material part of a 3. IHC is nonetheless liable to pay under the rule on constructive fulfillment of a
contract will prevent the performance from amounting to a substantial compliance. mixed conditional obligation
 estimated maximum to fund the expenses in undertaking phase 6 of the scope of
Notwithstanding the inapplicability of Article 1186 and Article 1234 of the Civil Code, services. Its conclusion was unquestionably borne out by the minutes of the
IHC was liable based on the nature of the obligation. February 11, 1969 meeting, viz:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Considering that the agreement between the parties was not circumscribed by a xxx
definite period, its termination was subject to a condition the happening of a future
and uncertain event.42 The prevailing rule in conditional obligations is that the II
acquisition of rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired,
shall depend upon the happening of the event that constitutes the The preparation of the necessary papers for the DBP including the preparation of the
condition.43chanroblesvirtualawlibrary application, the presentation of the mechanics of financing, the actual follow up with
the different departments of the DBP which includes the explanation of the
To recall, both the RTC and the CA held that Joaquin and Suarez's obligation was feasibility studies up to the approval of the loan, conditioned on the DBP's
subject to the suspensive condition of successfully securing a foreign loan acceptance of the project as feasible. The estimated expenses for this particular
guaranteed by DBP. IHC agrees with both lower courts, and even argues that the phase would be contingent, i.e. upon DBP's approval of the plan now being studied
obligation with a suspensive condition did not arise when the event or occurrence and prepared, is somewhere around P2,000,000.00.
did not happen. In that instance, partial performance of the contract subject to the
suspensive condition was tantamount to no performance at all. As such, the After a brief discussion on the matter, the Board on motion duly made and
respondents were not entitled to any compensation. seconded, unanimously adopted a resolution of the following
tenor:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
We have to disagree with IHC's argument.
RESOLUTION NO. ______
To secure a DBP-guaranteed foreign loan did not solely depend on the diligence or (Series of 1969)
the sole will of the respondents because it required the action and discretion of third
persons an able and willing foreign financial institution to provide the needed funds, "RESOLVED, as it is hereby RESOLVED, that if the Reparations allocation and the plan
and the DBP Board of Governors to guarantee the loan. Such third persons could not being negotiated with the DBP is realized the estimated maximum expenses of
be legally compelled to act in a manner favorable to IHC. There is no question that P2,000,000.00 for this phase is hereby authorized subject to the sound discretion of
when the fulfillment of a condition is dependent partly on the will of one of the the committee composed of Justice Felix Angelo Bautista, Jose N. Valero and Ephraim
contracting parties,44 or of the obligor, and partly on chance, hazard or the will of a G. Gochangco."47 (Emphasis supplied)
third person, the obligation is mixed.45 The existing rule in a mixed conditional
obligation is that when the condition was not fulfilled but the obligor did all in his Joaquin's claim for the additional sum of P500,000.00 was similarly without factual
power to comply with the obligation, the condition should be deemed and legal bases. He had requested the payment of that amount to cover services
satisfied.46chanroblesvirtualawlibrary rendered and still to be rendered to IHC separately from those covered by the first
six phases of the scope of work. However, there is no reason to hold IHC liable for
Considering that the respondents were able to secure an agreement with Weston, that amount due to his failure to present sufficient proof of the services rendered
and subsequently tried to reverse the prior cancellation of the guaranty by DBP, we towards that end. Furthermore, his July 11, 1969 letter revealed that the additional
rule that they thereby constructively fulfilled their obligation. services that he had supposedly rendered were identical to those enumerated in the
technical proposal, thus:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
4. Quantum meruit should apply in the absence of an express agreement on the fees
The Board of Directors
The next issue to resolve is the amount of the fees that IHC should pay to Joaquin
and Suarez. International Hotel Corporation

Joaquin claimed that aside from the approved P2,000,000.00 fee to implement Thru: Justice Felix Angelo Bautista
phase 1 to phase 6, the IHC Board of Directors had approved an additional President & Chairman of the Board
P500,000.00 as payment for his services. The RTC declared that he and Suarez were
entitled to P200,000.00 each, but the CA revised the amounts to P700,000.00 for Gentlemen:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Joaquin and P200,000.00 for Suarez.
I have the honor to request this Body for its deliberation and action on the fees for
Anent the P2,000,000.00, the CA rightly concluded that the full amount of my services rendered and to be rendered to the hotel project and to the corporation.
P2,000,000.00 could not be awarded to respondents because such amount was not These fees are separate from the fees you have approved in your previous Board
allocated exclusively to compensate respondents, but was intended to be the Resolution, since my fees are separate. I realize the position of the corporation at
present, in that it is not in a financial position to pay my services in cash, therefore, I 9. We have performed other services for the corporation which led to the
am requesting this Body to consider payment of my fees even in the form of shares cooperation and understanding of the different factions of this corporation.
of stock, as you have done to the other technical men and for other services
rendered to the corporation by other people. I have rendered services to your corporation for the past 6 months with no clear
understanding as to the compensation of my services. All I have drawn from the
Inasmuch as my fees are contingent on the successful implementation of this corporation is the amount of P500.00 dated May 12, 1969 and personal payment
project, I request that my fees be based on a percentage of the total project cost. advanced by Justice Felix Angelo Bautista in the amount of P1,000.00.
The fees which I consider reasonable for the services that I have rendered to the
project up to the completion of its construction is P500,000.00. I believe said amount I am, therefore, requesting this Body for their approval of my fees. I have shown my
is reasonable since this is approximately only of 1% of the total project cost. good faith and willingness to render services to your corporation which is evidenced
by my continued services in the past 6 months as well as the accomplishments
So far, I have accomplished Phases 1-5 of my report dated February 1, 1969 and above mentioned. I believe that the final completion of this hotel, at least for the
which you authorized us to do under Board Resolution of February 11, 1969. It is processing of the DBP up to the completion of the construction, will take
only Phase 6 which now remains to be implemented. For my appointment as approximately another 2 years. In view of the above, I again reiterate my request for
Consultant dated May 12, 1969 and the Board Resolution dated June 23, 1969 your approval of my fees. When the corporation is in a better financial position, I will
wherein I was appointed to the Technical Committee, it now follows that I have been request for a withdrawal of a monthly allowance, said amount to be determined by
also authorized to implement part of Phases 7 & 8. this Body.

A brief summary of my accomplished work has been as Very truly yours,

follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
(Sgd.)
1. I have revised and made the new Project Study of your hotel project, making it Francisco G., Joaquin, Jr.48
bankable and feasible. (Emphasis supplied)

2. I have reduced the total cost of your project by approximately P24,735,000.00. Joaquin could not even rest his claim on the approval by IHC's Board of Directors.
The approval apparently arose from the confusion between the supposedly separate
3. I have seen to it that a registered mortgage with the Reparations Commission did services that Joaquin had rendered and those to be done under the technical
not affect the application with the IBP for approval to processing. proposal. The minutes of the July 11, 1969 board meeting (when the Board of
Directors allowed the payment for Joaquin's past services and for the 70% project
4. I have prepared the application papers acceptable to the DBP by means of an completion by the technical group) showed as follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
advance analysis and the presentation of the financial mechanics, which was
accepted by the DBP. III

5. I have presented the financial mechanics of the loan wherein the requirement of The Third order of business is the compensation of Mr. Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. for his
the DBP for an additional P19,000,000.00 in equity from the corporation became services in the corporation.
unnecessary.
After a brief discussion that ensued, upon motion duly made and seconded, the
6. The explanation of the financial mechanics and the justification of this project was stockholders unanimously approved a resolution of the following
instrumental in changing the original recommendation of the Investment Banking tenor:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Department of the DBP, which recommended disapproval of this application, to the
present recommendation of the Real Estate Department which is for the approval of RESOLUTION NO. ___
this project for proceeding. (Series of 1969)

7. I have submitted to you several offers already of foreign financiers which are in "RESOLVED that Mr. Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. be granted a compensation in the
your files. We are presently arranging the said financiers to confirm their funds to amount of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000.00) Pesos for his past services and
the DBP for our project, services still to be rendered in the future to the corporation up to the completion of
the Project. The President is given full discretion to discuss with Mr. Joaquin the
8. We have secured the approval of the DBP to process the loan application of this manner of payment of said compensation, authorizing him to pay part in stock and
corporation as per its letter July 2, 1969. part in cash."
Incidentally, it was also taken up the necessity of giving the Technical Group a No costs of suit.
portion of the compensation that was authorized by this corporation in its Resolution
of February 11, 1969 considering that the assistance so far given the corporation by SO ORDERED.
said Technical Group in continuing our project with the DBP and its request for
guaranty for a foreign loan is 70% completed leaving only some details which are
now being processed. It is estimated that P400,000.00 worth of Common Stock THIRD DIVISION
would be reasonable for the present accomplishments and to this effect, the
President is authorized to issue the same in the name of the Technical Group, as [G.R. No. 124074. January 27, 1997.]
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
RESEARCH and SERVICES REALTY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
P200,000.00 in Common Stock to Rafael Suarez, an associate in the Technical Group, MANUEL S. FONACIER, JR., Respondents.
and P200,000.00 in Common stock to Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr., also a member of the
Technical Group.49chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Manuel M. Lazaro and Felipe S. Aldana for Petitioner.

Lastly, the amount purportedly included services still to be rendered that supposedly Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., for Private Respondent.
extended until the completion of the construction of the hotel. It is basic, however,
that in obligations to do, there can be no payment unless the obligation has been
completely rendered.50chanroblesvirtualawlibrary SYLLABUS

It is notable that the confusion on the amounts of compensation arose from the
parties' inability to agree on the fees that respondents should receive. Considering 1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; COMPENSATION OF
the absence of an agreement, and in view of respondents' constructive fulfillment of ATTORNEYS; AGREEMENT AS TO FEES; CONTRACT OF RETAINER IN CASE AT BAR;
their obligation, the Court has to apply the principle of quantum meruit in CONSTRUED. An analysis of the contract clearly shows that it was a general
determining how much was still due and owing to respondents. Under the principle retainer since its primary purpose was to secure beforehand the services of the
of quantum meruit, a contractor is allowed to recover the reasonable value of the private respondent for any legal problem which might afterward arise. The fixed
services rendered despite the lack of a written contract.51 The measure of recovery retaining fee was P800.00 a month. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to
under the principle should relate to the reasonable value of the services ensure and secure a lawyers future services, to remunerate him for being deprived
performed.52 The principle prevents undue enrichment based on the equitable by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other
postulate that it is unjust for a person to retain any benefit without paying for it. party and of receiving pay from him. In the absence of an agreement to the
Being predicated on equity, the principle should only be applied if no express contrary, the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration of the
contract was entered into, and no specific statutory provision was services contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed to pay for the
applicable.53chanroblesvirtualawlibrary services which he has retained him to perform. In the retainer contract in question,
there was no intention to make the retaining fee as the attorneys fees for the
Under the established circumstances, we deem the total amount of P200,000.00 to services contemplated. This is evident from the provision allowing additional
be reasonable compensation for respondents' services under the principle of attorneys fees in collection cases consisting of (1) a "contingent fee" and (2)
quantum meruit. whatever the petitioner might recover as attorneys fees in each case. The latter
could only refer to the attorneys fees which the court might award to the petitioner
Finally, we sustain IHC's position that the grant of attorney's fees lacked factual or in appropriate cases.
legal basis. Attorney's fees are not awarded every time a party prevails in a suit
because of the policy that no premium should be placed on the right to litigate. 2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ABSENCE OF THE STIPULATION OF ADDITIONAL
There should be factual or legal support in the records before the award of such fees ATTORNEYS FEES IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A BAR TO THE
is sustained. It is not enough justification for the award simply because respondents COLLECTION OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEYS FEES IN NON-COLLECTION CASES;
were compelled to protect their rights.54chanroblesvirtualawlibrary APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES. While the contract did not mention non-collection cases,
it is, nevertheless, clear therefrom that such cases were not excluded from the
ACCORDINGLY, the Court DENIES the petition for review on certiorari; and AFFIRMS retainership, as borne out by the provision requiring the private respondent to "make
the decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 8, 2002 in C.A.-G.R. appearances in court for cases involving the corporation or any allied cases
NO. 47094 subject to the MODIFICATIONS that: (a) International Hotel Corporation is pertaining to the latter." As to such cases, there was no specific stipulation of
ordered to. pay Francisco G. Joaquin, Jr. and Rafael Suarez P100,000.00 each as additional attorneys fees. Nevertheless, nothing therein shows that the private
compensation for their services, and (b) the award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees respondent agreed to render professional service in such cases gratuitously. The
is deleted. absence then of the stipulation of additional attorneys fees cannot be construed as
a bar to the collection of additional attorneys fees in non-collection cases. Two basic
principles come into play. The first is as stated earlier, viz., that the retaining fee is
neither made nor received in consideration of the services contemplated unless the 4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING THE
contract itself so provides. The second is that, unless expressly stipulated, rendition REASONABLENESS OF A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEYS FEES; CASE AT BAR. This court
of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or compensation and is not had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in determining
gratuitous. This is implicit from the opening clause of Section 24, Rule 138 of the the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys fees: (1) the amount and character of
Rules of Court, which states that "[a]n attorney shall be entitled to have and recover the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, . . ." and by importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give), as enunciated responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property
by this Court in Corpus v. Court of Appeals. Accordingly, as to non-collection cases affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and
where the petitioner was either a plaintiff or a defendant, the private respondent experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional
could still collect attorneys fees, apart from his regular retaining fee, on the basis of character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether
any supplemental agreement or, in its absence, under the principle of quantum the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may properly
meruit. There was no such supplemental agreement in this case. charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is not. Rule 20.1, Canon
20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the factors which should
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FEE "ON CONTINGENT BASIS"; UNWARRANTED IN CASE AT guide a lawyer in determining his fees. It was incumbent upon the private
BAR; REASONS. We cannot sustain the private respondents theory that he could respondent to prove the reasonable amount of attorneys fees, taking into account
collect attorneys fees on contingent basis because in the other "non- collection" the foregoing factors or circumstances. The records before us and the trial courts 11
cases he handled for the petitioner, he was paid on contingent basis at the rate of October 1993 order do not confirm that the private respondent proved by either
10% of what was awarded to the petitioner. In the first place, Civil Case No. 612 is testimonial or documentary evidence that the award of P600,000.00 was
still unresolved, and no judgment has yet been rendered in favor of the petitioner. reasonable. The private respondents testimony thereon was crucial. Yet, it does not
The amount in the memorandum of agreement could not be made the basis of a appear from the 11 October 1993 order that he took the witness stand. From the
"contingent fee" in the said case for at least three reasons. First, in his own Urgent Minutes of the trial court attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV NO. 44839, it appears
Motion to Direct Payment of Attorneys Fees and/or Register Attorneys Charging that only Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony on the motion. It
Lien, the private respondent based the contingent fee not only in Civil Case No. 612 necessarily follows then that the 11 October 1993 order has insufficient factual
but in a "multitude of peripheral cases," and the contingent fee would become due basis, and the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the
and collectible only if and when the petitioner obtains a judgment in his favor in Civil private respondents attorneys fees at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said
Case No. 612. Second, the amount of P28 million, which Filstream agreed to pay the order by the Court of Appeals premised on the provision in the retainer contract
petitioner, was not a judgment or award in favor of the petitioner in Civil Case No. regarding contingent fee is thus fatally flawed.
612. It was the consideration of the assignment, transfer, and conveyance to
Filstream of all the petitioners "rights, interest and participation embodied and
specified in the Joint Venture Agreement (Annex "A") and all the eight hundred DECISION
seventy-five (875) parcels of land comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision . . .
The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 612 were not parties to the memorandum of
agreement and there is no showing that they agreed to the assignment of the DAVIDE, JR., J.:
petitioners rights, interest, and participation in the Joint Venture Agreement. While
paragraph 10 of the memorandum of agreement provides that the petitioner shall
cause to sign a JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, together with the CARREONS regarding This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questions
Civil Case No. 612 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and to further DISMISS, the the propriety of the award for, and the reasonableness of the amount of, attorneys
case filed against PNB docketed as Civil Case No. 6918 of the Regional Trial Court of fees granted in favor of the private respondent by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Makati . . . [and] shall obtain the dismissal of all cases filed by lot buyers against it Makati City, Branch 64, 1 in Civil Case No. 612, 2 which the Court of Appeals
now pending with the HLURB the fact remains that no such motion to dismiss has affirmed in its decision 3 of 31 March 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839.
been filed yet in Civil Case No. 612, and there is no assurance whatsoever that the
plaintiffs therein will sign a joint motion to dismiss. Third, as correctly posited by the The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
petitioner, the private respondent had no participation in the negotiations leading to,
and in the preparation of, the memorandum of agreement. Indisputably then, the On 3 November 1969, the petitioner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with
private respondents attorneys fee on "contingent basis" in Civil Case No. 612 is Jose, Fidel, and Antonia Carreon. Under the said agreement, the petitioner undertook
unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to attorneys fees on quantum meruit to develop, subdivide, administer, and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned
basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31 March 1993. Quantum meruit by the Carreons. The proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be paid to the
simply means "as much as he deserves." In no case, however, must a lawyer be Philippine National Bank (PNB) for the landowners mortgage obligation, and the net
allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to Section 24, Rule 138 profits to be shared by the contracting parties on a 50-50 basis.
of the Rules of Court.
On 4 April 1983, the Carreons and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before the various pleadings and represented it in Court (See Records after May 1985). Until his
RTC of Makati City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint Venture services were terminated the lawyer client relationship between Atty. Fonacier and
Agreement. They prayed therein that pending the hearing of the case, a writ of Research was governed by a "contract" embodied in a letter addressed to Atty.
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the petitioner from selling the lots subject Fonacier on April 19, 1985 [sic], the pertinent portion of which is reproduced below,
of the agreement and that after hearing, the writ be made permanent; the as follows . . .
agreement be rescinded; and the petitioner be ordered to pay the PNB the stipulated
15% per annum of the outstanding obligation and to pay the plaintiffs attorneys x x x
fees, exemplary damages, expenses of litigation, and costs of suit. This case was
docketed as Civil Case No. 612 at Branch 64 of the said court.
Soon after said letter, cases were referred to him including this case. In accordance
In its answer, which was prepared and signed by Atty. Apolonio G. Reyes, the with their agreement, there were instances that Research gave Atty. Fonacier ten
petitioner sought the denial of the writ of preliminary injunction, the dismissal of the (10%) percent of the amount received as the latters attorneys fees pursuant to
complaint, and payment in its favor of (a) P10 million by way of actual damages; (b) their agreement.
P5 million by way of return to the petitioner of the amount advanced to the
Carreons, payments to the PNB, and cost of the work on the subdivision; (c) The instant case in which defendant is praying to be awarded attorneys fees, is an
P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages; (d) any and all damages up to the action for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement between plaintiffs, Patricio
amount of P4,638,420.00 which the petitioner may suffer under the terms of its Sarile, Et Al., as owners of a parcel of land and defendant Research & Service Realty,
Performance Bond in favor of the National Housing Authority; (e) P50,000.00 as Inc., as developer of the land. At the time Atty. Fonacier entered his appearance as
attorneys fees; and (f) costs of suit. counsel for defendant Research, the Court has issued a preliminary injunction
against Research. Thus all developmental and commercial activities of defendant
On 9 April 1985, the petitioner engaged the services of private respondent Atty. had to stop. In this regard, Atty. Fonacier did spade work towards persuading the
Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., 4 who then entered his appearance in Civil Case No. 612. plaintiffs to agree to the relaxation of the effects of the injunction to pave the way to
a negotiation with a third-party, the Filstream. Atty. Fonanciers efforts were
While the said case was pending, or on 24 July 1992, the petitioner, without the complemented by the efforts of his counterpart in the plaintiffs side. The third-party
knowledge of the private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement Filstream Inc., became the assignee of defendant Research. In this connection, a
(MOA) 5 with another land developer, Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter memorandum of agreement was entered into between them. By the terms of
Filstream). Under this MOA, the former assigned its rights and obligations under the agreement, defendant Research will be receiving from the third party Filstream
Joint Venture Agreement in favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million, International, Inc. (Filstream) the following amount. . . .
payable within twenty four months.
x x x
On 31 March 1993, the petitioner terminated the legal services of the private
respondent. At the time the petitioner had already received P7 million from
Filstream. The termination of the legal services of Atty. Fonacier was made definite on March
31, 1993 at which time the Memorandum of Agreement which Research entered into
Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, the private respondent filed in Civil Case with Filstream, Inc., has already been effective. By this time also, defendant
No. 612 an Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorneys Fees and/or Register Research has already received the first two stipulated consideration of the
Attorneys Charging Lien praying, among other things, that the petitioner be ordered agreement in the total sum of Six Million (P6,000,000.00). The necessary and legal
to pay him the sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in the case. 6 consequence of said "Memorandum of Agreement" is the termination of the case
insofar as plaintiff Patricio Sarile, Et Al. and defendant Research is concerned. The
After hearing the motion, the trial court issued an order dated 11 October 1993 conclusion of the Memorandum of Agreement insofar as the cause of Research is
directing the petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P600,000.00 as concerned, is a legal victory for defendant Research. What could have been a loss in
attorneys fees on the basis of quantum meruit. investment has been turned to a legal victory. Atty. Fonanciers effort contributed to
defendants victory, albeit outside the Court which would not have been possible
The trial court justified the award in this manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library without the legal maneuvering of a lawyer.

Insofar as material to the resolution of this motion the records of this case show that The dismissal of the case before this Court will come in a matter of time considering
movant Atty. Fonacier became the counsel of defendant Research in May 1985 while that plaintiffs, with the assumption by the third party, Filstream Inc., of what were
this case has been in progress. (Records, p. 770). By this time also, the defendant supposed to be the obligations to them of defendant Research pursuant to their Joint
Research has been enjoined by the Court from executing Contracts To Sell involving Venture Agreement, is no longer interested in pursuing the rescission.
Saranay Homes Subdivision . . . (Order dated December 3, 1984, Records pp. 625-
626). However, the said counsel for defendant Research prepared for the latter
It is a matter of record that Atty. Fonacier is the last of the three lawyers who
handled this case. Moreover it is Atty. Fonacier who contributed to the forging of the Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees and collection cases
memorandum of agreement as testified to by Atty. Rogel Atienza one of the two (case to case basis) aside from the attorneys fee recovered from any law suit.
retained counsels of plaintiffs.
(Paragraph 3, Retainer Contract)
Considering the importance which is attached to this case, certainly it would not be
fair for Atty. Fonacier if his attorneys fees in this case would be equated only to the In an American jurisprudence on this point cited in local annotation on the Canon of
measly monthly allowance of (P800.00) Pesos and office space and other office Professional Ethics, it was held that "if a lawyer renders valuable services to one who
facilities provided by defendant Research. Ten (10%) per cent of the amount which receives the benefits thereof, a promise to pay a reasonable value is presumed,
Research had received from Filstream at the time of the termination of a lawyer- unless such services were intended to be gratuitous" (Young v. Buere, 78 Cal. Am.
client relationship between Atty. Fonacier and Research or P600,000.00 will be a just 127) In effect, to compensate a lawyer, we are faced with the pivotal question: "was
and equitable compensation for Atty. Fonanciers legal services, by way of quantum the legal services intended to be free or not?" If it is not free, then, appellant must
meruit (See Cabildo v. Provincial Treasurer, Ilocos Norte, Et Al., 54 SCRA 26). 7 simply pay. The 10% contingent fee of the amount collected and/or to be collected in
Civil Case No. 612 of the lower court, is, to Our mind fair and reasonable. As ruled by
In its Order 8 of 12 January 1994, the trial court denied the petitioners motion for the Supreme Court in the case of Cosmopolitan Insurance Co. v. Angel Reyes (G.R. L-
reconsideration of the above order. 20199, Nov. 23, 1995) 15% was even deemed reasonable. 11

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Appellants Brief, 9 the The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 12 on the ground among other
petitioner alleged that the private respondent was not entitled to attorneys fees things, that the decision is contrary to the evidence, as the trial court granted the
under the retainer contract. Moreover, the private respondent did not exert any claim for attorneys fees based on quantum meruit, yet, the Court of Appeals
effort to amicably settle the case, nor was he even present during the negotiations granted the same on a contingent basis which it based on an erroneous quotation
for the settlement of the same. There was, therefore, no legal and factual and comprehension of the following provision of the retainer contract:chanrob1es
justification for the private respondents "fantastic and unreasonable claim for virtual 1aw library
attorneys fees of P600,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw library
Minimal allowance of P800.00 per month plus contingent fees on collection cases
On the other hand, the private respondent asserted that he was assured by the (case to case basis) aside from the attorneys fees recovered from any law suit.
petitioner that non-collection cases were included in the contingent fee arrangement (Emphasis ours) 13
specified in the retainer contract wherein there was to be contingent compensation
for any award arising from any lawsuit handled by him. According to him, Civil Case In its decision, the Court of Appeals substituted the word "on" after "contingent fees"
No. 612 was not the only "non-collection" case he handled for the petitioner. There with the word "and." Under the aforequoted paragraph, the private respondent was
was a "right of way" dispute where the petitioner was awarded P50,000.00, and the entitled to attorneys fees on contingent basis in collection cases only. In non
latter paid him P5,000.00, or 10% of the award as attorneys fees. He thus stressed collection cases, he was entitled only to the attorneys fees that might be recovered
that since under the memorandum of agreement the petitioner was to receive P28 in the lawsuit. 14 Since Civil Case No. 612 is not a collection case but an action for
million, he should be entitled to 10% thereof or P2.8 million as attorneys fees. rescission of a contract, then the aforequoted paragraph is not applicable as a basis
chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary for awarding attorneys fees to the private respondent. 15

In its decision 10 of 31 March 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged Finding nothing new in the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied it
order of the trial court. It ratiocinated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library in the resolution 16 of 15 February 1996.

Movant-appellee, on the other hand, correctly argues that it was the clear intention The petitioner then came to us via this petition for review wherein it contends that
of appellant and counsel to compensate the latter for any legal services rendered by
him to the former. Stated otherwise, it was never the intention of the parties in the I
instant appeal that counsels services shall be free or to be rendered ex gratia.

x x x RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH
LAW AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE.

It must in addition be underscored that the retainer contract of April 9, 1985 is the II
law that governs the relationship between appellant and appellee. In fact, the
following provisions squarely and categorically supports the award of P600,000.00 to
counsel, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN adjudication in favor of the petitioner as the defendant therein. Since such lien is
AWARDING ON CONTINGENT BASIS RESPONDENT-APPELLEES ATTORNEYS FEES ON collectible only from an award of money that a court would adjudicate in a judgment
THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT IN WHICH HE HAD NO rendered in favor of the attorneys client pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the
PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATION AND PREPARATION THEREOF. Rules of Court, it would follow that no attorneys charging lien could be validly
entered.
III
We uphold the petitioner, but not necessarily on the strength of its arguments.

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN AWARDING The parties are in agreement that the lawyer-client relationship between the
EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE ATTORNEYS FEES. petitioner and the private respondent, Atty. Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., was governed by
a retainer contract dated 9 April 1985. The petitioners undertakings thereunder are
IV outlined as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. CORPORAT[ION]:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE NO
JURISDICTION TO SATISFY ATTORNEYS CHARGING LIEN ON A SUM OF MONEY THAT 1. Corporation will provide the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE OF AND OVER WHICH THE TRIAL
COURT HAD MADE NO FINAL ADJUDICATION. a. Office space airconditioned

The petitioners more important argument in support of the first error is the Court of b. Furnishings, tables, executive chairs, visitors chair & steel filing cabinet
Appeals misquotation of the provision in the retainer contract regarding attorneys
fees on contingent basis, which the petitioner had stressed in its motion for c. Telephone facilities and partial secretarial services.
reconsideration. The petitioner maintains that under the contract, attorneys fees on
contingent basis could only be awarded in collection cases, and Civil Case No. 612 is 2. Legal service referrals by the corporation to its clients for additional income
not a collection case. Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award on of the lawyer.
that basis, while the trial court was correct in applying the principle of quantum
meruit. 3. Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees on contingent
fees on collection cases (case to case basis) aside from the attorneys fees
In its second assigned error, the petitioner asserts that the private respondent recovered from any lawsuit.
admitted in his Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorneys Fees and/or Register
Attorneys Charging Lien that he had not participated in the negotiations and 4. That in case of legal problems to be attended to outside Metro Manila and
preparation of the memorandum of agreement, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Suburbs, the corporation shall defray expenses for transportation, lodging and other
legal expenses incidental in the case. 18
Despite the dishonest concealment, by the light of Providence coupled with a streak
of good luck, counsel discovered in the first week of March 1993 that the parties had An analysis of the contract clearly shows that it was a general retainer, since its
respectively entered into a meaningful agreement with a third-party as early as July primary purpose was to secure beforehand the services of the private respondent for
27, 1992, which in the case of client, case in the form of a "Memorandum of any legal problem which might afterward arise. 19 The fixed retaining fee was
Agreement" (MOA) . . . 17 P800.00 a month. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to ensure and secure a
lawyers future services, to remunerate him for being deprived, by being retained by
The third assigned error is but a logical consequence of the second, and the one party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other party and of
petitioner maintains that since the private respondent "did not do anything receiving pay from him. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the
spectacular or out of the ordinary" in Civil Case No. 612, "except to ask for the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration of the services
suspension or postponement of the proceedings thereof from 1985 to 1993," the contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed to pay for the services
P600,000.00 attorneys fees, whether on contingent basis or quantum meruit, is which he has retained him to perform. 20
excessive and unreasonable.
In the retainer contract in question, there was no intention to make the retaining fee
In the fourth imputed error, the petitioner argues that the memorandum of as the attorneys fees for the services contemplated. This is evident from the
agreement was never submitted to the trial court, and the trial court never made provision allowing additional attorneys fees in collection cases consisting of (1) a
any disposition or adjudication over the proceeds of the said agreement. What would "contingent fee" and (2) whatever the petitioner might recover as attorneys fees in
eventually happen then is the dismissal of Civil Case No. 612, as the trial court itself each case. The latter could only refer to the attorneys fees which the court might
had intimated in its challenged order. Necessarily then, there would be no money award to the petitioner in appropriate cases.
 the petitioner he was paid on contingent basis at the rate of 10% of what was
While the contract did not mention non-collection cases, it is, nevertheless, clear awarded to the petitioner. In the first place, Civil Case No. 612 is still unresolved, and
therefrom that such eases were not excluded from the retainership, as borne out by no judgment has yet been rendered in favor of the petitioner. The amount in the
the provision requiring the private respondent to "make appearances in Court for memorandum of agreement could not be made the basis of a "contingent fee" in the
eases involving the corporation or any allied cases pertaining to the latter." As to said case for at least three reasons. First, in his own Urgent Motion to Direct Payment
such cases, there was no specific stipulation of additional attorneys fees. of Attorneys Fees and/or Register Attorneys Charging Lien, the private respondent
Nevertheless, nothing therein shows that the private respondent agreed to render based the contingent fee not only in Civil Case No. 612 but in a "multitude of
professional service in such cases gratuitously. The absence then of the stipulation peripheral cases," and the contingent fee would become due and collectible only if
of additional attorneys fees cannot be construed as a bar to the collection of and when the petitioner obtains a judgment in his favor in Civil Case No. 612. The
additional attorneys fees in non-collection cases. second paragraph of page 3 of the said motion reads as follows:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
Two basic principles come into play. The first is as stated earlier, viz., that the
retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration of the services Hence, from May 1985 and continuously thru the years without interruption and
contemplated unless the contract itself so provides. The second is that, unless surviving a series of no less than five (5) changes of Presiding Judges, the
expressly stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or undersigned counsel labored tirelessly in handling the defense of client. In addition
compensation and is not gratuitous. This is implicit from the opening clause of to the instant lawsuit, a multitude of peripheral cases, civil, criminal and
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[a]n attorney shall be administrative, arising from the non-delivery of titles by client on fully paid lots in
entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable the subdivision project were also filed as a consequence, not only against defendant
compensation for his services . . .," and by virtue of the innominate contract of facio but also against its President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). Needless to state,
ut des (I do and you give), as enunciated by this Court in Corpus v. Court of Appeals, the undersigned was designated to handle majority of these cases for both, where
21 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library he appeared and conducted trial without any "appearance fees" for more than eight
(8) long years solely relying on the contingent fee in case of recovery in the instant
Moreover, the payment of attorneys fees . . . may also be justified by virtue of the main case. 23 (Emphasis supplied)
innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the
principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." Second, the amount of P28 million, which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was
Innominate contracts have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code not a judgment or award in favor of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. It was the
by providing under Article 1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the consideration of the assignment, transfer, and conveyance to Filstream of all the
stipulations of the parties, by the general provisions or principles of obligations and petitioners "rights, interest and participation embodied and specified in the Joint
contracts, by the rules governing the most analogous nominate contracts, and by Venture Agreement (Annex "A") and in all the eight hundred seventy-five (875)
the customs of the people. The rationale of this article was stated in the 1903 case parcels of land comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision. . . ." The plaintiffs in
of Perez v. Pomar (2 Phil. 682). Civil Case No. 612 were not parties to the memorandum of agreement, and there is
no showing that they agreed to the assignment of the petitioners rights, interest,
In Perez v. Pomar, 22 this Court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library and participation in the Joint Venture Agreement. While paragraph 10 of the
memorandum of agreement provides that the petitioner
[B]ut whether the plaintiffs services were solicited or whether they were offered to
the defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and shall cause to sign a JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, together with the CARREONS
made use of by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual regarding Civil Case No. 612 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and to further
consent as to the rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the DISMISS, the case filed against PNB docketed as Civil Case No. 6918 of the Regional
person benefited by the services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral Trial Court of Makati . . . [and] shall obtain the dismissal of all cases filed by lot
obligation to render service as interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay buyers against it now pending with the HLURB
for the services rendered, is thereby incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the
Civil Code). the fact remains that no such motion to dismiss has been filed yet in Civil Case No.
612, and there is no assurance whatsoever that the plaintiffs therein will sign a joint
Accordingly, as to non-collection cases where the petitioner was either a plaintiff or a motion to dismiss. Third, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the private
defendant, the private respondent could still collect attorneys fees, apart from his respondent had no participation in the negotiations leading to, and in the
regular retaining fee, on the basis of any-supplemental agreement or, in its absence, preparation of, the memorandum of agreement.
under the principle of quantum meruit. There was no such supplemental agreement
in this case. Indisputably then, the private respondents attorneys fee on "contingent basis" in
Civil Case No. 612 is unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to attorneys
We cannot sustain the private respondents theory that he could collect attorneys fees on quantum meruit basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31
fees on contingent basis because in the other "non-collection" cases he handled for March 1993.
 (i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
Quantum meruit simply means "as much as he deserves." 24 In no case, however,
must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable pursuant to (j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library It was incumbent upon the private respondent to prove the reasonable amount of
attorneys fees, taking into account the foregoing factors or circumstances. The
SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. An attorney records before us and the trial courts 11 October 1993 order do not confirm that the
shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable private respondent proved by either testimonial or documentary evidence that the
compensation for his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of award of P600,000.00 was reasonable. The private respondents testimony thereon
the controversy, the extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing was crucial. Yet, it does not appear from the 11 October 1993 order that he took the
of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witness stand. From the Minutes of the trial court attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV
witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and No. 44839, 26 it appears that only Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for on the motion.
services shall control the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be
unconscionable or unreasonable. It necessarily follows then that the 11 October 1993 order has insufficient factual
basis, and the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the
This Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in private respondents attorneys fees at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorneys fees: (1) the amount and order by the Court of Appeals premised on the provision in the retainer contract
character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the regarding contingent fee is thus fatally flawed.
nature and importance of the litigation or business in which the services were
rendered; (4) the responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of The interest for both the petitioner and the private respondent demands that the
the property affected by the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill trial court should conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. 612 relative to the
and experience called for in the performance of the services; (7) the professional private respondents motion for the payment of attorneys fees and, thereafter, fix it
character and social standing of the attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) in light of Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the
whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being recognized that an attorney may Code of Professional Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially established guiding
properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent than when it is principles in determining attorneys fees on quantum meruit basis.
not.25cralaw:red
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 31 March
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839 and the Order of 11 October
following factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:chanrob1es 1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 612 are
virtual 1aw library hereby SET ASIDE. The trial court is further DIRECTED to set for further hearing the
private respondents Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorneys Fees and/or
(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required; Register Attorneys Charging Lien and thereafter to fix the private respondents
attorneys fees in Civil Case No. 612 as of 31 March 1993 when his contract with the
(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved; petitioner was effectively terminated, taking into account Section 24, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court; Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and
(c) The importance of the subject matter; the jurisprudentially established guiding principles in determining attorneys fees on
quantum meruit basis.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
(d) The skill demanded;
No pronouncement as to costs.
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case; SO ORDERED.

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the Narvasa, C.J., Melo, Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., concur.
IBP Chapter to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the FIRST DIVISION
client from the service;
[G.R. No. 104600. July 2, 1999.]
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA, Petitioners, v. EASTERN applications were not acted upon, ETPI brought the case up to the Court of Appeals
TELECOMMUNICATIONS PHILS., INC. and PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE COMPANY, by petition for certiorari.
Respondents.
On June 28, 1988, petitioner received a letter from ETPI signed by E. M. Villanueva,
President and Chief Executive Officer. In substance, the letter stated that ETPI was
DECISION terminating the retainer contract dated October 1, 1987, effective June 30, 1988.

On June 29, 1988, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court a notice of attorneys
PARDO, J.: lien, furnishing copies to the plaintiff ETPI, to the signatory of the termination letter
and PLDT. On the same date, petitioner additionally sent a letter to ETPI attaching its
partial billing statement. In its notice, RADA informed the court that there were
The Issue negotiations toward a compromise between ETPI and PLDT.

The basic issue submitted for consideration of the Court is whether or not petitioner In April 1990, petitioner confirmed that indeed the parties arrived at an amicable
is entitled to recover attorneys fees amounting to Twenty Six Million Three Hundred settlement and that the same was entered as a judgment. On April 26, 1990,
Fifty Thousand Seven Hundred Seventy Nine Pesos and Ninety One Centavos petitioner filed a motion for the enforcement of attorneys lien with the Regional Trial
(P26,350,779.91) for handling the case for its client Eastern Telecommunications Court of Makati and then appraised the Supreme Court thereof by manifestation. 2
Philippines, Inc. filed with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, though its services were We noted the manifestation in a resolution dated July 23, 1990.
terminated in midstream and the client directly compromised the case with the
adverse party.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary On May 24, 1990, PLDT filed with the trial court a manifestation that it is not a party
to nor in any manner involved in the attorneys lien being asserted by Atty. Rilloraza
The Facts for and in behalf of the law firm, 3 while ETPI filed its opposition thereto on June 11,
1990.

In giving due course to the petition, we carefully considered the facts attendant to The Lower Courts Ruling
the case. On August 28, 1987, Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (ETPI)
represented by the law firm San Juan, Africa, Gonzales and San Agustin (SAGA), filed The trial court in its resolution dated September 14, 1990 denied the motion for
with the Regional Trial Court, Makati, a complaint for recovery of revenue shares enforcement of attorneys lien. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
against Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). Atty. Francisco D.
Rilloraza, a partner of the firm appeared for ETPI. "WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court finds that the Notice of Attorneys Lien
filed by the law firm of Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo and Africa has no basis in fact
After ETPI rested its case, it paid SAGA the billed amount of One Hundred Thousand and in law, and therefore denies the Motion for Enforcement of Attorneys
Pesos (P100,000.00). On September 18, 1987, the trial court issued a resolution Lien.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
granting ETPIs application for preliminary restrictive and mandatory injunctions.
During this period, SAGA was dissolved and four of the junior partners formed the "SO ORDERED.
law firm Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa (RADA), which took over as counsel in
the case for ETPI. The latter signed a retainer agreement with counsel dated October "Makati, Metro Manila, September 4, 1990.
1, 1987. 1
"(s/t) ZEUS C. ABROGAR
Petitioners presented the three aspects of the main case in the trial court. First, the
traffic revenue shares which ETPI sought to recover from PLDT in accordance with "Judge" 4
the contract between them. Second, ETPI sought preventive injunctive relief against
the PLDTs threats to deny ETPI access to the Philippines international gateway On October 10, 1990, petitioner filed with the trial court a notice of appeal from the
switch. Third, ETPI called this the "foreign correspondentships aspect" where ETPI above-mentioned order to the Supreme Court. On November 6, 1990, ETPI filed a
sought preventive injunctive relief against PLDTs incursions and inducements Motion to Dismiss Appeal contending that the case could be brought to the Supreme
directed at ETPIs foreign correspondents in Hongkong, Taiwan and Singapore, to Court only via a petition for review on certiorari, not by a mere notice of appeal. In
break their correspondentship contracts with PLDT, using the threat of denying them an order dated January 16, 1991, the trial court dismissed RADAs appeal.
access to the international gateway as leverage.
The trial court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In this connection, ETPI filed with the trial court two urgent motions for restraining
order, one on October 30, 1987 and another on November 4, 1987. As the
"There is no more regular appeal from the Regional Trial Court to the Supreme Court. There is nothing sacrosanct about procedural rules, which are liberally construed in
Under the amendment of Section 17 of the Judiciary Act by R.A. 5440, orders and order to promote their objectives and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and
judgments of the Regional Trial Court may be elevated to the Supreme Court only by inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. 8 In an analogous case, 9
petition for review on certiorari. we ruled that where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial
justice 10 , or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in
x x x exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.

In A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we said

"Wherefore, premises considered, the order dated September 14, 1990 is hereby
reconsidered and set aside. The Notice of Appeal filed by movant RADA is dismissed. "Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on
technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and
"SO ORDERED. the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for
they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat
"Given this 16th day of January, 1991, at Makati, Metro Manila. their very claims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant
should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of
"(s/t) ZEUS C. ABROGAR his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities." 11

"Judge" 5 A basic legal principle is that no one shall be unjustly enriched at the expense of
another. 12 This principle is one of the mainstays of every legal system for centuries
Hence, on February 9, 1991, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme and which the Civil Code echoes:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Court, which we remanded to the Court of Appeals. The latter dismissed the petition
in a decision promulgated on November 14, 1991, 6 ruling that the judge committed "ARTICLE 22. Every person who through an act of performance by another, or any
no abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion for enforcement of attorneys other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the
lien. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph latter without just or legal ground, shall return the same to him." 13

"We therefore rule that respondent judge committed no abuse of discretion, much The Code Commission, its report, emphasized that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
less a grave one, in denying petitioners motion for enforcement of attorneys lien.
"It is most needful that this ancient principle be clearly and specifically consecrated
"Assuming that respondent judge committed an error in denying petitioners motion in the proposed Civil Code to the end that in cases not foreseen by the lawmaker, no
for enforcement of attorneys lien, it cannot be corrected by certiorari. one may unjustly benefit himself to the prejudice of another. The German Civil Code
has a similar provision (Art. 812)." 14
"WHEREFORE, the writs prayed for are DENIED, and the petition is hereby
DISMISSED, with cost against petitioner. With this in mind, one could easily understand why, despite technical deficiencies,
we resolved to give due course to this petition. More importantly, the case on its
"SO ORDERED. face appears to be impressed with merit.chanrobles virtualawlibrary
chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"(s/t) REGINA G. ORDOEZ-BENITEZ
B. The Attorneys Fees
"Associate Justice"
We understand that Atty. Francisco Rilloraza handled the case from its inception until
"WE CONCUR:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph ETPI terminated the law firms services in 1988. Petitioners claim for attorneys fees
hinges on two grounds: first, the fact that Atty. Rilloraza personally handled the case
"(s/t) JOSE A. R. MELO" (s/t) EMETERIO C. CUI when he was working for SAGA; and second, the retainer agreement dated October
1, 1987.
"Associate Justice "Associate Justice" 7
We agree that petitioners are entitled to attorneys fees. We, however, are not
DISCUSSION convinced with the petitioners arguments that the services RADA rendered merit
the amount they are claiming.
A. The Procedural Aspect
First, petitioner contends that Atty. Rilloraza initiated the filing of the complaint.
When a client employs the services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of
the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle the case. Rather, he employs the importance of the subject matter in controversy, (2) the extent of services rendered,
entire law firm. In the event that the counsel appearing for the client resigns, the and (3) the professional standing of the lawyer. A determination of these factors
firm is bound to provide a replacement. Thus, RADA could not claim to have initiated would indispensably require nothing less than a full-blown trial where private
the filing of the complaint considering that ETPI hired SAGA. What is more, on respondents can adduce evidence to establish the right to lawful attorneys fees and
September 17, 1987, ETPI paid SAGA the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos for petitioner to oppose or refute the same. 21 The trial court has the principal task
(P100,000.00) 15 representing services performed prior to September 17, 1987. of fixing the amount of attorneys fees 22 . Hence, the necessity of a hearing is
SAGA assigned one of its associates, Atty. Francisco Rilloraza, to handle the case for beyond cavil.
the firm. Although Atty. Rilloraza handled the case personally, he did so for and in
behalf of SAGA. C. Charging Lien

Second, petitioner claims that under the retainer agreement, which Petitioner contends that pursuant to Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, it is
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph entitled to a charging lien. The rule provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"6.2 B. Court Cases:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library "SECTION 37. Attorneys liens. An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds,
documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into his possession
Should recourse to judicial action be necessary to effect collection or judicial action and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been paid,
be taken by adverse party, our attorneys fees shall be fifteen percent (15%) of the and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the
amounts collected or the value of the property acquired or liability saved." same extent upon all judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in
16cralawnad pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured in a litigation of his client, from
and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien
the firm is entitled to the fees agreed upon. to be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing
such execution, and shall have caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his
However, the retainer agreement has been terminated. True, Attorney Rilloraza client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right and power over
played a vital role during the inception of the case and in the course of the trial. We such judgments and executions as his client would have to enforce his lien and
cannot also ignore the fact that an attorney-client relationship between petitioner secure the payment of his just fees and disbursements." (Emphasis supplied)
and respondent no longer existed during its culmination by amicable agreement. To
award the attorneys fees amounting to 15% of the sum of One Hundred Twenty Five We do not agree. A charging lien to be enforceable as security for the payment of
Million Six Hundred Seventy One Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Six Pesos and Four attorneys fees requires as a condition sine qua non a judgment for money and
Centavos (P125,671,886.04) plus Fifty Million Pesos (P50,000,000.00) paid by PLDT execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney
to ETPI would be too unconscionable. in favor of his client 23 . A charging lien presupposes that the attorney has secured a
favorable money judgment for his client. 24 From the facts of the case it would seem
"In any case, whether there is an agreement or not, the courts shall fix a reasonable that petitioner had no hand in the settlement that occurred, nor did it ever obtain a
compensation which lawyers may receive for their professional services." 17 "A favorable judgment for ETPI.
lawyer has the right to be paid for the legal services he has extended to his client,
which compensation must be reasonable." 18 A lawyer would be entitled to receive ETPI entered into a compromise agreement when it ended the services of petitioner
what he merits for his services. Otherwise stated, the amount must be determined and through the effort of ETPIs new lawyers, the law firm Romulo, Mabanta,
on a quantum meruit basis. Buenaventura, Sayoc and De los Angeles. Whether there was bad faith in the
substitution of the lawyers to avoid compliance with the retainer agreement could
"Quantum meruit, meaning as much as he deserved is used as a basis for only be determined after a trial of the case on the merits.
determining the lawyers professional fees in the absence of a contract but
recoverable by him from his client." 19 Recovery of attorneys fees on the basis of This decision, however, should not be interpreted as to impose upon petitioner any
quantum meruit is authorized when (1) there is no express contract for payment of additional burden in collecting its attorneys fees. The petitioner must avail itself of
attorneys fees agreed upon between the lawyer and the client; (2) when although the proper remedy in order to forestall the possibility of any injustice on or unjust
there is a formal contract for attorneys fees, the fees stipulated are found enrichment of any of the parties.
unconscionable or unreasonable by the court; and (3) when the contract for
attorneys fees is void due to purely formal defects of execution; (4) when the The Judgment (Fallo)
counsel, for justifiable cause, was not able to finish the case to its conclusion; (5)
when lawyer and client disregard the contract for attorneys fees. 20 ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the petition, REVERSES the decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24463 and REMANDS the case to the court of origin for
In fixing a reasonable compensation for the services rendered by a lawyer on the the determination of the amount of attorneys fees to which petitioner is
basis of quantum meruit, the elements to be considered are generally (1) the entitled.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
No costs. Subsequently, respondent filed a motion dated May 21, 2004[2]cralaw seeking a
clarification on what should be the correct amount of the attorney's fee awarded to
SO ORDERED. him.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur. Obviously, the P10,000.00 attorney's fee stated in the dispositive portion of our
Decision is merely a clerical error. As stated in the body of our Decision, the
Melo, J., took no part. attorney's fee awarded to him should be in the amount of P20,000.00.

ACCORDINGLY, the dispositive portion of our Decision is hereby amended to read as

follows:
[G.R. No. 137680. July 5, 2004]
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
CONCEPT PLACEMENT vs. FUNK
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that the award of P50,000.00 as
attorney's fee to herein respondent is reduced to only P20,000.00.
THIRD DIVISION
No costs.
Gentlemen:
SO ORDERED.
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated JUL 5
2004.
Very truly yours,
G.R. No. 137680 (Concept Placement Resources, Inc. vs. Richard V. Funk.)
(Sgd.) JULIETA Y. CARREON
Clerk of Court
On February 6, 2004, we rendered a Decision in this case, the pertinent portions of
which read:

"Significantly, in German Marine Agencies, Inc. vs. NLRC (G.R. No. 142049, January Authority of Supreme Court to Sanction Members of the Bar
30, 2001, 350 SCRA 629), we held that there must always be a factual basis for the
award of attorney's fee. Here, since petitioner agreed to be represented by SECOND DIVISION
respondent as counsel in the labor case and to pay him his attorney's fee, it must
abide with its agreement which has the force of law between them (Article 1308, A.C. No. 10583 [Formerly CBD 09-2555], February 18, 2015
Civil Code; Jespajo Realty Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 113626,
September 27, 2002, 390 SCRA 27). ROBERTO BERNARDINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS, Respondent.

"We observe, however, that respondent did not encounter difficulty in representing A.C. NO. 10584 [FORMERLY CBD 10-2827]
petitioner. The complaint against it was dismissed with prejudice. All that respondent
did was to prepare the answer with counterclaim and possibly petitioner's position ATTY. JOSE MANGASER CARINGAL, Complainant, v. ATTY. VICTOR REY SANTOS,
paper. Considering respondent's limited legal services and the case involved is not Respondent.
complicated, the award of P50.000.00 as attorney's fee is a bit excessive. In First
Metro Investment Corporation vs. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve, Inc. (G.R. No. RESOLUTION
141811, November 15, 2001, 369 SCRA 99), we ruled that courts are empowered to
reduce the amount of attorney's fee if the same is iniquitous or unconscionable. LEONEN, J.:
Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, we consider the amount of
P20,000.00 reasonable. These cases involve administrative Complaints1 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos for
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.012 and Canon 15, Rule 15.033 of the Code of
"WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Professional Responsibility.
Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in the sense that the award of P50,000.00
as attorney's fee to herein respondent is reduced to only P10,000.00. No costs. In A.C. No. 10583, complainant Roberto C. Bernardino (Bernardino) filed a Letter-
Complaint4 against Atty. Victor Rey Santos (Atty. Santos) before the Integrated Bar
"SO ORDERED."[1]cralaw of the Philippines, praying that Atty. Santos be investigated and subjected to
disciplinary action.5cralawlawlibrary
 Now, the parents of Marilu Turla are Mariano C. Turla and Rufina C. Turla?
Bernardino alleged that the death certificate of his aunt, Rufina de Castro Turla, was THE WITNESS
falsified by Atty. Santos. Atty. Santos made it appear that Rufina Turla died in 1992,
when in fact, she died in 1990.6cralawlawlibrary :
Yes, sir. As per my study and as per my knowledge of her relationship[s].
Atty. Santos used the falsified death certificate to support the Affidavit of Self- THE COURT
Adjudication7 executed by Mariano Turla, husband of Rufina Turla.8 Paragraph 6 of
the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication prepared by Atty. Santos
:
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Whats the name of the mother?
ATTY. CARINGAL
Being her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit
the estate of said deceased who did not leave any descendant or any other heir
entitled to her estate.9 (Emphasis in the original, underscoring supplied) :
Rufina, your Honor. Rufina Turla.
Years later, Atty. Santos, on behalf of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano
Turla,10 filed a Complaint11 for sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Q
Injunction and temporary restraining order against Bernardino, docketed as Civil :
Case No. 09-269.12 The Complaint in Civil Case No. 09-269 alleged that Marilu Turla And wife died ahead of Mariano, isnt it?
is an heir of Mariano Turla,13 which allegedly contradicts the Affidavit of Self- THE WITNESS
Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.14 Hence, Atty. Santos represented clients
with conflicting interests.15cralawlawlibrary :
Yes, sir.
In Civil Case No. 09-269, Atty. Santos testified during cross- Q
examination:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary :
And of course, being the daughter of Rufina Turla, Marilu is also an heir of Rufina
CROSS-EXAMINATION BY: Turla, isnt it?
A
ATTY. CARINGAL :
.... Of course.
Q
Q :
: Now, we go by the ethics of the profession, Mr. Witness. You recall[,] of course[,] and
In your Judicial Affidavit[,] you mentioned that you know Marilu C. Turla[,] the admitted [sic] in court that you drafted this document which you requested to be
plaintiff[,] since she was about four years old. marked as Exhibit B.
A THE COURT
:
Yes, sir. :
Q Exhibit?
: ATTY. CARINGAL
As a matter of fact[,] you know her very well[,] considering that you are a Ninong of
the plaintiff, isnt it? :
A B, your Honor, in particular reference to the Affidavit of Adjudication for the extra
: judicial settlement of the intestate estate of the late Rufina De Castro Turla[,] and I
I was not a Ninong when I first knew Marilu Turla, I was just recently married to one have just learned from you as you just testified. Rufina is the mother of the plaintiff
of her cousins. here[,] Marilu Turla.
.... THE WITNESS

:
Q Yes, sir.
: Q
: Only for the purposes [sic] of showing one or two . . . properties owned by the late
And as you admitted, you prepared you drafted [sic] this Extra Judicial. Mariano Turla, your Honor. That is why thats only [sic] portion I have referred to in
A marking the said documents, your Honor.
: THE COURT

Yes, sir. :
Q So, you now refused [sic] to answer the question?
: ATTY. REY SANTOS
Or this Affidavit of Adjudication.
ATTY. REY SANTOS :
No, I am not refusing to answer, I am just making a manifestation.
: ATTY. CARINGAL
At this point in time, your Honor, I would object to the question regarding my legal
ethics because it is not the issue in this case. :
.... What is the answer, is it true or false, your Honor[?]
ATTY. REY SANTOS

ATTY. CARINGAL :
.... My answer regarding the same would be subject to my objection on the materiality
and impertinency and relevancy of this question, your Honor[,] to this case.
THE COURT
Q
: :
So anyway, the court has observed the continuing objection before[,] and to be
consistent with the ruling of the court[,] I will allow you to answer the question[.] [I]s
. . . In this document consisting of one, two, three, four and appearing to have been
it true or false?
duly notarized on or about 29th [of] June 1994 with document number 28, page
THE WITNESS
number 7, book number 23, series of 1994 before Notary Public Hernando P. Angara.
I call your attention to the document[,] more particularly[,] paragraph 6 thereof and
marked as Exhibit 7-A for the defendants[.] I read into the record and I quote, Being :
her surviving spouse, I am the sole legal heir entitled to succeed to and inherit the No, that is not true.
estate of the said deceased who did not leave any descendant, ascendant or any ATTY. CARINGAL
other heir entitled to her estate.16Mr. Witness, is this particular provision that you
have drafted into this document . . . true or false? :
ATTY. REY SANTOS That is not true. Mr. Witness, being a lawyer[,] you admit before this court that you
have drafted a document that caused the transfer of the estate of the decease[d]
: Rufina Turla.
Your Honor, I would like to reiterate that any question regarding the matter that THE WITNESS
would impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff, Marilu Turla[,] is impertinent and
immaterial in this case[.] [I]t was only the wife Rufina Turla [who] ha[s] the right to :
impugn the legitimacy of the plaintiff[,] and that has been the subject of my Yes, sir.
continuing objection from the very beginning. ....
THE COURT

: ATTY. CARINGAL
But then again[,] you have presented this document as your Exhibit B[.] [Y]ou have Q
practically opened the floodgate to . . . questions on this document. :
ATTY. REY SANTOS This document, this particular provision that you said was false, you did not tell
anybody[,] ten or five years later[,] that this is false, is it not?
: THE WITNESS
 Turlas properties that were supposed to be distributed to the heirs. Instead, Atty.
: Santos received the rental income.34cralawlawlibrary
I called the attention of Mr. Mariano Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu17 she is
entitled [sic] to a share of properties and he . . . told me, Ako na ang bahala kay Lastly, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos cited the repealed Article 262 of the
Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan. So, he asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Civil Code in his arguments.35cralawlawlibrary
Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole [sic] properties for himself.18 (Emphasis
supplied) In his Answer,36 Atty. Santos denied having falsified the death certificate.37 He
Another Complaint19 was filed against Atty. Santos by Atty. Jose Mangaser Caringal explained that the death certificate and the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication were given
(Atty. Caringal). This was docketed as A.C. No. 10584.20 Similar to Bernardinos to him by Mariano Turla and that he was not aware that there was a falsified entry in
Complaint, Atty. Caringal alleged that Atty. Santos represented clients with the death certificate.38cralawlawlibrary
conflicting interests.21 He also alleged that in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos
would necessarily go against the claims of Mariano Turla.22cralawlawlibrary As regards the issue on conflict of interest, Atty. Santos argued that he did not
represent and was not representing conflicting interests since Mariano Turla was
Also, in representing Marilu Turla, Atty. Santos was allegedly violating the so-called already dead.39 Further, he [was] representing Marilu Turla against those who
Dead Mans Statute23 because he [would] be utilizing information or matters of ha[d] an interest in her fathers estate.40 Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-
fact occurring before the death of his deceased client. Similarly, he . . . [would] be Adjudication never stated that there was no other legal heir but only that Mariano
unscrupulously utilizing information acquired during his professional relation with his Turla was the sole heir of Rufina Turla.41cralawlawlibrary
said client . . . that [would] constitute a breach of trust . . . or of privileged
communication[.]24cralawlawlibrary Regarding the allegations of Atty. Caringal, Atty. Santos insisted that he did not
commit forum shopping because the various cases filed had different
Atty. Caringal further alleged that Atty. Santos violated Canon 1225 of the Code of issues.42cralawlawlibrary
Professional Responsibility when he filed several cases against the other claimants
of Mariano Turlas estate.26 In other words, he engaged in forum As to the conversion of funds, Atty. Santos explained that the funds used were being
shopping.27cralawlawlibrary held by his client as the special administratrix of the estate of Mariano Turla.43
According to Atty. Santos, payment of attorneys fees out of the estates funds could
In addition, Atty. Santos allegedly violated Canon 10, Rule 10.0128 of the Code of be considered as expenses of administration.44 Also, payment of Atty. Santos
Professional Responsibility when he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self- legal services was a matter which Atty. Caringal had no standing to
Adjudication. The Affidavit states that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla, question.45cralawlawlibrary
but Atty. Santos knew this to be false.29 Atty. Santos wife, Lynn Batac, is Mariano
Turlas niece.30 As part of the family, Atty. Santos knew that Rufina Turla had other On the allegation that Atty. Santos cited a repealed provision of law, he discussed
heirs.31 Atty. Caringal further alleged:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary that Article 262 of the Civil Code is applicable because it was in force when Marilu
Turlas birth certificate was registered.46cralawlawlibrary
14.4 Being the lawyer of Mariano Turla in the drafting of the document some fifteen
years ago, he is fully aware of all the circumstances therein recited. Moreover at that The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
time, the [sic] Lynn Batac Santos was then employed at the BIR [sic] who arranged recommended that Atty. Santos be suspended for three (3)
for the payment of the taxes due. There is some peculiarity in the neat set up [sic] months.47cralawlawlibrary
of a husband and wife team where the lawyer makes the document while the wife
who is a BIIR [sic] employee arranges for the payment of the taxes due the It found that Bernardino failed to prove his allegation that Atty. Santos knew that the
government; death certificate was falsified and used it to support Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Self-
Adjudication.48cralawlawlibrary
14.5 Respondent attorney could not have been mistaken about the fact recited in
the Affidavit of Adjudication, etc. that said deceased (Rufina de Castro Turla) did not Likewise, Atty. Caringal failed to prove that Atty. Santos converted funds from
leave any descendant, xxx, or any other heir entitled to her estate [sic] . . . [.]32 Mariano Turlas estate.49cralawlawlibrary
(Emphasis in the original)
With regard to the citation of a repealed provision, the Commission on Bar Discipline
Atty. Caringal argued that Atty. Santos was bound by the statement in Mariano stated that the evidence presented did not prove that Atty. Santos knowingly cited
Turlas affidavit that Rufina Turla had no other heir.33cralawlawlibrary a repealed law.50cralawlawlibrary

Moreover, Atty. Santos allegedly converted funds belonging to the heirs of Mariano Further, Atty. Santos did not engage in forum shopping. The various cases filed
Turla for his own benefit. The funds involved were rental income from Mariano involved different parties and prayed for different reliefs.51cralawlawlibrary
However, the Commission on Bar Discipline agreed with Bernardino and Atty. SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors.
Caringal that Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests.52 The
Report and Recommendation53 of the Commission on Bar Discipline ....
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that
the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall
. . . Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility particularly Rule 15.03 issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together
specifically proscribes members of the bar from representing conflicting interests. with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme
The Supreme Court has explained that the proscription against representation of Court for final action.
conflicting interest finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect
to the same general matter and is applicable however slight such adverse interest The issues in this case are: (1) whether respondent Atty. Santos violated the Code of
may be; the fact that the conflict of interests is remote or merely probable does not Professional Responsibility; and (2) whether the penalty of suspension of three (3)
make the prohibition inoperative. months from the practice of law is proper.

.... This court accepts and adopts the findings of fact of the IBP Board of Governors
Resolution. However, this court modifies the recommended penalty of suspension
. . . In the case at bar, the fact that the respondent represented Mariano Turla is no from the practice of law from three (3) months to one (1) year.
secret. The respondent has in a number of pleadings/motions/documents and even
on the witness stand admitted that he drafted Mariano Turlas Affidavit of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Adjudication which expressly states that he was the sole heir of Rufina Turla. states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

And then he afterwards agreed to represent Marilu Turla who claimed to be Mariano CANON 15 A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings
Turlas daughter. To substantiate her claim that she is Mariano Turlas daughter, the and transactions with his client.
respondent admitted that he relied on the birth certificate presented by Marilu
Turla[,] which indicates that she is not only the daughter of Mariano Turla but also of ....
Rufina Turla as evidenced by the Birth Certificate presented stating that Rufina Turla
is Marilu Turlas mother. This means that Marilu Turla was also a rightful heir to Rule 15.03 A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
Rufina Turlas inheritance and was deprived of the same because of the Affidavit of consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Adjudication which he drafted for Mariano Turla[,] stating that he is his wifes sole
heir. The rule on conflict of interest is based on the fiduciary obligation in a lawyer-client
relationship. Lawyers must treat all information received from their clients with
. . . To further explain, the respondent[,] in agreeing to represent Marilu Turla[,] utmost confidentiality in order to encourage clients to fully inform their counsels of
placed himself in a position where he is to refute the claim in Mariano Turlas the facts of their case.59 In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,60 this court explained what
Affidavit of Adjudication that he is the only heir of Rufina Turla.54 (Citations omitted) conflict of interest means:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or

In the Resolution55 dated May 10, 2013, the Board of Governors of the Integrated more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
Bar of the Philippines (IBP Board of Governors) adopted and approved the findings lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline. client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which
Atty. Santos filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,56 which was denied by the IBP confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
Board of Governors in the Resolution57 dated March 22, 2014. confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
This administrative case was forwarded to this court through a letter of transmittal will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
dated July 15, 2014,58 pursuant to Rule 139-B, Section 12(b) of the Rules of Court also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
which provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
RULE 139-B from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.61
DISBARMENT AND DISCIPLINE OF ATTORNEYS (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Applying the test to determine whether conflict of interest exists, respondent would As officers of the court, lawyers have the duty to uphold the rule of law. In doing so,
necessarily refute Mariano Turlas claim that he is Rufina Turlas sole heir when he lawyers are expected to be honest in all their dealings.67 Unfortunately, respondent
agreed to represent Marilu Turla. Worse, he knew that Mariano Turla was not the was far from being honest. With full knowledge that Rufina Turla had another heir,
only heir. As stated in the Report of the Commission on Bar he acceded to Mariano Turlas request to prepare the Affidavit of Self-
Discipline:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Adjudication.68cralawlawlibrary

Worse[,] the respondent himself on the witness stand during his April 14, 2009 This court notes that the wording of the IBP Board of Governors Resolutions dated
testimony in the Civil Case for Sum of Money with Prayer of Writ of Preliminary May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 seems to imply that it is the Integrated Bar of the
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order docketed as Civil Case No. 09-269 filed Philippines that has the authority to impose sanctions on lawyers. This is wrong.
with the RTC of Makati City admitted as follows: I called the attention of Mr. Mariano
Turla[.] I . . . asked him what about Lulu she is entitled [sic] to a share of properties The authority to discipline members of the Bar is vested in this court under the 1987
and he . . . told me, Ako na ang bahala kay Lulu[,] hindi ko pababayaan yan. So he Constitution:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
asked me to proceed with the Affidavit of Adjudication wherein he claimed the whole
[sic] properties for himself. This very admission proves that the respondent was ARTICLE VIII
privy to Marilu Turlas standing as a legal and rightful heir to Rufina Turlas estate.62 JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
(Citation omitted)
....
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, by written consent of
all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.63 Respondent had the duty Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
to inform Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla that there is a conflict of interest and to
obtain their written consent. ....

Mariano Turla died on February 5, 2009,64 while respondent represented Marilu Turla (5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional
in March 2009.65 It is understandable why respondent was unable to obtain rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
Mariano Turlas consent. Still, respondent did not present evidence showing that he of law, the integrated bar, and legal assistance to the underprivileged. . . .
disclosed to Marilu Turla that he previously represented Mariano Turla and assisted (Emphasis supplied)
him in executing the Affidavit of Self-Adjudication. Thus, the allegation of conflict of
interest against respondent was sufficiently proven. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan69 elucidated on this courts plenary disciplinary
authority over attorneys70 and discussed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Likewise, we accept and adopt the IBP Board of Governors finding that respondent
violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of
states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary the court and members of the court and members of the Bar. The Supreme Court,
as regular and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary disciplinary authority
CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Courts
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in as well authority to regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this
court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be mislead by any artifice. constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court over
members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper administration of
In the Report, the Commission on Bar Discipline justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. . . .
explained:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
. . . The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary
Corollary to the foregoing, the Commission by virtue of the doctrine res ipsa loquitor to the Courts exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyers [sic] is not merely
[sic] finds that the respondents act of failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from a professional but also an officer of the court and as such, he is called upon to share
filing the Affidavit of Adjudication despite . . . his knowledge of the existence of in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and resolving disputes in
Marilu Turla as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla, the respondent failed to society.71 (Citations omitted)
uphold his obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and
protectors of what is just, legal and proper. Thus in failing to do his duty and acting This courts authority is restated under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,
dishonestly[,] not only was he in contravention of the Lawyers Oath but was also in specifically:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
violation of Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.66
(Emphasis in the original) RULE 138
Attorneys and Admission to Bar
 ADOPTED with the MODIFICATION that the penalty of suspension from the practice of
.... law for one (1) year is imposed upon Atty. Victor Rey Santos. He is warned that a
repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such appended to respondents personal record as attorney, to the Integrated Bar of the
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving Philippines, and to the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before courts throughout the country for their information and guidance.
admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for SO ORDERED.
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
malpractice. (Emphasis supplied) Carpio, (Chairperson), Velasco, Jr.,* Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ.,
concur.chanrobleslaw
In Ramirez v. Buhayang-Margallo,72 this court emphasized the authority of this court
to impose disciplinary action on those admitted to the practice of law.
Quantum of evidence in administrative cases
Parenthetically, it is this court that has the constitutionally mandated duty to
discipline lawyers.73 Under the current rules, the duty to assist fact finding can be SECOND DIVISION
delegated to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The findings of the Integrated
Bar, however, can only be recommendatory, consistent with the constitutional [A.C. No. 7649 : December 14, 2011]
powers of this court. Its recommended penalties are also, by its nature,
recommendatory.74 SIAO ABA, MIKO LUMABAO, ALMASIS LAUBAN, AND BENJAMIN DANDA,
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary COMPLAINANTS, VS. ATTYS. SALVADOR DE GUZMAN, JR., WENCESLAO "PEEWEE"
The authority given to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is based on Rule 139-B, TRINIDAD, AND ANDRESITO FORNIER, RESPONDENTS.
Section 1 of the Rules of Court, which provides that [p]roceedings for the
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme DECISION
Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines . . . upon the verified
complaint of any person. However, this authority is only to assist this court with CARPIO, J.:
the investigation of the case, to determine factual findings, and to recommend, at
best, the penalty that may be imposed on the erring lawyer. The Case

We reiterate the discussion in Tenoso v. Atty. Echanez:75cralawlawlibrary This is an administrative complaint filed by Siao Aba, Miko Lumabao, Almasis Lauban
and Benjamin Danda (complainants) against lawyers Salvador De Guzman, Jr.,
Time and again, this Court emphasizes that the practice of law is imbued with public Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad, and Andresito Fornier (respondents). Complainants
interest and that a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to claim that respondents instigated and filed fabricated criminal complaints against
his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one them before the Iligan City Prosecutor's Office for Large Scale and Syndicated Illegal
of the most important functions of the Statethe administration of justiceas an Recruitment and Estafa under I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835.[1]
officer of the court. Accordingly, [l]awyers are bound to maintain not only a high Complainants pray for the imposition of the grave penalty of disbarment upon
standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity and fair respondents.[2] Attached to complainants' letter-complaint is the Joint Counter-
dealing.76 (Citations omitted) Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint[3] allegedly submitted by complainants in the
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaints.cralaw
Only this court can impose sanctions on members of the Bar. This disciplinary
authority is granted by the Constitution and cannot be relinquished by this court.77 The Facts
The Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines are, at best,
recommendatory, and its findings and recommendations should not be equated with Complainants claim that in January 2006 they met former Pasay City Regional Trial
Decisions and Resolutions rendered by this court. Court Judge Salvador P. De Guzman, Jr. (De Guzman) in Cotabato City.4 De Guzman
allegedly persuaded them to file an illegal recruitment case (I.S. No. 2006-C-31,
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Victor Rey Santos guilty of violating Canon 15, Lauban, et al. vs. Alvarez, Amante, Montesclaros, et al.) against certain persons, in
Rule 15.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The exchange for money.5 De Guzman allegedly represented to complainants that his
findings of fact and recommendations of the Board of Governors of the Integrated group, composed of Pasay City Mayor Wenceslao "Peewee" Trinidad (Trinidad), Atty.
Bar of the Philippines dated May 10, 2013 and March 22, 2014 are ACCEPTED and
Andresito Fornier (Fornier), Everson Lim Go Tian, Emerson Lim Go Tian, and Trinidad pointed out that this syndicate, headed by Montesclaros, is abusing court
Stevenson Lim Go Tian (Go Tian Brothers), were untouchable.[6] processes by filing fabricated criminal complaints of illegal recruitment in remote
areas with fabricated addresses of defendants.[28] Since the defendants' addresses
In the third week of February 2006, complainants allegedly received from De are fabricated, the defendants are not informed of the criminal complaint, and thus
Guzman a prepared Joint Complaint-Affidavit with supporting documents, which they the information is filed with the court.[29] Consequently, a warrant of arrest is issued
were directed to sign and file.[7] The Joint Complaint-Affidavit and supporting by the court, and only when the warrant of arrest is served upon the defendant will
documents were allegedly fabricated and manufactured by De Guzman.[8] the latter know of the criminal complaint.[30] At this point, Montesclaros intervenes
by extorting money from the defendant in order for the complainants to drop the
During the I.S. No. 2006-C-31 proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor's criminal complaint.[31] To prove the existence of this syndicate, Trinidad presented
Office, complainants allegedly received several phone calls from De Guzman, the letter of Eden Rabor, then a second year law student in Cebu City, to the
Trinidad, Fornier, and the Go Tian brothers, all of them continuously telling Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism and to this Court, requesting these
complainants to pursue the case.[9] When complainants asked De Guzman what institutions to investigate the syndicate of Montesclaros, who has victimized a
would happen if a warrant of arrest would be issued, De Guzman allegedly replied, Canadian citizen who was at that time jailed in Cebu City due to an extortion racket.
"Ipa tubus natin sa kanila, perahan natin sila.'[10] [32] Trinidad also presented the Decision of Branch 65 of the Regional Trial Court of
Tarlac City on the illegal recruitment charge against his friend, Emmanuel Cinco,
Complainants claim they were bothered by their conscience, and that is why they which charge was dismissed because the charge was fabricated, as admitted by
told De Guzman and his group that they planned to withdraw the criminal complaint complainants themselves.[33]
in I.S. No. 2006-C-31.[11] Complainants were allegedly offered by respondents
P200,000.00 to pursue the case, but they refused.[12] Complainants were once Trinidad further claimed that, in some cases, the Montesclaros syndicate included
again allegedly offered by respondents One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) to pursue some of their members as respondents to divert suspicion.[34] Trinidad pointed out
the case until the end, but they refused again.[13] For this reason, respondents that his wife was a victim of this fabricated criminal charge of illegal recruitment
allegedly orchestrated the filing of fabricated charges for syndicated illegal filed in Marawi City.[35] Fortunately, when the warrant of arrest was being served in
recruitment and estafa (I.S. No. 06-1676 and I.S. No. 06-1835) against complainants Pasay City Hall, Trinidad's wife was not there.[36] Lastly, Trinidad declared that
in Iligan City.[14] On 30 November 2006, Aba claims to have received a text Montesclaros has perfected the method of filing fabricated cases in remote and
message from De Guzman, saying, "Gud p.m. Tago na kayo. Labas today from Iligan dangerous places to harass his victims.[37]
Warrant of Arrest. No Bail. Dating sa Ctbto pulis mga Wednesday. Gud luck
kayo.'[15] Fornier, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court[38] and Position
Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,[39] claimed that in his 35 years
In support of their allegations in the administrative complaint, complainants as a member of the bar, he has conducted himself professionally in accordance with
submitted the allegedly fabricated complaint,16 supporting documents,[17] letter of the exacting standards of the legal profession.[40] Fornier denied knowing any of the
De Guzman to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy,[18] De Guzman's Affidavit of complainants, and also denied having any dealings or communication with any of
Clarification submitted in I.S. No. 2006-C-31,[19] and other relevant documents. them. He likewise claimed that he has not filed, either for himself or on behalf of a
Subsequently, complainants filed a Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. client, any case, civil, criminal or otherwise, against complainants.[41] Fornier
Trinidad and Atty. Fornier,[20] and prayed that the complaint be pursued against De claimed that he was included in this case for acting as defense counsel for the Go
Guzman. Tian Brothers in criminal complaints for illegal recruitment.[42] Fornier claimed that
the Go Tian Brothers are victims of an extortion racket led by Montesclaros.[43] For
Trinidad, on the other hand, in his Comment filed with this Court[21] and Position coming to the legal aid of the Go Tian Brothers, Fornier exposed and thwarted the
Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,[22] denied all the allegations in plan of the group of Montesclaros to extort millions of pesos from his clients.[44]
the complaint. Trinidad vehemently declared that he has never communicated with Fornier claimed that the filing of the complaint is apparently an attempt of the
any of the complainants and has never been to Cotabato.[23] He further claimed syndicate to get even at those who may have exposed and thwarted their criminal
that the subscribed letter-complaint does not contain ultimate facts because it does designs at extortion.[45] Fornier prays that the Court will not fall prey to the scheme
not specify the times, dates, places and circumstances of the meetings and and machinations of this syndicate that has made and continues to make a mockery
conversations with him.[24] Trinidad asserted that the complaint was a fabricated, of the justice system by utilizing the courts, the Prosecutor's Offices, the Philippine
politically motivated charge, spearheaded by a certain Joseph Montesclaros National Police and the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration in carrying
(Montesclaros), designed to tarnish Trinidad's reputation as a lawyer and city mayor. out their criminal activities.[46] Lastly, Fornier claimed that complainants failed to
[25] Trinidad claims that Montesclaros was motivated by revenge because establish the charges against him by clear, convincing and satisfactory proof, as
Montesclaros mistakenly believed that Trinidad ordered the raid of his gambling den complainants' affidavits are replete with pure hearsay, speculations, conjectures and
in Pasay City.[26] Trinidad also claims that he, his family members and close friends sweeping conclusions, unsupported by specific, clear and convincing evidence.[47]
have been victims of fabricated criminal charges committed by the syndicate
headed by Montesclaros.[27] De Guzman, on the other hand, instead of filing a Comment with this Court, filed a
Motion to Dismiss Complaint[48] on the ground that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and
Affidavit of Complaint attached to the Letter-Complaint, which was made the basis of their charges against respondents Trinidad and Fornier.[63] Other than bare
this administrative complaint, are spurious.[49] According to the Certification issued allegations, complainants did not adduce proof of Trinidad and Fornier's supposed
by the Office of the City Prosecutor in Iligan City, complainants Lauban, Lumabao involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts constituting the
and Aba, who were charged for violation of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers complaint.[64] In addition, complainants, on their own volition, admitted the non-
Act), which charge was subsequently dismissed through a Joint Resolution rendered participation and non-involvement of Trinidad and Fornier when complainants filed
by the Prosecutor, did not submit any Joint Counter-Affidavit in connection with the their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only.[65]
charge, nor did they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.[50] For these reasons, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charges
against Trinidad and Fornier be dismissed for utter lack of merit.
In his Position Paper filed with the Commission on Bar Discipline,[51] De Guzman
stated he is an 81-year old retired Regional Trial Court judge.[52] He pointed out that On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner stated that De Guzman failed to
there are no details regarding the allegations of grave and serious misconduct, deny the allegations in the Letter-Complaint or to explain the import of the same.
dishonesty, oppression, bribery, falsification of documents, violation of lawyers' [66] Moreover, De Guzman failed to controvert the "truly vicious evidence' against
oath and other administrative infractions.[53] De Guzman invited the attention of him:
the Investigating Commissioner to his Affidavit of Clarification which he submitted in
I.S. No. 2006-C-31 to deny any participation in the preparation of the criminal But what should appear to be a truly vicious evidence for Respondent is the letter he
complaint and to narrate in detail how he became involved in this case which was sent to Orlando D. Badoy, City Councilor, Cotabato City dated February 16, 2006.
masterminded by Montesclaros.[54] In his Affidavit of Clarification,[55] De Guzman This letter was alleged in and attached to the Joint Counter-Affiavit with Affidavit of
claimed that he had no participation in the preparation of the criminal complaint in Complaint. The letter had confirmed the allegation of his travel to Cotabato City to
I.S. No. 2006-C-31, and he was surprised to receive a photocopy of the counter- file charges against persons he did not identify. He intriguingly mentioned the name
affidavit of Rogelio Atangan, Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, Lolita Zara, Marcelo Pelisco and Ben Danda as the one to whom he handed the complaint. Danda, incidentally, was
Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr., implicating him in the preparation of the complaint.[56] one of those who executed the Letter of Complaint along with Siao Aba, Miko
De Guzman stated that he was surprised to find his and his clients' names in the Lumabao, Benjamin Danda and Almasis Lauban which was filed before the Supreme
counter-affidavit, and for this reason, felt under obligation to make the Affidavit of Court.[67]
Clarification.[57] Lastly, De Guzman declared that he has "no familiarity with the
complainants or Tesclaros Recruitment and Employment Agency, nor with other The Decision of the Board of Governors of the
respondents in the complaint, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante, Jr. and Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal
recruitment business.'[58]
The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted the
During the mandatory conference hearings on 28 November 2008[59] and 13 March recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation
2009,[60] none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating on the dismissal of the charges against Fornier and Trinidad.[68] In De Guzman's
Commissioner to substantiate the allegations in their complaint despite due notice. case, the Board of Governors increased the penalty from a suspension of two (2)
[61] months to a suspension of two (2) years from the practice of law for his attempt to
file illegal recruitment cases to extort money:
Report and Recommendation
of the Commission on Bar Discipline RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED with
modification, and APPROVED the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
The recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Annex "A' and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
Discipline reads: record and the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the case against
Respondents Trinidad and Fornier is without merit, the same is hereby DISMISSED.
In view of the foregoing, the charges against the Respondent Trinidad and Fornier However, Atty. Salvador De Guzman, Jr. is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of
are deemed to be without basis and consequently, the undersigned recommends law for two (2) years for his attempt to file illegal recruitment cases in order to extort
DISMISSAL of the charges against them. money.[69]

As to Respondent de Guzman, a former Regional Trial Court Judge, there is enough The Issue
basis to hold him administratively liable. Accordingly, a penalty of SUSPENSION for
two (2) months is hereby recommended.[62] The issue in this case is whether Trinidad, Fornier and De Guzman should be
administratively disciplined based on the allegations in the complaint.
The Investigating Commissioner found, after a careful perusal of the allegations in
the complaint as well as in the attachments, that complainants failed to substantiate The Ruling of this Court
 When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which
We adopt the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and side the evidence preponderates, the decision should be against the party with the
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner on the dismissal of the charges burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.[77]
against Trinidad and Fornier.
To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment
We reverse the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with regard to De Guzman's the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his
liability, and likewise dismiss the charges against De Guzman. complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is
preponderance of evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally
Presumption, Burden of Proof and Weight of Evidence balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in favor of the respondent.

Section 3(a), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court provides that a person is presumed De Guzman's Liability
innocent of crime or wrongdoing. This Court has consistently held that an attorney
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of charges against him until the
contrary is proved, and that as an officer of the court, he is presumed to have The Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the Report and
performed his duties in accordance with his oath.[70] Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner regarding De Guzman's liability
for the following reasons: (a) the documents submitted by complainants in support
Burden of proof, on the other hand, is defined in Section 1 of Rule 131 as the duty of of their complaint are not credible; (b) complainants did not appear in any of the
a party to present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or mandatory conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. In disbarment proceedings, the complaint; and (c) complainants were not able to prove by preponderance of
burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its evidence that De Guzman communicated with them for the purpose of filing
disciplinary powers, the case against the respondent must be established by fabricated illegal recruitment charges for purposes of extortion.
convincing and satisfactory proof.[71]
The documents submitted by complainants are clearly not credible. First,
Weight and sufficiency of evidence, under Rule 133 of the Rules of Court, is not complainants submitted a Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which
determined mathematically by the numerical superiority of the witnesses testifying contained all their allegations of misconduct against De Guzman, Trinidad and
to a given fact. It depends upon its practical effect in inducing belief for the party on Fornier. Complainants misled the Investigating Commissioner, the Board of
the judge trying the case.[72] Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into believing that
the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint was submitted to the Office of
Consequently, in the hierarchy of evidentiary values, proof beyond reasonable doubt the City Prosecutor in Iligan to rebut the illegal recruitment charges against them.
is at the highest level, followed by clear and convincing evidence, then by The Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint purportedly appears to be
preponderance of evidence, and lastly by substantial evidence, in that order.[73] subscribed and sworn to before a prosecutor. After inquiry by De Guzman, however,
Considering the serious consequences of the disbarment or suspension of a member the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan issued a Certification denying the
of the Bar, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is submission of this document by complainants:
necessary to justify the imposition of administrative penalty on a member of the Bar.
[74] This is to certify that based on available records of the Office, ALMASIS LAUBAN,
MIKO LUMABAO and SIAO ALBA were among the respondents named and charged
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a with Violation of Republic Act No. 8042 under I.S. No. 06-1835, Page 254, Vol. XVI,
whole, superior to or has greater weight than that of the other.[75] It means and I.S. No. 06-1676, Page 240, Vol. XVI, which complaints were dismissed thru a
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is Joint Resolution dated December 29, 2006 rendered by the Office.
offered in opposition thereto.[76] Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining
whether or not there is preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the This is to certify further that the abovenamed persons did not submit any Joint
following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses' manner Counter-Affidavit in connection to the complaints filed against them, and neither did
of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to they file any Affidavit of Complaint against any person.[78] (Emphasis supplied)
which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability
or improbability of their testimony; (c) the witnesses' interest or want of interest, To repeat, complainants deceived and misled the Investigating Commissioner, the
and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and this Court into
trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that believing that the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint, which contained
preponderance is necessarily with the greater number. all their allegations of misconduct, were submitted and sworn to before a prosecutor.
This deception gives doubt to the credibility of the other documents complainants
submitted in support of their administrative charges against respondents. Worse,
complainants submitted falsified documents to the Investigating Commissioner, the the letter. In addition, none of the complainants appeared before the Investigating
Board of Governors, and this Court. Commissioner to substantiate their allegations or authenticate the supporting
documents.
Second, De Guzman, Fornier and Trinidad all claim that complainants are part of a
syndicate headed by Montesclaros that has perfected the filing of fabricated criminal The Investigating Commissioner, on the other hand, put a lot of weight and
charges. Given this claim that complainants are well-adept in filing fabricated credibility into this purported letter:
criminal charges supported by fabricated documents, this Court is more cautious in
appreciating the supporting documents submitted by complainants. Complainants Again, to the extreme amazement of the undersigned, Respondent failed to offer
bear the burden of proof to establish that all the documents they submitted in denial of the letter or explain the import of the same differently from what is
support of their allegations of misconduct against respondents are authentic. understood by the Complainants. But even with that effort, the letter is so plain to
Unfortunately, complainants did not even attend any mandatory conference called understand. Verily, the undersigned cannot ignore the same and the message it
by the Investigating Commissioner to identify the documents and substantiate or conveys.[80]
narrate in detail the allegations of misconduct allegedly committed by respondents.
To make matters worse, the Joint Counter-Affidavit and Affidavit of Complaint Generally, the letter would have been given weight, if not for the fact that
complainants attached to their Letter-Complaint, which supposedly contained all complainants, whom respondents claim are part of an extortion syndicate, are
their allegations of misconduct against respondents, is spurious, not having been consistently involved in the fabrication of evidence in support of their criminal
submitted to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iligan, despite purportedly having complaints. Moreover, contrary to the Investigating Commissioner's observation,
the signature and seal of the prosecutor. De Guzman actually denied any involvement in the preparation of complainants'
criminal complaint in I.S. No. 2006-C-31. In his Affidavit of Clarification, De Guzman
Third, the allegations of complainants lack material details to prove their stated:
communication with De Guzman. If De Guzman really called and texted them that a
warrant of arrest would be issued, what mobile number did De Guzman use? Out of Undersigned has no participation in the above-captioned complaint, but to his
the voluminous documents that complainants submitted, where is the warrant for surprise, he recently received a photocopy of (a) the counter-affidavit of Rogelio
their arrest? What is their occupation or profession? Who are these complainants? Atangan, (b) Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez, (c) Lolita Zara, (d) Marcelo Pelisco, and (e) Atty.
These questions are unanswered because complainants did not even bother to Roque A. Amante Jr. (his records at the Surpeme Court does not have any "Daryll');
attend any mandatory conference called by the Investigating Commissioner, despite
due notice. For this reason, the allegations of De Guzman's misconduct are really Undersigned counsel's name and that of his clients appear in the counter-affidavit
doubtful. of Atty. Nicanor G. Alcarez (Montesclaros' lawyer who appeared in the sala of Pasay
RTC Judge Francisco Mendiola as against the undersigned), or Marcelo Pelisco, a
Lastly, the supposedly "vicious' evidence against De Guzman, which was a letter he known henchman of Montesclaros and a squatter at the Monica Condominium, and
allegedly sent to Cotabato City Councilor Orlando Badoy, is not credible. This letter Atty. Amante, and for this reason, undersigned counsel feels under obligation to
states: make this affidavit of clarification for the guidance of the Investigating Prosecutor;

Dear Orly, xxx

Thank you very much for a wonderful visit to Cotabato City. I learned much about 4.4. Undersigned has no familiarity with the Tesclaros Recruitment & Employment
the South and the way of life there. Agency nor with the complainants (except for Laura Timbag Tuico of Cotabato City),
nor with the other respondents, but he believes that Atty. Roque A. Amante Jr. and
It took me time to prepare the complaint to be filed. In the meantime, the son-of-a- Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez are the key players of Joseph L. Montesclaros in the illegal
gun filed charges against us in Marawi City! I have addressed the affidavit-complaint recruitment business.[81]
directly to your man, Ben Danda, with instructions for him and the other two
complainants to sign the same before an assistant prosecutor and file with City
Prosecutor Bagasao. But we are relying on you to orchestrate the whole thing, from For these reasons, the Court finds that the documents submitted by complainants in
the prosecutor to the RTC Judge, especially the warrants of arrest. support of their complaint against De Guzman are not credible. Accordingly, the
Court dismisses the charges against De Guzman.
Thank you and best regards.[79]
De Guzman enjoys the legal presumption that he committed no crime or
The signatures of De Guzman in his Affidavit of Clarification and in the purported wrongdoing. Complainants have the burden of proof to prove their allegations of
letter have material discrepancies. At the same time, complainants did not even misconduct against De Guzman. Complainants were not able to discharge this
explain how they were able to get a copy of the purported letter. Complainants did burden because the documents they submitted were not authenticated and were
not present the recipients, Orlando Badoy or Atty. Francis V. Gustilo, to authenticate apparently fabricated. Also, complainants did not appear in the mandatory
conference proceedings to substantiate the allegations in their complaint. In At any rate, we consider the case against Trinidad and Fornier terminated. Under
disbarment proceedings, what is required to merit the administrative penalty is Section 12(c) of Rule 139-B, the administrative case is deemed terminated if the
preponderance of evidence, which weight is even higher than substantial evidence penalty imposed by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is
in the hierarchy of evidentiary values. Complainants were not able to prove by less than suspension or disbarment (such as reprimand, admonition or fine), unless
preponderance of evidence that De Guzman communicated with them and the complainant files a petition with this Court within 15 days from notice:
persuaded them to file fabricated charges against other people for the purpose of
extorting money. In fact, even if the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced, the If the respondent is exonerated by the Board or the disciplinary sanction imposed by
Court must rule in favor of De Guzman according to the equipoise doctrine. For it is less than suspension or disbarment (such as admonition, reprimand, or fine) it
these reasons, the Court reverses the Decision of the Board of Governors and the shall issue a decision exonerating respondent or imposing such sanction. The case
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and accordingly shall be deemed terminated unless upon petition of the complainant or other
dismisses the charges against De Guzman. interested party filed with the Supreme Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the Board's resolution, the Supreme Court orders otherwise.
Trinidad's and Fornier's Liabilities
Here, complainants did not appeal the Decision of the Board of Governors dismissing
the charges against Trinidad and Fornier. In fact, complainants filed with this Court a
The Court adopts the findings of fact and the report and recommendation of the Motion to Dismiss Complaint Against Trinidad and Fornier.cralaw
Investigating Commissioner with respect to Trinidad's and Fornier's liabilities:
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
A careful persusal of the allegations in as well as the attachments to the Joint Bar of the Philippines, adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Counter Affidavit with Affidavit of Complaint reveals that Complainants failed Commissioner, and DISMISS the charges against Attys. Wenceslao "Peewee"
miserably to substantiate their charges against Respondents. Other than their bare Trinidad and Andresito Fornier for utter lack of merit. We REVERSE the Decision of
allegations, the Complainants did not adduce proof of Respondent's supposed the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, modifying and
involvement or participation directly or indirectly in the acts complained of. For increasing the penalty in the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
instance, they failed to prove though faintly that Respondents had gone to Cotabato Commissioner, and accordingly DISMISS the charges against Atty. Salvador P. De
City to personally induce and persuade the complainants to file illegal recruitment Guzman, Jr. also for utter lack of merit.
charges against Atty. Nicanor G. Alvarez and sixteen (16) others or that they have
prodded and stirred them to do so as they did by any form of communication. The SO ORDERED.
supposed telephone call the Respondents and their supposed cohorts had made
during the proceedings before the Cotabato City Prosecutor's Office to the ARTURO D. BRION
Complainants is unbelievable and absurd. It is inconceivable that Complainants Associate Justice
could have answered the calls of six (6) persons during a serious proceeding such as
the inquest or preliminary investigation of a criminal complaint before the City JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Prosecutor. To the undersigned, the fallacy of the allegation above strongly militates Associate Justice
against the reliabiity of Complainants' charges against Respondents.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
xxx Associate Justice

But on top of all, the Complainants had by their own volition already made BIENVENIDO L. REYES
unmistakable Respondents' non-participation or non-involvement in the charges Associate Justice
they have filed when they wittingly filed their Motion to Dismiss Complaint against
Atty. Trinidad and Atty. Fornier Only. The undersigned realizes only too well that the
filing of a Motion to Dismiss is proscribed in this Commission, however, any such [A.C. No. 6580. August 3, 2005]
pleading must be appreciated as to its intrinsic merit. A clear reading of the same
reveals that the Complainants had wanted to clarify that they have erroneously DELA CRUZ vs. SALADERO
included Respondents Trinidad and Fornier as parties to the case. In particular, they
explained that they had no communication or dealings whatsoever with the said SECOND DIVISION
lawyers as to inspire belief that the latter had some involvement in their charges.
The undersigned finds the affidavit persuasive and for that he has no reason to Sirs/Mesdames:
ignore the import of the same as a piece of evidence.[82]
Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated AUG 3
2005.
 She then recommended that the instant case of disbarment filed against respondent
A.C. No. 6580 (CBD 03-1175) (Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz vs. Atty. Remegio D. be dismissed for lack of merit.[6]cralaw
Saladero, Jr.)
On July 30, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution thus:
A complaint dated December 16, 2003 was filed by Atty. Miniano B. Dela Cruz before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) charging respondent of violating the RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2004-349
lawyer's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing disbarment, CBD Case No. 03-1175
criminal and administrative cases against complainant without legal and factual Atty. Miniano B. dela Cruz vs.
bases, for submitting false affidavits, for refusing his invitation to have a "brotherly" Atty. Remegio D. Saladero, Jr.
talk as fellow lawyer to clarify the matters between complainant and respondent's RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the
clients and for filing a prohibited pleading. Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the
Specifically, complainant accuses respondent of: filing, through Adoracion Losloso, a recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
baseless disbarment case against him supported by two false affidavits; sending and rules, and considering that the complaint lacks merit, the case is hereby
complainant a letter charging him of estafa and ignoring complainant's reply DISMISSED.[7]cralaw
thereto; refusing complainant's invitation to a "brotherly" talk; filing an estafa case
through falsification of public document and four other criminal complaints against On October 19, 2004, complainant filed before this Court a Motion for
herein complainant, through Losloso, which were eventually dismissed for being Reconsideration on the grounds that: the report and recommendation of IBP
groundless; filing an HLURB case in behalf of Losloso and Nestor Aguirre without Commissioner Maala is not based on correct records of the case; Maala's report and
verifying the truth of their claims; filing a motion to dismiss the ejectment case filed recommendation did not consider the violations of respondent under Sec. 20 of Rule
by complainant against Losloso before the barangay knowing that such is a 138[8]cralaw of the Rules of Court, Canons 1,[9]cralaw 8[10]cralaw and 12,
prohibited pleading; and helping Losloso to file motions to inhibit a prosecutor in [11]cralaw and Rules 1.02, 1.03, and 1.04 of the Code of Professional Conduct;
Pasig for alleged bias.[1]cralaw [12]cralaw the report and recommendation did not discuss the failure of respondent
to conduct an investigation to ascertain the veracity of the complaint for Estafa,
Respondent filed an answer contending that: he merely acted as counsel of the disbarment and complaint before the HLURB, among others; and the Resolution of
parties who filed cases against complainant and out of the 17 cases filed by the IBP Board of Governors erred in approving the incomplete and defective report of
Adoracion Losloso against complainant, respondent only handles four which are still Maala and should therefore be set aside.[13]cralaw
pending resolution; it would be premature to say that said cases were filed only to
harass complainant; there is no showing that respondent is moved by malice or bad On December 28, 2004, complainant filed a Supplement to the Motion for
faith in agreeing to act as counsel of Losloso; Losloso also alleged that it was a Reconsideration emphasizing the issue that respondent filed groundless cases
public attorney who was assisting her in all her cases by preparing the various against him.[14]cralaw
pleadings in court; and it is only because said public attorney could not appear in
court that she asked the assistance of respondent and eventually engaged the legal On April 13, 2005, respondent filed a Comment stating that: complainant, instead of
services of respondent when the public attorney died.[2]cralaw filing a petition from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, pursuant to Rule
139-B, Sec. 12(c), erroneously filed a motion for reconsideration; contrary to the
On February 17, 2004, complainant filed a Reply to the answer reiterating his earlier allegations of complainant, respondent acted in good faith and studied the
claims which respondent countered with a Rejoinder asserting the same denials. supporting documents of Losloso first before sending complainant the demand
[3]cralaw letter; respondent was not the one who filed the cases before the HLURB, the
Prosecutors' Office and the IBP; respondent came into the picture long after these
A mandatory conference was held on April 16, 2004 and on said date, IBP cases have been filed; respondent agreed to handle the said cases based on his
Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala directed the parties to submit their honest assessment that there is a valid cause of action against complainant;
respective position papers.[4]cralaw On June 7, 2004, she submitted her report [15]cralaw the investigating IBP commissioner was not biased in requiring
dated June 7, 2004, finding that: respondent to submit his position paper despite his failure to attend the mandatory
hearing on time; respondent agreed to the order of Maala requiring both parties to
...In the case at hand, complainant failed to present a clear, convincing and submit position papers and it was only when the commissioner dismissed his
satisfactory evidence to prove that respondent has been moved by malice and bad complaint that complainant raised the issue of bias; respondent enjoys the
faith in accepting to serve as legal counsel of Mrs. Adoracion Losloso. Moreover, presumption that he is innocent of the charges against him and complainant has
records show that the cases, where respondent acted as counsel for Mrs. Losloso failed to convincingly prove that respondent has acted in bad faith in the manner by
have not been resolved, and therefore, it could not be determined yet whether or which he has handled the cases pending between complainant and Losloso, et al.;
not they are meritorious.[5]cralaw complainant himself has filed several cases against Losloso (cancellation of contract,
estafa and perjury) which have been dismissed; since these cases were also found to
be without merit, complainant, following his line of reasoning, should also be complaints against herein complainant.[26]cralaw We cannot, based on this letter
considered as having harassed Losloso in violation of his oath as a lawyer.[16]cralaw alone, say that respondent was moved by malice or bad faith.

First of all, we are treating herein motion for reconsideration as a petition referred to We reiterate that in disbarment proceedings, such as the case at bar, the burden of
in Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(c). proof rests upon the complainant. This Court will exercise its disciplinary powers only
if the complainant establishes his case by clear, convincing and satisfactory
After reviewing the records of this case, we find the report and recommendation of evidence. In the absence of convincing or clearly preponderant evidence, the
the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, to be complaint for disbarment against respondent is correctly dismissed[27]cralaw by the
well-founded. IBP Board of Governors.

Well-settled is the rule that he who alleges must prove his allegations. If the WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration, filed by Atty. Miniano Dela Cruz, is
complainant, upon whom rests the burden of proving his cause of action, fails to DENIED for lack of merit.
show in a satisfactory manner the facts upon which he bases his claim, the
respondent is under no obligation to prove his exception or defense.[17]cralaw SO ORDERED.

Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any Very truly yours,
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
[18]cralaw But his guilt cannot be presumed.[19]cralaw A mere charge or allegation (Sgd.) LUDICHI YASAY-NUNAG
of wrongdoing will not suffice.[20]cralaw There must be sufficient evidence to Clerk of Court
support the charge.[21]cralaw

In this case, complainant accuses respondent of filing baseless charges against him. SECOND DIVISION
Apart from his bare allegations, however, complainant failed to show that
respondent did in fact file baseless cases against him. As borne by the records, the A.C. No. 7687, December 03, 2014
complaint, as well as the motions for reconsideration of the denial thereof, for estafa
through falsification of public document, was filed by Adoracion Losloso;[22]cralaw RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants, v. ATTYS. FRANKIE O.
the disbarment case before the IBP were filed by Losloso, Sheila Bones-Lei and MAGSALIN III AND PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.
Nestor Aguirre;[23]cralaw while the HLURB case was filed by Losloso and Aguirre.
[24]cralaw Aside from complainant's allegations, there is no proof that respondent A.C. No. 7688
prodded said individuals to file cases against herein complainant. Adoracion Losloso
even executed a sworn statement expressing that it was Atty. Ramon Vera of the RAUL C. LANUZA AND REYNALDO C. RASING, Complainants, v. ATTYS. FRANKIE O.
Public Attorney's Office in Pasig who helped her in filing the cases before the fiscal, MAGSALIN III, PETER ANDREW S. GO AND PABLO R. CRUZ, Respondents.
the HLURB and the IBP. She also categorically stated that herein respondent only
entered the picture after the said cases had already been filed and that he did not DECISION
have any participation in the drafting of said complaints. She also explained that out
of the 20 cases filed between her and herein complainant, respondent only MENDOZA, J.:
participated in four cases which are still pending resolution.[25]cralaw
Before the Court are two (2) separate administrative cases for disbarment filed by
Apart from complainant's naked assertions, there is also no proof anywhere in the complainants Raul C. Lanuza (Lanuza) and Reynaldo C. Rasing (Rasing), docketed as
records that respondent filed false affidavits to support the disbarment case against A.C. No. 7687, against lawyers Frankie O. Magsalin III (Atty. Magsalin) and Pablo R.
complainant in the IBP. Neither is there any showing that respondent filed a Cruz (Atty. Cruz) and A.C. No. 7688 against Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Peter
prohibited pleading, In any case, we cannot see how such pleading, if ever one was Andrew Z. Go (Atty. Go) for alleged fraud, deceit, malpractice, and gross misconduct
filed, could be a basis for disbarment. Neither could respondent's refusal to have a in violation of Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the Code of Professional
"brotherly talk over a cup of coffee" with complainant or respondent's act of helping Responsibility (CPR).
Losloso file a motion to inhibit a prosecutor in Pasig for alleged bias could be a basis
for disciplinary action. The Court eventually consolidated the two cases as they both involve the same
parties, revolve around the same set of facts, and raise exactly the same
What is only clear is that herein respondent sent complainant a letter dated May 17, issues.chanrobleslaw
2001 demanding that complainant give Losloso, et al. their commission for the sale
of a property in Antipolo based on a Memorandum of Agreement, otherwise Losloso, The Facts
et al. would be constrained to file appropriate criminal, civil and administrative
These disbarment cases stemmed from a labor case filed by complainant Lanuza CA Decision on April 10, 2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt4 (1st return
against Philippine Hoteliers, Inc. (PHI), which operated the Dusit Hotel Nikko (Dusit receipt) that was sent back to CA. Stamped on the 1st return receipt was RECEIVED
Hotel), a client of respondents Atty. Magsalin, Atty. Cruz and Atty. Go, all from the law APRIL 10 2007 and signed by Calucag in front and within the full view of Postman
firm, P.R. Cruz Law Offices (PRC Law Office). Both the Labor Arbiter and the National Pecante. The respondents claimed that examining and finding that the return receipt
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) decided in favor of PHI. Lanuza appealed the had been faithfully accomplished and the date indicated therein to be true and
NLRC decision before the Court of Appeals (CA). accurate, Postman Pecante accepted the said return receipt. As borne out by the
records, the 1st return receipt pertaining to the CA decision was duly returned to the
A.C. No. 7688 CA as the sender. Eventually, Atty. Magsalin filed the required Compliance.
Considering that Atty. Cruz was out of the country from April 5, 2007, to May 6,
On March 23, 2007, the CA rendered a decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 92642, favoring 2007, based on a Bureau of Immigration certification,5 Atty. Magsalin requested Atty.
Lanuza and directing PHI to reinstate him with full backwages. Go, a senior associate in their law office, to review PHIs motion for reconsideration
of the decision. Afterwards, Atty. Go signed the said motion for reconsideration and
According to Lanuza, his legal counsel, Atty. Solon R. Garcia (Atty. Garcia), received had it filed with the CA.
the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the CA Decision on March 28, 2007 at his
law office located in Quezon City. Subsequently, Atty. Garcia received by registered Relying on the date indicated in the return receipt, respondents stated the date,
mail the Compliance1 and Motion for Reconsideration,2 both dated April 12, 2007, April 10, 2007, in the filed compliance and motion for reconsideration .
filed by PHI and signed by Atty. Magsalin. In the said pleadings, PHI stated that it
received Notice of Judgment with a copy of the CA decision on April 10, 2007. This To oppose complainants assertion of Calucags application of snowpake in the 1st
information caused Atty. Garcia to wonder why the postman would belatedly deliver return receipt allegedly to conceal the true date of receipt of the CA decision, the
the said Notice of Judgment and the CA decision to the PRC Law Office, which was respondents secured a Certification6 from the CA, which stated the following:
also located in Quezon City, thirteen (13) days after he received his own copies. This is to certify that the Registry Return Receipt dated March 23, 2007, attached to
the dorsal portion of page 209 of the rollo of the above-captioned case, as per
Afterwards, Atty. Garcia requested the Quezon City Central Post Office (QCCPO) for a careful observation, reveals no snowpaked portion and that the white mark that
certification as to the date of the actual receipt of the Notice of Judgment with the appears on the upper, center portion of the subject Registry Return Receipt bearing
CA decision by the PRC Law Office. In the October 31, 2007 Certification,3 issued by the stamp mark of receipt of P.R. Cruz Law Offices is a part of the white envelope
Llewelyn F. Fallarme (Fallarme), Chief of the Records Section, QCCPO, it was stated that contained the decision of this Court which stuck to the said Return Receipt.
that the Registered Letter No. S-1582 addressed to Atty. Magsalin was delivered by A.C. No. 7687
Postman Rosendo Pecante (Postman Pecante) and duly received by Teresita Calucag
on March 29, 2007, supposedly based on the logbook of Postman Pecante. As the records would show, PHI moved for reconsideration of the said CA decision,
but the CA denied the motion in its July 4, 2007 Resolution.
With the October 31, 2007 Certification as basis, the complainants lodged the
disbarment complaint against Attys. Magsalin, Go and Cruz, which was docketed as On July 10, 2007, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Notice of Resolution
A.C. No. 7688. from the CA. Thereafter, Atty. Garcia received by registered mail the Compliance,7
dated July 26, 2007, filed by PHI, through the PRC Law Office. In the said
A.C. No. 7688 Compliance, it was stated that the Notice of Resolution was received on July 23,
2007 based on the Registry Return Receipt8 (2nd return receipt) sent back to the CA.
In A.C. No. 7688, the complainants alleged that Teresita Tess Calucag (Calucag),
secretary of PRC Law Office, altered the true date of receipt of the Notice of Again wondering about the delay in the delivery of the registered mail to the
Judgment with the CA decision when she signed and stamped on the registry return respondents, Atty. Garcia requested the QCCPO to issue a certification as to the date
receipt the date, April 10, 2007, to mislead the CA and the opposing party that they of the actual receipt of the said Notice of Resolution by the PRC Law Office. In the
received their copy of the CA decision on a later date and not March 29, 2007. The October 25, 2007 Certification9 issued by the QCCPO, Chief of the Records Section
complainants added that the alteration was very evident on the registry return Fallarme, stated that the Registered Letter No. S-114 addressed to Atty. Magsalin
receipt which bore two (2) stamped dates of receipt, with one stamped date was delivered by Postman Pecante and duly received by Calucag on July 16, 2007,
snowpaked or covered with a liquid correction fluid to conceal the true date based on the logbook of Postman Pecante.
written on the registry return receipt. They inferred that Calucag concealed what
could probably be the true date of receipt, and that the respondents must have The October 25, 2007 Certification became the basis of the other disbarment
induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt because they stood to benefit from complaint against Attys. Magsalin and Cruz docketed as A.C. No. 7687.
the additional thirteen (13) days to prepare their motion for reconsideration.
In A.C. No. 7687, the complainants claimed that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz must have
In their defense, the respondents denied the complainants allegations and induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt of the Notice of Resolution or at
countered that they actually received the Notice of Judgment and their copy of the least had the knowledge thereof when she signed and stamped on the 2nd return
receipt the date - July 23, 2007. They contended that Attys. Magsalin and Cruz stood A.C. No. 7688
to benefit from the additional seven (7) days derived from the alleged altered date
as they, in fact, used the altered date in their subsequent pleading. Attys. Magsalin In its Report and Recommendation,16 dated March 10, 2009, the CBD recommended
and Cruz falsely alleged such in the compliance filed before the CA; the motion for that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave credence to the date
extension of time to file a petition for review on certiorari;10 and the petition for indicated in the 1st return receipt as the actual and true date of receipt of the Notice
review on certiorari11 filed before this Court. The complainants insinuated that Atty. of Judgment with the attached CA decision by the respondents. It did not subscribe
Magsalin and Atty. Cruz deliberately misled the CA and this Court by filing the above- to the complainants theory that Calucag was induced by the respondents to conceal
mentioned pleadings with the full knowledge that they were already time barred. the true date of receipt by applying a liquid correction fluid in the 1st return receipt.
It found the the Certification issued by Atty. Teresita R. Marigomen sufficient to
In their defense, Attys. Magsalin and Cruz denied the allegations in the complaint explain the presence of the white substance appearing on the 1st return receipt.
and retorted that they actually received the subject Notice of Resolution on the date
- July 23, 2007 as indicated in the 2nd return receipt which was also duly accepted On April 17, 2009, the IBP-BOG resolved to adopt and approve the CBD report and
by Postman Pecante and appropriately returned to the CA as sender. Relying on the recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009-178.17 The complainants
date, July 23, 2007, as indicated in 2nd return receipt, Atty. Magsalin, on behalf of moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied.
PHI, filed the compliance and the other pleadings before the CA and this Court
concerning CA-G.R. SP No. 92642. The respondents asserted that the date in the 2nd With their motions for reconsideration in the two cases denied, the complainants
return receipt deserved full faith and credence as it was clearly indicated by filed their respective petitions for review before this Court.chanrobleslaw
Calucag, witnessed by Postman Pecante and ultimately processed by the QCCPO to
be duly returned to the CA. ISSUE

Referral to the IBP The vital issue for the Courts resolution is whether Attys. Magsalin, Cruz and Go
should be held administratively liable based on the allegations in the
In its April 2, 200812 and June 16, 200813 Resolutions, the Court referred the said complaints.chanrobleslaw
administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation,
report and recommendation. The Courts Ruling

The complainants and the respondents all appeared at the scheduled mandatory The petitions lack merit.
conference held before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). Thereafter, the
parties filed their respective position papers. The Court deems it appropriate to discuss A.C. Nos. 7687 and 7688 jointly as they
essentially revolve around the same circumstances and parties.
IBPs Report and Recommendation
The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension proceedings always rests on the
A.C. No. 7687 complainant. The Court exercises its disciplinary power only if the complainant
establishes the complaint by clearly preponderant evidence that warrants the
In its March 9, 2009 Report and Recommendation,14 Commissioner Salvador B. imposition of the harsh penalty. As a rule, an attorney enjoys the legal presumption
Hababag (Commissioner Hababag) recommended that the administrative complaint that he is innocent of the charges made against him until the contrary is proved. An
be dismissed for lack of merit. It gave more credence to the date indicated in the attorney is further presumed as an officer of the Court to have performed his duties
2nd return receipt which bore no alteration and was duly accepted by Postman in accordance with his oath.18chanrobleslaw
Pecante than the October 25, 2007 Certification issued by the QCCPO. He stated that
the 2nd return receipt did not contain any alteration as to the stamping of the date - In the cases at bench, the Court finds the evidentiary records to be inconclusive,
July 23, 2007, and that Postman Pecante would not have allowed and accepted the thus, insufficient to hold the respondents liable for the acts alleged in the complaint.
2nd return receipt from Calucag if it contained an inaccurate date other than the
true date of receipt. Finally, the CBD ruled that the complainants failed to Though there is a variance between the QCCPO Certifications and the Registry
demonstrate the specific acts constituting deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct Return Receipts as to the dates of the CA receipt of the notices, decision and
by evidence that was clear and free from doubt as to the act charged and as to the resolution by the respondents, there is no clear and convincing evidence to prove
respondents motive. that the respondents intentionally and maliciously made it appear that they received
the CA notices, decision and resolution later than the dates stated in the QCCPO
On April 17, 2009, the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG) resolved to adopt and Certifications. The complainants would like to impress upon the Court that the only
approve the CBD report and recommendation through its Resolution No. XVIII-2009- logical explanation as to the discrepancy on the dates between the QCCPO
176.15 The complainants moved for reconsideration, but the motion was denied. Certifications and the Registry Return Receipts was that the respondents must have
induced Calucag to alter the true date of receipt by the CA for the purpose of
extending the period to file, the otherwise time-barred, motion for reconsideration. The Facts
Verily, this leap of inference proffered by the complainants is merely anchored on The records reveal that on 3 October 2006 Marissa L. Macarilay (Macarilay), through
speculation and conjecture and not in any way supported by clear substantial her then counsel Sorreda,1 filed an administrative complaint2 against Kho before the
evidence required to justify the imposition of an administrative penalty on a member Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1866
of the Bar. (Macarilay's complaint). Sorreda withdrew as counsel for Macarilay on 10 March
2007.3 On 5 December 2007, Sorreda filed with the IBP the present complaint4
Even if the postmasters certifications were to merit serious consideration, the Court against Kho, which contained exactly the same allegations in Macarilay's complaint.
cannot avoid the legal reality that the registry return card is considered as the Sorreda alleged that: (1) Macarilay, through him as counsel, filed an arbitration case
official CA record evidencing service by mail. This card carries the presumption that against Candelaria Kholoma (Candelaria) and Imelda Kholoma (Imelda), Kho's
it was prepared in the course of official duties which have been regularly performed. clients, before the Construction Industry Arbitration Commission (CIAC); (2) Kho
In this sense, it is presumed to be accurate, unless clearly proven otherwise. notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit in the arbitration case despite being
disqualified under the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since Candelaria and Imelda
The Court finds merit in the respondents argument that had Calucag stamped an are Kho's sister-in-law and niece, respectively; (3) Kho did not furnish Macarilay and
inaccurate date on the registry return receipts, Postman Pecante, who witnessed and Sorreda a copy of his comment on their motion for substitution of arbitrator; (4) Kho
had full view of the receiving and stamping of the said registry return receipts, would did not countervail the manifestation alleging the mendacity of Kho and his clients;
have called her attention to correct the same or would have refused to receive them (5) Kho intentionally delayed the receipt of Macarilay's motion for time extension; (6)
altogether for being erroneous. Here, Postman Pecante having accepted two registry Kho advised Robert Kholoma (Robert), the husband of Candelaria, to forcibly eject
return receipts with the dates, April 10, 200719 and July 23, 2007,20 respectively, Macarilay's watchman in the disputed property; (7) Kho notarized the answer filed
can only mean that the said postman considered the dates indicated therein to be by the Kholomas in the case for forcible entry; (8) Kho also notarized the Special
correct and accurate. Power of Attorney (SPA) executed by the Kholomas, which amounted to "self-
notarization," because "the one being given power is the law firm of Kho Antonio
While the Court will not avoid its responsibility in meting out the proper disciplinary Velasco & Payos Law Offices, of which [Kho] is the premier partner"; (9) Kho
punishment upon lawyers who fail to live up to their sworn duties, the Court will not notarized the SPA with only one of the three signatories exhibiting her cedula; (10)
wield its axe against those the accusations against whom are not indubitably Kho also notarized the petition for review filed by Candelaria and Imelda before the
proven. Court of Appeals; and (11) Kho and his clients deliberately failed to furnish the CIAC
Accordingly, in the absence of a clear and convincing evidence, the complaint for with a copy their appeal.
disbarment should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the administrative complaints against Attys. Frankie O. Magsalin III and In his Answer,5 Kho admitted that he notarized Candelaria and Imelda's affidavit,
Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7687; and the administrative complaint against Attys. answer in the case for forcible entry, SPA, and petition for review. Kho, however,
Frankie O. Magsalin III, Peter Andrew S. Go and Pablo R. Cruz, in A.C. No. 7688, are alleged that he acted in good faith for he believed that the decision in Aznar
hereby DISMISSED. Brothers Realty Co. v. Court of Appeals,6 where only "those convicted of the crime
SO ORDERED. involving moral turpitude were disqualified to notarize documents," was still the
prevailing rule. Kho pleaded for liberality in the application of the then recently
Insert A.C. 6056 enacted 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, since there was no damage caused by the
notarization. He admitted that he was not yet fully conversant with the new rules. As
to the other allegations, Kho claimed that those were unsubstantiated conclusions,
conjectures and speculations. Kho admitted his failure to furnish Sorreda with a copy
SECOND DIVISION of the comment on the motion for substitution of arbitrator and his failure to furnish
the CIAC with a copy of his clients' appeal. However, he alleged that no damage was
A.C. No. 10635, August 26, 2015 caused and he immediately furnished the copies of the pleadings upon discovery of
his inadvertence.
NOEL S. SORREDA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DAVID L. KHO, Respondent.
Finally, Kho claimed that "Macarilay's penchant for deliberate forum shopping and
RESOLUTION splitting a cause of action, albeit baseless and unfounded, must be sanctioned."7 In
an Order8 dated 29 January 2009, IBP Commissioner Romualdo A. Din, Jr. (IBP
CARPIO, J.: Commissioner) denied Sorreda's motion to consolidate the present complaint with
Macarilay's complaint, because there was already a report and recommendation by
The Case a different commissioner in Macarilay's complaint. On 4 August 2009, Kho filed an
Before the Court is an administrative case filed by Noel S. Sorreda (Sorreda) against urgent manifestation,9 pleading for the dismissal of the present case. Kho attached
Atty. David L. Kho (Kho) for malpractice and/or gross misconduct. a copy of this Court's Resolution10 dated 30 March 2009, where the Third Division of
this Court resolved to close and terminate CBD Case No. 06-1866 (docketed as A.C.
No. 8161), considering that no motion for reconsideration was filed against the IBP
Resolution11 dismissing the case for lack of merit, and no petition for review was
filed before the Court. FIRST DIVISION

The Ruling of the IBP A.C. No. 8261, March 11, 2015

In a Report and Recommendation dated 31 May 2011,12 the IBP Commissioner JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. FEDERICO S.
recommended the dismissal of the present complaint against Kho because Sorreda TOLENTINO, JR., ATTY. RENATO G. CUNANAN, ATTY. DANIEL F. VICTORIO, JR., AND
failed to establish his allegations by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence. ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondents.
The IBP Commissioner also found that Sorreda did not establish how Kho's alleged
violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice, if proven, would damage Macarilay. A.C. No. 8725
In Resolution No. XX-2013-10713 issued on 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of
Governors adopted and approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and JESSIE T. CAMPUGAN AND ROBERT C. TORRES, Complainants, v. ATTY. CONSTANTE P.
Recommendation, dismissing the complaint for lack of evidence. In Resolution No. CALUYA, JR., AND ATTY. ELBERT T. QUILALA, Respondent.
XXI-2014-22114 issued on 2 May 2014, the IBP Board of Governors likewise denied
the motion for reconsideration filed by Sorreda, since the Board found no cogent DECISION
reason to reverse its initial findings and the matters raised were reiterations of those
which had already been taken into consideration. BERSAMIN, J.:
The Ruling of the Court
In this consolidated administrative case, complainants Jessie T. Campugan and
We dismiss the complaint against Kho. Applying the principle of res judicata or bar Robert C. Torres seek the disbarment of respondents Atty. Federico S. Tolentino, Jr.,
by prior judgment, the Court finds that the present administrative case becomes Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Elbert T. Quilala and Atty.
dismissible. Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court enunciates the rule of res Constante P. Caluya, Jr. for allegedly falsifying a court order that became the basis
judicata or bar by prior judgment.15 It provides that a final judgment on the merits for the cancellation of their annotation of the notice of adverse claim and the notice
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the of lis pendens in the Registry of Deeds in Quezon City.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
parties and their privies, and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions
involving the same claim, demand, or cause of action.16 A.C. No. 8161 and the
present case have substantially identical parties, refer to the same subject matter, Antecedents
raise the same issue, and claim the same relief. The present complaint is a mere
duplication of Macarilay's complaint in A.C. No. 8161. Thus, the Resolution of this Atty. Victorio, Jr. had replaced Atty. Edgardo Abad as counsel of the complainants in a
Court in A.C. No. 8161 is conclusive in the present case. Furthermore, Sorreda failed civil action they brought to seek the annulment of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
to discharge the burden of proving Kho's administrative liability by clear No. N-290546 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City in the first week of January
preponderance of evidence. 2007 in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Quezon City (Civil Case No. Q-07-59598).
They impleaded as defendants Ramon and Josefina Ricafort, Juliet Vargas and the
The legal presumption is that an attorney is innocent of the charges against him Register of Deeds of Quezon City. They caused to be annotated on TCT No. N-290546
until the contrary is proved.17 The burden of proof in disbarment and suspension their affidavit of adverse claim, as well as the notice of lis pendens.1 Atty. Tolentino,
proceedings always rests on the complainant,18 and the burden is not satisfied Jr. was the counsel of defendant Ramon and Josefina Ricafort.
when complainant relies on mere assumptions and suspicions as evidence.19
Considering the serious consequences of disbarment and suspension, this Court has In their sworn complaint for disbarment dated April 23, 2009 (later docketed as A.C.
consistently held that clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the No. 8261),2 the complainants narrated that as the surviving children of the late
imposition of administrative penalty.20 In the present case, Sorreda did not Spouses Antonio and Nemesia Torres, they inherited upon the deaths of their parents
substantiate his allegations, and he relied on his own assumptions and suspicions. a residential lot located at No. 251 Boni Serrano Street, Murphy, Cubao, Quezon City
Sorreda did not show how Kho's alleged actions amount to malpractice or gross registered under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT-64333(35652) of the
misconduct, which will subject Kho to administrative sanction. Sorreda cannot shift Register of Deeds of Quezon City;3 that on August 24, 2006, they discovered that
the burden of proof to Kho by asking him to rebut his allegations. It is axiomatic that TCT No. RT-64333(35652) had been unlawfully cancelled and replaced by TCT No. N-
one who alleges an act has the onus of proving it.21 If the burden of proof is not 290546 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City under the names of Ramon and
overcome, the respondent is under no obligation to prove his defense.22 Josefina Ricafort;4 and that, accordingly, they immediately caused the annotation of
their affidavit of adverse claim on TCT No. N-290546.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against respondent Atty. David L. Kho. Costs
against complainant. SO ORDERED. Del Castillo, Mendoza Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., It appears that the parties entered into an amicable settlement during the pendency
concur. of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 in order to end their dispute,5 whereby the
complainants agreed to sell the property and the proceeds thereof would be equally be held responsible for their representation in other proceedings, such as that before
divided between the parties, and the complaint and counterclaim would be the LRA, which required a separate engagement; and that the only payment he had
withdrawn respectively by the complainants (as the plaintiffs) and the defendants. received from the complainants were those for his appearance fees of P1,000.00 for
Pursuant to the terms of the amicable settlement, Atty. Victorio, Jr. filed a Motion to every hearing in the RTC.
Withdraw Complaint dated February 26, 2008,6 which the RTC granted in its order
dated May 16, 2008 upon noting the defendants' lack of objection thereto and the In his Comment dated August 24, 2009,13 Atty. Tolentino, Jr. refuted the charge of
defendants' willingness to similarly withdraw their counterclaim.7 conspiracy, stressing that he was not acquainted with the other respondents, except
Atty. Victorio, Jr. whom he had met during the hearings in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598;
The complainants alleged that from the time of the issuance by the RTC of the order that although he had notarized the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 of Ramon
dated May 16, 2008, they could no longer locate or contact Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite Ricafort to the Register of Deeds, he had no knowledge about how said letter-
making several phone calls and visits to his office; that they found out upon request had been disposed of by the Register of Deeds; and that the present
verification at the Register of Deeds of Quezon City that new annotations were made complaint was the second disbarment case filed by the complainants against him
on TCT No. N-290546, specifically: (1) the annotation of the letter-request appearing with no other motive except to harass and intimidate him.
to be filed by Atty. Tolentino, Jr.8 seeking the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse
claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546; and (2) the Atty. Quilala stated in his Comment dated September 1, 200914 that it was Atty.
arinotation of the decision dated May 16, 2008 rendered in Civil Case No. Q-07- Caluya, Jr., another Deputy Register of Deeds, who was the actual signing authority
59598 by the RTC, Branch 95, in Quezon City, granting the complainants' Motion to of the annotations that resulted in the cancellation of the affidavit of adverse claim
Withdraw Complaint;9 and that a copy of the letter-request dated June 30, 2008 and the notice of lis pendens on TCT No. N-290546; that the cancellation of the
addressed to Atty. Quilala, Registrar of Deeds of Quezon City, disclosed that it was annotations was undertaken in the regular course of official duty and in the exercise
defendant Ramon Ricafort who had signed the letter. of the ministerial duty of the Register of Deeds; that no irregularity occurred or was
performed in the cancellation of the annotations; and that the Register of Deeds was
Feeling aggrieved by their discovery, the complainants filed an appeal en consulta impleaded in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 only as a nominal party, thereby discounting
with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), docketed as Consulta No. 4707, assailing any involvement in the proceedings in the case.
the unlawful cancellation of their notice of adverse claim and their notice of lis
pendens under primary entries PE-2742 and PE-3828-9, respectively. The LRA set Atty. Cunanan did not file any comment.15
Consulta No. 4707 for hearing on March 30, 2009, and directed the parties to submit
their respective memoranda and/or supporting documents on or before such As the result of Atty. Quilala's allegation in his Comment in A.C. No. 8261 that it had
scheduled hearing.10 However, the records do not disclose whether Consulta No. been Atty. Caluya, Jr.'s signature that appeared below the cancelled entries, the
4707 was already resolved, or remained pending at the LRA. complainants filed another sworn disbarment complaint dated August 26, 2010
alleging that Atty. Caluya, Jr. had forged the signature of Atty. Cunanan.16 This
Unable to receive any response or assistance from Atty. Victorio, Jr. despite their disbarment complaint was docketed as A.C. No. 8725, and was later on consolidated
having paid him for his professional services, the complainants felt that said counsel with A.C. No. 826117 because the complaints involved the same parties and rested
had abandoned their case. They submitted that the cancellation of their notice of on similar allegations against the respondents.
adverse claim and their notice of lis pendens without a court order specifically
allowing such cancellation resulted from the connivance and conspiracy between Atty. Quilala filed his Comment in A.C. No. 8725 to belie the allegation of forgery and
Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr., and from the taking advantage of their to reiterate the arguments he had made in A.C. No. 8261.18 On his part, Atty.
positions as officials in the Registry of Deeds by respondents Atty. Quilala, the Chief Caluya, Jr. manifested that he adopted Atty. Quilala's Comment.19
Registrar, and Atty. Cunanan, the acting Registrar and signatory of the new
annotations. Thus, they claimed to be thereby prejudiced. Ruling

On July 6, 2009, the Court required the respondents to comment on the verified We dismiss the complaints for disbarment for being bereft of merit.
complaint.11
Well entrenched in this jurisdiction is the rule that a lawyer may be disciplined for
Atty. Victorio, Jr. asserted in his Comment dated August 17, 200912 that complainant misconduct committed either in his professional or private capacity. The test is
Robert Torres had been actively involved in the proceedings in Civil Case No. Q-07- whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity,
59598, which included the mediation process; that the complainants, after having and good demeanor, or whether his conduct renders him unworthy to continue as an
aggressively participated in the drafting of the amicable settlement, could not now officer of the Court.20 Verily, Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
claim that they had been deceived into entering the agreement in the same way mandates all lawyers to uphold at all times the dignity and integrity of the Legal
that they could not feign ignorance of the conditions contained therein; that he did Profession. Lawyers are similarly required under Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the same
not commit any abandonment as alleged, but had performed in good faith his duties Code not to engage in any unlawful, dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
as the counsel for the complainants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598; that he should not Failure to observe these tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility exposes
the lawyer to disciplinary sanctions as provided in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules sufficient in law and t]o be in conformity with existing requirements, it became
of Court, as amended, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary obligatory for them to perform their ministerial duty without unnecessary delay.24
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds
therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as Should they be aggrieved by said respondents' performance of duty, complainants
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross were not bereft of any remedy because they could challenge the performance of
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of duty by bringing the matter by way of consulta with the LRA, as provided by Section
a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is 11725 of Presidential Decree No. 1529. But, as enunciated in Gabriel v. Register of
required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience Deeds of Rizal,26 it was ultimately within the province of a court of competent
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The jurisdiction to resolve issues concerning the validity or invalidity of a document
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or registered by the Register of Deeds.
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
The complainants' allegations of the respondents' acts and omissions are insufficient The complainants charge Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. with having
to establish any censurable conduct against them. conspired with each other to guarantee that the parties in Civil Case No. Q-59598
would enter into the amicable settlement, and then to cause the cancellation of the
Section 10 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) affidavit of adverse claim and notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-290546.
enumerates the general duties of the Register of Deeds, as The complainants further fault Atty. Victorio, Jr. with having abandoned their cause
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary since the issuance of the RTC of its order dated May 16, 2008.
Section 10. General functions of Registers of Deeds. - x x x
The complainants' charges are devoid of substance.
It shall be the duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an instrument
presented for registration dealing with real or personal property which complies with Although it is not necessary to prove a formal agreement in order to establish
all the requisites for registration. He shall see to it that said instrument bears the conspiracy because conspiracy may be inferred from the circumstances attending
proper documentary science stamps and that the same are properly canceled. If the the commission of an act, it is nonetheless essential that conspiracy be established
instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny registration thereof and inform by clear and convincing evidence.27 The complainants failed in this regard. Outside
the presenter of such denial in writing, stating the ground or reason therefor, and of their bare assertions that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. had conspired
advising him of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of this with each other in order to cause the dismissal of the complaint and then discharge
Decree. (Emphasis supplied) of the annotations, they presented no evidence to support their allegation of
The aforementioned duty of the Register of Deeds is ministerial in nature.21 A purely conspiracy. On the contrary, the records indicated their own active pjarticipation in
ministerial act or duty is one that an officer or tribunal performs in a given state of arriving at the amicable settlement with the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-
facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of a legal authority, 59598. Hence, they could not now turn their backs on the amicable settlement that
without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or they had themselves entered into.
impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives
him the right to decide how or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is Even assuming that Atty. Victorio, Jr. and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. initiated ahd participated
discretionary, not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when its discharge requires in the settlement of the case, there was nothing wrong in their doing so. It was
neither the exercise of official discretion nor the exercise of judgment.22 actually their obligation as lawyers to do so, pursuant to Rule 1.04, Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, viz.:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In Gabriel v. Register of Deeds of Rizal,23 the Court underscores that registration is a RULE 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a controversy
merely ministerial act of the Register of Deeds, if it will admit of a fair settlement.
explaining:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In fine, the presumption of the validity of the amicable settlement of the
xxx [W]hether the document is invalid, frivolous or intended to harass, is not the complainants and the defendants in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598 subsisted.28
duty of a Register of Deeds to decide, but a court of competent jurisdiction, and that
it is his concern to see whether the documents sought to be registered conform with Anent the complainants' charge of abandonment against Atty. Victorio, Jr., Rule
the formal and legal requirements for such documents. 18.03 and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility are
In view of the foregoing, we find no abuse of authority or irregularity committed by applicable, to wit:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Quilala, Atty. Cunanan, and Atty. Caluya, Jr. with respect to the cancellation of CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.
the notice of adverse claim and the notice of lis pendens annotated on TCT No. N-
290546. Whether or not the RTC order dated May 16, 2008 or the letter-request Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
dated June 30, 2008 had been falsified, fraudulent or invalid was not for them to negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
determine inasmuch as their duty to examine documents presented for registration
was limited only to what appears on the face of the documents. If, upon their Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
evaluation of the letter-request and the RTC order, they found the same to be shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
There is no issue that the complainants engaged the services of Atty. Victorio, Jr. as
their counsel in Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Atty. Victorio, Jr. served as such counsel.
With Atty. Victorio, Jr. assistance, the complainants obtained a fair settlement
consisting in receiving half of the proceeds of the sale of the property in litis, without
any portion of the proceeds accruing to counsel as his legal fees. The complainants
did not competently and persuasively show any unfaithfulness on the part of Atty.
Victorio, Jr. as far as their interest in the litigation was concerned. Hence, Atty.
Victorio, Jr. was not liable for abandonment.

Atty. Victorio, Jr. could not be faulted for the perceived inattention to any other
matters subsequent to the termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598. Unless
otherwise expressly stipulated between them at any time during the engagement,
the complainants had no right to assume that Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s legal representation
was indefinite as to extend to his representation of them in the LRA. The Law EN BANC
Profession did not burden its members with the responsibility of indefinite service to
the clients; hence, the rendition of professional services depends on the agreement A.C. No. 10579, December 10, 2014
between the attorney and the client. Atty. Victorio, Jr.'s alleged failure to respond to
the complainants' calls or visits, or to provide them with his whereabouts to enable ERLINDA FOSTER, Complainant, v. ATTY. JAIME V. AGTANG, Respondent.
them to have access to him despite the termination of his engagement in Civil Case
No. Q-07-59598 did not equate to abandonment without the credible showing that DECISION
he continued to come under the professional obligation towards them after the
termination of Civil Case No. Q-07-59598.cralawred PER CURIAM:

WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the baseless disbarment complaints against Atty. This refers to the Resolution1 of the Board of Governors (BOG), Integrated Bar of the
Federico S. Tolentino, Jr., Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, Atty. Daniel F. Victorio, Jr., Atty. Philippines (IBP), dated March 23, 2014, affirming with modification the findings of
Elbert T. Quilala and Atty. Constante P. Caluya, Jr. the Investigating Commissioner, who recommended the suspension of respondent
Atty. Jaime V. Agtang (respondent) from the practice of law for one (1) year for
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary ethical impropriety and ordered the payment of his unpaid obligations to
complainant.
Sereno, C. J., Leonardo-De Castro, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur.
From the records, it appears that the IBP, thru its Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD), received a complaint2, dated May 31, 2011, filed by Erlinda Foster
(complainant) against respondent for unlawful, dishonest, immoral and deceitful3
acts as a lawyer.

In its July 1, 2011 Order,4 the IBP-CBD directed respondent to file his Answer within
15 days from receipt of the order. Respondent failed to do so and complainant sent a
query as to the status of her complaint. On October 10, 2011, the Investigating
Commissioner issued the Order5 setting the case for mandatory conference/hearing
on November 16, 2011. It was only on November 11, 2011, or five (5) days before
the scheduled conference when respondent filed his verified Answer.6

During the conference, only the complainant together with her husband appeared.
She submitted a set of documents contained in a folder, copies of which were
furnished the respondent. The Investigating Commissioner7 indicated that the said
documents would be reviewed and the parties would be informed if there was a
need for clarificatory questioning; otherwise, the case would be submitted for
resolution based on the documents on file. The Minutes8 of the mandatory
conference showed that respondent arrived at 11:10 oclock in the morning or after
the proceeding was terminated.
 or emergency.16 Complainant obliged the request and gave respondent the sum of
On December 12, 2011, the complainant filed her Reply to respondents Answer. P22,000.00.

On April 18, 2012, complainant submitted copies of the January 24, 2012 Decisions9 On August 31, 2010, respondent came to complainants house and demanded the
of the Municipal Trial Court in Small Claims Case Nos. 2011-0077 and 2011-0079, sum of P50,000.00, purportedly to be given to the judge in exchange for a favorable
ordering respondent [defendant therein] to pay complainant and her husband the ruling. Complainant expressed her misgivings on this proposition but she eventually
sum of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00, respectively, with interest at the rate of 12% gave the amount of P25,000.00 which was covered by a receipt,17 stating that it is
per annum from December 8, 2011 until fully paid, plus cost of suit.10 understood that the balance of P25,000.00 shall be paid later after favorable
judgment for plaintiff Erlinda Foster. On November 2, 2010, respondent insisted
Complainants Position that the remaining amount be given by complainant prior to the next hearing of the
case, because the judge was allegedly asking for the balance. Yet again,
From the records, it appears that complainant was referred to respondent in complainant handed to respondent the amount of P25,000.00.18
connection with her legal problem regarding a deed of absolute sale she entered into
with Tierra Realty, which respondent had notarized. After their discussion, On September 29, 2010, complainants case was dismissed. Not having been
complainant agreed to engage his legal services for the filing of the appropriate case notified by respondent, complainant learned of the dismissal on December 14, 2010,
in court, for which they signed a contract. Complainant paid respondent P20,000.00 when she personally checked the status of the case with the court. She went to the
as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for incidental expenses.11 office of respondent, but he was not there. Instead, one of the office staff gave her a
copy of the order of dismissal.
On September 28, 2009, respondent wrote a letter12 to Tropical Villas Subdivision in
relation to the legal problem referred by complainant. He then visited the latter in On December 15, 2010, respondent visited complainant and gave her a copy of the
her home and asked for a loan of P100,000.00, payable in sixty (60) days, for the motion for reconsideration. On January 15, 2011, complainant went to see
repair of his car. Complainant, having trust and confidence on respondent being her respondent and requested him to prepare a reply to the comment filed by Tierra
lawyer, agreed to lend the amount without interest. A promissory note13 evidenced Realty on the motion for reconsideration; to include additional facts because the
the loan. Land Registration Authority would not accept the documents unless these were
amended; and to make the additional averment that the defendant was using false
In November 2009, complainant became aware that Tierra Realty was attempting to documents.
transfer to its name a lot she had previously purchased. She referred the matter to
respondent who recommended the immediate filing of a case for reformation of On January 18, 2011, respondents driver delivered to complainant a copy of the
contract with damages. On November 8, 2009, respondent requested and thereafter reply with a message from him that the matters she requested to be included were
received from complainant the amount of P150,000.00, as filing fee.14 When asked mentioned therein. Upon reading the same, however, complainant discovered that
about the exorbitant amount, respondent cited the high value of the land and the these matters were not so included. On the same occasion, the driver also asked for
sheriffs travel expenses and accommodations in Manila, for the service of the P2,500.00 on respondents directive for the reimbursement of the value of a bottle of
summons to the defendant corporation. Later, complainant confirmed that the fees wine given to the judge as a present. Complainant was also told that oral arguments
paid for the filing of Civil Case No. 14791-65, entitled Erlinda Foster v. Tierra Realty on the case had been set the following month.19
and Development Corporation, only amounted to P22,410.00 per trial court
records.15 On February 2, 2011, complainant decided to terminate the services of respondent
as her counsel and wrote him a letter of termination,20 after her friend gave her
During a conversation with the Registrar of Deeds, complainant also discovered that copies of documents showing that respondent had been acquainted with Tierra
respondent was the one who notarized the document being questioned in the civil Realty since December 2007. Subsequently, complainant wrote to respondent,
case she filed. When asked about this, respondent merely replied that he would take requesting him to pay her the amounts he received from her less the contract fee
a collaborating counsel to handle complainants case. Upon reading a copy of the and the actual cost of the filing fees. Respondent never replied.
complaint filed by respondent with the trial court, complainant noticed that: 1] the
major differences in the documents issued by Tierra Realty were not alleged; 2] the Respondents Position
contract to buy and sell and the deed of conditional sale were not attached thereto;
3] the complaint discussed the method of payment which was not the point of In his Answer,21 respondent alleged that he was 72 years old and had been
contention in the case; and 4] the very anomalies she complained of were not engaged in the practice of law since March 1972, and was President of the IBP Ilocos
mentioned. Respondent, however, assured her that those matters could be brought Norte Chapter from 1998 to 1999. He admitted the fact that he notarized the Deed
up during the hearings. of Absolute Sale subject of complainants case, but he qualified that he was not paid
his notarial fees therefor. He likewise admitted acting as counsel for complainant for
On April 23, 2010, respondent wrote to complainant, requesting that the latter which he claimed to have received P10,000.00 as acceptance fee and P5,000.00 for
extend to him the amount of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency incidental fees. Anent the loan of P100,000.00, respondent averred that it was
complainant, at the behest of her husband, who willingly offered the amount to him Respondent received a copy of the said resolution on January 16, 2014 to which he
for his patience in visiting them at home and for his services. The transaction was filed a motion for reconsideration.25 Complainant filed her opposition thereto,
declared as no loan and he was told not to worry about its payment. As regards informing the IBP-BOG that an information charging respondent for estafa had
the amount of P150,000.00 he received for filing fees, respondent claimed that the already been filed in court and that a corresponding order for his arrest had been
said amount was suggested by the complainant herself who was persistent in issued.26
covering the incidental expenses in the handling of the case. He denied having said
that the sheriffs of the court would need the money for their hotel accommodations. In its March 23, 2014 Resolution, the IBP-BOG denied respondents motion for
Complainants husband approved of the amount. In the same vein, respondent reconsideration but modified the penalty of his suspension from the practice of law
denied having asked for a loan of P50,000.00 and having received P22,000.00 from by reducing it from one (1) year to three (3) months. Respondent was likewise
complainant. He also denied having told her that the case would be discussed with ordered to return the balance of the filing fee received from complainant amounting
the judge who would rule in their favor at the very next hearing. Instead, it was to P127,590.00.
complainant who was bothered by the possibility that the other party would befriend
the judge. He never said that he would personally present a bottle of wine to the No petition for review was filed with the Court.
judge.
The only issue in this case is whether respondent violated the Code of Professional
Further, respondent belied the Registrars comment as to his representation of Tierra Responsibility (CPR).
Realty in the past. Respondent saw nothing wrong in this situation since complainant
was fully aware that another counsel was assisting him in the handling of cases. The Courts Ruling
Having been fully informed of the nature of her cause of action and the
consequences of the suit, complainant was aware of the applicable law on The Court sustains the findings and recommendation of the Investigating
reformation of contracts. Finally, by way of counterclaim, respondent demanded just Commissioner with respect to respondents violation of Rules 1 and 16 of the CPR.
compensation for the services he had rendered in other cases for the complainant. The Court, however, modifies the conclusion on his alleged violation of Rule 15, on
representing conflicting interests. The Court also differs on the penalty.
Reply of Complainant
Rule 1.0, Canon 1 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
In her Reply,22 complainant mainly countered respondents defenses by making dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It is well-established that a lawyers
reference to the receipts in her possession, all evidencing that respondent accepted conduct is not confined to the performance of his professional duties. A lawyer may
the amounts mentioned in the complaint. Complainant also emphasized that be disciplined for misconduct committed either in his professional or private
respondent and Tierra Realty had relations long before she met him. While capacity. The test is whether his conduct shows him to be wanting in moral
respondent was employed as Provincial Legal Officer of the Provincial Government of character, honesty, probity, and good demeanor, or whether it renders him
Ilocos Norte, he was involved in the preparation of several documents involving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.27
Flying V, an oil company owned by Ernest Villavicencio, who likewise owned Tierra
Realty. Complainant insisted that the amount of P100,000.00 she extended to In this case, respondent is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct,
respondent was never considered as no loan. both in his professional and private capacity. As a lawyer, he clearly misled
complainant into believing that the filing fees for her case were worth more than the
On June 26, 2012, complainant furnished the Investigating Commissioner copies of prescribed amount in the rules, due to feigned reasons such as the high value of the
the Resolution, dated June 20, 2012, issued by the Office of the City Prosecutor of land involved and the extra expenses to be incurred by court employees. In other
Laoag City, finding probable cause against respondent for estafa.23 words, he resorted to overpricing, an act customarily related to depravity and
dishonesty. He demanded the amount of P150,000.00 as filing fee, when in truth, the
Findings and Recommendation of the IBP same amounted only to P22,410.00. His defense that it was complainant who
suggested that amount deserves no iota of credence. For one, it is highly improbable
In its July 3, 2012 Report and Recommendation,24 the Investigating Commissioner that complainant, who was then plagued with the rigors of litigation, would propose
found respondent guilty of ethical impropriety and recommended his suspension such amount that would further burden her financial resources. Assuming that the
from the practice of law for one (1) year. complainant was more than willing to shell out an exorbitant amount just to initiate
her complaint with the trial court, still, respondent should not have accepted the
In its September 28, 2013 Resolution, the IBP-BOG adopted and approved with excessive amount. As a lawyer, he is not only expected to be knowledgeable in the
modification the recommendation of suspension by the Investigating Commissioner matter of filing fees, but he is likewise duty-bound to disclose to his client the actual
and ordered respondent to return to complainant: 1) his loan of P122,000.00; and 2) amount due, consistent with the values of honesty and good faith expected of all
the balance of the filing fee amounting to P127,590.00. members of the legal profession.
Moreover, the fiduciary nature of the relationship between the counsel and his fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
client imposes on the lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
or received for or from his client.28 Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client. In his
purpose but not used for the purpose should be immediately returned. A lawyers private capacity, he requested from his client, not just one, but two loans of
failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client gives rise considerable amounts. The first time, he visited his client in her home and borrowed
to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of P100,000.00 for the repair of his car; and the next time, he implored her to extend to
the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general him a loan of P70,000.00 or P50,000.00 in the moment of urgency or emergency
morality as well as of professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal but was only given P22,000.00 by complainant. These transactions were evidenced
profession and deserves punishment.29 by promissory notes and receipts, the authenticity of which was never questioned by
respondent. These acts were committed by respondent in his private capacity,
It is clear that respondent failed to fulfill this duty. As pointed out, he received seemingly unrelated to his relationship with complainant, but were indubitably
various amounts from complainant but he could not account for all of them. Worse, acquiesced to by complainant because of the trust and confidence reposed in him as
he could not deny the authenticity of the receipts presented by complainant. Upon a lawyer. Nowhere in the records, particularly in the defenses raised by respondent,
demand, he failed to return the excess money from the alleged filing fees and other was it implied that these loans fell within the exceptions provided by the rules. The
expenses. His possession gives rise to the presumption that he has misappropriated loans of P100,000.00 and P22,000.00 were surely not protected by the nature of the
it for his own use to the prejudice of, and in violation of the trust reposed in him by, case or by independent advice. Respondents assertion that the amounts were given
the client.30 When a lawyer receives money from the client for a particular purpose, to him out of the liberality of complainant and were, thus, considered as no loan,
the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money does not justify his inappropriate behavior. The acts of requesting and receiving
was spent for the intended purpose. Consequently, if the lawyer does not use the money as loans from his client and thereafter failing to pay the same are indicative
money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must immediately return the money to of his lack of integrity and sense of fair dealing. Up to the present, respondent has
the client.31 not yet paid his obligations to complainant.

Somewhat showing a propensity to demand excessive and unwarranted amounts Time and again, the Court has consistently held that deliberate failure to pay just
from his client, respondent displayed a reprehensible conduct when he asked for the debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
amount of P50,000.00 as representation expenses allegedly for the benefit of the suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the administration
judge handling the case, in exchange for a favorable decision. Respondent himself of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only
signed a receipt showing that he initially took the amount of P 25,000.00 and, worse, legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
he subsequently demanded and received the other half of the amount at the time dealing so that the peoples faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured.
the case had already been dismissed. Undoubtedly, this act is tantamount to gross They must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the
misconduct that necessarily warrants the supreme penalty of disbarment. The act of courts and their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations.32
demanding a sum of money from his client, purportedly to be used as a bribe to
ensure a positive outcome of a case, is not only an abuse of his clients trust but an Verily, when the Code or the Rules speaks of conduct or misconduct, the
overt act of undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and reference is not confined to ones behavior exhibited in connection with the
the entire Judiciary. This is the height of indecency. As officers of the court, lawyers performance of the lawyers professional duties, but also covers any misconduct
owe their utmost fidelity to public service and the administration of justice. In no which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be
way should a lawyer indulge in any act that would damage the image of judges, lest unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law vest
the publics perception of the dispensation of justice be overshadowed by iniquitous him with. Unfortunately, respondent must be found guilty of misconduct on both
doubts. The denial of respondent and his claim that the amount was given scores.
gratuitously would not excuse him from any liability. The absence of proof that the
said amount was indeed used as a bribe is of no moment. To tolerate respondents With respect to respondents alleged representation of conflicting interests, the
actuations would seriously erode the publics trust in the courts. Court finds it proper to modify the findings of the Investigating Commissioner who
concluded that complainant presented insufficient evidence of respondents
As it turned out, complainants case was dismissed as early as September 29, 2010. lawyering for the opposing party, Tierra Realty.
At this juncture, respondent proved himself to be negligent in his duty as he failed to
inform his client of the status of the case, and left the client to personally inquire Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR, provides that [a] lawyer shall not represent
with the court. Surely, respondent was not only guilty of misconduct but was also conflicting interest except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
remiss in his duty to his client. disclosure of the facts. The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should
ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard
Respondents unbecoming conduct towards complainant did not stop here. Records of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most
reveal that he likewise violated Rule 16.04, Canon 16 of the CPR, which states that confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
[a] lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests are information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful
secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred
fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which
lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests.33 Thus, shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.
decline professional employment if the same would trigger the violation of the
prohibition against conflict of interest. The only exception provided in the rules is a Here, respondent demonstrated not just a negligent disregard of his duties as a
written consent from all the parties after full disclosure. lawyer but a wanton betrayal of the trust of his client and, in general, the public.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the suspension for three (3) months recommended
The Court deviates from the findings of the IBP. There is substantial evidence to hold by the IBP-BOG is not sufficient punishment for the unacceptable acts and omissions
respondent liable for representing conflicting interests in handling the case of of respondent. The acts of the respondent constitute malpractice and gross
complainant against Tierra Realty, a corporation to which he had rendered services misconduct in his office as attorney. His incompetence and appalling indifference to
in the past. The Court cannot ignore the fact that respondent admitted to having his duty to his client, the courts and society render him unfit to continue discharging
notarized the deed of sale, which was the very document being questioned in the trust reposed in him as a member of the Bar.
complainants case. While the Investigating Commissioner found that the complaint
in Civil Case No. 14791-65 did not question the validity of the said contract, and that For taking advantage of the unfortunate situation of the complainant, for engaging
only the intentions of the parties as to some provisions thereof were challenged, the in dishonest and deceitful conduct, for maligning the judge and the Judiciary, for
Court still finds that the purpose for which the proscription was made exists. The undermining the trust and faith of the public in the legal profession and the entire
Court cannot brush aside the dissatisfied observations of the complainant as to the judiciary, and for representing conflicting interests, respondent deserves no less
allegations lacking in the complaint against Tierra Realty and the clear admission of than the penalty of disbarment.38
respondent that he was the one who notarized the assailed document. Regardless of
whether it was the validity of the entire document or the intention of the parties as Notably, the Court cannot order respondent to return the money he borrowed from
to some of its provisions raised, respondent fell short of prudence in action when he complainant in his private capacity. In Tria-Samonte v. Obias,39 the Court held that it
accepted complainants case, knowing fully that he was involved in the execution of cannot order the lawyer to return money to complainant if he or she acted in a
the very transaction under question. Neither his unpaid notarial fees nor the private capacity because its findings in administrative cases have no bearing on
participation of a collaborating counsel would excuse him from such indiscretion. It is liabilities which have no intrinsic link to the lawyers professional engagement. In
apparent that respondent was retained by clients who had close dealings with each disciplinary proceedings against lawyers, the only issue is whether the officer of the
other. More significantly, there is no record of any written consent from any of the court is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar. The only concern of
parties involved. the Court is the determination of respondents administrative liability. Its findings
have no material bearing on other judicial actions which the parties may choose
The representation of conflicting interests is prohibited not only because the against each other.
relation of attorney and client is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree,
but also because of the principles of public policy and good taste. An attorney has To rule otherwise would in effect deprive respondent of his right to appeal since
the duty to deserve the fullest confidence of his client and represent him with administrative cases are filed directly with the Court. Furthermore, the quantum of
undivided loyalty. Once this confidence is abused or violated the entire profession evidence required in civil cases is different from the quantum of evidence required in
suffers.34 administrative cases. In civil cases, preponderance of evidence is required.
Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the last analysis, means
Penalties and Pecuniary Liabilities probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as
worthier of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.40 In
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office administrative cases, only substantial evidence is needed. Substantial evidence,
as an attorney, for violation of the lawyers oath and/or for breach of the ethics of which is more than a mere scintilla but is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
the legal profession as embodied in the CPR.35 For the practice of law is a mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, would suffice to hold one
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those administratively liable.41 Furthermore, the Court has to consider the prescriptive
who are qualified and who possess good moral character.36 The appropriate period applicable to civil cases in contrast to administrative cases which are, as a
penalty for an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion rule, imprescriptible.42
based on the surrounding facts.37
Thus, the IBP-BOG was correct in ordering respondent to return the amount of
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may P127,590.00 representing the balance of the filing fees he received from
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) complainant, as this was intimately related to the lawyer-client relationship between
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) them. Similar to this is the amount of P50,000.00 which respondent received from
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) complainant, as representation expenses for the handling of the civil case and for
the purported purchase of a bottle of wine for the judge. These were connected to Before the Court is the present administrative case which arose from the affidavit
his professional relationship with the complainant. While respondents deplorable act complaint for disbarment1 filed with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) on
of requesting the said amount for the benefit of the judge is stained with mendacity, July 7, 2006, by Dominic Paul D. Lazareto (Lazareto) against Atty. Dennis N. Acorda
respondent should be ordered to return the same as it was borne out of their (respondent), for violation of the Code of Professional
professional relationship. As to his other obligations, respondent was already Responsibility.2ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
adjudged as liable for the personal loans he contracted with complainant, per the
small claims cases filed against him. The Antecedents

All told, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a Lazareto, eldest son of the late Damaso R. Lazareto, for himself and on behalf of his
member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the co-heirs (family), specifically charged respondent with violating the following
end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession.43 The Court likewise provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
aims to ensure the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
profession of members who, by their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities of an attorney.44 LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

WHEREFORE, finding the respondent, Atty. Jaime V. Agtang, GUILTY of gross xxxx
misconduct in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court hereby
DISBARS him from the practice of law and ORDERS him to pay the complainant, CANON 7 -- A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY OF THE LEGAL
Erlinda Foster, the amounts of P127,590.00, P50,000.00 and P2,500.00. PROFESSION, AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.

Let a copy of this Decision be sent to the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated xxxx
Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts. CANON 18 A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
SO ORDERED.
xxxx
Sereno, (Chief Justice), Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo,
Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur. Rule 18.03 A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
Brion, J., on leave. negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Peralta, J., no part.
Bersamin, Perez, and Jardeleza, JJ., on official leave. Rule 18.04 A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the clients request for information.
chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Res Judicata in administrative cases In January 2004, Lazareto and his family engaged the respondents services (the
Sorreda v. Kho AC No. 10635 August 26, 2015 respondent was a member of the law office Jaromay Baylon Acorda Landrito &
Associates3) to handle the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazaretos father
who died intestate. They agreed to set the deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial
settlement action on May 26, 2004, to enable the family to avail of a P100,000.00
Effect of complainants desistance/disinterest deduction in estate taxes.4 They also agreed that titles to a parcel of conjugal land
(Lots B & E) at Tomas Mapua St., Sta. Cruz, Manila, left by the deceased, be
EN BANC transferred to Lazaretos mother, Cleotilde D. Lazareto.

A.C. No. 9603, June 16, 2015 Lazareto gave the respondent the original duplicate copies of TCT No. 206006 for Lot
B and TCT No. 206008 for Lot E, together with cash5 representing the respondents
DOMINIC PAUL D. LAZARETO, Complainant, v. ATTY. DENNIS N. ACORDA, Respondent. acceptance fee (P50,000.00), and initial deposit to answer for extrajudicial
transactions which include transfer taxes and cost of publication (P70,000.00) for a
DECISION total of P120,000.00. Since then, Lazareto had followed up the developments with
the respondent by phone, but he could not be contacted until he received a fax
PER CURIAM: message from him asking for an additional P88,000.00,6 which Lazareto gave in
installments of P66,000.007 and P20,000.00.8ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
May 2004 passed without the papers for extrajudicial settlement being filed. copy of extrajudicial settlement with deed of sale, and no receipts of payments for
Lazareto had not heard from the respondent all this time, although the lawyer sent a transactions the respondent had entered into in representation of the Lazareto
certain Manny Pacheco (Pacheco), allegedly the liaison officer of the law firm, to get family. With this development, Lazareto had no choice but to agree to just accept an
the second installment of P20,000.00. The family received a liquidation report from affidavit of loss for the receipts and to rely on the word of respondents counsel that
the respondent on August 24, 2004.9ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary he was assured by his client that he (respondent) had filed the extrajudicial
settlement papers with the Register of Deeds of Manila.
On several occasions after August 24, 2004, Lazareto gave additional funds to
respondent consisting of P150,000.00 for property taxes and issuance of new titles; Consequently, Lazareto consented to the compromise offer, in exchange for his
P15,000.00 for additional transfer expenses; and another P10,330.00 for additional affidavit of desistance. His family decided to work on the extrajudicial settlement
property taxes. Since then, Lazareto had not heard from the respondent, until he themselves, to shorten their agony16 and in doing so, they discovered that:
wrote the family on April 8, 2005, saying that Pacheco had not given an accounting
of the monies the family had given him (respondent). (1) no Extrajudicial Settlement was on file with the Manila Register of Deeds, nor
was there an Affidavit of Publication;
Meantime, Lazareto and his family entered into negotiations to sell Lot B with a
certain Mrs. Nel Manzano. They asked the respondent to prepare the deed of sale for (2) what was on file with the Register of Deeds was only a Deed of Absolute Sale17
the transaction; however, even if the respondent promised to give the matter of Lot B dated September 20, 2005, where the signature D. Lazareto appeared
priority, he failed to attend to it. On August 15, 2005, the family wrote him a letter above the name of his father, Damaso R. Lazareto, who had been dead since
reminding him of his promise, as well as of his failure to act on the filing of the November 26, 2003; and
extrajudicial settlement action which had expired a year
ago.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (3) three copies of the tabloid Balitang Detalye,18 given to the family by the
respondent, where the lawyer claimed the extrajudicial settlement was published,
On October 8, 2005, Lazareto and respondent agreed that the deed of sale and tax were one and the same issue VOLUME VIII-NO. 31 MAY 24-30, 2004; 3.a, the
declaration for Lot B would be forwarded to the family on or before November 1, published notice was merely ONE DETACHED SEPARATE PAGE appearing on a mere
2005, and in a weeks time, they would discuss the extrajudicial settlement insert (page 6) titled Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Damaso Lazareto with
question.11ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Deed of Sale; 3.b. below it was the statement: Publisher: Balitang Detalye; Dates:
May 24, 31 and June 7, 2004.
After more than a week without hearing from the respondent, Lazareto was
constrained to write the respondent another letter on April 3, 2006, and one more on Alarmed and shocked at his discovery, Lazareto moved for the admission of newly
May 21, 2006, demanding the return of the title to Lot E.12 Thereafter, Lazareto discovered evidence,19 but the motion was denied by Comm. Rico, as well as his
made several follow-ups with the respondent through his (respondents) relative subsequent motion for reconsideration.
Ma. Teresa Puntero and his mother, as well as through text messages to no avail,
until the respondent admitted that he had lost TCT No. 206008 covering Lot His affidavit of desistance and respondents apology notwithstanding, Lazareto
E.13ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary expressed grave concern over respondents misrepresentations in performing his
tasks as the family lawyer in the settlement of his fathers estate. Nonetheless, he
With this admission, Lazareto requested the respondent to execute an affidavit of left it to Comm. Rico to resolve the case in the light of his affidavit of desistance and
loss so that the family could secure a duplicate copy of the TCT. The respondent did the circumstances of the case.
send a copy of the affidavit of loss, but it was unsigned.14 Exasperated with the
difficulties he was having with the respondents nonchalant and negligent attitude The Case for the Respondent
and his refusal to provide his family a signed affidavit of loss, Lazareto filed the
present complaint. In his position paper,20 dated March 21, 2007, the respondent alleged that upon his
engagement as counsel by Lazaretos family, he advised them that he could not
Thereafter, Atty. Rufino I. Policarpio, III (Atty. Policarpio), the respondents lawyer, determine the exact date of completion or termination of his assigned task,
proposed an amicable settlement with Lazareto. As proposed, part of the money considering that he did not have full control over the processing of documents by
given to the respondent for legal services would be returned to the family and they the concerned agencies.
would be given the document extrajudicial settlement with deed of sale, as well as
the official receipts for land taxes and other expenses. Lazareto agreed to the He denied Lazaretos submission that he had been negligent in the performance of
proposal and submitted a manifestation on the matter to the IBP Investigating his duties as lawyer for the settlement of the estate of Lazaretos deceased father.
Commissioner, Gerely Rico (Comm. Rico).15ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary He claimed that he performed the tasks assigned to him with honesty and diligence
and that he intended, in good faith, to complete his tasks at the soonest possible
Once again, Lazareto was greatly disappointed. The respondent failed to deliver on time.
his commitments: there was no return of part of the money given to respondent, no
Additionally, the respondent alleged that Pacheco stole a substantial amount of Lazareto family.28 Although the family gave the respondent the opportunity to make
money from the firm, as well as several original documents, and that Pacheco could amends for his negligence in the handling of the legal matter entrusted to him,
not be found despite efforts to locate him.21 Lazareto, however, alleged that the Comm. Inocencio pointed out, the affidavit of desistance did not completely
documents were returned to the respondent.22 The respondent claimed that the he exculpate him from liability for what has occurred.29ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
had to borrow money from his relatives, friends, and even from informal lenders to
enable him to continue performing his work for Lazareto and his family. He stressed The IBP Resolution and Related Incidents
that despite the losses he suffered, he was able to finalize all documents and
transactions and to deliver the certificate of title covering Lot On July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVIII-2008-
B.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary 347,30 approving, with modification, Comm. Inocencios recommendation. The
board suspended respondent from the practice of law for one month, for his failure
The respondent further claimed that he was determined to complete the task to comply with his obligation towards Lazareto and his family.
assigned to him despite the fact that Lazareto, his mother Clotilde, and Ramon
Lazareto became impatient and intrusive in their language and dealings with The respondent moved for reconsideration31 of the IBP resolution, praying that the
him.24ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary case be dismissed on the grounds of supervening events which occurred after the
case was submitted for resolution. He claimed that the very reason why the
He insisted that he was not negligent in handling the task entrusted to him by the complaint was filed his failure to return to Lazareto the TCT for Lot E of the estate
Lazareto family and that he was entitled to the presumption of diligence as the Court of his deceased father was non-existent as the document was found among the
held in Adarne v. Aldaba.25 He stressed that Lazareto had executed an affidavit of records of his former law office and was returned to Lazareto on June 9,
desistance and had, in fact, agreed to let him continue as the family lawyer. This 2007.32ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
being the case, he maintained, Lazareto should be deemed to have abandoned his
cause of action against him. He thus prayed that the complaint be dismissed. The respondent argued that in the light of Comm. Inocencios finding that he did not
act in bad faith in dealing with Lazareto and the fact that he had returned the TCT of
The Investigating Commissioners Report and Recommendation Lot E and substantially all of the amounts paid to him, substantial justice, fairness
and equity demand that the case be dismissed.
Commissioner Angelito C. Inocencio (Comm. Inocencio), who took over the
investigation from Comm. Rico, rendered a report dated May 14, 2008,26 Lazareto opposed33 the respondents bid to have the case dismissed. He strongly
recommending that disciplinary action be taken against respondent. He resolved the argued that while he and his family had accepted the respondents personal apology
case based on the following issues: (1) whether respondent was negligent in for the grievous betrayal of their trust and confidence and the wanton disregard of
handling the legal matter entrusted to him; and (2) whether respondent acted in bad their interest in the extrajudicial settlement of his fathers property, it did not mean
faith in dealing with complainant Lazareto and his family. that the respondent did not commit a violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
Comm. Inocencio found respondent liable in regard to the first issue. He was
convinced that respondent committed a breach of Rule 18.03 of the Code of Lazareto bewailed the fact that he was not given the opportunity to present to
Professional Responsibility by his negligence in handling the legal matter entrusted Comm. Rico the full facts and issues of the case, as the IBP investigator denied his
to him by Lazareto. Comm. Inocencio believed that had the respondent been motion to admit newly discovered evidence such as the fake deed of sale and the
conscientious, diligent, and efficient in rendering legal services to Lazareto and his bogus publication of the non-existent extra-judicial settlement that respondent used
family, the complaint could have been avoided. He faulted the respondent for in accomplishing his contract of legal services with them. He lamented that he and
making excuses Pacheco absconding with the funds of the law firm and the his family are now suffering from the falsification that respondent resorted to as they
negative attitude of the Lazareto family in dealing with him for his failure to fulfill were having difficulties in transferring the title of the property (Lot E) to his mother.
his contractual obligation to them rather than what he had accomplished.
He thus maintained that the loss of the TCT of Lot E is not the only basis of the
With respect to the second issue, however, Comm. Inocencio believed the complaint, but also respondents negligence, misrepresentations, and bad faith in
respondents dealings with Lazareto and his family were not attended with bad faith. handling the legal matter the family entrusted to him. Lazareto prayed that
He explained that while the respondents efforts did not produce the desired results respondent be meted the penalty of at least six months suspension from the
as fast as they should have, a modicum of living up to expectations could be practice of law for the betrayal of their interest.
discerned. He succeeded, though belatedly, in finalizing all documents and
transactions and delivering the certificate of title covering Lot On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-19634
B.27ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary granting respondents motion for reconsideration. Consequently, it dismissed the
administrative case against the respondent, with a warning that he be circumspect
Notwithstanding Lazaretos affidavit of desistance, Comm. Inocencio recommended in his future dealings.
that the respondent be severely censured for his malfeasance as lawyer for the
The Courts Ruling he could not even produce the title to one of the lots (Lot E) handed to him by
Lazareto, and when pressed to produce it, he admitted he could not find it.42 The
After an objective examination of the facts and the evidence, we find the dismissal TCT of Lot E was returned to Lazareto only on June 9, 2007, after it was found among
of the case unacceptable, notwithstanding Lazaretos affidavit of desistance and his the files of the respondents former law office, almost a year after the complaint was
silence with respect to said dismissal. The IBP Board of Governors misappreciated filed on July 7, 2006, and three years after it was entrusted to him by Lazareto in
the gravity and the scope of the respondents breach of his contractual obligation January 2004.
with Lazareto and his family. He had been negligent in carrying out the task
entrusted to him by Lazareto and his family as found by Comm. Inocencio, a clear While the respondent might have manifested, in good faith, his intention to
violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.35 He had been grossly dishonest complete the task referred to him at the earliest possible time, the results proved
with respect to certain actions he claimed he had taken in relation to his task. otherwise. He did not complete the legal matter referred to him by Lazareto,
especially their agreement that titles to Lots B and E were to be transferred to
We refer particularly to Lazaretos discovery of a misrepresentation committed by Lazaretos mother Clotilde. Only the TCT of Lot B was delivered to the Lazareto
respondent in relation to the amicable settlement proposed by respondents lawyer, family in late December 2005. The transfer of Lot E to Clotilde was put on hold
Atty. Policarpio, where Atty. Policarpio assured him that respondent had already filed because of the respondents negligence in the custody of the TCT of Lot E,
the extrajudicial settlement papers with the Manila Register of Deeds. Atty. Mayla compelling the family to work on the extra-judicial settlement of the estate of the
Domingo (Atty. Domingo), another lawyer for the respondent, testified that she deceased Lazareto on their own.
talked with Atty. Acorda and he said that all proceedings of the extrajudicial
settlement have already been completed.36 It would be recalled in this respect Moreover, we are bothered by Lazaretos submission that the respondent resorted to
that, as agreed upon, the respondent would furnish Lazareto with papers pertaining dishonest means to make it appear that he had finally taken action on the legal
to the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazaretos father,37 as the family matter referred to him thereby responding, although belatedly, to the charge of
decided to work on respondents unfinished task themselves, to mitigate their negligence when one of his lawyers (Atty. Domingo) testified at the hearing before
agony.38ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Comm. Rico that she was told by respondent that all proceedings of the
Extrajudicial Settlement have already been
To the Lazareto familys shock, they learned that only the following were filed with completed.43ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
the Manila Registry of Deeds: (1) a copy of a Deed of Absolute Sale,39 which made it
appear that his father, who died on November 26, 2003,40 signed the document on Had Atty. Domingos testimony been based on fact, then the dismissal of the
September 20, 2005, and that his mother signed it also, without her and the family complaint could have been well justified inasmuch as Lazareto accepted the
knowing about it; (2) a copy of a detached page 6 of the tabloid Balitang Detalye, compromise agreement offered by respondent after he was assured by Atty.
Vol. VIII-No. 31, May 24-30, 2004, with notice of the extrajudicial settlement of the Policarpio that the papers for the extrajudicial settlement of his fathers estate had
estate of one Damaso Lazareto (Lazareto was given three copies of the same issue already been filed with the Register of Deeds of Manila.44 As it turned out, all that
of the paper to comply with the three-weekly publication requirement). were on file were a fake deed of sale for Lot B and a bogus publication of the
extrajudicial settlement. It is quite unfortunate that Comm. Rico denied Lazaretos
With the discovery, Lazareto moved for the admission of newly discovered bid to have the newly discovered documents admitted in evidence on the pretext
documents by Comm. Rico, for marking, but she denied the motion on the grounds that they were irrelevant to the proceedings before her.
that [t]o admit these pieces of evidence now would have the effect of introducing
new matters, which the Respondent is entitled to rebut in the interest of complying On the contrary, and as we had stressed earlier, the respondents claim that all the
with the requirements of due process.41 Further, Comm. Rico declared that the proceedings for the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of Lazaretos father had
pieces of evidence alluded to did not relate to any allegations of the complaint and been completed was necessarily relevant to Lazaretos contention that the lawyer
were irrelevant to her investigation. had been seriously remiss in the fulfillment of his contractual obligation to his family.
The filing of the falsified documents by the respondent or by someone acting upon
We disagree with and cannot accept Commissioner Ricos conclusion and reason. his instructions was clearly a dishonest attempt to mitigate the adverse effect of his
The filing of the fake deed of sale and the bogus publication of the extrajudicial inaction or negligence on the legal matter entrusted to him.
settlement of the estate of Lazaretos deceased father were very much relevant to
the proceedings before Comm. Rico. They were inextricably linked to the charge of Necessarily also, the respondent committed a violation of Canon 1 of the Code of
negligence against respondent in his handling of the extrajudicial settlement matter Professional Responsibility, cited in Lazaretos complaint. Rule 1.01, in particular,
entrusted to him by Lazareto and his family. requires that [a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. The IBP Board of Governors completely disregarded this particular aspect of
After the family gave him his acceptance fee and provided him with the necessary the complaint against the respondent which, to our mind, should have been given
funds for the undertaking, respondent became inaccessible and unheard of with proper consideration, if only to remind the members of the Bar to always keep faith
respect to his task (except when he was asking for funding), until the agreed with the tenets of the Code of Professional Responsibility and as importantly, with
deadline for the filing of the extrajudicial settlement papers expired. For some time, their oath.
 DECISION
Further, the ethics of the legal profession rightly enjoins every lawyer to act with the
highest standards of truthfulness, fair play, and nobility in the course of his practice PER CURIAM:
of law.45 Stated differently, any member of the legal fraternity should do nothing
that would lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty, Joselano Guevarra (complainant) filed on March 4, 2002 a Complaint for
and integrity of the legal profession.46ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Disbarment1 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Bar
Discipline (CBD) against Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala a.k.a. Noli Eala (respondent)
Considering the foregoing, we find the dismissal of the administrative case for "grossly immoral conduct and unmitigated violation of the lawyer's oath."
improvident. What to us comes out in bold relief in reading through the records of
this case is a web of deceit and negligence perpetrated by the respondent against In his complaint, Guevarra gave the following account:
the complainant and his family, to their prejudice and to the prejudice of the
profession that now has been brought to disrepute by the respondents sharp He first met respondent in January 2000 when his (complainant's) then-fiancee Irene
practices. How the respondent was able to extricate himself for what he did is Moje (Irene) introduced respondent to him as her friend who was married to
reprehensible and casts doubt on the integrity of the IBP and its Commissioners. Marianne (sometimes spelled "Mary Ann") Tantoco with whom he had three children.
Thus, the respondent should be made to answer for his dishonest dealings with
Lazareto and his family, as well as for his negligence in the handling of the task After his marriage to Irene on October 7, 2000, complainant noticed that from
Lazareto had entrusted to him. We say this notwithstanding the layman Lazaretos January to March 2001, Irene had been receiving from respondent cellphone calls, as
desistance, as the respondents action was a transgression not only of what is due well as messages some of which read "I love you," "I miss you," or "Meet you at
Lazareto as a client but also of the profession and the nation that expect its lawyers Megamall."
to live up to the highest standards of performance in this noble profession.
Complainant also noticed that Irene habitually went home very late at night or early
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2012-196, dated June 9, 2012, in the morning of the following day, and sometimes did not go home from work.
of the IBP Board of Governors is SET ASIDE. Respondent Atty. Dennis N. Acorda is When he asked about her whereabouts, she replied that she slept at her parents'
ORDERED suspended from the practice of law for three (3) years from and after house in Binangonan, Rizal or she was busy with her work.
notice of this Decision. We also WARN him that the commission of the same or
similar act or acts shall be dealt with more severely. In February or March 2001, complainant saw Irene and respondent together on two
occasions. On the second occasion, he confronted them following which Irene
Atty. Dennis N. Acorda is DIRECTED to formally MANIFEST to this Court, upon receipt abandoned the conjugal house.
of this Decision, the date of his receipt which shall be the starting point of his
suspension. He shall furnish a copy of this Manifestation to all the courts and quasi- On April 22, 2001, complainant went uninvited to Irene's birthday celebration at
judicial bodies where he has entered his appearance as counsel; to his employer (if which he saw her and respondent celebrating with her family and friends. Out of
he is employed); and to his law firm. embarrassment, anger and humiliation, he left the venue immediately. Following
that incident, Irene went to the conjugal house and hauled off all her personal
Let a copy of this decision be attached to Atty. Acordas records with the Office of the belongings, pieces of furniture, and her share of the household appliances.
Bar Confidant and posted on the Supreme Court website as a notice to the general
public. Complainant later found, in the master's bedroom, a folded social card bearing the
words "I Love You" on its face, which card when unfolded contained a handwritten
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary letter dated October 7, 2000, the day of his wedding to Irene, reading:

Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Bersamin, Del Castillo, My everdearest Irene,
Villarama, Jr., Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Peralta, and Leonen, JJ., on official leave. By the time you open this, you'll be moments away from walking down the aisle. I
Perez, J., no part. will say a prayer for you that you may find meaning in what you're about to do.

Sometimes I wonder why we ever met. Is it only for me to find fleeting happiness but
EN BANC experience eternal pain? Is it only for us to find a true love but then lose it again? Or
is it because there's a bigger plan for the two of us?cralaw library
[A.C. NO. 7136 : August 1, 2007]
I hope that you have experienced true happiness with me. I have done everything
JOSELANO GUEVARRA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE EMMANUEL EALA, Respondent. humanly possible to love you. And today, as you make your vows . . . I make my own
vow to YOU!
I will love you for the rest of my life. I loved you from the first time I laid eyes on you, 15. Respondent's adulterous conduct with the complainant's wife and his apparent
to the time we spent together, up to the final moments of your single life. But more abandoning or neglecting of his own family, demonstrate his gross moral depravity,
importantly, I will love you until the life in me is gone and until we are together making him morally unfit to keep his membership in the bar. He flaunted his
again. aversion to the institution of marriage, calling it a "piece of paper." Morally
reprehensible was his writing the love letter to complainant's bride on the very day
Do not worry about me! I will be happy for you. I have enough memories of us to last of her wedding, vowing to continue his love for her "until we are together again," as
me a lifetime. Always remember though that in my heart, in my mind and in my now they are.6 (Underscoring supplied),
soul, YOU WILL ALWAYS
respondent stated in his ANSWER as follows:
. . . AND THE WONDERFUL THINGS YOU DO!
5. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 15 of the Complaint
BE MINE . . . . AND MINE ALONE, and I WILL ALWAYS BE YOURS AND YOURS ALONE! regarding his adulterous relationship and that his acts demonstrate gross moral
depravity thereby making him unfit to keep his membership in the bar, the reason
I LOVE YOU FOREVER, I LOVE YOU FOR ALWAYS. AS LONG AS I'M LIVING MY TWEETIE being that Respondent's relationship with Irene was not under scandalous
YOU'LL BE!"2 circumstances and that as far as his relationship with his own family:

Eternally yours, 5.1 Respondent has maintained a civil, cordial and peaceful relationship with [his
NOLI wife] Mary Anne as in fact they still occasionally meet in public, even if Mary Anne is
aware of Respondent's special friendship with Irene.
Complainant soon saw respondent's car and that of Irene constantly parked at No.
71-B 11th Street, New Manila where, as he was to later learn sometime in April 2001, xxx
Irene was already residing. He also learned still later that when his friends saw Irene
on or about January 18, 2002 together with respondent during a concert, she was 5.5 Respondent also denies that he has flaunted his aversion to the institution of
pregnant. marriage by calling the institution of marriage a mere piece of paper because his
reference [in his above-quoted handwritten letter to Irene] to the marriage between
In his ANSWER,3 respondent admitted having sent the I LOVE YOU card on which the Complainant and Irene as a piece of paper was merely with respect to the formality
above-quoted letter was handwritten. of the marriage contract.7 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary

On paragraph 14 of the COMPLAINT reading: Respondent admitted8 paragraph 18 of the COMPLAINT reading:

14. Respondent and Irene were even FLAUNTING THEIR ADULTEROUS RELATIONSHIP 18. The Rules of Court requires lawyers to support the Constitution and obey the
as they attended social functions together. For instance, in or about the third week laws. The Constitution regards marriage as an inviolable social institution and is the
of September 2001, the couple attended the launch of the "Wine All You Can" foundation of the family (Article XV, Sec. 2).9
promotion of French wines, held at the Mega Strip of SM Megamall B at Mandaluyong
City. Their attendance was reported in Section B of the Manila Standard issue of 24 And on paragraph 19 of the COMPLAINT reading:
September 2001, on page 21. Respondent and Irene were photographed together;
their picture was captioned: "Irene with Sportscaster Noli Eala." A photocopy of the 19. Respondent's grossly immoral conduct runs afoul of the Constitution and the
report is attached as Annex C.4 (Italics and emphasis in the original; CAPITALIZATION laws he, as a lawyer, has been sworn to uphold. In pursuing obsessively his illicit
of the phrase "flaunting their adulterous relationship" supplied), love for the complainant's wife, he mocked the institution of marriage, betrayed his
own family, broke up the complainant's marriage, commits adultery with his wife,
respondent, in his ANSWER, stated: and degrades the legal profession.10 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

4. Respondent specifically denies having ever flaunted an adulterous relationship respondent, in his ANSWER, stated:
with Irene as alleged in paragraph 14 of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being
that their relationship was low profile and known only to the immediate members of 7. Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the Complaint,
their respective families, and that Respondent, as far as the general public was the reason being that under the circumstances the acts of Respondent with respect
concerned, was still known to be legally married to Mary Anne Tantoco.5 (Emphasis to his purely personal and low profile special relationship with Irene is neither under
and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conductas would be a
ground for disbarment pursuant to Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court.11
On paragraph 15 of the COMPLAINT reading: (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
 Hence, the present petition21 of complainant before this Court, filed pursuant to
To respondent's ANSWER, complainant filed a REPLY,12 alleging that Irene gave birth Section 12 (c), Rule 13922 of the Rules of Court.
to a girl and Irene named respondent in the Certificate of Live Birth as the girl's
father. Complainant attached to the Reply, as Annex "A," a copy of a Certificate of The petition is impressed with merit.
Live Birth13 bearing Irene's signature and naming respondent as the father of her
daughter Samantha Irene Louise Moje who was born on February 14, 2002 at St. Oddly enough, the IBP Board of Governors, in setting aside the Recommendation of
Luke's Hospital. the Investigating Commissioner and dismissing the case for lack of merit, gave no
reason therefor as its above-quoted 33-word Resolution shows.
Complainant's REPLY merited a REJOINDER WITH MOTION TO DISMISS14 dated
January 10, 2003 from respondent in which he denied having "personal knowledge of Respondent contends, in his Comment23 on the present petition of complainant,
the Certificate of Live Birth attached to the complainant's Reply."15 Respondent that there is no evidence against him.24 The contention fails. As the IBP-CBD
moved to dismiss the complaint due to the pendency of a civil case filed by Investigating Commissioner observed:
complainant for the annulment of his marriage to Irene, and a criminal complaint for
adultery against respondent and Irene which was pending before the Quezon City While it may be true that the love letter dated October 7, 2000 (Exh. "C") and the
Prosecutor's Office. news item published in the Manila Standard (Exh. "D"), even taken together do not
sufficiently prove that respondent is carrying on an adulterous relationship with
During the investigation before the IBP-CBD, complainant's Complaint-Affidavit and complainant's wife, there are other pieces of evidence on record which support the
Reply to Answer were adopted as his testimony on direct examination.16 accusation of complainant against respondent.
Respondent's counsel did not cross-examine complainant.17
It should be noted that in his Answer dated 17 October 2002, respondent through
After investigation, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan, in a counsel made the following statements to wit: "Respondent specifically denies
12-page REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION18 dated October 26, 2004, found the having [ever] flaunted an adulterous relationship with Irene as alleged in paragraph
charge against respondent sufficiently proven. [14] of the Complaint, the truth of the matter being [that] their relationship was low
profile and known only to immediate members of their respective families . . ., and
The Commissioner thus recommended19 that respondent be disbarred for violating Respondent specifically denies the allegations in paragraph 19 of the complaint, the
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility reading: reason being that under the circumstances the acts of the respondents with respect
to his purely personal and low profile relationship with Irene is neither under
Rule 1.01: A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful scandalous circumstances nor tantamount to grossly immoral conduct . . ."
conduct (Underscoring supplied),
These statements of respondent in his Answer are an admission that there is indeed
and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code reading: a "special" relationship between him and complainant's wife, Irene, [which] taken
together with the Certificate of Live Birth of Samantha Louise Irene Moje (Annex "H-
Rule 7.03: A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness 1") sufficiently prove that there was indeed an illicit relationship between respondent
to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous and Irene which resulted in the birth of the child "Samantha". In the Certificate of
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary Live Birth of Samantha it should be noted that complainant's wife Irene supplied the
information that respondent was the father of the child. Given the fact that the
The IBP Board of Governors, however, annulled and set aside the Recommendation respondent admitted his special relationship with Irene there is no reason to believe
of the Investigating Commissioner and accordingly dismissed the case for lack of that Irene would lie or make any misrepresentation regarding the paternity of the
merit, by Resolution dated January 28, 2006 briefly reading: child. It should be underscored that respondent has not categorically denied that he
is the father of Samantha Louise Irene Moje.25 (Emphasis and underscoring
RESOLUTION NO. XVII-2006-06 supplied)cralawlibrary

CBD Case No. 02-936 Indeed, from respondent's Answer, he does not deny carrying on an adulterous
Joselano C. Guevarra v. relationship with Irene, "adultery" being defined under Art. 333 of the Revised Penal
Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala Code as that "committed by any married woman who shall have sexual intercourse
a.k.a. Noli Eala with a man not her husband and by the man who has carnal knowledge of her,
knowing her to be married, even if the marriage be subsequently declared void."26
RESOLVED to ANNUL and SET ASIDE, as it is hereby ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE, the (Italics supplied) What respondent denies is having flaunted such relationship, he
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and to APPROVE the DISMISSAL maintaining that it was "low profile and known only to the immediate members of
of the above-entitled case for lack of merit.20 (Italics and emphasis in the original) their respective families."
In other words, respondent's denial is a negative pregnant, party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
a denial pregnant with the admission of the substantial facts in the pleading malpractice.
responded to which are not squarely denied. It was in effect an admission of the
averments it was directed at. Stated otherwise, a negative pregnant is a form of The disbarment or suspension of a member of the Philippine Bar by a competent
negative expression which carries with it in affirmation or at least an implication of court or other disciplinatory agency in a foreign jurisdiction where he has also been
some kind favorable to the adverse party. It is a denial pregnant with an admission admitted as an attorney is a ground for his disbarment or suspension if the basis of
of the substantial facts alleged in the pleading. Where a fact is alleged with such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated.
qualifying or modifying language and the words of the allegation as so qualified or
modified are literally denied, it has been held that the qualifying circumstances The judgment, resolution or order of the foreign court or disciplinary agency shall be
alone are denied while the fact itself is admitted.27 (Citations omitted; emphasis prima facie evidence of the ground for disbarment or suspension (Emphasis and
and underscoring supplied) underscoring supplied),

A negative pregnant too is respondent's denial of having "personal knowledge" of under scandalous circumstances.34
Irene's daughter Samantha Louise Irene Moje's Certificate of Live Birth. In said
certificate, Irene named respondent - a "lawyer," 38 years old - as the child's father. The immediately-quoted Rule which provides the grounds for disbarment or
And the phrase "NOT MARRIED" is entered on the desired information on "DATE AND suspension uses the phrase "grossly immoral conduct," not "under scandalous
PLACE OF MARRIAGE." A comparison of the signature attributed to Irene in the circumstances." Sexual intercourse under scandalous circumstances is, following
certificate28 with her signature on the Marriage Certificate29 shows that they were Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code reading:
affixed by one and the same person. Notatu dignum is that, as the Investigating
Commissioner noted, respondent never denied being the father of the child. ART. 334. Concubinage. - Any husband who shall keep a mistress in the conjugal
dwelling, or, shall have sexual intercourse, under scandalous circumstances, with a
Franklin A. Ricafort, the records custodian of St. Luke's Medical Center, in his January woman who is not his wife, or shall cohabit with her in any other place, shall be
29, 2003 Affidavit30 which he identified at the witness stand, declared that Irene punished by prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods.
gave the information in the Certificate of Live Birth that the child's father is "Jose
Emmanuel Masacaet Eala," who was 38 years old and a lawyer.31 x x x x,

Without doubt, the adulterous relationship between respondent and Irene has been an element of the crime of concubinage when a married man has sexual intercourse
sufficiently proven by more than clearly preponderant evidence - that evidence with a woman elsewhere.
adduced by one party which is more conclusive and credible than that of the other
party and, therefore, has greater weight than the other32 - which is the quantum of "Whether a lawyer's sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the
evidence needed in an administrative case against a lawyer. benefit of marriage should be characterized as 'grossly immoral conduct' depends
on the surrounding circumstances."35 The case at bar involves a relationship
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct between a married lawyer and a married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. whether the affair was carried out discreetly. Apropos is the following
pronouncement of this Court in Vitug v. Rongcal:36
. . . of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond
reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or On the charge of immorality, respondent does not deny that he had an extra-marital
suspension, "clearly preponderant evidence" is all that is required.33 (Emphasis affair with complainant, albeit brief and discreet, and which act is not "so corrupt
supplied)cralawlibrary and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to
a high degree" in order to merit disciplinary sanction. We disagree.
Respondent insists, however, that disbarment does not lie because his relationship
with Irene was not, under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, x x x
reading:
While it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact of sexual relations
SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. between two unmarried adults is not sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for
A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney such illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of the marital vow of
by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such fidelity. Even if not all forms of extra-marital relations are punishable under penal
office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving law, sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it
moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as an attorney for a
vowsprotected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.37 (Emphasis and which was pending review before the Department of Justice (DOJ), on petition of
underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary complainant, had been, on motion of complainant, withdrawn.

And so is the pronouncement in Tucay v. Atty. Tucay:38 The Secretary of Justice's Resolution of January 16, 2004 granting complainant's
Motion to Withdraw Petition for Review reads:
The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not the respondent did
contract a bigamous marriage . . . It is enough that the records of this administrative Considering that the instant motion was filed before the final resolution of the
case substantiate the findings of the Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Petition for Review, we are inclined to grant the same pursuant to Section 10 of
Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has been carrying on an illicit affair Department Circular No. 70 dated July 3, 2000, which provides that "notwithstanding
with a married woman, a grossly immoral conduct and indicative of an extremely low the perfection of the appeal, the petitioner may withdraw the same at any time
regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior renders before it is finally resolved, in which case the appealed resolution shall stand as
him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which though no appeal has been taken."42 (Emphasis supplied by complainant)
his license confers upon him.39 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
That the marriage between complainant and Irene was subsequently declared void
Respondent in fact also violated the lawyer's oath he took before admission to ab initio is immaterial. The acts complained of took place before the marriage was
practice law which goes: declared null and void.43 As a lawyer, respondent should be aware that a man and a
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife are presumed, unless proven
I _________, having been permitted to continue in the practice of law in the otherwise, to have entered into a lawful contract of marriage.44 In carrying on an
Philippines, do solemnly swear that I recognize the supreme authority of the extra-marital affair with Irene prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage with
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well complainant was null and void, and despite respondent himself being married, he
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, showed disrespect for an institution held sacred by the law. And he betrayed his
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or unfitness to be a lawyer.
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same; I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer As for complainant's withdrawal of his Petition for Review before the DOJ, respondent
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well as glaringly omitted to state that before complainant filed his December 23, 2003
to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation Motion to Withdraw his Petition for Review, the DOJ had already promulgated a
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. Resolution on September 22, 2003 reversing the dismissal by the Quezon City
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary Prosecutor's Office of complainant's complaint for adultery. In reversing the City
Prosecutor's Resolution, DOJ Secretary Simeon Datumanong held:
Respondent admittedly is aware of Section 2 of Article XV (The Family) of the
Constitution reading: Parenthetically the totality of evidence adduced by complainant would, in the fair
estimation of the Department, sufficiently establish all the elements of the offense of
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family adultery on the part of both respondents. Indeed, early on, respondent Moje
and shall be protected by the State. conceded to complainant that she was going out on dates with respondent Eala, and
this she did when complainant confronted her about Eala's frequent phone calls and
In this connection, the Family Code (Executive Order No. 209), which echoes this text messages to her. Complainant also personally witnessed Moje and Eala having a
constitutional provision, obligates the husband and the wife "to live together, rendezvous on two occasions. Respondent Eala never denied the fact that he knew
observe mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and support."40 Moje to be married to complainant[.] In fact, he (Eala) himself was married to
another woman. Moreover, Moje's eventual abandonment of their conjugal home,
Furthermore, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional after complainant had once more confronted her about Eala, only served to confirm
Responsibility which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in "unlawful, dishonest, the illicit relationship involving both respondents. This becomes all the more
immoral or deceitful conduct," and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the same Code which apparent by Moje's subsequent relocation in No. 71-B, 11th Street, New Manila,
proscribes a lawyer from engaging in any "conduct that adversely reflects on his Quezon City, which was a few blocks away from the church where she had exchange
fitness to practice law." marital vows with complainant.

Clutching at straws, respondent, during the pendency of the investigation of the It was in this place that the two lovers apparently cohabited. Especially since Eala's
case before the IBP Commissioner, filed a Manifestation41 on March 22, 2005 vehicle and that of Moje's were always seen there. Moje herself admits that she
informing the IBP-CBD that complainant's petition for nullity of his (complainant's) came to live in the said address whereas Eala asserts that that was where he held
marriage to Irene had been granted by Branch 106 of the Quezon City Regional Trial office. The happenstance that it was in that said address that Eala and Moje had
Court, and that the criminal complaint for adultery complainant filed against decided to hold office for the firm that both had formed smacks too much of a
respondent and Irene "based on the same set of facts alleged in the instant case," coincidence. For one, the said address appears to be a residential house, for that
was where Moje stayed all throughout after her separation from complainant. It was Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-
both respondent's love nest, to put short; their illicit affair that was carried out there Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia, Velasco, Jr.,
bore fruit a few months later when Moje gave birth to a girl at the nearby hospital of Nachura, JJ., concur.
St. Luke's Medical Center. What finally militates against the respondents is the
indubitable fact that in the certificate of birth of the girl, Moje furnished the
information that Eala was the father. This speaks all too eloquently of the unlawful THIRD DIVISION
and damning nature of the adulterous acts of the respondents. Complainant's
supposed illegal procurement of the birth certificate is most certainly beside the A.C. No. 5914, March 11, 2015
point for both respondents Eala and Moje have not denied, in any categorical
manner, that Eala is the father of the child Samantha Irene Louise Moje.45 SPOUSES ROGELIO AMATORIO AND AIDA AMATORIO, Complainants, v. ATTY.
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary FRANCISCO DY YAP AND ATTY. WHELMA F. SITON-YAP, Respondents.

It bears emphasis that adultery is a private offense which cannot be prosecuted de RESOLUTION
oficio and thus leaves the DOJ no choice but to grant complainant's motion to
withdraw his Petition for Review . But even if respondent and Irene were to be REYES, J.:
acquitted of adultery after trial, if the Information for adultery were filed in court, the
same would not have been a bar to the present administrative complaint. This pertains to the complaint for disbarment filed by Spouses Rogelio Amatorio and
Aida Amatorio (Aida) (complainants) against Attys. Francisco Dy Yap (Francisco) and
Citing the ruling in Pangan v. Ramos,46 viz: Whelma Siton-Yap (respondents) for violating Rules 1.01, 7.03, 10.01, 10.02 and
10.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these
[administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by In their complaint, the complainants alleged that the respondents employed deceit
conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of x x x criminal law. to obtain favorable judgments, specifically by failing to inform the trial court that
Moreover, this Court, in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different there was already an out-of-court settlement between them and maliciously
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal case47 (Italics in the manifesting that their counsel, Atty. Justo Paras (Atty. Paras) was suspended from the
original), practice of law.1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

this Court in Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pools, Inc. v. Atty. Naldoza,48 held: The complainants asseverated that they are clients of Atty. Paras in two collection
cases, particularly, Civil Case No. 2000-319 and Civil Case No. 2000-321, which were
Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct filed against them by the respondents. In Civil Case No. 2000-319, respondents sued
from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases. the complainants to compel them to pay their indebtedness of P18,000.00, which
was evidenced by a promissory note. After they filed their answer to the complaint,
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. XVII-2006-06 passed on however, the respondents filed a motion to strike out the same and to declare them
January 28, 2006 by the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines in default on the ground that the said pleading was prepared by a lawyer suspended
is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. from the practice of law and lacked proper verification. The motion was however
denied.2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Respondent, Atty. Jose Emmanuel M. Eala, is DISBARRED for grossly immoral
conduct, violation of his oath of office, and violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and On the other hand, in Civil Case No. 2000-321, the respondents sued the
Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. complainants to collect the amount of P94,173.44. The answer filed by Atty. Paras
was however stricken off the record for the reason that he was suspended from the
Let a copy of this Decision, which is immediately executory, be made part of the practice of law at the time of its filing.3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
records of respondent in the Office of the Bar Confidant, Supreme Court of the
Philippines. And let copies of the Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Unable to find a lawyer to replace Atty. Paras, the complainants decided to seek an
Philippines and circulated to all courts. out-of-court settlement. On May 23, 2001, Aida went to the respondents law office.
She appealed for the respondents consideration and asked that they be allowed to
This Decision takes effect immediately. pay their obligations by way of installment. The parties agreed on the terms of
payment and, on that same day, Aida tendered her first payment of P20,000.00,
SO ORDERED. which was received and duly acknowledged by Francisco in a written document with
the letterhead of Yap Law Office. When Aida asked the respondents if they should
still attend the pre-trial conference scheduled on May 28, 2001 and June 18, 2001 in
the civil cases filed against them, the latter told them they need not attend anymore
as they will be moving for the dismissal of the cases. Relying on the respondents On their counter-petition for disbarment, the respondents asserted that Atty. Paras
assurance, the complainants did not attend the scheduled hearings. Subsequently, clearly defied the authority of this Court when he represented the complainants and
they were surprised to receive copies of the decisions of the trial court in the two filed an answer on their behalf during the period of his suspension from the practice
civil cases filed by the respondents, declaring them in default for non-appearance in of law. They alleged that he appeared in several cases and filed numerous pleadings
the pre-trial conference and ordering them to pay the amount of their indebtedness despite his suspension.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and damages. The decision however did not mention the out-of-court settlement
between the parties. Nonetheless, the complainants continued tendering installment After the parties submitted their respective position papers, the Investigating
payments to the respondents upon the latters assurance that they will disregard the Commissioner of the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline issued a Report and
decision of the trial court since they already had an out-of-court settlement before Recommendation10 dated June 23, 2005, which pertinently states as
the rendition of said judgment. They were surprised to learn, however, that the follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
respondents filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Case No. There is substantial evidence that Respondent Francisco Yap ha[s] deliberately
2000-319 and were in fact issued said writ.4 This prompted them to seek legal neglected, at the very least, offered and/or pleaded inaccurate
advice to address their predicament. They went to Atty. Jose V. Carriaga who, after allegations/testimonies to purposely mislead or confuse the civil courts in
learning of the factual milieu of their case, told them that they have a good ground Dumaguete City. Francisco Yap failed to controvert the existence and the
to file a disbarment case against the respondents. He, however, declined to handle authenticity of the Acknowledgment Receipt dated May 21, 2001 which bore his
the case himself as he disclosed that his wife is a relative of the respondents. signature and written in a Yap Law Office letterhead. Such documentary evidence
Instead, he referred the complainants to Atty. Paras, who had just resumed his supports the theory of the Complainants that there was indeed an out-of-court
practice of law after his suspension.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary settlement prior to the pre-trial hearings and that they were most likely assured that
these cases would be dismissed. Their absence during the pre-trial hearings
As advised, the complainants went to Atty. Paras to engage his services as their evidently resulted to decisions adverse to them. Moreover, the Motions for the Writ
counsel. Initially, Atty. Paras refused to handle their case as he revealed that the of Execution did not fail to mention the existence of partial payments and the prior
personal animosity between him and the respondents may invite unwelcome agreement which, if disclosed, would have led the court not to issue such writs.
repercussions. Even then, the complainants insisted to retain his services as their Since Respondent Francisco Yaps signature appear in all the Acknowledgement
counsel. Thus, Atty. Paras proceeded to file a disbarment case against the Receipts and in all Motions filed in the civil courts, he alone should be penalized. On
respondents with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the other hand, Respondent Whelma Siton Yap should not be penalized in the
(IBP).6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary absence of any evidence of her participation in such conduct. x x x.

As foretold by Atty. Paras, the complainants experienced unpleasant backlash which All told, this Commissioner recommends that only Respondent Francisco Yap should
were allegedly instigated by the respondents who come from a very powerful and be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. At the same time, the
affluent clan. They received threats of physical harm and Aidas continued Counter Petition for Disbarment filed by herein Respondents against Atty. Justo
employment as a public school teacher was put in jeopardy. Also, suspicious-looking Paras, which appears to be VERY meritorious, be given due course in another
individuals were seen loitering around their house. When they refused to yield to the proceeding with utmost dispatch.11
respondents intimidation, the latter resorted to the filing of charges against them, Upon review of the report and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
to wit: (1) an administrative case against Aida for failure to pay the same debts the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVII-2005-15912 dated December
subject of this case; and (2) a criminal case for perjury against the complainants. To 17, 2005, disposing thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
alleviate their situation, they filed a Joint-Affidavit,7 seeking the assistance of this RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, with
Court to warn the respondents and to stop them from employing deplorable acts modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of
upon them. the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex A, and,
finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
In their Comment on the Complaint and Counter-Petition for Disbarment dated March applicable laws and rules, and for deliberately neglecting, offering inaccurate
14, 2003, the respondents denied having resorted to deceitful means to obtain allegations to purposely mislead or confuse the courts, Atty. Francisco D. Yap is
favorable judgments in Civil Case Nos. 2000-319 and 2000-321. They admitted that hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. Atty. Whelma F.
they agreed to an out-of-court settlement, through the intercession of Rosa Yap Siton-Yap is exonerated in the absence of any evidence of her participation in such
Paras, estranged wife of Atty. Paras, but denied that the complainants ever tendered conduct; however Respondents are Warned for indirectly misleading the
any installment payment. They claimed that Atty. Paras merely employed cajolery in Commission.13
order to entice the complainants to file the instant case to retaliate against them. On March 27, 2006, the respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Petition for
They asseverated that Atty. Paras resented the fact that the respondents served as Review.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
counsel for his former wife, who previously filed the administrative case for
immorality, abandonment of family, and falsification and use of falsified documents On August 9, 2007, the complainants filed a Manifestation,15 terminating the
which resulted to his suspension.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary services of Atty. Paras and/or Paras-Enojo and Associates as their counsel for the
reason that they can no longer afford the services of a private counsel.
 After a careful examination of the facts of this case, the Court finds no compelling
Surprisingly, on the same day, the complainants executed a Judicial Affidavit,16 reason to deviate from the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors.
disclaiming knowledge and participation in the preparation of the complaint and the
pleadings filed on their behalf by Atty. Paras in connection with the disbarment case Notably, the respondents seek a reconsideration of the resolutions of the IBP Board
against the respondents. They claimed that they merely signed the pleadings but of Governors primarily on the basis of the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007,
the contents thereof were not explained to them in a dialect which they understood. wherein the complainants cleared them of the charges of misconduct and turned the
They likewise expressed lack of intention to file a disbarment case against the blame on their own counsel, Atty. Paras, for allegedly having made up the
respondents and that, on the contrary, they were very much willing to settle and pay allegations in the disbarment complaint. When the IBP Board of Governors sustained
their indebtedness to them. Further, they asserted that it was not the respondents, the imposition of suspension to Francisco, the complainants themselves submitted a
but Atty. Paras who instructed them not to attend the pre-trial conference of the motion to admit the said judicial affidavit to this Court, together with a motion to
cases which eventually resulted to a judgment by default against them. They dismiss and withdraw complaint.
claimed that Atty. Paras told them that he will be the one to attend the pre-trial
conference to settle matters with the respondents and the court but he did not show The question now is whether the statements of the complainants, specifically
up on the scheduled date. They also asseverated that most of the statements contesting the truthfulness of the allegations hurled against the respondents in their
contained in the complaint for disbarment were false and that they wished to own complaint for disbarment necessarily results to Franciscos absolution. The
withdraw the said complaint. answer is in the negative.

On May 14, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XIX-2011-172,17 It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.
which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
RESOLVED to DENY Respondents Motion for Reconsideration there being no cogent possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and it being a mere reiteration of honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the publics
the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. faith in the legal profession.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Thus, Resolution No. XVII-2005-159 dated 17 December 2005 is hereby AFFIRMED.18
On August 18, 2011, the respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, claiming The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated to guide the members of
that the admission of the complainants in the Judicial Affidavit dated August 9, 2007 the bar by informing them of the deportment expected of them in leading both their
proved that the disbarment case filed against them was just fabricated by Atty. professional and private lives. Primarily, it aims to protect the integrity and nobility
Paras. They pointed out the complainants statement that they were just made to of the legal profession, to breed honest and principled lawyers and prune the
sign the complaint for disbarment by Atty. Paras to retaliate against them for having association of the unworthy.
filed a case against him for falsification of documents which sent him to prison for
some time. It is for the foregoing reason that the Court cannot simply yield to complainants
change of heart by refuting their own statements against the respondents and
On August 18, 2011, the complainants sent a letter19 to the IBP, expressing praying that the complaint for disbarment they filed be dismissed. It bears
disappointment over the fact that the IBP Board of Governors did not dismiss the emphasizing that any misconduct on the part of the lawyer not only hurts the
disbarment case against Francisco. The letter pertinently clients cause but is even more disparaging on the integrity of the legal profession
stated:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary itself. Thus, for tarnishing the reputation of the profession, a lawyer may still be
We are very concerned and saddened by the fact that the disbarment case against disciplined notwithstanding the complainants pardon or withdrawal from the case
ATTY. FRANCISCO DY YAP was NOT DISMISSED. The reason is that we have submitted for as long as there is evidence to support any finding of culpability. A case for
our JUDICIAL AFFIDAVIT relating the facts and circumstances wherein the said suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of
disbarment complaint was prepared by our former legal counsel, ATTY. JUSTO J. the complainants, if the facts proven so warrant.23 It follows that the withdrawal of
PARAS consisting of fabrications and not on facts. It was upon the machination and the complainant from the case, or even the filing of an affidavit of desistance, does
instigation of ATTY. JUSTO PARAS, that the simple collection case of P94,000.00 more not conclude the administrative case against an erring lawyer.
or less, became a multifaceted case in several forums.20 (Emphasis in the original)
The instant case is now referred to this Court for final action. This is so because the misconduct of a lawyer is deemed a violation of his oath to
keep sacred the integrity of the profession for which he must be disciplined. The
The Court notes that on September 16, 2011, the complainants filed a Motion to power to discipline lawyers who are officers of the court may not be cut short by
Admit Judicial Affidavit with Motion to Dismiss and/or Withdraw Complaint,21 compromise and withdrawal of the charges. This is as it should be, especially when
reiterating their claim that the filing of the disbarment was a product of Atty. Paras we consider that the law profession and its exercise is one impressed with public
maneuverings and that the allegations against the respondents stated therein were interest. Proceedings to discipline erring members of the bar are not instituted to
false. protect and promote the public good only but also to maintain the dignity of the
profession by the weeding out of those who have proven themselves unworthy
thereof.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
 charge of misconduct against Francisco. What clearly appears is that the facts
Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of material to the violation committed by Francisco are well-established
culpability against the respondents merely because the complainants have decided notwithstanding Atty. Paras supposed fabrication of some insignificant particulars.
to forgive them or settle matters amicably after the case was completely evaluated
and reviewed by the IBP. The complainants forgiveness or even withdrawal from the WHEREFORE, for deliberately misleading the Court, Atty. Francisco Dy Yap is hereby
case does not ipso facto obliterate the misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months effective upon
with, it is already too late in the day for the complainants to withdraw the receipt of this Resolution, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
disbarment case considering that they had already presented and supported their similar act in the future shall be dealt with severely.
claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a
resolution on the basis thereof. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
the Office of the Court Administrator which shall circulate the same in all courts in
To be clear, [i]n administrative cases for disbarment or suspension against lawyers, the country, and spread upon the personal records of the respondent lawyer in the
the quantum of proof required is clearly preponderant evidence and the burden of Office of the Bar Confidant.
proof rests upon the complainant.25 In the present case, it was clearly established
that Francisco received P20,000.00 as initial payment from the complainants in SO ORDERED.
compliance with the terms of their out-of-court settlement for the payment of the
latters outstanding obligations. The amount was duly received and acknowledged Velasco, Jr., (Chairperson), Peralta, Villarama, Jr., and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
by Francisco, who drafted the same in a paper with the letterhead of his own law
office, a fact he did not deny. While the respondents deny that they told the
complainants not to attend the pre-trial of the case anymore and that they will be Taking the Oath and Signing the Roll
the one to inform the trial court of the settlement, they did not bring the said
agreement to the attention of the court. Thus, the trial court, oblivious of the EN BANC
settlement of the parties, rendered a judgment by default against the complainants.
The respondents even filed a motion for execution of the decision but still did not [B.M. NO. 2112 - July 24, 2012]
inform the trial court of the out-of-court settlement between them and the
complainants. They deliberately failed to mention this supervening event to the trial IN RE: PETITION RE-ACQUIRE THE PRIVILEGE TO PRACTICE LAW IN THE PHILIPPINES,
court, hence, violating the standards of honesty provided for in the Code of EPIFANIO B. MUNESES, Petitioner,
Professional Responsibility, which states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and RESOLUTION
promote respect for law and for legal processes.
REYES, J.:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct. On June 8, 2009, a petition was filed by Epifanio B. Muneses (petitioner) with the
Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) praying that he be granted the privilege to practice
xxxx law in the Philippines.

CANON 10 A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. The petitioner alleged that he became a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) on March 21, 1966; that he lost his privilege to practice law when
Rule 10.01 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in he became a citizen of the United States of America (USA) on August 28, 1981; that
Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.cralawred on September 15, 2006, he re-acquired his Philippine citizenship pursuant to
The complainants belated claim that the respondents were faultless and that the Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the "Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
allegations stated in the disbarment complaint were just fabricated by their former 2003" by taking his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
counsel cannot stand against the clear and preponderant evidence they earlier Consulate General in Washington, D.C., USA; that he intends to retire in the
presented. It is inexplicable how the complainants could now claim that the Philippines and if granted, to resume the practice of law. Attached to the petition
respondents were blameless when the records tell otherwise. That they were simply were several documents in support of his petition, albeit mere photocopies thereof,
duped by Atty. Paras into signing the numerous pleadings he filed on their behalf is to wit:rbl r l l lbrr
hardly believable considering that Aida is well-lettered, being a public school
teacher. They also do not claim that they were prevented from reading the contents 1. Oath of Allegiance dated September 15, 2006 before Consul General Domingo P.
of the pleadings or that their signatures were simply forged. At any rate, while it Nolasco;
may be true that Atty. Paras fabricated some of the facts stated in the disbarment
complaint, these matters are trivial and do not relate to the facts material to the 2. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship of same date;
 copies of the following documents in relation to his petition:rbl r
3. Order for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship also of same date; l l lbrr

4. Letter dated March 13, 2008 evidencing payment of membership dues with the 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
IBP;
2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
5. Attendance Forms from the Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE).
3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
chanrobles virtual law library
In Bar Matter No. 1678, dated December 17, 2007, the Court was confronted with a 4. Identification Certificate (IC) issued by the Bureau of Immigration;
similar petition filed by Benjamin M. Dacanay (Dacanay) who requested leave to
resume his practice of law after availing the benefits of R.A. No. 9225. Dacanay was 5. Certificate of Good Standing issued by the IBP;
admitted to the Philippine Bar in March 1960. In December 1998, he migrated to
Canada to seek medical attention for his ailments and eventually became a 6. Certification from the IBP indicating updated payments of annual membership
Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, Dacanay re-acquired his Philippine dues;
citizenship pursuant to R.A. No. 9225 after taking his oath of allegiance before the
Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. He returned to the Philippines and 7. Proof of payment of professional tax; and
intended to resume his practice of law.
8. Certificate of compliance issued by the MCLE Office.
The Court reiterates that Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar
and is, in fact, a continuing requirement for the practice of law. The loss thereof chanrobles virtual law library
means termination of the petitioner s membership in the bar; ipso jure the privilege In compliance thereof, the petitioner submitted the
to engage in the practice of law. Under R.A. No. 9225, natural-born citizens who have following:rbl r l l lbrr
lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country are deemed to have re-acquired their Philippine citizenship upon 1. Petition for Re-Acquisition of Philippine Citizenship;
taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic.1 Thus, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country and later re-acquires his Philippine citizenship under R.A. 2. Order (for Re-Acquisition of Philippine citizenship);
No. 9225, remains to be a member of the Philippine Bar. However, as stated in
Dacanay, the right to resume the practice of law is not automatic.2 R.A. No. 9225 3. Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines;
provides that a person who intends to practice his profession in the Philippines must
apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such 4. Certificate of Re-Acquisition/Retention of Philippine Citizenship issued by the
practice.3rbl r l l lbrr Bureau of Immigration, in lieu of the IC;

It can not be overstressed that:rl 5. Certification dated May 19, 2010 of the IBP-Surigao City Chapter attesting to his
good moral character as well as his updated payment of annual membership dues;
The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is so delicately affected
with public interest that it is both the power and duty of the State (through this 6. Professional Tax Receipt (PTR) for the year 2010;
Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
7. Certificate of Compliance with the MCLE for the 2nd compliance period;
Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of andcralawlibrary
morality, faithful observance of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory
continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the 8. Certification dated December 5, 2008 of Atty. Gloria Estenzo-Ramos, Coordinator,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in UC-MCLE Program, University of Cebu, College of Law attesting to his compliance
good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach with the MCLE.
by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and
confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of chanrobles virtual law library
his professional privilege.4rll The OBC further required the petitioner to update his compliance, particularly with
the MCLE. After all the requirements were satisfactorily complied with and finding
chanrobles virtual law library that the petitioner has met all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications for
Thus, in pursuance to the qualifications laid down by the Court for the practice of membership in the bar, the OBC recommended that the petitioner be allowed to
law, the OBC required the herein petitioner to submit the original or certified true resume his practice of law.
 of the action taken should be submit by registered mail to the member and to the
Upon this favorable recommendation of the OBC, the Court adopts the same and Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court required the
sees no bar to the petitioner's resumption to the practice of law in the Philippines. respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted
his comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Epifanio B. Muneses is hereby GRANTED, fees due from him. On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the
subject to the condition that he shall re-take the Lawyer's Oath on a date to be set IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they
by the Court and subject to the payment of appropriate fees. submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976.
After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of
Furthermore, the Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to draft the necessary their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution."
guidelines for the re-acquisition of the privilege to resume the practice of law for the 3chanrobles virtual law library
guidance of the Bench and Bar.
Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to
SO ORDERED. recommend to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from
the Roll of Attorneys as found in Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. -
Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual
EN BANC dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar,
and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
A.C. 1928 December 19, 1980 name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys. 4chanrobles virtual law
library
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION
(IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner, The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is
that the above provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the
FERNANDO, C.J.: sense that he is being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a
lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the corresponding
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of the said
disbarred member of the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived
the specific case, public interest, the integrity of the profession and the welfare of of the rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence,
the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are given their due weight. the respondent concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978, 1 the vote being Laws are void and of no legal force and effect. 5It was pointed out in the resolution
unanimous with the late.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library that such issues was raised on a previous case before the Court, entitled
'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the
Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
be reinstated. The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration
was there made clear that it "is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion." of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6The unanimous
2chanrobles virtual law library conclusion reached by the Court was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises
no constitutional question and is therefore legally unobjectionable, "and, within the
Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has become an imperative
respondent may not be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration of
Justice Castro: "On November 29. 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and effectively."
short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in 7chanrobles virtual law library
Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues Delinquency
of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision
the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership was rendered, there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement
dues' to the IBP since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On starting with a motion for reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it
January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the was by persistence in his adamantine refusal to admit the full competence of the
said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,. Pursuant to paragraph Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would be denied. So it turned out.
2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ... Should the 8It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic juridical
delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect.
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever Since respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since
action it shall deem appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court his pleadings in other cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if
for the removal of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice rather generously sprinkled with invective for which he had been duly taken to task,
there was the impression that his recalcitrance arose from and sheer obstinacy.
Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was more than CORONA, J.:
justified.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a resume the practice of law.
different attitude on his part was discernible. 9The tone of defiance was gone and
circumstances of a mitigating character invoked - the state of his health and his Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until
advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former clients who still rely on him he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments.
for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his career been He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada's free medical
a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library 2004.

This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-
it did in the resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that
acceptance on his part of the competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine
plenary power to regulate the legal profession and can integrate the bar and that Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and
the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years had elapsed now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether
during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition.
for contempt and paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v.
Lukban, 10 the power to discipline, especially if amounting to disbarment, should be In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2,
exercised on the preservative and not on the vindictive principle. 11chanrobles Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court:
virtual law library
SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar. - Every
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines,
as far as admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the
membership. What must ever be borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of
follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with conditions. Failure to abide by any of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrant such drastic have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations evidencing
that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the
23, 1980.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It
recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines,
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon. conditioned on his retaking the lawyer's oath to remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar.
Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos,
De Castro and Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain
virtual law library modifications.

Aquino, J., concurs in the result. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately
affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through
this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public
EN BANC welfare.3

[B.M. NO. 1678 : December 17, 2007] Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of
morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership
Petitioner. fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for
membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice
RESOLUTION law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the
trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership
exercise of his professional privilege.4 in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues.

Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines
and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply
SECTION 1. Who may practice law. - Any person heretofore duly admitted as a with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18
member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA
of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority
to do so, conditioned on:
Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in
accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP;
is entitled to practice law.
(b) the payment of professional tax;
Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates
that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal
twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner's knowledge
He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and
character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been
filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6 (d) the retaking of the lawyer's oath which will not only remind him of his duties and
responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge
Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing to maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar
examinations;8 taking the lawyer's oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the
receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to Philippine bar.
practice.10
WHEREFORE, the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED,
The second requisite for the practice of law membership in good standing is a subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of
continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a
payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual member of the Philippine bar.
professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education
requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession SO ORDERED.
and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14

Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice Insert In re Marcos del Rosario (September 2014)
law in the Philippines? No.

The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall
EN BANC
be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino
citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
B.M. No. 2540, September 24, 2013
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the
practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the
IN RE: PETITION TO SIGN IN THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS MICHAEL A. MEDADO,
privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied
Petitioner.
to foreigners.16
RESOLUTION
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a
citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is
SERENO, C.J.:
because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be
deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA
We resolve the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys filed by petitioner
9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is
Michael A. Medado (Medado).
deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance
Medado graduated from the University of the Philippines with the degree of Bachelor For one, petitioner demonstrated good faith and good moral character when he
of Laws in 19791 and passed the same years bar examinations with a general finally filed the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys. We note that it was
weighted average of 82.7.2cralaw virtualaw library not a third party who called this Courts attention to petitioners omission; rather, it
was Medado himself who acknowledged his own lapse, albeit after the passage of
On 7 May 1980, he took the Attorneys Oath at the Philippine International more than 30 years. When asked by the Bar Confidant why it took him this long to
Convention Center (PICC) together with the successful bar examinees.3 He was file the instant petition, Medado very candidly replied:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
scheduled to sign in the Roll of Attorneys on 13 May 1980,4 but he failed to do so on Mahirap hong i-explain yan pero, yun bang at the time, what can you say? Takot ka
his scheduled date, allegedly because he had misplaced the Notice to Sign the Roll kung anong mangyayari sa yo, you dont know whats gonna happen. At the same
of Attorneys5 given by the Bar Office when he went home to his province for a time, its a combination of apprehension and anxiety of whats gonna happen. And,
vacation.6cralaw virtualaw library finally its the right thing to do. I have to come here sign the roll and take the oath
as necessary.16
Several years later, while rummaging through his old college files, Medado found the For another, petitioner has not been subject to any action for disqualification from
Notice to Sign the Roll of Attorneys. It was then that he realized that he had not the practice of law,17 which is more than what we can say of other individuals who
signed in the roll, and that what he had signed at the entrance of the PICC was were successfully admitted as members of the Philippine Bar. For this Court, this fact
probably just an attendance record.7cralaw virtualaw library demonstrates that petitioner strove to adhere to the strict requirements of the ethics
of the profession, and that he has prima facie shown that he possesses the character
By the time Medado found the notice, he was already working. He stated that he required to be a member of the Philippine Bar.
was mainly doing corporate and taxation work, and that he was not actively involved
in litigation practice. Thus, he operated under the mistaken belief [that] since he Finally, Medado appears to have been a competent and able legal practitioner,
ha[d] already taken the oath, the signing of the Roll of Attorneys was not as urgent, having held various positions at the Laurel Law Office,18 Petron, Petrophil
nor as crucial to his status as a lawyer;8 and the matter of signing in the Roll of Corporation, the Philippine National Oil Company, and the Energy Development
Attorneys lost its urgency and compulsion, and was subsequently forgotten.9cralaw Corporation.19cralaw virtualaw library
virtualaw library
All these demonstrate Medados worth to become a full-fledged member of the
In 2005, when Medado attended Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Philippine Bar. While the practice of law is not a right but a privilege,20 this Court
seminars, he was required to provide his roll number in order for his MCLE will not unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from individuals who have shown
compliances to be credited.10 Not having signed in the Roll of Attorneys, he was mental fitness and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of the profession.
unable to provide his roll number.
That said, however, we cannot fully exculpate petitioner Medado from all liability for
About seven years later, or on 6 February 2012, Medado filed the instant Petition, his years of inaction.
praying that he be allowed to sign in the Roll of Attorneys.11cralaw virtualaw library
Petitioner has been engaged in the practice of law since 1980, a period spanning
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) conducted a clarificatory conference on the more than 30 years, without having signed in the Roll of Attorneys.21 He justifies
matter on 21 September 201212 and submitted a Report and Recommendation to this behavior by characterizing his acts as neither willful nor intentional but based
this Court on 4 February 2013.13 The OBC recommended that the instant petition be on a mistaken belief and an honest error of judgment.22cralaw virtualaw library
denied for petitioners gross negligence, gross misconduct and utter lack of merit.14
It explained that, based on his answers during the clarificatory conference, petitioner We disagree.
could offer no valid justification for his negligence in signing in the Roll of
Attorneys.15cralaw virtualaw library While an honest mistake of fact could be used to excuse a person from the legal
consequences of his acts23 as it negates malice or evil motive,24 a mistake of law
After a judicious review of the records, we grant Medados prayer in the instant cannot be utilized as a lawful justification, because everyone is presumed to know
petition, subject to the payment of a fine and the imposition of a penalty equivalent the law and its consequences.25 Ignorantia facti excusat; ignorantia legis neminem
to suspension from the practice of law. excusat.

At the outset, we note that not allowing Medado to sign in the Roll of Attorneys Applying these principles to the case at bar, Medado may have at first operated
would be akin to imposing upon him the ultimate penalty of disbarment, a penalty under an honest mistake of fact when he thought that what he had signed at the
that we have reserved for the most serious ethical transgressions of members of the PICC entrance before the oath-taking was already the Roll of Attorneys. However, the
Bar. moment he realized that what he had signed was merely an attendance record, he
could no longer claim an honest mistake of fact as a valid justification. At that point,
In this case, the records do not show that this action is warranted. Medado should have known that he was not a full-fledged member of the Philippine
Bar because of his failure to sign in the Roll of Attorneys, as it was the act of signing
therein that would have made him so.26 When, in spite of this knowledge, he chose
to continue practicing law without taking the necessary steps to complete all the Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Del Castillo, Abad, Perez, Reyes, Perlas-
requirements for admission to the Bar, he willfully engaged in the unauthorized Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
practice of law. Brion, and Villarama, Jr., JJ., On leave.
Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., On official leave.
Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized practice of law by ones assuming to be
an attorney or officer of the court, and acting as such without authority, may
constitute indirect contempt of court,27 which is punishable by fine or imprisonment EN BANC
or both.28 Such a finding, however, is in the nature of criminal contempt29 and
must be reached after the filing of charges and the conduct of hearings.30 In this B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003
case, while it appears quite clearly that petitioner committed indirect contempt of
court by knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law, we refrain from making DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.
any finding of liability for indirect contempt, as no formal charge pertaining thereto
has been filed against him. DECISION

Knowingly engaging in unauthorized practice of law likewise transgresses Canon 9 of CARPIO, J.:
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 9 A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized The Case
practice of law.
While a reading of Canon 9 appears to merely prohibit lawyers from assisting in the Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral
unauthorized practice of law, the unauthorized practice of law by the lawyer himself integrity for membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of
is subsumed under this provision, because at the heart of Canon 9 is the lawyers greater importance than possession of legal learning. The practice of law is a
duty to prevent the unauthorized practice of privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is morally unfit
law. This duty likewise applies to law students and Bar candidates. As aspiring cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.
members of the Bar, they are bound to comport themselves in accordance with the
ethical standards of the legal profession. The Facts

Turning now to the applicable penalty, previous violations of Canon 9 have Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar
warranted the penalty of suspension from the practice of law.31 As Medado is not Examinations.
yet a full-fledged lawyer, we cannot suspend him from the practice of law. However,
we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty akin to suspension by allowing him to sign On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar
in the Roll of Attorneys one (1) year after receipt of this Resolution. For his examinees as members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre
transgression of the prohibition against the unauthorized practice of law, we likewise (complainant) filed against respondent a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar.
see it fit to fine him in the amount of P32,000. During the one year period, petitioner Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave
is warned that he is not allowed to engage in the practice of law, and is sternly misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.
warned that doing any act that constitutes practice of law before he has signed in
the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt with severely by this Court. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the
scheduled oath-taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition to Sign in the Roll of Attorneys is hereby GRANTED. Center. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys
Petitioner Michael A. Medado is ALLOWED to sign in the Roll of Attorneys ONE (1) pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyers
YEAR after receipt of this Resolution. Petitioner is likewise ORDERED to pay a FINE of oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.
P32,000 for his unauthorized practice of law. During the one year period, petitioner
is NOT ALLOWED to practice law, and is STERNLY WARNED that doing any act that Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave
constitutes practice of law before he has signed in the Roll of Attorneys will be dealt misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared
with severely by this Court. as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of
Election Canvassers (MBEC) of Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that
Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19 May 2001 entitled Formal
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court Administrator for Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office
circulation to all courts in the country.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as
SO ORDERED. counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).
 The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for
On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal Bunan in the May 2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that
government employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, respondent actively participated in the proceedings. The OBC likewise found that
Masbate. As such, respondent is not allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he took the lawyers oath
any court or administrative body. on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that
On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondents unauthorized practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the
respondent of acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends that respondent be denied
without the latter engaging respondents services. Complainant claims that admission to the Philippine Bar.
respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning
vice mayoralty candidate. On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which
respondent allegedly violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was
On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the a government employee. Respondent resigned as secretary and his resignation was
lawyers oath but disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to represent him before
of the charges against him. In the same resolution, the Court required respondent to the MBEC.
comment on the complaint against him.
The Courts Ruling
In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to
represent him before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in
advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who knows the law. Respondent the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the
admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the inclusion of certain Philippine Bar.
votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading. Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show
that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before
On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that respondent took the lawyers oath. In the pleading entitled Formal Objection to the
he submitted his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the Office of Vice-Mayor
same date. He submitted a copy of the Certification of Receipt of Revocable dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon Relox. Respondent paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned
further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that Counsel for, and in behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan
complainant is the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana
Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays that the complaint be dismissed for lack of as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and similar bodies.
merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.
On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent
On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted as her counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that
the claim of respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend Atty. Edwin L. Rana has been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of
specific assistance to Bunan. Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily the party and the candidate of the said party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC
Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for proclamation as the winning on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as counsel for Mayoralty
candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this petition. Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May 2001,
When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC
appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and praying for the proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of
(2) he was an employee of the government. Mandaon, Masbate.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly,
that the instant administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta. respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine
Bar.
On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
for evaluation, report and recommendation. In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,1 the Court elucidated that:

OBCs Report and Recommendation The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and
special proceedings, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of
clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing. In general, all On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow
advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law, respondent to act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body
incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an since respondent is the secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a
creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been the acts complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter
held to constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal dated 11 May 2001 addressed to Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he was resigning effective upon
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics your acceptance.10 Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation effective 11
supplied) x x x May 2001.11 Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted
as counsel for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.
In Cayetano v. Monsod,2 the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or
out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the
are usually performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law MBEC and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent
is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.
proceedings before the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so.
Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized practice of law. Respondent SO ORDERED.
called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a member of the Bar.
Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law, Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and
Bar.3crlwvirtualibrry Azcuna, JJ., concur.

The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is
limited to persons of good moral character with special qualifications duly EN BANC
ascertained and certified. The exercise of this privilege presupposes possession of
integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public trust4 since a B.M. No. 712 July 13, 1995
lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to
practice law simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a IN THE MATTER OF THE ADMISSION TO THE BAR AND OATH-TAKING OF SUCCESSFUL
privilege that can be withheld even from one who has passed the bar examinations, BAR APPLICANT AL C. ARGOSINO, petitioner.
if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.5crlwvirtualibrry RESOLUTION

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,6 FELICIANO, J.:
a candidate passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the
Roll of Attorneys. He was held in contempt of court for practicing law even before his A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial Court of
admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, a person Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with thirteen (13) other
who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt of individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with the death of one Raul
court.7crlwvirtualibrry Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul Camaligan stemmed from the
infliction of severe physical injuries upon him in the course of "hazing" conducted as
True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. part of university fraternity initiation rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then
However, it is the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full- entered into plea bargaining with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining,
fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent passed the bar examinations is immaterial. pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence. This
Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8 plea was accepted by the trial court. In a judgment dated 11 February 1993, each of
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had the fourteen (14) accused individuals was sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a
to be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his period ranging from two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4)
signature in the Roll of Attorneys.9crlwvirtualibrry years.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application for deals with is client's property, reputation, his life, his all. An attorney at law is a
probation with the lower court. The application for probation was granted in an Order sworn officer of the Court, whose chief concern, as such, is to aid the administration
dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court Judge Pedro T. Santiago. The of justice. . . .
period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the probationer's initial
report to the probation officer assigned to supervise xxx xxx xxx 4
him.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In Re Application of Kaufman, 5citing Re Law Examination of 1926 (1926) 191 Wis
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for Admission 359, 210 NW 710:chanrobles virtual law library
to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he disclosed the fact of his
criminal conviction and his then probation status. He was allowed to take the 1993 It can also be truthfully said that there exists nowhere greater temptations to
Bar Examinations in this Court's En Banc Resolution dated 14 August 1993. 1He deviate from the straight and narrow path than in the multiplicity of circumstances
passed the Bar Examination. He was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer's oath that arise in the practice of profession. For these reasons the wisdom of requiring an
of office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library applicant for admission to the bar to possess a high moral standard therefore
becomes clearly apparent, and the board of bar examiners as an arm of the court, is
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him to take the required to cause a minute examination to be made of the moral standard of each
attorney's oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law, averring that Judge candidate for admission to practice. . . . It needs no further argument, therefore, to
Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period by virtue of an Order dated 11 arrive at the conclusion that the highest degree of scrutiny must be exercised as to
April 1994. We note that his probation period did not last for more than ten (10) the moral character of a candidate who presents himself for admission to the bar.
months from the time of the Order of Judge Santiago granting him probation dated The evil must, if possible, be successfully met at its very source, and prevented, for,
18 June 1993. Since then, Mr. Argosino has filed three (3) Motions for Early after a lawyer has once been admitted, and has pursued his profession, and has
Resolution of his Petition for Admission to the established himself therein, a far more difficult situation is presented to the court
Bar.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library when proceedings are instituted for disbarment and for the recalling and annulment
of his license.
The practice of law is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to
everyone who demands it. Rather, it is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of In Re Keenan: 6
good moral character, with special educational qualifications, duly ascertained and
certified. 2The essentiality of good moral character in those who would be lawyers is The right to practice law is not one of the inherent rights of every citizen, as in the
stressed in the following excerpts which we quote with approval and which we right to carry on an ordinary trade or business. It is a peculiar privilege granted and
regard as having persuasive effect: continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment
and in moral character. All may aspire to it on an absolutely equal basis, but not all
In Re Farmer: 3 will attain it. Elaborate machinery has been set up to test applicants by standards
fair to all and to separate the fit from the unfit. Only those who pass the test are
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library allowed to enter the profession, and only those who maintain the standards are
allowed to remain in it.
This "upright character" prescribed by the statute, as a condition precedent to the
applicant's right to receive a license to practice law in North Carolina, and of which Re Rouss: 7
he must, in addition to other requisites, satisfy the court, includes all the elements
necessary to make up such a character. It is something more than an absence of bad Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions, and a fair private and
character. It is the good name which the applicant has acquired, or should have professional character is one of them; to refuse admission to an unworthy applicant
acquired, through association with his fellows. It means that he must have is not to punish him for past offense: an examination into character, like the
conducted himself as a man of upright character ordinarily would, or should, or does. examination into learning, is merely a test of fitness.
Such character expresses itself, not in negatives nor in following the line of least
resistance, but quite often, in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right, and the Cobb vs. Judge of Superior Court: 8
resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong. . . .
Attorney's are licensed because of their learning and ability, so that they may not
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library only protect the rights and interests of their clients, but be able to assist court in the
trial of the cause. Yet what protection to clients or assistance to courts could such
And we may pause to say that this requirement of the statute is eminently proper. agents give? They are required to be of good moral character, so that the agents
Consider for a moment the duties of a lawyer. He is sought as counsellor, and his and officers of the court, which they are, may not bring discredit upon the due
advice comes home, in its ultimate effect, to every man's fireside. Vast interests are administration of the law, and it is of the highest possible consequence that both
committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he those who have not such qualifications in the first instance, or who, having had
them, have fallen therefrom, shall not be permitted to appear in courts to aid in the proximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan, certainly indicated
administration of justice. serious character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. Mr. Argosino
and his co-accused had failed to discharge their moral duty to protect the life and
It has also been stressed that the requirement of good moral character is, in fact, of well-being of a "neophyte" who had, by seeking admission to the fraternity involved,
greater importance so far as the general public and the proper administration of reposed trust and confidence in all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
justice are concerned, than the possession of legal learning: beaten and kicked to death like a useless stray dog. Thus, participation in the
prolonged and mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
. . . (In re Applicants for License, 55 S.E. 635, 143 N.C. 1, 10 L.R.A. [N.S.] 288, 10 evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
Ann./Cas. 187): makes impossible a finding that the participant was then possessed of good moral
character.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
The public policy of our state has always been to admit no person to the practice of
the law unless he covered an upright moral character. The possession of this by the Now that the original period of probation granted by the trial court has expired, the
attorney is more important, if anything, to the public and to the proper Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of whether applicant A.C.
administration of justice than legal learning. Legal learning may be acquired in after Argosino has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to
years, but if the applicant passes the threshold of the bar with a bad moral character above. We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
the chances are that his character will remain bad, and that he will become a must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to take the
disgrace instead of an ornament to his great calling - a curse instead of a benefit to bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of application for
his community - a Quirk, a Gammon or a Snap, instead of a Davis, a Smith or a admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of
Ruffin. 9 office.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library

All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
seeking admission to the Bar. The scope of such inquiry is, indeed, said to be consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with the
properly broader than inquiry into the moral proceedings for disbarment: requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the
bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn certifications from responsible
Re Stepsay: 10 members of the community who have a good reputation for truth and who have
actually known Mr. Argosino for a significant period of time, particularly since the
The inquiry as to the moral character of an attorney in a proceeding for his judgment of conviction was rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the
admission to practice is broader in scope than in a disbarment proceeding. Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to
the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino
Re Wells: 11 must, in other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and learned
. . . that an applicant's contention that upon application for admission to the profession of the law.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
California Bar the court cannot reject him for want of good moral character unless it
appears that he has been guilty of acts which would be cause for his disbarment or Finally, Mr. Argosino is hereby DIRECTED to inform this Court, by appropriate written
suspension, could not be sustained; that the inquiry is broader in its scope than that manifestation, of the names and addresses of the father and mother (in default
in a disbarment proceeding, and the court may receive any evidence which tends to thereof, brothers and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan), within ten (10) day from
show the applicant's character as respects honesty, integrity, and general morality, notice hereof. Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the parents or brothers
and may no doubt refuse admission upon proofs that might not establish his guilt of and sisters, if any, of Raul Camaligan.
any of the acts declared to be causes for disbarment.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Melo, JJ.,
The requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who would seek concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
admission to the bar must of necessity be more stringent than the norm of conduct
expected from members of the general public. There is a very real need to prevent a Bellosillo, J. is on leave.
general perception that entry into the legal profession is open to individuals with
inadequate moral qualifications. The growth of such a perception would signal the
progressive destruction of our people's confidence in their courts of law and in our EN BANC
legal system as we know it. 12
[B.M. NO. 1222 : April 24, 2009]
Mr. Argosino's participation in the deplorable "hazing" activities certainly fell far
short of the required standard of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS
merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe physical injuries which
ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner, conduct of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar
examinees.
RESOLUTION
Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.: still managed to excel in his studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence
Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10,
2008 filed by petitioner Danilo de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government
the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner's plea for judicial clemency, service as a Legal Officer assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig.
and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less fortunate residents of
Philippine Bar."1 Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos
the dispositive portion of which reads in part: and Perez Law Offices. It was during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer
was polished and developed. Despite having entered private practice, he continued
WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeos.
Committee, hereby resolves to'
Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner's flourishing career was
(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his cut short as he was stripped of his license to practice law for his alleged involvement
receipt of this RESOLUTION; in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

xxx Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the
rather unavoidable consequences of his disbarment.
The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during
the 2003 Bar Examinations. Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken
lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose partners, Marcial Balgos, was as a consultant by the City Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a
the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had member of the Secretariat of the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB). For the
adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.
the person who had downloaded the test questions from the computer of Balgos and
faxed them to other persons. Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which
unfortunately, compromised the integrity of the bar examinations. As could be borne
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the investigation
of petitioner in the Philippine Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his
rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of which we quote sincerest apologies to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar
hereunder: examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of his actions.

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father's Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the
childhood dream to become one. This task was not particularly easy for him and his said humbling experience to make him a better person.
family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to his parents.
Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials
Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself and endorsements of various individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral
the duty of rendering service to his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure character:
to public service when he was elected Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects 1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo
benefiting the youth in their barangay. G. De Guzman in his Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence
and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of the Philippine Bar and for Other
Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of Taguig;
Science and eventually pursuing Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school,
he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the Institute of Law of the 2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang
Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People's Village
Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang
Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa 11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Southeast People's Village Homeowners Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and President, General Parent-Teacher
Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City of Taguig; Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;

3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang 12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President,
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Taguig Lawyers League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;
Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang 13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 Judge, Regional Trail Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; andcralawlibrary
June 2007 of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower
Bicutan, City of Taguig; 14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former
Justice, Court of Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University
4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang (FEU).
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG
KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the
Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong same kindness and compassion in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future
sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had the occasion to
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) say:
Neighborhood Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. California and the Philippine Islands. Recently, he was charged in the Court of First
De Guzman as to Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found
Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8 June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First
Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices; Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven
months and eleven days of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was
6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
Truly Deserving of Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr.
Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest, Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne; xxx

7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken
Eastern University Law Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU); by the court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of
the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
Buong Suporta ng Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong
Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and
Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 solemnly pledged to exert all efforts to atone for his misdeeds.
July 2008 of the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);
There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.
9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the
Contributions of Danilo G. De Guzman to the People's Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer's Oath (Bar Matter 712),
- Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication and Commitment to the Call of Civic which may be applied in the instant case, the Court said:
and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the People's Law
Enforcement Board (PLEB); After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros
Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal
10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor profession with the following admonition:
of Danilo G. De Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor,
College of Law, San Sebastian College - Recoletos; In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr.
Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the
instant Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED. Petitioner's disbarment is now
death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash, temerarious and petitioner's five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to
uncalculating. resume practice of law.

xxx The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in

part.rbl rl l lbrr
Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo v. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative
Case No. 2984), the Court [in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the We deem petitioner worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to
practice of law stated: seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law, inclusive of the five (5) years he
has already served his disbarment.
The Court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to
the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders.2
his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that has elapsed in between While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also
the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has already served its
purpose.3
Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law
for five (5) years when he was disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of
that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not for the decision of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we have taken into account the remorse of the
the Court stripping off his license. disbarred lawyer4 and the conduct of his public life during his years outside of the
bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:
Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his
disbarment, as attested to overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave
people of known probity in the community and society. him the chance to purge himself of his misconduct, to show his remorse and
repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up once again to
Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer
his intense desire to render public service as evidenced by his active involvement of the court. During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date
and participation in several social and civic projects and activities. Likewise, even for his professional infraction, he has been persistent in reiterating his apologies and
during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts to show
circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian
in whatever means possible. This only proves petitioner's strength of character and activities and unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by
positive moral fiber. numerous civic and professional organizations, government institutions, public
officials and members of the judiciary.6
However, still, it is of no question that petitioner's act in copying the examination
questions from Atty. Balgos' computer without the latter's knowledge and consent, And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia,7 we noted:
and which questions later turned out to be the bar examinations questions in
Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia's disbarment, it also
do believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the
action ensued, still, he must be sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has endured the
the bar examinations as well as of this Court. ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for
reinstatement, the Court takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his
We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been attributed to him, and he has
reflected on his transgressions. Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now be commuted to punishment has lasted long enough. x x x
suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been
disbarred for more than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering
service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be allowed to resume practice the gravity of his transgressions. Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected
of law. focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with the People's Law
Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and Examinations that he took his pre-bar review course at the Philippine Law School
other esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals (PLS) when, as certified by Acting Registrar Rasalie G. Kapauan, PLS had not offered
Associate Justice Oscar Herrera, Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and such course since 1967.
Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas
testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the 13 April 2000 Resolution but his motion
2003. was denied.

Petitioner's subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope On 29 October 2001, retired Regional Trial Court Judge Amante P. Purisima, father of
that if he were to reacquire membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a petitioner, filed a Petition to Reopen Bar Matter 986. However, the Court in its
lawyer would redound to the general good and more than mitigate the stain on his Resolution of 27 November 2001 "noted without action" the said petition and further
record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to resolved "that no further pleadings will be entertained."cralaw virtua1aw library
him the following stern warning:
On 2 July 2002 petitioner filed a Motion for Due Process stating, among others, his
"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the reasons why in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar Examinations it was stated that he
laws. He is their sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and was enrolled in and regularly attending the pre-bar review course at the PLS and not
override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of at the University of Santo Tomas (UST) where he in fact took the said course as
society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to evidenced by the Certification dated 22 July 1999 of Dean Amado L. Damayuga of
the insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."8 the UST Faculty of Civil Law.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Petitioner claimed that the statement in paragraph 8 of his Petition that "he . . .
Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN enrolled in and passed the regular fourth year (law) review classes at the Phil. Law
from the practice of law is hereby COMMUTED to SEVEN (7) YEARS SUSPENSION School . . ." was a "self-evident clerical error and a mere result of an oversight which
FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004. is not tantamount to a deliberate and willful declaration of a falsehood."cralaw
virtua1aw library
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner explained that upon obtaining a "ready-made form" of the Petition and
affixing his signature on the space provided therefor, he requested his
EN BANC schoolmate/friend Ms. Lilian A. Felipe to fill up the form, have it notarized and then
to file it for him with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC). Being "consumed with his
[Bar Matter Nos. 979 and 986. December 10, 2002.] preparations for the upcoming bar examinations," petitioner admitted that he did
not have the opportunity to check the veracity of the information supplied by Ms.
RE: 1999 BAR EXAMINATIONS, MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA, Petitioner. Felipe. Had he done this he could have readily seen that Ms. Felipe had erroneously
typed "Philippine Law School," instead of UST, on the space provided for the school
RESOLUTION where petitioner attended his pre-bar review course.

Petitioner further averred that on 26 July 1999, a week after the filing of the Petition
BELLOSILLO, J.: to take the bar, he (thru Ms. Felipe) submitted the Certification of Completion of the
Pre-Bar Review as Annex "D" of his Petition to prove that he actually enrolled and
attended the pre-bar review course in UST.
Petitioner was conditionally admitted to take the 1999 Bar Examinations. Like many
others he was directed "to submit the required certification of completion of the pre- To corroborate his enrollment in UST, petitioner submitted (a) the Official Receipt of
bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of the examinations." his payment of tuition fee for the course; (b) his identification card for the course; (c)
chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary car pass to the UST campus; (d) individual affidavits of classmates in the pre-bar
review course in UST that petitioner was their classmate and that he attended the
Petitioner passed the 1999 Examinations. But in a Resolution dated 13 April 2000 review course; (e) separate affidavits of five (5) UST students/acquaintances of
the Court disqualified him from becoming a member of the Philippine Bar and petitioner that they saw him regularly attending the review lectures; (f) affidavit of
declared his examinations null and void on two (2) grounds: (a) Petitioner failed to Professor Abelardo T. Domondon attesting to the attendance of petitioner in his
submit the required certificate of completion of the pre-bar review course under oath review classes and lectures in Taxation and Bar Review Methods at the UST Faculty
for his conditional admission to the 1999 Bar Examinations; and (b) He committed a of Civil Law; (g) affidavit of Ms. Gloria L. Fernandez, maintenance staff at the UST
serious act of dishonesty which rendered him unfit to become a member of the Law Department that she knew petitioner very well as he was among those who
Philippine Bar when he made it appear in his Petition to Take the 1999 Bar would arrive early and request her to open the reading area and turn on the
airconditioning before classes started; and, (h) affidavit of Ms. Melicia Jane Parena, In his letter, petitioners father also pleaded that the three (3) years denial of his
office clerk at the UST Faculty Civil Law, that Dean Dimayuga issued the Certification sons request for oath-taking should be enough penalty, if there may be any wrong
dated 22 July 1999 to the effect that petitioner was officially enrolled in and had that his son may have unwittingly committed.
completed the pre-bar review course in UST which started on 14 April 1999 and
ended 24 September 1999. It is submitted that the same kindness and compassion extended to Mr. Gingoyon in
Bar Matter 890 be given to petitioner. Three years deprivation of the privilege to
Petitioner also explained that he did not submit the required certification of practice law may be considered an ample penalty, not to mention that petitioner has
completion of the pre-bar review course within sixty (60) days from the last day of not been convicted of any crime.
the examinations because he thought that it was already unnecessary in view of the
Certification of Completion (Annex "D" of his Petition) issued by Dean Dimayuga As regards petitioners failure to submit within sixty days the required certification of
which not only attested to his enrollment in UST but also his completion of the pre- completion of the pre-bar review course, his explanation that there was no need for
bar review course. him to submit another certification because the July 22, 1999 Certification of Dean
Dimayuga certified not only his enrollment but also his completion of the course, is
In a letter dated 17 September 2002, addressed to Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., impressed with truth.
thru Senior Associate Justice Josue N. Bellosillo, who took over as Chairman of the
1995 Committee on Bar Examinations, retired Judge Purisima expressed his concern Let it be also noted that, in the Resolution dated April 13, 2000, in this Bar Matter
for his son and stated that his son took the pre-bar review course in UST and that 986, the Court declared DISQUALIFIED from the 1999 Bar examinations not only
the entry in his sons Petition that he took it in PLS is a "self-evident clerical error." Purisima but also Josenio Marquez Reoma, Ma. Salvacion Sucgang Revilla and Victor
He then poised the question that if there was really a falsehood and forgery in Estell Tesorero for their failure to submit within sixty days from the last day of the
paragraph 8 and Annex "D" of the Petition, which would have been a fatal defect, examinations the certification of completion of the pre-bar review course. However,
why then was his son issued permit to take the 1999 Bar examinations? the Court, in its Resolution dated June 20, 2000, acting on the separate motions for
reconsideration of the Court Resolution dated April 13, 2000 filed by Reoma and
Pursuant to the Court Resolution of 1 October 2002, the OBC conducted a summary Revilla, both were allowed to take the Lawyers Oath.
hearing on 30 October 2002 during which the Bar Confidant asked clarificatory
questions from petitioner who appeared together with his father, retired Judge In the case of Reoma, his explanation that his failure to submit the required
Purisima, and Ms. Lilian Felipe.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary certification was due to his honest belief and assumption that the UP College of Law,
where he took his review course, had filed the required certification together with
On 7 November 2002 the OBC submitted its Report and Recommendation the other required documents, was accepted.
pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
In the case of Revilla, her claim that her failure to submit the required certification
"Considering petitioners explanation fortified by unquestionably genuine documents within the 60-day period was due to her erroneous impression that only the
in support thereof, we respectfully submit that petitioner should be given the benefit certification of enrollment and attendance was required, was likewise accepted.
of the doubt.
The Court also allowed Mr. Tesorero to take his oath, as he stated that his failure to
The Resolution of the Court dated April 2, 2002, in Bar Matter 890, may be cited. In submit within the 60-day period was due to his honest and mistaken belief that he
the said case, Victor Rey T. Gingoyon was given the benefit of the doubt and allowed had substantially complied with the requirements for admission to the Bar
to take the Lawyers Oath. Examinations because he thought that the required certificate of completion of the
pre-bar review course is the same as the certificate of enrollment and attendance in
In said case, Mr. Gingoyon stated in his Petition to take the 1998 Bar that the charge the said course.
of Grave Threats (Criminal Case No. 9693) against him was still pending before the
Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Mandaue City, Branch 3, when in fact, in the decision The OBS respectfully submits that petitioners explanation should also be given
of MTC dated April 8, 1998, he was already convicted. But the Court believed his credit just like his three co-examinees.
explanation that he had no actual knowledge of his conviction.
Let it be finally cited that in Bar Matter No. 832, in the Matter of Admission to the Bar
In allowing Mr. Gingoyon to take the Lawyers Oath, the Court stated, of Blas Antonio M. Tuliao, the Court also favorably considered the report of the
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library Committee on Legal Education which recommended the admission to the Bar of Mr.
Tuliao on grounds of fairness, equal treatment and protection, considering that his
It had been two (2) years past since he first filed the petition to take the lawyers co-accused in a criminal case have been allowed to take the lawyers oath. This
oath. Hopefully, this period of time of being deprived the privilege had been long Court stated, in its Resolution dated November 27, 2001, that there was no reason
enough for him to do some introspection. to accord a different treatment to Mr. Tuliao, and that the dispensation of justice
should be even-handed and consistent."cralaw virtua1aw library
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, as recommended by the Office of the Bar
The recommendation is well taken. Confidant in its Report and Recommendation dated 7 November 2002, the prayer in
Bar Matters Nos. 979 and 986 is granted and examinee MARK ANTHONY A. PURISIMA
The foremost question to be resolved is whether petitioner did enroll in and who passed the 1999 Bar Examinations is now allowed to take the Lawyers Oath
complete his pre-bar review course in UST as he herein avows.chanrob1es virtua1 and be admitted to the Philippine Bar. He is further allowed to sign the Roll of
1aw 1ibrary Attorneys upon payment of the required fees.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The testimony of petitioner and Ms. Felipe during the 30 October 2002 hearing that Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-
the subject Certification of Dean Dimayuga was duly submitted to the OBC a week Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., and Azcuna,
after the filing of the Petition to take the bar appears to be credible. It is supported JJ., concur.
by documentary evidence showing that petitioner actually enrolled and completed
the required course in UST. Panganiban, J., in the result.

Granting that the Certification of Dean Dimayuga was defective as it certified

completion of the pre-bar review course which was still on-going, this defect should EN BANC
not be attributed to petitioner considering that he had no participation in the
preparation thereof. Whatever it is, the fact remains that there is such a certification BAR MATTER No. 810. January 27, 1998
issued by the UST which appears to be genuine. This finding is backed by the
affidavit of Ms. Parena, office clerk at the UST Faculty of Civil Law, that she was the IN RE: PETITION TO TAKE THE LAWYERS OATH BY ARTHUR M. CUEVAS, JR.
one who released the Certification to petitioner on 26 July 1999.
RESOLUTION
Indeed, it must be stressed that there is nothing on record which impugns the
authenticity of the subject Certification as well as that of the other documentary FRANCISCO, J .:
evidence proffered by petitioner to establish that he was duly enrolled and took the
pre-bar review course in UST, not in PLS. As to the argument that the Certification of Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., recently passed the 1996 Bar Examinations.1 His
Dean Dimayuga did not include the "taking and completion" of the pre-bar review oath-taking was held in abeyance in view of the Courts resolution dated August 27,
course, the realities of our bar reviews render it difficult to record the attendance 1996 which permitted him to take the Bar Examinations subject to the condition that
religiously of the reviewees every single day for several months. should (he) pass the same, (he) shall not be allowed to take the lawyers oath
pending approval of the Court x x x due to his previous conviction for Reckless
Considering petitioners explanation, fortified by undisputedly genuine documents, Imprudence Resulting In Homicide. The conviction stemmed from petitioners
at the very least, petitioner should be given the benefit of the doubt and be allowed participation in the initiation rites of the LEX TALIONIS FRATERNITAS, a fraternity in
to take his oath. the SAN BEDA COLLEGE OF LAW, sometime in September 1991, where Raul I.
Camaligan, a neophyte, died as a result of the personal violence inflicted upon him.
The Court is well aware of instances in the past when, as a measure of compassion Thereafter, petitioner applied for and was granted probation. On May 16, 1995, he
and kindness, it has acted favorably on similar petitions. In his letter petitioners was discharged from probation and his case considered closed and terminated.
father pleaded that "the denial of permission for Mark to take his oath for about
three (3) years now should be enough penalty." It is time to move on. In this petition , received by the Court on May 5, 1997, petitioner prays that he be
allowed to take his lawyers oath at the Courts most convenient time2 attaching
At this juncture it may be well to note the Courts growing concern over the apparent thereto the Order dated May 16, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 10 of
laxity of law schools in the conduct of their pre-bar review classes. Specifically, it has Antique discharging him from his probation, and certifications attesting to his
been observed that the attendance of reviewees is not closely monitored, such that righteous, peaceful and law abiding character issued by: (a) the Mayor of the
some reviewees are able to comply with the requisite with minimal attendance. Municipality of Hamtic, Antique; (b) the Officer-in-Charge of Hamtic Police Station; (c)
Enrollment and completion of pre-bar review course is an additional requirement the Sangguniang Kabataan of Pob. III, Hamtic, through its chairman and officers; (d)
under Rule 138 of the Rules of Court for those who failed the bar examinations for a member of the IBP Iloilo Chapter; (e) the Parish Priest and Vicar General of St.
three (3) or more times. Joseph Cathedral, San Jose, Antique, and (f) the President of the Parish Pastoral
Council, Parish of Sta. Monica, Hamtic, Antique. On July 15, 1997, the Court, before
For the Court to insist on strict compliance may be literally asking for the moon but it acting on petitioners application, resolved to require Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan,
can be done. We just have to bear in mind that this requirement is not an empty or father of the deceased hazing victim Raul I. Camaligan, to comment thereon. In
idle ceremony; it is intended to ensure the quality and preparedness of those compliance with the Courts directive, Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan filed his comment
applying for admission to the bar. which states as follows:
1 He fully appreciates the benign concern given by this Hon. Court in allowing him to
comment to the pending petition of Arthur M. Cuevas to take the lawyers oath, and Petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr.s discharge from probation without any infraction of
hereby expresses his genuine gratitude to such gesture. the attendant conditions therefor and the various certifications attesting to his
righteous, peaceful and civic-oriented character prove that he has taken decisive
2 He conforms completely to the observation of the Hon. Court in its resolution steps to purge himself of his deficiency in moral character and atone for the
dated March 19, 1997 in Bar Matter No.712 that the infliction of severe physical unfortunate death of Raul I. Camaligan. The Court is prepared to give him the benefit
injuries which approximately led to the death of the unfortunate Raul Camaligan was of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of the youth to be rash,
deliberate (rather than merely accidental or inadvertent) thus, indicating serious temerarious and uncalculating.5 Let it be stressed to herein petitioner that the
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such injuries. This is consistent lawyers oath is not a mere formality recited for a few minutes in the glare of flashing
with his stand at the outset of the proceedings of the criminal case against the cameras and before the presence of select witnesses. Petitioner is exhorted to
petitioner and his co-defendants that they are liable not only for the crime of conduct himself beyond reproach at all times and to live strictly according to his
homicide but murder, since they took advantage of the neophytes helpless and oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. And, to paraphrase Mr. Justice
defenseless condition when they were beaten and kicked to death like a useless Padillas comment in the sister case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino To Take The Lawyers
stray dog, suggesting the presence of abuse of confidence, taking advantage of Oath, Bar Matter No. 712, March 19, 1997, [t]he Court sincerely hopes that Mr.
superior strength and treachery (People vs. Gagoco, 58 Phil. 524). Cuevas, Jr., will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his community. As
a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the
3 He, however, has consented to the accused-students plea of guilty to the lesser more unfortunate members of society.6crlwvirtualibrry
offense of reckless imprudence resulting to the homicide, including the petitioner,
out of pity to their mothers and a pregnant wife of the accused who went together at ACCORDINGLY, the Court hereby resolved to allow petitioner Arthur M. Cuevas, Jr., to
his house in Lucena City, literally kneeling, crying and begging for forgiveness for take the lawyers oath and to sign the Roll of Attorneys on a date to be set by the
their sons, on a Christmas day in 1991 and on Maundy Thursday in 1992, during Court, subject to the payment of appropriate fees. Let this resolution be attached to
which they reported that the father of one of the accused died of heart attack upon petitioners personal records in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
learning of his sons involvement in the case.
SO ORDERED.
4 As a Christian, he has forgiven the petitioner and his co-defendants in the criminal
case for the death of his son. But as a loving father, who lost a son in whom he has a Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
high hope to become a good lawyer to succeed him, he still feels the pain of his Mendoza, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.
untimely demise, and the stigma of the gruesome manner of taking his life. This he
cannot forget.
SECOND DIVISION
5 He is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner, since then has become
morally fit for admission to the noble profession of the law. He politely submits this [G.R. No. 121180. July 5, 1996.]
matter to the sound and judicious discretion of the Hon. Court. 3crlwvirtualibrry
GERARD A. MOSQUERA, Petitioner, v. HON. DELIA H. PANGANIBAN, in her capacity as
At the outset, the Court shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert D. Camaligan and Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 64, City of Makati, Metro Manila,
commiserates with the untimely death of his son. Nonetheless, Atty. Gilbert D. HON. FELICIDAD Y. NAVARRO-QUIAMBAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the
Camaligan admits that [h]e is not, right now, in a position to say whether petitioner Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 65, City of Makati, Metro Manila, and MARK F.
since then has become morally fit x x x and submits petitioners plea to be admitted JALANDONI, Respondents.
to the noble profession of law to the sound and judicious discretion of the Court.

The petition before the Court requires the balancing of the reasons for disallowing DECISION
petitioners admission to the noble profession of law. His deliberate participation in
the senseless beatings over a helpless neophyte which resulted to the latters
untimely demise indicates absence of that moral fitness required for admission to MENDOZA, J.:
the bar. And as the practice of law is a privilege extended only to the few who
possess the high standards of intellectual and moral qualifications the Court is duty
bound to prevent the entry of undeserving aspirants, as well as to exclude those This is a petition for review on certiorari of orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19,
who have been admitted but have become a disgrace to the profession. The Court, 1995 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (Branch 64) sustaining an order of the
nonetheless, is willing to give petitioner a chance in the same manner that it Metropolitan Trial Court (Branch 65) for the reinstatement of the information for less
recently allowed Al Caparros Argosino, petitioners co-accused below, to take the serious physical injuries against petitioner Gerard S. Mosquera, which the MeTC had
lawyers oath.4crlwvirtualibrry
previously allowed to be withdrawn by the prosecution. The reinstatement of the Considering the time limit given by the Court to said counsel in the order dated
case was made on motion of the offended party. August 15, 1994 within which it pursue the motion for reconsideration [of DOJ
Resolution No. 525, Series of 1994] and without said counsel having informed this
The prosecution in the MeTC arose out of a physical encounter between petitioner Court of the outcome of the same, 2 it can safely be concluded that private counsel
and private respondent Mark E. Jalandoni within the premises of the Ateneo Law had lost interest to further prosecute the case. Moreover, Atty. Valdez acting as
School on June 21, 1993. Petitioner is a graduate of the law school and a member of private counsel in the prosecution of the instant criminal case is under the direct
a fraternity in that school. On the other hand, private respondent was then a third- control and supervision of the Trial Fiscal, who by virtue of the Department of Justice
year student enrolled in the law school. There is considerable dispute how the fight resolution was impliedly ordered to desist from prosecuting the case for lack of
took place. Petitioners version was that he had gone to the law school and probable cause. In view thereof, the Court is of the opinion that the motion of the
happened to meet respondent Jalandoni. Because Jalandoni had a previous Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance, as it was premised on the
altercation with another member of petitioners fraternity, petitioner tried to talk to findings that the filing of the information in question has no legal basis.
Jalandoni, but the latter reacted belligerently and the two had a fight. On the other
hand, Jalandoni claimed that petitioner and members of petitioners fraternity simply On motion of private respondent, however, the MeTC reconsidered its order. In its
attacked him upon seeing him, for a remark which they claimed he (Jalandoni) had order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC said: 3
made, which caused a female student to cry. The female student was a friend of one
of the fraternity members. After carefully weighing the arguments of the parties in support of their respective
claims, the Court believes that the weight of the evidence and the jurisprudence on
Be that as it may, as a result of the scuffle, a criminal complaint for frustrated the matter which is now presented for resolution heavily leaned in favor of
homicide was filed by private respondent against petitioner and five others, namely, complainants contention. As held in the cases recently decided by the Hon.
Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronald B. Almeida, Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr., Walter S. Ong, Supreme Court, once a case is filed in Court, the latter acquires complete jurisdiction
and Jayme A. Sy, Jr., before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal. over the same without regard to technicalities and personal beliefs.

After the usual preliminary investigation, Second Assistant Provincial Prosecutor That while there is merit in the accused Gerard A. Mosqueras claim that the
Herminio T. Ubana, Sr. recommended the filing of an information for less serious institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the Fiscal who
physical injuries against petitioner, Gavino R. Meneses Jr., Ronald B. Almeida and may or may not file the complaint or information, when in his opinion the evidence is
Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr. and the dismissal of the charges against Walter S. Ong and insufficient to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the same
Jayme Sy, Jr. The recommendation was approved by Rizal Provincial Prosecutor is true only when the case is not in Court yet because after the case is already
Mauro M. Castro on January 10, 1994. forwarded, raffled and assigned to a particular branch the Public Prosecutor loses
control over the case.
Accordingly, an information for less serious physical injuries was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Metro Manila on January 17, 1994 against It required the parties to appear before it on January 20, 1995, at 9:00 A.M.
petitioner and Gavino R. Meneses, Jr., Ronaldo B. Almeida and Alfredo B. Lagamon, Jr.
The case, docketed as Criminal Case No. 147366, was assigned to Branch 65 of the Petitioner moved for reconsideration but his motion was denied. 4 In its order, dated
MeTC and tried in accordance with the Rule on Summary Procedure. The April 24, 1995, the MeTC also set the arraignment of petitioner and Meneses, Jr. on
arraignment was set on July 29, 1994, at 8:30 A.M., but petitioner filed a motion May 19, 1995.
before the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor for the reconsideration of the resolution
finding probable cause against him. As his motion was denied by the Provincial Petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the Regional Trial Court
Prosecutor, petitioner appealed to the Department of Justice which, on July 20, 1994, of Makati. The case, docketed as Special Civil Case No. 95-718, was assigned to
directed the Provincial Prosecutor to withdraw the information. Branch 65, presided over by respondent Judge Delia H. Panganiban.

Accordingly, Second Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin R. Bautista filed a motion to Initially the RTC issued a temporary restraining order but, on June 9, 1995, 5 it
withdraw the information in Criminal Case No. 147366. Private respondent in turn denied petitioners application for preliminary injunction. The RTC upheld the
moved for reconsideration of the resolution of the Department of Justice but his reinstatement of the information against petitioner and the other accused. With its
motion was denied. denial of injunction the RTC considered the petition for certiorari and prohibition as
having been rendered moot and academic. Petitioner filed a motion for
In its order dated October 13, 1994, 1 the MeTC, presided over by respondent Judge reconsideration which the RTC denied in its order of July 19, 1995.
Felicidad Y. Navarro-Quiambao, granted the motion of the prosecution and
considered the information against petitioner withdrawn. The MeTC stated in its Hence this petition for review on certiorari and for an order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
order:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library library
a. Reversing the Orders dated 09 June 1995 and 19 July 1995 (cf. Annexes "A"
and "B") issued by respondent Judge Panganiban; While it is true that the offended party, Silvino San Diego, through the private
prosecutor, filed a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary fifteen-day
b. Setting aside, as null and void, the Orders dated 29 December 1994 and 24 period, such move did not stop the running of the period for appeal [from the order
April 1995 (cf . Annexes "R" and "T") issued by respondent Judge Quiambao; of dismissal of the information]. He did not have the legal personality to appeal or
file the motion for reconsideration on his behalf. The prosecution in a criminal case
c. Making the preliminary injunction final; through the private prosecutor is under the direction and control of the Fiscal, and
only the motion for reconsideration or appeal filed by the Fiscal could have
d. Prohibiting respondent Judge Quiambao from trying and hearing Criminal interrupted the period for appeal.
Case No. 147366; and
The case of Cabral, however, differs materially from this case. In Cabral, the
e. Declaring the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 147366 as final and executory offended party had lost his right to intervene because prior to the filing of the
in accordance with the Order dated 13 October 1994 issued by respondent Judge criminal case, he had instituted a civil action arising from the same act subject of
Quiambao. the criminal case. On the other hand, in the case at bar, the right of private
respondent to intervene in the criminal prosecution is well nigh beyond question as
Petitioners contention is that, because the direction and control of criminal he had neither instituted a separate civil action nor reserved or waived the right to
prosecutions are vested in the public prosecutor, the motion for reconsideration of do so. 9
the order of October 13, 1994, which the private prosecutor filed without the
conformity by the public prosecutor, was a nullity and did not prevent the order of For the foregoing reasons, we hold that private respondent has the legal personality
dismissal from becoming final. Consequently, the MeTC gravely abused its discretion to file the motion for reconsideration in the trial court.
in afterward reinstating the information.
Beyond the personality of the private respondent to seek a reconsideration of the
Undoubtedly private respondent, as complainant, has an interest in the maintenance order of dismissal of the MeTC, the central issue in this case is whether in ordering
of the criminal prosecution. The right of offended parties to appeal an order of the the reinstatement of the information, the MeTC acted with grave abuse of discretion.
trial court which deprives them of due process has always been recognized, the only
limitation being that they cannot appeal any adverse ruling if to do so would place The MeTC invoked its authority under Crespo v. Mogul 10 to approve the withdrawal
the accused in double jeopardy. 6 We recently had occasion to reiterate this rule in of informations after they have been filed in court, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
Martinez v. Court of Appeals, 7 where, through the Chief Justice, we held:chanrob1es library
virtual 1aw library
[O]nce a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its
Under Section 2, Rule 122 of the 1988 Rules of Criminal Procedure, the right to dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion
appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party," of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution
except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his
opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with
In People v. Guido, [57 Phil. 52 (1932)] this Court ruled that the word "party" must be the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction
understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be
persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not
Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the
resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instruction of the Secretary of Justice
from the offense. The right of the offended party to file a special civil action of who reviewed the records of the investigation.
prohibition and certiorari from an [interlocutory] order rendered in a criminal case
was likewise recognized in the cases of Paredes v. Gopengco [29 SCRA 688 (1969)] Petitioner argues that by its order of October 13, 1994, the MeTC already exercised
and People v. Calo, Jr., [186 SCRA 620 (1990)] which held that "offended parties in its authority under the Mogul doctrine to grant or deny the public prosecutors
criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as "person(s) aggrieved" to motion to withdraw the information and was thereafter precluded from changing its
file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule mind in absence of a motion for reconsideration filed by the public prosecutor.
65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court in
order to promote their object. . . . This argument is untenable. The court could have denied the public prosecutors
motion for the withdrawal of the information against petitioner, and there would
Petitioner cites the following statement in Cabral v. Puno 8 in support of his have been no question of its power to do so. If it could do that, so could it reconsider
contention that private respondent has no personality to file the motion in what it had ordered. Every court has the power and indeed the duty to review and
question:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library amend or reverse its findings and conclusions when its attention is timely called to
any error or defect therein. 11 In this case, the motion for reconsideration was timely RESOLVE the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the information in Criminal
filed by the private prosecutor who, as already discussed, has the legal personality Case No. 147366, stating in its order clearly the reason or reasons for its resolution,
to do so. after due consideration of the evidence of the parties.

Indeed, the MeTC must have realized that it had surrendered its exclusive SO ORDERED.
prerogative regarding the withdrawal of informations by accepting public
prosecutors say-so that the prosecution had no basis to prosecute petitioner. 12 Its Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
order of October 13, 1994 was based mainly on its notion that "the motion of the
Trial Fiscal should be accorded weight and significance as it was premised on the
findings [of the Department of Justice] that the filing of the information in question SPECIAL SECOND DIVISION
has no legal basis."cralaw virtua1aw library
G.R. No. 151258, December 01, 2014
This certainly was not the exercise of discretion. As we said in Martinez, "whether to
approve or disapprove the stand taken by the prosecution is not the exercise of ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
discretion required in cases like this [under the Mogul ruling] . . . What was
imperatively required was the trial judges own assessment of such evidence, it not G.R. No. 154954
being sufficient for the valid and proper exercise of judicial discretion merely to
accept the prosecutions word for its supposed insufficiency." 13 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO
Unfortunately, just as in allowing the withdrawal of the information by the public JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON, ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III,
prosecutor, the MeTC did not make an independent evaluation of the evidence, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI,
neither did it do so in granting the private prosecutors motion for reconsideration. In VICENTE VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE PURISIMA II,
its order dated December 29, 1994, the MeTC simply stated that it was reinstating EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO SANTOS, JONAS KARL B.
the case against petitioner because" [a]fter carefully weighing the arguments of the PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS, JOSEPH LLEDO, AND RONAN DE GUZMAN,
parties in support of their respective claims, the Court believes that the weight of Respondents.
the evidence and the jurisprudence on the matter which is now presented for
resolution heavily leaned in favor of complainants contention" and that after a case G.R. No. 155101
has already been "forwarded, raffled, and assigned to a particular branch, the Public
Prosecutor loses control over the case." The order contains no evaluation of the FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
parties evidence for the purpose of determining whether there was probable cause
to proceed against petitioner. The statement that the "weight of evidence . . . lean[s] G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
heavily in favor of complainants [Jalandonis] contention" is nothing but the
statement of a conclusion. GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, v. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II, MARCUS JOEL
CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., AND ANSELMO ADRIANO,
Nor could the MeTC rest its judgment solely on its authority under the Mogul Respondents.
doctrine to have the last word on whether an information should be withdrawn. The
question in this case is not so much whether the MeTC has the authority to grant or RESOLUTION
not to grant the public prosecutors motion to withdraw the information it does
but whether in the exercise of that discretion or authority it acted justly and fairly. In SERENO, C.J.:
this case, the MeTC did not have good reason stated in its order for the
reinstatement of the information against petitioner; just as it did not have good We are asked to revisit our Decision in the case involving the death of Leonardo
reason for granting the withdrawal of the information. Lenny Villa due to fraternity hazing. While there is nothing new in the arguments
raised by the parties in their respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration,
The matter should therefore be remanded to the MeTC so that it can make an we find a few remaining matters needing to be clarified and resolved. Some of
independent evaluation of the evidence of the prosecution and on that basis decide these matters include the effect of our Decision on the finality of the Court of
whether to grant or not to grant the withdrawal of the information against petitioner. Appeals judgments insofar as respondents Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda), Junel
Anthony D. Ama (Ama), Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug), and Vincent Tecson (Tecson) are
WHEREFORE, the orders dated June 9, 1995 and July 19, 1995 of the Regional Trial concerned; the question of who are eligible to seek probation; and the issue of the
Court are REVERSED and the orders of October 13, 1994 and December 29, 1994 of validity of the probation proceedings and the concomitant orders of a court that
the Metropolitan Trial Court of Makati, Branch 65 are SET ASIDE and the Metropolitan allegedly had no jurisdiction over the case.
Trial Court of Makati is ORDERED within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision to
Before the Court are the respective Motions for Reconsideration or Clarification filed
by petitioners People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General To refresh our memories, we quote the factual antecedents surrounding the present
(OSG), and Gerarda H. Villa (Villa); and by respondents Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and case:6chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Tecson (collectively, Tecson et al.) concerning the Decision of this Court dated 1
February 2012.1 The Court modified the assailed judgments2 of the Court of Appeals In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 15520 and found respondents Fidelito Dizon (Dizon), Almeda, School of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila
Ama, Bantug, and Tecson guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of reckless Fraternity). They were Caesar Bogs Asuncion, Samuel Sam Belleza, Bienvenido
imprudence resulting in homicide. The modification had the effect of lowering the Bien Marquez III, Roberto Francis Bert Navera, Geronimo Randy Recinto, Felix
criminal liability of Dizon from the crime of homicide, while aggravating the verdict Sy, Jr., and Leonardo Lenny Villa (neophytes).
against Tecson et al. from slight physical injuries. The CA Decision itself had modified
the Decision of the Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 121 finding all of On the night of 8 February 1991, the neophytes were met by some members of the
the accused therein guilty of the crime of homicide.3chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Aquila Fraternity (Aquilans) at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They all
proceeded to Rufos Restaurant to have dinner. Afterwards, they went to the house
Also, we upheld another CA Decision4 in a separate but related case docketed as of Michael Musngi, also an Aquilan, who briefed the neophytes on what to expect
CA-G.R. S.P. Nos. 89060 & 90153 and ruled that the CA did not commit grave abuse during the initiation rites. The latter were informed that there would be physical
of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Manuel Escalona II beatings, and that they could quit at any time. Their initiation rites were scheduled
(Escalona), Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos), Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca), and Anselmo to last for three days. After their briefing, they were brought to the Almeda
Adriano (Adriano) on the ground that their right to speedy trial was violated. Compound in Caloocan City for the commencement of their initiation.
Reproduced below is the dispositive portion of our
Decision:5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Even before the neophytes got off the van, they had already received threats and
insults from the Aquilans. As soon as the neophytes alighted from the van and
WHEREFORE, the appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 155101 finding petitioner Fidelito walked towards the pelota court of the Almeda compound, some of the Aquilans
Dizon guilty of homicide is hereby MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. The appealed delivered physical blows to them. The neophytes were then subjected to traditional
Judgment in G.R. No. 154954 finding Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, forms of Aquilan initiation rites. These rites included the Indian Run, which
Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson guilty of the crime of slight physical injuries required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of Aquilans, each row
is also MODIFIED and SET ASIDE IN PART. Instead, Fidelito Dizon, Antonio Mariano delivering blows to the neophytes; the Bicol Express, which obliged the neophytes
Almeda, Junel Anthony Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are found GUILTY to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched while
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide defined and the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the Rounds, in which the
penalized under Article 365 in relation to Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. They neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the auxiliaries (the Aquilans
are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months and charged with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites),
one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of while the latter were being hit with fist blows on their arms or with knee blows on
prison correccional as maximum. In addition, accused are ORDERED jointly and their thighs by two Aquilans; and the Auxies Privilege Round, in which the
severally to pay the heirs of Lenny Villa civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of auxiliaries were given the opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes.
P50,000, and moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000, plus legal interest on all During this time, the neophytes were also indoctrinated with the fraternity
damages awarded at the rate of 12% from the date of the finality of this Decision principles. They survived their first day of initiation.
until satisfaction. Costs de oficio.
On the morning of their second day 9 February 1991 the neophytes were made to
The appealed Judgment in G.R. No. 154954, acquitting Victorino et al., is hereby present comic plays and to play rough basketball. They were also required to
AFFIRMED. The appealed Judgments in G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080, dismissing the memorize and recite the Aquila Fraternitys principles. Whenever they would give a
criminal case filed against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano, are likewise wrong answer, they would be hit on their arms or legs. Late in the afternoon, the
AFFIRMED. Finally, pursuant to Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the Petition Aquilans revived the initiation rites proper and proceeded to torment them physically
in G.R. No. 151258 is hereby dismissed, and the criminal case against Artemio and psychologically. The neophytes were subjected to the same manner of hazing
Villareal deemed CLOSED and TERMINATED. that they endured on the first day of initiation. After a few hours, the initiation for
the day officially ended.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives for possible consideration of the amendment of the After a while, accused non-resident or alumni fraternity members Fidelito Dizon
Anti-Hazing Law to include the fact of intoxication and the presence of non-resident (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal) demanded that the rites be reopened. The
or alumni fraternity members during hazing as aggravating circumstances that head of initiation rites, Nelson Victorino (Victorino), initially refused. Upon the
would increase the applicable penalties. insistence of Dizon and Villareal, however, he reopened the initiation rites. The
fraternity members, including Dizon and Villareal, then subjected the neophytes to
SO ORDERED. paddling and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle
blows, one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The Florentino Ampil (Ampil)
neophytes heard him complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After Enrico de Vera III (De Vera)
their last session of physical beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be Stanley Fernandez (S. Fernandez)
carried by the auxiliaries to the carport. Again, the initiation for the day was officially Noel Cabangon (Cabangon)
ended, and the neophytes started eating dinner. They then slept at the carport.
Twenty-six of the accused Aquilans in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) were jointly
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lennys shivering tried. On the other hand, the trial against the remaining nine accused in Criminal
and incoherent mumblings. Initially, Villareal and Dizon dismissed these rumblings, Case No. C-38340 was held in abeyance due to certain matters that had to be
as they thought he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was resolved first.
really feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him. They removed his
clothes and helped him through a sleeping bag to keep him warm. When his
condition worsened, the Aquilans rushed him to the hospital. Lenny was pronounced On 8 November 1993, the trial court rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. C-
dead on arrival. 38340(91), holding the 26 accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
homicide, penalized with reclusion temporal under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against the following 35 Code. A few weeks after the trial court rendered its judgment, or on 29 November
Aquilans: 1993, Criminal Case No. C-38340 against the remaining nine accused commenced
anew.
In Criminal Case No. C-38340(91)
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) On 10 January 2002, the CA in (CA-G.R. No. 15520) set aside the finding of
Artemio Villareal (Villareal) conspiracy by the trial court in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) and modified the
Efren de Leon (De Leon) criminal liability of each of the accused according to individual participation. Accused
Vincent Tecson (Tecson) De Leon had by then passed away, so the following Decision applied only to the
Junel Anthony Ama (Ama) remaining 25 accused, viz:
Antonio Mariano Almeda (Almeda)
Renato Bantug, Jr. (Bantug) Nineteen of the accused-appellants Victorino, Sabban, Lledo, Guerrero, Musngi,
Nelson Victorino (Victorino) Perez, De Guzman, Santos, General, Flores, Lim, Montecillo, Ranada, Mendoza,
Eulogio Sabban (Sabban) Verdadero, Purisima, Fernandez, Abas, and Brigola (Victorino et al.) were acquitted,
Joseph Lledo (Lledo) as their individual guilt was not established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Etienne Guerrero (Guerrero)
Michael Musngi (Musngi) Four of the accused-appellants Vincent Tecson, Junel Anthony Ama, Antonio
Jonas Karl Perez (Perez) Mariano Almeda, and Renato Bantug, Jr. (Tecson et al.) were found guilty of the
Paul Angelo Santos (Santos) crime of slight physical injuries and sentenced to 20 days of arresto menor. They
Ronan de Guzman (De Guzman) were also ordered to jointly pay the heirs of the victim the sum of P30,000 as
Antonio General (General) indemnity.
Jaime Maria Flores II (Flores)
Dalmacio Lim, Jr. (Lim) Two of the accused-appellants Fidelito Dizon and Artemio Villareal were found
Ernesto Jose Montecillo (Montecillo) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide under Article 249 of the
Santiago Ranada III (Ranada) Revised Penal Code. Having found no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the
Zosimo Mendoza (Mendoza) CA sentenced them to an indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor to 17
Vicente Verdadero (Verdadero) years of reclusion temporal. They were also ordered to indemnify, jointly and
Amante Purisima II (Purisima) severally, the heirs of Lenny Villa in the sum of P50,000 and to pay the additional
Jude Fernandez (J. Fernandez) amount of P1,000,000 by way of moral damages.
Adel Abas (Abas)
Percival Brigola (Brigola) On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge
against accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial.
In Criminal Case No. C-38340 Meanwhile, on different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court
Manuel Escalona II (Escalona) denied the respective Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
Crisanto Saruca, Jr. (Saruca) Adriano. On 25 October 2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed
Anselmo Adriano (Adriano) the trial courts Orders and dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos,
Marcus Joel Ramos (Ramos) Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of violation of their right to speedy trial.
Reynaldo Concepcion (Concepcion)
From the aforementioned Decisions, the five (5) consolidated Petitions were effect of our Decision insofar as their criminal liability and service of sentence are
individually brought before this Court. (Citations omitted) concerned. According to respondents, they immediately applied for probation after
the CA rendered its Decision (CA-G.R. No. 15520) lowering their criminal liability
Motion for Partial Reconsideration from the crime of homicide, which carries a non-probationable sentence, to slight
filed by Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa physical injuries, which carries a probationable sentence. Tecson et al. contend that,
as a result, they have already been discharged from their criminal liability and the
Petitioner Villa filed the present Motion for Partial Reconsideration7 in connection cases against them closed and terminated. This outcome was supposedly by virtue
with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 (Villa v. Escalona) asserting that the CA committed of their Applications for Probation on various dates in January 200211 pursuant to
grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended, otherwise known as the Probation Law.
Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano (collectively, Escalona et al.) in its assailed Decision and They argue that Branch 130 of Caloocan City Regional Trial Court (RTC) had already
Resolution.8 Villa reiterates her previous arguments that the right to speedy trial of granted their respective Applications for Probation on 11 October 200212 and, upon
the accused was not violated, since they had failed to assert that right within a their completion of the terms and conditions thereof, discharged them from
reasonable period of time. She stresses that, unlike their co-accused Reynaldo probation and declared the criminal case against them terminated on various dates
Concepcion, respondents Escalona et al. did not timely invoke their right to speedy in April 2003.13chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
trial during the time that the original records and pieces of evidence were
unavailable. She again emphasizes that the prosecution cannot be faulted entirely To support their claims, respondents attached14 certified true copies of their
for the lapse of 12 years from the arraignment until the initial trial, as there were a respective Applications for Probation and the RTC Orders granting these applications,
number of incidents attributable to the accused themselves that caused the delay of discharging them from probation, and declaring the criminal case against them
the proceedings. She then insists that we apply the balancing test in determining terminated. Thus, they maintain that the Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 had already
whether the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. lapsed into finality, insofar as they were concerned, when they waived their right to
appeal and applied for probation.cralawred
Motion for Reconsideration filed
by the OSG ISSUES

The OSG, in its Motion for Reconsideration9 of G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
and 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals), agrees with the findings of this Court that jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and
accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither the felonious intent to kill (animus Adriano for violation of their right to speedy trial
interficendi) nor the felonious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) Lenny Villa. In fact,
it concedes that the mode in which the accused committed the crime was through Whether the penalty imposed on Tecson et al. should have corresponded to that for
fault (culpa). However, it contends that the penalty imposed should have been intentional felonies
equivalent to that for deceit (dolo) pursuant to Article 249 (Homicide) of the Revised
Penal Code. It argues that the nature and gravity of the imprudence or negligence Whether the completion by Tecson et al. of the terms and conditions of their
attributable to the accused was so gross that it shattered the fine distinction probation discharged them from their criminal liability, and closed and terminated
between dolo and culpa by considering the act as one committed with malicious the cases against them
intent. It maintains that the accused conducted the initiation rites in such a
malevolent and merciless manner that it clearly endangered the lives of the initiates DISCUSSION
and was thus equivalent to malice aforethought.
Findings on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration
With respect to the 19 other accused, or Victorino et al., the OSG asserts that their of Petitioner Gerarda H. Villa
acquittal may also be reversed despite the rule on double jeopardy, as the CA also
committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its assailed Decision (CA-G.R. No. As regards the first issue, we take note that the factual circumstances and legal
15520). The OSG insists that Victorino et al. should have been similarly convicted assertions raised by petitioner Villa in her Motion for Partial Reconsideration
like their other co-accused Dizon, Almeda, Ama, Bantug, and Tecson, since the concerning G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 have already been thoroughly considered
former also participated in the hazing of Lenny Villa, and their actions contributed to and passed upon in our deliberations, which led to our Decision dated 1 February
his death. 2012. We emphasize that in light of the finding of violation of the right of Escalona et
al. to speedy trial, the CAs dismissal of the criminal case against them amounted to
Motions for Clarification or an acquittal,15 and that any appeal or reconsideration thereof would result in a
Reconsideration of Tecson et al. violation of their right against double jeopardy.16 Though we have recognized that
the acquittal of the accused may be challenged where there has been a grave abuse
Respondents Tecson et al.,10 filed their respective motions pertaining to G.R. No. of discretion,17certiorari would lie if it is convincingly established that the CAs
154954 (People v. Court of Appeals). They essentially seek a clarification as to the Decision dismissing the case was attended by a whimsical or capricious exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. It must be shown that the assailed
judgment constitutes a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an Simple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly
to act in contemplation of law; an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manifest. (Emphases supplied)
manner by reason of passion and hostility; or a blatant abuse of authority to a point
so grave and so severe as to deprive the court of its very power to dispense On the other hand, intentional felonies concern those wrongs in which a deliberate
justice.18 Thus, grave abuse of discretion cannot be attributed to a court simply malicious intent to do an unlawful act is present. Below is our exhaustive discussion
because it allegedly misappreciated the facts and the on the matter:20chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
evidence.19chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Our Revised Penal Code belongs to the classical school of thought. x x x The identity
We have taken a second look at the court records, the CA Decision, and petitioners of mens rea defined as a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal
arguments and found no basis to rule that the CA gravely abused its discretion in intent is the predominant consideration. Thus, it is not enough to do what the law
concluding that the right to speedy trial of the accused was violated. Its findings prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
were sufficiently supported by the records of the case and grounded in law. Thus, we committed by means of dolo or malice.
deny the motion of petitioner Villa with finality.
The term dolo or malice is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom,
Ruling on the Motion for Reconsideration intelligence, and intent. x x x x The element of intent on which this Court shall
filed by the OSG focus is described as the state of mind accompanying an act, especially a
forbidden act. It refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a
We likewise deny with finality the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the OSG with person proceeds. It does not refer to mere will, for the latter pertains to the act,
respect to G.R. Nos. 155101 (Dizon v. People) and 154954 (People v. Court of while intent concerns the result of the act. While motive is the moving power that
Appeals). Many of the arguments raised therein are essentially a mere rehash of the impels one to action for a definite result, intent is the purpose of using a particular
earlier grounds alleged in its original Petition for Certiorari. means to produce the result. On the other hand, the term felonious means, inter
alia, malicious, villainous, and/or proceeding from an evil heart or purpose. With
Furthermore, we cannot subscribe to the OSGs theory that even if the act these elements taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must
complained of was born of imprudence or negligence, malicious intent can still be refer to malicious intent, which is a vicious and malevolent state of mind
appreciated on account of the gravity of the actions of the accused. We emphasize accompanying a forbidden act. Stated otherwise, intentional felony requires the
that the finding of a felony committed by means of culpa is legally inconsistent with existence of dolus malus that the act or omission be done willfully, maliciously,
that committed by means of dolo. Culpable felonies involve those wrongs done as a with deliberate evil intent, and with malice aforethought. The maxim is actus
result of an act performed without malice or criminal design. The Revised Penal Code non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea a crime is not committed if the mind of the person
expresses thusly:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary performing the act complained of is innocent. As is required of the other elements of
a felony, the existence of malicious intent must be proven beyond reasonable doubt.
ARTICLE 365. Imprudence and Negligence. Any person who, by reckless
imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a xxxx
grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to
prisin correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave The presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is thus a vital
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be ingredient in establishing the commission of the intentional felony of homicide.
imposed. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo
immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill or
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which animus interficendi cannot and should not be inferred, unless there is proof beyond
would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor reasonable doubt of such intent. Furthermore, the victims death must not have
in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious been the product of accident, natural cause, or suicide. If death resulted from an act
felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. executed without malice or criminal intent but with lack of foresight, carelessness,
or negligence the act must be qualified as reckless or simple negligence or
xxxx imprudence resulting in homicide.

Reckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or falling to do xxxx
an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of
precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking In order to be found guilty of any of the felonious acts under Articles 262 to 266 of
into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical the Revised Penal Code, the employment of physical injuries must be coupled with
condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. dolus malus. As an act that is mala in se, the existence of malicious intent is
fundamental, since injury arises from the mental state of the wrongdoer iniuria ex We thus reiterate that the law requires proof beyond reasonable doubt of the
affectu facientis consistat. If there is no criminal intent, the accused cannot be found existence of malicious intent or dolus malus before an accused can be adjudged
guilty of an intentional felony. Thus, in case of physical injuries under the Revised liable for committing an intentional felony.
Penal Code, there must be a specific animus iniuriandi or malicious intention to do
wrong against the physical integrity or well-being of a person, so as to incapacitate Since the accused were found to have committed a felony by means of culpa, we
and deprive the victim of certain bodily functions. Without proof beyond reasonable cannot agree with the argument of the OSG. It contends that the imposable penalty
doubt of the required animus iniuriandi, the overt act of inflicting physical injuries for intentional felony can also be applied to the present case on the ground that the
per se merely satisfies the elements of freedom and intelligence in an intentional nature of the imprudence or negligence of the accused was so gross that the felony
felony. The commission of the act does not, in itself, make a man guilty unless his already amounted to malice. The Revised Penal Code has carefully delineated the
intentions are. imposable penalties as regards felonies committed by means of culpa on the one
hand and felonies committed by means of dolo on the other in the context of the
Thus, we have ruled in a number of instances that the mere infliction of physical distinctions it has drawn between them. The penalties provided in Article 365
injuries, absent malicious intent, does not make a person automatically liable for an (Imprudence and Negligence) are mandatorily applied if the death of a person
intentional felony. x x x. occurs as a result of the imprudence or negligence of another. Alternatively, the
penalties outlined in Articles 246 to 261 (Destruction of Life) are automatically
xxxx invoked if the death was a result of the commission of a forbidden act accompanied
by a malicious intent. These imposable penalties are statutory, mandatory, and not
The absence of malicious intent does not automatically mean, however, that the subject to the discretion of the court. We have already resolved and the OSG
accused fraternity members are ultimately devoid of criminal liability. The Revised agrees that the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. had neither animus interficendi
Penal Code also punishes felonies that are committed by means of fault (culpa). nor animus iniuriandi in inflicting physical pain on Lenny Villa. Hence, we rule that
According to Article 3 thereof, there is fault when the wrongful act results from the imposable penalty is what is applicable to the crime of reckless imprudence
imprudence, negligence, lack of foresight, or lack of skill. resulting in homicide as defined and penalized under Article 365 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Reckless imprudence or negligence consists of a voluntary act done without malice,
from which an immediate personal harm, injury or material damage results by Ruling on the Motions for Clarification or
reason of an inexcusable lack of precaution or advertence on the part of the person Reconsideration filed by Tecson et al.
committing it. In this case, the danger is visible and consciously appreciated by the
actor. In contrast, simple imprudence or negligence comprises an act done without We clarify, however, the effect of our Decision in light of the motions of respondents
grave fault, from which an injury or material damage ensues by reason of a mere Tecson et al. vis--vis G.R. No. 154954 (People v. Court of Appeals).
lack of foresight or skill. Here, the threatened harm is not immediate, and the
danger is not openly visible. The finality of a CA decision will not bar
the state from seeking the annulment of
The test for determining whether or not a person is negligent in doing an act is as the judgment via a Rule 65 petition.
follows: Would a prudent man in the position of the person to whom negligence is
attributed foresee harm to the person injured as a reasonable consequence of the In their separate motions,21 respondents insist that the previous verdict of the CA
course about to be pursued? If so, the law imposes on the doer the duty to take finding them guilty of slight physical injuries has already lapsed into finality as a
precaution against the mischievous results of the act. Failure to do so constitutes result of their respective availments of the probation program and their ultimate
negligence. discharge therefrom. Hence, they argue that they can no longer be convicted of the
heavier offense of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.22 Respondents allude
As we held in Gaid v. People, for a person to avoid being charged with recklessness, to our Decision in Tan v. People23 to support their contention that the CA judgment
the degree of precaution and diligence required varies with the degree of the danger can no longer be reversed or annulled even by this Court.
involved. If, on account of a certain line of conduct, the danger of causing harm to
another person is great, the individual who chooses to follow that particular course The OSG counters24 that the CA judgment could not have attained finality, as the
of conduct is bound to be very careful, in order to prevent or avoid damage or injury. former had timely filed with this Court a petition for certiorari. It argues that a Rule
In contrast, if the danger is minor, not much care is required. It is thus possible that 65 petition is analogous to an appeal, or a motion for new trial or reconsideration, in
there are countless degrees of precaution or diligence that may be required of an that a petition for certiorari also prevents the case from becoming final and
individual, from a transitory glance of care to the most vigilant effort. The duty of executory until after the matter is ultimately resolved.
the person to employ more or less degree of care will depend upon the
circumstances of each particular case. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted) Indeed, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court speaks of the finality of a criminal judgment
once the accused applies for probation, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SECTION 7. Modification of judgment. A judgment of conviction may, upon motion correctness. Under the exceptional nature of a Rule 65 petition, the burden a very
of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is heavy one is on the shoulders of the party asking for the review to show the
perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final presence of a whimsical or capricious exercise of judgment equivalent to lack of
after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has jurisdiction; or of a patent and gross abuse of discretion amounting to an evasion of
been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law or to act in
writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. (7a) (Emphases supplied) contemplation of law; or to an exercise of power in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. (Emphases supplied, citations omitted)
Coupled with Section 7 of Rule 11725 and Section 1 of Rule 122,26 it can be culled
from the foregoing provisions that only the accused may appeal the criminal aspect While this Courts Decision in Tan may have created an impression of the
of a criminal case, especially if the relief being sought is the correction or review of unassailability of a criminal judgment as soon as the accused applies for probation,
the judgment therein. This rule was instituted in order to give life to the we point out that what the state filed therein was a mere motion for the modification
constitutional edict27 against putting a person twice in jeopardy of punishment for of the penalty, and not a Rule 65 petition. A petition for certiorari is a special civil
the same offense. It is beyond contention that the accused would be exposed to action that is distinct and separate from the main case. While in the main case, the
double jeopardy if the state appeals the criminal judgment in order to reverse an core issue is whether the accused is innocent or guilty of the crime charged, the
acquittal or even to increase criminal liability. Thus, the accuseds waiver of the right crux of a Rule 65 petition is whether the court acted (a) without or in excess of its
to appeal as when applying for probation makes the criminal judgment jurisdiction; or (b) with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
immediately final and executory. Our explanation in People v. Nazareno is worth jurisdiction. Hence, strictly speaking, there is no modification of judgment in a
reiterating:28chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary petition for certiorari, whose resolution does not call for a re-evaluation of the merits
of the case in order to determine the ultimate criminal responsibility of the accused.
Further prosecution via an appeal from a judgment of acquittal is likewise barred In a Rule 65 petition, any resulting annulment of a criminal judgment is but a
because the government has already been afforded a complete opportunity to prove consequence of the finding of lack of jurisdiction.
the criminal defendants culpability; after failing to persuade the court to enter a
final judgment of conviction, the underlying reasons supporting the constitutional In view thereof, we find that the proper interpretation of Section 7 of Rule 120 must
ban on multiple trials applies and becomes compelling. The reason is not only the be that it is inapplicable and irrelevant where the courts jurisdiction is being
defendants already established innocence at the first trial where he had been assailed through a Rule 65 petition. Section 7 of Rule 120 bars the modification of a
placed in peril of conviction, but also the same untoward and prejudicial criminal judgment only if the appeal brought before the court is in the nature of a
consequences of a second trial initiated by a government who has at its disposal all regular appeal under Rule 41, or an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, and if that
the powers and resources of the State. Unfairness and prejudice would necessarily appeal would put the accused in double jeopardy. As it is, we find no irregularity in
result, as the government would then be allowed another opportunity to persuade a the partial annulment of the CA Decision in CA-G.R. No. 15520 in spite of its finality,
second trier of the defendants guilt while strengthening any weaknesses that had as the judgment therein was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
attended the first trial, all in a process where the governments power and resources or excess of jurisdiction.
are once again employed against the defendants individual means. That the second
opportunity comes via an appeal does not make the effects any less prejudicial by The orders of Caloocan City RTC
the standards of reason, justice and conscience. (Emphases supplied, citations Branch 130 have no legal effect, as
omitted) they were issued without jurisdiction.

It must be clarified, however, that the finality of judgment evinced in Section 7 of First, Tecson et al. filed their Applications for Probation with the wrong court. Part
Rule 120 does not confer blanket invincibility on criminal judgments. We have and parcel of our criminal justice system is the authority or jurisdiction of the court
already explained in our Decision that the rule on double jeopardy is not absolute, to adjudicate and decide the case before it. Jurisdiction refers to the power and
and that this rule is inapplicable to cases in which the state assails the very capacity of the tribunal to hear, try, and decide a particular case or matter before
jurisdiction of the court that issued the criminal judgment.29 The reasoning behind it.31 That power and capacity includes the competence to pronounce a judgment,
the exception is articulated in Nazareno, from which we impose a punishment,32 and enforce or suspend33 the execution of a sentence in
quote:30chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary accordance with law.

In such instance, however, no review of facts and law on the merits, in the manner The OSG questions34 the entire proceedings involving the probation applications of
done in an appeal, actually takes place; the focus of the review is on whether the Tecson et al. before Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. Allegedly, the trial court did not
judgment is per se void on jurisdictional grounds, i.e., whether the verdict was have competence to take cognizance of the applications, considering that it was not
rendered by a court that had no jurisdiction; or where the court has appropriate the court of origin of the criminal case. The OSG points out that the trial court that
jurisdiction, whether it acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or originally rendered the Decision in Criminal Case No. C-38340(91) was Branch 121 of
excess of jurisdiction. In other words, the review is on the question of whether there the Caloocan City RTC.
has been a validly rendered decision, not on the question of the decisions error or
The pertinent provision of the Probation Law is hereby quoted for the accused of the offense charged becomes final under any of the following
reference:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary conditions among others:42 after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal;
when the accused waives the right to appeal; upon the grant of a withdrawal of an
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court appeal; when the sentence has already been partially or totally satisfied or served;
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application or when the accused applies for probation. When the decision attains finality, the
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution judgment or final order is entered in the book of entries of judgments.43 If the case
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such was previously appealed to the CA, a certified true copy of the judgment or final
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for order must be attached to the original record, which shall then be remanded to the
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal clerk of the court from which the appeal was taken.44 The court of origin then
from the judgment of conviction. x x x x (Emphases supplied) reacquires jurisdiction over the case for appropriate action. It is during this time that
the court of origin may settle the matter of the execution of penalty or the
It is obvious from the foregoing provision that the law requires that an application for suspension of the execution thereof,45 including the convicts applications for
probation be filed with the trial court that convicted and sentenced the defendant, probation.46chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
meaning the court of origin. Here, the trial court that originally convicted and
sentenced Tecson et al. of the crime of homicide was Branch 121 not Branch 130 A perusal of the case records reveals that the CA had not yet relinquished its
of the Caloocan City RTC.35 Neither the judge of Branch 130 in his Orders nor Tecson jurisdiction over the case when Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 took cognizance of
et al. in their pleadings have presented any explanation or shown any special the Applications for Probation of Tecson et al. It shows that the accused filed their
authority that would clarify why the Applications for Probation had not been filed respective applications47 while a motion for reconsideration was still pending before
with or taken cognizance of by Caloocan City RTC Branch 121. While we take note the CA48 and the records were still with that court.49 The CA settled the motion only
that in a previous case, the CA issued a Decision ordering the inhibition of Branch upon issuing the Resolution dated 30 August 2002 denying it, or about seven
121 Judge Adoracion G. Angeles from hearing and deciding Criminal Case No. C- months after Tecson et al. had filed their applications with the trial court.50 In
38340(91), the ruling was made specifically applicable to the trial of petitioners September 2002, or almost a month before the promulgation of the RTC Order dated
therein, i.e. accused Concepcion, Ampil, Adriano, and S. 11 October 2002 granting the probation applications,51 the OSG had filed
Fernandez.36chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Manifestations of Intent to File Petition for Certiorari with the CA52 and this Court.53
Ultimately, the OSG assailed the CA judgments by filing before this Court a Petition
Tecson et al. thus committed a fatal error when they filed their probation for Certiorari on 25 November 2002.54 We noted the petition and then required
applications with Caloocan City RTC Branch 130, and not with Branch 121. We stress respondents to file a comment thereon.55 After their submission of further pleadings
that applicants are not at liberty to choose the forum in which they may seek and motions, we eventually required all parties to file their consolidated
probation, as the requirement under Section 4 of the Probation law is substantive memoranda.56 The records of the case remained with the CA until they were
and not merely procedural. Considering, therefore, that the probation proceedings elevated to this Court in 2008.57chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
were premised on an unwarranted exercise of authority, we find that Caloocan City
RTC Branch 130 never acquired jurisdiction over the case. For the foregoing reasons, we find that RTC Branch 130 had no jurisdiction to act on
the probation applications of Tecson et al. It had neither the power nor the authority
Second, the records of the case were still with the CA when Caloocan City RTC to suspend their sentence, place them on probation, order their final discharge, and
Branch 130 granted the probation applications. Jurisdiction over a case is lodged eventually declare the case against them terminated. This glaring jurisdictional faux
with the court in which the criminal action has been properly instituted.37 If a party pas is a clear evidence of either gross ignorance of the law or an underhanded one-
appeals the trial courts judgment or final order, 38 jurisdiction is transferred to the upmanship on the part of RTC Branch 130 or Tecson et al., or both to which this
appellate court. The execution of the decision is thus stayed insofar as the appealing Court cannot give a judicial imprimatur.
party is concerned.39 The court of origin then loses jurisdiction over the entire case
the moment the other partys time to appeal has expired.40 Any residual jurisdiction In any event, Tecson et al. were ineligible to seek probation at the time they applied
of the court of origin shall cease including the authority to order execution pending for it. Probation58 is a special privilege granted by the state to penitent qualified
appeal the moment the complete records of the case are transmitted to the offenders who immediately admit their liability and thus renounce their right to
appellate court.41 Consequently, it is the appellate court that shall have the appeal. In view of their acceptance of their fate and willingness to be reformed, the
authority to wield the power to hear, try, and decide the case before it, as well as to state affords them a chance to avoid the stigma of an incarceration record by
enforce its decisions and resolutions appurtenant thereto. That power and authority making them undergo rehabilitation outside of prison. Some of the major purposes
shall remain with the appellate court until it finally disposes of the case. Jurisdiction of the law are to help offenders to eventually develop themselves into law-abiding
cannot be ousted by any subsequent event, even if the nature of the incident would and self-respecting individuals, as well as to assist them in their reintegration with
have prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first place. the community.

According to Article 78 of the Revised Penal Code, [n]o penalty shall be executed
except by virtue of a final judgment. A judgment of a court convicting or acquitting
It must be reiterated that probation is not a right enjoyed by the accused. Rather, it enunciated in Lagrosa that the accused are disallowed from availing themselves of
is an act of grace or clemency conferred by the state. In Francisco v. Court of the benefits of probation if they obtain a genuine opportunity to apply for probation
Appeals,59 this Court explained thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary only on appeal as a result of the downgrading of their sentence from non-
probationable to probationable.
It is a special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not
enjoyed by others or by all. Accordingly, the grant of probation rests solely upon the While Lagrosa was promulgated three months after Caloocan City RTC Branch 130
discretion of the court which is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized issued its various Orders discharging Tecson et al. from probation, the ruling in
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. The Probation Law Lagrosa, however, was a mere reiteration of the reasoning of this Court since the
should not therefore be permitted to divest the state or its government of any of the 1989 case Llamado v. Court of Appeals63 and Francisco. The Applications for
latters prerogatives, rights or remedies, unless the intention of the legislature to this Probation of Tecson et al., therefore, should not have been granted by RTC Branch
end is clearly expressed, and no person should benefit from the terms of the law 130, as they had appealed their conviction to the CA. We recall that respondents
who is not clearly within them. (Emphases supplied) were originally found guilty of homicide and sentenced to suffer 14 years, 8 months,
and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Accordingly, even if the CA later
The OSG questions the validity of the grant of the probation applications of Tecson et downgraded their conviction to slight physical injuries and sentenced them to 20
al.60 It points out that when they appealed to the CA their homicide conviction by days of arresto menor, which made the sentence fall within probationable limits for
the RTC, they thereby made themselves ineligible to seek probation pursuant to the first time, the RTC should have nonetheless found them ineligible for probation
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968 (the Probation Law). at the time.

We refer again to the full text of Section 4 of the Probation Law as The actions of the trial court must thus be adjudged as an arbitrary and despotic use
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary of authority, so gross that it divested the court of its very power to dispense justice.
As a consequence, the RTC Orders granting the Applications for Probation of Tecson
SEC. 4. Grant of Probation. Subject to the provisions of this Decree, the trial court et al. and thereafter discharging them from their criminal liability must be deemed
may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a defendant, and upon application to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
by said defendant within the period for perfecting an appeal, suspend the execution jurisdiction.
of the sentence and place the defendant on probation for such period and upon such
terms and conditions as it may deem best; Provided, That no application for Whether for lack of jurisdiction or for grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal excess of jurisdiction, we declare all orders, resolutions, and judgments of Caloocan
from the judgment of conviction. City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the probation applications of Tecson et al. null and
void for having been issued without jurisdiction. We find our pronouncement in
Probation may be granted whether the sentence imposes a term of imprisonment or Galman v. Sandiganbayan64 applicable, viz:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
a fine only. An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court. The filing of
the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested.
Through it, no rights can be attained. Being worthless, all proceedings founded upon
An order granting or denying probation shall not be appealable. (Emphases supplied) it are equally worthless. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts performed under it
and all claims flowing out of it are void. (Emphasis supplied)
Indeed, one of the legal prerequisites of probation is that the offender must not have
appealed the conviction.61 In the 2003 case Lagrosa v. Court of Appeals,62 this The ultimate discharge of Tecson et al.
Court was faced with the issue of whether a convict may still apply for probation from probation did not totally extinguish
even after the trial court has imposed a non-probationable verdict, provided that the their criminal liability.
CA later on lowers the original penalty to a sentence within the probationable limit.
In that case, the trial court sentenced the accused to a maximum term of eight Accused Bantug asserts65 that, in any event, their criminal liability has already been
years of prisin mayor, which was beyond the coverage of the Probation Law. They extinguished as a result of their discharge from probation and the eventual
only became eligible for probation after the CA reduced the maximum term of the termination of the criminal case against them by Caloocan City RTC Branch 130. To
penalty imposed to 1 year, 8 months and 21 days of prisin correccional. support his argument, he cites the following provision of the Revised Penal
Code:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In deciding the case, this Court invoked the reasoning in Francisco and ruled that the
accused was ineligible for probation, since they had filed an appeal with the CA. In ARTICLE 89. How Criminal Liability is Totally Extinguished. Criminal liability is
Francisco, we emphasized that Section 4 of the Probation Law offers no ambiguity totally extinguished:
and does not provide for any distinction, qualification, or exception. What is clear is By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
that all offenders who previously appealed their cases, regardless of their reason for penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
appealing, are disqualified by the law from seeking probation. Accordingly, this Court occurs before final judgment.
By service of the sentence. pay for the trial courts erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his right to apply
By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its effects. for probation. Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabaw (the horse errs,
By absolute pardon. the carabao gets the whip). Where is justice there?
By prescription of the crime.
By prescription of the penalty. The dissenting opinion also expresses apprehension that allowing Arnel to apply for
By the marriage of the offended woman, as provided in article 344 of this Code. probation would dilute the ruling of this Court in Francisco v. Court of Appeals that
(Emphasis supplied) the probation law requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail himself of probation. But there is a huge difference between
As previously discussed, a void judgment cannot be the source of legal rights; legally Francisco and this case.
speaking, it is as if no judgment had been rendered at all. Considering our
annulment of the Orders of Caloocan City RTC Branch 130 in relation to the xxxx
probation proceedings, respondents cannot claim benefits that technically do not
exist. Here, however, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him
to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and probation. He
In any event, Tecson et al. cannot invoke Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, as we was not in a position to say, By taking this appeal, I choose not to apply for
find it inapplicable to this case. One of the hallmarks of the Probation Law is probation. The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied him that
precisely to suspend the execution of the sentence,66 and not to replace the choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation under this
original sentence with another, as we pointed out in our discussion in Baclayon v. Courts greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling in Francisco. It
Mutia:67chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction, when they have
the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that privilege.
An order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather in effect
a suspension of the imposition of sentence. It is not a final judgment but is rather an xxxx
interlocutory judgment in the nature of a conditional order placing the convicted
defendant under the supervision of the court for his reformation, to be followed by a In a real sense, the Courts finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated homicide,
final judgment of discharge, if the conditions of the probation are complied with, or but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time
by a final judgment of sentence if the conditions are violated. (Emphases supplied) imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the start,
it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed on him the right
Correspondingly, the criminal liability of Tecson et al. remains. penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the
right to apply for probation.
In light of our recent Decision in
Colinares v. People, Tecson et al. The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through
may now reapply for probation. no fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of
Very recently, in Colinares v. People,68 we revisited our ruling in Francisco and the statutory provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in
modified our pronouncements insofar as the eligibility for probation of those who Francisco, the Probation Law must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to
appeal their conviction is concerned. Through a majority vote of 9-6, the Court En the accused only where it clearly appears he comes within its letter; to do so would
Banc in effect abandoned Lagrosa and settled the following once and for be to disregard the teaching in many cases that the Probation Law should be applied
all:69chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law but to achieve its beneficent
purpose.
Secondly, it is true that under the probation law the accused who appeals from the
judgment of conviction is disqualified from availing himself of the benefits of xxxx
probation. But, as it happens, two judgments of conviction have been meted out to
Arnel: one, a conviction for frustrated homicide by the regional trial court, now set At any rate, what is clear is that, had the RTC done what was right and imposed on
aside; and, two, a conviction for attempted homicide by the Supreme Court. Arnel the correct penalty of two years and four months maximum, he would have
had the right to apply for probation. No one could say with certainty that he would
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinions hard position, it will apply the have availed himself of the right had the RTC done right by him. The idea may not
probation law on Arnel based on the trial courts annulled judgment against him. He even have crossed his mind precisely since the penalty he got was not
will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty that such judgment probationable.
imposed on him. More, the Supreme Courts judgment of conviction for a lesser
offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to the trial courts judgment The question in this case is ultimately one of fairness. Is it fair to deny Arnel the right
even if this has been found in error. And, worse, Arnel will now also be made to to apply for probation when the new penalty that the Court imposes on him is, unlike
the one erroneously imposed by the trial court, subject to probation? (Emphases determined by using as reference the principal penalty imposed by the court before
supplied) the prison sentence is computed in accordance with the ISL.72 This determination is
made in spite of the two classes of penalties mentioned in an indeterminate
In our Decision, we set aside the RTC and the CA judgments and found Tecson et al. sentence. It must be emphasized that the provisions on the inclusion of accessory
ultimately liable for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. Pursuant penalties specifically allude to the actual penalty73 imposed, not to the prison
to Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the offense is punishable by arresto mayor sentence74 set by a court. We believe that the ISL did not intend to have the effect
in its maximum period (from 4 months and 1 day to 6 months) to prisin of imposing on the convict two distinct sets of accessory penalties for the same
correccional in its medium period (from 2 years, 4 months, and 1 day to 4 years and offense.75 The two penalties are only relevant insofar as setting the minimum
2 months). Considering that the new ruling in Colinares is more favorable to Tecson imprisonment period is concerned, after which the convict may apply for parole and
et al., we rule that they are now eligible to apply for probation. Since Fidelito Dizon eventually seek the shortening of the prison term.76chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(Dizon) was convicted of the same crime, we hereby clarify that Dizon is also eligible
for probation. Under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code, the prescribed penalty for the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide is arresto mayor in its maximum period to
While we cannot recognize the validity of the Orders of RTC Branch 130, which prisin correccional in its medium period. As this provision grants courts the
granted the Applications for Probation, we cannot disregard the fact that Tecson et discretion to lay down a penalty without regard to the presence of mitigating and
al. have fulfilled the terms and conditions of their previous probation program and aggravating circumstances, the imposable penalty must also be within the
have eventually been discharged therefrom. Thus, should they reapply for probation, aforementioned range.77 Hence, before applying the ISL, we ultimately imposed on
the trial court may, at its discretion, consider their antecedent probation service in Dizon and Tecson et al. the actual (straight) penalty78 of four years and two months
resolving whether to place them under probation at this time and in determining the of prisin correccional.79 Pursuant to Article 43 of the Revised Penal Code, the
terms, conditions, and period thereof. penalty of prisin correccional automatically carries with it80 the following accessory
penalties:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Final clarificatory matters
ARTICLE 43. Prisin Correccional Its accessory penalties. The penalty of prisin
We now take this opportunity to correct an unintentional typographical error in the correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public office, from the right to
minimum term of the penalty imposed on the accused Dizon and Tecson et al. While follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the
this issue was not raised by any of the parties before us, this Court deems it proper right of suffrage, if the duration of said imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months.
to discuss the matter ex proprio motu in the interest of justice. In the first paragraph The offender shall suffer the disqualification provided in this article although
of the dispositive portion of our Decision dated 1 February 2012, the fourth sentence pardoned as to the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly
reads as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary remitted in the pardon.

They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months The duration of their suspension shall be the same as that of their principal penalty
and one (1) day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months sans the ISL; that is, for four years and two months81 or until they have served their
of prisin correccional, as maximum. sentence in accordance with law. Their suspension takes effect immediately, once
the judgment of conviction becomes final.82chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
As we had intended to impose on the accused the maximum term of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense of We further point out that if the length of their imprisonment exceeds 18 months,
reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, in accordance with the Indeterminate they shall furthermore suffer a perpetual special disqualification from the right of
Sentence Law (ISL),70 the phrase and one (1) day, which had been inadvertently suffrage. Under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, if this accessory penalty
added, must be removed. Consequently, in the first paragraph of the dispositive attaches, it shall forever deprive them of the exercise of their right (a) to vote in any
portion, the fourth sentence should now read as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary popular election for any public office; (b) to be elected to that office; and (c) to hold
any public office.83 Any public office that they may be holding becomes vacant
They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four (4) months upon finality of the judgment.84 The aforementioned accessory penalties can only
of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prisin be wiped out if expressly remitted in a pardon.85chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
correccional, as maximum.
Of course, the aforementioned accessory penalties are without prejudice to a grant
In this instance, we further find it important to clarify the accessory penalties of probation, should the trial court find them eligible therefor. As we explained in
inherent to the principal penalty imposed on Dizon and Tecson et al. Baclayon,86 the grant of probation suspends the execution of the principal penalty
of imprisonment, as well as that of the accessory penalties. We have reiterated this
By operation of Articles 40 to 45 and 73 of the Revised Penal Code, a corresponding point in Moreno v. Commission on Elections:87chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
accessory penalty automatically attaches every time a court lays down a principal
penalty outlined in Articles 25 and 27 thereof.71 The applicable accessory penalty is
In Baclayon v. Mutia, the Court declared that an order placing defendant on 'The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not brilliance,' Justice
probation is not a sentence but is rather, in effect, a suspension of the imposition of Antonio Carpio had told a former associate, and that explains his actuations in the
sentence. We held that the grant of probation to petitioner suspended the imposition Supreme Court
of the principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and from the right to follow a profession or calling, and (Newsbreak wrote this profile on Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio T Carpio
that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage. We thus deleted in a Dec 4, 2006 issue. We are republishing it now as Carpio, being the most senior
from the order granting probation the paragraph which required that petitioner justice in the High Tribunal, becomes acting chief justice, following the removal of
refrain from continuing with her teaching profession. Renato Corona. A PDF version of the story as published on Newsbreak is embedded
below.)
Applying this doctrine to the instant case, the accessory penalties of suspension
from public office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of MANILA, Philippines - Let us notdelude ourselves into believing that a new
perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage, attendant to the penalty constitution would immediately eradicate the ills that plague our country. Nor can we
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisin correccional in its minimum period expect that tinkering with the constitution will totally purge it of its defects and
imposed upon Moreno were similarly suspended upon the grant of probation. make this nation great again. One thing we cannot afford to overlook nor
downgrade is the importance of the human element. A basically workable
It appears then that during the period of probation, the probationer is not even constitution or law can become defective in the hands of enthroned rascals, as we
disqualified from running for a public office because the accessory penalty of are now experiencing, wrote Antonio Tirol Carpio.
suspension from public office is put on hold for the duration of the probation. x x x x.
During the period of probation, the probationer does not serve the penalty imposed No, this was not written recently but was penned by him when he was a 20-year-old
upon him by the court but is merely required to comply with all the conditions senior economics student of the Ateneo de Manila University in 1969. Published in
prescribed in the probation order. The Guidon, of which Carpio was then editor in chief, the piece mirrored tumultuous
times.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of
petitioner Gerarda H. Villa in connection with G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080 is hereby Before graduating in 1970, Carpio wrote in his last editorial about the seeming
DENIED. The Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General inevitability of a revolution, given the pervasive and severe inequity prevailing at the
concerning G.R. Nos. 155101 and 154954 is also DENIED. time. Yet he lamented the fragmentation of revolutionary forces and their inability to
overhaul the system. A revolution is something that cannot be left to accident. It
The respective Motions for Clarification or Reconsideration of Antonio Mariano has to be a deliberate and organized action.
Almeda, Junel Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., and Vincent Tecson are likewise
DENIED. In light of the finding that Caloocan City Regional Trial Court Branch 130 A son of the First Quarter Storm, the first months of 1970 that were marked by
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the massive student protests against Ferdinand Marcoss rule, Carpio would become
aforementioned Applications for Probation, we hereby ANNUL the entire probation Supreme Court (SC) justice 31 years later on Oct 22, 2001, and at 52, be the
proceedings and SET ASIDE all orders, resolutions, or judgments issued in youngest appointee at that by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
connection thereto. We, however, CLARIFY that Antonio Mariano Almeda, Junel
Anthony D. Ama, Renato Bantug, Jr., Vincent Tecson, and Fidelito Dizon are eligible to Today, hes caught in the vortex of public opinion because of his biting language in
apply or reapply for probation in view of our recent ruling in Colinares v. People of his ponencia on peoples initiative. But Carpioaccording to those who know himis
the Philippines,88 without prejudice to their remaining civil liability, if any. just being consistent. His decision on Charter amendments via what appears to be a
rushed and personal-agenda-driven peoples initiative is not radically different from
Furthermore, we issue a CORRECTION of the dispositive portion of our Decision his early views as a young student leader, they say.
dated 1 February 2012 and hereby delete the phrase and one (1) day located in
the fourth sentence of the first paragraph thereof. The sentence shall now read as The repressive Marcos years which he saw and experienced as a law student at the
follows: They are hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of four University of the Philippines from 1970 to 1975 shaped and left a deep imprint on
(4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of him. After all, Edgar Jopson and Eman Lacaba, student activists during Carpios time,
prisin correccional, as maximum. were among the Ateneo batchmates whom he lost to the revolution.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary At UP, radicalism was predominant among students who organized and joined often
violent demonstrations against the Marcos regime. Although student organizations
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, (Chairperson), *Villarama, Perez, and Reyes, JJ., concur. were not recognized then, fraternities became an outlet of rage and violence, and
Carpio, as head of the Sigma Rho fraternity during his time, got caught in the tides.

Antonio Carpio: The man on the bench Dad's advice

Sigma Rhoans entangled with rival Alpha Phi Betans who, at the time, were headed they were neighbors in the posh Ayala Alabang subdivision. Abaya says it was the
by Oscar Orbos, who would later become congressman and then governor of late Teodoro Benigno Jr. who helped connect them directly with Ramos.
Pangasinan. The ensuing rumble resulted in casualties on both sides and, following
command responsibility, fraternity leaders Orbos and Carpio were suspended from Regular meetings in Alabang followed in mid-January 1990 for purposes of analyzing
law school for a year. Orbos managed to have his suspension reduced to one the prevailing political situation. These eventually gave birth to Ramoss Alabang
semester, however, and graduated on time in 1975. Group which was a merger of his Rotarians group and his neighbors circle. That
Carpio and what was then the Carpio Villaraza & Cruz (CVC) law firm would play a
Carpio, who was a year ahead of Orbos and was in third year when the rumble major role in the Ramos presidency and become ascendant in the process is already
erupted, ended up graduating in 1975 instead of 1974. This was part of the widely known.
adventure of growing up, says an Alpha Phi Beta member who recalls events that
happened at the time. In the 1992 presidential elections which Ramos eventually won, the three partners of
the firm had different political leanings but respected each others preferences.
It was in UP, too, that Carpio was introduced by former beauty queen and later While Carpio was for Ramos, Villaraza was batting for Eduardo Danding Cojuangco
activist Nelia Sancho to his future wife, Vietnamese Ruth Nguyen, with whom he Jr., and Cruz was for Jovito Salonga.
would have two children, now both college graduates.
All three combined were a formidable team. While Villaraza was tactical, Cruz was
It was useless to be a lawyer then, Carpio told people he knew before he was strategic, and Carpio, the most serious of the three, was more deliberate, says
appointed to the SC, but he nevertheless pursued his law studies because his Abaya. Carpio put his passion behind whatever he targeted.
father wanted him to. His father Bernardo Carpio, who was former regional director
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue in Davao, wanted his youngest to be a lawyer like He took to sailing, hunting, and sharp shooting, believing that the latter was the best
him. protection he could possibly have.

When martial law was declared in 1972, Carpio was in his second year in law school What is not widely known is Carpios reason for leaving Ramos in 1996, four years
and like most law students, was reading the SC decision on the case of Javellana vs after serving as his chief presidential legal counsel. As legal counsel, he was
Executive Secretary, of then Alejandro Melchor. In that case, the High Court ruled instrumental in breaking up monopolies in the telecommunications and shipping
that the 1973 Constitution drafted by the 1971 Constitutional Convention was industries, the same stranglehold which contributed to societal inequities, and which
ratified in accordance with the 1935 Constitution. he already saw as a college student.

What made the decision controversial at the time was the declaration of martial law Against PIRMA
in the middle of the convention in 1972 and the absence of real debates on the draft Early talk about constitutional amendments and the possibility of extending the term
Constitution that Marcos wanted the people to ratify through a plebiscite. of Ramos did not sit well with Carpio because he thought it was not in accordance
with the spirit of the Constitution. And it put him at loggerheads with its proponents.
It was a decision issued under the gun of the martial law regime, Carpio is quoted It marked a key policy difference between him and his boss who did nothing to stop
by an associate as having previously said. It was precisely the repression of the those lobbying for it.
period that left an indelible mark on the man who would become SC justice. It would
also explain some of the important decisions he penned as a member of the High It was after Carpios departure that the Peoples Initiative for Reform, Modernization
Court. and Action (PIRMA) was given an aggressive push by then Budget Secretary
Salvador Enriquez Jr. and spouses Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa, with the backing of
The path to FVR then National Security Adviser Jose T. Almonte. The efforts came to naught when
brought to the SC, however.
Tony would philosophize the needs of society, says PR consultant Antonio Abaya,
who recalls that the night before EDSA 1 broke, he, along with Carpio, were Publicist and Ramos media consultant Ed Malay describes Carpio as having enjoyed
supposed to meet with Jesuit priest Joaquin Bernas who had access to Corazon the confidence of the former President. Hindi political, tahimik. He would not even
Aquino, the widow of slain Sen. Benigno Ninoy Aquino Jr. Already in private exchange banter. He did not smoke. He would attend meetings and stay for a
practice with the firm he co-founded with partners F. Arthur Pancho Villaraza and while; he rarely attended political meetings.
Avelino Nonong Cruz Jr., Carpio was ready to risk his firm and connect with the
mutinous Reform the Armed Forces Movement, says Abaya. Malay says that despite the association with Ramos, Carpio showed his
independence from his former boss. One of his first decisions as associate justice
Years later, as the Aquino government remained vulnerable to coup attemptsthe involved the Public Estates Authority-Amari Coastal Bay Development Corp. deal,
most serious of which was the 1989 Makati siegeCarpio joined the political fray as which the High Court voided in 2003.
he got into the circle of Fidel Ramos, whom he did not know personally although
Written by Carpio, the decision upheld the Constitution which prohibits the sale of If there is anything that the three partners have in common, it is political astuteness.
public lands to private corporations. The deal was first negotiated under Ramoss How tactics, strategy, and deliberation will come into play bears close watching. For
term and renegotiated under the administration of Joseph Estrada. Akala ko ba Carpio however, his place is secure for a good 13 more yearsunless politicians in
kakampi natin (I thought he was with us), Ramos is quoted as saying after the SC Congress try to impeach him. - Rappler.com/First published in Newsbreak in
released its decision. December 2006

The most important qualification of a judge is independence, not brilliance, Carpio

had told a former associate, and that explains his actuations in the SC. EN BANC

Out of the box [G.R. No. 110280. October 21, 1993.]

Before he joined government as Ramoss chief legal counsel, Carpioperhaps taking UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES BOARD OF REGENTS and DR. OLIVIA C. CAOILI in
after his mother Sol Tirol who was, at one time, superintendent of the Department of her capacity as Secretary of the Board, Petitioners, v. HON. ELSIE LIGOT-TELAN in her
Educationbecame a professorial lecturer at the UP College of Law from 1983 to capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch 87, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and
1992. Notwithstanding his one-year suspension, Carpio graduated cum laude and RAMON P. NADAL, Respondents.
valedictorian in 1975, and placed sixth in the Bar that same year.
U.P. Office of Legal Services, for Petitioners.
He went into private practice before forming the firm in 1980 with Villaraza and
Cruz. While the three went their separate ways after law school (the three are Sigma Bonifacio A. Aletajan for Private Respondent.
Rhoans), they promised to keep in touch and get together when anyone felt he had
gained sufficient wingspan. It was Carpio who called Villaraza to tell him it was
perhaps time to come together. DECISION

They struggled to build a steady client base as they sought to create a niche for a
firm that they hoped would outlive them. While he was the managing partner of the ROMERO, J.:
firm, Carpio took pains to travel to Diliman to teach credit transactions and
negotiable instruments, two subjects in law. As professor, he was known for his
clarity of thinking and easily recruited to the firm the best and the brightest among In an effort to make the University of the Philippines (U.P.) truly the university of the
his students. people, the U.P. administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized
scheme of tuition fee payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance
To Lani Gomez Somera, one of Carpios former students who joined him in the firm Program (STFAP), popularly known as the "Iskolar ng Bayan" program. Spawned by
and later in Malacaang, Carpio is a bit standoffish and is not inclined to smile. Her the public clamor to overcome what was perceived as the sharpening elitist profile of
boss is even-tempered and the closest he got to losing his cool was when he took the U.P. studentry, the STFAP aspired to expand the coverage of government
off his glasses and put them on the table, she recalls. educational subsidies so as to include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-
economic ladder.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
A known techie, the associate justice introduced his former firm to computers as
early as the 1980s when these were not yet widely used. Believing that technology After broad consultations with the various university constituencies by U.P. President
is both equalizing and liberating, he pushed for an e-library for the judiciary, the Jose V. Abueva, the U.P. Board of Regents issued on April 28, 1988 a Resolution
first Web-based searchable electronic library in the Philippine government. establishing the STFAP. A year later, it was granted official recognition when the
Congress of the Philippines allocated a portion of the National Budget for the
He is solution-oriented and likes to think out of the box. He is not predisposed to a implementation of the program.
linear way of thinking; he likes branching out, Somera, who has since left the firm,
adds. In discussions of cases, he would always push with his characteristic, And? In In the interest of democratizing admission to the State University, all students are
the aftermath of the SC ruling on peoples initiative, there was an abundance of entitled to apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in tuition fees, living and
loose talk about the firm being behind the Carpio-penned decision and supposed book subsidies and student assistantships which give undergraduate students the
differences between Carpio and Villaraza over Executive Order 464, which prevented opportunity to earn P12.00 per hour by working for the University.chanrobles law
Cabinet officials from appearing before a congressional investigation. Despite library
seeming evidence to the contrarygiven the resignation of Cruz as defense
secretary and the firms other lawyers in government following suitVillaraza Applicants are required to accomplish a questionnaire where, among others, they
declared that the firm remains supportive of the Arroyo administration. state the amount and source of the annual income of the family, their real and
personal properties and special circumstances from which the University may
evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized To further insure the integrity of the program, a random sampling scheme of
into brackets. At the end of the application form, the student applicant, as well as his verification of data indicated in a students application form is undertaken. Among
parent, signs a sworn statement, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph those who applied for STFAP benefits for School Year 1989-90 was Ramon P. Nadal, a
student enrolled in the College of Law.
"Statement of the Student
On March 14, 1991, a team composed of Arsenio L. Dona and Jose Carlo Manalo
I hereby certify, upon my honor, that all the data and information which I have conducted a home investigation at the residence of Nadal at 31 Twinpeaks Drive,
furnished are accurate and complete. I understand that any willful misinformation Blue Ridge, Quezon City.
and/or withholding of information will automatically disqualify me from receiving any
financial assistance or subsidy, and may serve as ground for my expulsion from the Ms. Cristeta Packing, Nadals aunt, was interviewed and the team submitted a home
University. Furthermore, if such misinformation and/or withholding of information on visit report. Consolacion Urbino, Scholarship Affairs Officer II, found discrepancies
my part is discovered after I have been awarded tuition scholarship or any form of between the report and Nadals application form. Forthwith, she and Bella M.
financial assistance, I will be required to reimburse all financial benefits plus the Villanueva, head of the Office of Scholarships and Student Services, presented the
legal rate of interest prevailing at the time of reimbursement without prejudice to matter to the Diliman Committee on Scholarships and Financial Assistance. 2
the filing of charges against me. (Italics supplied for emphasis)
In compliance with the said Committees directive, Bella Villanueva wrote Nadal
Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my informing him that the investigation showed that he had failed to declare, not only
home/residence to verify the veracity of the information provided in this application the fact that he had been maintaining a 1977 Corolla car which was owned by his
and I will give my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my brother but also the income of his mother who was supporting his brothers Antonio
refusal to cooperate with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal and Federico. Nadal was likewise informed that the Diliman Committee had
of STFAP benefits and privileges. reclassified him to Bracket 9 (from Bracket 4), retroactive to June 1989, unless he
could submit "proofs to the contrary." Nadal was required "to pay back the
___________________ equivalent amount of full school fees" with "interest based on current commercial
rates." Failure to settle his account would mean the suspension of his registration
Students Signature privileges and the withholding of clearance and transcript of records. He was also
warned that his case might be referred to the Student Disciplinary Tribunal for
Statement of the Applicants Parent or Guardian further investigation. 3

I hereby certify to the truthfulness and completeness of the information which my On July 12, 1991, Nadal issued a certification stating, among other things, that his
son/daughter/dependent has furnished in this application together with all the mother migrated to the United States in 1981 but because her residency status had
documents attached. I further recognize that in signing this application form, I share not yet been legalized, she had not been able to find a "stable, regular, well-paying
with my son/daughter/dependent the responsibility for the truthfulness and employment." He also stated that his mother, jointly with his brother Virgilio, Jr., was
completeness of the information supplied herein. (Italics supplied for emphasis) shouldering the expenses of the college education of his two younger brothers. 4

Moreover, I understand that the University may send a fact-finding team to visit my Noting further discrepancies between Nadals application form and the certification,
home/residence to verify the information provided in this application and I will give the U.P. charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) on August 23,
my utmost cooperation in this regard. I also understand that my refusal to cooperate 1991 with the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
with the fact-finding team may mean suspension or withdrawal of STFAP benefits
and privileges of my son/daughter/dependent. "That respondent RAMON P. NADAL (UP Student No. 83-11640), a student of the
College of Law, UP System, Diliman, Quezon City, and STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN)
____________________________________ recipient (Bracket 4 for SY 1989-1990; Bracket 5 for SY 1990-1991) in his
applications for STFAP (ISKOLAR NG BAYAN) benefits which he filed for schoolyear
Parents/Legal Guardians/Spouses Signature" 1 1989-1990, and schoolyear 1990-1991, with the Office of Scholarship and Student
Services (formerly Scholarship and Financial Assistance Service) voluntarily and
From the early stages of its implementation, measures were adopted to safeguard willfully withheld and did not declare the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
the integrity of the program. One such precautionary measure was the inclusion as
one of the punishable acts under Section 2 (a) of the Rules and Regulations on (a) That he has and maintains a car (Toyota Corolla, Model 1977); and
Student Conduct and Discipline of the University the deliberate falsification or
suppression/withholding of any material information required in the application (b) The income of his mother (Natividad Packing Nadal) in the U.S.A. in support
form.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary of the studies of his brothers Antonio and Federico,
which acts of willfully withholding information is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in Nadals motion for reconsideration was included in the March 23, 1993 agenda but in
relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2, of the Rules and view of the absence of Senator Shahani, the decision thereon was deferred.
Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended. (Approved by the
B.O.R. at its 876th meeting on 02 September 1976, amended at the 923rd B.O.R. At the special meeting of the BOR on March 28, 1993 at the Board Room of the
meeting on 31 January 1980, and further amended at its 1017th B.O.R. meeting on Manila Polo Club in Forbes Park, Makati, Regent Antonio T. Carpio raised the
08 December 1988)." 5 "material importance" of verifying the truth of Nadals claim that earlier, he was a
beneficiary of a scholarship and financial aid from the Ateneo de Manila University
On October 27, 1992, after hearing, the SDT 6 rendered a decision in SDT Case No. (AdeMU). Learning that the "certification issued by the AdeMU that it had not given
91-026 exculpating Nadal of the charge of deliberately withholding in his STFAP Nadal financial aid while he was a student there was made through a telephone
application form information that he was maintaining a Toyota Corolla car, but call," Regent Carpio declared that there was as yet "no direct evidence in the records
finding him guilty of "wilfully and deliberately withholding information about the to substantiate the charge." According to Carpio, if it should be disclosed that Nadal
income of his mother, who is living abroad, in support of the studies of his brothers falsely stated that he received such financial aid, it would be a clear case of gross
Antonio and Federico, 7 which is tantamount to acts of dishonesty in relation to his and material misrepresentation that would even warrant the penalty of expulsion.
studies in violation of paragraph [a], Section 2 of the Rules [now covered by Hence, he cast a conditional vote that would depend on the verification of Nadals
paragraph (i), Section 2 of the Rules, as amended 25 June 1992]." As such, the SDT claim on the matter.
imposed upon Nadal the penalty of expulsion from the University and required him
to reimburse all STFAP benefits he had received but if he does not voluntarily make U.P. President and concurrently Regent Jose V. Abueva countered by stating that "a
reimbursement, it shall be "effected by the University thru outside legal action." 8 decision should not be anchored solely on one piece of information which he
considered irrelevant, and which would ignore the whole pattern of the respondents
The SDT decision was thereafter automatically elevated to the Executive Committee dishonesty and deception from 1989 which had been established in the investigation
of U.P. Diliman for review pursuant to Sec. 20 of the U.P. Rules on Student Conduct and the reviews." He added that "the respondents eligibility for his AdeMU high
and Discipline. On November 26, 1992, the Executive Committee, voting 13:4, school scholarship and financial assistance from 1979 to 1983 does not in any way
affirmed the decision of the SDT; whereupon, Nadal appealed to the Board of establish that he is not guilty as charged before the SDT," since the formal charges
Regents (BOR). The appeal was included in the agenda of the BOR meeting on against him do not include withholding of information regarding scholarship grants
January 25, 1993. 9 received from other schools.

On January 18, 1993, upon her assumption to the Chairmanship of the Senate At the said March 28, 1993 special meeting, the Board decided to go into executive
Committee on Education, thereby making her automatically a member of the BOR, session where the following transpired:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Senator Leticia Ramos-Shahani wrote the BOR a letter expressing her view that,
after a close review of Nadals case by her legal staff, "it is only fair and just to find "The Chairman of the Board, together with the President, directed the Secretary to
Mr. Nadals appeal meritorious and his arguments worthy of belief. Consequently, he reflect in the minutes of the meeting the following decisions of the Board in
should be allowed to graduate and take the bar examinations this year." 10 executive session, with only the Board members present.

At its January 25, 1993 meeting, the BOR affirmed the decision of the SDT but A vote was held by secret ballot on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not guilty
because "the Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in as charged of willful withholding of information in relation to his application for
view of the alleged status and predicament of the mother as an immigrant TNT in Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits which he filed
the United States," the penalty was modified "from Expulsion to One Year for Schoolyears 1989-1990 and 1990-1991 which is tantamount to act of dishonesty
Suspension, effective immediately, plus reimbursement of all benefits received from in relation to his studies, in violation of paragraph (a), Section 2 of the Rules and
the STFAP, with legal interest." The BOR also decided against giving Nadal a Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline, as amended.
certification of good moral character. 11
The Chairman gave the following results of the Board action during the Executive
Nadal forthwith filed a motion for reconsideration of the BOR decision, allegedly Session: four (4) voted guilty; three (3) voted not guilty; and three (3) gave
against the advice of his counsel. 12 The motion was placed on the agenda of the conditional votes, pending verification with Father Raymond Holscher of Ateneo de
February 25, 1993 meeting of the BOR. A day before said date, Senator Shahani Manila University of Ramon P. Nadals statement in his STFAP application that he was
wrote the BOR another letter requesting that deliberation on Nadals case be granted scholarship while he was in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal
deferred until such time as she could attend a BOR meeting. had not received financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be
considered as guilty, and if otherwise, then not guilty. The Chairman requested the
On March 15, 1993, the U.P. filed an opposition to Nadals motion for President to make the verification as soon as possible the next day. In answer to a
reconsideration. Thereafter, the BOR held a special meeting to accommodate the query, the Chairman clarified that once the information was received from Ateneo,
request of Regent Shahani with Nadals case as the sole item on its agenda. Again, there would be no need for another meeting to validate the decision.
The President reiterated his objections to the casting of conditional votes. asserting the Universitys prerogative to discipline students found guilty of violating
its rules of discipline. 18
The Chairman himself did not vote." 13
On the same day, the lower court 19 issued the following
In the morning of March 29, 1993, the AdeMU issued a certification to the effect that Order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
Nadal was indeed a recipient of a scholarship grant from 1979 to 1983. That
evening, the BOR met again at a special meeting at the Westin Philippine Plaza "The parties were heard on their respective positions on the incident (application for
Hotel. According to Regent Carpio, in executive session, the BOR found Nadal preliminary injunction and prayer for temporary restraining order and opposition
"guilty" as the members voted as follows: six members guilty, three members thereto). For lack of material time set this for continuation on May 17 and 18, 1993
not guilty, and three members abstained. 14 Consequently, the BOR imposed on both at 2:30 p.m.
Nadal the penalties of suspension for one (1) year effective March 29, 1993, non-
issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and/or as In the meantime, in order that the proceedings of this case may not be rendered
long as Nadal has not reimbursed the STFAP benefits he had received with 12% moot and academic, the respondents herein, namely: Jose V. Abueva, President of
interest per annum from March 30, 1993 and non-issuance of his transcript of the University of the Philippines and Vice-Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents,
records until he has settled his financial obligations with the university. 15 Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Buenaventura and Armand V. Fabella, members of the
U.P. Board of Regents, Olivia C. Caoili, the officers, agents, representatives, and all
On March 30, 1993, Nadal wrote President Abueva a handwritten letter stating that persons acting in their behalf, are hereby temporarily restrained from implementing
"after learning of the latest decision" of the BOR, he had been "intensely their decision rendered on March 29, 1993 in Administrative SDT Case No. 91-026
concentrating on (his) job so that (he) can earn enough to be able to pay for (his) entitled University of the Philippines v. Ramon P. Nadal, as reflected in the Minutes of
financial obligations to the University." Alleging that he was "now letting nature take the 1062nd meeting of the Board of Regents, U.P. held at the Romblon Room, Westin
its course," Nadal begged President Abueva not to issue any press release regarding Phil. Plaza, Manila, until further order from this Court.
the case. 16
SO ORDERED."cralaw virtua1aw library
However, on April 22, 1993, Nadal filed in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City a
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary Thereafter, Nadal presented as witnesses Regents Emerenciana Y. Arcellana, Ariel P.
restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar M. Alfonso, Cesar A. Tanangonan, Leticia R. Shahani and Antonio T. Carpio. The University, on the other
Buenaventura, Armand V. Fabella and Olivia C. Caoili. The petition hand, presented Dr. Olivia Caoili and Nadal himself as a hostile witness. On May 29,
prayed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph 1993, the lower court issued the following Order:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"After trial on the merits, judgment be rendered as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw "The petitioner complains that he was not afforded due process when, after the
library Board Meeting on SDT Case No. 91-026 on March 28, 1993 that resulted in a
decision of "NOT GUILTY" in his favor, the Chairman of the U.P. Board of Regents,
a. Making the preliminary injunction permanent; without notice to the herein petitioner, called another meeting the following day to
deliberate on his (the Chairmans) MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, which this time
b. Ordering respondents to uphold and implement their decision rendered on resulted in a decision of "GUILTY." While the main issue of violation of due process
28 March 1993, exonerating petitioner from all the charges against him, and raised in the petition pends trial and resolution, the petitioner prays for the issuance
accordingly dismissing SDT Case No. 91-026; of a writ of preliminary injunction prohibiting the respondents from further
proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026 and from suspending the petitioner for one
c. Ordering respondents jointly and severally to pay petitioner litigation year.
expenses of at least P150,000.00.
It is a basic requirement in the issuance of the preliminary injunctive writ that there
Other just and equitable reliefs are likewise prayed for." 17 must be a right to be protected. As the issue in the case at bar is due process in the
March 29 Board meeting, there is, indeed, a right to be protected for, in
The motion for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and the writ of administrative proceedings, a respondents right to due process exists not only at
preliminary injunction was immediately set for hearing. At the May 10, 1993 hearing, the early stages but also at the final stage thereof.
the lower court declared that the only issue to be resolved was "whether or not the
respondents in Civil Case No. 93-15665 violated (Nadals) right to due process when With the circulation to the members of the Board of Regents, as well as to other UP
it rendered a decision finding Nadal guilty of the charges against him" during the personnel, of the Minutes of the March 29, 1993 meeting, even after this case had
March 29, 1993 meeting. After the respondents had presented their first witness, Dr. already been filed, the Court is convinced that there now exists a threat to the
Olivia C. Caoili, the lower court asked respondents counsel whether they were petitioner (respondent in SDT Case No. 91-026) that the decision of the Board of
amenable to maintaining the status quo. Said counsel replied in the negative Regents finally finding him guilty of willfully withholding information material to his
application for Socialized Tuition and Financial Assistance Program (STFAP) benefits, Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and Caoili as respondents in the petition for
will be implemented at any time, especially during the enrollment period, and that mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now estopped from questioning their
this implementation would work injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in personality to file the instant petition. 23 Moreover, under Sec. 7 of the U.P. Charter
finishing his course, and, consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job. The (Act 1870) and Sec. 11 of the University Code "all process" against the BOR shall be
injury thus caused would be irreparable. served on "the president or secretary thereof." It is in accordance with these legal
provisions that Dr. Caoili is named as a petitioner. Necessarily, Dr. Abueva, the
Damages are irreparable within the meaning of the rule where there is no standard University President and member of the BOR, has to verify the petition. It is not
by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. Where the mandatory, however, that each and every member of the BOR be named petitioners.
damage is susceptible of mathematical computation, it is not irreparable. (Social As the Court has time and again held, an action may be entertained,
Security Commission v. Bayona, Et Al., G.R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962). notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where it appears that
the naming of the party would be but a formality. 24
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, and so as not to render moot the issues in the instant
proceedings, let a writ of preliminary injunction be issued restraining the No longer novel, as this is not a case of first impression, is the issue on the right of
respondents, their officers, agent(s), representatives, and all persons acting in their an academic institution to refuse admission to a student arising from the imposition
behalf, from further proceeding with SDT Case No. 91-026, and from suspending upon him of an administrative disciplinary sanction. In our recent decision in Ateneo
petitioner, upon the latters filing a bond in the amount of P3,000.00. de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, 25 wherein certain law students
were dismissed for hazing resulting in the death of another, we held that the matter
IT IS SO ORDERED." 20 of admission of students is within the ambit of academic freedom and therefore,
beyond the province of the courts to decide. Certain fundamental principles bear
Dispensing with the filing of a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners filed the stressing.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the issuance of an
injunction or temporary restraining order, raising the following issues: whether or not One of the arguments of Nadal in his petition for mandamus below was that he was
Nadal was denied due process in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against denied due process. To clarify, the so-called lack of due process referred only to the
him, and, whether or not the respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in March 29, 1993 meeting of the BOR. As stated by respondents counsel: "What was
issuing the May 29, 1993 writ of preliminary injunction thereby preventing the BOR conceded by undersigned counsel was that Nadal was afforded due process from the
from implementing the one-year suspension penalty it had imposed on Nadal. start of the administrative proceeding up to the meeting of the Board of Regents on
March 28, 1993." 26
Before proceeding with the discussion of the merits of the instant petition, we shall
confront a threshold issue raised by private respondent, namely, that Dr. Caoili, not With respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting, respondent considers the same as
having been authorized by the Board of Regents as a collegial body to file the "unquestionably void for lack of due process" inasmuch as he was not sent a notice
instant petition, and Dr. Abueva, who verified the petition, not being the "Board of of said meeting. Counsel cites the ruling in Non v. Dames II 27 that imposition of
Regents" nor "the University of the Philippines," they are not the real parties in sanctions on students requires "observance of procedural due process," 28 the
interest who should file the same. 21 phrase obviously referring to the sending of notice of the meeting.

A real party in interest is one "who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment Attention is drawn to the disparate factual environments obtaining in Non v. Dames
or the party entitled to the avails of the suit.Interest within the meaning of the rule II and in the instant case. In the former case, the students were refused admission
means material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as for having led or participated in student mass actions against the school, thereby
distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental posing a collision between constitutionally cherished rights freedom of expression
interest." 22 Undoubtedly, the U.P. Board of Regents has an interest to protect and academic freedom. In the case at bar, Nadal was suspended for having
inasmuch as what is in issue here is its power to impose disciplinary action against a breached the Universitys disciplinary rules. In the Non case, the Court ruled that the
student who violated the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline students were not afforded due process for even the refusal to re-enroll them
by withholding information in connection with his application for STFAP benefits, appeared to have been a mere afterthought on the part of the school administrators.
which information, if disclosed, would have sufficed to disqualify him from receiving Here, Nadal does not dispute the fact that his right to due process was held inviolate
the financial assistance he sought. Such dishonesty, if left unpunished, would have until the BOR decided to meet on March 29, 1993 with his case as the sole item on
the effect of subverting a commendable program into which the University officials the agenda.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
had devoted much time and expended precious resources, from the
conceptualization to the implementation stage, to rationalize the socialized scheme In any event, it is gross error to equate due process in the instant case with the
of tuition fee payments in order that more students may benefit from the public sending of notice of the March 29, 1993 BOR meeting to Respondent. University
funds allocated to the State University. rules do not require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are
included as items on the agenda of the Board. This is not exclusive of students
whose disciplinary cases have been appealed to the Board of Regents as the final
review body. At no time did respondent complain of lack of notice given to him to Unlike in criminal cases which require proof beyond reasonable doubt as basis for a
attend any of the regular and special BOR meetings where his case was up for judgment, in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence
deliberation. He would make an exception of the March 29, 1993 meeting for it was is required, that which means more than a mere scintilla or relevant evidence as a
"supposed to reconsider the decision made on March 28, 1993 exonerating reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other
respondent Nadal from all administrative charges against him." 29 minds equally reasonable might conceivably opine otherwise. 35 In light of the
foregoing circumstances, we find that Nadal has been sufficiently proven to have
Regent Antonio T. Carpio, in his testimony before the lower court on May 25, 1993 violated his undertaking to divulge all information needed when he applied for the
admitted that there was no final verdict at the March 28, 1993 meeting in view of benefits of the STFAP.
the conditional votes resulting from his assertion that he was "not morally convinced
that there was sufficient evidence to make a finding of guilty against Nadal because Let it not be forgotten that respondent aspires to join the ranks of the professionals
there was no direct evidence that his mother received income from the United who would uphold truth at all costs so that justice may prevail. The sentinels who
States and this income was sent to the Philippines to support the studies of the stand guard at the portals leading to the hallowed Temples of Justice cannot be
children." 30 Two regents shared the view of Regent Carpio, with the following result: overzealous in admitting only those who are intellectually and morally fit. In those
four voted guilty, three, not guilty, and three cast conditional votes. The BOR agreed who exhibit duplicity in their student days, one spots the shady character who is
that, upon the suggestion of Regent Carpio, they would still verify from the AdeMU bound to sow the seeds of chicanery in the practice of his profession.
about Nadals alleged scholarship as a student in said institution. Consequently, no
definitive decision was arrived at by the BOR on March 28, 1993. Much less was a Having reached his senior year, respondent is presumably aware that the bedrock
verdict of exoneration handed down as averred by Respondent. axiom, Canon I, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer
shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Further on,
Regent Carpio testified, with respect to the March 29, 1993 meeting where all twelve Canon 7, Rule 7.01 provides: "A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a
members of the BOR were present, that all of them participated in the voting held to false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
reconsider the previous days decision. He stated: "I remember Regent Arcellana admission to the bar." (Italics supplied for emphasis)
questioning the voting again on the ground that there was already a final decision,
but there was a vote taken on whether a motion for reconsideration can be decided Surely, it is not too early to warn entrants to the noble profession of law that honesty
by the board, and a majority of the board ruled that the matter can be reconsidered and integrity are requirements no less weighty than hurdling the Bar examinations.
again upon motion of the chairman." 31 This is the reason why a certification of good moral character is one of the
documents that must be submitted in applying to take said examination. In fact, a
At said meeting, six (6) regents voted to find respondent guilty, three (3) voted that charge of immoral or deceitful conduct on the part of an applicant, when proved, is a
he was not guilty and three (3) abstained. As succinctly announced by Regent ground for disqualifying him.
Carpio, the final decision was that which was rendered on March 29, 1993 as "no
other decision was made by the Board with respect to the same issue." 32 To revert to the instant case, inasmuch as it has been shown sufficiently that
respondent has committed an act of dishonesty in withholding vital information in
Counsel for Nadal charged before the lower court that his client was "not given due connection with his application for STFAP benefits, all in blatant violation of the Rules
process in the March 29 meeting because the ground upon which he was again and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline of petitioner University, the
convicted was not the same as the original charge." 33 Obviously, he was referring latters inherent power and authority to impose disciplinary sanction may be invoked
to the basis of the conditional votes on March 28, i.e., whether or not Nadal was and rightfully exercised.
telling the truth when he claimed that he received a scholarship grant from the
AdeMU. However, Regent Carpio himself testified that the charge considered was As a Bohemian proverb puts it: "A school without discipline is like a mill without
"exactly the same charge" of withholding information on the income of Nadals water." Insofar as the water turns the mill, so does the schools disciplinary power
mother. 34 It should be stressed that the reason why Regent Carpio requested a assure its right to survive and continue operating. In more relevant terms, through
verification of Nadals claim that he was a scholar at the AdeMU was that Regent its power to impose disciplinary sanctions, an educational institution is able to
Carpio was not "morally convinced" yet as to the guilt of Nadal. In other words, he exercise its academic freedom which is, in the case at bar, the right to suspend and
sought additional insights into the character of Nadal through the information that refuse admission to a student who has subverted its authority in the implementation
would be obtained from the AdeMU.chanrobles law library of the critically important STFAP.

In this regard, we find such information to be irrelevant and a mere superfluity. In his At the risk of being repetitious, the matter of admission to a University is
July 12, 1991 certification aforementioned, Nadal admitted, although inconsistently, encompassed by the right of academic freedom. In Garcia v. The Faculty Admission
that his mother was a "TNT" who could not find a "stable, regular, well-paying Committee, Loyola School of Theology 36 the Court stated that a school or college
employment" but that she was supporting the education of his brothers with the which is possessed of the right of academic freedom "decides for itself its aims and
help of another son. To our mind, this constitutes sufficient admission that Nadal objectives and how best to attain them. It is free from outside coercion or
withheld information on the income, however measly and irregular, of his mother. interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare calls for some
restraint. It has a wide sphere of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of Hence, by issuing the writ of preliminary injunction, the lower court dared to tread
students." Elucidating, in Ateneo de Manila University v. Hon. Ignacio M. Capulong, upon legally forbidden grounds. For, by virtue of the writ, the Universitys exercise of
37 the Court further expounded:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph academic freedom was peremptorily curtailed. Moreover, the door was flung wide
open for Nadal to do exactly what the decision of the BOR prohibited him from doing
"Since Garcia v. Loyola School of Theology, we have consistently upheld the salutary and that is, to violate the suspension order by enrolling for the first semester of
proposition that admission to an institution of higher learning is discretionary upon a 1993-1994. It must have been with consternation that the University officials
school, the same being a privilege on the part of the student rather than a right. helplessly watched him complete his academic requirements for taking the Bar. 40
While under the Education Act of 1982, students have a right to freely choose their In the event that he be allowed to continue with his studies, he would, in effect
field of study, subject to existing curricula and to continue their course therein up to render moot and academic the disciplinary sanction of suspension legally imposed
graduation, such right is subject, as all rights are, to the established academic and upon him by the BORs final decision of March 29, 1993. What is to prevent other
disciplinary standards laid down by the academic institution. aspirants for STFAP scholarships from misleading the University authorities by
misrepresenting certain facts or as in instant case, withholding vital information and
For private schools have the right to establish reasonable rules and regulations for stating downright falsehoods, in their application forms with impunity? Not only
the admission, discipline and promotion of students. This right . . . extends as well to would this undermine the authority of the U.P. to discipline its students who violate
parents . . . as parents are under a social and moral (if not legal) obligation, the rules and regulations of the institution but, more importantly, subvert the very
individually and collectively, to assist and cooperate with the schools. concept and lofty intent to give financial assistance to poor but deserving students
through the STFAP which, incidentally, has not ceased refining and modifying its
Such rules are incident to the very object of incorporation and indispensable to the operations.
successful management of the college. The rules may include those governing
student discipline. Going a step further, the establishment of rules governing WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED and the lower court is hereby ordered
university-student relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may to DISMISS the petition for mandamus.
be regarded as vital, if not merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the
institution, but to its very survival. SO ORDERED.

Within memory of the current generation is the eruption of militancy in the academic Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr.,
groves as collectively, the students demanded and plucked for themselves from the Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno and Vitug, JJ., concur.
panoply of academic freedom their own rights encapsulized under the rubric of right
to education forgetting that, in Hohfeldian terms, they have a concomitant duty,
and that is, their duty to learn under the rules laid down by the school." (Italics Acts of Law Office Associates
supplied.)
EN BANC
On the second issue presented for adjudication, the Court finds that the lower court
gravely abused its discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction of May 29, [G.R. No. L-22979. January 27, 1967.]
1993. The issuance of the said writ was based on the lower courts finding that the
implementation of the disciplinary sanction of suspension on Nadal "would work RHEEM OF THE PHILIPPINES INC. AND GORDON W. MACKAY, Petitioners, v. ZOILO B.
injustice to the petitioner as it would delay him in finishing his course, and FERRER, MARIO TATLONGHARI, SANTOS MARILAG AND COURT OF INDUSTRIAL
consequently, in getting a decent and good paying job." Sadly, such a ruling RELATIONS, Respondents.
considers only the situation of Nadal without taking into account the circumstances,
clearly of his own making, which led him into such a predicament. More importantly, Ponce Enrile, Siguion Reyna, Montecillo, Belo & Armonio, for Petitioners.
it has completely disregarded the overriding issue of academic freedom which
provides more than ample justification for the imposition of a disciplinary sanction Jose T. Valmonte for Respondents.
upon an erring student of an institution of higher learning.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary Mariano B. Tuason for respondent Court of Industrial Relations.

From the foregoing arguments, it is clear that the lower court should have restrained
itself from assuming jurisdiction over the petition filed by Nadal. Mandamus is never SYLLABUS
issued in doubtful cases, a showing of a clear and certain right on the part of the
petitioner being required. 38 It is of no avail against an official or government
agency whose duty requires the exercise of discretion or judgment. 39 1. COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS; POWER TO DETERMINE THE WAGES OF NIGHT
WORKERS; COMMONWEALTH ACT 103 CONSTRUED. While there was no law
actually requiring payment of additional compensation for night work, the industrial
court has the power to determine the wages that night workers should receive under enunciated in Campos, Et Al., v. Manila Railroad Co., Et Al., L-17905, May 25, 1962,
Commonwealth Act No. 103. thus

2. ID.; JURISDICTION; COMMONWEALTH ACT 103 CONSTRUED IN RELATION TO REP. "We may, therefore, restate for the benefit of the bench and the bar, that in order
ACT 857. The broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR have that the Court of Industrial Relations may acquire jurisdiction over a controversy in
been curtailed by Republic Act 375 which limited them to the four categories therein the light of Republic Act No. 876, the following circumstances must be present: (a)
expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes there must evident between the parties an employer-employee relationship, or the
via the collective bargaining process. claimant must seek his reinstatement; and (b) the controversy must relate to a case
certified by the President to the CIR as one involving national interest, or must have
3. ID.; CLAIM FOR SUNDAY AND SPECIAL HOLIDAY PAY, NIGHT DIFFERENTIALS, a bearing on an unfair labor practice charge, or must arise either under the Eight-
REINSTATEMENT AND BACK WAGES AND DAMAGES INCIDENT THERETO. Where Hour Labor Law, or under the Minimum Wage Law. In default of any of these
the record does not show that the employer-employee relationship between the 65 circumstances the claim becomes a mere money claim that comes under the
respondents and the petitioner had ceased, the claim for Sunday and legal holiday jurisdiction of the regular courts."cralaw virtua1aw library
pay and that for night differentials and payment of salary increases and separation
pay are within the Court of Industrial Relations jurisdiction. And for this reason, the And, the CIR has jurisdiction. 2
demands for reinstatement and backwages and damages incident thereto, also fall
within the jurisdiction of the same Court. 2. On the claim for night differentials, no extended discussion is necessary. To be
read as controlling here is a Philippine Engineers Syndicate, Inc. v. Hon. Jose S.
Bautista, Et Al., L- 16440, February 29, 1964, where this Court, speaking thru Mr.
DECISION Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon, declared

"Only one issue is raised: whether or not upon the enactment of Republic Act 876
SANCHEZ, J.: the CIR lost its jurisdiction over claims for additional compensation for regular night
work. Petitioner says that this Act reduced the jurisdiction of respondent court and
limited it to specific cases which this Court has defined as: . . . (1) when the labor
Challenged by petitioner on certiorari and prohibition is the jurisdiction of the Court dispute affects an industry which is indispensable to the national interest and is so
of Industrial Relations [hereinafter referred to as CIR] to hear and determine a case 1 certified by the President to the industrial court (Sec. 10, Republic Act 875); (2) when
seeking the controversy refers to minimum wage under the Minimum Wage Law (Republic
Act 602); (3) when it involves hours of employment under the Eight-Hour Labor Law
1. Reinstatement with back wages, which accumulated since their illegal separation, (Commonwealth Act 444); and (4) when it involves an unfair labor practice Sec. 5(a)
on the ground of unjustified dismissal; Republic Act 875]. [Paflu, Et. Al. v. Tan, Et Al., 99 Phil., 854; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 13,
5836].
2. Moral and exemplary damages because of such dismissal;
Petitioner insists that respondents case falls in none of these categories because as
3. Payment of increase in salary and separation pay; held in to previous cases, night work is not overtime but regular work; and that
respondent courts authority to try the case cannot be implied from the general
4. Night differential pay; and jurisdiction and broad powers under Commonwealth Act 103 because Republic Act
875 precisely curbed such powers limiting them to certain specific litigations,
5. Premium pay for work done on Sundays and legal holidays. beyond which it is not permitted to act.

The present proceeding is an offshoot of the CIRs denial of petitioners motion to We believe petitioner to be in error. Its position collides with our ruling in the Naric
dismiss grounded on want jurisdiction over the subject-matter the principal case [National Rice & Corn Corp. (NARIC) v. NARIC Workers Union, Et Al., 106 Phil.,
respondents complaint and said courts refusal to reconsider the order of denial. 891] where we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. We start with the demand for additional pay for work performed on Sundays and While it is true that this Court made the above comment in the aforementioned
legal holidays. Right to such pay is, by explicit articulation in Section 4 of the Eight- case, it does not intend to convey the idea that work done at night cannot also be an
Hour Labor Law, guaranteed a workman. Consequently, failure to give additional overtime work. The comment only served to emphasize that the demand which the
compensation for such work is a violation of the said law. Here, the principal Shell Company made upon its laborers is not merely an overtime work but night
respondents were dismissed from their employment. But they seek reinstatement. work and so there was need to differentiate night work from daytime work. In fact,
Hence, the case, on this score, is within the coverage of the prevailing rule the company contended that there was no law that required the payment of
additional compensation for night work unlike an overtime work which is covered by
Commonwealth Act No. 444 (Eight Hour Labor Law). And this Court in that case said 3. The other demands, namely, reinstatement, and back wages and the damages
that while there was no law actually requiring payment of additional compensation incident thereto, and payment of salary increases and separation pay, are matters
for night work, the industrial court has the power to determine the wages that night which arose out of the same employment. Since employer-employee relationship is
workers should receive under Commonwealth Act No. 103, and so it justified the sought to be reestablished, the Industrial Court "has jurisdiction over all claims
additional compensation in the Shell case for" hygienic, medical, moral, cultural and arising out of, or in connection with, employment." 3
sociological reasons."
Earlier, we held herein that the claim for Sunday and legal holiday pay and that for
Apropos the issue of jurisdiction, this Court in the same Shell case spoke in this night differentials are within the compass of the CIRs jurisdiction. It is because of
fashion:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library this that we say that no reason exists why we should pull said demands for
reinstatement, and back wages and damages incident thereto, and payment of
La cuestin que, a nuestro juicio, se debe determinar es si entre las facultades salary increases and separation pay out of the CIR s jurisdiction and place them
generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales que estan admitidas sin disputa, in the hands of ordinary courts. Just recently, we had occasion to remark that: 4" [t]o
esta la de considerar la jornada de noche como una jornada completa de trabajo; la draw a tenuous jurisdictional line is to undermine stability in labor litigations. A
de estimarla como mas gravosa que la jornada de dia; y consiguientemente, la de piecemeal resort to one court and another gives rise to multiplicity of suits. To force
proveer y ordenar que se remunere con un 50% mas de los salarios regulares the employees to shuttle from one court to another to secure full redress is a
diurnos. Nuestra contestacion es afirmativa: todo esto se halla comprendido entre situation gravely prejudicial. The time to be lost, effort wasted, anxiety augmented,
los poderes generales de la Corte de Relaciones Industriales. Si este tribunal tiene, additional expense incurred these are considerations which weigh heavily against
en casos de disputa, el poder fijar los salarios que estime justos y razonables para el split jurisdiction. Indeed, it is more in keeping with orderly administration of justice
trabajo de dia, no hay razon nor qu no ha de tener el mismo poder con respecto a that all the causes of action here be cognizable and heard by only one court: the
los salarios de noche; es tan trabajo lo uno como lo otro . . . [Shell Co. contra Court of Industrial Relations." 5
National Labor Union, ibid., at 325-326].
Upon the view we take of this case, the petition herein for certiorari and prohibition
True, in PAFLU Et. Al. v. Tan Et. Al. supra, and in a series of cases thereafter, we held is hereby dismissed. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
that the broad powers conferred by Commonwealth Act 103 on the CIR may have
been curtailed by Republic Act 875 which limited them to the four categories therein Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar and
expressed in line with the public policy of allowing settlement of industrial disputes Ruiz Castro, JJ., concur.
via the collective bargaining process, but we find no cogent reason for concluding
that a suit of this nature-for extra compensation for night work falls outside the
domain of the industrial court. Withal, the record does not show that the employer- FIRST DIVISION
employee relation between the 65 respondents and the petitioner had ceased.
[G.R. NO. 164871 : August 22, 2006]
After the passage of Republic Act 875 this Court has not only upheld the industrial
courts assumption of jurisdiction over cases for salary differentials and overtime TRUST INTERNATIONAL PAPER CORPORATION, Petitioner, v. MARILOU R. PELAEZ,
pay [Chua Workers Union (NLU) v. City Automotive Co., Et Al., G.R. No. L-11655 April Respondent.
29, 1959; Prisco v. CIR, Et Al., 108 Phil., 134] or for payment of additional
compensation for work rendered on Sundays and holidays and for night work DECISION
[Nassco v. Almin, Et. Al. 104 Phil., 835; Detective & Protective Bureau, Inc. v. Felipe
Guevara, Et Al., G. R. No. L-8738, May 31, 1957] but has also supported such courts CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
ruling that work performed at night should be paid more than work done at daytime
and that if that work is done beyond the workers regular hours of duty, he should This Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with an Urgent
also be paid additional compensation for overtime work. [Naric v. Naric Workers Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Union, et al, G. R. No. L-12075, May 29, 1959 citing Shell Co. v. National Labor Union, Preliminary Injunction, seeks to set aside the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in
81 Phil. 315]. Besides to hold that this case for extra compensation now falls beyond CA-G.R. SP No. 73356 entitled, "Marilou R. Pelaez v. National Labor Relations
the powers of the industrial court to decide, would amount to a further curtailment Commission, et al." dated 13 February 20041 and 29 July 2004, respectively. The
of the jurisdiction of said court to an extent which may defeat the purpose of the first Resolution denied petitioner Trust International Paper Corporation's (TIPCO)
Magna Carta to the prejudice of labor." [Luis Recato Dy, at al. v. CIR, G.R. No. L- Petition for Relief from Judgment, while the second denied its motion seeking
17788, May 25, 1962]. reconsideration thereof.

Again, we hold that the CIR is with authority to act on this grievance. Respondent Marilou R. Pelaez started her employment with petitioner as Secretary.
She earned various promotions, the last of which was her appointment as Corporate
Cashier in 1993.
 In a Decision dated 31 May 2002, the NLRC reversed the findings and rulings of the
After undergoing substantial business losses for the fiscal year 1996-1997, petitioner Labor Arbiter. It affirmed the validity of petitioner's redundancy program, which was
implemented cost-cutting and streamlining programs to alleviate its financial the ground for the termination of respondent's employment. The dispositive portion
predicament. In the course of carrying out the said programs, several positions were of the Decision provides:
abolished and declared redundant, one of which was the position of Corporate
Cashier. Thus, on 24 December 1997, respondent received a memorandum from WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby VACATED and SET ASIDE and a
Jose Reyes, petitioner's Chief Financial Officer, informing her that her services were new one entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.3
terminated. She accepted her severance from the employ of petitioner and turned
over her accountabilities to the different departments which absorbed her On 5 July 2002, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration which the NLRC denied
responsibilities. Thereafter, she was no longer required to report for work. in a Resolution dated 31 July 2002.

Sometime in January 1998, respondent found out the creation of the position of Unfazed with the setback, respondent filed a special civil action for certiorari under
Treasury Clerk in petitioner's plantilla which has the same job description and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals arguing that grave abuse of
responsibilities as that of Corporate Cashier. Feeling deceived, respondent discretion was committed by the NLRC in setting aside the Labor Arbiter's Decision
immediately filed on 6 January 1998 a Complaint for illegal dismissal, non- despite having been duly supported by the facts and the law.
payment/underpayment of salaries, separation pay, retirement benefits, service
incentive leave and sick leave benefits, and damages against petitioner, Elon Ting, In due time, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of respondent on the
the president of TIPCO, Efren TanLapco, the Chief Operating Officer of TIPCO and Jose ground that respondent's dismissal due to redundancy did not meet the
E. Reyes, the Chief Financial Officer of TIPCO before the Arbitration Branch of the requirements of law; hence, the same was illegal. The Court of Appeals decreed:
DOLE-NCR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The decision of
On 12 January 1998, respondent received her separation benefits from petitioner in public respondent NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 021691-99, as well as its subsequent
the amount of P539,974.20 and correspondingly signed a Deed of Release and resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration, are hereby ANNULLED
Quitclaim. AND SET ASIDE and the decision of the labor arbiter a quo REINSTATED.4

In a Decision dated 21 September 1999, the Labor Arbiter found petitioner guilty of The Decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory as no appeal or
illegal dismissal and awarded to respondent backwages, separation pay and motion for reconsideration was filed by either party.
damages. The decretal portion of the Decision reads:
Hence, on 25 July 2003, an Entry of Judgment was issued by the Court of Appeals.
CONFORMABLY WITH THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding
complainant to have been illegally retrenched by respondents. Consequently, they On 29 December 2003, petitioner filed a Petition for Relief from Judgment with the
are ordered to pay in solidum complainant as follows: Court of Appeals. Petitioner anchored its petition on the "excusable negligence" of its
counsel Siguion Reyna, Montecillo & Ongsiako's (Siguion Reyna) law firm and the
a) Backwages as of August 29 August, 1999 - Php 484,000.00 gross negligence of Atty. Elena C. Cardinez (Atty. Cardinez), a newly hired junior
associate of the Siguion Reyna law firm, who allegedly handled the case for
b) Separation Pay - Php 459,800.00 petitioner. Petitioner revealed that the instant case was assigned to Atty. Cardinez in
June 2003 and that all notices, orders and legal processes in connection with the
c) Moral Damages - Php 300,000.00 instant case were immediately forwarded to her for appropriate action.

d) Exemplary Damages - Php 100,000.00 Petitioner contended that the Siguion Reyna law firm was never remiss in its duty to
follow up the status of the case with Atty. Cardinez. In fact, it was the law firm itself,
e) Vacation and sick leaves - Php 55,974.20 through Atty. Cardinez's supervising lawyers and co-counsels, Attys. Carla E.
Santamaria-Sea, Cheryll Ann L. Pea and Rean Mayo D. Javier, who had to elicit
f) 5% of the awarded money claims as attorney's fees. reports from her. When asked about the developments of the case, Atty. Cardinez
supposedly informed the law firm that everything was in order regarding petitioner's
The sum of Php 539,974.20 should be deducted from the awards granted to defense, when in fact, it was not. Eventually, Atty. Cardinez never reported to work
complainant.2 and that she was nowhere to be found despite the law firm's diligent efforts to
search for her. She did not turn over the case files in her possession, including the
On 22 October 1999, petitioner appealed to the National Labor Relations Court of Appeals file folders of the instant case.
Commission (NLRC).
Petitioner maintained that the acts of Atty. Cardinez in misrepresenting to the law WHICH MUST BE FULLY VENTILATED, CONSIDERING THAT IT STANDS TO LOSE THE
firm that everything was in order regarding its defense, when in fact, it was not, and STAGGERING SUM OF MORE THAN TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00)6
the fact that she took the files with her constitute gross negligence and should not
bind petitioner. Corollarily, petitioner argues that the Siguion Reyna law firm's fault At the onset, it must be pointed out that the present petition seeking the setting
can only be categorized as an excusable neglect for it was not remiss in making aside of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions dated 13 February 2004 and 29 July 2004,
follow-ups about the status of the case with Atty. Cardinez. It acknowledged that the denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment, is a Petition for Review on
law firm's mistake was that it put faith in the assurances of Atty. Cardinez, who Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
repeatedly gave her word that nothing was amiss in the defense of petitioner's
position in the instant case. Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, however, provides:

Unconvinced, the Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 13 February 2004, denied SECTION 1. Subject of appeal. - An appeal may be taken from a judgment or final
petitioner's Petition for Relief from Judgment, ratiocinating as follows: order that completely disposes of the case, or of a particular matter therein when
declared by these Rules to be appealable.
There is no use arguing that the instant case was unloaded by Attys. Pea and
Javier, to a certain Atty. Elena C. Cardinez, as it is the responsibility of the law firm of No appeal may be taken from:
Siguion Reyna Montecillo and Ongsiako Law Office itself, to prepare and submit the
appropriate relief or remedy of its client. The negligence or failure of its partners or xxx
associates to perform its duties and tasks is not excusable negligence that could
merit relief under Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. (b) An order denying a petition for relief or any similar motion seeking relief from
judgment.
The doctrinal rule is that the negligence of the counsel binds the client because,
otherwise, there would never be an end to a suit so long as counsel could allege its xxx
own fault or negligence to support the client's case and obtain remedies and relief
already lost by the operation of law.5 In all the above instances where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the
aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the
Court of Appeals in a Resolution dated 29 July 2004. Thus, in Azucena v. Foreign Manpower Services,7 it was held:

Hence, the instant Petition. Neither may petitioner seek to set aside the Court of Appeals' April 26, 2001
Resolution denying his petition for relief from judgment through the same mode of
In its Memorandum, petitioner submitted the following issues: review (petition for review on certiorari ), for under Section 1(b) of Rule 41 of the
Rules of Court, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment is subject only to a
A. special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65. (Emphasis supplied.)

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO Based on the foregoing, the denial of a petition for relief from judgment can only be
RECOGNIZE THE GROSS AND PALPABLE NEGLIGENCE, BORDERING ON FRAUD, assailed before this Court via a special civil action under Rule 65 and not through a
COMMITTED BY PETITIONER'S FORMER HANDLING COUNSEL, ATTY. CARDINEZ, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. In availing of a Petition for Review on
WHOSE NEGLIGENCE AND ACTIVE MISREPRESENTATION PREVENTED PETITIONER Certiorari under Rule 45 to obtain the reversal of the Court of Appeals' Resolutions
FROM EXHAUSTING ALL THE LEGAL REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO IT, PARTICULARLY, THE denying its petition for relief from judgment, petitioner certainly has made use of the
REMEDY OF APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT. wrong remedy.

B. Even if this Court was to treat the instant petition as a special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65, the same would still have to be dismissed.
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR WHEN IT STRICTLY
APPLIED THE TECHNICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE TO THE DETRIMENT OF In Mercury Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals,8 the Court clarified the nature of a
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTICE. petition for relief from judgment:

C. A petition for relief from judgment is an equitable remedy that is allowed only in
exceptional cases when there is no other available or adequate remedy. When a
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED TO party has another remedy available to him, which may be either a motion for new
TAKE INTO CONSIDERATION PETITIONER'S GOOD AND SUBSTANTIAL DEFENSE, trial or appeal from an adverse decision of the trial court, and he was not prevented
by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence from filing such motion or was guilty of inexcusable neglect in handling petitioner's case before the Court of
taking such appeal, he cannot avail himself of this petition. x x x. Appeals.

This Court likewise ruled: Petitioner insists that its case is an exception to the general rule that the negligence
of counsel binds the client. Petitioner invokes this Court's ruling in People's Homesite
Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks avoidance from the effects of and Housing Operation v. Workmen's Compensation Commission,11 Somoso v. Court
the judgment when the loss of the remedy at law was due to his own negligence; of Appeals,12 Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,13 Salazar v. Court of Appeals,14
otherwise the petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which had Sarraga, Sr. v. Banco Filipino Savings and Mortgage Bank,15 and Heirs of Pael v.
been lost thru inexcusable negligence.9 Court of Appeals,16 where this Court departed from the general rule that the client
is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer considering that, in said cases, the lawyers
In the present case, petitioner posits that the Court of Appeals committed grave were grossly negligent in their duty to maintain their client's cause and such
error when it failed to recognize the gross and palpable negligence, bordering on amounted to a deprivation of their client's property without due process of law. In
fraud, committed by Atty. Cardinez, whose negligence prevented petitioner from said cases, the petitions for relief from judgment were given due course. However,
exhausting all the legal remedies available to it. we find that the ruling in said cases do not apply in the instant case.

It is undisputed that the counsel of record of petitioner is the Siguion Reyna law firm. In People's Homesite, the counsel failed to apprise the petitioners therein of the
The law firm failed to notify petitioner of the adverse decision of the Court of hearing and the case was heard in their absence. The counsel also did not inform the
Appeals to enable it to file a motion for reconsideration or to appeal from the said petitioners that he had received a copy of the decision and neither did he file a
decision. The law firm's failure to inform petitioner of the decision is inexcusable motion for reconsideration or a petition to set aside judgment to protect the
negligence which cannot be a ground for relief from judgment. This is in line with interests of his clients. When asked to explain, the counsel merely said that he did
jurisprudence that notice sent to counsel of record is binding upon the client, and not inform the petitioners because the case escaped his attention. On account of
the neglect or failure of counsel to inform his client of an adverse judgment resulting these attendant facts, this Court found that there was "something fishy and
in the loss of right to appeal will not justify the setting aside of a judgment that is suspicious" with the actions of counsel. The Court therein, in allowing the petition for
valid and regular on its face.10 relief from judgment and in remanding the case to the court of origin, had, in mind,
the attending probability that petitioner's counsel colluded with the adverse party,
The negligence of Atty. Cardinez, the law firm's new associate, apparent in her which is utterly wanting in the present case.
mishandling of the cause of petitioner likewise constitutes inexcusable negligence.
Negligence, to be excusable, must be one which ordinary diligence and prudence In the case at bar, petitioner's counsel was able to actively defend its case before
could have not guarded against. the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. In fact, the Siguion Reyna law
firm was able to obtain a favorable decision for petitioner before the NLRC. The
It must be pointed out that Atty. Cardinez's name did not appear in any of the instant case is clearly at variance with the People's Homesite case.
pleadings filed by petitioner before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC, and the Court of
Appeals. It was only in the petition for relief filed before the Court of Appeals that In Somoso, the counsel of spouses Somoso informed them that he was withdrawing
the name of Atty. Cardinez appeared for the first time. In the petition for relief, Atty. his appearance as counsel of the case. A decision dated 8 March 1985 was issued by
Cardinez was blamed by petitioner and its counsel, the Siguion Reyna law firm, for the trial court against the spouses. The counsel received the decision on 15 August
squandering petitioner's opportunity to appeal the Court of Appeals' decision. What 1985, but the spouses came to know of the decision only on 27 September 1985, the
appears on the records is that the Comment and Memorandum of petitioner before day they received the letter from their counsel informing them of such decision. On
the Court of Appeals were signed by Attys. Carla E. Santamaria-Sea, Cheryll Ann L. 27 September 1985, the counsel belatedly filed in court his motion to withdraw as
Pea and Rean Mayo D. Javier. counsel which was dated 10 June 1985. This Court granted spouses' petition for
relief from judgment as they were able to prove that they were entitled thereto
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the handling lawyers of the law firm were considering that their counsel had earlier informed them of his intention to withdraw
putting the blame on Atty. Cardinez when they lost the case and forgot to file the from the case, but belatedly filed the formal withdrawal.
appeal. Besides, if the case was, indeed, unloaded to Atty. Cardinez, the supervising
lawyers would have detected the omission of the former considering that it is a In the present case, it has been Attys. Santamaria-Sea, Pea and Javier who
common practice in a law firm that when it hires a new associate, his or her work is participated in the proceedings before the Court of Appeals. They did not notify the
ordinarily reviewed by the more senior associate of the law firm. If the supervising Court of Appeals that they had withdrawn from the case. There was completely no
lawyers of Atty. Cardinez, namely, Attys. Sea, Pea and Javier, were not remiss in reason for them not to file an appeal, being the handling counsel of record during
their duty to follow up the status of the case, they would have known that they have the pendency of the case before the Court of Appeals.
not received or reviewed any pleadings from Atty. Cardinez pertaining to the case
under consideration. Simply, petitioner's counsel, the Siguion Reyna law firm itself, The case of Apex Mining, Inc. invoked by petitioner is not on all fours with the instant
case. In Apex, petitioners' counsel did not attend the scheduled hearing for the
reception of the evidence. The law firm did not even bother to inform its client of the Conflict of Interest
scheduled hearing, as a result of which both counsel and petitioners were unable to
attend the same. After the trial court issued an order declaring petitioners in default SECOND DIVISION
for having waived their right to present evidence, their counsel did not take steps to
have the same set aside. In addition, the negligent counsel deliberately A. C. No. 2040 March 4, 1998
misrepresented in the progress report that the case was still pending with Court of
Appeals when the same was dismissed months earlier. These circumstances are IMELDA A. NAKPIL, Complainant, vs. ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES, Respondent.
absent in the case under consideration because at no time was petitioner was
deprived of its right to submit evidence to support its argument.

Neither can the case of Salazar be applied in the case under consideration. In the PUNO, J.:
former, petitioners were deprived of their right to present evidence at the trial
through the gross and palpable mistake of their counsel who agreed to submit the The friendship of JOSE NAKPIL and respondent CARLOS J. VALDES dates back to the
case for decision without fully substantiating their defense. In the instant case, '50s during their school days in De La Salle and the Philippine Law School. Their
petitioner was able to ventilate its defense though various pleadings and closeness extended to their families and respondent became the business
documentary evidence before the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC and the Court of Appeals. consultant, lawyer and accountant of the Nakpils.

In Sarraga, the petition for relief from judgment was granted due to the attending In 1965, Jose Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence in Moran
circumstance where the counsel of record was grossly negligent in defending the Street, Baguio City. 1 For lack of funds, he requested respondent to purchase the
cause of the client. On the other hand, in the present case, petitioner is placing the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the property in
blame on the alleged gross negligence of an attorney who was not even been shown trust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant to their agreement,
to have participated in the proceedings of the case. respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank (in the amounts of P65,000.00 and
P75,000.00) which he used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then
In Heirs of Antonio Pael, this Court found that there was a showing of "badges of issued in respondent's name.
fraud" displayed by the counsel of the unsuccessful party when he resorted to two
clearly inconsistent remedies, namely appeal and motion for new trial. In contrast, It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house. When Jose Nakpil died on
the instant case merely illustrates a scenario where a counsel committed a simple July 8, 1973, respondent acted as the legal counsel and accountant of his widow,
and inexcusable negligence to the prejudice of the client. complainant IMELDA NAKPIL. On March 9, 1976, respondent's law firm, Carlos J.
Valdes & Associates, handled the proceeding for the settlement of Jose's estate.
In sum, this is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, Complainant was appointed as administratrix of the estate.
palpable, pervasive and reckless which deprives the party of his or her day in court.
For this reason, the Court need no longer concern itself with the propriety of the The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate proceedings.
ruling of the Court of Appeals reinstating the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The Court It appears that respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory of Jose's
is bound by the Court of Appeal's ruling which had become final and executory due estate. On February 13, 1978, respondent transferred his title to the Moran property
to the simple and inexcusable negligence of petitioner's counsel in allowing the to his company, the Caval Realty Corporation.
reglementary period to lapse without perfecting an appeal.
On March 29, 1979, complainant sought to recover the Moran property by filing with
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Baguio City an action for reconveyance with
13 February 2004 and 29 July 2004 in CA-G.R. SP damages against respondent and his corporation. In defense, respondent claimed
absolute ownership over the property and denied that a trust was created over it.
No. 73356 denying petitioner's petition for relief from judgment, are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner. During the pendency of the action for reconveyance, complainant filed this
administrative case to disbar the respondent. She charged that respondent violated
SO ORDERED. professional ethics when he:

I. Assigned to his family corporation the Moran property (Pulong Maulap) which
RILLORAZA, AFRICA, DE OCAMPO and AFRICA v. Eastern belonged to the estate he was settling as its lawyer and auditor.
Telecommunications Philippines Inc. GR No. 104600 July 2, 1999
II. Excluded the Moran property from the "inventory of real estate properties"
he prepared for a client-estate and, at the same time, charged the loan secured to
purchase the said excluded property as a liability of the estate, all for the purpose of
transferring the title to the said property to his family corporation. Respondent also disclaimed knowledge or privity in the preparation of a letter
(Exhibit "H") of his accounting firm to the Baguio City treasurer remitting the real
III. Prepared and defended monetary claims against the estate that retained estate taxes for the Moran property on behalf of the Nakpils. He contended that the
him as its counsel and auditor. 2 letter could be a mere error or oversight.

On the first charge, complainant alleged that she accepted respondent's offer to Respondent averred that it was complainant who acknowledged that they did not
serve as lawyer and auditor to settle her husband's estate. Respondent's law firm own the Moran property for: (1) complainant's February 1979 Statement of Assets
then filed a petition for settlement of the estate of the deceased Nakpil but did not and Liabilities did not include the said property, and; (2) complainant, as
include the Moran property in the estate's inventory. Instead, respondent transferred administratrix, signed the Balance Sheet of the Estate where the Moran property
the property to his corporation, Caval Realty Corporation, and title was issued in its was not mentioned.
name. Complainant accused respondent of maliciously appropriating the property in
trust knowing that it did not belong to him. She claimed that respondent has Respondent admitted that complainant retained the services of his law and
expressly acknowledged that the said property belonged to the late Nakpil in his accounting firms in the settlement of her husband's estate. 5 However, he pointed
correspondences 3 with the Baguio City Treasurer and the complainant. out that he has resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as 1974. He
alleged that it was Atty. Percival Cendaa (from the law firm Carlos Valdes &
On the second charge, complainant alleged that respondent's auditing firm (C. J. Associates) who filed the intestate proceedings in court in 1976.
Valdes & Co., CPAs) excluded the Moran property from the inventory of her
husband's estate, yet included in the claims against the estate the amounts of As to the third charge, respondent denied there was a conflict of interest when his
P65,000.00 and P75,000.00, which respondent represented as her husband's loans law firm represented the estate in the intestate proceedings while his accounting
applied "probably for the purchase of a house and lot in Moran Street, Baguio City." firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) served as accountant of the estate and prepared the
claims of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate. He proffered the
As to the third charge, complainant alleged that respondent's law firm (Carlos J. following reasons for his thesis: First, the two claimants were closely related to the
Valdes and Associates) filed the petition for the settlement of her husband's estate late Nakpil. Claimant ENORN, Inc. is a family corporation of the Nakpils of which the
in court, while respondent's auditing firm (C.J. Valdes & Co., CPAs) acted as late Nakpil was the President. Claimant Angel Nakpil is a brother of the late Nakpil
accountant of both the estate and two of its creditors. She claimed that respondent who, upon the latter's death, became the President of ENORN, Inc. These two
represented conflicting interests when his accounting firm prepared the list of claims claimants had been clients of his law and accounting firms even during the lifetime
of creditors Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against her husband's estate which was of Jose Nakpil. Second, his alleged representation of conflicting interests was with
represented by respondent's law firm. Complainant averred that there is no the knowledge and consent of complainant as administratrix. Third, there was no
distinction between respondent's law and auditing firms as respondent is the senior conflict of interests between the estate and the claimants for they had forged a
and controlling partner of both firms which are housed in the same building. modus vivendi, i.e., that the subject claims would be satisfied only after full payment
of the principal bank creditors. Complainant, as administratrix, did not controvert the
We required respondent to answer the charges against him. In his ANSWER, 4 claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Complainant has started paying off the
respondent initially asserted that the resolution of the first and second charges claims of Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. after satisfying the banks' claims.
against him depended on the result of the pending action in the CFI for Complainant did not assert that their claims caused prejudice to the estate. Fourth,
reconveyance which involved the issue of ownership of the Moran property. the work of Carlos J. Valdes & Co. as common auditor redounded to the benefit of the
estate for the firm prepared a true and accurate amount of the claim. Fifth,
On the merit of the first charge, respondent reiterated his defense in the respondent resigned from his law and accounting firms as early as August 15, 1974.
reconveyance case that he did not hold the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils 6 He rejoined his accounting firm several years later. He submitted as proof the
as he is its absolute owner. Respondent explained that the Nakpils never bought SEC's certification of the filing of his accounting firm of an Amended Articles of
back the Moran property from him, hence, the property remained to be his and was Partnership. Thus, it was not he but Atty. Percival Cendaa, from the firm Carlos J.
rightly excluded from the inventory of Nakpil's estate. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate proceedings in court. On the other hand,
the claimants were represented by their own counsel Atty. Enrique O. Chan. Sixth,
As to the second charge, respondent denied preparing the list of claims against the respondent alleged that in the remote possibility that he committed a breach of
estate which included his loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 for the purchase and professional ethics, he committed such "misconduct" not as a lawyer but as an
renovation of the Moran property. In charging his loans against the estate, he accountant who acted as common auditor of the estate and its creditors. Hence, he
stressed that the list drawn up by his accounting firm merely stated that the loans in should be held accountable in another forum.
respondent's name were applied "probably for the purchase of the house and lot in
Moran Street, Baguio City." Respondent insisted that this was not an admission that On November 12, 1979, complainant submitted her REPLY. 7 She maintained that the
the Nakpils owned the property as the phrase "probably for the purchase" did not pendency of the reconveyance case is not prejudicial to the investigation of her
imply a consummated transaction but a projected acquisition. disbarment complaint against respondent for the issue in the latter is not the
ownership of the Moran property but the ethics and morality of respondent's conduct
as a CPA-lawyer. In 1983, the CFI of Baguio dismissed the action for reconveyance. The trial court
ruled that respondent held the Moran property in trust for the Nakpils but found that
Complainant alleged that respondent's Annexes to his Reply (such as the Statement complainant waived her right over it.
of Assets & Liability of the Nakpils and the Balance Sheet of the Estate) which
showed that complainant did not claim ownership of the Moran property were all On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court. The appellate court held
prepared by C.J. Valdes & Co. as accountant of the estate of Jose Nakpil and filed that respondent was the absolute owner of the Moran property. The Decision was
with the intestate court by C.J. Valdes & Associates as counsel for the estate. She elevated to this Court.
averred that these Annexes were not proofs that respondent owned the Moran
property but were part of respondent's scheme to remove the property from the On February 18, 1986, during the pendency of complainant's appeal to this Court,
estate and transfer it to his family corporation. Complainant alleged that she signed the OSG submitted its Report 11 on the disbarment complaint. The OSG relied
the documents because of the professional counsel of respondent and his firm that heavily on the decision of the Court of Appeals then pending review by this Court.
her signature thereon was required. Complainant charged respondent with greed for The OSG found that respondent was not put on notice of complainant's claim over
coveting the Moran property on the basis of defects in the documents he himself the property. It opined that there was no trust agreement created over the property
prepared.. and that respondent was the absolute owner thereof. Thus, it upheld respondent's
right to transfer title to his family corporation. It also found no conflict of interests as
Complainant urged that respondent cannot disown unfavorable documents (the list the claimants were related to the late Jose Nakpil. The OSG recommended the
of claims against the estate and the letter regarding Nakpil's payment of realty tax dismissal of the administrative case.
on the Moran property) which were prepared by his law and accounting firms and
invoke other documents prepared by the same firms which are favorable to him. She Prefatorily, we note that the case at bar presents a novel situation as it involves the
averred that respondent must accept responsibility not just for some, but for all the disbarment of a CPA-lawyer for his demeanor in his accounting profession and law
representations and communications of his firms. practice in connection with the property of his client.

Complainant refuted respondent's claim that he resigned from his firms from March As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his client but the business
9, 1976 to "several years later." She alleged that none of the documents submitted transaction must be characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. 12 The
as evidence referred to his resignation from his law firm. The documents merely measure of good faith which an attorney is required to exercise in his dealings with
substantiated his resignation from his accounting firm. his client is a much higher standard than is required in business dealings where the
parties trade at "arms length." 13 Business transactions between an attorney and
In his REJOINDER, 8 respondent insisted that complainant cannot hold him liable for his client are disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law. Hence, courts
representing the interests of both the estate and the claimants without showing that carefully watch these transactions to assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer
his action prejudiced the estate. He urged that it is not per se anomalous for over his client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by virtue of his office, an
respondent's accounting firm to act as accountant for the estate and its creditors. He attorney is in an easy position to take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of
reiterated that he is not subject to the jurisdiction of this Court for he acted not as his client. Thus, no presumption of innocence or improbability of wrongdoing is
lawyer, but as accountant for both the estate and its claimants. considered in an attorney's favor. 14

He alleged that his accounting firm merely prepared the list of claims of the creditors In the case at bar, we cannot subscribe to the findings of the OSG in its Report.
Angel Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. Their claims were not defended by his accounting or These findings were based mainly on the decision of the Court
law firm but by Atty. Enrique Chan. He averred that his law firm did not oppose these of Appeals in the action for reconveyance which was reversed by this Court in 1993.
claims as they were legitimate and not because they were prepared by his 15
accounting firm. He emphasized that there was no allegation that the claims were
fraudulent or excessive and that the failure of respondent's law firm to object to As to the first two charges, we are bound by the factual findings of this Court in the
these claims damaged the estate. aforementioned reconveyance case. 16 It is well-established that respondent offered
to the complainant the services of his law and accounting firms by reason of their
In our January 21, 1980 Resolution, 9 we deferred further action on the disbarment close relationship dating as far back as the '50s. She reposed her complete trust in
case until after resolution of the action for reconveyance between the parties respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and business consultant of her late
involving the issue of ownership by the then CFI of Baguio. Complainant moved for husband. Respondent and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would purchase the
reconsideration on the ground that the issue of ownership pending with the CFI was Moran property and keep it in trust for the latter. In violation of the trust agreement,
not prejudicial to her complaint which involved an entirely different issue, i.e., the respondent claimed absolute ownership over the property and refused to sell the
unethical acts of respondent as a CPA-lawyer. We granted her motion and referred property to complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place the property beyond
the administrative case to the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) for investigation, the reach of complainant and the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to
report and recommendation. 10 his corporation.
 obtained by respondent for the purchase and renovation of the property which he
Contrary to the findings of the OSG, respondent initially acknowledged and claimed for himself. Respondent seeks to exculpate himself from this charge by
respected the trust nature of the Moran property. Respondent's bad faith in disclaiming knowledge or privity in the preparation of the list of the estate's
transferring the property to his family corporation is well discussed in this Court's liabilities. He theorizes that the inclusion of the loans must have been a mere error
Decision, 17 thus: or oversight of his accounting firm. It is clear that the information as to how these
two loans should be treated could have only come from respondent himself as the
said loans were in his name. Hence, the supposed error of the accounting firm in
. . . Valdes (herein respondent) never repudiated the trust during the lifetime of the charging respondent's loans against the estate could not have been committed
late Jose Nakpil. On the contrary, he expressly recognized it. . . . (H)e repudiated the without respondent's participation. Respondent wanted to "have his cake and eat it
trust when (he) excluded Pulong Maulap from the list of properties of the late Jose too" and subordinated the interest of his client to his own pecuniary gain.
Nakpil submitted to the intestate court in 1973. . . . Respondent violated Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
provides that a lawyer owes fidelity to his client's cause and enjoins him to be
xxx xxx xxx mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.

The fact that there was no transfer of ownership intended by the parties . . . can be As regards the third charge, we hold that respondent is guilty of representing
bolstered by Exh. "I-2," an annex to the claim filed against the estate proceedings of conflicting interests. It is generally the rule, based on sound public policy, that an
the late Jose Nakpil by his brother, Angel Nakpil, which was prepared by Carlos J. attorney cannot represent adverse interests. It is highly improper to represent both
Valdes & Co., the accounting firm of herein respondent. Exhibit "I-2," which is a list of sides of an issue. 19 The proscription against representation of conflicting interests
the application of the proceeds of various FUB loans contracted as of 31 December finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the same
1973 by the late Jose Nakpil, . . . contains the two (2) loans contracted in the name general matter 20 and is applicable however slight such adverse interest may be. It
of respondent. If ownership of Pulong Maulap was already transferred or ceded to applies although the attorney's intentions and motives were honest and he acted in
Valdes, these loans should not have been included in the list. good faith. 21 However, representation of conflicting interests may be allowed where
the parties consent to the representation, after full disclosure of facts. Disclosure
Indeed, as we view it, what the parties merely agreed to under the arrangement alone is not enough for the clients must give their informed consent to such
outlined in Exh. "J" was that respondent Valdes would . . . "take over the total loan of representation. The lawyer must explain to his clients the nature and extent of the
P140,000.00 and pay all of the interests due on the notes" while the heirs of the late conflict and the possible adverse effect must be thoroughly understood by his
Jose Nakpil would continue to live in the disputed property for five (5) years without clients. 22
remuneration save for regular maintenance expenses. This does not mean, however,
that if at the end of the five-year period petitioner (Nakpil) failed to reimburse Valdes In the case at bar, there is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its
for his advances, . . . Valdes could already automatically assume ownership of creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent's accounting firm prepared the list
Pulong Maulap. Instead, the remedy of respondents Carlos J. Valdes and Caval Realty of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the claims of
Corporation was to proceed against the estate of the late Jose M. Nakpil and/or the two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the interest of the
property itself." (emphasis supplied) estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants who are creditors of
the estate. In fact, at one instance, respondent's law firm questioned the claims of
In the said reconveyance case, we further ruled that complainant's documentary creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.
evidence (Exhibits "H", "J" and "L"), which she also adduced in this administrative
case, should estop respondent from claiming that he bought the Moran property for To exculpate himself, respondent denies that he represented complainant in the
himself, and not merely in trust for Jose Nakpil. 18 intestate proceedings. He points out that it was one Atty. Percival Cendaa, from his
law firm Carlos J. Valdes & Associates, who filed the intestate case in court. However,
It ought to follow that respondent's act of excluding the Moran property from the the fact that he did not personally file the case and appear in court is beside the
estate which his law firm was representing evinces a lack of fidelity to the cause of point. As established in the records of this case and in the reconveyance case, 23
his client. If respondent truly believed that the said property belonged to him, he respondent acted as counsel and accountant of complainant after the death of Jose
should have at least informed complainant of his adverse claim. If they could not Nakpil. Respondent's defense that he resigned from his law and accounting firms as
agree on its ownership, respondent should have formally presented his claim in the early as 1974 (or two years before the filing of the intestate case) is unworthy of
intestate proceedings instead of transferring the property to his own corporation and merit. Respondent's claim of resignation from his law firm is not supported by any
concealing it from complainant and the judge in the estate proceedings. documentary proof. The documents on record 24 only show respondent's resignation
Respondent's misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his client of the Moran from his accounting firm in 1972 and 1974. Even these documents reveal that
property is clearly unethical. respondent returned to his accounting firm on July 1, 1976 and as of 1978, the
intestate proceedings for the settlement of Jose's estate had not yet been
To make matters worse, respondent, through his accounting firm, charged the two terminated. It does not escape us that when respondent transferred the Moran
loans of P65,000.00 and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans were property to his corporation on February 13, 1978, the intestate proceedings was still
pending in court. Thus, the succession of events shows that respondent could not standards embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility as the relationship
have been totally ignorant of the proceedings in the intestate case. between an attorney and his client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost
fidelity and good faith. 28 In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full
Respondent claims that complainant knew that his law firm Carlos J. Valdes & fidelity to his duty to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and
Associates was the legal counsel of the estate 25 and his accounting firm, C.J. Valdes transactions with his clients. 29
& Co., CPAs, was the auditor of both the estate and the two claimants against it. 26
The fact, however, that complainant, as administratrix, did not object to the set-up IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Court finds respondent ATTY. CARLOS J. VALDES guilty of
cannot be taken against her as there is nothing in the records to show that misconduct. He is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year
respondent or his law firm explained the legal situation and its consequences to effective from receipt of this Decision, with a warning that a similar infraction shall
complainant. Thus, her silence regarding the arrangement does not amount to an be dealt with more severely in the future.
acquiescence based on an informed consent.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, as well as the Integrated Bar of
We also hold that the relationship of the claimants to the late Nakpil does not negate the Philippines and the Office of the Bar Confidant.
the conflict of interest. When a creditor files a claim against an estate, his interest is
per se adverse to the estate. As correctly pointed out by complainant, if she had a SO ORDERED.
claim against her husband's estate, her claim is still adverse and must be filed in the
intestate proceedings. Regalado, Mendoza and Martinez, JJ., concur.

Prescinding from these premises, respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a Melo, J., took no part.
position where his loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings,
the duty of respondent's law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors
but which claims were prepared by respondent's accounting firm. Even if the claims FIRST DIVISION
were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still undesirable. The test to
determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, A.C. No. 5804 - July 1, 2003
not certainty of conflict. It was respondent's duty to inhibit either of his firms from
said proceedings to avoid the probability of conflict of interest. BENEDICTO HORNILLA and ATTY. FEDERICO D. RICAFORT, complainants, vs. ATTY.
ERNESTO S. SALUNAT, respondent.
Respondent advances the defense that assuming there was conflict of interest, he
could not be charged before this Court as his alleged "misconduct" pertains to his RESOLUTION
accounting practice.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
We do not agree. Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both
professions. He is the senior partner of his law and accounting firms which carry his On November 21, 1997, Benedicto Hornilla and Federico D. Ricafort filed an
name. In the case at bar, complainant is not charging respondent with breach of administrative complaint1 with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and the two creditors. He is Commission on Bar Discipline, against respondent Atty. Ernesto S. Salunat for illegal
charged for allowing his accounting firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, and unethical practice and conflict of interest. They alleged that respondent is a
at the same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in the proceedings member of the ASSA Law and Associates, which was the retained counsel of the
where these claims were presented. The act is a breach of professional ethics and Philippine Public School Teachers Association (PPSTA). Respondents brother, Aurelio
undesirable as it placed respondent's and his law firm's loyalty under a cloud of S. Salunat, was a member of the PPSTA Board which approved respondents
doubt. Even granting that respondent's misconduct refers to his accountancy engagement as retained counsel of PPSTA.
practice, it would not prevent this Court from disciplining him as a member of the
Bar. The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for ANY Complainants, who are members of the PPSTA, filed an intra-corporate case against
misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be its members of the Board of Directors for the terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1997
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. 27 Possession of before the Securities and Exchange Commission, which was docketed as SEC Case
good moral character is not only a prerequisite to admission to the bar but also a No. 05-97-5657, and a complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as
continuing requirement to the practice of law. OMB Case No. 0-97-0695, for unlawful spending and the undervalued sale of real
property of the PPSTA. Respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the PPSTA
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible and Board members in the said cases. Complainants contend that respondent was guilty
improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should determine his of conflict of interest because he was engaged by the PPSTA, of which complainants
conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity were members, and was being paid out of its corporate funds where complainants
of the legal profession. Members of the Bar are expected to always live up to the
have contributed. Despite being told by PPSTA members of the said conflict of confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
interest, respondent refused to withdraw his appearance in the said cases. confidence has been bestowed or will be used.6 Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
Moreover, complainants aver that respondent violated Rule 15.062 of the Code of will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
Professional Responsibility when he appeared at the meeting of the PPSTA Board and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
assured its members that he will win the PPSTA cases. any knowledge acquired through their connection.7 Another test of the
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent
In his Answer,3 respondent stressed that he entered his appearance as counsel for an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
the PPSTA Board Members for and in behalf of the ASSA Law and Associates. As a client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance
partner in the said law firm, he only filed a "Manifestation of Extreme Urgency" in thereof.8
OMB Case No. 0-97-0695.4 On the other hand, SEC Case No. 05-97-5657 was
handled by another partner of the firm, Atty. Agustin V. Agustin. Respondent claims In this jurisdiction, a corporations board of directors is understood to be that body
that it was complainant Atty. Ricafort who instigated, orchestrated and which (1) exercises all powers provided for under the Corporation Code; (2) conducts
indiscriminately filed the said cases against members of the PPSTA and its Board. all business of the corporation; and (3) controls and holds all property of the
corporation.9 Its members have been characterized as trustees or directors clothed
Respondent pointed out that his relationship to Aurelio S. Salunat was immaterial; with a fiduciary character.10 It is clearly separate and distinct from the corporate
and that when he entered into the retainer contract with the PPSTA Board, he did so, entity itself.
not in his individual capacity, but in representation of the ASSA Law Firm. He denied
that he ensured the victory of the PPSTA Board in the case he was handling. He Where corporate directors have committed a breach of trust either by their frauds,
merely assured the Board that the truth will come out and that the case before the ultra vires acts, or negligence, and the corporation is unable or unwilling to institute
Ombudsman will be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, considering that respondents suit to remedy the wrong, a stockholder may sue on behalf of himself and other
therein are not public officials, but private employees. Anent the SEC case, stockholders and for the benefit of the corporation, to bring about a redress of the
respondent alleged that the same was being handled by the law firm of Atty. wrong done directly to the corporation and indirectly to the stockholders.11 This is
Eduardo de Mesa, and not ASSA. what is known as a derivative suit, and settled is the doctrine that in a derivative
suit, the corporation is the real party in interest while the stockholder filing suit for
By way of Special and Affirmative Defenses, respondent averred that complainant the corporations behalf is only nominal party. The corporation should be included as
Atty. Ricafort was himself guilty of gross violation of his oath of office amounting to a party in the suit.12
gross misconduct, malpractice and unethical conduct for filing trumped-up charges
against him and Atty. De Mesa. Thus, he prayed that the complaint against him be Having thus laid a suitable foundation of the basic legal principles pertaining to
dismissed and, instead, complainant Ricafort be disciplined or disbarred. derivative suits, we come now to the threshold question: can a lawyer engaged by a
corporation defend members of the board of the same corporation in a derivative
The complainant was docketed as CBD Case No. 97-531 and referred to the IBP suit? On this issue, the following disquisition is enlightening:
Commission on Bar Discipline. After investigation, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro
recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) The possibility for conflict of interest here is universally recognized. Although early
months. The Board of Governors thereafter adopted Resolution No. XV-3003-230 cases found joint representation permissible where no conflict of interest was
dated June 29, 2002, approving the report and recommendation of the Investigating obvious, the emerging rule is against dual representation in all derivative actions.
Commissioner. Outside counsel must thus be retained to represent one of the defendants. The
cases and ethics opinions differ on whether there must be separate representation
Respondent filed with this Court a Motion for Reconsideration of the above from the outset or merely from the time the corporation seeks to take an active role.
Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors. Furthermore, this restriction on dual representation should not be waivable by
consent in the usual way; the corporation should be presumptively incapable of
The pertinent rule of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: giving valid consent.13 (underscoring ours)

RULE 15.03. A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written In other jurisdictions, the prevailing rule is that a situation wherein a lawyer
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. represents both the corporation and its assailed directors unavoidably gives rise to a
conflict of interest. The interest of the corporate client is paramount and should not
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or be influenced by any interest of the individual corporate officials.14 The rulings in
more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the these cases have persuasive effect upon us. After due deliberation on the wisdom of
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other this doctrine, we are sufficiently convinced that a lawyer engaged as counsel for a
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him corporation cannot represent members of the same corporations board of directors
when he argues for the other client."5 This rule covers not only cases in which in a derivative suit brought against them. To do so would be tantamount to
representing conflicting interests, which is prohibited by the Code of Professional Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. for "unethical and unprofessional conduct in violation
Responsibility. of his duty as a lawyer," 2 praying that on the basis of the facts alleged therein, the
said respondent be disbarred and/or administratively sanctioned.chanrob1es virtua1
In the case at bar, the records show that SEC Case No. 05-97-5657, entitled 1aw 1ibrary
"Philippine Public School Teachers Assn., Inc., et al. v. 1992-1995 Board of Directors
of the Philippine Public School Teachers Assn. (PPSTA), et al.," was filed by the PPSTA The complainants alleged that on April 17, 2000, the respondent notarized a falsified
against its own Board of Directors. Respondent admits that the ASSA Law Firm, of Deed of Absolute Sale 3 involving a parcel of land then registered under the name of
which he is the Managing Partner, was the retained counsel of PPSTA. Yet, he their parents, Pacita and Hermilindo Ocampo under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
appeared as counsel of record for the respondent Board of Directors in the said case. No. T-31064. 4 The alleged vendee, Rosita S. Billones, falsified their fathers
Clearly, respondent was guilty of conflict of interest when he represented the parties signature and caused the notarization of the deed before the Respondent. The
against whom his other client, the PPSTA, filed suit. complainants alleged that on the date the Deed of Absolute Sale was purportedly
notarized, their mother was in Isabela with her children. As such, it was impossible
In his Answer, respondent argues that he only represented the Board of Directors in for her to appear before the respondent on the said date. Furthermore, their father,
OMB Case No. 0-97-0695. In the said case, he filed a Manifestation of Extreme Hermilindo, had been dead for more than a year and could not have appeared
Urgency wherein he prayed for the dismissal of the complaint against his clients, the before the respondent to attest to the truth of the matters contained in the deed.
individual Board Members. By filing the said pleading, he necessarily entered his
appearance therein.15 Again, this constituted conflict of interests, considering that The respondents illegal act of notarizing the said deed without the parties thereto
the complaint in the Ombudsman, albeit in the name of the individual members of appearing before him was compounded by the fact that he even placed a
the PPSTA, was brought in behalf of and to protect the interest of the corporation. Community Tax Certificate (CTC) Number, which was not issued to Pacita, but to a
certain Edelia M. Balingan on March 6, 2000. 5 As a consequence of the
Therefore, respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Considering respondents acts, Rosita Billones and her husband were able to transfer the subject
however, that this is his first offense, we find the penalty of suspension, property in their names despite the non-payment of the purchase price. TCT No. T-
recommended in IBP Resolution No. XV-2002-230 dated June 29, 2002, to be too 31064 was thus cancelled, and a new TCT was issued in the name of the Billones
harsh. Instead, we resolve to admonish respondent to observe a higher degree of Spouses, TCT No. T-75256. 6
fidelity in the practice of his profession.
The complainants later learned that the respondent apparently had a personal
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Atty. Ernesto Salunat is found GUILTY of representing interest in the subject property, as it was later mortgaged to JCY Loans and
conflicting interests and is ADMONISHED to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the Mortgage, Inc., a company owned by the respondent, and for whom the latter also
practice of his profession. He is further WARNED that a repetition of the same or acted as legal counsel. Rosita Billones secured a loan from JCY Loan and Mortgage,
similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Inc. and used the subject property as collateral. 7

SO ORDERED. On November 15, 2000, Pacita filed a civil case for nullification of the deed of sale
and reconveyance of title to real property before the Regional Trial Court of Las Pias
Davide, Jr., C.J., Vitug, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. City, Branch 275, docketed as Civil Case No. LP-00-230. 8 In an apparent attempt to
protect his interests, the respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
Billones Spouses. 9 The complainants also filed a criminal case for estafa through
SECOND DIVISION falsification against the Billones Spouses. 10

[A.C. No. 5480. September 29, 2003.] The complainants further alleged that the respondent, although acting as counsel for
the Billones Spouses in the said civil case, also acted as counsel for JCY Loans and
LEILANI OCAMPO-INGCOCO and BALTAZAR D. OCAMPO, Complainants, v. ATTY. Mortgage, Inc., which had earlier filed a civil case against the same spouses. 11 The
ALEJANDRO G. YRREVERRE, JR., Respondent. respondent also entered his appearance as counsel for JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc.,
which moved to intervene in Civil Case No. LP-00-0230. 12 According to the
DECISION complainants, such act of the respondent was unprofessional and unethical, as he
counseled for parties with conflicting interests. Furthermore, based on the
respondents actuations and those of the Billones Spouses, it was most likely that
CALLEJO, SR., J.: they connived with one another in defrauding the Ocampo family. 13

On May 24, 2001, the respondent wrote a letter to the Ocampo family, denying the
In a verified Complaint dated July 11, 2001, 1 Leilani Ocampo-Ingcoco and Baltazar charges against him, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
D. Ocampo filed an administrative complaint before the Court charging respondent
1. Before the execution of the Deed of Sale, you together with Debbi Abendano supposedly executed by Mr. Hermilindo P. Ocampo, who was actually deceased at
and Mrs. Billones personally came to the office of our client at Makati City on or the time of the notarization. Respondent is also found GUILTY and responsible for the
before April 2000, and requested to accommodate the loan application of Mrs. use of a Community Tax Certificate (CTC) that did not belong to affiant Mrs. Pacita
Billones using your house and lot as collateral so that the loan proceeds thereof, part Ocampo, but instead belonged to another person.
of which, will be paid to you as additional of her down payment of PHP=1,000,000.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that respondent is GUILTY of the offenses
2. As a matter of fact, you personally submitted to our client through the charged, discussed above, and should be given the penalty of ONE (1) MONTH
undersigned lawyer the following documents: (a) Your receipt of the down payment SUSPENSION with a STERN WARNING that repetition of said acts will warrant a more
of PHP=1,000,000 from Sps. Billones, (b) Contract to Sell between Sps. Billones and severe penalty. 16
yourself; (c) Philamlife and (d) Price Smart IDs and (e) your Cedula, copies of which
are hereto attached as Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D" and "E" ; On the issue of representing clients with conflicting interests

3. Further, you were the one who personally delivered to the undersigned the The respondent cannot be held liable for representing conflicting interests in acting
original copy of TCT No. 31064 together with other related documents such as tax as defense counsel for the Billones Spouses in Civil Case No. LP-00-0230 while acting
declarations, vicinity map. In addition, you even signed in the presence of the as counsel for defendant-intervenor JCY Loans and Mortgage, Inc. in the same case.
undersigned a Special Power of Attorney (copy of which is hereto appended as The evidence presented by the respondent shows that when the Billones Spouses
Annex "F") empowering Mrs. Billones to use your real property as collateral with our secured his services as counsel, they were made fully aware of the pertinent facts
client; and circumstances. Their consent and written conformity was obtained after full
disclosure of the facts of the case. 17 They even submitted a verified written
4. Finally, you executed the subject Deed of Sale in front of ATTY. ALEJANDRO G. manifestation of conformity to show proof that the respondent was hired with their
YRREVERRE, JR. together with the witnesses in favor of SPS. Billones for the sum of approval. 18
PHP=1,000,000. When asked by the notary public about the signing of your
husband, you requested that he will sign it in your house because your husband is so One of the recognized exceptions to the rule against a lawyers representation of
sick and old and that he could not come to office for that purpose. Banking on your clients with conflicting interests is where the clients knowingly consent to the dual
representation, the notary public agreed and later the said Deed of Sale was representation after the prospective counsel makes full disclosure of the facts to the
returned back to the latter. 14 parties. 19

In a Resolution dated April 3, 2002, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar On the issue of notarizing a deed without requiring the parties to be present to
of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation/decision. 15 attest to the truth of the matters contained therein

Commissioner Dennis B. Funa of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline thereafter The respondent maintains that Mrs. Pacita Ocampo was present when he notarized
submitted a Report and Recommendation dated July 4, 2002, with the following the deed of sale, but admitted that Mr. Hermilindo Ocampo did not appear before
findings and recommendations:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary him. The respondent claims that he acted in good faith, and had no knowledge that
Mr. Ocampo, the other party to the document, was already deceased. It was Mrs.
1. On the Charge of Conflict of Interest. Ocampo who led him to believe that her husband was merely ill

We adopt in toto the arguments of respondent in quoting Canon 6, Canon[s] of . . . In yielding to Mrs. Ocampos plea, I just acted out of passion, generosity and
Professional Ethics, which provides for an exception to the rule on conflict of interest, kindness to her to facilitate the processing of the loan as she also intimated to me
to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph during the meeting that she was also in dire need of money to be used for her
husbands recovery. . . . 20
"except by express consent of all the parties concerned given after a full disclosure
of facts."cralaw virtua1aw library The respondent further explained that he took precautionary measures to safeguard
the public interest by making specific instructions to Rosita S. Billones and Deborah
2. On the charge of Notarizing Deed of Sale Without the Affiants. Hernandez Abendano to be present when Mr. Ocampo affixed his signature, and not
to use the subject deed unless and until he got hold of Mr. Ocampos CTC. No
Respondent herein had all but admitted this particular charge and, in fact, is willing damage was caused to any party, since what facilitated the transfer of the property
to face the appropriate sanction. Respondent furthermore pleads for leniency and was a subsequent Deed of Transfer entered into by and between the same parties.
consideration. As such, the subject deed was without any legal effect and a "mere scrap of paper."
21
Accordingly, Respondent is found NOT GUILTY with respect to the charge of Conflict
of Interest. However, Respondent is found GUILTY of notarizing a document
The respondents arguments are without merit. Section 1 of Public Act No. 2103 22 Court. 29 We agree that the penalty of disbarment is too excessive and is not
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library commensurate to the faux pas committed by the Respondent.

(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, for breach of the notarial law, the commission of
authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. as Notary Public, if still existing, is
documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking REVOKED. He is disqualified from being commissioned as such for a period of two (2)
the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who years.
executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The
certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a Respondent Atty. Alejandro G. Yrreverre, Jr. is also SUSPENDED from the practice of
seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state. law for a period of Six (6) Months effective immediately for violation of Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is DIRECTED to report the date of his
It is thus clear from the foregoing that a notary public should not notarize a receipt of this Decision to the Court to enable us to determine when the revocation
document unless the persons who signed the same are the very same persons who of his notarial commission and his disqualification from being commissioned as
executed and personally appeared before the said notary public to attest to the Notary Public as well as when his suspension from the practice of law shall have
contents and truth of what are stated therein. 23 taken effect.

Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. On the contrary, it is

invested with substantial public interest, such that only those who are qualified or Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and the
authorized may act as notaries public. Notarization of a private document converts Integrated Bar of the Philippines.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
the document into a public one making it admissible in court without further proof of
its authenticity. A notarial document by law is entitled to full faith and credit upon its SO ORDERED.
face and, for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic
requirements in the performance of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the Bellosillo, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Tinga, JJ., concur.
public in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be undermined. 24

When the respondent notarized the Deed of Absolute Sale without ascertaining that FIRST DIVISION
the vendors-signatories thereto were the very same persons who executed it and
personally appeared before him to attest to the truth of what were stated therein, he [ADM. CASE NO. 6708 August 25, 2005]
undermined the confidence of the public on notarial documents and thereby
breached Canon I of the Code of Professional Responsibility which requires lawyers (CBD Case No. 01-874)
to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the
law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 thereof which proscribes lawyers from FELICITAS S. QUIAMBAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. NESTOR A. BAMBA, Respondent.
engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. 25 In acknowledging
that the parties personally came and appeared before him, the respondent also RESOLUTION
made an untruthful statement, thus violating Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer that he shall do no falsehood. 26 Moreover, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.:
he opens himself to prosecution for falsification of a public document under Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code. We are aware of the hapless fact that there are not enough lawyers to serve an
exploding population. This unfortunate state of affairs, however, will not seize this
In Maligsa v. Cabanting, 27 we had the occasion to state:chanrob1es virtual 1aw Court from exercising its disciplinary power over lawyers culpable of serious
library indiscretions. The incidence of public force must be deployed to bear upon the
community to eventually forge a legal profession that provides quality, ethical,
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to subscribe to accessible, and cost-effective legal service to our people and whose members are
the sacred duties appertaining to his office, such duties being dictated by public willing and able to answer the call to public service.
policy and impressed with public interest. Faithful observance and utmost respect of
the legal solemnity of an oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply In this administrative case for disbarment, complainant Felicitas S. Quiambao
put, such responsibility is incumbent upon respondent and failing therein, he must charges respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba with violation of the Code of Professional
now accept the commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. . . . 28 Responsibility for representing conflicting interests when the latter filed a case
against her while he was at that time representing her in another case, and for
We take note of the respondents remorseful attitude and his willingness to forego committing other acts of disloyalty and double-dealing.
his notarial work or accept severe censure, reprimand and admonition from the
From June 2000 to January 2001, the complainant was the president and managing (Atty. Hernandez's) legal services as corporate secretary and legal counsel of QRMSI.
director of Allied Investigation Bureau, Inc. (AIB), a family-owned corporation The respondent also denies that he convinced complainant's brother Leodegario to
engaged in providing security and investigation services. She avers that she organize another security agency and that the funds of AIB were unlawfully diverted
procured the legal services of the respondent not only for the corporate affairs of AIB to SESSI. It was to complement the business of AIB, which was then in danger of
but also for her personal case. Particularly, the respondent acted as her counsel of collapse, that SESSI was established. Leodegario's wife and her son have the
record in an ejectment case against Spouses Santiago and Florita Torroba filed by effective control over SESSI. Respondent's subscribed shareholdings in SESSI
her on 29 December 2000 before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Paraaque comprise only 800 shares out of 12,500 subscribed shares. He serves AIB and SESSI
City, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 11928. She paid attorney's fees for in different capacities: as legal counsel of the former and as president of the latter.5
respondent's legal services in that case.1 About six months after she resigned as AIB
president, or on 14 June 2001, the respondent filed on behalf of AIB a complaint for In his Report and Recommendation6 dated 31 August 2004, the investigating
replevin and damages against her before the MeTC of Quezon City for the purpose of commissioner of the IBP found the respondent guilty of representing conflicting
recovering from her the car of AIB assigned to her as a service vehicle. This he did interests based on the following undisputed facts: first, the respondent was still
without withdrawing as counsel of record in the ejectment case, which was then still complainant's counsel of record in the ejectment case when he filed, as legal
pending.2 counsel of AIB, the replevin case against her; and second, the respondent was still
the legal counsel of AIB when he advised the complainant on the incorporation of
Apart from the foregoing litigation matter, the complainant, in her Position Paper, another security agency, QRMSI, and recommended his former law partner, Atty.
charges the respondent with acts of disloyalty and double-dealing. She avers that Gerardo Hernandez, to be its corporate secretary and legal counsel and also when
the respondent proposed to her that she organize her own security agency and that he conferred with Leodegario to organize another security agency, SESSI, where the
he would assist her in its organization, causing her to resign as president of AIB. The respondent became an incorporator, stockholder, and president. Thus, the
respondent indeed assisted her in December 2000 in the formation of another investigating commissioner recommended that the respondent be suspended from
security agency, Quiambao Risk Management Specialists, Inc., (QRMSI), which was the practice of law for one year.
later registered under complainant's name, with the respondent as a "silent partner"
represented by his associate Atty. Gerardo P. Hernandez. The respondent was paid The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the investigating commissioner's
attorney's fees for his legal services in organizing and incorporating QRMSI. He also report and recommendation, but reduced the penalty from one year to a stern
planned to "steal" or "pirate" some of the more important clients of AIB. While reprimand.7
serving as legal counsel for AIB and a "silent partner" of QRMSI, he convinced
complainant's brother Leodegario Quiambao to organize another security agency, The issue in this case is whether the respondent is guilty of misconduct for
San Esteban Security Services, Inc. (SESSI) where he (the respondent) served as its representing conflicting interests in contravention of the basic tenets of the legal
incorporator, director, and president. The respondent and Leodegario then illegally profession.
diverted the funds of AIB to fund the incorporation of SESSI, and likewise planned to
eventually close down the operations of AIB and transfer the business to SESSI.3 Rule 15.03, Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned
For his part, the respondent admits that he represented the complainant in the given after a full disclosure of the facts." This prohibition is founded on principles of
aforementioned ejectment case and later represented AIB in the replevin case public policy and good taste.8 In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
against her. He, however, denies that he was the "personal lawyer" of the lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
complainant, and avers that he was made to believe that it was part of his function strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust
as counsel for AIB to handle even the "personal cases" of its officers. Even assuming and confidence of the highest degree.9 It behooves lawyers not only to keep
that the complainant confided to him privileged information about her legal inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
interests, the ejectment case and the replevin case are unrelated cases involving double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
different issues and parties and, therefore, the privileged information which might their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.10
have been gathered from one case would have no use in the other. At any rate, it
was the complainant herself who insisted that he stay as her counsel despite the In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in
perceived differences among her, her brother, and AIB over the motor vehicle behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client
subject of the replevin case. The complainant even asked him to assist her in her requires them to oppose.11 Developments in jurisprudence have particularized
monetary claims against AIB.4 various tests to determine whether a lawyer's conduct lies within this proscription.
One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
The respondent also denies the charge raised by the complainant in her position one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client.12 Thus, if
paper that he agreed to be a "silent partner" of QRMSI through his nominee, Atty. a lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing
Gerardo P. Hernandez, who was his former law partner. He declined complainant's for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
offer to assume that role and suggested Atty. Hernandez in his place; thus, 375
shares of stock were registered in Atty. Hernandez's name as consideration of his
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new incorporator, stockholder, and president of SESSI, which is also a security agency. He
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity justified his act by claiming that that while both AIB and SESSI are engaged in
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the security agency business, he is serving in different capacities. As the in-house legal
performance of that duty.13 Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called counsel of AIB, he "serves its legal interest the parameter of which evolves around
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information legal matters" such as protecting the legal rights and interest of the corporation;
acquired through their connection or previous employment.14 conducting an investigation or a hearing on violations of company rules and
regulations of their office employees and security guards; sending demand letters in
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation collection cases; and representing the corporation in any litigation for or against it.
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated And as president of SESSI, he serves the operational aspects of the business such as
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for "how does it operate[], how much do they price their services, what kind or how do
one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there they train[] their security guards, how they solicit clients." Thus, conflict of interest is
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the far-fetched. Moreover, the respondent argues that the complainant, not being a
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that stockholder of AIB and SESSI, has no right to question his alleged conflict of interest
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present in serving the two security agencies.22
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both While the complainant lacks personality to question the alleged conflict of interests
clients.15 on the part of the respondent in serving both security agencies, we cannot just turn
a blind eye to respondent's act. It must be noted that the proscription against
In this case, it is undisputed that at the time the respondent filed the replevin case representation of conflicting interests finds application where the conflicting
on behalf of AIB he was still the counsel of record of the complainant in the pending interests arise with respect to the same general matter however slight the adverse
ejectment case. We do not sustain respondent's theory that since the ejectment interest may be. It applies even if the conflict pertains to the lawyer's private activity
case and the replevin case are unrelated cases fraught with different issues, parties, or in the performance of a function in a non-professional capacity.23 In the process
and subject matters, the prohibition is inapplicable. His representation of opposing of determining whether there is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is
clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of interest or, probability, not certainty, of conflict.
at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing. While the respondent may assert
that the complainant expressly consented to his continued representation in the Since the respondent has financial or pecuniary interest in SESSI, which is engaged
ejectment case, the respondent failed to show that he fully disclosed the facts to in a business competing with his client's, and, more importantly, he occupies the
both his clients and he failed to present any written consent of the complainant and highest position in SESSI, one cannot help entertaining a doubt on his loyalty to his
AIB as required under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional client AIB. This kind of situation passes the second test of conflict of interest, which
Responsibility. is whether the acceptance of a new relationship would prevent the full discharge of
the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
Neither can we accept respondent's plea that he was duty-bound to handle all the unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty. The close
cases referred to him by AIB, including the personal cases of its officers which had relationship of the majority stockholders of both companies does not negate the
no connection to its corporate affairs. That the representation of conflicting interest conflict of interest. Neither does his protestation that his shareholding in SESSI is "a
is in good faith and with honest intention on the part of the lawyer does not make mere pebble among the sands."
the prohibition inoperative.16 Moreover, lawyers are not obliged to act either as an
adviser or advocate for every person who may wish to become their client. They In view of all of the foregoing, we find the respondent guilty of serious misconduct
have the right to decline such employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the for representing conflicting interests.
Code of Professional Responsibility.17 Although there are instances where lawyers
cannot decline representation,18 they cannot be made to labor under conflict of Furthermore, it must be noted that Republic Act No. 5487, otherwise known as the
interest between a present client and a prospective one.19 Private Security Agency Law, prohibits a person from organizing or having an
interest in more than one security agency. From respondent's position paper, it can
Additionally, in his position paper, the respondent alleges that when the complainant be culled that Leodegario Quiambao is the president and managing director of AIB,
invited the respondent to join QRMSI, he "vehemently refused to join them due to his holding 60% of the outstanding shares; while his four other siblings who are
perception of conflicting interest as he was then (and still is at present) the Legal permanent residents in the United States own the remaining 40%.24 This prohibition
Counsel" of AIB, which is also a security agency.20 To bolster his allegation, he notwithstanding, the respondent organized SESSI, with Leodegario's wife and son as
invoked the affidavits of complainant's witnesses which contained statements of his majority stockholders holding about 70% of the outstanding shares and with him
apprehension of conflict of interest should he join QRMSI.21 (the respondent), as well as the rest of the stockholders, holding minimal shares.25
In doing so, the respondent virtually allowed Leodegario and the latter's wife to
Surprisingly, despite his apprehension or awareness of a possible conflict of interest violate or circumvent the law by having an interest in more than one security
should he join QRMSI, the respondent later allowed himself to become an agency. It must be noted that in the affidavit26 of Leodegario's wife, she mentioned
of their conjugal property. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the property
relation of Leodegario and his wife can be presumed to be that of conjugal
partnership of gains; hence, the majority shares in AIB and SESSI are the conjugal FIRST DIVISION
property of Leodegario and his wife, thereby placing themselves in possession of an
interest in more than one security agency in contravention of R.A. No. 5487. Thus, in [A.C. NO. 6836 - January 23, 2006]
organizing SESSI, the respondent violated Rule 1.02, Canon 1 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to promote respect for the law LETICIA GONZALES, Complainant, v. ATTY. MARCELINO CABUCANA, Respondent.
and refrain from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law.
RESOLUTION
As to the recommendation that the penalty be reduced from a suspension of one
year to a stern warning, we find the same to be without basis. We are disturbed by AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
the reduction made by the IBP Board of Governors of the penalty recommended by
the investigating commissioner without clearly and distinctly stating the facts and Before this Court is a complaint filed by Leticia Gonzales (Gonzales) praying that
reasons on which that reduction is based. Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, (respondent) be disbarred for representing conflicting
interests.
Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court reads in part as follows:
On January 8, 2004, Gonzales filed a petition before the Integrated Bar of the
SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. - Philippines (IBP) alleging that: she was the complainant in a case for sum of money
and damages filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of Santiago City,
(a) Every case heard by an investigator shall be reviewed by the IBP Board of docketed as Civil Case No. 1-567 where she was represented by the law firm
Governors upon the record and evidence transmitted to it by the Investigator with CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, with Atty. Edmar
his report. The decision of the Board upon such review shall be in writing and Cabucana handling the case and herein respondent as an associate/partner; on
shallclearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on which it is based. February 26, 2001, a decision was rendered in the civil case ordering the losing
party to pay Gonzales the amount of P17,310.00 with interest and P6,000.00 as
We may consider the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors as a memorandum attorney's fees; Sheriff Romeo Gatcheco, failed to fully implement the writ of
decision adopting by reference the report of the investigating commissioner. execution issued in connection with the judgment which prompted Gonzales to file a
However, we look with disfavor the change in the recommended penalty without any complaint against the said sheriff with this Court; in September 2003, Sheriff
explanation therefor. Again, we remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance Gatcheco and his wife went to the house of Gonzales; they harassed Gonzales and
of the requirement to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the asked her to execute an affidavit of desistance regarding her complaint before this
requirement that its decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the Court; Gonzales thereafter filed against the Gatchecos criminal cases for trespass,
reasons on which its decision is based is akin to what is required of the decisions of grave threats, grave oral defamation, simple coercion and unjust vexation;
courts of record.27 The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station notwithstanding the pendency of Civil Case No. 1-567, where respondent's law firm
than any other portion of the ratio. was still representing Gonzales, herein respondent represented the Gatchecos in the
cases filed by Gonzales against the said spouses; respondent should be disbarred
In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting from the practice of law since respondent's acceptance of the cases of the
interests a penalty ranging from one to three years' suspension was imposed.28 In Gatchecos violates the lawyer-client relationship between complainant and
this case, we find that a suspension from the practice of law for one year is respondent's law firm and renders respondent liable under the Code of Professional
warranted. Responsibility (CPR) particularly Rules 10.01,1 13.01,2 15.02,3 15.03,4 21.015 and
21.02.6
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nestor A. Bamba is hereby held GUILTY of violation of
Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 and Rule 1.02 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional On January 9, 2004, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline ordered Atty. Marcelino
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of ONE (1) Cabucana, Jr. to submit his Answer to the complaint.7
YEAR effective from receipt of this Resolution, with a warning that a similar infraction
in the future shall be dealt with more severely. In his Answer, respondent averred: He never appeared and represented complainant
in Civil Case No. 1-567 since it was his brother, Atty. Edmar Cabucana who appeared
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant and the and represented Gonzales in said case. He admitted that he is representing Sheriff
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Gatcheco and his wife in the cases filed against them but claimed that his
appearance is pro bono and that the spouses pleaded with him as no other counsel
SO ORDERED. was willing to take their case. He entered his appearance in good faith and opted to
represent the spouses rather than leave them defenseless. When the Gatchecos
Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur. asked for his assistance, the spouses said that the cases filed against them by
Gonzales were merely instigated by a high ranking official who wanted to get even Ako ang nagdedemanda o petitioner sa CBD Case No. 04-1186 na may pamagat na
with them for their refusal to testify in favor of the said official in another case. At "Leticia Gonzales v. Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr." na kasalukuyang nahaharap sa
first, respondent declined to serve as counsel of the spouses as he too did not want Commission on Bar Discipline ng Integrated Bar of the Philippines
to incur the ire of the high-ranking official, but after realizing that he would be
abdicating a sworn duty to delay no man for money or malice, respondent entered Ang pagkakahain ng naturang demanda ay nag-ugat sa di-pagkakaintindihan na
his appearance as defense counsel of the spouses free of any charge. Not long after, namamagitan sa akin at nina Mr. and Mrs. Romeo and Anita Gatcheco.
the present complaint was crafted against respondent which shows that respondent
is now the subject of a 'demolition job.' The civil case filed by Gonzales where Dahil sa aking galit sa naturang mag-asawa, idinawit ko si Atty. Marcelino C.
respondent's brother served as counsel is different and distinct from the criminal Cabucana, Jr. sa sigalot na namamagitan sa akin at sa mag-asawang Gatcheco,
cases filed by complainant against the Gatcheco spouses, thus, he did not violate gayong nalalaman ko na si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana ay walang nalalaman sa
any canon on legal ethics.8 naturang di pagkakaintindihan.

Gonzales filed a Reply contending that the civil case handled by respondent's Makaraang pag-isipang mabuti ang paghain ko ng demanda kontra kay Atty.
brother is closely connected with the cases of the Gatchecos which the respondent is Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr., nakumbinsi ako na ang pagdedemanda ko kay Atty.
handling; that the claim of respondent that he is handling the cases of the spouses Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay isang malaking pagkakamali dahil siya ay walang
pro bono is not true since he has his own agenda in offering his services to the kinalalaman (sic) sa di pagkakaintindihan naming(sic) ng mag-asawang Gatcheco.
spouses; and that the allegation that she is filing the cases against the spouses
because she is being used by a powerful person is not true since she filed the said Si Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. ay di ko rin naging abogado sa Civil Case No. 1-
cases out of her own free will.9 567 (MTCC Br. I Santiago City) na inihain ko kontra kay Eduardo Mangano.

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP sent to the parties a Notice of Nais kong ituwid ang lahat kung kaya't aking iniuurong ang naturang kasong inihain
Mandatory Conference dated March 1, 2004.10 On the scheduled conference, only a ko kontra kay Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. at dahil dito ay hindi na ako interesado
representative of complainant appeared.11 Commissioner Demaree Raval of the IBP- pang ituloy and naturang kaso, at aking hinihiling sa kinauukulan na dismisin na ang
CBD then directed both parties to file their respective verified position papers.12 naturang kaso.

Complainant filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions and added that Ginawa ko ang sinumpaang salaysay na ito upang patotohanan sa lahat ng
respondent prepared and notarized counter-affidavits of the Gatcheco spouses; that nakasaad dito.17
the high-ranking official referred to by respondent is Judge Ruben Plata and the
accusations of respondent against the said judge is an attack against a brother in Commissioner Reyes issued an Order dated October 28, 2004 requiring Gonzales to
the profession which is a violation of the CPR; and that respondent continues to use appear before him on November 25, 2004, to affirm her statements and to be
the name of De Guzman in their law firm despite the fact that said partner has subject to clarificatory questioning.18 However, none of the parties appeared.19 On
already been appointed as Assistant Prosecutor of Santiago City, again in violation of February 17, 2005, only respondent was present. Commissioner Reyes then
the CPR.13 considered the case as submitted for resolution.20

Respondent filed his Position Paper restating his allegations in his Answer.14 On February 24, 2005, Commissioner Reyes submitted his Report and
Recommendation, portions of which are quoted hereunder:
On August 23, 2004, Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes issued an Order notifying
both parties to appear before his office on October 28, 2004 for a clarificatory The Undersigned Commissioner believes that the respondent made a mistake in the
question regarding said case.15 On the said date, only respondent appeared16 acceptance of the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, however, the
presenting a sworn affidavit executed by Gonzales withdrawing her complaint Commission (sic) believes that there was no malice and bad faith in the said
against respondent. It reads: acceptance and this can be shown by the move of the complainant to unilaterally
withdraw the case which she filed against Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. However,
SINUMPAANG SALAYSAY Atty. Cabucana is reminded to be more careful in the acceptance of cases as conflict
of interests might arise.
TUNGKOL SA PAG-UURONG NG DEMANDA
It is respectfully recommended that Atty. Marcelino C. Cabucana, Jr. (be) sternly
Ako, si LETICIA GONZALES, nasa tamang edad, Pilipino, may asawa, at nakatira sa warned and reprimanded and advised to be more circumspect and careful in
Barangay Dubinan East, Santiago City, makaraang manumpa ayon sa batas ay accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.21
nagsasabing:
On June 25, 2005, a Resolution was passed by the Board of Governors of the IBP, to
wit:
 the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
RESOLUTION NO. XVI-2005-153 clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
CBD CASE NO. 03-1186 clients.29

Leticia Gonzales v. The claim of respondent that there is no conflict of interests in this case, as the civil
Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. case handled by their law firm where Gonzales is the complainant and the criminal
cases filed by Gonzales against the Gatcheco spouses are not related, has no merit.
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the The representation of opposing clients in said cases, though unrelated, constitutes
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above- conflict of interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion of double-dealing which
entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A"; and, finding the this Court cannot allow.30
recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws
and rules, and considering that respondent made (a) mistake in the acceptance of Respondent further argued that it was his brother who represented Gonzales in the
the administrative case of Romeo Gatcheco, Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is hereby civil case and not him, thus, there could be no conflict of interests. We do not agree.
WARNED and REPRIMANDED and advised to be more circumspect and careful in As respondent admitted, it was their law firm which represented Gonzales in the civil
accepting cases which might result in conflict of interests.22 case. Such being the case, the rule against representing conflicting interests applies.

Before going to the merits, let it be clarified that contrary to the report of As we explained in the case of Hilado v. David:31
Commissioner Reyes, respondent did not only represent the Gatcheco spouses in the
administrative case filed by Gonzales against them. As respondent himself narrated '[W]e' can not sanction his taking up the cause of the adversary of the party who
in his Position Paper, he likewise acted as their counsel in the criminal cases filed by had sought and obtained legal advice from his firm; this, not necessarily to prevent
Gonzales against them.23 any injustice to the plaintiff but to keep above reproach the honor and integrity of
the courts and of the bar. Without condemning the respondent's conduct as
With that settled, we find respondent guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of dishonest, corrupt, or fraudulent, we do believe that upon the admitted facts it is
the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit: highly inexpedient. It had the tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a
distinguished member, "into public disrepute and suspicion and undermine the
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written integrity of justice."32
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The claim of respondent that he acted in good faith and with honest intention will
It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from representing conflicting interests except also not exculpate him as such claim does not render the prohibition inoperative.33
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.24 Such
prohibition is founded on principles of public policy and good taste as the nature of In the same manner, his claim that he could not turn down the spouses as no other
the lawyer-client relations is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.25 lawyer is willing to take their case cannot prosper as it is settled that while there
Lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to may be instances where lawyers cannot decline representation they cannot be made
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be to labor under conflict of interest between a present client and a prospective one.34
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount Granting also that there really was no other lawyer who could handle the spouses'
importance in the administration of justice.26 case other than him, still he should have observed the requirements laid down by
the rules by conferring with the prospective client to ascertain as soon as practicable
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client then seek the written
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity consent of all concerned after a full disclosure of the facts.35 These respondent
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the failed to do thus exposing himself to the charge of double-dealing.
performance of that duty.27
We note the affidavit of desistance filed by Gonzales. However, we are not bound by
As we expounded in the recent case of Quiambao v. Bamba,28 such desistance as the present case involves public interest.36 Indeed, the Court's
exercise of its power to take cognizance of administrative cases against lawyers is
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation not for the purpose of enforcing civil remedies between parties, but to protect the
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated court and the public against an attorney guilty of unworthy practices in his
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for profession.37
one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the In similar cases where the respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that interests a penalty ranging from one to three years' suspension was imposed.38
 confessions as the mastermind in the criminal activities for which they were being
We shall consider however as mitigating circumstances the fact that he is charged.
representing the Gatcheco spouses pro bono and that it was his firm and not
respondent personally, which handled the civil case of Gonzales. As recounted by Respondent denied the accusations against him. He explained that while being
complainant herself, Atty. Edmar Cabucana signed the civil case of complainant by detained at the Calabanga Municipal Police Jail, Avila sought his assistance in
stating first the name of the law firm CABUCANA, CABUCANA, DE GUZMAN AND drafting an extrajudicial confession regarding his involvement in the crimes of
CABUCANA LAW OFFICE, under which, his name and signature appear; while herein kidnapping for ransom, murder and robbery. He advised Avila to inform his parents
respondent signed the pleadings for the Gatcheco spouses only with his name,39 about his decision to make an extrajudicial confession, apprised him of his
without any mention of the law firm. We also note the observation of the IBP constitutional rights and of the possibility that he might be utilized as a state-
Commissioner Reyes that there was no malice and bad faith in respondent's witness.
acceptance of the Gatchecos' cases as shown by the move of complainant to
withdraw the case. Respondent claimed that when Ilo sought his assistance in executing his
extrajudicial confession, he conferred with Ilo in the presence of his parents; and
Thus, for violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only after he was convinced that Ilo was not under undue compulsion did he assist
and taking into consideration the aforementioned mitigating circumstances, we the accused in executing the extrajudicial confession.
impose the penalty of fine of P2,000.00.
The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVI-2005-153 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is investigation, report and recommendation.2 On August 16, 2005, the Investigating
APPROVED with MODIFICATION that respondent Atty. Marcelino Cabucana, Jr. is Commissioner submitted his report with the following recommendation:
FINED the amount of Two Thousand Pesos (P2,000.00) with a STERN WARNING that a
commission of the same or similar act in the future shall be dealt with more severely. WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that Atty. Danilo de la Torre be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of the legal profession for violation of
SO ORDERED. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.
EN BANC
The Board of Governors of the IBP modified the recommendation by increasing the
period of suspension to two years.
[A.C. NO. 6160 : March 30, 2006]
In finding the respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests, the
NESTOR PEREZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. DANILO DE LA TORRE, Respondent.
Investigating Commissioner opined that:
DECISION
In administrative proceedings, the complainant has the burden of proving, by
substantial evidence, the allegations in his complaint. The complainant was able to
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
prove by substantial evidence his charge against Atty. de la Tor[r]e. The respondent
admitted that his services as a lawyer were retained by both Avila and Ilo. Perez was
In a letter-complaint1 dated July 30, 2003 addressed to then Chief Justice Hilario G.
able to show that at the time that Atty. de la Torre was representing the said two
Davide, Jr., complainant Nestor Perez charged respondent Atty. Danilo de la Torre
accused, he was also representing the interest of the victim's family. This was
with misconduct or conduct unbecoming of a lawyer for representing conflicting
declared by the victim's daughter, Vicky de Chavez, who testified before Branch 63
interests.
of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur that her family retained the services of
Atty. Danilo de la Torre to prosecute the case against her father's killers. She even
Perez alleged that he is the barangay captain of Binanuaanan, Calabanga,
admitted that she was present when Atty. de la Torre met with and advised Avila and
Camarines Sur; that in December 2001, several suspects for murder and kidnapping
Ilo on one occasion. This is proof that the respondent consciously offered his services
for ransom, among them Sonny Boy Ilo and Diego Avila, were apprehended and
to Avila and Ilo despite the fact that he was already representing the family of the
jailed by the police authorities; that respondent went to the municipal building of
two accused's victim. It may not even be improbable that respondent purposely
Calabanga where Ilo and Avila were being detained and made representations that
offered to help the accused in order to further his other clients' interest. The
he could secure their freedom if they sign the prepared extrajudicial confessions;
respondent failed to deny these facts or offer competent evidence to refute the said
that unknown to the two accused, respondent was representing the heirs of the
facts despite the ample opportunity given him.
murder victim; that on the strength of the extrajudicial confessions, cases were filed
against them, including herein complainant who was implicated in the extrajudicial
Under Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent is therefore duty bound to refrain from one of the victims. Respondent, who presumably knows the intricacies of the law,
representing two parties having conflicting interests in a controversy. By doing should have exercised his better judgment before conceding to accused's choice of
precisely the foregoing, and without any proof that he secured the written consent of counsel. It did not cross his mind to inhibit himself from acting as their counsel and
both parties after explaining to them the existing conflict of interest, respondent instead, he even assisted them in executing the extrajudicial confession.
should be sanctioned.
Considering that this is respondent's first infraction, disbarment as sought by the
We agree with the findings of the IBP except for the recommended penalty. complaint is deemed to be too severe. Under the present circumstances, we find
that a suspension from the practice of law for three years is warranted.
There is conflict of interests when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two
or more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the WHEREFORE, Atty. Danilo de la Torre is found GUILTY of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests. He is
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him SUSPENDED for THREE YEARS from the practice of law, effective upon his receipt of
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no dealt with more severely.
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.3
Let copies of this Decision be entered in the record of respondent and served on the
There is a representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new IBP, as well as on the Court Administrator who shall circulate it to all courts for their
retainer will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first information and guidance.
client in any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called
upon in his new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired SO ORDERED.
through their connection.4

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of EN BANC

public policy and good taste. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong [A.C. NO. 6705 : March 31, 2006]
points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree. It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, Complainant, v. ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, Respondent.
client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of impropriety and double-
dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their DECISION
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.5
CARPIO, J.:
To negate any culpability, respondent explained that he did not offer his legal
services to accused Avila and Ilo but it was the two accused who sought his The Case
assistance in executing their extrajudicial confessions. Nonetheless, he acceded to
their request to act as counsel after apprising them of their constitutional rights and This is a disbarment complaint against Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio for violating Rule
after being convinced that the accused were under no compulsion to give their 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition
confession. against private practice of law while working as government prosecutor.

The excuse proferred by the respondent does not exonerate him from the clear The Facts
violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which prohibits a
lawyer from representing conflicting interests except by written consent of all Ruthie Lim-Santiago ("complainant") is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Administratrix of his estate.1 Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President
of Taggat Industries, Inc.2
As found by the IBP, at the time respondent was representing Avila and Ilo, two of
the accused in the murder of the victim Resurreccion Barrios, he was representing Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio ("respondent") was the former Personnel Manager and
the family of the murder victim. Clearly, his representation of opposing clients in the Retained Counsel of Taggat Industries, Inc.3 until his appointment as Assistant
murder case invites suspicion of double-dealing and infidelity to his clients. Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan in 1992.4

What is unsettling is that respondent assisted in the execution by the two accused of Taggat Industries, Inc. ("Taggat") is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation
their confessions whereby they admitted their participation in various serious of timber concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good
criminal offenses knowing fully well that he was retained previously by the heirs of Government sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997.6
 Respondent states that complainant's reason in not filing a motion to inhibit was her
Sometime in July 1997, 21 employees of Taggat ("Taggat employees") filed a criminal impression that respondent would exonerate her from the charges filed as gleaned
complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie Lim-Santiago," docketed as I.S. from complainant's statement during the hearing conducted on 12 February 1999:
No. 97-240 ("criminal complaint").7 Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who
took over the management and control of Taggat after the death of her father, xxx
withheld payment of their salaries and wages without valid cause from 1 April 1996
to 15 July 1997.8 Q. (Atty. Dabu). What do you mean you didn't think he would do it, Madam Witness?
cralawlibrary
Respondent, as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the
preliminary investigation.9 He resolved the criminal complaint by recommending the A. Because he is supposed to be my father's friend and he was working with my Dad
filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 11 in relation to Article 116 and he was supposed to be trusted by my father. And he came to me and told me he
12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.13 gonna help me. x x x.26

Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations: Respondent also asserts that no conflicting interests exist because he was not
representing Taggat employees or complainant. Respondent claims he was merely
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility performing his official duty as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor.27 Respondent argues
that complainant failed to establish that respondent's act was tainted with personal
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. interest, malice and bad faith.28
Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat,
knew the operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself Respondent denies complainant's allegations that he instigated the filing of the
from hearing, investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees.14 cases, threatened and harassed Taggat employees. Respondent claims that this
Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases accusation is bereft of proof because complainant failed to mention the names of the
and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit employees or present them for cross-examination.29
to support the complaint.15
Respondent does not dispute his receipt, after his appointment as government
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor prosecutor, of retainer fees from complainant but claims that it

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private was only on a case-to-case basis and it ceased in 1996.30 Respondent contends that
practice of law while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented the fees were paid for his consultancy services and not for representation.
evidence to prove that respondent received P10,000 as retainer's fee for the months Respondent submits that consultation is not the same as representation and that
of January and February 1995, 16 another P10,000 for the months of April and May rendering consultancy services is not prohibited.31 Respondent, in his Reply-
1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April 1996.18 Memorandum, states:

Complainant seeks the disbarment of respondent for violating Rule 15.03 of the x x x [I]f ever Taggat paid him certain amounts, these were paid voluntarily by
Code of Professional Responsibility and for defying the prohibition against private Taggat without the respondent's asking, intended as token consultancy fees on a
practice of law while working as government prosecutor. case-to-case basis and not as or for retainer fees. These payments do not at all show
or translate as a specie of 'conflict of interest'. Moreover, these consultations had no
Respondent refutes complainant's allegations and counters that complainant was relation to, or connection with, the above-mentioned labor complaints filed by
merely aggrieved by the resolution of the criminal complaint which was adverse and former Taggat employees.32
contrary to her expectation.19
Respondent insists that complainant's evidence failed to prove that when the
Respondent claims that when the criminal complaint was filed, respondent had criminal complaint was filed with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cagayan,
resigned from Taggat for more than five years.20 Respondent asserts that he no respondent was still the retained counsel or legal consultant.33
longer owed his undivided loyalty to Taggat.21 Respondent argues that it was his
sworn duty to conduct the necessary preliminary investigation.22 Respondent While this disbarment case was pending, the Resolution and Order issued by
contends that complainant failed to establish lack of impartiality when he performed respondent to file 651 Informations against complainant was reversed and set aside
his duty.23 Respondent points out that complainant did not file a motion to inhibit by Regional State Prosecutor of Cagayan Rodolfo B. Cadelina last 4 January 1999.34
respondent from hearing the criminal complaint 24 but instead complainant Hence, the criminal complaint was dismissed.35
voluntarily executed and filed her counter-affidavit without mental reservation.25
The IBP's Report and Recommendation
The Integrated Bar of the Philippines' Investigating Commissioner Ma. Carmina M. xxxx
Alejandro-Abbas ("IBP Commissioner Abbas") heard the case 36 and allowed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.37 Due to IBP Commissioner Abbas' While Respondent ceased his relations with Taggat in 1992 and the unpaid salaries
resignation, the case was reassigned to Commissioner Dennis A.B. Funa ("IBP being sought in I.S. No. 97-240 were of the years 1996 and 1997, the employees and
Commissioner Funa").38 management involved are the very personalities he dealt with as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. Respondent dealt with these persons in his fiduciary
After the parties filed their memoranda and motion to resolve the case, the IBP relations with Taggat. Moreover, he was an employee of the corporation and part of
Board of Governors issued Resolution No. XVI-2004-479 ("IBP Resolution") dated 4 its management.
November 2004 adopting with modification 39 IBP Commissioner Funa's Report and
Recommendation ("Report") finding respondent guilty of conflict of interests, failure xxxx
to safeguard a former client's interest, and violating the prohibition against the
private practice of law while being a government prosecutor. The IBP Board of As to the propriety of receiving "Retainer Fees" or "consultancy fees" from herein
Governors recommended the imposition of a penalty of three years suspension from Complainant while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, and for rendering legal
the practice of law. The Report reads: consultancy work while being an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, this matter had
long been settled. Government prosecutors are prohibited to engage in the private
Now the issue here is whether being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with his role practice of law (see Legal and Judicial Ethics, Ernesto Pineda, 1994 ed., p. 20; People
as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor in deciding I.S. No. 97-240. A determination of this v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109; Aquino v. Blanco 70 Phil. 647). The act of being a legal
issue will require the test of whether the matter in I.S. No. 97-240 will conflict with consultant is a practice of law. To engage in the practice of law is to do any of those
his former position of Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat. acts that are characteristic of the legal profession (In re: David, 93 Phil. 461). It
covers any activity, in or out of court, which required the application of law, legal
I.S. No. 97-240 was filed for "Violation of Labor Code" (see Resolution of the principles, practice or procedures and calls for legal knowledge, training and
Provincial Prosecutors Office, Annex "B" of Complaint). Herein Complainant, Ruthie experience (PLA v. Agrava, 105 Phil. 173; People v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 111;
Lim-Santiago, was being accused as having the "management and control" of Taggat Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210).
(p. 2, Resolution of the Prov. Pros. Office, supra).
Respondent clearly violated this prohibition.
Clearly, as a former Personnel Manager and Legal Counsel of Taggat, herein
Respondent undoubtedly handled the personnel and labor concerns of Taggat. As for the secondary accusations of harassing certain employees of Taggat and
Respondent, undoubtedly dealt with and related with the employees of Taggat. instigating the filing of criminal complaints, we find the evidence insufficient.
Therefore, Respondent undoubtedly dealt with and related with complainants in I.S.
No. 97-240. The issues, therefore, in I.S. No. 97-240, are very much familiar with Accordingly, Respondent should be found guilty of conflict of interest, failure to
Respondent. While the issues of unpaid salaries pertain to the periods 1996-1997, safeguard a former client's interest, and violating the prohibition against the private
the mechanics and personalities in that case are very much familiar with practice of law while being a government prosecutor.40
Respondent.
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the Report to the Court as provided under
A lawyer owes something to a former client. Herein Respondent owes to Taggat, a Section 12(b), Rule 139-B 41 of the Rules of Court.
former client, the duty to "maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain
from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he The Ruling of the Court
previously represented him" (Natam v. Capule, 91 Phil. 640; p. 231, Agpalo, Legal
Ethics, 4th ed.) The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility ("Code"). However, the Court finds respondent
Respondent argues that as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, he does not represent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
any client or any interest except justice. It should not be forgotten, however, that a against unlawful conduct.42 Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he
lawyer has an immutable duty to a former client with respect to matters that he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
previously handled for that former client. In this case, matters relating to personnel, Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713 ("RA 6713").
labor policies, and labor relations that he previously handled as Personnel Manager
and Legal Counsel of Taggat. I.S. No. 97-240 was for "Violation of the Labor Code." Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in government service in the
Here lies the conflict. Perhaps it would have been different had I.S. No. 97-240 not discharge of their official duties." 43 A government lawyer is thus bound by the
been labor-related, or if Respondent had not been a Personnel Manager concurrently prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." 44 However, this rule is subject
as Legal Counsel. But as it is, I.S. No. 97-240 is labor-related and Respondent was a to certain limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not
former Personnel Manager of Taggat. apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is
given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-client relationship
exists.45 Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or The Court has defined the practice of law broadly as'
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to
justify the imposition of the administrative penalty.46 x x x any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is
Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to
x x x conduct." Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service
government employee to "engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." 51
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or
tend to conflict with [his] official functions." 47 "Private practice of law" contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature
habitually or customarily holding one's self to the public as a lawyer.52
Complainant's evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented
conflicting interests Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat
intermittently and he was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as
In Quiambao v. Bamba, 48 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict alleged. This argument is without merit because the law does not distinguish
of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be between consultancy services and retainer agreement. For as long as respondent
asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers with the use of their legal
their connection or previous employment.49 In essence, what a lawyer owes his knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term "practice of law."
former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously Nonetheless, respondent admitted that he rendered his legal services to
represented him.50 complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he signed
stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer's fee." 53 Thus, as correctly
In the present case, we find no conflict of interests when respondent handled the pointed out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713.
preliminary investigation of the criminal complaint filed by Taggat employees in
1997. The issue in the criminal complaint pertains to non-payment of wages that However, violations of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code
occurred from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Clearly, respondent was no longer of Professional Responsibility unless the violations also constitute infractions of
connected with Taggat during that period since he resigned sometime in 1992. specific provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has
no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 - the Code of Conduct and Ethical
In order to charge respondent for representing conflicting interests, evidence must Standards for Public Officials and Employees - unless the acts involved also
be presented to prove that respondent used against Taggat, his former client, any transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
confidential information acquired through his previous employment. The only
established participation respondent had with respect to the criminal complaint is Here, respondent's violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of
that he was the one who conducted the preliminary investigation. On that basis Canon 1, which mandates that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
alone, it does not necessarily follow that respondent used any confidential immoral or deceitful conduct." Respondent's admission that he received from Taggat
information from his previous employment with complainant or Taggat in resolving fees for legal services while serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful
the criminal complaint. conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01.

The fact alone that respondent was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Respondent admitted that complainant also charged him with unlawful conduct
Counsel of Taggat and the case he resolved as government prosecutor was labor- when respondent stated in his Demurrer to Evidence:
related is not a sufficient basis to charge respondent for representing conflicting
interests. A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions In this instant case, the complainant prays that the respondent be permanently and
that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the client. The intent of the law indefinitely suspended or disbarred from the practice of the law profession and his
is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on name removed from the Roll of Attorneys on the following grounds:
matters that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that
arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated. xxxx

Further, complainant failed to present a single iota of evidence to prove her d) that respondent manifested gross misconduct and gross violation of his oath of
allegations. Thus, respondent is not guilty of violating Rule 15.03 of the Code. office and in his dealings with the public.54

Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government On the Appropriate Penalty on Respondent
prosecutor
The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound cralawHumberto C. Lim Jr.[1] filed a verified complaint for disbarment against
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.55 respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa on July 7, 2000.[2]On February 19, 2002,
respondent moved for the consolidation of the said complaint with the following
Under Civil Service Law and rules, the penalty for government employees engaging substantially interrelated cases earlier filed with the First Division of this Court:
in unauthorized private practice of profession is suspension for six months and one
day to one year.56 We find this penalty appropriate for respondent's violation in this 1. Administrative Case No. 5463: Sandra F. Vaflor v. Atty. Adoniram P.
case of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Pamplona and Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa;
2. Administrative Case No. 5502: Daniel A. Jalandoni v. Atty. Nicanor V.
WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio GUILTY of violation of Rule Villarosa.
1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND
respondent Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio from the practice of law for SIX MONTHS effective
cralawIn a resolution dated February 24, 2003, this Court considered Administrative
upon finality of this Decision.
Case No. 5463 closed and terminated.[3]On February 4, 2004, considering the
pleadings filed in Administrative Case No. 5502, the Court resolved:
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondent's personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their (a) to NOTE the notice of the resolution dated September 27, 2003 of the
information and guidance. Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the case against respondent for lack of
merit; and
SO ORDERED.
(b) to DENY, for lack of merit, the petition filed by complainant praying that
the resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dismissing the instant case be
SECOND DIVISION reviewed and that proper sanctions be imposed upon respondent.
[4]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
HUMBERTO C. LIM, JR.,A.C. No. 5303
in behalf of PENTA RESORTS
CORPORATION/Attorney-in- No motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid denial in Administrative Case No.
Fact of LUMOT A. JALANDONI, 5502 appears in the records.The Court is now called upon to determine the merits of
Complainant,Present: this remaining case (A.C. No. 5303) against respondent.
cralawThe complaint read:
PUNO, J., Chairperson,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, AS FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
-v e r s u s- CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ. xxx xxxxxx

ATTY. NICANOR V. VILLAROSA, - II -

Respondent.Promulgated:

June 15, 2006

cralawThat respondent is a practicing lawyer and a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, Bacolod City, Negros Occidental Chapter. That sometime on
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x September 19, 1997, Lumot A. Jalandoni, Chairman/President of PRC was sued
before RTC, Branch 52 in Civil Case No. 97-9865, RE: Cabiles et al. vs. Lumot
Jalandoni, et al.The latter engaged the legal services of herein respondent who
RESOLUTION formally entered his appearance on October 2, 1997 as counsel for the defendants
Lumot A. Jalandoni/Totti Anlap Gargoles' . Respondent as a consequence of said
CORONA, J. Attorney-Client relationship represented Lumot A. Jalandoni et al in the entire
proceedings of said case.Utmost trust and confidence was reposed on said counsel,
hence delicate and confidential matters involving all the personal circumstances of
his client were entrusted to the respondent.The latter was provided with all the
necessary information relative to the property in question and likewise on legal (82%) percent of PRC's shares of stocks] and the interest of PRC are one and the
matters affecting the corporation (PRC) particularly [involving] problems [which same, notwithstanding the fact that Lumot A. Jalandoni was still his client in Civil
affect] Hotel Alhambra.Said counsel was privy to all transactions and affairs of the Case No. 97-9862, respondent opted to represent opposing clients at the same time.
corporation/hotel. The corporation's complaint for estafa (P3,183,5525.00) was filed against the Sps.
Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena together with UCPB bank manager Vicente
Delfin.Succeeding events will show that respondent instead of desisting from further
violation of his [lawyer's ] oath regarding fidelity to his client, with extreme
- III -
arrogance, blatantly ignored our laws on Legal Ethics, by palpably and despicably
defending the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in all the cases filed against them
by PRC through its duly authorized representatives, before the Public Prosecutors
cralawThat it was respondent who exclusively handled the entire proceedings of Office, Bacolod City (PP vs. Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena for False
afore-cited Civil Case No. 97-9865 [and] presented Lumot A. Jalandoni as his witness Testimony/Perjury, viol. of Art. 183 RPC under BC I.S. No. 2000-2304; viol. of Art. 363,
prior to formally resting his case.However, on April 27, 1999 respondent, without 364, 181 and 183 RPC under BC I.S. 2000-2343, PP vs. Carmen J. Jalbuena for viol. of
due notice prior to a scheduled hearing, surprisingly filed a Motion to withdraw as Art. 315 ' under BC I.S. 2000-2125 and various other related criminal cases against
counsel, one day before its scheduled hearing on April 28, 1999. A careful perusal of the Sps. Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena).
said Motion to Withdraw as Counsel will conclusively show that no copy thereof was AS SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
furnished to Lumot A. Jalandoni, neither does it bear her conformity.No doubt, such
notorious act of respondent resulted to (sic) irreparable damage and injury to Lumot
A. Jalandoni, et al since the decision of the court RTC, Branch 52 proved adverse to
xxxcralaw cralawxxxxxx
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. The far reaching effects of the untimely and unauthorized
withdrawal by respondent caused irreparable damage and injury to Lumot A.
Jalandoni, et al; a highly meritorious case in favor of his client suddenly [suffered] -I-
unexpected defeat.
xxx xxx xxx
- IV -
cralaw
cralawThere is no dispute that respondent was able to acquire vast resources of
cralawThat the grounds alleged by respondent for his withdrawal as counsel of confidential and delicate information on the facts and circumstances of [Civil Case
Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al. was that he is [a] retained counsel of Dennis G. Jalbuena No. 97-9865] when Lumot A. Jalandoni was his client ' which knowledge and
and the Fernando F. Gonzaga, Inc. It was Dennis G. Jalbuena who recommended him information was acquired by virtue of lawyer-client relationship between respondent
to be the counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et al.It is worthy to note that from the and his clients.Using the said classified information which should have been closely
outset, respondent already knew that Dennis G. Jalbuena is the son-in-law of Lumot guarded ' respondent did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, feloniously conspired
A. Jalandoni being married to her eldest daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena.The other and confabulated with the Sps. Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena in concocting the
directors/officers of PRC were comprised of the eldest sibling of the remaining despicable and fabricated charges against his former clients denominated as PP vs.
children of Lumot A. Jalandoni made in accordance with her wishes, with the Lumot A. Jalandoni, Pamela J. Yulo, Cristina J. Lim and Leica J. Lim for viol. of Art. 172
exception of Carmen J. Jalbuena, the only daughter registered as one of the of Revised Penal Code due to a board resolution executed by the corporation which
incorporators of PRC, obviously, being the author of the registration itself [sic]. the Sps. Jalbuena, with the assistance of herein respondent, claimed to have been
Respondent further stated that he cannot refuse to represent Dennis G. Jalbuena in made without an actual board meeting due to an alleged lack of quorum, [among
the case filed against the latter before the City Prosecutors Office by PRC/Lumot A. other things].Were it not for said fiduciary relation between client and lawyer,
Jalandoni due to an alleged retainership agreement with said Dennis G. Jalbuena. respondent will not be in a position to furnish his conspirator spouses with
[He] likewise represented Carmen J. Jalbuena and one Vicente Delfin when PRC filed confidential information on Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, operator of Alhambra Hotel.
the criminal complaint against them. On April 06, 1999, twenty-one (21) days prior
to respondent's filing of his Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni, et
al., respondent entered his appearance with Bacolod City Prosecutor OIC-Vicente C.
- II -
Acupan, through a letter expressly stating that effective said date he was appearing
as counsel for both Dennis G. Jalbuena and Carmen J. Jalbuena and Vicente Delfin in
the 'Estafa case filed by the corporation (PRC) against them. Simply stated, as early
as April 6, 1999 respondent already appeared for and in behalf of the Sps. Carmen cralawAdding insult to injury, respondent opted to deliberately withhold the entire
and Dennis Jalbuena/Vicente Delfin while concurrently representing Lumot A. case file including the marked exhibits of the Cabiles case for more than three (3)
Jalandoni, et al. in Civil Case No. 97-9865. However, despite being fully aware that months after his untimely unilateral withdrawal therefrom, despite repeated
the interest of his client Lumot A. Jalandoni [holding an equivalent of Eighty-two demands from [his] client.On July 26, 1999, capitalizing on his knowledge of the
indispensability of said documents particularly the marked exhibits, which deadline cralawA pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading and
to file the formal offer of exhibits was continually impressed upon the new counsel that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal knowledge or based
by the court, respondent suddenly interposed an amount of five thousand on authentic records.
(P5,000.00) pesos as consideration prior to or simultaneous to the turnover of said
documents' . [On] July 29, 1999, left with no other alternative owing to the urgency cralawA pleading required to be verified which contains verification based on
of the situation, PRC issued Check No. 2077686 for P5,000.00 in payment information and belief or upon 'knowledge, information and belief, or lacks a proper
thereof.This was duly received by respondent's office on the same date. Such verification, shall be treated as an unsigned pleading. (As amended, A.M. 00-2-10,
dilatory tactics employed by respondent immensely weakened the case of Lumot A. May 1, 2000.) (emphasis ours)
Jalandoni eventually resulting to (sic) an adverse decision against [her].

cralawFurther demonstrating before this Honorable Court the notoriety of

respondent in representing conflicting interest which extended even beyond the
family controversy was his improper appearance in court in Civil Case No. 99-10660, While the Rules provide that an unsigned pleading produces no legal effect,[8] the
RE: Amy Albert Que vs. Penta Resorts Corp., this time favoring the party opponent of court may, in its discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it appears that
defendant who is even outside the family circle.During the pre-trial hearing the same was due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay.[9]We find that
conducted on May 5, 1999, while still [holding] exclusive possession of the entire Lim was not shown to have deliberately filed the pleading in violation of the Rules.
case file of his client in Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent brazenly positioned
himself beside Atty. Adoniram P. Pamplona, counsel of plaintiff [in] a suit against his cralawIn his comment dated December 1, 2000, respondent, reiterating his ground
client Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC, coaching said counsel on matters [he was privy to] as for the dismissal of the complaint, added:
counsel of said client.Facts mentioned by said counsel of the plaintiff starting from
the last par. of page 25 until and including the entire first par. of page 26 were the
exact words dictated by respondent. The entire incident was personally witnessed by [that] complainant Humberto C. Lim, Jr. has not only violated the Rule on Civil
herein complainant [who was] only an arms length away from them during the Procedure but he was/is NOT duly authorize[d] by the Penta Resorts Corp. (PRC) nor
hearing. However, the particular portion showing the said irregular acts of [by] Lumot A. Jalandoni to file this complaint against [him].Neither [was Lim] a
respondent was deliberately excluded by the court stenographer from the transcript, proper party to file this complaint.This fact is an additional ground to have his case
despite her detailed recollection and affirmation thereof to herein complainant. This dismissed because Humberto C. Lim Jr. exceeded whatever authority was granted to
prompted the new counsel of Lumot A. Jalandoni/PRC to complain to the court why him as embodied in a resolution and the Special Power of Attorney allegedly granted
Atty. Nicanor Villarosa was coaching Atty. Pamplona in such proceedings' . Said to him by the complainants.[10]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
corrections were only effected after repeated demands to reflect the actual events
which [transpired] on said pre-trial.[5] (emphasis ours)

cralawTo bolster his assertion that the complaint against him was unfounded,
respondent presented the following version in his defense:
cralawIn an addendum to the July 4, 2000 complaint, Lim also pointed to certain acts
of respondent which allegedly violated the Rules of Court perpetration of
FACTS OF THE CASE
falsehood and abuse of his influence as former public prosecutor. These supposedly
affected the status of the cases that Lim filed against the clients of respondent.[6]
cralaw
cralawIn a motion to dismiss dated October 30, 2000, respondent claimed that the xxxcralawcralawxxx xxx
complainant violated Circular No. 48-2000 because, in his verification, Lim stated:

3. That [he] prepared this instant complaint for disbarment against Atty. Nicanor V. cralawThat Mrs. Jalandoni has two sons-in-law, namely Dennis G. Jalbuena married to
Villarosa, read its contents, the same are all true and correct to [his] own personal her daughter, Carmen J. Jalbuena, and Humberto C. Lim Jr., the herein complainant
knowledge and belief.[7] (emphasis ours) married to her daughter, Cristina J. Lim.
cralaw
cralawSection 4, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court explicitly provides that: cralawThat Mrs. Lumot Jalandoni organized a corporation namely the Penta Resorts
Corporation (PRC) where she owned almost ninety seven percent (97%). In other
cralawSEC. 4. Verification. ' Except when otherwise specifically required by law or words, in reality, Penta Resorts Corporation is a single proprietorship belonging to
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit. (5a) Mrs. Jalandoni.That the only property of the corporation is as above-stated, the
Alhambra Hotel, constructed solely through the effort of the spouses Jalbuena on
that parcel of land now claimed by the Cabiles family.
 over the records of the case to Lim.[12]While he admitted an oversight in addressing
cralawThat sometime on the year 1997 the case above-cited (Civil Case No. 97- the notice of the motion to withdraw as counsel to Mrs. Totti Anlap Gargoles instead
9865) was filed before the court against the sisters. of Mrs. Jalandoni at Hotel Alhambra, he maintained that it was the height of
That [he], being RETAINED counsel of the spouses Dennis and Carmen J. Jalbuena hypocrisy to allege that Mrs. Jalandoni was not aware of his motion to withdraw[13]
was RECOMMENDED by the spouses to the sisters to answer the complaint filed since Mrs. Gargoles is Mrs. Jalandoni's sister and Hotel Alhambra is owned by PRC
against them. which, in turn, actually belongs to Mrs. Jalandoni. Respondent also argued that no
prejudice was suffered by Mrs. Jalandoni because she was already represented by
Atty. Lorenzo S. Alminaza from the first hearing date.[14]In fact, respondent
contended, it was he who was not notified of the substitution of counsels.[15]
II.
cralawAs to the bill of P 5,000, respondent stated:

cralawThat as counsel to the sisters, [he] filed a Motion for Extension Of Time To File That Mr. Lim begrudge[s] [him] for billing Mrs. Jalandoni Five Thousand
Answer ' and ultimately, [he] filed an Answer With Counter-Claim And Prayer For (Php5,000.00) Pesos. Mr. Humberto C. Lim Jr. conveniently forgets that the net worth
Issuance Of Writ Of Preliminary Injunction. of the property together with its improvements, under litigation in that Cabiles, et al.
vs. Gargoles et al. case, is a minimum of THIRTY MILLION (Php30,000,000.00) PESOS
cralawThat reading the Answer ' it is clear that the defense of the sisters totally rest then, and more so now.[He] cannot find any law which prohibits a counsel from
on public documents (the various titles issued to the land in question because of the billing a client for services in proportion to the services he rendered.[16]
series [of changes] in ownership) and the sisters' and their parents' actual
occupation and possession thereof.xxx xxx xxx
cralawIn view of these developments, respondent was adamant that:
cralawMr. Lim['s ] accusation against [him] in the light of the above-facts is the best
evidence of Humberto C. Lim, Jr.'s penchant for exaggeration and distortion of the
the only real question to be answered in this complaint is why Mr. Lim so
truth.Since the defense of the sisters to retain ownership of the land in question is
consistently [determined] to immerse the Jalandoni family [in] a series of criminal
based on PUBLIC documents, what delicate and confidential matters involving
and civil suits and to block all attempts to reconcile the family by prolonging
personal circumstances of the sisters allegedly entrusted to [him], is Mr. Humberto
litigations, complaints and filing of new ones in spite of the RESOLUTION of the
C. Lim, Jr. talking about in paragraphs I and II of his Complaint? What [privity] to all
corporation and the UNDERTAKING of the members' .[17]
transactions and affairs of the corporation/hotel is he referring to? Whatever
transactions the corporation may have been involved in or [may be getting involved
into], is totally immaterial and irrelevant to the defense of the sisters. cralaw
On June 18, 2001, the Court resolved to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro made the
cralawThere was nothing personal [about the] circumstances of the sisters nor
following report and recommendation:
transactions of the corporation [which were] discussed. The documents being
offered as evidence, [he] reiterate[s] for emphasis, are public; the presumption is
that the whole world knows about them. xxx xxx xxx

cralawThat [he] [also] vehemently den[ies] another distorted allegation of Mr. Lim
that [he] represented Mrs. Jalandoni [in] the entire proceedings of [the] case.[Lim] cralawAfter going over the [pieces of evidence] submitted by the parties[,] the
himself attested that [he] [filed] [his] Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, dated April 26, undersigned noted that from the onset, PRC had a case wherein respondent was its
1999 ', before the trial court, sometime on April 27, 1999. How then could [he] have counsel.Later on, complainant had a case against spouses Jalbuena where the
represented Mrs. Jalandoni for [the] entire proceedings of the case? parties were related to each other and the latter spouses were represented by the
respondent as their retained counsel; after respondent had allegedly withdrawn as
Further, Mr. Lim intentionally hid from this Honorable Court the important fact that counsel for the complainant in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
[his] Motion to Withdraw was APPROVED by the trial court because of the possibility
of a conflict of interest.xxx xxx xxx. [11]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawBeing the husband of one of the complainants which respondent himself
averred in his answer, it is incumbent upon Humberto Lim Jr. to represent his wife as
Respondent discredited Lim's claim that he deliberately withheld the records of the one of the representatives of PRC and Alhambra Hotel in the administrative
cited civil case.He insisted that it took him just a few days, not three months, to turn complaint to protect not only her interest but that of the [family's ].
 shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
cralawFrom the facts obtaining, it is evident that complainant had a lawyer-client affidavits or persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
relationship with the respondent before the latter [was] retained as counsel by the by such documents a may substantiate said facts.
Spouses Jalbuena when the latter were sued by complainant's representative.
cralawThe IBP Board of Governors may, motu propio or upon referral by the Supreme
cralawWe cannot disregard the fact that on this situation for some reason or another Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
there existed some confidentiality and trust between complainants and respondent prosecute proper charges against any erring attorneys' .[22] (emphasis ours)
to ensure the successful defense of their cases.

cralawRespondent for having appeared as counsel for the Spouses Jalbuena when Complaints against members of the Bar are pursued to preserve the integrity of the
charged by respondent's former client Jalandoni of PRC and Alhambra Hotel, legal profession, not for private vendetta.Thus, whoever has such personal
represented conflicting interests ' in violation of the Canon of Professional knowledge of facts constituting a cause of action against erring lawyers may file a
Responsibility. verified complaint with the Court or the IBP.[23] Corollary to the public interest in
cralaw these proceedings is the following rule:
cralawAs such therefore, the Undersigned has no alternative but to respectfully
recommend the suspension of the respondent from the practice of law for a period of SEC. 11. Defects. ' No defect in a complaint, notice, answer, or in the proceeding or
six (6) months from receipt hereof. the Investigator's Report shall be considered as substantial unless the Board of
Governors, upon considering the whole record, finds that such defect has resulted or
cralawRESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED. may result in a miscarriage of justice, in which event the Board shall take such
remedial action as the circumstances may warrant, including invalidation of the
cralawPasig City, June 20, 2002.[18]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary entire proceedings.[24] (emphasis ours)

cralawThe IBP Board of Governors (Board), however, reversed the recommendation Respondent failed to substantiate his allegation that Lim's complaint was defective
of the investigating commissioner and resolved to dismiss the case on August 3, in form and substance, and that entertaining it would result in a miscarriage of
2002.[19] Lumot A. Jalandoni filed a motion for reconsideration (MR) on October 18, justice.For the same reason, we will no longer put in issue the filing at the onset of a
2002 but the Board denied the MR since it no longer had jurisdiction to consider and motion to dismiss by respondent instead of an answer or comment.[25]
resolve a matter already endorsed
cralaw
to this Court.[20]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The core issues before us now are:

cralawBefore delving into the core issues of this case, we need to address some 1. whether there existed a conflict of interest in the cases represented and
preliminary matters. handled by respondent, and
2. whether respondent properly withdrew his services as counsel of record
in Civil Case No. 97-9865.
cralawRespondent argues that the alleged resolution of PRC and the special power of
attorney given by Lumot A. Jalandoni to Humberto did not contemplate the filing of
an administrative complaint.[21]Citing the Rules of Court, respondent said that: CONFLICT OF INTEREST

[s]uch complaints are personal in nature and therefore, the filing of the same, cralawPetitioners alleged that as an offshoot of representing conflicting interests,
cannot be delegated by the alleged aggrieved party to any third person unless breach of attorney-client confidentiality and deliberate withholding of records were
expressly authorized by law. committed by respondent. To effectively unravel the alleged conflict of interest, we
must look into the cases involved.

cralawIn Civil Case No. 97-9865, respondent represented Lumot A. Jalandoni and
We must note, however, the following:
Totti Anlap Gargoles.This was a case for the recovery of possession of property
involving Hotel Alhambra, a hotel owned by PRC.
SECTION 1. How instituted. ' Proceedings for disbarment, suspension or discipline of
attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu propio, or by the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
In BC I.S. No. 99-2192, Lim v. Vicente Delfin, Spouses Dennis and Carmen Jalbuena, It is only upon strict compliance with the condition of full disclosure of facts that a
respondent was counsel for Delfin and the spouses Jalbuena. In this case, plaintiff lawyer may appear against his client; otherwise, his representation of conflicting
Cristina Lim sued the spouses Jalbuena and Delfin on the basis of two checks issued interests is reprehensible.[31] Conflict of interest may be determined in this manner:
by PRC for the construction of Hotel Alhambra.[26]The corporate records allegedly There is representation of conflicting interests if the acceptance of the new retainer
reflected that the contractor, AAQ Sales and Construction (AAQSC), was already paid will require the attorney to do anything which will injuriously affect his first client in
in full yet Amy Albert Que of AAQSC still filed a collection case against PRC for an any matter in which he represents him and also whether he will be called upon in his
unpaid balance.[27] In her complaint-affidavit, Cristina averred: new relation, to use against his first client any knowledge acquired through their
connection.[32] (emphasis ours)
11. That it was respondent Carmen J. Jalbuena, who took advantage of [her]
signatures in blank in DBP Check Nos. 0865590 and 0865591, and who filled up the
spaces of the payee, date and amount without the knowledge and consent of any cralawThe rule on conflict of interests covers not only cases in which confidential
officer of the corporation and [herself], after which she caused the delivery of the communications have been confided but also those in which no confidence has been
same checks to her husband Dennis Jalbuena, who encashed without [their] bestowed or will be used.[33]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
knowledge and consent, and received the proceeds of the same checks' (as
evidenced by his signature in receipt of payment on the dorsal side of the said
Another test of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
checks) with the indispensable participation and cooperation of respondent Vicente
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
B. Delfin, the Asst. Vice President and Branch Head of UCPB.
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
[28]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
in the performance thereof, and also whether he will be called upon in his new
relation to use against his first client any knowledge acquire in the previous
employment.The first part of the rule refers to cases in which the opposing parties
Notably, in his comment, respondent stated: are present clients either in the same action or in a totally unrelated case; the
second part pertains to those in which the adverse party against whom the attorney
There was a possibility of conflict of interest because by this time, or one month appears is his former client in a matter which is related, directly or indirectly, to the
before [he] filed [his] Motion to Withdraw, Mrs. Jalandoni /Penta Resorts Corporation, present controversy.[34](emphasis ours)
Mr. Lim, through his wife, Cristina J. Lim, by another counsel, Atty. Lorenzo S.
Alminaza, filed a criminal complaint against the spouses Dennis and Carmen J.
Jalbuena on March 26, 1999 under BC-I.S. Case No. 99-2192.
[29]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
cralawThe rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests
oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the
same action or in totally unrelated cases.The cases here directly or indirectly
involved the parties' connection to PRC, even if neither PRC nor Lumot A. Jalandoni
Similarly, in BC I.S. Nos. 00-1370, 2000-2304, 2000-2343, 00-2125, 00-2230, 00-880, was specifically named as party-litigant in some of the cases mentioned.
respondent positioned himself against PRC's interests.
An attorney owes to his client undivided allegiance.After being retained and
And, in Civil Case No. 99-10660, a collection case against PRC, Atty. Alminaza of PRC receiving the confidences of the client, he cannot, without the free and intelligent
was alarmed by the appearance of respondent at the table in court for AAQSC's consent of his client, act both for his client and for one whose interest is adverse to,
counsel.[30]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary or conflicting with that of his client in the same general matter. The prohibition
stands even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the
intention and motive of the attorney may have been honest.[35] (emphasis ours)
cralawCanon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) highlights the need
for candor, fairness and loyalty in all the dealings of lawyers with their clients. Rule
15.03 of the CPR aptly provides:
cralawThe representation by a lawyer of conflicting interests, in the absence of the
cralawRule 15.03 ' A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all parties concerned after a full disclosure of the facts,
written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. constitutes professional misconduct which subjects the lawyer to disciplinary action.
[36]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

cralawEven respondent's alleged effort to settle the existing controversy among the
family members[37] was improper because the written consent of all concerned was
still required.[38] A lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent cralaw
any of the parties to it.[39]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The appearance of Atty. Alminaza in fact was not even to substitute for respondent
but to act as additional counsel.[45] Mrs. Jalandoni's conformity to having an
WITHDRAWAL AS COUNSEL IN CIVIL CASE NO. 97-9865 additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity to respondent's desire to
withdraw as counsel. Respondent's speculations on the professional relationship of
Atty. Alminaza and Mrs. Jalandoni find no support in the records of this case.
The next bone of contention was the propriety of respondent's withdrawal as counsel
cralaw
for Lumot A. Jalandoni in Civil Case No. 97-9865 to fulfill an alleged retainership
Respondent should not have presumed that his motion to withdraw as counsel[46]
agreement with the spouses Jalbuena in a suit by PRC, through Cristina Lim, against
would be granted by the court. Yet, he stopped appearing as Mrs. Jalandoni's counsel
the Jalbuenas and Delfin (BC I.S. No. 99-2192).In his December 1, 2000 comment,
beginning April 28, 1999, the first hearing date.No order from the court was shown
respondent stated that it was he who was not notified of the hiring of Atty. Alminaza
to have actually granted his motion for withdrawal. Only an order dated June 4, 1999
as the new counsel in that case and that he withdrew from the case with the
had a semblance of granting his motion:
knowledge of Lumot A. Jalandoni and with leave of court.

When this case was called for hearing Atty. Lorenzo Alminaza appeared for the
cralawThe rule on termination of attorney-client relations may be summarized as
defendants considering that Atty. Nicanor Villarosa has already withdrawn his
follows:
appearance in this case which the Court considered it to be approved as it bears the
conformity of the defendants.[47] (emphasis ours)
The relation of attorney and client may be terminated by the client, by the lawyer or
by the court, or by reason of circumstances beyond the control of the client or the
lawyer.The termination of the attorney-client relationship entails certain duties on
the part of the client and his lawyer.[40]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary cralawThat Mrs. Jalandoni continued with Atty. Alminaza's professional engagement
on her behalf despite respondent's withdrawal did not absolve the latter of the
consequences of his unprofessional conduct, specially in view of the conflicting
interests already discussed. Respondent himself stated that his withdrawal from Civil
Accordingly, it has been held that the right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate Case No. 97-9865 was due to the 'possibility of a conflict of interest.
the relation other than for sufficient cause is considerably restricted.Canon 22 of the [48]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
CPR reads:
cralawBe that as it may, the records do not support the claim that respondent
Canon 22 ' A lawyer shall withdraw his services only for good cause and upon notice improperly collected P5,000 from petitioner.Undoubtedly, respondent provided
appropriate in the circumstances. professional services to Lumot A. Jalandoni.Furthermore, there is no evidence that
the documents belonging to Mrs. Jalandoni were deliberately withheld. The right of
an attorney to retain possession of a client's documents, money or other property
cralawAn attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client which may have lawfully come into his possession in his professional capacity, until
or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the his lawful fees and disbursements have been fully paid, is well-established.
attorney should see to it that the name of the new lawyer is recorded in the case. [49]chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[41] A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his cralaw
client must file a petition for withdrawal in court.[42] He must serve a copy of his Finally, we express our utter dismay with Lim's apparent use of his wife's community
petition upon his client and the adverse party at least three days before the date set tax certificate number in his complaint for disbarment against respondent.[50] This
for hearing, otherwise the court may treat the application as a 'mere scrap of paper. is not, however, the forum to discuss this lapse.
[43] Respondent made no such move. He admitted that he withdrew as counsel on cralawWHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Nicanor V. Villarosa is
April 26, 1999, which withdrawal was supposedly approved by the court on April 28, hereby found GUILTY of violating Canon 15 and Canon 22 of the Code of Professional
1999. The conformity of Mrs. Jalandoni was only presumed by Atty. Villarosa because Responsibility and is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year, effective
of the appearance of Atty. Alminaza in court, supposedly in his place. upon receipt of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
[A client] may discharge his attorney at any time with or without cause and
thereafter employ another lawyer who may then enter his appearance.Thus, it has cralawLet a copy of this resolution be entered into the records of respondent and
been held that a client is free to change his counsel in a pending case and thereafter furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
retain another lawyer to represent him.That manner of changing a lawyer does not Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
need the consent of the lawyer to be dismissed. Nor does it require approval of the information and guidance.
court.[44] cralaw
SO ORDERED.
 Firstly, complainants maintained that by acting as counsel for the spouses Falame in
SECOND DIVISION the second civil case wherein they were impleaded as defendants, respondent
violated his oath of office and duty as an attorney. Plainly, they contended that the
[ADM. CASE NO. 6876 : March 7, 2008] spouses Falame's interests are adverse to those of his former client, Lydio.7

HEIRS OF LYDIO "JERRY" FALAME, namely: MELBA FALAME, LEO FALAME and JERRY Secondly, complainants claimed that respondent knowingly made false statements
FALAME, Petitioners, v. ATTY. EDGAR J. BAGUIO, Respondent. of fact in the complaint in the second civil case to mislead the trial court. In so
doing, respondent violated paragraph (d), Section 208 of Rule 138 of the Rules of
RESOLUTION Court,9 complainants asserted further.

TINGA, J.: Lastly, complainants alleged that the second civil case is a baseless and fabricated
suit which respondent filed as counsel for complainants' uncle against the heirs of
On Petition for Review1 is the Resolution of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) respondent's deceased client. Specifically, they averred that respondent filed the
Board of Governors dismissing the disbarment complaint filed by the Heirs of Lydio case for the sole purpose of retaining, maintaining and/or withholding the possession
"Jerry" Falame (complainants) against Atty. Edgar J. Baguio (respondent), docketed of the subject property from complainants who are its true owners. Complainants
as CBD Case No. 04-1191. concluded that respondent violated paragraph (g), Section 2010 of Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court.11
In their Complaint2 against respondent, complainants alleged that on 15 July 1991,
their father, the late Lydio "Jerry" Falame (Lydio), engaged the services of In his Answer with Motion to Dismiss,12 respondent controverted complainants'
respondent to represent him in an action for forcible entry docketed as Civil Case No. allegations. He emphasizes that it was only Raleigh Falame who personally engaged
A-2694 (the first civil case) and entitled "Heirs of Emilio T. Sy, represented by his legal services for him and on Lydio's behalf and that, in fact, it was Raleigh who
Anastacia Velayo Vda. De Sy and Belen V. Sy v. Lydio 'Jerry' Falame, Raleigh Falame paid him the attorney's fees. He also stated that he signed the jurat in Raleigh's
and Four (4) John Does," in which Lydio was one of the defendants.3 affidavit, which was submitted as evidence in the first civil case, believing to the
best of his knowledge that there is good ground to support it. Insisting that he did
Complainants recounted that respondent, as counsel for the defendants, filed the not betray the confidence reposed in him by Lydio as the latter's counsel in the first
answer to the complaint in the first civil case. Subsequently, when the parties to the civil case, respondent maintained that he did not reveal or use any fact he acquired
first civil case were required to file their respective position papers, respondent used knowledge of during the existence of the attorney-client relation in the first civil case
and submitted in evidence the following: (1) a special power of attorney dated 1 July as he had never even conferred with nor talked to Lydio in the first place.
1988 executed by Lydio in favor of his brother, Raleigh Falame, appointing the latter Respondent likewise contended that he did not knowingly make any misleading or
to be his attorney-in-fact; and (2) the affidavit of Raleigh Falame dated 23 July 1988, untruthful statement of fact in the complaint in the second civil case and neither did
executed before respondent, in which Raleigh stated that Lydio owned the property he employ any means inconsistent with truth and honor in the hearing of the
subject of the first civil case.4 case.13

Complainants claimed that even after the Municipal Trial Court of Dipolog City had Respondent vigorously averred that Lydio had not retained him as counsel in any
ruled in favor of the defendants in the first civil case, Lydio retained the services of case or transaction. Stressing the long interval of twelve years separating the
respondent as his legal adviser and counsel for his businesses until Lydio's death on termination of the first civil case and his acceptance of the second civil case,
8 September 1996.5 respondent pointed out that the first civil case was not between Lydio and Raleigh
but rather between the heirs of Emilio T. Sy on one hand and Lydio and Raleigh on
However, on 23 October 2000, in representation of spouses Raleigh and Noemi the other where physical possession of property was at stake. Respondent further
Falame, respondent filed a case against complainants allegedly involving the averred that in contrast the second civil case is one involving the spouses Raleigh
property subject of the first civil case, entitled "Spouses Rally F. Falame and Noemi F. and Noemi Falame as plaintiffs, and Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr., all surnamed Falame,
Falame v. Melba A. Falame, Leo A. Falame, Jerry A. Falame, Jr., Sugni Realty Holdings and Sugni Realty Holdings and Development Corporation, as defendants'a case
and Development Corporations, their representatives, agents and persons acting in which arose from the wrongful acts committed by Melba, Leo and Jerry Jr. after
their behalf" and docketed as Civil Case No. 5568 (the second civil case) before the Lydio's death.14
Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 6. The complaint sought the declaration
of nullity of the deed of sale, its registration in the registry of deeds, Transfer Respondent maintained that since the second civil case was still pending before the
Certificate of Title No. 20241 issued as a consequence of the registration of the deed trial court, the IBP had no jurisdiction over the instant administrative case. He added
of sale, and the real estate mortgage on the said property. Alternatively, it prayed that complainants filed this administrative case when Raleigh could no longer testify
for specific performance and reconveyance or legal redemption and damages with in his own favor as he had died a year earlier.15
preliminary injunction and restraining order.6
In their Position Paper16 dated 7 September 2004, in addition to their previous
charges against respondent, complainants claimed that respondent violated Rule xxx
15.0317 of the Code of Professional Responsibility when he represented the cause of
the spouses Falame against that of his former client, Lydio.18 The other allegations of the complainants that the respondent violated paragraph
(d), Section 20 of Rule 139, Rules of Court, and his lawyer's oath when he allegedly
On 25 June 2005, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XVI-2005-167 betrayed the trust and confidence of his former client by denying knowledge of the
adopting and approving Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan's report fact that the land was owned by Lydio Falame and when he did not disclose to the
and recommendation for the dismissal of this administrative case, thus:19 Court that at one time his present clients categorically declared and unconditionally
recognized the full ownership of the late Lydio Falame and complainant Melba
x x x The charge lacks specification as to what part of the lawyer's oath was violated Falame over subject matter of both cases equally lacks evidentiary basis.
by the respondent and what confidence was disclosed. The complainants may have
in mind the prohibition against disclosure of secret information learned in xxx
confidence, but there is no specification in the complaint what secret or information
learned in confidence under Civil Case No. A-2694 was disclosed or will be disclosed It is beyond the competence of the complainants to conclude and is outside the
by respondent in Civil Case No. 5568. In administrative complaints for disbarment or jurisdiction of this Honorable Commission to rule as to whether or nor (sic) the
suspension against lawyers, the complainant must specify in the affidavit-complaint complaint in Civil Case No.5568 is baseless or fabricated. It is only the Honorable
the alleged secrets or confidential information disclosed or will be disclosed in the Court which has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the same and cannot be the
professional employment (Uy v. Gonzalez, 426 SCRA 422; 431). In the absence of subject of an administrative complaint against the respondent.
such specification, the complaint must fail.
xxx
In the complaint, there is no specific charge against respondent for violation of
Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility about the prohibition WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that this
against representation of conflicting interest. So, the allegation in paragraph 1, page complaint be dismissed on grounds of prescription, the same having been filed four
8 and 9 of complainants' position paper stating: With all due respect, it is submitted (4) years after the alleged misconduct took place and for lack of merit.
that respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility" cannot be countenanced. The reason being that it is an elementary RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.20
principle of due process to which the respondent is entitled that only those charged
in the complaint can be proved by the complainants. A charge not specified in the Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the
complaint cannot be proved (Uy v. Gonzales, id.) Rules of Court reiterating their allegations in the complaint and their position
paper.21 They likewise assert that the IBP erred in holding that the instant
x x x But still this charge will not proper for lack of sufficient bases. administrative complaint had been filed out of time since it was filed on 16 January
2004, or three (3) years, four (4) months and sixteen (16) days after the second civil
xxx case was filed on 23 October 2000.22 In addition, in their Consolidated Comment
(should be Consolidated Reply),23 complainants invoke the Court's ruling in Frias v.
Civil Case No. 5568, which was commenced on 03 October 2000, or three years Bautista-Lozada24 to support their contention that administrative complaints against
since the complainants became owners of Lydio Falame's properties, is a suit against members of the bar do not prescribe.25
the complainants, not as representatives of Lydio Falame, but as owners of their
respective aliquot interests in the property in question (Gayon v. Gayon, 36 SCRA In his Comment,26 respondent principally maintains that the charges imputed to
104; 107-108). The complainants are sued not on the basis of the acts, rights, him have never been proven by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence which is
obligations and interest of Lydio Falame on the material possession of the the quantum of proof required in administrative cases against lawyers, and that
improvements found on Lot 345 litigated in Civil Case No. A-2694 nor even on such complainants have the burden to prove their accusations as he enjoys the
land itself, but rather on the facts alleged in the second amended and supplemental presumption of innocence.27 Respondent likewise asserts that in accusing him of
complaint which give rise to their cause of action against them. violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility only in their position
paper and in the instant petition, complainants infringed his right to due process and
While the complainants could not specify under what circumstances the respondent to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him.28
committed [the] alleged breach of confidence, breach of secrecy or revelation of
secret or confidential information[,] the respondent has shown that he did not There is merit in the petition.
commit any violation of such duties or obligations of an attorney.
At the outset, the Court holds that the instant administrative action is not barred by
It is clear that only Raleigh Falame engaged the legal services of the respondent for prescription. As early as 1947, the Court held in Calo, Jr. v. Degamo,29 to wit:
his and Lydio Falame's defense in Civil Case No. A-2694.
The ordinary statutes of limitation have no application to disbarment proceedings, same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
nor does the circumstance that the facts set up as a ground for disbarment only if the former client consents to it after consultation. The rule is grounded in the
constitute a crime, prosecution for which in a criminal proceeding is barred by fiduciary obligation of loyalty.38 In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the
limitation, affect the disbarment proceeding x x x (5 Am. Jur. 434)30 lawyer learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of that relationship is, therefore, one of trust
This doctrine was reaffirmed in the relatively recent case of Frias v. Bautista- and confidence of the highest degree.39
Lozada31 where the Court held that Rule VII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of
the CBD-IBP, which provides for a prescriptive period for the filing of administrative The termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to
complaints against lawyers, should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The
being ultra vires.32 client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere expiration of
professional employment. Even after the severance of the relation, a lawyer should
Prescinding from the unavailability of the defense of prescription, the Court concurs not do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which
with the Investigating Commissioner's opinion that some of the charges raised by he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any of the client's
complainants in their complaint are unsubstantiated. confidences acquired in the previous relation.40

There is, however, sufficient basis to hold respondent accountable for violation of In relation to this, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. While this charge was not lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and shall be mindful of the trust and
raised in the initiatory pleading, it was put forward in complainants' position paper confidence reposed on him. His highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect
filed with the IBP and in the petition filed with the Court. In fact, respondent the client at all hazards and costs even to himself.41 The protection given to the
proffered his defenses to the charge in his position paper before the IBP and likewise client is perpetual and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it
in his comment before the Court. In his very first pleading before the IBP, the answer affected by the party's ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by
with motion to dismiss, he denied having Lydio as his client. Such absence of any other change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the
attorney-client relationship is the essential element of his defense to the charge of client.42
conflict of interest, as articulated in his subsequent submissions.
In the case at bar, respondent admitted having jointly represented Lydio and Raleigh
The Court, therefore, rules and so holds that respondent has been adequately as defendants in the first civil case. Evidently, the attorney-client relation between
apprised of and heard on the issue. In administrative cases, the requirement of Lydio and respondent was established despite the fact that it was only Raleigh who
notice and hearing does not connote full adversarial proceedings. Actual adversarial paid him. The case of Hilado v. David43 tells us that it is immaterial whether such
proceedings only become necessary for clarification when there is a need to employment was paid, promised or charged for.44
propound searching questions to witnesses who give vague testimonies. Due
process is fulfilled when the parties were given reasonable opportunity to be heard As defense counsel in the first civil case, respondent advocated the stance that Lydio
and to submit evidence in support of their arguments.33 solely owned the property subject of the case. In the second civil case involving the
same property, respondent, as counsel for Raleigh and his spouse, has pursued the
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: inconsistent position that Raleigh owned the same property in common with Lydio,
with complainants, who inherited the property, committing acts which debase
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all respondent's rights as a co-owner.
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
The fact that the attorney-client relation had ceased by reason of Lydio's death or
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for through the completion of the specific task for which respondent was employed is
a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client.34 The test not reason for respondent to advocate a position opposed to that of Lydio.45
is whether, on behalf of one client, it is the lawyer's duty to contest for that which Precedents tell us that even after the termination of his employment, an attorney
his duty to another client requires him to oppose or when the possibility of such may not act as counsel against his client in the same general matter, even though,
situation will develop.35 The rule covers not only cases in which confidential while acting for his former client, he acquired no knowledge which could operate to
communications have been confided, but also those in which no confidence has his client's disadvantage in the subsequent adverse employment.46 And while
been bestowed or will be used.36 In addition, the rule holds even if the complainants have never been respondent's clients, they derive their rights to the
inconsistency is remote or merely probable or the lawyer has acted in good faith and property from Lydio's ownership of it which respondent maintained in the first civil
with no intention to represent conflicting interests.37 case.

The rule concerning conflict of interest prohibits a lawyer from representing a client For representing Raleigh's cause which is adverse to that of his former client
if that representation will be directly adverse to any of his present or former clients. Raleigh's supposed co-ownership of the subject property' respondent is guilty of
In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the
representing conflicting interests. Having previously undertaken joint representation Distraught, complainant sought the advice of respondent who also happened to be a
of Lydio and Raleigh, respondent should have diligently studied and anticipated the member of the Couples for Christ, a religious organization where complainant and
his wife were also active members. From then on, complainant and respondent
potential conflict of interest. Accordingly, disciplinary action is warranted.47 constantly communicated, with the former disclosing all his involvement and
Heretofore, respondent is enjoined to look at any representation situation from "the interests in Precedent and Precedent's relation with Multitel. Respondent gave legal
point of view that there are possible conflicts"; and further, "to think in terms of advice to complainant and even helped him prepare standard quitclaims for
impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way will impair creditors. In sum, complainant avers that a lawyer-client relationship was
loyalty to a client.48 Considering, however, that this is respondent's first offense, the established between him and respondent although no formal document was
Court resolves to reprimand respondent, with admonition to observe a higher degree executed by them at that time. A Retainer Agreement4 dated January 15, 2003 was
of fidelity in the practice of his profession.49 proposed by respondent. Complainant, however, did not sign the said agreement
because respondent verbally asked for One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00)
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Edgar J. Baguio is found GUILTY of representing as acceptance fee and a 15% contingency fee upon collection of the overpayment
conflicting interests and meted out the penalty of REPRIMAND. He is further made by Multitel to Benefon,5 a telecommunications company based in Finland.
admonished to observe a higher degree of fidelity in the practice of his profession Complainant found the proposed fees to be prohibitive and not within his means.6
and to bear in mind that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with Hence, the retainer agreement remained unsigned.7
more severely.
After a few weeks, complainant was surprised to receive a demand letter from
SO ORDERED. respondent8 asking for the return and immediate settlement of the funds invested
by respondent's clients in Multitel. When complainant confronted respondent about
Carpio, Acting Chairperson Carpio-Morales, Azcuna*, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur. the demand letter, the latter explained that she had to send it so that her clients -
defrauded investors of Multitel - would know that she was doing something for them
and assured complainant that there was nothing to worry about.9
EN BANC
Both parties continued to communicate and exchange information regarding the
[A.C. NO. 8243 : July 24, 2009] persistent demands made by Multitel investors against complainant. On these
occasions, respondent impressed upon complainant that she can closely work with
ROLANDO B. PACANA, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. MARICEL PASCUAL-LOPEZ, officials of the Anti-Money Laundering Council (AMLC), the Department of Justice
Respondent. (DOJ), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportations (BID),10 and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)11 to
DECISION resolve complainant's problems. Respondent also convinced complainant that in
order to be absolved from any liability with respect to the investment scam, he must
PER CURIAM: be able to show to the DOJ that he was willing to divest any and all of his interests in
Precedent including the funds assigned to him by Multitel.12
This case stems from an administrative complaint1 filed by Rolando Pacana, Jr.
against Atty. Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the Respondent also asked money from complainant allegedly for safekeeping to be
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.2 Complainant alleges that used only for his case whenever necessary. Complainant agreed and gave her an
respondent committed acts constituting conflict of interest, dishonesty, influence initial amount of P900,000.00 which was received by respondent herself.13
peddling, and failure to render an accounting of all the money and properties Sometime thereafter, complainant again gave respondent P1,000,000.00.14 Said
received by her from complainant. amounts were all part of Precedent's collections and sales proceeds which
complainant held as assignee of the company's properties.15
On January 2, 2002, complainant was the Operations Director for Multitel
Communications Corporation (MCC). MCC is an affiliate company of Multitel When complainant went to the United States (US), he received several messages
International Holdings Corporation (Multitel). Sometime in July 2002, MCC changed from respondent sent through electronic mail (e-mail) and short messaging system
its name to Precedent Communications Corporation (Precedent).3 (SMS, or text messages) warning him not to return to the Philippines because
Rosario Baladjay, president of Multitel, was arrested and that complainant may later
According to complainant, in mid-2002, Multitel was besieged by demand letters on be implicated in Multitel's failed investment system. Respondent even said that
from its members and investors because of the failure of its investment schemes. He ten (10) arrest warrants and a hold departure order had been issued against him.
alleges that he earned the ire of Multitel investors after becoming the assignee of Complainant, thereafter, received several e-mail messages from respondent
majority of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of updating him of the status of the case against Multitel and promised that she will
a fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real Bank. settle the matter discreetly with government officials she can closely work with in
order to clear complainant's name.16 In two separate e-mail messages,17
respondent again asked money from complainant, P200,000 of which was handed by they want to come out from hiding (sic). I do not want that to happen. Things will be
complainant's wife while respondent was confined in Saint Luke's Hospital after really easier on my side.
giving birth,18 and another P700,000 allegedly to be given to the NBI.19
Please do not worry. Give me 3 months to make it all disappear. But if you hire Coco,
Through respondent's persistent promises to settle all complainant's legal problems, I will give him the free hand to work with your case. Please trust me. I have never let
respondent was able to convince complainant who was still in the US to execute a you down, have I? I told you this will happen but we are ready and prepared. The
deed of assignment in favor of respondent allowing the latter to retrieve 178 boxes clients who received the phones will stand by you and make you the hero in this
containing cellular phones and accessories stored in complainant's house and inside scandal. I will stand by you always. This is my expertise. TRUST me! That is all. You
a warehouse.20 He also signed a blank deed of sale authorizing respondent to sell have an angel on your side. Always pray though to the best legal mind up there. You
his 2002 Isuzu Trooper.21 will be ok!

Sometime in April 2003, wary that respondent may not be able to handle his legal Candy22
problems, complainant was advised by his family to hire another lawyer. When
respondent knew about this, she wrote to complainant via e-mail, as follows: On July 4, 2003, contrary to respondent's advice, complainant returned to the
country. On the eve of his departure from the United States, respondent called up
Dear Butchie, complainant and conveniently informed him that he has been cleared by the NBI and
the BID.23
Hi! Ok ka lang? Hope you are fine. Sorry if I shocked you but I had to do it as your
friend and lawyer. The charges are all non-bailable but all the same as the SEC About a month thereafter, respondent personally met with complainant and his wife
report I told you before. The findings are the same, i.e. your company was the front and told them that she has already accumulated P12,500,000.00 as attorney's fees
for the fraud of Multitel and that funds were provided you. and was willing to give P2,000,000.00 to complainant in appreciation for his help.
Respondent allegedly told complainant that without his help, she would not have
I anticipated this, that is why I really pushed for a quitclaim. Rolly is willing to return earned such amount. Overwhelmed and relieved, complainant accepted
the Crosswind, laptap (sic) and [P]alm [P]ilot. Manny Cancio really helped. Anthony respondent's offer but respondent, later on, changed her mind and told complainant
na lang. Then, I will need the accounting of all the funds you received from the sale that she would instead invest the P2,000,000.00 on his behalf in a business venture.
of the phones, every employees and directors['] quitclaim (including yours), the Complainant declined and explained to respondent that he and his family needed
funds transmitted to the clients through me, the funds you utilized, and whatelse the money instead to cover their daily expenses as he was no longer employed.
(sic) is still unremitted, every centavo must be accounted for as DOJ and NBI can Respondent allegedly agreed, but she failed to fulfill her promise.24
have the account opened.
Respondent even publicly announced in their religious organization that she was
I will also need the P30 M proof of deposit with Real [B]ank and the trust given [to] able to help settle the ten (10) warrants of arrest and hold departure order issued
you. So we can inform them [that] it was not touched by you. against complainant and narrated how she was able to defend complainant in the
said cases.25
I have been informed by Efie that your family is looking at hiring Coco Pimentel. I
know him very well as his sister Gwen is my best friend. I have no problem if you By April 2004, however, complainant noticed that respondent was evading him.
hire him but I will be hands off. I work differently kasi. In this cases (sic), you cannot Respondent would either refuse to return complainant's call or would abruptly
be highprofile (sic) because it is the clients who will be sacrificed at the expense of terminate their telephone conversation, citing several reasons. This went on for
the fame of the lawyer. I have to work quietly and discreetly. No funfare. Just like several months.26 In one instance, when complainant asked respondent for an
what I did for your guys in the SEC. I have to work with people I am comfortable update on the collection of Benefon's obligation to Precedent which respondent had
with. Efren Santos will sign as your lawyer although I will do all the work. He can help previously taken charge of, respondent arrogantly answered that she was very busy
with all his connections. Val's friend in the NBI is the one is (sic) charge of organized and that she would read Benefon's letter only when she found time to do so.
crime who is the entity (sic) who has your warrant. My law partner was the state
prosecutor for financial fraud. Basically we have it covered in all aspects and all On November 9, 2004, fed up and dismayed with respondent's arrogance and
departments. I am just trying to liquidate the phones I have allotted for you s ana evasiveness, complainant wrote respondent a letter formally asking for a full
(sic) for your trooper kasi whether we like it or not, we have to give this agencies accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter.27
(sic) to make our work easier according to Val. The funds with Mickey are already Respondent rendered an accounting through a letter dated December 20, 2004.28
accounted in the quit claims (sic) as attorneys (sic) fees. I hope he will be able to When complainant found respondent's explanation to be inadequate, he wrote a
send it so we have funds to work with. latter expressing his confusion about the accounting.29 Complainant repeated his
request for an audited financial report of all the properties turned over to her;
As for your kids, legally they can stay here but recently, it is the children who (sic) otherwise, he will be constrained to file the appropriate case against respondent.30
the irate clients and government officials harass and kidnap to make the individuals Respondent replied,31 explaining that all the properties and cash turned over to her
by complainant had been returned to her clients who had money claims against
Multitel. In exchange for this, she said that she was able to secure quitclaim Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional responsibility provides:
documents clearing complainant from any liability.32 Still unsatisfied, complainant
decided to file an affidavit-complaint33 against respondent before the Commission Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the consent of all concerned given after full disclosure of the facts.
disbarment of respondent.
This prohibition is founded on principles of public policy, good taste43 and, more
In her Answer-Affidavit,34 respondent vehemently denied being the lawyer for importantly, upon necessity. In the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer
Precedent. She maintained that no formal engagement was executed between her learns all the facts connected with the client's case, including its weak and strong
and complainant. She claimed that she merely helped complainant by providing him points. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care. No
with legal advice and assistance because she personally knew him, since they both opportunity must be given to him to take advantage of his client; for if the
belonged to the same religious organization.35 rbl rl l lbrr confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.44 It behooves
lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the
Respondent insisted that she represented the group of investors of Multitel and that appearance of treachery and double dealing for only then can litigants be
she merely mediated in the settlement of the claims her clients had against the encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is paramount in the
complainant. She also averred that the results of the settlement between both administration of justice.45 It is for these reasons that we have described the
parties were fully documented and accounted for.36 Respondent believes that her attorney-client relationship as one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.46
act in helping complainant resolve his legal problem did not violate any ethical
standard and was, in fact, in accord with Rule 2.02 of the Code of Professional Respondent must have known that her act of constantly and actively communicating
Responsibility.37 with complainant, who, at that time, was beleaguered with demands from investors
of Multitel, eventually led to the establishment of a lawyer-client relationship.
To bolster her claim that the complaint was without basis, respondent noted that a Respondent cannot shield herself from the inevitable consequences of her actions by
complaint for estafa was also filed against her by complainant before the Office of simply saying that the assistance she rendered to complainant was only in the form
the City Prosecutor in Quezon City citing the same grounds. The complaint was, of "friendly accommodations,"47 precisely because at the time she was giving
however, dismissed by Assistant City Prosecutor Josephus Joannes H. Asis for assistance to complainant, she was already privy to the cause of the opposing
insufficiency of evidence.38 Respondent argued that on this basis alone, the parties who had been referred to her by the SEC.48
administrative case must also be dismissed.
Respondent also tries to disprove the existence of such relationship by arguing that
In her Position Paper,39 respondent also questioned the admissibility of the no written contract for the engagement of her services was ever forged between her
electronic evidence submitted by complainant to the IBP's Commission on Bar and complainant.49 This argument all the more reveals respondent's patent
Discipline. Respondent maintained that the e-mail and the text messages allegedly ignorance of fundamental laws on contracts and of basic ethical standards expected
sent by respondent to complainant were of doubtful authenticity and should be from an advocate of justice. The IBP was correct when it said:
excluded as evidence for failure to conform to the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M.
No. 01-7-01-SC). The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not an
After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez issued a Report essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be express or
and Recommendation40 finding that a lawyer-client relationship was established implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an
between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a written contract. The attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession.50
Investigating Commissioner also declared that respondent violated her duty to be (Emphasis supplied.)rbl rl l lbrr
candid, fair and loyal to her client when she allowed herself to represent conflicting
interests and failed to render a full accounting of all the cash and properties Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which respondent should have
entrusted to her. Based on these grounds, the Investigating Commissioner done was either to advise complainant to engage the services of another lawyer
recommended her disbarment. since she was already representing the opposing parties, or to desist from acting as
representative of Multitel investors and stand as counsel for complainant. She
Respondent moved for reconsideration,41 but the IBP Board of Governors issued a cannot be permitted to do both because that would amount to double-dealing and
Recommendation42 denying the motion and adopting the findings of the violate our ethical rules on conflict of interest.
Investigating Commissioner.
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,51 we explained the concept of conflict of interest, thus:
The case now comes before this Court for final action.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
We affirm the findings of the IBP. more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other so. This is because membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions.58
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him The conduct of a lawyer may make him or her civilly, if not criminally, liable to his
when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which client or to third parties, and such liability may be conveniently avoided if this Court
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no were to allow voluntary termination of membership. Hence, to terminate one's
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if membership in the Bar voluntarily, it is imperative that the lawyer first prove that
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which the voluntary withdrawal of membership is not a ploy to further prejudice the public
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and or to evade liability. No such proof exists in the present case.
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency WHEREFORE, respondent Attorney Maricel Pascual-Lopez is hereby DISBARRED for
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney representing conflicting interests and for engaging in unlawful, dishonest and
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or deceitful conduct in violation of her Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.52 Responsibility.

Indubitably, respondent took advantage of complainant's hapless situation, initially, Let a copy of this Decision be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the
by giving him legal advice and, later on, by soliciting money and properties from Bar, and notice of the same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and
him. Thereafter, respondent impressed upon complainant that she had acted with on the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
utmost sincerity in helping him divest all the properties entrusted to him in order to
absolve him from any liability. But simultaneously, she was also doing the same
thing to impress upon her clients, the party claimants against Multitel, that she was SO ORDERED.
doing everything to reclaim the money they invested with Multitel. Respondent
herself admitted to complainant that without the latter's help, she would not have
been able to earn as much and that, as a token of her appreciation, she was willing FIRST DIVISION
to share some of her earnings with complainant.53 Clearly, respondent's act is
shocking, as it not only violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code of Professional [A.C. NO. 8242 : October 2, 2009]
Responsibility,54 but also toyed with decency and good taste.
REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
Respondent even had the temerity to boast that no Multitel client had ever
complained of respondent's unethical behavior.55 This remark indubitably displays DECISION
respondent's gross ignorance of disciplinary procedure in the Bar. As a member of
the Bar, she is expected to know that proceedings for disciplinary actions against CARPIO, J.:
any lawyer may be initiated and prosecuted by the IBP Board of Governors, motu
proprio or upon referral by this Court or by the Board of Officers of an IBP Chapter56 The Case
even if no private individual files any administrative complaint.
The case before the Court is a disbarment proceeding filed by Rebecca J. Palm
Upon review, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings and recommendations (complainant) against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. (respondent) for revealing information
of the IBP Investigating Commissioner, as adopted by the IBP Board of Governors, on obtained in the course of an attorney-client relationship and for representing an
the admissibility of the electronic evidence submitted by complainant. We, interest which conflicted with that of his former client, Comtech Worldwide Solutions
accordingly, adopt the same in toto. Philippines, Inc. (Comtech).

Finally, respondent argues that the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors The Antecedent Facts
to disbar her on the grounds of deceit, malpractice and other gross misconduct,
aside from violation of the Lawyer's Oath, has been rendered moot and academic by Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of
voluntary termination of her IBP membership, allegedly after she had been placed computer software development. From February 2003 to November 2003,
under the Department of Justice's Witness Protection Program.57 Convenient as it respondent served as Comtech's retained corporate counsel for the amount of
may be for respondent to sever her membership in the integrated bar, this Court P6,000 per month as retainer fee. From September to October 2003, complainant
cannot allow her to do so without resolving first this administrative case against her. personally met with respondent to review corporate matters, including potential
amendments to the corporate by-laws. In a meeting held on 1 October 2003,
The resolution of the administrative case filed against respondent is necessary in respondent suggested that Comtech amend its corporate by-laws to allow
order to determine the degree of her culpability and liability to complainant. The participation during board meetings, through teleconference, of members of the
case may not be dismissed or rendered moot and academic by respondent's act of Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines.
voluntarily terminating her membership in the Bar regardless of the reason for doing
Prior to the completion of the amendments of the corporate by-laws, complainant case was not related to or connected with the limited procedural queries he handled
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda with Comtech.
Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director of Comtech, who resigned and who
was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. Thus, The IBP's Report and Recommendation
Comtech decided to terminate its retainer agreement with respondent effective
November 2003. In a Report and Recommendation dated 28 March 2006,3 the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline (IBP-CBD) found respondent guilty of violation of Canon 21 of the Code of
In a stockholders' meeting held on 10 January 2004, respondent attended as proxy Professional Responsibility and of representing interest in conflict with that of
for Gary Harrison (Harrison). Steven C. Palm (Steven) and Deanna L. Palm, members Comtech as his former client.
of the Board of Directors, were present through teleconference. When the meeting
was called to order, respondent objected to the meeting for lack of quorum. The IBP-CBD ruled that there was no doubt that respondent was Comtech's retained
Respondent asserted that Steven and Deanna Palm could not participate in the counsel from February 2003 to November 2003. The IBP-CBD found that in the
meeting because the corporate by-laws had not yet been amended to allow course of the meetings for the intended amendments of Comtech's corporate by-
teleconferencing. laws, respondent obtained knowledge about the intended amendment to allow
members of the Board of Directors who were outside the Philippines to participate in
On 24 March 2004, Comtech's new counsel sent a demand letter to Soledad to board meetings through teleconferencing. The IBP-CBD noted that respondent knew
return or account for the amount of P90,466.10 representing her unauthorized that the corporate by-laws have not yet been amended to allow the
disbursements when she was the Corporate Treasurer of Comtech. On 22 April 2004, teleconferencing. Hence, when respondent, as representative of Harrison, objected
Comtech received Soledad's reply, signed by respondent. In July 2004, due to to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm through teleconferencing on the
Soledad's failure to comply with Comtech's written demands, Comtech filed a ground that the corporate by-laws did not allow the participation, he made use of a
complaint for Estafa against Soledad before the Makati Prosecutor's Office. In the privileged information he obtained while he was Comtech's retained counsel.
proceedings before the City Prosecution Office of Makati, respondent appeared as
Soledad's counsel. The IBP-CBD likewise found that in representing Soledad in a case filed by Comtech,
respondent represented an interest in conflict with that of a former client. The IBP-
On 26 January 2005, complainant filed a Complaint1 for disbarment against CBD ruled that the fact that respondent represented Soledad after the termination of
respondent before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). his professional relationship with Comtech was not an excuse.

In his Answer,2 respondent alleged that in January 2002, Soledad consulted him on The IBP-CBD recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law
process and procedure in acquiring property. In April 2002, Soledad again consulted for one year, thus:
him about the legal requirements of putting up a domestic corporation. In February
2003, Soledad engaged his services as consultant for Comtech. Respondent alleged WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully recommended that herein
that from February to October 2003, neither Soledad nor Palm consulted him on respondent be found guilty of the charges preferred against him and be suspended
confidential or privileged matter concerning the operations of the corporation. from the practice of law for one (1) year.4
Respondent further alleged that he had no access to any record of Comtech.
In Resolution No. XVII-2006-5835 passed on 15 December 2006, the IBP Board of
Respondent admitted that during the months of September and October 2003, Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating
complainant met with him regarding the procedure in amending the corporate by- Commissioner with modification by suspending respondent from the practice of law
laws to allow board members outside the Philippines to participate in board for two years.
meetings.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.6
Respondent further alleged that Harrison, then Comtech President, appointed him as
proxy during the 10 January 2004 meeting. Respondent alleged that Harrison In an undated Recommendation, the IBP Board of Governors First Division found that
instructed him to observe the conduct of the meeting. Respondent admitted that he respondent's motion for reconsideration did not raise any new issue and was just a
objected to the participation of Steven and Deanna Palm because the corporate by- rehash of his previous arguments. However, the IBP Board of Governors First Division
laws had not yet been properly amended to allow the participation of board recommended that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for only one
members by teleconferencing. year.

Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-703 passed on 11 December 2008, the IBP Board of
Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He alleged that Soledad was already Governors adopted and approved the recommendation of the IBP Board of
a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. He alleged that the criminal Governors First Division. The IBP Board of Governors denied respondent's motion for
reconsideration but reduced his suspension from two years to one year.
 Representing Interest in Conflict With the Interest of a Former Client
The IBP Board of Governors forwarded the present case to this Court as provided
under Section 12(b), Rule 139-B7 of the Rules of Court. The IBP found respondent guilty of representing an interest in conflict with that of a
former client, in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
The Ruling of this Court Responsibility which provides:

We cannot sustain the findings and recommendation of the IBP. Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Violation of the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship
We do not agree with the IBP.
Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
In Quiambao v. Bamba,13 the Court enumerated various tests to determine conflict
Canon 21. A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even after of interests. One test of inconsistency of interests is whether the lawyer will be
the attorney-client relationship is terminated. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary asked to use against his former client any confidential information acquired through
their connection or previous employment.14 The Court has ruled that what a lawyer
We agree with the IBP that in the course of complainant's consultations, respondent owes his former client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain
obtained the information about the need to amend the corporate by-laws to allow from doing anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he
board members outside the Philippines to participate in board meetings through previously represented him.15
teleconferencing. Respondent himself admitted this in his Answer.
We find no conflict of interest when respondent represented Soledad in a case filed
However, what transpired on 10 January 2004 was not a board meeting but a by Comtech. The case where respondent represents Soledad is an Estafa case filed
stockholders' meeting. Respondent attended the meeting as proxy for Harrison. The by Comtech against its former officer. There was nothing in the records that would
physical presence of a stockholder is not necessary in a stockholders' meeting show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information acquired
because a member may vote by proxy unless otherwise provided in the articles of while he was still Comtech's retained counsel. Further, respondent made the
incorporation or by-laws.8 Hence, there was no need for Steven and Deanna Palm to representation after the termination of his retainer agreement with Comtech. A
participate through teleconferencing as they could just have sent their proxies to the lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred
meeting. beyond the lawyer's employment with the client.16 The intent of the law is to
impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters
In addition, although the information about the necessity to amend the corporate by- that he previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after
laws may have been given to respondent, it could not be considered a confidential the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.17
information. The amendment, repeal or adoption of new by-laws may be effected by
"the board of directors or trustees, by a majority vote thereof, and the owners of at WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the complaint against Atty. Felipe Iledan, Jr. for lack of
least a majority of the outstanding capital stock, or at least a majority of members of merit.
a non-stock corporation."9 It means the stockholders are aware of the proposed
amendments to the by-laws. While the power may be delegated to the board of SO ORDERED.
directors or trustees, there is nothing in the records to show that a delegation was
made in the present case. Further, whenever any amendment or adoption of new
by-laws is made, copies of the amendments or the new by-laws are filed with the SECOND DIVISION
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and attached to the original articles of
incorporation and by-laws.10 The documents are public records and could not be [A.C. No. 6174 : November 16, 2011]
considered confidential.rbl rl l lbrr
LYDIA CASTRO-JUSTO, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. RODOLFO T. GALING, RESPONDENT.
It is settled that the mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a
presumption of confidentiality.11 The client must intend the communication to be DECISION
confidential.12 Since the proposed amendments must be approved by at least a
majority of the stockholders, and copies of the amended by-laws must be filed with PEREZ, J.:
the SEC, the information could not have been intended to be confidential. Thus, the
disclosure made by respondent during the stockholders' meeting could not be Before us for consideration is Resolution No. XVIII-2007-196[1] of the Board of
considered a violation of his client's secrets and confidence within the contemplation Governors, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), relative to the complaint[2] for
of Canon 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. disbarment filed by Lydia Castro-Justo against Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing.
Complainant Justo alleged that sometime in April 2003, she engaged the services of led her to vent her ire on respondent and file the instant administrative case for
respondent Atty. Galing in connection with dishonored checks issued by Manila City conflict of interest.
Councilor Arlene W. Koa (Ms. Koa). After she paid his professional fees, the
respondent drafted and sent a letter to Ms. Koa demanding payment of the checks. In a resolution dated 19 October 2007, the Board of Governors of the IBP adopted
[3] Respondent advised complainant to wait for the lapse of the period indicated in and approved with modification the findings of its Investigating Commissioner. They
the demand letter before filing her complaint. found respondent guilty of violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by representing conflicting interests and for his daring audacity and
On 10 July 2003, complainant filed a criminal complaint against Ms. Koa for estafa for the pronounced malignancy of his act. It was recommended that he be
and violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 before the Office of the City Prosecutor of suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year with a warning that a repetition
Manila.[4] of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.[8]

On 27 July 2003, she received a copy of a Motion for Consolidation[5] filed by We agree with the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner,
respondent for and on behalf of Ms. Koa, the accused in the criminal cases, and the [9] as adopted by the Board of Governors of the IBP.
latters daughter Karen Torralba (Ms. Torralba). Further, on 8 August 2003,
respondent appeared as counsel for Ms. Koa before the prosecutor of Manila. It was established that in April 2003, respondent was approached by complainant
regarding the dishonored checks issued by Manila City Councilor Koa.
Complainant submits that by representing conflicting interests, respondent violated
the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was also established that on 25 July 2003, a Motion for Consolidation was filed by
respondent in I.S. No. 03G-19484-86 entitled "Lydia Justo vs. Arlene Koa" and I.S.
In his Comment,[6] respondent denied the allegations against him. He admitted No. 03G-19582-84 entitled "Lani C. Justo vs. Karen Torralba". Respondent stated
that he drafted a demand letter for complainant but argued that it was made only in that the movants in these cases are mother and daughter while complainants are
deference to their long standing friendship and not by reason of a professional likewise mother and daughter and that these cases arose out from the same
engagement as professed by complainant. He denied receiving any professional fee transaction. Thus, movants and complainants will be adducing the same sets of
for the services he rendered. It was allegedly their understanding that complainant evidence and witnesses.
would have to retain the services of another lawyer. He alleged that complainant,
based on that agreement, engaged the services of Atty. Manuel A. Ao. Respondent argued that no lawyer-client relationship existed between him and
complainant because there was no professional fee paid for the services he
To bolster this claim, respondent pointed out that the complaint filed by complainant rendered. Moreover, he argued that he drafted the demand letter only as a personal
against Ms. Koa for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was based not on the demand favor to complainant who is a close friend.
letter he drafted but on the demand letter prepared by Atty. Manuel A. Ao.
We are not persuaded. A lawyer-client relationship can exist notwithstanding the
Respondent contended that he is a close friend of the opposing parties in the close friendship between complainant and respondent. The relationship was
criminal cases. He further contended that complainant Justo and Ms. Koa are established the moment complainant sought legal advice from respondent regarding
likewise long time friends, as in fact, they are comares for more than 30 the dishonored checks. By drafting the demand letter respondent further affirmed
years since complainant is the godmother of Ms. Torralba.[7] Respondent claimed such relationship. The fact that the demand letter was not utilized in the criminal
that it is in this light that he accommodated Ms. Koa and her daughters request complaint filed and that respondent was not eventually engaged by complainant to
that they be represented by him in the cases filed against them by complainant and represent her in the criminal cases is of no moment. As observed by the
complainant's daughter. He maintained that the filing of the Motion for Investigating Commissioner, by referring to complainant Justo as "my client" in the
Consolidation which is a non-adversarial pleading does not evidence the existence of demand letter sent to the defaulting debtor[10], respondent admitted the existence
a lawyer-client relationship between him and Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba. Likewise, his of the lawyer-client relationship. Such admission effectively estopped him from
appearance in the joint proceedings should only be construed as an effort on his part claiming otherwise.
to assume the role of a moderator or arbiter of the parties.
Likewise, the non-payment of professional fee will not exculpate respondent from
He insisted that his actions were merely motivated by an intention to help the liability. Absence of monetary consideration does not exempt lawyers from
parties achieve an out of court settlement and possible reconciliation. He reported complying with the prohibition against pursuing cases with conflicting interests. The
that his efforts proved fruitful insofar as he had caused Ms. Koa to pay complainant prohibition attaches from the moment the attorney-client relationship is established
the amount of P50,000.00 in settlement of one of the two checks subject of I.S. No. and extends beyond the duration of the professional relationship.[11] We held in
03G-19484-86. Burbe v. Atty. Magulta[12] that it is not necessary that any retainer be paid,
promised or charged; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not
Respondent averred that the failure of Ms. Koa and Ms. Torralba to make good the afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.[13]
other checks caused a lot of consternation on the part of complainant. This allegedly
Under Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer for their information and guidance. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to
shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned append a copy of this Decision to respondent's record as member of the Bar.
given after a full disclosure of the facts. Respondent was therefore bound to
refrain from representing parties with conflicting interests in a controversy. By SO ORDERED.
doing so, without showing any proof that he had obtained the written consent of the
conflicting parties, respondent should be sanctioned. Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Perez, Sereno, and Reyes, JJ.

The prohibition against representing conflicting interest is founded on principles of

public policy and good taste.[14] In the course of the lawyer-client relationship, the SECOND DIVISION
lawyer learns of the facts connected with the client's case, including the weak and
strong points of the case. The nature of the relationship is, therefore, one of trust [A.C. No. 5098 : April 11, 2012]
and confidence of the highest degree.[15]
JOSEFINA M. ANION, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR.,
It behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to RESPONDENT.
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount DECISION
importance in the administration of justice.[16]
BRION, J.:
The case of Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat[17] is instructive on this concept, thus:
We resolve this disbarment complaint against Atty. Clemencio Sabitsana, Jr. who is
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or charged of: (1) violating the lawyers duty to preserve confidential information
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the received from his client;[1] and (2) violating the prohibition on representing
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the conflicting interests.[2]cralaw
other client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by
him when he argues for the other client.[18] This rule covers not only cases in In her complaint, Josefina M. Anion (complainant) related that she previously
which confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her
confidence has been bestowed or will be used.[19] Also, there is conflict of interests favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale
and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first in behalf of Zenaida L. Caete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant
client any knowledge acquired through their connection.[20] Another test of the accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in
inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent filing the civil case.
an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his
client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and
thereof.[21] execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential
information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was
The excuse proffered by respondent that it was not him but Atty. Ao who was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint
eventually engaged by complainant will not exonerate him from the clear violation of who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint
Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The take- over of a client's for this reason.
cause of action by another lawyer does not give the former lawyer the right to
represent the opposing party. It is not only malpractice but also constitutes a The Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner
violation of the confidence resulting from the attorney-client relationship.
In our Resolution dated November 22, 1999, we referred the disbarment complaint
Considering that this is respondent's first infraction, the disbarment sought in the to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
complaint is deemed to be too severe. As recommended by the Board of Governors investigation, report and recommendation. In his Report and Recommendation dated
of the IBP, the suspension from the practice of law for one (1) year is warranted. November 28, 2003, IBP Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo Jr. found Atty. Sabitsana
administratively liable for representing conflicting interests. The IBP Commissioner
Accordingly, the Court resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Rodolfo T. Galing from the practice opined:
of law for one (1) year, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar
offense will warrant a more severe penalty. Let copies of this Decision be furnished In Bautista vs. Barrios, it was held that a lawyer may not handle a case to nullify a
all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines contract which he prepared and thereby take up inconsistent positions. Granting
that Zenaida L. Caete, respondents present client in Civil Case No. B-1060 did not to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them.
initially learn about the sale executed by Bontes in favor of complainant thru the Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer
confidences and information divulged by complainant to respondent in the course of based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the
the preparation of the said deed of sale, respondent nonetheless has a duty to lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all
decline his current employment as counsel of Zenaida Caete in view of the rule dealings and transactions with the client.[6] Part of the lawyers duty in this regard
prohibiting representation of conflicting interests. is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon
15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility quoted below:
In re De la Rosa clearly suggests that a lawyer may not represent conflicting
interests in the absence of the written consent of all parties concerned given after a Rule 15.03. -A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
full disclosure of the facts. In the present case, no such written consent was secured consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
by respondent before accepting employment as Mrs. Caetes counsel-of-record. x x
x The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
x x x action.[7] The prohibition also applies even if the lawyer would not be called upon
to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or
Complainant and respondents present client, being contending claimants to the that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from
same property, the conflict of interest is obviously present. There is said to be one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated.[8] To
inconsistency of interest when on behalf of one client, it is the attorneys duty to be held accountable under this rule, it is enough that the opposing parties in one
contend for that which his duty to another client requires him to oppose. In brief, if case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present clients and the nature or
he argues for one client this argument will be opposed by him when he argues for conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of them would affect the
the other client. Such is the case with which we are now confronted, respondent performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.[9]
being asked by one client to nullify what he had formerly notarized as a true and
valid sale between Bontes and the complainant. (footnotes omitted)[3] Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the
above rule is present in a given case.
The IBP Commissioner recommended that Atty. Sabitsana be suspended from the
practice of law for a period of one (1) year.[4] One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a
The Findings of the IBP Board of Governors lawyers argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing
for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to
adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
finding it to be fully supported by the evidence on record, the applicable laws and relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity
rules.[5] The IBP Board of Governors agreed with the IBP Commissioners and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
recommended penalty. performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of acquired through their connection or previous employment.[10] [emphasis ours]
Governors denied his motion in a resolution dated July 30, 2004.
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, we find substantial evidence to
The Issue support Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following
circumstances on record:
The issue in this case is whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for
representing conflicting interests. One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her
interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty.
The Courts Ruling Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the
complainants favor.
After a careful study of the records, we agree with the findings and
recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest
over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants
the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that interests.
must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the clients most confidential information
Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Interestingly, Atty. Sabitsana even admitted these allegations in his answer.[13] He
Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete. also averred in his Answer that:

Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two 6b. Because the defendant-to-be in the complaint (Civil Case No. B-1060) that he
clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first, he filed a case against the would file on behalf of Zenaida Caneja-Caete was his former client (herein
complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second, he impleaded the complainant as complainant), respondent asked [the] permission of Mrs. Caete (which she granted)
the defendant in the case; and third, the case he filed was for the annulment of the that he would first write a letter (Annex 4) to the complainant proposing to settle
Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant. the case amicably between them but complainant ignored it. Neither did she object
to respondents handling the case in behalf of Mrs. Caete on the ground she is now
By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against invoking in her instant complaint. So respondent felt free to file the complaint
another client in the same action; he also accepted a new engagement that against her.[14]
entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in
which his legal services had been previously retained. We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply the opportunity
to be informed of the charge against oneself and to be heard or, as applied to
To be sure, Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides administrative proceedings, the opportunity to explain ones side or the opportunity
an exception to the above prohibition. However, we find no reason to apply the to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of.[15] These
exception due to Atty. Sabitsanas failure to comply with the requirements set forth opportunities were all afforded to Atty. Sabitsana, as shown by the above
under the rule. Atty. Sabitsana did not make a full disclosure of facts to the circumstances.
complainant and to Zenaida Caete before he accepted the new engagement with
Zenaida Caete. The records likewise show that although Atty. Sabitsana wrote a All told, disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis.[16] In the exercise
letter to the complainant informing her of Zenaida Caetes adverse claim to the of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to
property covered by the Deed of Sale and, urging her to settle the adverse claim; account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of
Atty. Sabitsana however did not disclose to the complainant that he was also being preserving the purity of the legal profession. We likewise aim to ensure the proper
engaged as counsel by Zenaida Caete.[11] Moreover, the records show that Atty. and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who, by
Sabitsana failed to obtain the written consent of his two clients, as required by Rule their misconduct, have proven themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the
15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. duties and responsibilities of an attorney.[17] This is all that we did in this case.
Significantly, we did this to a degree very much lesser than what the powers of this
Accordingly, we find as the IBP Board of Governors did Atty. Sabitsana guilty of Court allows it to do in terms of the imposable penalty. In this sense, we have
misconduct for representing conflicting interests. We likewise agree with the penalty already been lenient towards respondent lawyer.cralaw
of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law recommended by the IBP
Board of Governors. This penalty is consistent with existing jurisprudence on the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and
administrative offense of representing conflicting interests.[12] recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for
We note that Atty. Sabitsana takes exception to the IBP recommendation on the representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of
ground that the charge in the complaint was only for his alleged disclosure of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the
confidential information, not for representation of conflicting interests. To Atty. practice of law.
Sabitsana, finding him liable for the latter offense is a violation of his due process
rights since he only answered the designated charge. Atty. Sabitsana is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall
We find no violation of Atty. Sabitsanas due process rights. Although there was take effect.
indeed a specific charge in the complaint, we are not unmindful that the complaint
itself contained allegations of acts sufficient to constitute a violation of the rule on SO ORDERED.
the prohibition against representing conflicting interests. As stated in paragraph 8
of the complaint: Brion, (Acting Chairperson), Peralta,* Perez, Sereno, and Reyes, JJ.

Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. accepted the commission as a Lawyer of ZENAIDA CANEJA, now
Zenaida Caete, to recover lands from Complainant, including this land where FIRST DIVISION
lawyer Atty. Sabitsana, Jr. has advised his client [complainant] to execute the second
sale[.] Adm. Case No. 9058 : November 14, 2012
ROBERT VICTOR G. SEARES, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. SANIATA LIWLIWA V. by Dominic Valera (a candidate for Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra) and by
GONZALES-ALZATE, Respondent. President Aquino, neither of whom was Seares, Jr.s political opponent;12rll (b)
Carlito Turqueza used to be a political ally of Seares, Jr.;13rll (c) she disclosed to
DECISION Turqueza her having once acted as a counsel of Seares, Jr.;14rll (d) Seares, Jr. did
not object to her legal representation of Turqueza;15rll and (e) the 2007 election
BERSAMIN, J.: protest that she handled for Seares, Jr. was unrelated to the administrative
complaint that Turqueza brought against Seares, Jr. in 2010.16rll
Atty. Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate is charged with incompetence and
professional negligence, and a violation of the prohibition against representing Issues
conflicting interests. Complainant Robert Victor G. Seares, Jr. is her former client.
To be determined are the following issues, namely:
Seares, Jr. alleges that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was his legal counsel when he ran for
the position of Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2007 elections; that after (a) Was Atty. Gonzales-Alzate guilty of professional negligence and incompetence in
he lost by a 50-vote margin to Albert Z. Guzman, she filed in his behalf a "Petition Of her handling of Seares, Jr.s electoral protest in the RTC?
Protest Ad Cautelam"1rll in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Bangued, Abra; that
the petition was dismissed for being "fatally defective;"2rll that several months (b) Did Atty. Gonzales-Alzate violate the prohibition against representing conflicting
later, she insisted on filing a "Petition of Protest" in the RTC, but the petition was also interests when she assisted Turqueza in his administrative case against Seares, Jr.,
dismissed on the ground that it was already time-barred, and on the further ground her former client?
of forum shopping because the certification against forum shopping was false; that
the RTC declared her as "professionally negligent;"3rll that he again ran for Ruling
Municipal Mayor of Dolores, Abra in the May 2010 elections, and won; that he later
learned that his political opponents retained her as their counsel;4rll that with The severity of disbarment or suspension proceedings as the penalty for an
him barely two months in office, one Carlito Turqueza charged him with abuse of attorneys misconduct has always moved the Court to treat the complaint with
authority, oppression and grave misconduct in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of utmost caution and deliberate circumspection. We have done so because we must
Abra;5rll that she represented Turqueza as counsel;6rll and that she wield the power to disbar or suspend on the preservative rather than on the
intentionally made false and hurtful statements in the memorandum she prepared in vindictive principle,17rll conformably with our thinking that disbarment or
that administrative case in order to attack him.7rll suspension will be condign and appropriate only when there is a clear, convincing,
and satisfactory proof of misconduct seriously affecting the professional standing
Seares, Jr. asserts that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate thereby violated Canon 15, Canon 17 and ethics of respondent attorney as an officer of the Court and as a member of the
and Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for negligently handling his Bar.18rll
election protest, for prosecuting him, her former client, and for uttering false and
hurtful allegations against him. Hence, he prays that she should be disbarred. Guided by the foregoing tenets, we dismiss the disbarment complaint against Atty.
Gonzales-Alzate.
In her comment,8rll Atty. Gonzales-Alzate denies the charges of professional
negligence and incompetence, and of representing conflicting interests. She states I.
that Seares, Jr. solicited her legal services in the last week of May 2007 because his
counsel, Atty. Yasser Lumbos, informed him that he could not go to Abra to handle Charge of professional negligence and incompetence
his ad cautelam petition;9rll that Seares, Jr. and his parents were themselves the is unfounded and devoid of substance
ones who decided not anymore to appeal the dismissal of the ad cautelam petition
despite her advice that an appeal would likely succeed;10rll that she did not Seares, Jr. insists that Atty. Gonzales-Alzates submission of a "fatally defective"
convince Seares, Jr. to file the second petition because he and his parents were the petition in his election protest violated Canon 1719rll and Canon 1820rll of
ones who insisted on filing the appeal in disregard of the possibly adverse the Code of Professional Responsibility, claiming that her attaching a "cut-and-paste"
consequences of doing so;11rll and that the imputation of negligence against her certificate of non-forum shopping to his election protest, which the trial courts
based on the trial judges declaration that she submitted a false certification against decision described as "professional negligence," reflected her lack of diligence and
forum shopping was unwarranted, because all that she did was to make competence as an attorney because it was fatal to his protest.
superimpositions in the certification against forum shopping in order to write the
correct dates as well as the notarial document number and notarial docket page The complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate is unfounded and devoid of substance.
number for the certification against forum shopping.
For administrative liability under Canon 18 to attach, the negligent act of the
Atty. Gonzales-Alzate refutes the charge that she represented conflicting interests by attorney should be gross21rll and inexcusable22rll as to lead to a result that
explaining that: (a) she was engaged as an attorney in the May 2010 elections only was highly prejudicial to the clients interest.23rll Accordingly, the Court has
imposed administrative sanctions on a grossly negligent attorney for unreasonable conflicting interests is bereft of merit
failure to file a required pleading,24rll or for unreasonable failure to file an
appeal,25rll especially when the failure occurred after the attorney moved for Seares, Jr. next charges Gonzales-Alzate with violating Canon 15 of the Code of
several extensions to file the pleading26rll and offered several excuses for his Professional Responsibility for supposedly representing conflicting interests when
nonfeasance.27rll The Court has found the attendance of inexcusable negligence she took on the administrative complaint that Turqueza brought against Seares, Jr.
when an attorney resorts to a wrong remedy,28rll or belatedly files an
appeal,29rll or inordinately delays the filing of a complaint,30rll or fails to The charge of Seares, Jr. is bereft of merit.
attend scheduled court hearings.31rll Gross misconduct on the part of an
attorney is determined from the circumstances of the case, the nature of the act Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits an attorney from
done and the motive that induced the attorney to commit the act.32rll representing a party in a controversy that is either directly or indirectly related to
the subject matter of a previous litigation involving another client. Relevantly, Rule
Yet, a reading of the June 8, 2007 order of the RTC (Branch I) in Bangued, Abra shows 15.01, Rule15.02 and Rule15.03 provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
that the true cause of the dismissal of Seares, Jr.s "Petition For Protest Ad Cautelam"
was its prematurity in light of the pendency in the Commission on Elections of his Rule 15.01A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as soon as
"Petition to Suspend Canvass and Proclamation."33rll The RTC cogently held that practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another client or his
"(t)he primary objective of this petition is to pray for the issuance of a Preliminary own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Precaution Order xxx (but) a prayer for the issuance of the protection of ballot boxes,
Books and Lists of Voters and other election paraphernalia in the recently concluded Rule 15.02A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in respect
elections is well within the power of the Commission on Elections."34rll We see of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
no trace of professional negligence or incompetence on the part of Atty. Gonzales-
Alzate in her handling of Seares, Jr.s protest, especially because she even filed in his Rule 15.03A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
behalf a "Motion for Reconsideration,"35rll a "Comment on the Courts Dismissal consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
of the Protest Ad Cautelam"36rll and a "Motion to Withdraw Cash
Deposit."37rll Besides, her explanation that it was Seares, Jr. himself who Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal representation of Turqueza neither resulted in her
decided not to pursue the appeal and who instead requested her to move for the betrayal of the fidelity and loyalty she owed to Seares, Jr. as his former attorney, nor
withdrawal of his cash deposit was very plausible. invited the suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing while she was performing
her duties as an attorney.39rll Representing conflicting interests would occur
Also, we cannot find Atty. Gonzales-Alzate professionally negligent in respect of the only where the attorneys new engagement would require her to use against a former
filing and eventual dismissal of the subsequent "Petition for Protest." The verification client any confidential information gained from the previous professional
and certification against forum shopping attached to the petition contained relation.40rll The prohibition did not cover a situation where the subject matter
handwritten superimpositions by Atty. Gonzales-Alzate, but such superimpositions of the present engagement was totally unrelated to the previous engagement of the
were apparently made only to reflect the corrections of the dates of subscription and attorney.41rll To constitute the violation, the attorney should be shown to
the notarial document number and docket number for the verification and intentionally use against the former client the confidential information acquired by
certification. If that was all there was to the superimpositions, then there was her during the previous employment.42rll But a mere allegation of professional
nothing to support the trial judges observation that the "cut and paste" method in misconduct would not suffice to establish the charge, because accusation was not
preparing the verification and certification for non-forum shopping constituted synonymous with guilt.43rll
"professional negligence" that proved fatal to her clients protest.38rll As a
matter of policy, a court-bound document or paper prepared in a slipshod manner As it turned out, the charge of representing conflicting interests leveled against Atty.
affects only the form but not the substance of the submission. Such slipshod Gonzales-Alzate was imaginary. The charge was immediately unworthy of serious
preparation, even assuming it to be true, would not deserve administrative censure. consideration because it was clear from the start that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate did not
Not letting form prevail over substance still remains to be the judicial ideal. take advantage of her previous engagement by Seares, Jr. in her legal representation
of Turqueza in the latters administrative charge against Seares, Jr. There was no
The foregoing notwithstanding, we doubt the sincerity of the charge of professional indication whatsoever of her having gained any confidential information during her
negligence and incompetence. Had Seares, Jr. been prejudiced by Atty. Gonzales- previous engagement by Seares, Jr. that could be used against Seares, Jr. Her
Alzates negligent and incompetent handling of his election protest, we wonder why engagement by Seares, Jr. related only to the election protest in 2007, but Turquezas
he would denounce her only after nearly five years have passed. The motivation for complaint involved Seares, Jr.s supposedly unlawful interference in ousting Turqueza
the charge becomes suspect, and the charge is thereby weakened all the more. as the president of the Liga ng mga Barangay of Dolores, Abra in 2010. There is no
question that both charges were entirely foreign to one another.
II.
Moreover, the prohibition against representing conflicting interests further
Charge of representing necessitated identity of the parties or interests involved in the previous and present
engagements. But such identity was not true here. The adverse party in Seares, Jr.s In De Leon v. Castelo,47rll we underscored the need to shield attorneys as
election protest in 2007 was Albert Z. Guzman, the newly-elected Municipal Mayor of officers of the Court from the mindless assaults intended to vex or harass them in
Dolores, Abra, who was not involved in Turquezas administrative complaint against their performance of duty, stating:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Seares, Jr. In fact, Turqueza was not even a mayoral candidate in Dolores, Abra in the
elections held in 2007 and in 2010. The allegation by Seares, Jr. that Atty. Gonzales- According to Justice Cardozo, "xxx the fair fame of a lawyer, however innocent of
Alzate represented his political opponent was not even true because Turqueza was wrong, is at the mercy of the tongue of ignorance or malice. Reputation in such a
Seares, Jr.s political ally, as Atty. Gonzales-Alzate stated. calling is a plant of tender growth, and its bloom, once lost, is not easily restored."

It is notable, too, that Seares, Jr. expressly agreed to Atty. Gonzales-Alzates legal A lawyers reputation is, indeed, a very fragile object. The Court, whose officer every
representation of Turqueza in the latters administrative case against Seares, Jr. This lawyer is, must shield such fragility from mindless assault by the unscrupulous and
is borne out by the affidavit of Turqueza that Atty. Gonzales-Alzate the malicious. It can do so, firstly, by quickly cutting down any patently frivolous
submitted,44rll the relevant portion of which follows: complaint against a lawyer; and, secondly, by demanding good faith from whoever
brings any accusation of unethical conduct. A Bar that is insulated from intimidation
xxx and harassment is encouraged to be courageous and fearless, which can then best
contribute to the efficient delivery and proper administration of justice.48rll
6. When Mayor Robert Victor Seares arrived, he was with a black shirt and jeans and
the Vice Governor started the conference asking us if there is a possibility of In Lim v. Antonio,49rll we censured the complainant because revenge and bad
amicable settlement. Atty. Ma. Saniata Liwliwa Gonzales-Alzate first talked and she faith had motivated him into filing a baseless complaint against an attorney,
raised the fact that in 2007 Mayor Robert Victor Seares was her client in an election stressing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
protest and she even said how she represented him, and Mayor Seares said "wen
Attorney (yes Attorney) and the Atty. Gonzales-Alzate said to all of us in the said The dignity and honor of the profession require that acts unworthy of membership in
room that she was before the lawyer of Jr. Seares (Mayor Robert Victor Seares) and the bar should be visited with the appropriate penalty. The charge against
now if Jr. will not oppose it, she will be representing me in the said administrative respondent is of a serious character. If in fact there was such a violation of the law
case and this time, she will now be a lawyer against Jr. Seares. The said lawyer was as charged, he should be duly penalized. It is quite clear, however, that the
even smiling when she said that and Jr. Seares (Mayor Robert Victor Seares) was complaint is unfounded. It was the product of ill-will, the desire of complainant to
normally giggling and smiling and said "wen attorney, awan ti kuak dita, avenge himself. It certainly was not made in good faith. If it were so, its dismissal
iyabogaduam latta a, isuna lang a ni kapitan no nya paylang ti kayatna, nayted la would have sufficed. To repeat, such is not the case. As the Report made clear, the
ngarud sueldo nan" (Yes, attorney, I have no concern with that, you lawyer for him if complaint arose from a feeling of resentment, even of hate. To allow complainant to
that is so, I dont know what the (barangay) captain would still want, his salary was trifle with the Court, to make use of the judicial process as an instrument of
already released to him.) xxx. retaliation, would be a reflection on the rule of law. He should be held to strict
accountability, considering that this is his second attempt. Such stubbornness,
xxx compounds the gravity of his offense. He appears to be incorrigible. At the very
least, therefore, he should be censured.50rll
The Court emphasizes that an attorney enjoys the presumption of innocence, and
whoever initiates administrative proceedings against the attorney bears the burden We have often demonstrated our genuine concern for the members of the Bar,
of proof to establish the allegation of professional misconduct.45rll When the especially those who stand before our courts as ethical advocates of their clients
complainant fails to discharge the burden of proof, the Court has no alternative but causes. We definitely do not tolerate unwarranted and malicious assaults against
to dismiss the charge and absolve the attorney. their honor and reputation. The Court issued a stern warning to the complainant
attorney in Dela Victoria v. Orig-Maloloy-on51rll for filing an unfounded complaint
We find that the administrative complaint against Atty. Gonzales-Alzate was nothing against a clerk of court, and found the complainant attorney in contempt of court
but an attempt to vex, harass and humiliate her as well as to get even with her for and deserving of a P2,000.00 fine. But a stiffer penalty of P5,000.00 was imposed on
representing Turqueza against Seares, Jr. Such an ill-motivated bid to disbar Atty. the complainant attorneys in Prieto v. Corpuz52rll and Arnado v. Suarin53rll
Gonzales-Alzate trifles with the Courts esteem for the members of the Bar who form because their complaints against a judge and a court sheriff, respectively, were
one of the solid pillars of Justice in our land. We cannot tolerate it because attorneys found to be baseless.
are officers of the Court who are placed under our supervision and control due to the
law imposing upon them peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities.46rll We Considering the circumstances attendant here, the Court deems it sufficient for now
exist in a symbiotic environment with them where their duty to defend the courts is to merely admonish Seares, Jr., but sternly warns him that he shall be dealt with
reciprocated by our shielding them from vindictive individuals who are deterred by more severely should he commit a similar act against a member of the
nothing just to strip them of their privilege to practice law. Bar.blrlllbrr
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the administrative complaint against Atty. sizeable amounts of money. Respondent acted as co-maker with Mejorado in various
Saniata Liwliwa V. Gonzales-Alzate for utter lack of merit; and ADMONISHES Robert cash loans, to wit:4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Victor G. Seares, Jr. for filing the malicious complaint, WITH STERN WARNING that a
repetition shall be dealt with more severely as indirect contempt of the Date:
Court.rllbrr Amount
November 11, 2006
SO ORDERED. Php 400,000.00
November 24, 2006
200,000.00
THIRD DIVISION November 27, 2006
400,000.00
A.C. No. 9537 [Formerly CBD Case No. 09-2489], June 10, 2013 December 7, 2006
200,000.00
DR. TERESITA LEE, Complainant, v. ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO, Respondent. December 13, 2006
_____200,000.00
DECISION Total:
Php1,400,000.00
PERALTA, J.: When the said obligation became due, despite Dr. Lee's repeated demands,
Mejorado failed and refused to comply with his obligation. Since Atty. Simando was
still her lawyer then, Dr. Lee instructed him to initiate legal action against Mejorado.
Atty. Simando said he would get in touch with Mejorado and ask him to pay his
obligation without having to resort to legal action. However, even after several
Before us is a Petition for Disbarment1 dated July 21, 2009 filed by Dr. Teresita Lee
months, Mejorado still failed to pay Dr. Lee, so she again asked Atty. Simando why
(Dr. Lee) against respondent Atty. Amador L. Simando (Atty. Simando) before the
no payment has been made yet. Dr. Lee then reminded Atty. Simando that he was
Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed
supposed to be the co-maker of the obligation of Mejorado, to which he replied: "Di
as CBD Case No. 09-2489, now A.C. No. 9537, for violation of the Code of Judicial
kasuhan din ninyo ako!"5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Ethics of Lawyers.
Despite complainant's repeated requests, respondent ignored her and failed to bring
The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as
legal actions against Mejorado. Thus, in January 2008, complainant was forced to
follows:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
terminate her contract with Atty. Simando.
Atty. Simando was the retained counsel of complainant Dr. Lee from November 2004
Subsequently, complainant's new lawyer, Atty. Gilbert Morandarte, sent a demand
until January 8, 2008, with a monthly retainer fee of Three Thousand Pesos
letter dated June 13, 2008 to Atty. Simando in his capacity as the co-maker of some
(Php3,000.00).2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
of the loans of Mejorado.
Sometime during the above-mentioned period, Atty. Simando went to see Dr. Lee
In his Letter dated June 30, 2008, respondent denied his liability as a co-maker and
and asked if the latter could help a certain Felicito M. Mejorado (Mejorado) for his
claimed that novation had occurred because complainant had allegedly given
needed funds. He claimed that Mejorado was then awaiting the release of his claim
additional loans to Mejorado without his knowledge.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
for informer's reward from the Bureau of Customs. Because Dr. Lee did not know
Mejorado personally and she claimed to be not in the business of lending money, the
Dr. Lee then accused Atty. Simando of violating the trust and confidence which she
former initially refused to lend money. But Atty. Simando allegedly persisted and
gave upon him as her lawyer, and even took advantage of their professional
assured her that Mejorado will pay his obligation and will issue postdated checks and
relationship in order to get a loan for his client. Worse, when the said obligation
sign promissory notes. He allegedly even offered to be the co-maker of Mejorado
became due, respondent was unwilling to help her to favor Mejorado. Thus, the
and assured her that Mejorado's obligation will be paid when due. Atty. Simando was
instant petition for disbarment against Atty. Simando.
quoted saying: "Ipapahamak ba kita, kliyente kita"; "Sigurado ito, kung gusto mo,
gagarantiyahan ko pa ito, at pipirma din ako"; "Isang buwan lang, at hindi hihigit sa
On August 12, 2009, the IBP-CBD ordered respondent to submit his Answer on the
dalawang buwan ito, bayad ka na."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
complaint against him.7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Due to Atty. Simando's persistence, his daily calls and frequent visits to convince Dr.
In his Answer8 dated September 17, 2009, Atty. Simando claimed that complainant,
Lee, the latter gave in to her lawyer's demands, and finally agreed to give Mejorado
who is engaged in lending money at a high interest rate, was the one who initiated
the financial transaction between her and Mejorado. He narrated that complainant
asked him if it is true that Mejorado is his client as she found out that Mejorado has a categorically stated that the money received was a loan with due dates, signed by
pending claim for informer's reward with the Bureau of Customs. When he affimed Mejorado and respondent as co-maker.17 She further claimed that she did not know
that Mejorado is his client, complainant signified that she is willing to give money for Mejorado and it was respondent who brought him to her and requested her to assist
Mejorado's financial needs while awaiting for the release of the informer's reward. Mejorado by lending him money as, in fact, respondent even vouched for Mejorado
Eventually, parties agreed that Mejorado will pay double the amount and that and agreed to sign as co-maker.
payment shall be made upon receipt by Mejorado of the payment of his claim for
informer's reward.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Complainant further emphasized that what she was collecting is the payment only of
the loan amounting to One Million Four Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php1,400,000.00)
Meanwhile, Atty. Simando stressed that Dr. Lee gave Mejorado a total of which respondent had signed as co-maker. Thus, respondent's claim that his
Php700,000.00 as an investment but he signed as co-maker in all the receipts obligation was already extinguished by novation holds no water, since what was
showing double the amount or Php1,400,000.00.10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary being collected is merely his obligation pertaining to the loan amounting to
Php1,400,000.00 only, and nothing more.
Respondent claimed that complainant is a money-lender exacting high interest rates
from borrowers.11 He narrated several instances and civil cases where complainant Finally, complainant lamented that respondent, in his comments, even divulged
was engaged in money-lending where he divulged that even after defendants had confidential informations he had acquired while he was still her lawyer and even
already paid their loan, complainant still persists in collecting from them.12 used it against her in the present case, thus, committing another unethical conduct.
Respondent asserted that he knew of these transactions, because he was among the She, therefore, maintained that respondent is guilty of violating the lawyer-client
four lawyers who handled complainant's case.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary confidentiality rule.

Respondent averred that from the time that Mejorado and Dr. Lee had become close Both parties failed to appear during the mandatory conference on January 15, 2010.
to each other, the latter had given Mejorado additional investments and one (1) Both parties requested for resetting of the mandatory conference, however, both
Silverado Pick-up at the price of P500,000.00 and fifty (50) sacks of old clothings. He failed to agree on a certain date. Hence, the IBP, so as not to delay the disposition of
claimed that the additional investments made by Dr. Lee to Mejorado were given the complaint, terminated the mandatory conference and instead required the
without his knowledge. parties to submit their respective position papers.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Atty. Simando further alleged that with Dr. Lee's investment of around P2 Million On March 18, 2010, the IBP-CBD found Atty. Simando guilty of violating the Code of
which included the Silverado Pick-up and the fifty (50) sacks of old clothings, the Professional Responsibility. It recommended that respondent be suspended from the
latter required Mejorado to issue five (5) checks with a total value of P7,033,500.00, practice of law for six (6) months.
an amount more than the actual value which Mejorado
received.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On December 29, 2010, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD to suspend Atty. Simando from the
Atty. Simando added that while Dr. Lee and Mejorado agreed that the issued checks practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
shall be presented to the bank only upon payment of his informer's reward, Dr. Lee
presented the checks to the bank despite being aware that Mejorado's account had Respondent moved for reconsideration.
no funds for said checks. Atty. Simando further denied that he refused to take legal
action against Mejorado. He claimed that complainant never instructed him to file On March 10, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors granted respondent's motion for
legal action, since the latter knew that Mejorado is obligated to pay only upon reconsideration for lack of sufficient evidence to warrant the penalty of suspension.
receipt of his informer's reward. The Resolution dated December 29, 2010 was reversed and the case against
respondent was dismissed.
Finally, Atty. Simando insisted that he did not violate their lawyer- client relationship,
since Dr. Lee voluntarily made the financial investment with Mejorado and that he RULING
merely introduced complainant to Mejorado. He further claimed that there is no
conflict of interest because he is Mejorado's lawyer relative to the latter's claim for We reverse the ruling of the IBP Board of Governors.
informer's reward, and not Mejorado's lawyer against Dr. Lee. He reiterated that
there is no conflicting interest as there was no case between Mejorado and Dr. Lee Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a lawyer is guilty of
that he is handling for both of them.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary representing conflicting interest:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

In her Reply dated October 30, 2009, Dr. Lee denied that what she entered into was One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of
a mere investment. She insisted that she lent the money to Mejorado and one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a
respondent, in his capacity as co-maker and the transaction was actually a loan.16 lawyer's argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing
To prove her claim, Dr. Lee submitted the written loan agreements/receipts which for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
 interest or, at the least, invites suspicion of double-dealing.20 Moreover, with the
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new subject loan agreement entered into by the complainant and Mejorado, who are both
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity his clients, readily shows an apparent conflict of interest, moreso when he signed as
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the co- maker.
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information Likewise, respondent's argument that the money received was an investment and
acquired through their connection or previous employment.19 not a loan is difficult to accept, considering that he signed as co-maker. Respondent
is a lawyer and it is objectionable that he would sign as co-maker if he knew all
In the instant case, we find substantial evidence to support respondent's violation of along that the intention of the parties was to engage in a mere investment. Also, as
the above parameters, as established by the following circumstances on a lawyer, signing as a co-maker, it can be presupposed that he is aware of the
record:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary nature of suretyship and the consequences of signing as co-maker. Therefore, he
cannot escape liability without exposing himself from administrative liability, if not
First, it is undisputed that there was a lawyer-client relationship between civil liability. Moreover, we noted that while complainant was able to show proof of
complainant and Atty. Simando as evidenced by the retainer fees received by receipts of various amounts of money loaned and received by Mejorado, and signed
respondent and the latter's representation in certain legal matters pertaining to by the respondent as co-maker, the latter, however, other than his bare denials,
complainant's business;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary failed to show proof that the money given was an investment and not a loan.

Second, Atty. Simando admitted that Mejorado is another client of him albeit in a It must be stressed that the proscription against representation of conflicting
case claiming rewards against the Bureau of Customs;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary interests finds application where the conflicting interests arise with respect to the
same general matter however slight the adverse interest may be. It applies even if
Third, Atty. Simando admitted that he was the one who introduced complainant and the conflict pertains to the lawyer's private activity or in the performance of a
Mejorado to each other for the purpose of entering into a financial transaction while function in a non-professional capacity. In the process of determining whether there
having knowledge that complainant's interests could possibly run in conflict with is a conflict of interest, an important criterion is probability, not certainty, of
Mejorado's interests which ironically such client's interests, he is duty-bound to conflict.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
protect;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
We likewise note that respondent offered several excuses in order to avoid payment
Fourth, despite the knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients, of his liability. First, in his Answer to complainant's demand letter, he claimed there
respondent consented in the parties' agreement and even signed as co-maker to the was novation which extinguished his liability; Secondly, he claimed that the amount
loan agreement;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary received by Mejorado for which he signed as co-maker was merely an investment
and not a loan. Finally, he alleged that it was agreed that the investment with profits
Fifth, respondent's knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients will be paid only after Mejorado receives the payment for his claim for reward which
was demonstrated further by his own actions, when he:chanroblesvirtualawlibrary complainant violated when she presented the checks for payment prematurely.
These actuations of Atty. Simando do not speak well of his reputation as a
(a) failed to act on Mejorado's failure to pay his obligation to complainant despite the lawyer.22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
latter's instruction to do so;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary
Finally, we likewise find respondent guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of
(b) denied liability despite signing as co-maker in the receipts/promissory notes Professional Responsibility.23 In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of
arising from the loan agreement between his two clients;nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary complainant, he divulged informations24 which he acquired in confidence during the
existence of their lawyer-client relationship.
(c) rebutted complainant's allegations against Mejorado and him, and even divulged
informations he acquired while he was still complainant's lawyer. We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez25 that the termination of the relation of attorney
and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or
Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the client's
(complainant as creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional
his client, since a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He employment. Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the severance of the
may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his former client in
whose interest conflict with that of his present or former client. any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he disclose or use any
of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.
Respondent's assertion that there is no conflict of interest because complainant and
respondent are his clients in unrelated cases fails to convince. His representation of Accordingly, we reiterate that lawyers are enjoined to look at any representation
opposing clients in both cases, though unrelated, obviously constitutes conflict of situation from "the point of view that there are possible conflicts," and further, "to
think in terms of impaired loyalty" that is to evaluate if his representation in any way
will impair loyalty to a client.26chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Samson engaged Atty. Era to represent and assist him and his relatives in the
criminal prosecution of Sison and her group. Pursuant to the engagement, Atty. Era
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and prepared the demand letter dated July 19, 2002 demanding the return or refund of
recommendation of the IBP in Resolution No. XIX-2010-733 suspending respondent the money subject of their complaints. He also prepared the complaint-affidavit that
Atty. Amador L. Simando for six (6) months from the practice of law, with a WARNING Samson signed and swore to on July 26, 2002. Subsequently, the complaint-affidavit
that a repetition of the same or similar offense will warrant a more severe penalty. charging Sison and the other corporate officials of ICS Corporation with several
counts of estafa1 was presented to the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts, the Office of the Bar Confidant and (OCPQC). After the preliminary investigation, the OCPQC formally charged Sison and
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for their information and guidance. The Office of the others with several counts of estafa in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 96 (RTC),
the Bar Confidant is DIRECTED to append a copy of this Decision to respondent's in Quezon City.2
record as member of the Bar.
In April 2003, Atty. Era called a meeting with Samson and his relatives to discuss the
Atty. Simando is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this possibility of an amicable settlement with Sison and her cohorts. He told Samson
Decision so that we can determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall and the others that undergoing a trial of the cases would just be a waste of time,
take effect. money and effort for them, and that they could settle the cases with Sison and her
group, with him guaranteeing the turnover to them of a certain property located in
This Decision shall be immediately executory. Antipolo City belonging to ICS Corporation in exchange for their desistance. They
acceded and executed the affidavit of desistance he prepared, and in turn they
SO ORDERED. received a deed of assignment covering land registered under Transfer Certificate of
Title No. R-4475 executed by Sison in behalf of ICS Corporation.3

EN BANC Samson and his relatives later demanded from Atty. Era that they be given instead a
deed of absolute sale to enable them to liquidate the property among themselves. It
A.C. No. 6664, July 16, 2013 took some period of negotiations between them and Atty. Era before the latter
delivered to them on November 27, 2003 five copies of a deed of absolute sale
FERDINAND A. SAMSON, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDGARDO O. ERA, Respondent. involving the property. However, Atty. Era told them that whether or not the title of
the property had been encumbered or free from lien or defect would no longer be his
DECISION responsibility. He further told them that as far as he was concerned he had already
accomplished his professional responsibility towards them upon the amicable
BERSAMIN, J.: settlement of the cases between them and ICS Corporation.4

When Samson and his co-complainants verified the title of the property at the
Registry of Deeds and the Assessors Office of Antipolo City, they were dismayed to
learn that they could not liquidate the property because it was no longer registered
An attorney who wittingly represents and serves conflicting interests may be
under the name of ICS Corporation but was already under the name of Bank Wise
suspended from the practice of law, or even disbarred when circumstances so
Inc.5 Upon their urging, Atty. Era negotiated as their counsel with ICS Corporation.
warrant.
Due to the silence of Atty. Era for sometime thereafter, Samson and his group wrote
Antecedents
to him on September 8, 2004 to remind him about his guarantee and the promise to
settle the issues with Sison and her cohorts. But they did not hear from Atty. Era at
Ferdinand A. Samson has brought this complaint for disbarment charging respondent
all.6
Atty. Edgardo O. Era with violation of his trust and confidence of a client by
representing the interest of Emilia C. Sison, his present client, in a manner that
During the hearings in the RTC, Atty. Era did not anymore appear for Samson and his
blatantly conflicted with his interest.
group. This forced them to engage another lawyer. They were shocked to find out
later on, however, that Atty. Era had already been entering his appearance as the
Samson and his relatives were among the investors who fell prey to the pyramiding
counsel for Sison in her other criminal cases in the other branches of the RTC in
scam perpetrated by ICS Exports, Inc. Exporter, Importer, and Multi-Level Marketing
Quezon City involving the same pyramiding scam that she and her ICS Corporation
Business (ICS Corporation), a corporation whose corporate officers were led by
had perpetrated.7 In this regard, they established Atty. Eras legal representation of
Sison. The other officers were Ireneo C. Sison, William C. Sison, Mimosa H. Zamudio,
Sison by submitting several certified copies of the minutes of the proceedings in the
Mirasol H. Aguilar and Jhun Sison.
criminal cases involving Sison and her group issued by Branch 102 and Branch 220
of the RTC in Quezon City showing that Atty. Era had appeared as the counsel of The Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Era be suspended from the
Sison in the cases for estafa pending and being tried in said courts.8 They also practice of law for six months, viz:cralavvonlinelawlibrary
submitted a certification issued on November 3, 2004 indicating that Atty. Era had
visited Sison, an inmate in the Female Dormitory in Camp Karingal, Sikatuna Village, From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent is guilty of misconduct for
Quezon City as borne out by the blotter logbook of that unit.9 representing conflicting interests, failing to serve his client, complainant herein, with
competence and diligence and champion the latters cause with wholehearted
On January 20, 2005, Samson executed an affidavit alleging the foregoing fidelity, care and devotion. It is respectfully recommended that respondent be
antecedents, and praying for Atty. Eras disbarment on the ground of his violation of SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months and WARNED that
the trust, confidence and respect reposed in him as their counsel.10 a repetition of the same or similar act would merit a more severe penalty.18

Upon being required by the Court to comment on the complaint against him within In Resolution No. XVIII-2007-195 passed on October 19, 2007,19 the IBP Board of
10 days from notice, Atty. Era several times sought the extension of his period to file Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of the
the comment to supposedly enable him to collate documents relevant to his Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD, with the modification that Atty. Era be
comment.11 The Court granted his request and allowed him an extension totalling suspended from the practice of law for two years.
40 days. But despite the lapse of the extended period, he did not file his comment.
On June 9, 2012, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2012-180,20
On September 27, 2005, Samson reiterated his complaint for disbarment against denying Atty. Eras motion for reconsideration and affirming Resolution No. XVIII-
Atty. Era.12 2007-195.

By its resolution dated March 1, 2006,13 the Court required Atty. Era to show cause The IBP Board of Governors then forwarded the case to the Court pursuant to
why he should not be disciplinarily dealt with or held in contempt for such failure to Section 12(b), Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.21
submit his comment.
On October 17, 2012, Atty. Era filed a Manifestation and Motion (With Leave of
In the comment that he subsequently filed on April 11, 2006 in the Office of the Bar Court).22 However, on November 26, 2012, the Court merely noted the
Confidant,14 Atty. Era alleged that the conclusion on April 23, 2002 of the manifestation, and denied the motion for its lack of merit.23
compromise settlement between Samson and his group, on one hand, and Sison and
her ICS Corporation, on the other, had terminated the lawyer-client relationship Ruling
between him and Samson and his group; and that on September 1, 2003, he had
been appointed as counsel de officio for Sison by Branch 102 of the RTC in Quezon We affirm the findings of the IBP.
City only for purposes of her arraignment.
In his petition for disbarment, Samson charged Atty. Era with violating Canon 15 of
On July 17, 2006, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines the Code of Professional Responsibility for representing conflicting interests by
(IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.15 accepting the responsibility of representing Sison in the cases similar to those in
which he had undertaken to represent Samson and his group, notwithstanding that
In his report and recommendation dated October 1, 2007,16 the Investigating Sison was the very same person whom Samson and his group had accused with Atty.
Commissioner of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) found Atty. Era Eras legal assistance. He had drafted the demand letters and the complaint-affidavit
guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests, for failing to serve his that became the bases for the filing of the estafa charges against Sison and the
clients with competence and diligence, and for failing to champion his clients cause others in the RTC in Quezon City.
with wholehearted fidelity, care and devotion.
Atty. Eras contention that the lawyer-client relationship ended when Samson and his
The Investigating Commissioner observed that the evidence did not sustain Atty. group entered into the compromise settlement with Sison on April 23, 2002 was
Eras claim that his legal services as counsel for Samson and his group had unwarranted. The lawyer-client relationship did not terminate as of then, for the fact
terminated on April 23, 2003 upon the execution of the compromise settlement of remained that he still needed to oversee the implementation of the settlement as
the criminal cases; that he even admitted during the mandatory conference that well as to proceed with the criminal cases until they were dismissed or otherwise
there was no formal termination of his legal services;17 that his professional concluded by the trial court. It is also relevant to indicate that the execution of a
obligation towards Samson and his group as his clients did not end upon execution compromise settlement in the criminal cases did not ipso facto cause the
of the settlement agreement, because he remained duty-bound to see to it that the termination of the cases not only because the approval of the compromise by the
settlement was duly implemented; that he also had the obligation to appear in the trial court was still required, but also because the compromise would have applied
criminal cases until their termination; and that his acceptance of the engagement to only to the civil aspect, and excluded the criminal aspect pursuant to Article 2034 of
appear in behalf of Sison invited suspicion of his double-dealing and unfaithfulness. the Civil Code.24
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that: A example, a lawyer might appear on both sides of the litigation, complicating the
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all process of taking proof and compromise adversary argumentation x x x. 29
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Atty. Era thus owed to Samson
and his group entire devotion to their genuine interest, and warm zeal in the The rule prohibiting conflict of interest was fashioned to prevent situations wherein a
maintenance and defense of their rights.25 He was expected to exert his best efforts lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his
and ability to preserve the clients cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to his present or former clients. In the same way, a lawyer may only be allowed to
clients likewise served the ends of justice.26 represent a client involving the same or a substantially related matter that is
materially adverse to the former client only if the former client consents to it after
In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,27 the Court discussed the concept of conflict of interest consultation.30 The rule is grounded in the fiduciary obligation of loyalty.31
in this wise:cralavvonlinelawlibrary Throughout the course of a lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer learns all the facts
connected with the client's case, including the weak and strong points of the case.
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or Knowledge and information gathered in the course of the relationship must be
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the treated as sacred and guarded with care. It behooves lawyers not only to keep
lawyers duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other inviolate the clients confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him double-dealing, for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which their lawyers, which is paramount in the administration of justice.32 The nature of
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no that relationship is, therefore, one of trust and confidence of the highest degree.33
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which Contrary to Atty. Eras ill-conceived attempt to explain his disloyalty to Samson and
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and his group, the termination of the attorney-client relationship does not justify a lawyer
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency spirit behind this rule is that the clients confidence once given should not be
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney stripped by the mere expiration of the professional employment. Even after the
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or severance of the relation, a lawyer should not do anything that will injuriously affect
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.28 his former client in any matter in which the lawyer previously represented the client.
Nor should the lawyer disclose or use any of the clients confidences acquired in the
The prohibition against conflict of interest rests on five rationales, rendered as previous relation.34 In this regard, Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary Responsibility expressly declares that: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his
client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him.
x x x. First, the law seeks to assure clients that their lawyers will represent them with
undivided loyalty. A client is entitled to be represented by a lawyer whom the client The lawyers highest and most unquestioned duty is to protect the client at all
can trust. Instilling such confidence is an objective important in itself. x x x. hazards and costs even to himself.35 The protection given to the client is perpetual
and does not cease with the termination of the litigation, nor is it affected by the
Second, the prohibition against conflicts of interest seeks to enhance the clients ceasing to employ the attorney and retaining another, or by any other
effectiveness of legal representation. To the extent that a conflict of interest change of relation between them. It even survives the death of the client.36
undermines the independence of the lawyers professional judgment or inhibits a
lawyer from working with appropriate vigor in the clients behalf, the clients In the absence of the express consent from Samson and his group after full
expectation of effective representation x x x could be compromised. disclosure to them of the conflict of interest, therefore, the most ethical thing for
Atty. Era to have done was either to outrightly decline representing and entering his
Third, a client has a legal right to have the lawyer safeguard the clients confidential appearance as counsel for Sison, or to advice Sison to engage another lawyer for
information xxx. Preventing use of confidential client information against the herself. Unfortunately, he did neither, and should now suffer the proper sanction.
interests of the client, either to benefit the lawyers personal interest, in aid of some
other client, or to foster an assumed public purpose is facilitated through conflicts WHEREFORE, the Court FINDS and PRONOUNCES Atty. EDGARDO O. ERA guilty of
rules that reduce the opportunity for such abuse. violating Rule 15.03 of Canon 15, and Canon 17 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for two years effective
Fourth, conflicts rules help ensure that lawyers will not exploit clients, such as by upon his receipt of this decision, with a warning that his commission of a similar
inducing a client to make a gift to the lawyer xxx. offense will be dealt with more severely.

Finally, some conflict-of-interest rules protect interests of the legal system in Let copies of this decision be included in the personal record of Atty. EDGARDO O.
obtaining adequate presentations to tribunals. In the absence of such rules, for ERA and entered in his file in the Office of the Bar Confidant.
Let copies of this decision be disseminated to all lower courts by the Office of the respondent filed an Entry of Appearance as collaborating counsel for Emilio in the
Court Administrator, as well as to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for its same case and moved for the reconsideration of the RTC Order.6cralaw virtualaw
guidance. library

SO ORDERED. Due to the respondents new engagement, complainants filed the instant disbarment
complaint before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), claiming that he
Sereno, C.J. Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Abad, violated: (a) Rule 15.03 of the Code, as he undertook to represent conflicting
Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-Bernabe, and Leonen, JJ., concur. interests in the subject case;7 and (b) Section 20(e), Rule 138 of the Rules, as he
Brion, J., on leave. breached the trust and confidence reposed upon him by his clients, the Heirs of
Antonio.8 Complainants further claimed that while Maricar, the surviving spouse of
Antonio and the mother of Karen, consented to the withdrawal of respondents
SECOND DIVISION appearance, the same was obtained only on October 18, 2007, or after he had
already entered his appearance for Emilio on October 10, 2007.9 In this accord,
A.C. No. 9860, September 11, 2013 respondent failed to disclose such fact to all the affected heirs and, as such, was not
able to obtain their written consent as required under the Rules.10cralaw virtualaw
JOSEPHINE L. OROLA, MYRNA L. OROLA, MANUEL L. OROLA, MARY ANGELYN OROLA- library
BELARGA, MARJORIE MELBA OROLA-CALIP, AND KAREN OROLA, Complainants, v.
ATTY. JOSEPH ADOR RAMOS, Respondent. For his part, respondent refuted the abovementioned charges, contending that he
never appeared as counsel for the Heirs of Trinidad or for the Heirs of Antonio. He
RESOLUTION pointed out that the records of the case readily show that the Heirs of Trinidad were
represented by Atty. Villa, while the Heirs of Antonio were exclusively represented by
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: Atty. Azarraga.11 He averred that he only accommodated Maricar's request to
temporarily appear on her behalf as their counsel of record could not attend the
For the Courts resolution is a disbarment complaint1 filed against respondent Atty. scheduled June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings and that his appearances thereat were
Joseph Ador Ramos (respondent) for his violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 (Rule free of charge.12 In fact, he obtained Maricars permission for him to withdraw from
15.03) of the Code of Professional Responsibility (Code) and Section 20(e), Rule 138 the case as no further communications transpired after these two hearings.
of the Rules of Court (Rules). Likewise, he consulted Maricar before he undertook to represent Emilio in the same
case.13 He added that he had no knowledge of the fact that the late Antonio had
The Facts other heirs and, in this vein, asserted that no information was disclosed to him by
Maricar or their counsel of record at any instance.14 Finally, he clarified that his
Complainants Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, (all surnamed Orola), Mary Angelyn Orola- representation for Emilio in the subject case was more of a mediator, rather than a
Belarga (Mary Angelyn), and Marjorie Melba Orola-Calip (Marjorie) are the children of litigator,15 and that since no settlement was forged between the parties, he formally
the late Trinidad Laserna-Orola (Trinidad), married to Emilio Q. Orola (Emilio).2cralaw withdrew his appearance on December 6, 2007.16 In support of his assertions,
virtualaw library respondent submitted the affidavits of Maricar17 and Atty. Azarraga18 relative to his
limited appearance and his consultation with Maricar prior to his engagement as
Meanwhile, complainant Karen Orola (Karen) is the daughter of Maricar Alba-Orola counsel for Emilio.
(Maricar) and Antonio L. Orola (Antonio), the deceased brother of the above-named
complainants and the son of Emilio.3cralaw virtualaw library The Recommendation and Action of the IBP

In the settlement of Trinidads estate, pending before the Regional Trial Court of In the Report and Recommendation19 dated September 15, 2008 submitted by IBP
Roxas City, Branch 18 (RTC) and docketed as Special Proceeding No. V-3639, the Investigating Commissioner Jose I. De La Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),
parties were represented by the following: (a) Atty. Roy M. Villa (Atty. Villa) as respondent was found guilty of representing conflicting interests only with respect to
counsel for and in behalf of Josephine, Myrna, Manuel, Mary Angelyn, and Marjorie Karen as the records of the case show that he never acted as counsel for the other
(Heirs of Trinidad); (b) Atty. Ely F. Azarraga, Jr. (Atty. Azarraga) as counsel for and in complainants. The Investigating Commissioner observed that while respondent's
behalf of Maricar, Karen, and the other heirs4 of the late Antonio (Heirs of Antonio), withdrawal of appearance was with the express conformity of Maricar, respondent
with respondent as collaborating counsel; and (c) Atty. Aquiliana Brotarlo as counsel nonetheless failed to obtain the consent of Karen, who was already of age and one
for and in behalf of Emilio, the initially appointed administrator of Trinidads estate. of the Heirs of Antonio, as mandated under Rule 15.03 of the Code.20cralaw
In the course of the proceedings, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio virtualaw library
moved for the removal of Emilio as administrator and, in his stead, sought the
appointment of the latters son, Manuel Orola, which the RTC granted in an Order5 On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner held that there was no violation
dated September 20, 2007 (RTC Order). Subsequently, or on October 10, 2007, of Section 20, Rule 138 of the Rules as complainants themselves admitted that
respondent did not acquire confidential information from his former client nor did the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
he use against the latter any knowledge obtained in the course of his previous will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
employment.21 Considering that it was respondent's first offense, the Investigating also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client
Commissioner found the imposition of disbarment too harsh a penalty and, instead, any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency
recommended that he be severely reprimanded for his act with warning that a of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
repetition of the same or similar acts would be dealt with more severely.22cralaw from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
virtualaw library invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.29
(Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the It must, however, be noted that a lawyers immutable duty to a former client does
aforementioned report in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-64123 dated December 11, not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyers employment with the
2008 (Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641), finding the same to be fully supported by the client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules but imposed against clients interests only on matters that he previously handled for the former client
respondent the penalty of six (6) months suspension from the practice of law. and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has
terminated.30cralaw virtualaw library
Respondent's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in IBP Resolution No. XX-
2013-1725 dated January 3, 2013. Applying the above-stated principles, the Court agrees with the IBPs finding that
respondent represented conflicting interests and, perforce, must be held
The Issue Before the Court administratively liable therefor.

The sole issue in this case is whether or not respondent is guilty of representing Records reveal that respondent was the collaborating counsel not only for Maricar as
conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code. claimed by him, but for all the Heirs of Antonio in Special Proceeding No. V-3639. In
the course thereof, the Heirs of Trinidad and the Heirs of Antonio succeeded in
The Courts Ruling removing Emilio as administrator for having committed acts prejudicial to their
interests. Hence, when respondent proceeded to represent Emilio for the purpose of
The Court concurs with the IBPs finding that respondent violated Rule 15.03 of the seeking his reinstatement as administrator in the same case, he clearly worked
Code, but reduced the recommended period of suspension to three (3) months. against the very interest of the Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen in violation of
the above-stated rule.
Rule 15.03 of the Code reads:chanrobles virtua1aw 1ibrary
CANON 15 A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS Respondent's justification that no confidential information was relayed to him cannot
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS. fully exculpate him for the charges against him since the rule on conflict of interests,
as enunciated in Hornilla, provides an absolute prohibition from representation with
Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written respect to opposing parties in the same case. In other words, a lawyer cannot
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. (Emphasis change his representation from one party to the latters opponent in the same case.
supplied) That respondents previous appearances for and in behalf of the Heirs of Antonio
Under the afore-cited rule, it is explicit that a lawyer is prohibited from representing was only a friendly accommodation cannot equally be given any credence since the
new clients whose interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether aforesaid rule holds even if the inconsistency is remote or merely probable or even if
or not they are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. The the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent conflicting
prohibition is founded on the principles of public policy and good taste.26 It interests.31cralaw virtualaw library
behooves lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid
the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be Neither can respondent's asseveration that his engagement by Emilio was more of a
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount mediator than a litigator and for the purpose of forging a settlement among the
importance in the administration of justice.27 In Hornilla v. Salunat28 (Hornilla), the family members render the rule inoperative. In fact, even on that assertion, his
Court explained the concept of conflict of interest, to wit:chanrobles virtua1aw conduct is likewise improper since Rule 15.04,32 Canon 15 of the Code similarly
1ibrary requires the lawyer to obtain the written consent of all concerned before he may act
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or as mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes. Irrefragably, respondent
more opposing parties. The test is whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the failed in this respect as the records show that respondent was remiss in his duty to
lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other make a full disclosure of his impending engagement as Emilios counsel to all the
client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him Heirs of Antonio particularly, Karen and equally secure their express written
when he argues for the other client. This rule covers not only cases in which consent before consummating the same. Besides, it must be pointed out that a
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no lawyer who acts as such in settling a dispute cannot represent any of the parties to
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
it.33 Accordingly, for respondents violation of the aforestated rules, disciplinary
sanction is warranted. CRISANTA JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOEL JIMENEZ, Respondent.

In this case, the penalty recommended by the Investigating Commissioner was DECISION
increased from severe reprimand to a suspension of six (6) months by the IBP Board
of Governors in its Resolution No. XVIII-2008-641. However, the Court observes that YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
the said resolution is bereft of any explanation showing the bases of the IBP Board of
Governors modification; as such, it contravened Section 12(a), Rule 139-B of the On September 20, 2002, petitioner Crisanta Jimenez filed a complaint1 before the
Rules which specifically mandates that [t]he decision of the Board upon such review Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against
shall be in writing and shall clearly and distinctly state the facts and the reasons on respondent Atty. Joel Jimenez for allegedly engaging in dishonest, immoral, or
which it is based.34 Verily, the Court looks with disfavor the change in the deceitful conduct; failing to account property received from a client; and failing to
recommended penalty without any ample justification therefor. To this end, the Court deliver property upon demand of a client.
is wont to remind the IBP Board of Governors of the importance of the requirement
to announce in plain terms its legal reasoning, since the requirement that its Petitioner alleged that on September 11, 2001, respondent received in trust several
decision in disciplinary proceedings must state the facts and the reasons on which documents for the purpose of transferring the registration thereof in her name. Due
the same is based is akin to what is required of courts in promulgating their to a misunderstanding between petitioner's husband and respondent's father,
decisions. The reasons for handing down a penalty occupy no lesser station than any petitioner demanded on October 17, 2001 the return of the documents but
other portion of the ratio.35cralaw virtualaw library respondent failed and refused to turn over the same. Petitioner also claimed that on
September 17, 2001, respondent surreptitiously took from her residence a black bag
In the foregoing light, the Court finds the penalty of suspension from the practice of containing important documents. She thus instituted cases for qualified theft and
law for a period of three (3) months to be more appropriate taking into consideration estafa against the respondent and his father. In addition, she filed the instant
the following factors: first, respondent is a first time offender; second, it is administrative case for respondent's disbarment.
undisputed that respondent merely accommodated Maricars request out of gratis to
temporarily represent her only during the June 16 and July 14, 2006 hearings due to In his answer, respondent admitted that he received on September 11, 2001 certain
her lawyers unavailability; third, it is likewise undisputed that respondent had no documents from Aurora Realon, an agent of petitioner's husband, Antonio Jimenez,
knowledge that the late Antonio had any other heirs aside from Maricar whose his uncle, the latter being a brother of his father, with instructions to deliver the
consent he actually acquired (albeit shortly after his first appearance as counsel for same to his father. On October 17, 2001, petitioner demanded the return of the
and in behalf of Emilio), hence, it can be said that he acted in good faith; and fourth, documents but his father refused pending an accounting of his share in the business
complainants admit that respondent did not acquire confidential information from venture with Antonio and in pursuance with the agency agreement between the two.
the Heirs of Antonio nor did he use against them any knowledge obtained in the Respondent also disclaimed any responsibility to account or deliver property to
course of his previous employment, hence, the said heirs were not in any manner petitioner due to the absence of any lawyer-client relationship between them. He
prejudiced by his subsequent engagement with Emilio. Notably, in Ilusorio-Bildner v. alleged that petitioner and her husband are persecuting him to collaterally attack his
Lokin, Jr.,36 the Court similarly imposed the penalty of suspension from the practice father, with whom they have a serious misunderstanding regarding their agency
of law for a period of three months to the counsel therein who represented parties agreement.
whose interests are hostile to his other clients in another case.
He also averred that on January 14, 2002, the Makati Prosecutor's Office dismissed
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joseph Ador Ramos is hereby held GUILTY of the complaint for estafa for lack of merit and insufficiency of evidence.2 Petitioner's
representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of appeal to the Department of Justice was denied on August 5, 2003.3 As regards the
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice case for qualified theft, the Justice Secretary reversed and set aside the resolution of
of law for a period of three (3) months, with WARNING that a repetition of the same the Office of the City Prosecutor of Paraaque City finding probable cause and
or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more directed the latter to move for the withdrawal of the complaint pending before the
severely.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Regional Trial Court of Paraaque City, Branch 274.4

SO ORDERED. It appears, however, that the trial court denied the motion to withdraw information
for qualified theft thus, respondent and his father filed a petition for certiorari before
Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Perez, JJ., concur. the appellate court docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 75138. On March 13, 2003, the Court
of Appeals ordered the trial judge to grant the motion to withdraw information and to
dismiss the criminal complaint for qualified theft against respondent and his father.5
FIRST DIVISION
In the report6 dated September 30, 2004, the Investigating Commissioner7
[A.C. NO. 6712 : February 6, 2006] concluded that respondent could not be held administratively liable for the charges
against him and thus recommended the dismissal of the complaint, which report and possession of respondent Jose Jimenez, any question bearing thereon could be
recommendation was adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors on raised in the Complaint, as amended, filed by respondent Jose Jimenez before the
November 4, 2004. RTC of Pampanga, against petitioner and her spouse, for "Collection of Sum of
Money, Accounting and Damages x x x.
On April 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Petition for Review 8 before this Court assailing
the resolution of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and approving the The long-settled rule is that the dismissal of a criminal case on the ground of
recommendation of the investigating commissioner to dismiss the administrative insufficiency of evidence against an accused who is also a respondent in an
case. She argued that the IBP erred in finding that there was insufficient evidence to administrative case does not necessarily foreclose the administrative proceeding
hold respondent administratively liable. against him or carry with it the relief from administrative liability.12 The quantum of
evidence needed in a criminal case is different from that required in an
In his comment,9 respondent alleged that on June 30, 2005, this Court rendered a administrative case. In the former, proof beyond reasonable doubt is needed;13
decision in Jimenez v. Jimenez10 which upheld the decision of the Court of Appeals while the latter, substantial evidence,14 defined as such relevant evidence as a
to grant the motion to withdraw the information in the criminal case of qualified reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,15 is enough.
theft against him and his father. However, if the complainant fails to meet the required standard or to establish
his/her case by clear, convincing, and satisfactory evidence16 as in this case, this
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.rbl r Court shall not hesitate to dismiss any disbarment proceedings against any lawyer.
l l lbrr After all, the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and may be
imposed only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and
The factual milieu of the present case lacks evidence of any dishonest, immoral, or character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar.17
deceitful conduct committed by respondent. Petitioner anchors this administrative
complaint on the alleged crimes committed by respondent. However, the complaints In the instant case, no sufficient evidence was presented to prove that respondent
for qualified theft and estafa were both ordered dismissed for lack of merit and engaged in dishonest, immoral, or deceitful conduct. There was no factual or legal
insufficiency of evidence. basis, much less substantial ground to hold respondent administratively liable.

The documents received by respondent from Realon were not held by him in trust for Likewise, we find no merit in the allegations of petitioner that respondent failed to
the petitioner. What was delivered to respondent was the material or physical account and deliver property she demanded from him. As correctly pointed out by
possession of the documents and not the juridical possession thereof. Juridical respondent, he has no duty to account anything to the petitioner as there is no
possession of said documents pertains to the receipt by respondent's father being attorney-client relationship between them. The only relationship between them is
the attorney-in-fact of the petitioner and Antonio by virtue of a special power of that of an estranged aunt and a nephew-in-law; whereby the former once asked the
attorney. latter to act as a courier between her and his father. Besides, with or without any of
these relations, the respondent has nothing to account or deliver to petitioner as the
As held in Jimenez v. Jimenez:11 documents in question were never within his juridical possession nor were they
unlawfully taken by him.
Contrary to petitioner's claim in said Complaint-Affidavit that respondent Jose
Jimenez admitted to real-estate agent Aurora Realon that his son-co-respondent Joel WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The Resolution of the Board of
Jimenez got hold of the documents and turned them over to him, no such claim Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated November 4, 2004 in CBD
appears in Aurora's affidavit submitted by petitioner in support of her complaint. Case No. 02-1012 is AFFIRMED. The administrative complaint for disbarment of
respondent Atty. Joel Jimenez is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Even in the Joint Affidavit of Carlos and Eduardo Jimenez also submitted by petitioner
in support of her complaint, there is no showing that respondent Joel took the SO ORDERED.
documents and turned them over to respondent Jose, as the affiants merely stated
having suggested to respondent Jose Jimenez "to return all the documents that were
taken by his son . . . from the house of Antonio Jimenez, together with the SECOND DIVISION
documents that were entrusted to him by Aurora Realon . . ., " which alleged taking
by Joel Jimenez was a mere conclusion of the affiants, hence, cannot serve to prove A.C. No. 9395, November 12, 2014
actual taking of the documents by respondent Joel Jimenez.
DARIA O. DAGING, Complainant, v. ATTY. RIZ TINGALON L. DAVIS, Respondent.
What is gathered through from petitioner's evidence is that some of the documents
were entrusted to respondent Jose Jimenez in his capacity as attorney-in-fact and the RESOLUTION
others were turned over by Aurora Realon to said respondent through his son co-
respondent Joel Jimenez. Parenthetically, if the documents have remained in the DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This administrative complaint for disbarment arose from an Affidavit Complaint1 3.c Respondent [asked] Novie Balageo [the purpose of] the inventoiy [to which] the
filed by Daria O. Daging (complainant) before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines latter x x x responded x x x that she entered | into] a leas contract with the present
(IBP), Benguet Chapter,2 against Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis (respondent). administrator of the building, Benjie Pinlac;cralawlawlibrary

Antecedents 3.d Respondent, to his disbelief requested Novie Balageo to go [to] the LAW OFFICE
for further clarification of the matter. Thereafter, Respondent was later informed that
Complainant was the owner and operator of Nashville Country Music Lounge. She the business of Complainant was taken over and operated by Mr. Benjie Pinlac for
leased from Benjie Pinlac (Pinlac) a building space located at No. 22 Otek St., Baguio seven days. Furthermore, Mr. Benjie Pinlac offered the said place to Novie Balageo
City where she operated the bar. which the latter readily accepted;cralawlawlibrary

Meanwhile, complainant received a Retainer Proposal[3 from Davis & Sabling Law 3.e [Left] with no recourse, Respondent requested one of his staff to assist Novie
Office signed by respondent and his partner Atty. Amos Saganib Sabling (Atty. Balageo in conducting an inventory. Furthermore, Respondent never acted as
Sabling). This eventually resulted in the signing by the complainant,, the respondent partner of Novie Balageo in operating the former Nashville Country Music
and Atty. Sabling of a Retainer Agreement4 dated March 7, 2005. Lounge;cralawlawlibrary

Because complainant was delinquent in paying the monthly rentals, Pinlac 3.f When Complainant filed the civil case for Ejectment against Novie Balageo and
terminated the lease. Together with Novie Balageo (Balageo) and respondent, Pinlac Benjie Pinlac, Respondent represented the former thereof without taking advantage
went to complainant's music bar, inventoried all the equipment therein, and of the retainership contract between the DAVIS and SABLING LAW OFFICE [and]
informed her that Balageo would take over the operation of the bar. Complainant Complainant as Respondent has no knowledge or information of any matters related
averred that subsequently respondent acted as business partner of Balageo in by complainant to Arty. Sabling regarding the former's
operating the bar under her business name, which they later renamed Amarillo business:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Music Bar.
3.g While the Complaint was pending, respondent was x x x informed by Novie
Complainant likewise alleged that she filed an ejectment case against Pinlac and Balageo and Benjie Pinlac of the truth of all matters x x x which x x x Respondent
Balageo before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 1, Baguio City. At [was unaware of];cralawlawlibrary
that time, Davis & Sabling Law Office was still her counsel as their Retainer
Agreement remained subsisting and in force. However, respondent appeared as 3.h However, for the interest of justice and fair play, x x x Respondent [deemed it
counsel for Balageo in that ejectment case and filed, on behalf of the latter, an prudent] to x x x withdraw as Counsel for Novie Balageo. Hence, Respondent filed
Answer with Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary his Motion to Withdraw As Counsel, x x x
Injunction.5
3.i The civil case was subsequently dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the
In his Comment,6 respondent denied participation in the takeover or acting as a [Complaint's] subject matter, x x x7chanrobleslaw
business partner of Balageo in the operation of the bar. He asserted that Balageo is
the sole proprietress of the establishment. He insisted that it was Atty. Sabling, his On October 15, 2008, the Investigating Commissioner rendered a Report and
partner, who initiated the proposal and was in fact the one who was able to convince Recommendation8 finding respondent guilty of betrayal of his client's trust and for
complainant to accept the law office as her retainer. Respondent maintained that he misuse of information obtained from his client to the disadvantage of the latter and
never obtained any knowledge or information regarding the business of complainant to the advantage of another person. He recommended that respondent be
who used to consult only Atty- Sabling. Respondent admitted though having suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
represented Balageo in the ejectment case, but denied that he took advantage of
the Retainer Agreement between complainant and Davis and Sabling Law Office. On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the
Thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.9 Upon motion of
the respondent, it reduced the penalty imposed to six months suspension
3.a Prior to the engagement of the Complainant of the DAVIS and SABLING LAW considering that there is no proof that respondent actually handled any previous
OFFICE as her retainer, Novie Balageo was already one of the Clients of Respondent legal matters involving complainant.10ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
in several cases;cralawlawlibrary
Our Ruling
3.b Sometime in the last week of the month of May 2005, while Respondent was in
his office doing some legal works, Novie Balageo called up Respondent informing the It is undisputed that complainant entered into a Retainer Agreement dated March 7,
latter that his assistance is needed for purposes of conducting an inventoiy of all 2005 with respondent's law firm. This agreement was signed by the respondent and
items at the former Nashville Country Music Lounge;cralawlawlibrary attached to the rollo of this case. And during the subsistence of said Retainer
Agreement, respondent represented and defended Balageo, who was impleaded as found GUILTY of violating Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
one ofthe defendants in the ejectment case complainant filed before the MTCC of Responsibility and is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six
Baguio City. In fact, respondent filed on behalf of said Balageo an Answer with (6) months effective upon receipt of this Resolution. He is warned that a commission
Opposition to the Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated of the same or similar offense in the future will result in the imposition of a stiffer
July 11, 2005. It was only on August 26, 2005 when respondent withdrew his penalty.
appearance for Balageo.
Let a copy of this Resolution be entered into the records of Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis
Based on the established facts, it is indubitable that respondent transgressed Rule and furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
15.03 of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. It Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary information and guidance.

Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. of this Resolution.

"A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel SO ORDERED.
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client."11 The
prohibition against representing conflicting interests is absolute and the rule applies Carpio, (Acting Chief Justice),* Brion, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
even if the lawyer has acted in good faith and with no intention to represent
conflicting interests.12 In Quiambao v. Atty. Bamba,13 this Court emphasized that
lawyers are expected not only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to EN BANC
avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount A.C. No. 5859 (Formerly CBD Case No. 421) : November 23, 2010
importance in the administration of justice.14
ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO, SEVERINO P.
Respondent argues that while complainant is a client of Davis & Sabling Law office, MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO MERCADO, Complainants, v. ATTY.
her case is actually handled only by his partner Atty. Sabling. He was not privy to EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Respondent.
any transaction between Atty. Sabling and complainant and has no knowledge of any
information or legal matter complainant entrusted or confided to his law partner. He RESOLUTION
thus inveigles that he could not have taken advantage of an information obtained by
his law firm by virtue of the Retainer Agreement. PER CURIAM:

We are not impressed. In Hilado v. David,15 reiterated in Gonzales v. Atty. Cabucana, For our review is the Resolution[1] of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of
Jr.,16 this Court held that a lawyer who takes up the cause of the adversary of the the Philippines (IBP) finding respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera liable for
party who has engaged the services of his law firm brings the law profession into professional malpractice and gross misconduct and recommending his disbarment.
public disrepute and suspicion and undermines the integrity of justice. Thus,
respondent's argument that he never took advantage of any information acquired by The facts, as appreciated by the investigating commissioner,[2] are undisputed.
his law firm in the course of its professional dealings with the complainant, even
assuming it to be true, is of no moment. Undeniably aware of the fact that The respondent is a member of the Bar and was the former counsel of Rosario P.
complainant is a client of his law firm, respondent should have immediately informed Mercado in a civil case filed in 1984 with the Regional Trial Court of Davao City and
both the complainant and Balageo that he, as well as the other members of his law an administrative case filed before the Securities and Exchange Commission, Davao
firm, cannot represent any of them in their legal tussle; otherwise, they would be City Extension Office.[3]cralaw
representing conflicting interests and violate the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Indeed, respondent could have simply advised both complainant and Balageo to Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in
instead engage the services of another lawyer. favor of Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the
bank deposits of the defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario.
The penalty for representing conflicting interests may either be reprimand or Rosario demanded that the respondent turn over the proceeds of the garnishment,
suspension from the practice of law ranging from six months to two years.17 We but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of the money to the judge while
thus adopt the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. the balance was his, as attorneys fees. Such refusal prompted Rosario to file an
administrative case for disbarment against the Respondent.[4]cralaw
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS and AFFIRMS the January 15, 2012 Resolution of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. Riz Tingalon L. Davis is
On March 23, 1993, the IBP Board of Governors promulgated a Resolution holding right to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for
the respondent guilty of infidelity in the custody and handling of clients funds and misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after opportunity to
recommending to the Court his one-year suspension from the practice of law. be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege or
[5]cralaw right, an attorneys right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to
suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
Following the release of the aforesaid IBP Resolution, the respondent filed a series of exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the
lawsuits against the Mercado family except George Mercado. The respondent also purpose of suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a
instituted cases against the family corporation, the corporations accountant and the person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and
judge who ruled against the reopening of the case where respondent tried to collect responsibilities belonging to an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public
the balance of his alleged fee from Rosario. Later on, the respondent also filed cases and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to punish the
against the chairman and members of the IBP Board of Governors who voted to attorney.[11] In Maligsa v. Cabanting,[12] we explained that the bar should maintain
recommend his suspension from the practice of law for one year. Complainants a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer
allege that the respondent committed barratry, forum shopping, exploitation of brings honor to the legal profession by faithfully performing his duties to society, to
family problems, and use of intemperate language when he filed several frivolous the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the legal profession
and unwarranted lawsuits against the complainants and their family members, their should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence
lawyers, and the family corporation.[6] They maintain that the primary purpose of and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal
the cases is to harass and to exact revenge for the one-year suspension from the profession. An attorney may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath
practice of law meted out by the IBP against the Respondent. Thus, they pray that or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include statutory grounds
the respondent be disbarred for malpractice and gross misconduct under Section 27, enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
[7] Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
In the present case, the respondent committed professional malpractice and gross
In his defense the respondent basically offers a denial of the charges against him. misconduct particularly in his acts against his former clients after the issuance of the
IBP Resolution suspending him from the practice of law for one year. In summary,
He denies he has committed barratry by instigating or stirring up George Mercado to the respondent filed against his former client, her family members, the family
file lawsuits against the complainants. He insists that the lawsuits that he and corporation of his former client, the Chairman and members of the Board of
George filed against the complainants were not harassment suits but were in fact Governors of the IBP who issued the said Resolution, the Regional Trial Court Judge in
filed in good faith and were based on strong facts.[8]cralaw the case where his former client received a favorable judgment, and the present
counsel of his former client, a total of twelve (12) different cases in various fora
Also, the respondent denies that he has engaged in forum shopping. He argues that which included the Securities and Exchange Commission; the Provincial Prosecutors
he was merely exhausting the remedies allowed by law and that he was merely Office of Tagum, Davao; the Davao City Prosecutors Office; the IBP-Commission on
constrained to seek relief elsewhere by reason of the denial of the trial court to Bar Discipline; the Department of Agrarian Reform; and the Supreme Court.
reopen the civil case so he could justify his attorneys fees. [13]cralaw

Further, he denies that he had exploited the problems of his clients family. He In addition to the twelve (12) cases filed, the respondent also re-filed cases which
argues that the case that he and George Mercado filed against the complainants had previously been dismissed. The respondent filed six criminal cases against
arose from their perception of unlawful transgressions committed by the latter for members of the Mercado family separately docketed as I.S. Nos. 97-135; 97-136; 97-
which they must be held accountable for the public interest. 137; 97-138; 97-139; and 97-140. With the exception of I.S. No. 97-139, all the
aforementioned cases are re-filing of previously dismissed cases.[14]cralaw
Finally, the respondent denies using any intemperate, vulgar, or unprofessional
language. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainants who resorted to Now, there is nothing ethically remiss in a lawyer who files numerous cases in
intemperate and vulgar language in accusing him of extorting from Rosario different fora, as long as he does so in good faith, in accordance with the Rules, and
shocking and unconscionable attorneys fees.[9]cralaw without any ill-motive or purpose other than to achieve justice and fairness. In the
present case, however, we find that the barrage of cases filed by the respondent
After careful consideration of the records of this case and the parties submissions, against his former client and others close to her was meant to overwhelm said client
we find ourselves in agreement with the findings and recommendation of the IBP and to show her that the respondent does not fold easily after he was meted a
Board of Governors. penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law.

It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by The nature of the cases filed by the respondent, the fact of re-filing them after being
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the dismissed, the timing of the filing of cases, the fact that the respondent was in
qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege.[10] Membership conspiracy with a renegade member of the complainants family, the defendants
in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and named in the cases and the foul language used in the pleadings and motions[15] all
indicate that the respondent was acting beyond the desire for justice and fairness.
His act of filing a barrage of cases appears to be an act of revenge and hate driven Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Bar Confidant to be spread on the
by anger and frustration against his former client who filed the disciplinary records of the respondent; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all
complaint against him for infidelity in the custody of a clients funds. its chapters; and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts
throughout the country.
In the case of Prieto v. Corpuz,[16] the Court pronounced that it is professionally
irresponsible for a lawyer to file frivolous lawsuits. Thus, we stated in Prieto, SO ORDERED.

Atty. Marcos V. Prieto must be sanctioned for filing this unfounded complaint.
Although no person should be penalized for the exercise of the right to litigate, THIRD DIVISION
however, this right must be exercised in good faith.[17]cralaw
A.C. No. 10687, July 22, 2015
As officers of the court, lawyers have a responsibility to assist in the proper
administration of justice. They do not discharge this duty by filing frivolous petitions MABINI COLLEGES, INC. REPRESENTED BY MARCEL N. LUKBAN, ALBERTO I. GARCIA,
that only add to the workload of the judiciary. JR., AND MA. PAMELA ROSSANA A. APUYA, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE D. PAJARILLO,
Respondent.
A lawyer is part of the machinery in the administration of justice. Like the court
itself, he is an instrument to advance its ends the speedy, efficient, impartial, DECISION
correct and inexpensive adjudication of cases and the prompt satisfaction of final
judgments. A lawyer should not only help attain these objectives but should likewise VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
avoid any unethical or improper practices that impede, obstruct or prevent their
realization, charged as he is with the primary task of assisting in the speedy and Before us is a verified complaint1 for disbarment against respondent Atty. Jose D.
efficient administration of justice.[18] Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Pajarillo for allegedly violating Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility promulgated on 21 June 1988 is very explicit that lawyers must exert Responsibility which prohibits a lawyer from representing conflicting interests and
every effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient Canon 15 of the same Code which enjoins a lawyer to observe candor, fairness, and
administration of justice. loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with clients.

Further, the respondent not only filed frivolous and unfounded lawsuits that violated The salient facts of the case follow:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
his duties as an officer of the court in aiding in the proper administration of justice,
but he did so against a former client to whom he owes loyalty and fidelity. Canon 21 In 1995, the complainant, Mabini Colleges, Inc., had a Board of Trustees which was
and Rule 21.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility[19] divided into two opposing factions. The first faction, called the Adeva Group, was
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary composed of Romulo M. Adeva, Lydia E. Cacawa, Eleodoro D. Bicierro, and Pilar I.
Andrade. The other faction, called the Lukban Group, was composed of Justo B.
CANON 21 - A lawyer shall preserve the confidence and secrets of his client even Lukban, Luz I. Garcia, Alice I. Adeva, and Marcel N. Lukban.
after the attorney-client relation is terminated.
In 1996, the complainant appointed the respondent as its corporate secretary with a
Rule 21.02 A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information total monthly compensation and honorarium of P6,000.
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the On March 29, 1999, the Adeva Group issued an unnumbered Board Resolution which
circumstances consents thereto. authorized Pilar I. Andrade, the Executive Vice President and Treasurer of the
complainant at that time, and Lydia E. Cacawa, the Vice President for Administration
The cases filed by the respondent against his former client involved matters and and Finance, to apply for a loan with the Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP), Daet Branch,
information acquired by the respondent during the time when he was still Rosarios Camarines Norte in favor of the complainant.
counsel. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation,
private documents, and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support On May 12, 1999, the Lukban Group sent a letter to RBP to oppose the loan
of the cases filed by the respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all application because the Adeva Group appointed Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano,
acquired through the attorney-client relationship with herein complainants. Such act who were allegedly not registered as stockholders in the Stock and Transfer Book of
is in direct violation of the Canons and will not be tolerated by the Court. the complainant, as members of the Board of Trustees. The Lukban Group also
alleged that the complainant was having financial difficulties.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is hereby DISBARRED from the
practice of law effective immediately upon his receipt of this Resolution.
On May 14, 1999, respondent sent a letter to RBP to assure the latter of Investigating Commissioner also held that the personality of complainant's
complainant's financial capacity to pay the loan. representatives to file this administrative case is immaterial since proceedings for
disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
On July 13, 1999, RBP granted the loan application in the amount of P200,000 which Court motu proprio or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified
was secured by a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties of the complainant. complaint of any person.

On September 27, 1999, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued an On June 21, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XX-2013-
Order which nullified the appointment of Librado Guerra and Cesar Echano by the 7704 which affirmed the findings of the Investigating Commissioner and imposed a
Adeva Group as members of the Board of Trustees of the complainant. As a result, penalty of suspension from the practice of law for one year against respondent.
complainant sent a letter to RBP to inform the latter of the SEC Order.
On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued Resolution No. XXI-2014-
On October 19, 1999, RBP sent a letter to the complainant acknowledging receipt of 2905 which denied the motion for reconsideration filed by respondent.
the SEC Order and informing the latter that the SEC Order was referred to RBP's
legal counsel, herein respondent. The complainant alleged that it was only upon The issue in this case is whether respondent is guilty of representing conflicting
receipt of such letter that it became aware that respondent is also the legal counsel interests when he entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for
of RBP. annulment of mortgage filed by complainant against RBP.

On April 18, 2000, complainant and RBP increased the loan to P400,000. We rule in the affirmative. We thus affirm the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner, and Resolution Nos. XX-2013-770 and XXI-2014-290 of
On April 23, 2002, RBP moved to foreclose the Real Estate Mortgage. the IBP Board of Governors. Indeed, respondent represented conflicting interests in
violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which
On May 28, 2002, complainant filed a complaint for Annulment of Mortgage with a provides that "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
Prayer for Preliminary Injunction against RBP. Respondent entered his appearance as consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."
counsel for RBP.
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose interests oppose
On September 2, 2011, complainant filed the present complaint for disbarment those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same
against the respondent for allegedly representing conflicting interests and for failing action or on totally unrelated cases.6 Based on the principles of public policy and
to exhibit candor, fairness, and loyalty. good taste, this prohibition on representing conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not
only to keep inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
Respondent raised three defenses against the complaint for disbarment. First, treachery and double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust
respondent argued that Marcel N. Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela their secrets to their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the
Rossana Apuya cannot represent the complainant in this disbarment case because administration of justice.7 In Maturan v. Gonzales8 we further explained the
they were not duly authorized by the Board of Directors to file the complaint. rationale for the prohibition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Second, respondent claimed that he is not covered by the prohibition on conflict of The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which is
interest which applies only to the legal counsel of complainant. Respondent argued one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with all
that he merely served as the corporate secretary of complainant and did not serve the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak points
as its legal counsel. Third, respondent argued that there was no conflict of interest of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred
when he represented RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage because all the and guarded with care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the
documents and information related to the loan transaction between RBP and the client's secrets. A lawyer must have the fullest confidence of his client. For if the
complainant were public records. Thus, respondent claimed that he could not have confidence is abused, the profession will suffer by the loss thereof.
taken advantage of his position as the mere corporate secretary of the complainant. Meanwhile, in Hornilla v. Salunat,9 we explained the test to determine the existence
of conflict of interest:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
On February 14, 2013, the Investigating Commissioner issued a Report and There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
Recommendation2 finding respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests and more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
recommending that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for at least lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
one year. The Investigating Commissioner noted that respondent appeared for RBP client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
in the case for annulment of mortgage filed by his former client, the complainant when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
herein. The Investigating Commissioner cited cash vouchers3 from 1994 to 2001 confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
showing that respondent was paid by complainant for his retained legal services. confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if
According to the Investigating Commissioner, these vouchers debunk respondent's the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which
claim that the complainant merely appointed him as its corporate secretary. The will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client attorney to represent the adverse party. (Brown vs. Miller, 52 App. D. C. 330; 286, F.
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency 994.)
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or In order that a court may prevent an attorney from appearing against a former
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof. client, it is unnecessary that the court ascertain in detail the extent to which the
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations wherein a lawyer would former client's affairs might have a bearing on the matters involved in the
be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any of his present or subsequent litigation on the attorney's knowledge thereof. (Boyd vs. Second Judicial
former clients.10 It also applies when the lawyer represents a client against a former Dist. Court, 274 P., 7; 51 Nev., 264.)
client in a controversy that is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of
the previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client.11 This rule applies This rule has been so strictly enforced that it has been held that an attorney, on
regardless of the degree of adverse interests.12 What a lawyer owes his former terminating his employment, cannot thereafter act as counsel against his client in
client is to maintain inviolate the client's confidence or to refrain from doing the same general matter, even though, while acting for his former client, he
anything which will injuriously affect him in any matter in which he previously acquired no knowledge which could operate to his client's disadvantage in the
represented him.13 A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the subsequent adverse employment. (Pierce vs. Palmer [1910], 31 R. I., 432; 77 Atl.,
same or a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client 201, Ann. Cas., 1912S, 181.)
only if the former client consents to it after consultation.14chanrobleslaw Thus, the nature and extent of the information received by the lawyer from his client
is irrelevant in determining the existence of conflict of interest.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, we find that respondent represented
conflicting interests when he served as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of Finally, we agree with the Investigating Commissioner that a complaint for
mortgage filed by the complainant, respondent's former client, against RBP. disbarment is imbued with public interest which allows for a liberal rule on legal
standing. Under Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, "[proceedings for the
The finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent was compensated by disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme
complainant for his retained legal services is supported by the evidence on record, Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the
the cash vouchers from 1994 to 2001. Clearly, complainant was respondent's former verified complaint of any person." Thus, in the present case, we find that Marcel N.
client. And respondent appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by his former Lukban, Alberto I. Garcia Jr., and Ma. Pamela Rossana A. Apuya can institute the
client against RBP. This makes respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests complaint for disbarment even without authority from the Board of Directors of the
since respondent failed to show any written consent of all concerned (particularly complainant.
the complainant) given after a full disclosure of the facts representing conflicting
interests.15chanrobleslaw WHEREFORE, premises considered, Resolution No. XX-2013-770 and Resolution No.
XXI-2014-290 of the IBP Board of Governors imposing a penalty of suspension from
We also note that the respondent acted for the complainant's interest on the loan the practice of law for one year against respondent Atty. Jose D. Pajarillo are hereby
transaction between RBP and the complainant when he sent a letter dated May 14, AFFIRMED.
1999 to RBP to assure the latter of the financial capacity of the complainant to pay
the loan. But as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of mortgage, he clearly
acted against the interest of the complainant, his former client. SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Contrary to the respondent's claim, it is of no moment that all the documents and Velasco, Jr., J., Chairperson, Peralta, Perez,* and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
information in connection with the loan transaction between RBP and the
complainant were public records. In Hilado v. David,16 we laid down the following
doctrinal pronouncements:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary SECOND DIVISION
The principle which forbids an attorney who has been engaged to represent a client
from thereafter appearing on behalf of the client's opponent applies equally even A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015
though during the continuance of the employment nothing of a confidential nature
was revealed to the attorney by the client. (Christian vs. Waialua Agricultural Co., 30 JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, v. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent.
Hawaii, 553, Footnote 7, C. J. S., 828.)
DECISION
Where it appeared that an attorney, representing one party in litigation, had
formerly represented the adverse party with respect to the same matter involved in BRION, J.:
the litigation, the court need not inquire as to how much knowledge the attorney
acquired from his former client during that relationship, before refusing to permit the We review Resolution No. XX-2011-2641 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) in CBD Case No. 07-2069, which imposed on Atty. Paul
Centillas Zaide (Atty. Zaide) the penalty of one-year suspension from the practice of previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in
law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's
being commissioned as a notary public, for violation of the 2004 Rules on Notarial partners.15 On this basis, the respondent should not be held liable for representing
Practice (Notarial Practice Rules).2 conflicting clients' interests.

Finally, he denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in
The Case his pleadings.16

On August 8, 2007, complainant Joy A. Gimeno (Gimeno) filed a complaint3 with the The IBP Proceedings
IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a
notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive On October 4, 2007, the IBP CBD issued an order setting the case for mandatory
language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. conference.17 After this, both parties were required to submit their position papers.

In her complaint, Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's admission4 to the In his report and recommendation18 dated May 18, 2010, Commissioner Pedro A.
Bar and receipt5 of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for
partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002.6 She also accused Atty. violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using
Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers.7 abusive and insulting language in his pleadings.

Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former client. She engaged the He noted that Atty. Zaide violated Section 1 (a) and 1 (b), Rule VI of the Notarial
services of his law firm Zaragoza-Makabangkit-Zaide Law Offices (ZMZ) in an Practice Rules when he maintained several active notarial registers in different
annulment of title case that involved her husband and her parents-in-law. offices. These provisions respectively require a notary public to "keep, maintain,
protect and provide for lawful inspection, a chronological official register of notarial
Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered papers" and to "keep
her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 30198 that one Priscilla Somontan only one active notarial register at any given time."19
(Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno posited that by
appearing against a former client, Atty. Zaide violated the prohibition against the However, Commissioner Magpayo opined that Atty. Zaide should not be held
representation of conflicting clients' interests.9 administratively liable for usurping a notary public's office. The investigating
commissioner noted that the evidence presented on this issue is not enough to
Lastly, Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide called her a "notorious extortionist" in the prove that Atty. Zaide signed and notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial
same administrative complaint that Somontan filed against her.10 In another civil partition even after his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial
case where she was not a party, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide referred to his commission.20
opposing counsel as someone suffering from "serious mental incompetence" in one
of his pleadings.11 According to Gimeno, these statements constitute intemperate, Commissioner Magpayo also found that the evidence presented proved that Gimeno
offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his was indeed Atty. Zaide's former client. He disagreed with Atty. Zaide's defense that
dealings. Gimeno only hired ZMZ but did not personally hire him to defend them in their
annulment of title case. The retainer of a law firm is equivalent to the retainer of all
In his answer12 dated September 13, 2007, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not its lawyers.21 But despite this previous attorney-client relationship, the investigating
notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for representing
notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were conflicting interests since the annulment of title case is totally unrelated to the
superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who Ombudsman complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno through Atty. Zaide.
actually notarized this document.13 Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his
signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar. Finally, the investigating commissioner noted that Atty. Zaide used intemperate,
offensive, and abusive language when he called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist" in
On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he one of his pleadings.22
needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite
offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their For violating the Notarial Practice Rules, Commissioner Magpayo recommended that
growing number.14 This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his Atty. Zaide be suspended for three months, and for another six months for
notarial registers. employing abusive and insulting language.23

Further, Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not The IBP Board of Governors' Findings
personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he
In its November 19, 2011 resolution, the IBP Board of Governors (Board) opined that We can only conclude that his professional details, which were only generated after
the evidence on record fully supports the findings of the investigating commissioner. his Bar admission, were stamped on the March 29, 2002 document. How this
However, the Board modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the happened is not clear from the evidence before us.
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial
commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices
notary public.24
We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different
Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration25 of the Board's November 19, 2011 notarial registers in several offices. Because of this practice, the following notarized
resolution but this was also denied in its subsequent June 21, 2013 resolution.26 documents had been irregularly numbered and entered:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Court's Ruling Document27

Date
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended Doc. No.
penalty, and accordingly confirms them. Page
Book
For an orderly disposition of the case, we shall discuss each of the main issues that Year
the parties identified. Special Power of Attorney
6/20/05
Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules 273
55
a. Usurpation of a notarial office 18
2005
As the investigating commissioner found, Gimeno did not present any concrete Secretary's Certificate
evidence to show that Atty. Zaide notarized the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial 10/28/05
partition prior to his admission to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission. 226
46
It appears that this document originally carried the name of one Atty. Elpedio 18
Cabasan, as notary public. Atty. Zaide's signature and notarial stamp that bears his 2005
name, roll number,, PTR number, IBP number, and the expiration date of his notarial Affidavit of Quitclaim
commission, were merely superimposed over Atty. Cabasan's typewritten name. 10/31/05
272
Notably, Atty. Zaide admitted that the details stamped on the document are his true 55
information. However, he denied that he personally stamped and signed the 18
document. In fact, this document never appeared in his notarial register and was 2005
never included in his notarial report for the year 2002. He contended that Gimeno Affidavit of Loss
falsified his signature and used his notarial stamp to make it appear that he was the 4/17/06
one who notarized it. 54
11
This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. 25
Zaide's details as a lawyer and as a notary public had not yet existed. He was 2006
admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used Affidavit of Two Disinterested Persons
the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the 4/17/06
expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 310
29, 2002. 61
25
This circumstance, coupled with the absence of any evidence supporting Gimeno's 2006
claim such as a witness to the alleged fictitious notarization, leads us to the Petition for Issuance of Owner's Duplicate copy
conclusion that Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar 4/17/06
admission and receipt of his notarial commission. 72
15
25
2006
Affidavit of Parental Consent Atty. Zaide should have been acutely aware of the requirements of his notarial
4/19/06 commission. His flagrant violation of Section 1, Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules
461 is not merely a simple and excusable negligence. It amounts to a clear violation of
93 Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that "a lawyer
23 [should] uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
2006 law and legal processes."
Confirmation of Sale
4/21/06 Representing conflicting interests
283
56 The investigating commissioner properly noted that Atty. Zaide should not be held
25 liable for representing conflicting clients' interests.
2006
Deed of Absolute Sale Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
4/27/06 provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
304 Rule 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
60 consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
25 In Aninon v. Sabitsana,31 the Court laid down the tests to determine if a lawyer is
2006 guilty of representing conflicting interests between and among his clients.
Section l(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall
keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite
bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that duty.32
public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time."28 On this
basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use
a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI. against a former client any confidential information acquired through their
connection or previous employment.33
The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one
active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared
The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from against Gimeno, his former law firm's client.
assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who
perform notarial services on his behalf. The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty.
Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an
Since a notarial commission is personal to each lawyer, the notary public must also entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint
personally administer the notarial acts29 that the law authorizes him to execute. that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman.
This important duty is vested with public interest. Thus, no other person, other than
the notary public, should perform it. The prior case where Gimeno hired ZMZ and where Atty. Zaide represented her
family pertained to the annulment of a land title. Somontan was never a party to this
On the other hand, entries in a notarial register need to be in chronological case since this only involved Gimeno's relatives. On the other hand, the case where
sequence in order to address and prevent the rampant practice of leaving blank Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno involved Somontan's Ombudsman complaint
spaces in the notarial register to allow the antedating of notarizations. against Gimeno for her alleged mishandling of the funds that Somontan entrusted to
her, and for Gimeno's alleged corruption as an examiner in the Register of Deeds of
In these lights, we cannot accept Atty. Zaide's explanation that he needed to Iligan City. Clearly, the annulment of title case and the Ombudsman case are totally
maintain several active notarial registers in separate offices so he could unrelated.
accommodate the increasing number of his clients requiring his notarial services.
There was also no double-dealing on the part of Atty. Zaide because at the time
This Court stresses that a notary public should not trivialize his functions as his Somontan engaged his services, he had already left ZMZ. More importantly, nothing
powers and duties are impressed with public interest.30 A notary public's office is in the record shows that Atty. Zaide used against Gimeno any confidential
not merely an income-generating venture. It is a public duty that each lawyer who information which he acquired while he was still their counsel in the annulment of
has been privileged to receive a notarial commission must faithfully and title case.
conscientiously perform.
Under these circumstances, Atty. Zaide should not be held liable for violating the DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of two (2)
prohibition against the representation of conflicting interests. years. He is also SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.

Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The prohibition on the use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in a Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.
lawyer's professional dealings, whether with the courts, his clients, or any other
person, is based on the following canons and rules of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary FIRST DIVISION
Canon 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward
his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing A.C. No. 10567, February 25, 2015
counsel.
WILFREDO ANGLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSE MA. V. VALENCIA, ATTY. JOSE MA. J.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is CIOCON, ATTY. PHILIP Z. DABAO, ATTY. LILY UY- VALENCIA, ATTY. JOEY P. DE LA PAZ,
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. ATTY. CRIS G. DIONELA, ATTY. RAYMUNDO T. PANDAN, JR.,* ATTY. RODNEY K. RUBICA,"
AND ATTY. WILFRED RAMON M. PENALOSA, Respondents.
Canon 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. DECISION

Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
or behavior before the Courts. (emphasis supplied)
As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide, in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman This is an administrative case stemming from a complaint-affidavit1 dated
case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist."34 And in another case, Gimeno December 4, 2009 filed by complainant Wilfredo Anglo (complainant) charging
observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia (Atty. Valencia), Jose Ma. J. Ciocon (Atty.
in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Ciocon), Philip Z. Dabao (Atty. Dabao), Lily Uy-Valencia (Atty. Uy-Valencia), Joey P. De
Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in La Paz (Atty. De La Paz), Cris G. Dionela (Atty. Dionela), Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr.
the whole Justice System, and the Department of Justice in particular, where the (Atty. Pandan, Jr.), Rodney K. Rubica (Atty. Rubica), and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa
taxpayers paid for her salary over her incompetence and poor performance as a (Atty. Pefialosa; collectively, respondents) of violating the Code of Professional
prosecutor... This is a clear manifestation that the Public prosecutor suffers serious Responsibility (CPR), specifically the rule against conflict of interest.
mental incompetence as regard her mandate as an Assistant City Prosecutor.35
(emphasis supplied)
This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words The Facts
a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court.
In his complaint-affidavit, complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law
While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such firm Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office
enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language (law firm), of which Attys. Valencia, Ciocon, Dabao, Uy-Valencia, De La Paz, Dionela,
abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, Pandan, Jr., and Rubica were partners, for two (2) consolidated labor cases2 where
convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive.36 he was impleaded as respondent. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent complainant. The labor cases were terminated on June 5, 2008
On many occasions, the Court has reminded the members of the Bar to abstain from upon the agreement of both parties.3cralawred
any offensive personality and to refrain from any act prejudicial to the honor or
reputation of a party or a witness. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, On September 18, 2009, a criminal case4 for qualified theft was filed against
a lawyer's language even in his pleadings, must be dignified.37 complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms Agricultural Corporation (FEVE Farms)
acting through a certain Michael Villacorta (Villacorta). Villacorta, however, was
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommended represented by the law firm, the same law office which handled complainant's labor
penalty of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Paul cases. Aggrieved, complainant filed this disbarment case against respondents,
Centillas Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and alleging that they violated Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR,5 to
for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. His
notarial commission, if existing, is hereby REVOKED, and he is declared CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.chanrobleslaw
 attorney-client relation provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
xxxx adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client.15cralawred

RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written In a Resolution16 dated February 12, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.chanrobleslaw approved the IBP Commissioner's Report and Recommendation with modification.
Instead of the penalty of reprimand, the IBP Board of Governors dismissed the case
xxxx with warning that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more
severely.
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration17 thereof, which the IBP Board of
TERMINATED.cralawlawlibrary Governors granted in its Resolution18 dated March 23, 2014 and thereby (a) set
aside its February 12, 2013 Resolution and (b) adopted and approved the IBP
In their defense,6 respondents admitted that they indeed operated under the name Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, with modification, (1) reprimanding
Valencia Ciocon Dabao Valencia De La Paz Dionela Pandan Rubica Law Office, but the respondents for violation of the rule on conflict of interest; (2) dismissing the
explained that their association is not a formal partnership, but one that is subject to case against Atty. Dabao in view of his death; and (3) suspending Atty. Dionela from
certain "arrangements." According to them, each lawyer contributes a fixed amount the practice of law for one year, being the handling counsel of complainant's labor
every month for the maintenance of the entire office; and expenses for cases, such cases.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
as transportation, copying, printing, mailing, and the like are shouldered by each
lawyer separately, allowing each lawyer to fix and receive his own professional fees The Issue Before the Court
exclusively.7 As such, the lawyers do not discuss their clientele with the other
lawyers and associates, unless they agree that a case be handled collaboratively. The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondents are guilty of
Respondents claim that this has been the practice of the law firm since its inception. representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of the
They averred that complainant's labor cases were solely and exclusively handled by CPR.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Atty. Dionela and not by the entire law firm. Moreover, respondents asserted that the
qualified theft case filed by FEVE Farms was handled by Atty. Penalosa, a new The Court's Ruling
associate who had no knowledge of complainant's labor cases, as he started working
for the firm after the termination thereof.8cralawred Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR provide:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Meanwhile, Atty. Dionela confirmed that he indeed handled complainant's labor CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL HIS
cases but averred that it was terminated on June 13, 2008,9 and that complainant DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.chanrobleslaw
did not have any monthly retainer contract.10 He likewise explained that he did not
see the need to discuss complainant's labor cases with the other lawyers as the xxxx
issue involved was very simple,11 and that the latter did not confide any secret
during the time the labor cases were pending that would have been used in the RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
criminal case with FEVE Farms. He also claimed that the other lawyers were not consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.chanrobleslaw
aware of the details of complainant's labor cases nor did they know that he was the
handling counsel for complainant even after the said cases were closed and xxxx
terminated.12cralawred
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCES AND SECRETS OF HIS
The IBP's Report and Recommendation CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP IS
TERMINATED.cralawlawlibrary
In a Report and Recommendation13 dated September 26, 2011, the IBP
Commissioner found respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and In Hornilla v. Atty. Salunat,19 the Court explained the concept of conflict of interest
recommended that they be reprimanded therefor, with the exception of Atty. Dabao, in this wise:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
who had died on January 17, 2010.14cralawred
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or
The IBP found that complainant was indeed represented in the labor cases by the more opposing parties. The test is "whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the
respondents acting together as a law firm and not solely by Atty. Dionela. lawyer's duty to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other
Consequently, there was a conflict of interest in this case, as respondents, through client. In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him
Atty. Penalosa, having been retained by FEVE Farms, created a connection that when he argues for the other client." This rule covers not only cases in which
would injure complainant in the qualified theft case. Moreover, the termination of confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests if WHEREFORE, respondents Attys. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Lily Uy-
the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act which Valencia, Joey P. De La Paz, Cris G. Dionela, Raymundo T. Pandan, Jr., Rodney K.
will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents him and Rubica, and Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa are found GUILTY of representing conflicting
also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against his first client interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the Code of
any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test of the inconsistency Professional Responsibility and are therefore REPRIMANDED for said violations, with
of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt
from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is DISMISSED in
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance view of his death.
thereof.20cralawred
cralawlawlibrary Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents' personal records as attorneys. Further, let copies of this
As such, a lawyer is prohibited from representing new clients whose interests oppose Resolution be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the
those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they are parties in the same Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country
action or on totally unrelated cases. The prohibition is founded on the principles of for their information and guidance.
public policy and good taste.21cralawred
SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
In this case, the Court concurs with the IBP's conclusions that respondents
represented conflicting interests and must therefore be held liable. As the records Sereno, C.J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.
bear out, respondents' law firm was engaged and, thus, represented complainant in
the labor cases instituted against him. However, after the termination thereof, the
law firm agreed to represent a new client, FEVE Farms, in the filing of a criminal case SECOND DIVISION
for qualified theft against complainant, its former client, and his wife. As the Court
observes, the law firm's unethical acceptance of the criminal case arose from its A.C. No. 10548, December 10, 2014
failure to organize and implement a system by which it would have been able to
keep track of all cases assigned to its handling lawyers to the end of, among others, CAROLINE CASTAEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO,
ensuring that every engagement it accepts stands clear of any potential conflict of Respondent.
interest. As an organization of individual lawyers which, albeit engaged as a
collective, assigns legal work to a corresponding handling lawyer, it behooves the DECISION
law firm to value coordination in deference to the conflict of interest rule. This lack of
coordination, as respondents' law firm exhibited in this case, intolerably renders its MENDOZA, J.:
clients' secrets vulnerable to undue and even adverse exposure, eroding in the
balance the lawyer-client relationship's primordial ideal of unimpaired trust and This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of
confidence. Had such system been institutionalized, all of its members, Atty. Dionela Governors (IBP-BOG), dated January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and
included, would have been wary of the above-mentioned conflict, thereby impelling approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) which found Atty.
the firm to decline FEVE Farms' subsequent engagement. Thus, for this shortcoming, Edgar B. Francisco (Atty. Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of
herein respondents, as the charged members of the law firm, ought to be the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of
administratively sanctioned. Note that the Court finds no sufficient reason as to why suspension of one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Dionela should suffer the greater penalty of suspension. As the Court sees it, all
respondents stand in equal fault for the law firm's deficient organization for which On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007,3 filed by
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR had been violated. As such, all of Caroline Castaeda Jimenez (complainant) against Atty. Francisco for multiple
them are meted with the same penalty of reprimand, with a stern warning that a violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed his Answer.4 On June
repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with more severely. 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for
Atty. Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability is not complainant was returned with the notation unknown at the given address. No
altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long been new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties were required to submit
terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no justification their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his
for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with that of the former Answer.
client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be divested by mere
expiration of professional employment.22cralawred The Antecedents
Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for
estafa against complainant, her sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means,
Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel Gonzalez.5 The complainant and her co-respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for
said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor sale sometime in August 2004. The said property was eventually sold to Philmetro
of Makati City. Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro) for the amount of P118,000,000.00 without
shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development Corporation (Clarion), which was Jimenezs knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at P78,000.000.00 per the
incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located in deed of sale. Atty. Francisco relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received
Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he handed all the proceeds
stockholders of Clarion were as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Thomas K. Chua - P500,000.00
Teresita C. Alsua - P500,000.00 Jimenezs complaint for estafa was based on complainants alleged participation in
Myla Villanueva - P249,998.00 the fraudulent means in selling the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion
Edgar B. Francisco - P1.00 with Jimenezs money. Complainant was duty-bound to remit all the proceeds of the
Soledad Gamat - P1.00 sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-
Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarions Articles of Incorporation, the above- respondents, however, misappropriated and converted the funds for their personal
named stockholders, except for Myla Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of use and benefit.
assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then
Jimenezs common-law partner. Clarions total capitalization was only P5,000,000.00. In support of Jimenezs complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit
Thus, in order to achieve its purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion reiterating its factual averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the
simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of P80,750,000.00. Thereafter, following claims and admissions, among other things, of Atty.
Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of P117,000,000.00 from Francisco:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the
was funded entirely by Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of documentation of the sale of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco
sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property was purchased for asked her if she had secured permission from Mark Jimenez and complainant
P78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not answered in the affirmative.
reflected in the books of Clarion.
The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to sale of the property.
Jimenez by virtue of a deed of trust. On the other hand, Mylas 249,997 shares were
transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment. The remaining one (1) For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco
share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Del Monte branch. When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount
Clarions General Information Sheet (GIS) filed with the Securities and Exchange and handed the same to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.
Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the subscribed shares of Clarion were as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes,
Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00 however, were paid.
Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00
Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00 When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale
Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00 of the Forbes property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the
Soledad Gamat - P 1.00 sale had already been farmed out to different corporations established by
On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another complainant and her sister.
deed of assignment, making her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to
P1,249,997.00. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the
money of Mark Jimenez.
According to Jimenezs complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in The Complaint
2004, he learned from Atty. Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel),
approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the United States Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) was about to go after their properties. Marcel filed by Jimenez against her. She felt even more betrayed when she read the
succeeded in persuading complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer and Clarions
Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment. Again, this was reflected in corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary
Clarions GIS for the year 2004. case against Atty. Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her,
she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco regarding the legal implications of
Clarions transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
sale and transfer of Clarions property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. and legal counsel of Clarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he
Francisco or the members of his law office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively served no conflicting interests because it was not a former client and a
participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes property. Without subsequent client who were the opposing parties in litigation.
admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its
execution clearly betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on
For this reason, complainant prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Francisco. privileged communication does not apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to
allege, much less prove, the requisites for the application of the privilege. When Atty.
The Respondents Position Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by
clear and convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed
In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in between them. Complainant failed to do this.
1998 for the incorporation of Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential
house in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-time partner, the Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful
complainant; that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their narration of facts by a witness, Atty. Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Caete,9 where the
respective shares in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership Court ruled that the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant had been
of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to Jimenezs orders; and that as the formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his
corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal testimony. In this case, he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in
documentation to give effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez as a client. This was likewise
the Forbes property. pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not
covered by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of
Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the complainant.
United States for excessive contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this
time, Jimenezs son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him again to change the The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner
ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenezs properties
in a tax evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in In the Commissioners Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating
accordance with Jimenezs wishes; and that as a result, almost 100% of Clarions Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama, Jr. (Investigating Commissioner), found Atty.
ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that he be suspended for
one (1) year from the practice of law.
Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to
prospective buyers and to negotiate the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the subsequent affidavit of
for P118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe that Jimenez desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation
had knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all conducted by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises
these representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned to the or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on the claims of the parties, the
Philippines and discovered that the proceeds of the sale were coursed through other Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would show that a
corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez likewise learned of lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.11 The
the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the circumstances would show that Atty. Francisco was an original incorporator and
members of his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate secretary of the
complainant and the others. As a witness to the fraud committed against Jimenez, said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an
Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances original incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired
surrounding the said transactions. shares from Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua. Jimenezs participation in Clarion
affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares in favor of
Atty. Francisco mainly argued that he violated neither the rule on disclosures of complainant.
privileged communication nor the proscription against representing conflicting
interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the lawyer of Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco,
Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might the report stated that it would appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations
have assisted her in some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez as to Clarions ownership to be reported to the SEC through its GIS. The Investigating
had given him authority to do so. Further, though he acted as legal counsel for Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Franciscos clear admission that the transfer of
Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as shares within Clarion were without any consideration, ran counter to the deeds of
a corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he assignment that he again admittedly executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty.
admitted that the legal documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the consideration of
Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by the members of his law firm, the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest,
immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he
executed the affidavit containing allegations against the interest of Clarion and The Courts Ruling
complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated the
rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted Violations of Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR and the Lawyers Oath
representation of conflicting interests in violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.
Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the CANON 1 A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE
findings and recommendation of the CBD against Atty. Francisco. LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved Rule 1.0 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
for its reconsideration.13 conduct.
Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal
Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the processes. To the best of his ability, a lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the
penalty of suspension of one (1) year is too severe considering that in his more than law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A lawyers personal
three decades of practice, he had never been involved in any act that would warrant deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and
the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, obedience to the law, on the part of the public. Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states
Jimenez, experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.
that he experienced a major upheaval in his professional life. He apologized for his
not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez. Any act or omission that is contrary to, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in
defiance of, disobedient to, or disregards the law is unlawful. Unlawful conduct
As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although the concept is broad
execution of the documents pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all enough to include such element.16 To be dishonest means the disposition to lie,
connected to his capacity as Clarions corporate secretary and legal counsel, not to cheat, deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty,
mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity probity, integrity in principle, fairness and straightforwardness17 while conduct that
to Clarion and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and is deceitful means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation,
shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when complainant sought advice in her capacity as a artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the
shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own words, Atty. prejudice and damage of the party imposed upon.18
Francisco insisted that Carol is not Clarion and vice versa.14
Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only
Attached to Atty. Franciscos motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by learned in law, but also known to possess good moral character. Lawyers should act
Jimenez, stating that he had retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in
Espousing Atty. Franciscos defenses, Jimenez asserted that Atty. Franciscos law firm order to promote the publics faith in the legal profession.19 To say that lawyers
was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines. He directed Atty. must at all times uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these statement can never be overemphasized. Considering that, of all classes and
companies, including Clarion. These documents were in the possession of professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative
complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001, Atty. Francisco that they live by the law.20
personally assisted him in the filing of his certificate of candidacy and the
proceedings before the electoral tribunals. While he was in prison in the United When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to obey the
States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his children, Myla and laws, do no falsehood, and conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of
Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, his knowledge and discretion.21
Inc., without his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his
childrens betrayal and to wait until he could go home. When he filed the criminal In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to
committed crimes against him were now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently,
Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing his duties as a lawyer. its corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the
deeds of assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity,
In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondents motion for feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were
reconsideration. done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit
upon the alleged orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in
No petition for review was filed with the Court. pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as
corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, [a] lawyer shall not represent
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
law and the rules enforced by the SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his disclosure of the facts.24 The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client
duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the
advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion clients most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange
and to have undervalued the consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government of taxes. confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer
Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe
infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons involved. candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with the client. Part
of the lawyers duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests25
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenezs wishes, or pursuant to Thus, even if lucrative fees offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must
complainants misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. decline professional employment if the same would trigger a violation of the
Franciscos act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to prohibition against conflict of interest.
be embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice
for the specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients flawed In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict
scheming and machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and of interest in this wise:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the court. In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in
behalf of one client, it is their duty to contend for that which duty to another client
Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have particularized various
their clients should never be attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a tests to determine whether a lawyers conduct lies within this proscription. One test
lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full devotion to his genuine is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client
interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyers
exertion of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the
the law. It needs to be emphasized that the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be other client, there is a violation of the rule.
pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and must be held within the bounds of
reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided fidelity
intentions.22 and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called
In the same vein, Atty. Franciscos admissions show that he lacks candor regarding upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information
his dealings. Canon 10 of the CPR provides that, [a] lawyer owes candor, fairness acquired through their connection or previous employment.
and good faith to the court. Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the CPR provides that a
lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation
mislead or allow the Court to be misled by an artifice. Lawyers are officers of the where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
court, called upon to assist in the administration of justice. They act as vanguards of action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for
our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule of law. They are one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court.23 would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that
From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
in the CPR, namely, to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyers respective retainers with each of
and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, Atty. them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a
doing of the same. lawyer-client relationship. The purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary
nature of the ties between an attorney and his client. Conversely, a lawyer may not
Rule on Conflicting Interests and Disclosure of Privileged Communication be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict
of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the
With respect to Atty. Franciscos alleged representation of conflicting interests and first place.
disclosure of privileged communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the
IBP-BOG.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of for Clarion and Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Franciscos indiscretion does not
interests, a scrutiny of the parties submissions with the IBP reveals that the detract the Court from finding that the totality of evidence presented by the
complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco. complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco
was her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the
First, complainants claim of being Atty. Franciscos client remains unsubstantiated, affirmation presented, of Jimenez. Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish
considering its detailed refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of interests.
Francisco was Clarions legal counsel and that complainant sought advice and
requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v.
property. This was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the factors essential to establish the existence of
the documents pertaining to the transaction and that he was retained as legal the said privilege, viz:
counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly
engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and In fine, the factors are as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
how she communicated with the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With (1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client
the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer made by Atty. Francisco, relationship, and it is by reason of this relationship that the client made the
accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and communication.
Clarion, would have to prevail.
Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on
Second, there is a stark disparity in the amount of narrative details presented by the privileged communication even if the prospective client does not thereafter retain
parties. Atty. Franciscos claim that he was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this is to make the
not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn statement executed by prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear
Jimenez himself. Complainants evidence pales in comparison with her claims of that what he tells the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer
being the client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity to be equally free to obtain information from the prospective client.
of circumstances.
xxx
Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty.
Franciscos answer. This could have given her opportunity to present evidence (2) The client made the communication in confidence.
showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during the
mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of
address on record. Her participation in the investigation of the case apparently confidentiality. The client must intend the communication to be confidential.
ended at its filing.
A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of
In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of disclosure between attorney and client in confidence and by means which, so far as
innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person other than one
allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence. Preponderance of evidence reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment
means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has of the purpose for which it was given.
greater weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to
the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise
Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is preponderance of agreement prepared by a lawyer pursuant to the instruction of his client and
evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement, or a
of the case; (b) the witnesses manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not
and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the privileged communications, the element of confidentiality not being present.
facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as (3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.
the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses,
although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the greater The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere
number.27 information, but for the purpose of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his
rights or obligations. The communication must have been transmitted by a client to
Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.
among the members of Jimenezs family by taking an upfront and candid stance in
dealing with Jimenezs children and complainant. He could have been staunch in
reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel
If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1
legal advice, the privilege does not attach to a communication disclosed for such and 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from
purpose. the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon receipt of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense
[Emphases supplied] in the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and
failed to establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The furnished to the Office of the Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
records are further bereft of any indication that the advice regarding the sale of Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines, for their
the Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a information and guidance.
demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this
complaint alleged in her complainant was that she sought legal advice from Decision so that the Court can determine the reckoning point when his suspension
respondent in various occasions.29 Considering that complainant failed to attend shall take effect.
the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential
information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, SO ORDERED.
difficult, if not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on
privileged communication. As held in Mercado, such confidential information is a Peralta,*Del Castillo, (Acting Chairperson), Villarama, Jr.,** and Leonen, JJ., concur.
crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication between
attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30
It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the SECOND DIVISION
privilege applies, failed in this regard.
A.C. No. 4763 - March 20, 2003
The Penalty
DR. GIL Y. GAMILLA, NORMA S. CALAGUAS, IRMA E. POTENCIANO, EDITHA OCAMPO,
A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office LUZ DE GUZMAN, GLICERIA BALDRES, FERDINAND LIMOS, MA. LOURDES C. MEDINA,
as an attorney, for violating of the lawyers oath and/or for breaching the ethics of HIDELITA GABO, CORAZON CUI, REMEDIOS T. GARCIA, RENE ARNEJO, RENE LUIS
the legal profession as embodied in the CPR,31 for the practice of law is a TADLE, LAURA ABARA, PHILIP AGUINALDO, BENEDICTA ALAVA, LEONCIO CASAL,
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those CARMELITA ESPINA, ZENAIDA FAMORCA, CELSO NIERA, CESAR REYES, NATIVIDAD
who are qualified and who possess good moral character.32 The appropriate penalty SANTOS and MAFEL YSRAEL, complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO J. MARIO JR.,
on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on Respondent.
the surrounding facts.33
BELLOSILLO, J.:
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may
be disbarred or suspended on any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) THIS DISBARMENT CASE EMANATED from an intra-union leadership dispute some
malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral conduct; (4) seventeen (17) years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money entrusted by
willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. as president of
appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A lawyer may be disbarred the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and directors for distribution among
or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which faculty members of the university.1
shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor,
or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court. For a sense of history, sometime in 1986 respondent Atty. Mario Jr. as president of
the UST Faculty Union and other union officers entered into a collective bargaining
While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of agreement with the management of UST for the provision of economic benefits
privileged communication, the acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively amounting to P35 million. Instead of creating a harmonious relationship between the
allowing Clarion to make untruthful representations to the SEC and in other public contracting parties, the collective bargaining agreement regrettably engendered
documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as disputes arising from the interpretation and implementation thereof one of which
attorney, for which a suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is even reached this Court.2
warranted.
The 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired in 1988 but efforts to forge a new
one unfortunately failed. In 1989 the faculty members of UST went on strike and as
a counter-measure UST terminated the employment of sixteen (16) officers and (d) P3,578,348.35 for reimbursements to the University of Santo Tomas. The
directors of the UST Faculty Union including respondent. The dismissal precipitated expenses left a balance of P5,050,140.13, i.e., the remainder of P1,315,301.10 out of
anew bitter legal battles which were resolved by this Court in favor of the dismissed the P18,038,939.37 earlier turned over by UST to the UST Faculty Union, plus the
employees by ordering their reinstatement with back wages.3 deficit amount of P3,734,839.03 which UST later turned over to the UST Faculty
Union after previously failing to deliver the amount. To the sum of P5,050,140.13,
In 1990 Secretary of Labor Ruben D. Torres prescribed the terms and conditions of a the UST Faculty Union added the interest earnings of P1,146,381.27 from money
five (5)-year collective bargaining agreement between UST and the UST Faculty market investments as well as the amount of P192,632.64 representing the
Union retroactive to 1988 when the 1986 collective bargaining agreement expired. disallowed amount of expenses earlier deducted by UST from the P42,000,000.00
In the same year, the administration of UST and the UST Faculty Union also entered package. All in all, the money left in the possession of the UST Faculty Union was
into a compromise agreement for the payment of P7,000,000.00 from which P6,389,154.04 which it distributed among the faculty members in 1994.
P5,000,000.00 was intended to settle the back wages and other claims of the
sixteen (16) union officers and directors of the UST Faculty Union, including herein Complainants as members of the UST Faculty Union questioned the alleged lack of
respondent, who were earlier ordered reinstated by this Court, and the sum of transparency among the officers and directors of the union in the management and
P2,000,000.00 to satisfy the remaining obligations of UST under the 1986 collective disbursement of the monetary benefits for the faculty members. They initiated two
bargaining agreement. It appears from the record that only P5,000,000.00 for the (2) complaints with the Office of the Regional Director, National Capital Region,
back wages and other claims of respondent Atty. Mario and other concerned union Department of Labor and Employment, one on 18 October 1995, docketed as Case
officers and directors was paid immediately by UST while the satisfaction of the No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022, and another, on 16 November 1996, docketed as Case No.
balance of P2,000,000.00 was apparently deferred to some unspecified time. NCR-OD-M-9510-028. In both pleadings, they prayed for the expulsion of the officers
and directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their alleged
In 1992 UST and the UST Faculty Union executed a memorandum of agreement to failure to account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 ceded to them by UST and
settle the salary increases and other benefits under the collective bargaining the attorney's fees amounting to P4,200,000.00 which they deducted from the
agreement effective 1988 for the period 1 June 1991 to 31 May 1993 for a total of benefits allotted to faculty members.4
P42,000,000.00. It was agreed that the benefits accruing from 1 June 1991 to 31
October 1992 were to be taken from the sum of P42,000,000.00 which UST would On 2 July 1997 complainants filed the instant complaint for disbarment against Atty.
release directly to the faculty members, while the remainder of the P42,000,000.00 Mario accusing him of (a) compromising their entitlements under the 1986
package would be ceded by UST to the UST Faculty Union which would then disburse collective bargaining agreement without the knowledge, consent or ratification of
the balance to cover the benefits from 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993. The the union members, and worse, for only P2,000,000.00 when they could have
memorandum of agreement also charged the amount of P2,000,000.00 agreed upon received more than P9,000,000.00; (b) failing to account for the P7,000,000.00
in the 1990 compromise agreement as well as the attorney's fees of Atty. Mario received by him and other officers and directors in the UST Faculty Union under the
worth P4,200,000.00 against the P42,000,000.00 outlay. 1990 compromise agreement; (c) lack of transparency in the administration and
distribution of the remaining balance of the P42,000,000.00 package under the 1992
In accordance with the memorandum of agreement, UST took care of the memorandum of agreement; (d) refusal to remit and account for the P4,200,000.00
disbursement of P20,226,221.60 from the total commitment of P42,000,000.00 to in favor of the faculty members although the amount was denominated as attorney's
pay for the following expenses: (a) P2,000,000.00 as payment for unpaid obligations fees. Complainants asserted that respondent violated Rules 1.015 and 1.026 of
to faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement; (b) Canon 1; Rule 15.087 of Canon 15; Rules 16.01,8 16.029 and 16.0310 of Canon 16;
P13,833,597.96 for the salary increases of faculty members from 1 June 1991 to 31 and Rule 20.0411 of Canon 20, of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
October 1992; (c) P192,623.64 for telephone, electricity and water billings; and, (d)
P4,200,000.00 paid to the UST Faculty Union as attorney's fees. The expenses left a On 4 November 1997, after several extensions Atty. Mario filed his comment on the
collectible sum of P21,773,778.40 from the obligation of P42,000,000.00. The complaint. He alleged that the issues raised therein were the same issues involved
university however relinquished only P18,038,939.37 to the UST Faculty Union which in the two (2) complaints before the Bureau of Labor Relations and therefore
was P3,734,839.03 short of the balance of P21,773,778.40. In the meantime, the constituted forum-shopping, and further explained that he had adequately
UST Faculty Union placed P9,766,570.01 of the amount received from UST in the accounted for the disbursement of the money demanded by complainants.
money market to earn as it did make P1,146,381.27 in interest.
On 18 March 1998 we referred the disbarment complaint and the comment thereon
For benefits corresponding to 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993, the UST Faculty to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation
Union charged against the short-changed amount of P18,038,939.37 a total of within ninety (90) days from notice thereof.
P16,723,638.27 consisting of the following expenses: (a) P10,521,800.64 as the
amount paid for salary increases beginning 1 November 1992 to 31 May 1993; (b) On 18 May 1999 we received the Report of IBP Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro as
P578,296.31 which was refunded to the faculty members whose salaries were well as the Resolution of 30 March 1999 of the IBP Board of Governors adopting and
reduced as a result of their participation in the 1989 strike; (c) P2,045,192.97 as approving the Report which found the complaint meritorious and suspended
amount paid to the faculty members representing their December 1992 bonus; and, respondent Atty. Mario from the practice of law "until such time that the required
detailed accounting of the questioned remittances made by UST to the UST [Faculty agreement and the P4,200,000.00 attorney's fees under the memorandum of
Union] during his incumbency as President and Legal Counsel has been officially agreement. Although the record shows that the Bureau of Labor Relations found
submitted and reported to the UST [Faculty Union] and to the IBP." respondent as having adequately accounted for the disbursement of the funds which
the UST Faculty Union received through the series of agreements with the
On 7 September 1999 respondent filed his comment on the IBP Report and management of UST, this Court believes that Atty. Mario failed to avoid conflict of
Resolution and alleged the same contentions he previously asserted. On 27 October interests, first, when he negotiated for the compromise agreement wherein he
1999 we referred the case back to the IBP for a more detailed investigation and played the diverse roles of union president, union attorney and interested party
submission of report and recommendation within sixty (60) days from notice. being one of the dismissed employees seeking his own restitution, and thereafter,
when he obtained the attorney's fees of P4,200,000.00 without full prior disclosure
In the meantime, or on 27 May 1999, the Regional Director found merit in the two of the circumstances justifying such claim to the members of the UST Faculty Union.
(2) complaints docketed as Case No. NCR-OD-M-9412-022 and Case No. NCR-OD-M-
9510-028 and ordered the expulsion of respondent and the other officers and As one of the sixteen (16) union officers and directors seeking compensation from
directors of the union led by respondent Atty. Mario because of their failure to the University of Santo Tomas for their illegal dismissal, respondent was involved in
account for the balance of the P42,000,000.00 that had been delivered to them by obvious conflict of interests when in addition he chose to act as concurrent lawyer
the management of UST, and their collection of exorbitant and illegal attorney's fees and president of the UST Faculty Union in forging the compromise agreement. The
amounting to P4,200,000.00.12 test of conflict of interest among lawyers is "whether the acceptance of a new
relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing
On 9 March 2000 the Bureau of Labor Relations in the appeal docketed as BLR-A-TR- in the performance thereof."15 In the same manner, it is undoubtedly a conflict of
52-25-10-99 set aside the Order of the Regional Director. It found that the balance of interests for an attorney to put himself in a position where self-interest tempts, or
the P42,000,000.00 which UST delivered to the UST Faculty Union had been fully and worse, actually impels him to do less than his best for his client.
adequately accounted for by respondent and the other officers and directors of the
union.13 Nonetheless, the Bureau of Labor Relations ordered respondent and the Thus it has been held that an attorney or any other person occupying fiduciary
other officers and directors of the union to distribute the attorney's fees of relations respecting property or persons is utterly disabled from acquiring for his
P4,200,000.00 among the faculty members and to immediately hold the elections own benefit the property committed to his custody for management.16 This rule is
for union officers and directors in view of the expiration of their respective terms of entirely independent of whether fraud has intervened as in fact no fraud need be
office. shown; no excuse will be heard from an attorney because the rule stands on the
moral obligation to refrain from placing oneself in positions that ordinarily excite
On 16 March 2001 the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations was affirmed in toto conflict between self-interest and integrity.
by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 60657.14 The Decision of the Court of
Appeals was elevated to this Court, docketed G.R. No. 149763, where the case is Necessarily, a lawyer cannot continue representing a client in an action or any
allegedly still pending resolution. proceeding against a party even with the client's consent after the lawyer brings suit
in his own behalf against the same defendant if it is uncertain whether the
On 25 September 2002 we received the detailed Report and Recommendation of IBP defendant will be able to satisfy both judgments.17 No doubt, a lawyer is not
Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro and the IBP Resolution of 3 August 2002 of the Board authorized to have financial stakes in the subject matter of the suit brought in behalf
of Governors adopting and approving the Report which recommended the lifting of of his client.18
Atty. Mario's suspension from law practice since he had sufficiently accounted for
the funds in question. In the instant case, quite apart from the issue of validity of the 1990 compromise
agreement, this Court finds fault in respondent's omission of that basic sense of
For a start, it appears that complainants did not file a petition with this Court to fidelity to steer clear of situations that put his loyalty and devotion to his client, the
review the IBP Resolution exonerating respondent from the accusations against him faculty members of UST, open to question. Atty. Mario both as lawyer and president
and lifting his suspension from the practice of law, an action otherwise required of the union was duty bound to protect and advance the interest of union members
under Sec. 12, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court if the case against respondent could and the bargaining unit above his own. This obligation was jeopardized when his
still proceed in this Court. Nevertheless since the IBP Resolution is merely personal interest as one of the dismissed employees of UST complicated the
recommendatory, and considering further the instructional value of this case to negotiation process and eventually resulted in the lopsided compromise agreement
members of the Bench, many of whom are engaged simultaneously in other that rightly or wrongly brought money to him and the other dismissed union officers
businesses or professions, we find it prudent and judicious to decide the instant case and directors, seemingly or otherwise at the expense of the faculty members.
once and for all.
The facts would affirm this observation. In brokering the compromise agreement,
In fine, there are ethical lapses on the part of respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. respondent received P5,000,000.00 as compensation for the dismissed union
in the manner by which he secured the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise officials while only P2,000,000.00 apparently settled UST's obligations in favor of the
faculty members under the 1986 collective bargaining agreement when their of justice so they are without doubt expected to have a bigger dose of service-
original claim amounted to at least P9,000,000.00. Worse, the P2,000,000.00 oriented conscience and a little less of self-interest.
concession for accountabilities demandable long ago in 1986 was paid only in 1992
under the memorandum of agreement, or a period of more than two (2) years after As indispensable part of the system of administering justice, attorneys must comply
the execution of the compromise agreement, in contrast to the immediate payment strictly with the oath of office and the canons of professional ethics - a duty more
of the P5,000,000.00 to Atty. Mario and the other union officers and directors. than imperative during these critical times when strong and disturbing criticisms are
hurled at the practice of law. The process of imbibing ethical standards can begin
Respondent Atty. Mario ought to have disclosed to the members of the UST Faculty with the simple act of openness and candor in dealing with clients, which would
Union, if not the entire bargaining unit of faculty members, his interest in the progress thereafter towards the ideal that a lawyer's vocation is not synonymous
compromise agreement as one of the dismissed union officers seeking with an ordinary business proposition but a serious matter of public interest.
compensation for the claim of back wages and other forms of damages, and also the
reasons for reducing the claim of the faculty members from more than The evidence on record proves that Atty. Mario failed to disclose at crucial
P9,000,000.00 to only P2,000,000.00. As the record shows, the explanations for moments significant information about the manner by which he secured the
respondent's actions were disclosed only years after the consummation of the P7,000,000.00 by virtue of the compromise agreement and the P4,200,000.00
compromise agreement, particularly only after the instant complaint for disbarment attorney's fees under the memorandum of agreement. A simple accounting of the
was filed against him, when the accounting should have been forthcoming either money that he and others concerned received from UST, as well as an explanation
before or during the settlement of the labor case against the management of UST. on the details of the agreements, would have enlightened the faculty members
about the probability of conflict of interests on respondent's part and guided them to
Equally important, since respondent and the other union officers and directors were look for alternative actions to protect their own interests.
to get for themselves a lion's share of the compromise as they ultimately did, Atty.
Mario should have unambiguously divulged and made clear to his client the In light of the irrefragable fact of respondent's misdemeanor, a possible mitigation of
compelling probability of conflict of interests. He should have voluntarily turned over his actionable conduct was that the attorney's fees and the compromise agreement
the reins of legal representation to another lawyer who could have acted on the were negotiated and finalized under the most strenuous circumstances where his
matter with a deep sense of impartiality over the several claims against UST and an leadership and that of his core officers and directors were incessantly challenged by
unfettered commitment to the cause of the faculty members. complainants allegedly aided by factions within UST itself. He might also have
believed that the settlement achieved immense benefits for his constituents which
Furthermore, there was lack of notice and transparency in respondent's dual role as would not have been otherwise obtained if he had chosen to relinquish the rein of
lawyer and president of the UST Faculty Union when he obtained P4,200,000.00 as legal representation to some other lawyer. Finally, it was not improbable for him to
attorney's fees. Without ruling on the validity of the collection of attorney's fees so suppose though wrongly that he could represent and in some manner serve the
as not to pre-empt the decision in G.R. No. 149763 on this issue, the record does not interests of all of them, including his own, by pushing for and seeking the approval
show any justification for such huge amount of compensation nor any clear of the agreements himself. 20
differentiation between his legal services and his tasks as union president
comprising in all probability the same duties for which he had collected a hefty We reiterate that the objective of a disciplinary case is not so much to punish the
compensation as attorney for the union. individual attorney as to protect the dispensation of justice by sheltering the
judiciary and the public from the misconduct or inefficiency of officers of the court.
The situation of Atty. Mario is not any different from that of an executor or Restorative justice not retribution is our goal in this type of proceedings. In view of
administrator of an estate who may not charge against the estate any professional this, instead of taking a more stern measure against respondent, a reprimand and a
fee for legal services rendered by him because his efforts as such are already paid warning would be sufficient disciplinary action in accordance with our ruling in
for in his capacity as executor or administrator.19 Indeed, he could have avoided Sumangil v. Sta. Romana.21 Hence, Atty. Mario is admonished to refrain from all
complaints and perceptions of self-enrichment arising from the levy of attorney's appearances and acts of impropriety including circumstances indicating conflict of
fees by spelling out the terms and bases for the claim of P4,200,000.00 since the interests, and to behave at all times with circumspection and dedication befitting a
compensation for his services as president of the union should have otherwise member of the Bar, especially observing candor, fairness and loyalty in all
covered his legal services as well. transactions with his client.22

Regardless of the motivations of respondent in perfecting the compromise WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Eduardo J. Mario Jr. is REPRIMANDED for his
agreement or demanding the inexplicable attorney's fees, his actions were not misconduct with a warning that a more drastic punishment will be imposed on him
transparent enough to allow the bargaining unit ample information to decide freely upon a repetition of the same act.
and intelligently. Clearly, he violated Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility requiring every lawyer to "observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all SO ORDERED.
his dealings and transactions with his clients." Lawyers are vanguards in the bastion
Mendoza, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
 Conviction of a crime as a ground for disciplinary action MALCOLM, J. :

FIRST DIVISION
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino Lontok
[April 7, 1922. ] from his office of lawyer in the Philippines Islands, because of having been convicted
of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer, prays that the charges be
In re MARCELINO LONTOK. dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a pardon issued to him by former
Governor General Harrison.
Ramon Diokno for Respondent.
Marcelino Lontok was convicted by the Court of First Instance of Zambales of the
Attorney-General Villa-Real for the Government. crime of bigamy. This judgment was affirmed on appeal to the Supreme Court, while
a further attempt to get the case before the United States Supreme Court was
SYLLABUS unsuccessful. On February 9, 1921, a pardon was issued by the Governor-General of
the following tenor:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT; PARDON BY GOVERNOR-GENERAL, EFFECT OF,
ON RIGHT OF COURTS TO DISBAR ATTORNEYS. L, an attorney-at-law, was "By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Philippine Organic Act of
convicted of the crime of bigamy, a crime involving moral turpitude, within the August 29, 1916, the sentence in the case of Marcelino Lontok, convicted by the
meaning of section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Later, L was granted a pardon Court of First Instance of Zambales of bigamy and sentenced on February 27, 1918,
by the Governor General. Held: That L may not now be excluded from the practice of to imprisonment for eight years, to suffer the accessory penalties prescribed by law,
law, because of a judgment of conviction for a crime of which he has been pardoned. and to pay the costs of the proceedings, which sentence was, on September 8, 1919,
confirmed by the Supreme Court, is hereby remitted, on condition that he shall not
2. ID.; ID. Where proceedings to strike an attorneys mane from the rolls are again be guilty of any misconduct."cralaw virtua1aw library
founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a
felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to wipe out The particular provision of the Code of Civil Procedure, upon which the Attorney-
the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the disbarment of the attorney General relies in asking for the disbarment of Attorney Lontok, provides that a
after the pardon has been granted. member of lawyer by the Supreme Court "by reason of his conviction of the crime
involving moral turpitude." (Sec. 21.) That conviction of the crime of bigamy involves
3. ID.; ID. Where proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the moral turpitude, within the meaning of the law, cannot be doubted. The debatable
professional misconduct involved in a transaction which has culminated in a question relates to the effect of the pardon by the Governor-General. On the one
conviction of felony, it has been held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve hand, it is contended by Government that while the pardon removes the legal
him of the penal consequence of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the infamy of the crime, it cannot wash out the moral stain; on the other hand, it is
disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute contended by the respondent that the pardon reaches and offense for which he was
proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not a fit or convicted and blots it out so that he may not be looked upon as guilty of it.
proper person to retain his license to practice law.
The cases are not altogether clear as to just what effect a pardon has on the right of
4. ID.; ID.; ID. A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense a court to disbar an attorney for conviction of a felony. On close examination,
and the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment however, it will be found that the apparent conflict in the decisions is more apparent
and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as than real and arises from differences in the nature of the charges on which the
innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it proceedings to disbar are based. Where proceedings to strike an attorneys name
prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from from the rolls are founded on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and conviction for a felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon
restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him operates to wipe out the conviction and is a bar to any proceeding for the
a new credit and capacity. There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not disbarment of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. (In re Emmons
restore offices forfeited, or property or interests vested in others in consequence of [1915], 29 cal. App., 121; Scott v. State [1894], 6 Tex. Civ. App., 343.) But where
the conviction and judgment. (Decision of the majority of the United States Supreme proceedings to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct
Court in Ex parte Garlan [1866], 4 Wall., 380, accepted and followed.) involved in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been
held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal consequences
of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment proceeding, inasmuch as
DECISION the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute proof that the attorney does not
possess a good moral character and is not a fit or proper person to retain his license
to practice law. (People v. Burton [1907], 39 Colo., 164; People v. George [1900], 186 [G.R. NO. 161455 : May 20, 2008]
Ill., 122; Nelson v. Com. [1098], 128 Ky., 779; Case of In re [1881], 86 N.Y.,
563.) ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE FOURTH DIVISION OF
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE HON. and SIMEON V. MARCELO, in his official capacity as
The celebrated case of Ex parte Garland [1866], 4 Wall., 380 is directly in point. The the Ombudsman, and MARIO R. FERRAREN, Respondents.
petitioner in this case applied for a license to practice law in the United States
courts, without first taking an oath to the effect that he had never voluntarily given DECISION
aid to any government hostile to the United States, as required by statute. The
petitioner, it seems, had been a member of the Confederate Congress, during the VELASCO, JR., J.:
secession of the South, but had been pardoned by the President of the United
States. It was held, by a divided court, that to exclude the petitioner from the Petitioner Atty. Rodolfo P. Pactolin was a former member of the Sangguniang
practice of law for the offense named would be to enforce a punishment for the Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental. During Pactolin's term, sometime in May 1996,
offense, notwithstanding the pardon, which the court had no right to do; and the the mayor of Ozamis City, Benjamin A. Fuentes, received a letter dated May 3, 1996
petition was granted. Mr. Justice Field, delivering the opinion of the court, in part, from Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach and team captain of the Ozamis City
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph volleyball team, requesting financial assistance for the city's volleyball team. Mayor
Fuentes immediately approved the request and then forwarded Abastillas' letter to
"A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the City Treasurer's Office for processing. Mayor Fuentes at that time designated
the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of Mario R. Ferraren, a member of the city council, as OIC (Officer-in-Charge)-Mayor for
existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the of fender is as innocent as if he the duration of his trip to Cagayan de Oro City starting May 5, 1996. Abastillas
had never committed the offense. If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the received the check for PhP 10,000 on behalf of the volleyball team on May 8, 1996.
penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from attaching; if granted
after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his While Ferraren was OIC-Mayor, Pactolin went to the Ozamis City Treasurer's Office
civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and and asked to photocopy Abastillas' letter. Assistant City Treasurer Alma Y. Toledo lent
capacity. the letter to Pactolin, having known him as a member of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan. Besides, he was accompanied by Solomon Villaueran, a city employee.
"There is only this limitation to its operation; it does not restore offices forfeited, or Pactolin returned the letter to the City Treasurer's Office immediately after
property or interests vested in others in consequence of the conviction and photocopying it.
judgment."cralaw virtua1aw library
Thereafter, on June 24, 1996, Pactolin filed a complaint, docketed as OMB-MIN-96-
Although much which is contained in the opinion of the four dissenting justices, in 0416, against Mario with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao, alleging
the Garland case, appeals powerfully to the minds of the court, we feel ourselves that Mario illegally disbursed public funds worth PhP 10,000 in connivance with then
under obligation to follow the rule laid down by the majority decision of the higher City Accountant Cynthia Ferraren. Attached as Annex "A" to the complaint was the
court. We do this with the more grace when we recall that according to article 130 of alleged falsified version of the Abastillas letter. The purported falsified letter showed
the Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is extinguished is that it was Mario and not Mayor Fuentes who approved the request for financial
by pardon. We must also remember that the motion for disbarment is based solely assistance. Aggrieved, Mario instituted a criminal complaint against Pactolin.
on the judgment of conviction for a crime of which the respondent has been Pactolin was charged with falsification of a public document under Article 171(2)1 of
pardoned, and that the language of the pardon is not such as to amount to a the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in an Amended Information filed on January 31, 2000,
conditional pardon similar in nature to a parole. It may be mentioned, however, in as follows:
this connection, that if Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct,
the condition of his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to That on or about June 24, 1996, or some time prior or subsequent thereto, in Ozamis
disbarment. City, Misamis Occidental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the accused RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, a high ranking public officer, being a
It results, therefore, that the petition of the Attorney General cannot be granted, and member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental, committing the
that the proceedings must be dismissed. Costs shall be taxed as provided by section felony herein charged in relation to his office, and taking advantage of his official
24 of the Code of Civil Procedure. So ordered. position as Sangguniang Panlalawigan Member and head of the athletic delegation
of Misamis Occidental, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, falsify
Araullo, C.J., Villamor; Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur. a document dated May 3, 1998 requesting from the city mayor of Ozamis City
financial assistance, by intercalating thereon the printed name of Mario R. Ferraren,
and the latter's position as OIC Mayor, and by imitating the latter's signature on top
EN BANC of the intercalated name "Mario R. Ferraren", thereby making it appear that OIC
Mayor Mario R. Ferraren approved the request for financial assistance, when in truth jurisdiction: (1) the offense is committed in violation of (a) RA 3019, as amended,
and in fact, Mario R. Ferraren neither signed the subject letter nor approved the said known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, (b) RA 1379 or The Law on Ill-
request for financial assistance. gotten Wealth, (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the RPC, (d) Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
After arraignment in which Pactolin appeared on his own behalf and pleaded not complex with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a),
guilty, and after trial on the merits in which Pactolin repeatedly failed to appear, the (b), (c), and (e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions
Sandiganbayan issued a Decision2 on November 12, 2003, disposing, thus: enumerated in Section 4, par. (a) of RA 8249; and (3) the offense committed is in
relation to the office.3 Pactolin argues that these requisites show that the crime of
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused falsification as defined under Arts. 171 and 172 of the RPC is not within the
Rodolfo D. Pactolin, guilty of Falsification under Article 172 of the Revised Penal jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. He also points out that nowhere under Sec. 4 of
Code, and in the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, he is Presidential Decree No. 1606, RA 3019, RA 1379, or in Title VII, Book II of the RPC is
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and 4 "falsification of official document" mentioned. He relies on Bartolome v. People4 as a
months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of case in point.
prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of Our Ruling: The Sandiganbayan Has Jurisdiction
insolvency to pay the fine.
Falsification of public document under the RPC is within the jurisdiction of the
SO ORDERED. Sandiganbayan. This conclusion finds support from Sec. 4 of RA 8249, which
enumerates the cases in which the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction, as
On the stated premise that the falsified document was not in the official custody of follows:
Pactolin, nor was there evidence presented showing that the falsification was
committed by him while in the performance of his duties, the Sandiganbayan found Section 4. x x x
him liable for falsification under the first paragraph of Art. 172, penalizing "any
private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-
preceding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
kind of commercial document." Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
Pactolin's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, he filed this petition, raising permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
the following issues:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
I. WHETHER OR NOT FALSIFICATION UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS WITHIN higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
THE PURVIEW OF THE JURISDICTION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN? [sic] Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

II. WHETHER RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AMOUNTING (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
TO ACTING WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN CONVICTING PETITIONER and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department
WHEN BY ITS OWN FINDINGS OF FACTS THE FALSIFIED DOCUMENT WAS NOT IN THE heads;
OFFICIAL CUSTODY OF THE ACCUSED NOR WAS THERE ANY EVIDENCE PRESENTED
THAT THE FALSIFICATION WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED WHILE IN THE xxx
PERFORMANCE OF HIS OFFICIAL DUTIES? [sic]
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade '27' and higher under the
Simply, the issues are: Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction over the case? If so, Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
did it gravely abuse its discretion when by its own findings the falsified document
was not in the custody of Pactolin, and he falsified the document while in the b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
performance of his duties?cralawred committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a. of this
section in relation to their office. (Emphasis supplied.)
Pactolin claims that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of
falsification. First, according to Pactolin, even as Republic Act No. (RA) 8249, known Going to another point, Pactolin, in his Memorandum, contends that the
as An Act Further Defining the Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, amending for the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion when it convicted him as a private
Purpose P.D. 1606, as Amended, Providing Funds therefor and for Other Purposes, individual under an information charging him as a public official, thus violating his
vests the Sandiganbayan with exclusive jurisdictional authority over certain right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and his
offenses, the following requisites must concur before that court can exercise such right to due process of law. He claims that the information filed against him charged
him with violation of Art. 171 of the RPC in his capacity as Board Member of the have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan, but the Sandiganbayan convicted him of violation of Art. complaint or information.6 In this case, the Amended Information encompasses the
172 as a private individual. Thus, he avers, he had not been given a chance to acts of Pactolin constitutive of a violation of Art. 172 in relation to par. 2 of Art. 171
defend himself from a criminal charge of which he had been convicted. of the RPC.

Again, Pactolin errs. It is true that the Amended Information did not at all mention Pactolin also misapplied Bartolome.7 In Bartolome, there was no showing that the
any statutory designation of the crime he is charged with. But, it is all too evident accused committed acts of falsification while they were discharging official
that the body of the information against him contains averments that unmistakably functions, and the information in Bartolome did not allege there was an intimate
constitute falsification under Art. 171 and also Art. 172 of the RPC, which, for connection between the discharge of official duties and the commission of the
reference, are quoted below: offense. In this case, the State, in no uncertain words, alleged in the Amended
Information and proved that Pactolin was a member of the Sangguniang
Art.171. Falsification by public officer, employee; or notary or ecclesiastical minister. Panlalawigan and took advantage of his position when he committed the
xxx falsification.

xxx The Sandiganbayan Is Correct in Convicting Petitioner

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when As to the second issue, Pactolin avers that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
they did not in fact so participate [as testified to by witnesses]. discretion when it convicted him despite its own findings that the falsified document
was not in his official custody and that there was no evidence he committed the
xxx falsification in the performance of his official duties.

Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents. The Pactolin distorts the statement of the Sandiganbayan.
penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not
more than 5,000 shall be imposed upon: The Sandiganbayan's conviction of Pactolin was based on its factual findings after
the prosecution presented both documentary and testimonial pieces of evidence. We
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsification enumerated in the are not a trier of facts so we defer to the factual findings of the lower court that had
next preceeding article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or more opportunities and facilities to examine the evidence presented.
any other kind of commercial document;
The Sandiganbayan had established the following undisputed facts: (1) the request
xxx for financial assistance of the volleyball players, represented by Abastillas, was
approved by Mayor Fuentes and not by OIC-Mayor Mario; (2) the original Abastillas
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceedings or letter was in the custody of Toledo in her official capacity and she testified that the
to the damage of another or who, with the intent to cause such damage, shall use approving authority was Mayor Fuentes and no other; (3) Pactolin borrowed the
any of the false documents embraced in the next preceeding article or in any of the Abastillas letter for photocopying upon oral request, and Toledo granted the said
foregoing subdivisions of this article shall be punished by the penalty next lower in request because she knew him as a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
degree. (Emphasis supplied.) their province; and (4) Pactolin filed a complaint against Mario with the Ombudsman
for illegal disbursement of public funds, and the principal document he attached to
Note that the last paragraph of Art. 172 does not specify that the offending person is show the alleged illegal disbursement was the Abastillas letter on which was
a public or private individual as does its par. 1. Note also that the last paragraph of superimposed Mario's signature, thus making it appear that Mario approved the
Art. 172 alludes to the use of the false document embraced in par. 2 of Art. 171 financial assistance to the volleyball players, and not Mayor Fuentes. In short, the
where it was made to appear that "persons have participated in any act or Sandiganbayan clearly established that the copy of the Abastillas letter that Pactolin
proceeding when they did not in fact participate." Patently, even a public officer may attached to his complaint was spurious. Given the clear absence of a satisfactory
be convicted under Art. 172. The crime in Art. 171 is absorbed by the last paragraph explanation regarding Pactolin's possession and use of the falsified Abastillas letter,
of Art. 172. Thus, Pactolin's argument about being deprived of his right to be the Sandiganbayan did not err in concluding that it was Pactolin who falsified the
informed of the charges against him when the Sandiganbayan convicted him as a letter. The settled rule is that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found
private person under Art. 172, is baseless. The headings in italics of the two articles in possession of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty
are not controlling. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, or the of falsification.8
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof allegedly
violated, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein Neither do we agree with Pactolin that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
recited.5 The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or the discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion implies a
preamble of the information or by the specification of the provision of law alleged to capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack of jurisdiction.9
The rule in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in court,
any disposition of the case, be it dismissal, conviction, or acquittal of the accused, In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City volleyball team,
rests on the sound discretion of the court.10 The only qualification to this exercise of wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City, requesting financial assistance for
judicial prerogative is that the substantial rights of the accused must not be his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the request and sent Abastillas letter to the City
impaired nor the People be deprived of the right to due process. As we have Treasurer for processing. Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city
discoursed, no substantial right of Pactolin has been impaired nor has there been council member, as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was
any violation of his right to due process. He had been adequately informed by the away. Abastillas eventually got the P10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.
detailed litany of the charges leveled against him in the information. He had the
occasion to confront witnesses against him and the opportunity to question Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a Sangguniang
documents presented by the prosecution. Under no circumstance in this case has his Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a photocopy of Abastillas letter
right to due process been violated. and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a complaint with the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman-Mindanao against Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of
Lastly, Pactolin is a member of the Philippine bar. As a lawyer, he is bound by the P10,000.00 in public funds. Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what
profession's strict code of ethics. His conviction means he has not met the high he claimed was a falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not
ethical standard demanded by his profession. He must be dealt with accordingly. Mayor Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Sandiganbayan's Decision dated November Aggrieved, Ferraren filed with the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case 25665 a
12, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 25665 and its Resolution dated January 7, 2004 are complaint against Atty. Pactolin for falsification of public document.[1] On November
AFFIRMED in their entirety. This Decision shall be treated as an administrative 12, 2003 the Sandiganbayan found Atty. Pactolin guilty of falsification under Article
complaint against petitioner Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin under Rule 139-B of the Rules 172 and sentenced him to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of 2 years and
of Court and is referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for appropriate 4 months of prision correccional as minimum to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days of
action. prision correccional as maximum, to suffer all the accessory penalties of prision
correccional, and to pay a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
The Clerk of Court is directed to furnish private complainant Mario R. Ferraren with a insolvency.
copy of this Decision.
Atty. Pactolin appealed to this Court but on May 20, 2008 it affirmed his conviction.
Costs against petitioner. [2] Since the Court treated the matter as an administrative complaint against him
as well under Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, it referred the case to the Integrated
SO ORDERED. Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for appropriate action.

Puno, C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona*, Carpio- Because complainant Ferraren neither appeared nor submitted any pleading during
Morales, Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Nachura, Reyes, Leonardo-de-Castro, JJ., the administrative proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, on
concur. October 9, 2010 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XIX-2010-632,
adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners Report and
Recommendation that the case against Atty. Pactolin be dismissed for insufficiency
EN BANC of evidence.

[A.C. No. 7940 : April 24, 2012] The Issue Presented

RE: SC DECISION DATED MAY 20, 2008 IN G.R. NO. 161455 UNDER RULE 139-B OF The only issue presented in this case is whether or not Atty. Pactolin should be
THE RULES OF COURT, VS. ATTY. RODOLFO D. PACTOLIN, RESPONDENT. disbarred after conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification.

DECISION The Courts Ruling

PER CURIAM: In his pleadings before the Commission on Bar Discipline, Atty. Pactolin reiterated
the defenses he raised before the Sandiganbayan and this Court in the falsification
This case resolves the question of whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a case. He claims that the Court glossed over the facts, that its decision and referral
crime involving moral turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from to the IBP was factually infirmed[3] and contained factual exaggerations and
the practice of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.cralaw patently erroneous observation,[4] and was too adventurous.[5]

The Facts and the Case

To recapitulate, this Court upheld the finding of the Sandiganbayan that the copy of WHEREFORE, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin is hereby DISBARRED and his name REMOVED
Abastillas letter which Atty. Pactolin attached to his complaint was spurious. Given from the Rolls of Attorney. Let a copy of this decision be attached to his personal
the clear absence of a satisfactory explanation regarding his possession and use of records and furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, Integrated Bar of the
the falsified Abastillas letter, this Court held that the Sandiganbayan did not err in Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in
concluding that it was Atty. Pactolin who falsified the letter. This Court relied on the the country.
settled rule that in the absence of satisfactory explanation, one found in possession
of and who used a forged document is the forger and therefore guilty of falsification. SO ORDERED.
[6]
Corona, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
This Courts decision in said falsification case had long become final and executory. Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ.,
In In Re: Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,[7] the Court held that in disbarment cases, it is concur.
no longer called upon to review the judgment of conviction which has become final.
The review of the conviction no longer rests upon this Court.
EN BANC
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be removed or
suspended on the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross A.C. No. 229 April 30, 1957
misconduct in office; (4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude; (6) violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any IN THE MATTER OF DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS
lawful order of a superior court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer vs.
for a party to a case without authority so to do. NARCISO N. JARAMILLO, Respondent.

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is contrary to Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Juan T. Alano for
justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral turpitude.[8] Moral complainants.
turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or Narciso N, Jaramillo in his own behalf.
good morals. It involves an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the PARAS, C.J.: chanrobles virtual law library
accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[9] The respondent was prosecuted for and convicted of estafa in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan and, on appeal, was finally sentenced by the Court of
Having said that, what penalty should be imposed then on Atty. Pactolin? appeals to an indeterminate penalty ranging from two months and one day of
arresto mayor to one year and one day of prision correccional in its decision
As a rule, this Court exercises the power to disbar with great caution. Being the most promulgated on April 17, 1954. On August 5, 1955, while the respondent was
severe form of disciplinary sanction, it is imposed only for the most imperative serving sentence for said conviction, the Solicitor General filed in this Court the
reasons and in clear cases of misconduct affecting the standing and moral character present complaint for respondent's disbarment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
of the lawyer as an officer of the court and a member of the bar.[10] Yet this Court chanrobles virtual law library
has also consistently pronounced that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for
conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude.[11] In his answer respondent contends that his conviction was a judicial error; that it
was unfortunate on his part that the trial court did not believe his explanation of the
Here, Atty. Pactolins disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has confirmed loss of the amount involved in the criminal case; that his imprisonment and the
that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably established, he has sufferings and mental anguish he has suffered since the commencement of the
not yet served his sentence. His conduct only exacerbates his offense and shows criminal of the criminal case constitute more than sufficient punishment; that for this
that he falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the Court to further disbar him is excessively inhuman, humiliating and
legal profession.[12] cruel.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This Court once again reminds all lawyers that they, of all classes and professions, There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of
are most sacredly bound to uphold the law.[13] The privilege to practice law is respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become
bestowed only upon individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and, final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the
equally important, morally. As such, lawyers must at all times conduct themselves, respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar.
especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[14]cralaw protect the administration of justice.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
 Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Labrador, Concepcion, Endencia and
Wherefore, the respondent is hereby disbarred and ordered to surrender to this Barrera, JJ., concur.
Court, within fifteen days from notice hereof, the lawyer's certificate heretofore
issued to him. So ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
EN BANC
Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion,
Endencia and Felix, JJ., concur. [A.C. NO. 6792 - January 25, 2006]

ROBERTO SORIANO, Complainant, v. Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Respondent.

EN BANC
DECISION
A.C. No. 350 August 7, 1959
PER CURIAM:
In re: DALMACIO DE LOS ANGELES, Respondent.
Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit1 for the disbarment of Atty. Manuel Dizon, filed by
Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Emerito M. Salva for the Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of
Government. the Philippines (IBP). Complainant alleges that the conviction of respondent for a
Dalmacio de los Angeles and Luis F. Gabinete for respondent. crime involving moral turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the
conviction, violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;2
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.: chanrobles virtual law library and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court.3
Atty. Dalmacio de los Angeles was convicted of the crime of attempted bribery in a
final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals and was sentenced to two (2) years, Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the Complaint, the CBD
four (40 months, and one (1) day of destierro, and to pay a fine of P2,300, with issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him that he was in default, and that
subsidiary destierro in case of insolvency (CA-G.R. No. 11411-R), and under section an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled for June 11, 2004.4 After that hearing,
1, Rule 128, of the Rules of Court, he was required to show cause why he should not complainant manifested that he was submitting the case on the basis of the
be disbarred from the practice of his profession.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary Complaint and its attachments.5 Accordingly, the CBD directed him to file his
chanrobles virtual law library Position Paper, which he did on July 27, 2004.6 Afterwards, the case was deemed
submitted for resolution.
In his written explanation he appealed to the sympathy and mercy of this Court
considering that he has six children to support the eldest being 16 years old and the On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered her Report and
youngest 4 years who will bear the stigma of dishonor if disciplinary action be taken Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by the IBP Board of
against him. He made manifest to this Court that if he ever committed what is Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12, 2005.
attributed to him, it was merely due to an error of judgment which he honestly and
sincerely deplores.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated Canon 1,
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that the conviction of the
Under section 25, Rule 127, a member of the bar may be removed from his office as latter for frustrated homicide,7 which involved moral turpitude, should result in his
attorney if he is convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude the reason behind disbarment.
this rule being that the continued possession of a good moral character is a requisite
condition for the rightful continuance of the lawyer in the practice of law with the The facts leading to respondent's conviction were summarized by Branch 60 of the
result that the loss of such qualification justifies his disbarment (Mortel vs. Aspiras Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise:
100 Phil., 586; 53 Off. Gaz., No. 3, 628). And since bribery is admittedly a felony
involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. 428), this Court, much as it "x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota Corolla and was on his way home
sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is constrained to decree his disbarment after gassing up in preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. Along
as ordained by section 25 of Rule 127.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven by the accused not knowing that
law library the driver of the car he had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was under the influence of liquor.
It is therefore ordered that respondent be removed from his office as attorney and Incensed, the accused tailed the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at
that his name be stricken out from the Roll of Attorneys. So [the] Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his car, berated the taxi
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library driver and held him by his shirt. To stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open
his door causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver knew that the
accused had been drinking because he smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused "5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming evidence, Respondent denied
who looked elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up. But the that he had shot Complainant;
accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately and was about to deal the taxi
driver a fist blow when the latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell "6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he claimed that he was the
down a second time, got up again and was about to box the taxi driver but the latter one mauled by Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
caught his fist and turned his arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused
until he could be pacified and then released him. The accused went back to his car "7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent has[,] to date[,] not yet
and got his revolver making sure that the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. satisfied his civil liabilities to Complainant."12
The taxi driver was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the eyeglasses of
the accused on the ground. He picked them up intending to return them to the On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the IBP Resolution
accused. But as he was handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel adopting the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner.
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him hitting him on the neck. He
fell on the thigh of the accused so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The We agree with the findings and recommendations of Commissioner Herbosa, as
incident was witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony corroborated that of the approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors.
taxi driver, the complainant in this case, Roberto Soriano."8
Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for a crime involving
It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the aid of Soriano and moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. By such conviction, a
brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had lacerated the carotid artery lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the administration of justice and
on the left side of his neck,9 complainant would have surely died of hemorrhage if to be no longer possessed of good moral character.13 In the instant case,
he had not received timely medical assistance, according to the attending surgeon, respondent has been found guilty; and he stands convicted, by final judgment, of
Dr. Francisco Hernandez, Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused frustrated homicide. Since his conviction has already been established and is no
paralysis on the left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver. longer open to question, the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows:
1) whether his crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether
The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001. On January 18, his guilt warrants disbarment.
2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which was granted by the court
on several conditions. These included satisfaction of "the civil liabilities imposed by Moral turpitude has been defined as "everything which is done contrary to justice,
[the] court in favor of the offended party, Roberto Soriano."10 modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private
and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary
According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon, who has yet to to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."14
comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the civil liability to the Court
of Appeals.11 The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude has been
discussed in International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) v. NLRC,15 a labor case
In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa recommended that concerning an employee who was dismissed on the basis of his conviction for
respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for having been convicted of a homicide. Considering the particular circumstances surrounding the commission of
crime involving moral turpitude. the crime, this Court rejected the employer's contention and held that homicide in
that case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
The commissioner found that respondent had not only been convicted of such crime, violative of the IRRI's Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack of good moral character, based on dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant
the following facts: circumstances, the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate.
Furthermore, it was not for the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime
"1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; involved moral turpitude. That discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:

"2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault Complainant only because the "x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree
latter, driving a taxi, had overtaken him; of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown
by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular
"3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted assault, Respondent conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently
went back to his car, got a gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and shot depends on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x."16 (Emphasis
Complainant[,] who was unarmed; supplied)cralawlibrary

"4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply pushed him out and fled; In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve moral turpitude, the
Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-defense and total absence of
aggravating circumstances. For a better understanding of that Decision, the All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is wanting in even a
circumstances of the crime are quoted as follows: basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of the trial court when it
suspended his sentence and granted him probation. And yet, it has been four
"x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI employee] was then urinating years21 since he was ordered to settle his civil liabilities to complainant. To date,
and had his back turned when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the respondent remains adamant in refusing to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy urinal; that Micosa pleaded impetuosity and intolerance, as shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic
to the victim to stop the attack but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in altercation, he has taken away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor
that position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his shirt and of his victim. Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could
desperately swung it at the victim who released his hold on Micosa only after the never even fully restore what the latter has lost.
latter had stabbed him several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention was
not to slay the victim but only to defend his person. The appreciation in his favor of Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to the exercise of
the mitigating circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender, plus the total the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral character.22 Where their
absence of any aggravating circumstance demonstrate that Micosa's character and misconduct outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to show them
intentions were not inherently vile, immoral or unjust."17 morally unfit for their office and unworthy of the privileges conferred upon them by
their license and the law, the court may be justified in suspending or removing them
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the circumstances from that office.23
clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his unworthiness to practice
law. We also adopt the IBP's finding that respondent displayed an utter lack of good
moral character, which is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter into the
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot complainant when practice of law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.24
the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown by respondent will not be
mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his arm twisted by complainant. In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest and duplicitous
Under the circumstances, those were reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with the aid of Vice-Mayor
the lawyer's assault. Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with complainant's family.25 But when this
effort failed, respondent concocted a complete lie by making it appear that it was
We also consider the trial court's finding of treachery as a further indication of the complainant's family that had sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to
skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was not in a a neurosurgeon.26
position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the assault was already
over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an entirely
when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To make matters worse, respondent wrapped implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two other persons.27
the handle of his gun with a handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, The trial court had this to say:
he betrayed his sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
"The physical evidence as testified to by no less than three (3) doctors who
The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral turpitude. By his examined [Atty. Dizon] does not support his allegation that three people including
conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. the complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him. The injuries he
As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who deserved to be venerated and never sustained were so minor that it is improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that
to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected three people who he said were bent on beating him to death could do so little
poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession. His overreaction also damage. On the contrary, his injuries sustain the complainant's version of the
evinced vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, incident particularly when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x x."28
more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, we see not
the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, but the obstinacy of Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar membership is
one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact revenge. more important than truthfulness.29 The rigorous ethics of the profession places a
premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous behavior.30 Hence, lawyers must
It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed Canon 1 of the Code not mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,
of Professional Responsibility through his illegal possession of an unlicensed they are expected to act in good faith.
firearm18 and his unjust refusal to satisfy his civil liabilities.19 He has thus brazenly
violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the courts. We remind him that, The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public perception of the legal
both in his attorney's oath20 and in the Code of Professional Responsibility, he profession. They constitute moral turpitude for which he should be disbarred. "Law is
bound himself to "obey the laws of the land." a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals
who are competent intellectually, academically and, equally important, morally.
Because they are vanguards of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all
times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the
public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach."31 PER CURIAM:

The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely dishonorable; they reveal This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of the offense he committed, we find Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against
the penalty recommended by the IBP proper and commensurate. Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
honorable and reliable - - lawyers in whom courts and clients may repose Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
confidence.32 Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and
that vital yet fragile confidence, we shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
members. modified Comm. Funa s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then
to a suspension of two years.
We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and
that disbarment should never be decreed when any lesser penalty would accomplish Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
the end desired. In the instant case, however, the Court cannot extend that Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
munificence to respondent. His actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the
duties to society and his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
penalty would be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession - - crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the private
that every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice. complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa s manner of prosecuting the
case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty. Silvosa.
We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege demanding a high
degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to admission, but In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence
has fallen short of the exacting standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also
profession. alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and
have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused s
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by
circumstances - not the mere fact of their conviction - would demonstrate their arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial Prosecutor
fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa from handling
vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused on 16
unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar. November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and as
counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of judgment
WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is hereby DISBARRED, and his name is of the Esperon case.
ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
entered in his record as a member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio. In
on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan s brother was a respondent, Pros.
for circulation to all courts in the country. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the offense
from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing before
SO ORDERED. Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the time,
Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the charge of
frustrated murder.
EN BANC
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan s
[A.C. NO. 7360 - July 24,2012] decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
Respondent. desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse s father-in-law,
Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than two
DECISION years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the case
and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for Atty. would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently,
Silvosa. GMA 7 s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the actual [Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence, and
viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa s defense of instigation, the Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No. act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
27776 reads:rl
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations
doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With [Atty.
of:rbl r l l lbrr Silvosa s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands alone
unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred more
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, one year, one than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was filed on
month and eleven days of prision correccional, as minimum, up to three years, six November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt on the
months and twenty days of prision correccional, as maximum; veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not be
ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency; andcralawlibrary As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant
has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa]
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law. was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case
nor was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not
chanrobles virtual law library binding upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding
SO ORDERED.2rll in a disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused s bail. PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
the accused.
Respectfully submitted.3rll
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
persecution." approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the penalty
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd of Atty. Silvosa s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The Office of the
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of the case on 1
turpitude since the act involved do [sic] not amount to a crime. " He further claims March 2012.
that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
under the category of crimes against public officers x x x." recommendations in the second and third causes of action.

In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
that:rl government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand,
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the
facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such We agree with Comm. Funa s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty. Silvosa
conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not represent Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
disclosure of facts." respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time has
elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time of
Atty. Silvosa s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public the disciplining arm of the Court.7rll
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference. He
likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited We disagree with Comm. Funa s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed of not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
our ruling in Hilado v. David:4rll
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can
An attorney is employed that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority
lawyer or counselor when he is listening to his client s preliminary statement of his acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the
case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer
client s pleadings, or advocating his client s pleadings, or advocating his client s undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:rl
cause in open court.
Section 1. How Instituted. Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or discipline
x x x of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person. The complaint
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be supported by
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or
rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste. As The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate and
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in government
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar s wife, not service.
only to keep inviolate the client s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of
treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust their x x x
secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice. It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan s judgment in
although the attorney s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5rll Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty.
Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its Sandiganbayan s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm. admitted, against his interest, that he is under probation.
Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa s ruling, Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the failed duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then President of the justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:rl
IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to make false
testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely denied the
accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a member of the Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against him. He must therefor. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must show proof that he attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is expected of misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of
him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect. a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his name
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent s
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to all
conviction.10rll courts in the country.

Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v. SO ORDERED.
COMELEC,11rll

we ruled:rl EN BANC

By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime [A.C. NO. 4585 : November 12, 2004]
of direct bribery:rbl r l l lbrr
MICHAEL P. BARRIOS, Complainant, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO P. MARTINEZ, Respondent.
1. the offender is a public officer;
DECISION
2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or
through another; PER CURIAM:

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public This is a verified petition1 for disbarment filed against Atty. Francisco Martinez for
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution of having been convicted by final judgment in Criminal Case No. 6608 of a crime
an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to refrain involving moral turpitude by Branch 8 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tacloban
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; andcralawlibrary City.2

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected The dispositive portion of the same states:
with the performance of his official duties.
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Francisco Martinez guilty beyond
chanrobles virtual law library reasonable doubt of the crime for (sic) violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 charged
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender in the Information. He is imposed a penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and fine
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains double the amount of the check which is EIGHT THOUSAND (8,000.00) PESOS, plus
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious payment of the tax pursuant to Section 205 of the Internal Revenue Code and costs
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his against the accused.3
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage of
his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is a Complainant further submitted our Resolution dated 13 March 1996 and the Entry of
conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty and Judgment from this Court dated 20 March 1996.
good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original) On 03 July 1996, we required4 respondent to comment on said petition within ten
(10) days from notice. On 17 February 1997, we issued a second resolution5
Atty. Silvosa s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at bribing requiring him to show cause why no disciplinary action should be imposed on him for
Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension. Atty. Silvosa s final conviction failure to comply with our earlier Resolution, and to submit said Comment. On 07
of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds for disbarment July 1997, we imposed a fine of P1,000 for respondent's failure to file said Comment
under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence of Atty. Silvosa s and required him to comply with our previous resolution within ten days.6 On 27
conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty more severe than April 1998, we fined respondent an additional P2,000 and required him to comply
suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to flout the exacting with the resolution requiring his comment within ten days under pain of
standards of morality and decency required of a member of the Bar. His excuse that imprisonment and arrest for a period of five (5) days or until his compliance.7
his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public officer, is Finally, on 03 February 1999, or almost three years later, we declared respondent
unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his character. The Martinez guilty of Contempt under Rule 71, Sec. 3[b] of the 1997 Rules of Civil
practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself unfit to exercise Procedure and ordered his imprisonment until he complied with the aforesaid
this privilege. resolutions.8
On 05 April 1999, the National Bureau of Investigation reported9 that respondent
was arrested in Tacloban City on 26 March 1999, but was subsequently released Several dates for the hearing of the case were scheduled but none of the parties
after having shown proof of compliance with the resolutions of 17 February 1997 and appeared before the Commission, until finally it was considered submitted for
27 April 1998 by remitting the amount of P2,000 and submitting his long overdue resolution last 27 June 2002. On the same date respondent filed a motion for the
Comment. dismissal of the case on the ground that the complainant died sometime in June
1997 and that dismissal is warranted because "the case filed by him does not
In the said Comment10 dated 16 March 1999, respondent stated that: survive due to his demise; as a matter of fact, it is extinguished upon his death."

1. He failed to respond to our Resolution dated 17 February 1997 as he was at that We disagree with respondent's contention.
time undergoing medical treatment at Camp Ruperto Kangleon in Palo, Leyte;
Pursuant to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, the Honorable
2. Complainant Michael Barrios passed away sometime in June 1997; Supreme Court or the IBP may motu proprio initiate the proceedings when they
andcralawlibrary perceive acts of lawyers which deserve sanctions or when their attention is called by
any one and a probable cause exists that an act has been perpetrated by a lawyer
3. Said administrative complaint is an offshoot of a civil case which was decided in which requires disciplinary sanctions.
respondent's favor (as plaintiff in the said case). Respondent avers that as a result of
his moving for the execution of judgment in his favor and the eviction of the family As earlier cited, respondent lawyer's propensity to disregard or ignore orders of the
of herein complainant Michael Barrios, the latter filed the present administrative Honorable Supreme Court for which he was fined twice, arrested and imprisoned
case. reflects an utter lack of good moral character.

In the meantime, on 11 September 1997, a certain Robert Visbal of the Provincial Respondent's conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude (estafa and/or violation
Prosecution Office of Tacloban City submitted a letter11 to the First Division Clerk of of BP Blg. 22) clearly shows his unfitness to protect the administration of justice and
Court alleging that respondent Martinez also stood charged in another estafa case therefore justifies the imposition of sanctions against him (see In re: Abesamis, 102
before the Regional Trial Court of Tacloban City, Branch 9, as well as a civil case Phil. 1182; In re: Jaramillo, 101 Phil. 323; In re: Vinzon, 19 SCRA 815; Medina v.
involving the victims of the Doa Paz tragedy in 1987, for which the Regional Trial Bautista, 12 SCRA 1, People v. Tuanda, Adm. Case No. 3360, 30 Jan. 1990).
Court of Basey, Samar, Branch 30 rendered a decision against him, his appeal
thereto having been dismissed by the Court of Appeals. WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Francisco P. Martinez be disbarred and his name stricken out from the Roll of
In the said Decision of Branch 30 of the Regional Trial Court of Basey, Samar,12 it Attorneys immediately.
appears that herein respondent Atty. Martinez offered his legal services to the
victims of the Doa Paz tragedy for free. However, when the plaintiff in the said civil On 27 September 2003, the IBP Board of Governors passed a Resolution16 adopting
case was issued a check for P90,000 by Sulpicio Lines representing compensation and approving the report and recommendation of its Investigating Commissioner.
for the deaths of his wife and two daughters, Atty. Martinez asked plaintiff to endorse
said check, which was then deposited in the account of Dr. Martinez, Atty. Martinez's On 03 December 2003, respondent Martinez filed a Motion for Reconsideration
wife. When plaintiff asked for his money, he was only able to recover a total of and/or Reinvestigation,17 in the instant case alleging that:
P30,000. Atty. Martinez claimed the remaining P60,000 as his attorney's fees.
Holding that it was "absurd and totally ridiculous that for a simple legal service - he 1. The Report and Recommendation of the IBP Investigating Commissioner is
would collect 2/3 of the money claim," the trial court ordered Atty. Martinez to pay tantamount to a deprivation of property without due process of law, although
the plaintiff therein the amount of P60,000 with interest, P5,000 for moral and admittedly the practice of law is a privilege;
exemplary damages, and the costs of the suit.
2. If respondent is given another chance to have his day in court and allowed to
Said trial court also made particular mention of Martinez's dilatory tactics during the adduce evidence, the result/outcome would be entirely different from that arrived at
trial, citing fourteen (14) specific instances thereof. Martinez's appeal from the by the Investigating Commissioner; andcralawlibrary
above judgment was dismissed by the Court of Appeals for his failure to file his brief,
despite having been granted three thirty (30)-day extensions to do so.13 3. Respondent is now 71 years of age, and has served the judiciary in various
capacities (from acting city judge to Municipal Judges League Leyte Chapter
On 16 June 1999, we referred14 the present case to the Integrated Bar of the President) for almost 17 years prior to resuming his law practice.
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation.
On 14 January 2004, we required18 complainant to file a comment within ten days.
The report15 of IBP Investigating Commissioner Winston D. Abuyuan stated in part On 16 February 2004, we received a Manifestation and Motion19 from complainant's
that: daughter, Diane Francis Barrios Latoja, alleging that they had not been furnished
with a copy of respondent's Motion, notwithstanding the fact that respondent final judgment for three counts of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in accordance with Sec. 12
ostensibly lives next door to complainant's family. Required to Comment on 17 May of the Omnibus Election Code, which states:
2004, respondent has until now failed to do so.
SEC. 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent
The records show that respondent, indeed, failed to furnish a copy of said Motion to authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for
herein complainant. The records also show that respondent was given several subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any offense for which he has been
opportunities to present evidence by this Court20 as well as by the IBP.21 Indeed, he sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months, or for a crime involving moral
only has himself to blame, for he has failed to present his case despite several turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he
occasions to do so. It is now too late in the day for respondent to ask this court to has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (emphasis supplied)
receive his evidence.
Enumerating the elements of that crime, we held that the act of a person in issuing
This court, moreover, is unwilling to exercise the same patience that it did when it a check knowing at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have sufficient
waited for his comment on the original petition. At any rate, after a careful funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the check in full upon its presentment,
consideration of the records of the instant case, we find the evidence on record is a manifestation of moral turpitude. Notwithstanding therein petitioner's averment
sufficient to support the IBP's findings. that he was not a lawyer, we nevertheless applied our ruling in People v. Tuanda, to
the effect that
Under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any (A) conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, "imports deceit" and "certainly relates to
deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral and affects the good moral character of a person." [Indeed] the effects of the
conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for issuance of a worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano v.
any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or Martinez, through Justice Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the
for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the
willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless commercial
In the present case, respondent has been found guilty and convicted by final papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
judgment for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 for issuing a worthless check in the amount of banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest."
P8,000. The issue with which we are now concerned is whether or not the said crime Thus, paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check
is one involving moral turpitude.22 deliberately reneges on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a
manner contrary to accepted and customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty
Moral turpitude "includes everything which is done contrary to justice, honesty, or good morals.28 (emphasis supplied)
modesty, or good morals."23 It involves "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity
in the private duties which a man owes his fellow men, or to society in general, In the recent case of Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,29 we stated that:
contrary to the accepted and customary rule of right and duty between man and
woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals."24 (T)he issuance of checks which were later dishonored for having been drawn against
a closed account indicates a lawyer's unfitness for the trust and confidence reposed
In People of the Philippines v. Atty. Fe Tuanda,25 where the erring lawyer was on her. It shows a lack of personal honesty and good moral character as to render
indefinitely suspended for having been convicted of three counts of violation of B.P. her unworthy of public confidence. [Cuizon v. Macalino, A.C. No. 4334, 07 July 2004]
Blg. 22, we held that conviction by final judgment of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves The issuance of a series of worthless checks also shows the remorseless attitude of
moral turpitude and stated: respondent, unmindful to the deleterious effects of such act to the public interest
and public order. [Lao v. Medel, 405 SCRA 227] It also manifests a lawyer's low
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit regard for her commitment to the oath she has taken when she joined her peers,
and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility under seriously and irreparably tarnishing the image of the profession she should hold in
both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime high esteem. [Sanchez v. Somoso, A.C. No. 6061, 03 October 2003]
involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22
does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly Clearly, therefore, the act of a lawyer in issuing a check without sufficient funds to
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such cover the same constitutes such willful dishonesty and immoral conduct as to
offense'26 (emphasis supplied) undermine the public confidence in law and lawyers. And while "the general rule is
that a lawyer may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
Over ten years later, we reiterated the above ruling in Villaber v. Commission on assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in his non-professional or
Elections27 and disqualified a congressional candidate for having been sentenced by private capacity, where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyer's
professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him,
the court may be justified in suspending or removing him from the office of In Pajares v. Abad Santos,35 we reminded attorneys that "there must be more
attorney."30 faithful adherence to Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court [now Rule 7, Section 3]
which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him that
The argument of respondent that to disbar him now is tantamount to a deprivation he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and
of property without due process of law is also untenable. As respondent himself belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay, and
admits, the practice of law is a privilege. The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
is "to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this subjected to disciplinary action.36 It is noteworthy that in the past, the Court has
important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable; men in whom courts disciplined lawyers and judges for willful disregard of its orders to file comments or
and clients may repose confidence."31 "A proceeding for suspension or disbarment appellant's briefs, as a penalty for disobedience thereof.37
is not in any sense a civil action where the complainant is plaintiff and the
respondent lawyer is a defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private For the same reasons, we are disinclined to take respondent's old age and the fact
interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are undertaken and that he served in the judiciary in various capacities in his favor. If at all, we hold
prosecuted solely for the public welfare, and for the purpose of preserving courts of respondent to a higher standard for it, for a judge should be the embodiment of
justice from the official ministrations of persons unfit to practice them."32 "Verily, competence, integrity, and independence,38 and his conduct should be above
lawyers must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, to the reproach.39 The fact that respondent has chosen to engage in private practice does
courts and to their clients. Their conduct must always reflect the values and norms not mean he is now free to conduct himself in less honorable - or indeed in a less
of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. On than honorable - manner.
these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend lawyers for any professional
or private misconduct showing them to be wanting in moral character, honesty, We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege,40 demanding a
probity and good demeanor - or to be unworthy to continue as officers of the high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition precedent to
Court."33 admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the practice of law.41 Sadly,
herein respondent falls short of the exacting standards expected of him as a
Nor are we inclined to look with favor upon respondent's plea that if "given another vanguard of the legal profession.
chance to have his day in court and to adduce evidence, the result/outcome would
be entirely different from that arrived at." We note with displeasure the inordinate The IBP Board of Governors recommended that respondent be disbarred from the
length of time respondent took in responding to our requirement to submit his practice of law. We agree.
Comment on the original petition to disbar him. These acts constitute a willful
disobedience of the lawful orders of this Court, which under Sec. 27, Rule 138 of the We come now to the matter of the penalty imposable in this case. In Co v.
Rules of Court is in itself a cause sufficient for suspension or disbarment. Thus, from Bernardino and Lao v. Medel, we upheld the imposition of one year's suspension for
the time we issued our first Resolution on 03 July 1996 requiring him to submit his non-payment of debt and issuance of worthless checks, or a suspension of six
Comment, until 16 March 1999, when he submitted said Comment to secure his months upon partial payment of the obligation.42 However, in these cases, for
release from arrest, almost three years had elapsed. various reasons, none of the issuances resulted in a conviction by the erring lawyers
for either estafa or B.P. Blg. 22. Thus, we held therein that the issuance of worthless
It is revealing that despite the unwarranted length of time it took respondent to checks constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with
comply, his Comment consists of all of two pages, a copy of which, it appears, he suspension from the practice of law.
neglected to furnish complainant.34 And while he claims to have been confined
while undergoing medical treatment at the time our Resolution of 17 February 1997 In the instant case, however, herein respondent has been found guilty and stands
was issued, he merely reserved the submission of a certification to that effect. Nor, convicted by final judgment of a crime involving moral turpitude. In People v.
indeed, was he able to offer any explanation for his failure to submit his Comment Tuanda, which is similar to this case in that both respondents were convicted for
from the time we issued our first Resolution of 03 July 1996 until 16 March 1999. In violation of B.P. Blg. 22 which we have held to be such a crime, we affirmed the
fact, said Comment alleged, merely, that the complainant, Michael Barrios, passed order of suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals, until
away sometime in June 1997, and imputed upon the latter unsupported ill-motives further orders.
for instituting the said Petition against him, which argument has already been
resolved squarely in the abovementioned IBP report. However, in a long line of cases, some of which were decided after Tuanda, we have
held disbarment to be the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a
Moreover, the IBP report cited the failure of both parties to appear before the crime involving moral turpitude. Thus:
Commission as the main reason for the long delay, until the same was finally
submitted for Resolution on 27 June 2002. Respondent, therefore, squandered away 1. In In The Matter of Disbarment Proceedings v. Narciso N. Jaramillo,43 we disbarred
seven years to "have his day in court and adduce evidence" in his behalf, which a lawyer convicted of estafa without discussing the circumstances behind his
inaction also unduly delayed the court's prompt disposition of this petition. conviction. We held that:
There is no question that the crime of estafa involves moral turpitude. The review of 8. In Adelina T. Villanueva v. Atty. Teresita Sta. Ana,53 we upheld the
respondent's conviction no longer rests upon us. The judgment not only has become recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors to disbar a lawyer who had been
final but has been executed. No elaborate argument is necessary to hold the convicted of estafa through falsification of public documents, because she was
respondent unworthy of the privilege bestowed on him as a member of the bar. "totally unfit to be a member of the legal profession."54
Suffice it to say that, by his conviction, the respondent has proved himself unfit to
protect the administration of justice.44 9. In Victoriano P. Resurreccion v. Atty. Ciriaco C. Sayson,55 a lawyer was disbarred
for having been convicted of estafa by final judgment for misappropriating the funds
2. In In Re: Dalmacio De Los Angeles,45 a lawyer was convicted of the crime of of his client.
attempted bribery in a final decision rendered by the Court of Appeals. "And since
bribery is admittedly a felony involving moral turpitude (7 C.J.S., p. 736; 5 Am. Jur. p. In this case as well, we find disbarment to be the appropriate penalty. "Of all classes
428), this Court, much as it sympathizes with the plight of respondent, is and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their
constrained to decree his disbarment as ordained by Section 25 of Rule 127."46 sworn servant; and for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the
laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very bands of society, argues
3. In Ledesma De Jesus-Paras v. Quinciano Vailoces,47 the erring lawyer recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the
acknowledged the execution of a document purporting to be a last will and insubordinate and dangerous elements of the body politic."56
testament, which later turned out to be a forgery. He was found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public document, which the Court WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Francisco P. Martinez is hereby dISBARRED and his
held to be a crime involving moral turpitude, said act being contrary to justice, name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision
honesty and good morals, and was subsequently disbarred. be entered in the respondent's record as a member of the Bar, and notice of the
same be served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the
4. In In Re: Disbarment Proceedings Against Atty. Diosdado Q. Gutierrez,48 Atty. Court Administrator for circulation to all courts in the country.
Gutierrez was convicted for murder. After serving a portion of the sentence, he was
granted a conditional pardon by the President. Holding that the pardon was not SO ORDERED.
absolute and thus did not reach the offense itself but merely remitted the
unexecuted portion of his term, the court nevertheless disbarred him. Davide, Jr., C.J., Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Chico-Nazario, and
5. In In Re: Atty. Isidro P. Vinzon,49 Atty. Vinzon was convicted of the crime of estafa Garcia, JJ., concur.
for misappropriating the amount of P7,000.00, and was subsequently disbarred. We Puno, J., on official leave.
held thus: Corona, and TINGA, JJ., on leave.

Upon the other hand, and dealing now with the merits of the case, there can be no
question that the term "moral turpitude" includes everything which is done contrary EN BANC
to justice, honesty, or good morals. In essence and in all respects, estafa, no doubt,
is a crime involving moral turpitude because the act is unquestionably against [A.C. No. 3360. January 30, 1990.]
justice, honesty and good morals (In re Gutierrez, Adm. Case No. 263, July 31, 1962;
Bouvier's Law Dictionary; In re Basa, 41 Phil. 275-76). As respondent's guilt cannot PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Complainant, v. ATTY. FE T. TUANDA, Respondent.
now be questioned, his disbarment is inevitable. (emphasis supplied)50

6. In In Re: Attorney Jose Avancea,51 the conditional pardon extended to the erring SYLLABUS
lawyer by the Chief Executive also failed to relieve him of the penalty of disbarment
imposed by this court.
1. LEGAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; GROUNDS FOR SUSPENSION FROM THE
7. In In Re Disbarment of Rodolfo Pajo,52 a lawyer was charged and found guilty of PRACTICE OF LAW; CASE AT BAR. The Court affirms the suspension from the
the crime of falsification of public document for having prepared and notarized a practice of law imposed by the Court of Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court
deed of sale of a parcel of land knowing that the supposed affiant was an impostor of Appeals correctly ruled that "the offense [of] which she is found guilty involved
and that the vendor had been dead for almost eight years. We ruled that disbarment moral turpitude." We should add that violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal
follows as a consequence of a lawyer's conviction by final judgment of a crime offense which deleteriously affects public interest and public order. Respondent was
involving moral turpitude, and since the crime of falsification of public document thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had been convicted
involves moral turpitude, we ordered respondent's name stricken off the roll of of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Revised
attorneys. Rules of Court provide as follows: "Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by
Supreme Court on what grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or Royal Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the honoring
malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her obligations to Ms.
reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of Marquez.chanrobles law library : red
the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a wilful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully Consequently, four (4) informations were filed against respondent with the Regional
appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The Trial Court of Manila: (a) one for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 85-38358;
practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain either personally or through and (b) three (3) for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, docketed respectively as Criminal Cases
paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." "Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by Nos. 85-38359, 85-38360 and 85-38361. In due time, after trial, the trial court
the Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court rendered a decision dated 25 August 1987 which:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
of First Instance may spend an attorney from practice for any of the causes named
in the last preceding section, and after such suspension such attorney shall not (a) acquitted respondent of the charge of estafa; and
practice his profession until further action of the Supreme Court in the
premises."cralaw virtua1aw library (b) convicted respondent of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in all three (3) cases, and
sentenced respondent to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONVICTION OF A CRIME INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE, VALID case of insolvency and to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00 in
GROUND THEREFOR; RATIONALE. The crimes of which respondent was convicted Criminal Case No. 85-38359;.
also import deceit and violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of Professional
Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." to pay a fine of P6,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to
Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, indemnify the complainant in the amount of P5,400.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; 38360; and
however, it certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person
convicted of such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, this Court stressed that: "the to pay a fine of P16,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and
nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of good to indemnify the complainant in the amount of P15,450.00, in Criminal Case No. 85-
moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an admission 38361, and to pay the costs in all three (3) cases.
to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the
practice of law." On appeal, the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093 affirmed in toto the
decision of the trial court but, in addition, suspended respondent Tuanda from the
practice of law. The pertinent portion of the decision read as
RESOLUTION follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"For reasons above stated and finding the evidence sufficient to sustain the
PER CURIAM: conviction, the judgment is hereby AFFIRMED subject to this modification.

It appearing from the records that the accused Fe Tuanda is a member of the Bar,
and the offense for (sic) which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude, she is
In a Motion to Lift Order of Suspension dated 12 July 1989, respondent Fe T. Tuanda, hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law and shall not practice her
a member of the Philippine Bar, asks this Court to lift the suspension from the profession until further action from the Supreme Court, in accordance with Sections
practice of law imposed upon her by a decision of the Court of Appeals dated 17 27 and 28 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. A copy of this decision must be
October 1988 in C.A.-G.R. CR No. 05093. forwarded to the Supreme Court as required by Section 29 of the same Rule.

On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A. Marquez several SO ORDERED." 1
pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00, for sale on a commission
basis, with the condition that the respondent would turn over the sales proceeds and On 16 December 1988, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal with the Court of
return the unsold items to Ms. Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in Appeals. The Court of Appeals, in a Resolution dated 9 January 1989, noted
February 1984, respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which respondents Notice of Appeal and advised her "to address her Notice of Appeal to
then amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks: (a) a check dated the Honorable Supreme Court, the proper forum." On 1 February 1989, respondent
16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00; (b) a check dated 23 February 1984 filed with this Court a Notice of Appeal.
also for the amount of P5,400.00; and (c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the
amount of P15,450.00. Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after In a Resolution dated 31 May 1989, the Supreme Court noted without action
their issuance, all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders respondents Notice of Appeal and declared that the Court of Appeals decision of 17
October 1988 had become final and executory upon expiration of the period for filing Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law because she had
a petition for review on certiorari on 16 December 1988. In that Resolution, the been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude. Sections 27 and 28 of Rule 138
Court found that respondent had lost her right to appeal by certiorari when she of the Revised Rules of Court provide as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
posted with this Court a Notice of Appeal instead of filing a petition for review on
certiorari under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court within the "Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what
reglementary period. grounds. A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court of any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct
In the instant Motion to Lift Order of Suspension, respondent in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to
take before admission to practice, or for a wilful disobedience of any lawful order of
"that suspension from the practice of law is indeed a harsh if not a not painful a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a
penalty aggravating the lower courts penalty of fine considering that accused- case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the
appellants action on the case during the trial on the merits at the lower court has purpose of gain either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes
always been motivated purely by sincere belief that she is innocent of the offenses malpractice." (Emphasis supplied)
charged nor of the intention to cause damage to the herein plaintiff-appellee."cralaw
virtua1aw library "Sec. 28. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or a Court of First
Instance. The Court of Appeals or a Court of First Instance may spend an attorney
We read the above statement as a claim by the respondent that, she had not from practice for any of the causes named in the last preceding section, and after
violated her oath as a member of the Philippine Bar upon the ground that when she such suspension such attorney shall not practice his profession until further action of
issued the checks which bounced, she did not intend to cause damage to the Supreme Court in the premises." (Emphasis supplied)
complainant Ms. Marquez.chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also import deceit
The Court affirms the suspension from the practice of law imposed by the Court of and violation of her attorneys oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
Appeals upon respondent Tuanda. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that "the under both of which she was bound to "obey the laws of the land." Conviction of a
offense [of] which she is found guilty involved moral turpitude." We should add that crime involving moral turpitude might not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P.
violation of B.P. Blg. 22 is a serious criminal offense which deleteriously affects Blg. 22 does not) relate to the exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it
public interest and public order. In Lozano v. Martinez, 2 the Court explained the certainly relates to and affects the good moral character of a person convicted of
nature of the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in the following such offense. In Melendrez v. Decena, 4 this Court stressed
terms:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"x x x "the nature of the office of an attorney at law requires that she shall be a person of
good moral character. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to an
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and admission to the practice of law; its continued possession is also essential for
issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for remaining in the practice of law." 5
payment. xxx The thrust of the law is to prohibit under pain of penal sanctions, the
making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DENY the Motion to Lift Order of Suspension.
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the law. The Respondent shall remain suspended from the practice of law until further orders
law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against public from this Court. A copy of this Resolution shall be forwarded to the Bar Confidant
order. and to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and spread on the record of
Respondent.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
x x x
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento, Corts and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of
the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the Gutierrez, Jr., Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., In the result.
community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or
holder, but also an injury to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless
commercial papers in circulation, multiplied a thousand fold, can very well pollute EN BANC
the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt
the welfare of society and the public interest." 3 (Emphasis supplied) [IN RE: CARLOS S. BASA : December 7, 1920. ]
IN RE: CARLOS S. BASA. the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly passed over. On the
other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in
Pedro Guevarra for Respondent. order that so promising a career may not be utterly ruined.

Attorney-General Feria for the Government. It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa shall be
discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer for one year. So
SYLLABUS ordered.

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; DISBARMENT OR SUSPENSION; CONVICTION OF A CRIME Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Street, Avancea and Villamor, JJ., concur.
INVOLVING MORAL TURPITUDE. "Moral turpitude" includes everything which is
done contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
EN BANC
2. ID.; ID.; ID. The crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of
the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude. A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, February 03, 2015

MELVYN G. GARCIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAUL H. SESBREO, Respondent.

DECISION
DECISION

MALCOLM, J. : PER CURIAM:

Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the disbarment of Attorney Carlos Atty. Raul H. Sesbreo (Sesbreo). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and
S. Basa. A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Courts Resolution dated 30 September
2014.
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of
California and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the Court of First A.C. No. 7973
Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with consent, was found
guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M. V. del Rosario, Judge of First On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreo before
Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven the Office of the Bar Confidant. The case was docketed as A.C. No. 7973. Garcia
months and eleven days of prision correcional. On appeal, months and eleven days alleged that in 1965, he married Virginia Alcantara in Cebu. They had two children,
of prision correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. In 1971, he and Virginia separated. He became a
down by the second division of the Supreme Court. 1 dentist and practiced his profession in Cabanatuan City. Garcia alleged that in 1992,
Virginia filed a petition for the annulment of their marriage, which was eventually
The Code of Civil Procedure, section 21, provides that "A member of the bar may be granted.
removed or suspended from his office of lawyer by the Supreme Court by reason of
his conviction of a crime involving moral turpide . . . ." The sole question presented, Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreo, representing Maria
therefore, is whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister
of the Penal Code, involves moral turpide. Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was
already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In
"Moral turpide," it has been said, "includes everything which is done contrary to 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreo and Garcias children learned
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, cited by about his return, Sesbreo filed a Second Amended Complaint against him. Garcia
numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found which has decided the exact alleged that he learned that Sesbreo was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of
question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes of this character involve moral Cebu City, Branch 18, for Homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733. Garcia alleged
turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is such that it is against good morals and that Sesbreo is only on parole. Garcia alleged that homicide is a crime against
the accepted rule of right conduct. (In re Hopkins [1909], 54 Wash., 569; Pollard v. moral turpitude; and thus, Sesbreo should not be allowed to continue his practice
Lyon [1875], 91 U. S., 225; 5 Ops. Atty. -Gen. P. I., 46, 185; decisions of the Supreme of law.
Court of Spain of November 30, 1876 and June 15, 1895.)
In his Comment, Sesbreo alleged that on 15 August 2008, Garcia filed a similar
When we come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be complaint against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Commission on
taken by court, we do so regretfully and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBC Case No. 08-2273. Sesbreo alleged that
Garcias complaint was motivated by resentment and desire for revenge because he The circumstances leading to the death of Luciano solely caused by respondent,
acted as pro bono counsel for Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth. bear the earmarks of moral turpitude. Paraphrasing what the Supreme Court
observed in Soriano v. Dizon, supra, the respondent, by his conduct, displayed
In the Courts Resolution dated 18 January 2010, the Court referred A.C. No. 7973 to extreme arrogance and feeling of self-importance. Respondent acted like a god who
the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation. deserved not to be slighted by a couple of drunks who may have shattered the
stillness of the early morning with their boisterous antics, natural display of loud
A.C. No. 10457 (CBC Case No. 08-2273) bravado of drunken men who had one too many. Respondents inordinate
overreaction to the ramblings of drunken men who were not even directed at
A day prior to the filing of A.C. No. 7973, or on 29 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint respondent reflected poorly on his fitness to be a member of the legal profession.
for disbarment against Sesbreo before the IBP-CBD. He alleged that Sesbreo is Respondent was not only vindictive without a cause; he was cruel with a misplaced
practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU- sense of superiority.2
31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully
served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreo violated Section 27, Rule 138 of Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was
the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-CBD, recommended that Sesbreo be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of
Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreo alleging basically the same Attorneys.
facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973.
In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors
In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreo alleged that his sentence was commuted adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
and the phrase with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law was deleted.
Sesbreo argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the On 6 May 2013, Sesbreo filed a motion for reconsideration before the IBP-CBD.
disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreo further Sesbreo alleged that the IBP-CBD misunderstood and misapplied Soriano v. Atty.
alleged that homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreo claimed that Dizon. He alleged that the attendant circumstances in Soriano are disparate,
Garcias complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to distinct, and different from his case. He further alleged that there was no condition
retaliate against him for representing Garcias daughters in court. set on the grant of executive clemency to him; and thus, he was restored to his full
civil and political rights. Finally, Sesbreo alleged that after his wife died in an
The IBP-CBD consolidated A.C. No. 7973 with CBD Case No. 08-2273. The parties ambush, he already stopped appearing as private prosecutor in the case for bigamy
agreed on the sole issue to be resolved: whether moral turpitude is involved in a against Garcia and that he already advised his clients to settle their other cases. He
conviction for homicide. alleged that Garcia already withdrew the complaints against him.

The IBP-CBD ruled that the Regional Trial Court of Cebu found Sesbreo guilty of On 11 February 2014, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XX-2014-31
murder and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. On appeal, denying Sesbreos motion for reconsideration. The IBP-CBD transmitted the records
this Court downgraded the crime to homicide and sentenced Sesbreo to suffer the of the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant on 20 May 2014. CBD Case No. 08-
penalty of imprisonment for 9 years and 1 day of prision mayor as minimum to 16 2273 was redocketed as A.C. No. 10457. In the Courts Resolution dated 30
years and 4 months of reclusion temporal as maximum. The IBP-CBD found that September 2014, the Court consolidated A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457.
Sesbreo was released from confinement on 27 July 2001 following his acceptance
of the conditions of his parole on 10 July 2001. The only issue in these cases is whether conviction for the crime of homicide
involves moral turpitude.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground
for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National We adopt the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution
Labor Relations Commission,1 the IBP-CBD further ruled that homicide may or may No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11
not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors.
reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreo for the crime of homicide,
and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim involved moral Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be
turpitude. The IBP-CBD stated:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the
Neither victim Luciano Amparado nor his companion Christopher Yapchangco was appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral
shown to be a foe of respondent and neither had the victim Luciano nor his turpitude.4 Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the
companion Christopher shown to have wronged the respondent. They simply private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary
happened to be at the wrong place and time the early morning of June 3, 1993. to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The question of whether conviction for homicide involves moral turpitude was
discussed by this Court in International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC6 where it We cannot accept Sesbreos argument that the executive clemency restored his full
ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary civil and political rights. Sesbreo cited In re Atty. Parcasio10 to bolster his
argument. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted an absolute and unconditional
This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral pardon11 which restored his full civil and political rights,12 a circumstance not
turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation13 did not state that the
degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not pardon was absolute and unconditional. The accessory penalties were not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any mentioned when the original sentence was recited in the Order of Commutation and
particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and they were also not mentioned in stating the commuted sentence. It only
frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibita
do not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not By virtue of the authority conferred upon me by the Constitution and upon the
exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, the original sentence of
crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are prisoner RAUL SESBREO Y HERDA convicted by the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City
crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows and Supreme Court and sentenced to an indeterminate prison term of from 9 years
therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the and 1 day to 16 years and 4 months imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of
meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the P50,000.00 is/are hereby commuted to an indeterminate prison term of from 7 years
cases are reached.7 and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment and to pay an indemnity of P50,000.00.14

In People v. Sesbreo,8 the Court found Sesbreo guilty of homicide and Again, there was no mention that the executive clemency was absolute and
ruled:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary unconditional and restored Sesbreo to his full civil and political rights.

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the
18, in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733 is hereby MODIFIED. Appellant Raul H. Sesbreo President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and
is hereby found GUILTY of HOMICIDE and hereby sentenced to suffer a prison term of forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment.15 In this case, the executive
9 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as a minimum, to 16 years and 4 months of clemency merely commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6
reclusion temporal, as a maximum, with accessory penalties provided by law, to months to 10 years imprisonment the penalty imposed on Sesbreo. Commutation
indemnify the heirs of the deceased Luciano Amparado in the amount of P50,000.00 is a mere reduction of penalty.16Commutation only partially extinguished criminal
and to pay the costs. liability.17 The penalty for Sesbreos crime was never wiped out. He served the
commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he was released from prison. More
SO ORDERED.9 importantly, the Final Release and Discharge18 stated that [i]t is understood that
such x x x accessory penalties of the law as have not been expressly remitted herein
We reviewed the Decision of this Court and we agree with the IBP-CBD that the shall subsist. Hence, the Parcasio case has no application here. Even if Sesbreo
circumstances show the presence of moral turpitude. has been granted pardon, there is nothing in the records that shows that it was a full
and unconditional pardon. In addition, the practice of law is not a right but a
The Decision showed that the victim Luciano Amparado (Amparado) and his privilege.19 It is granted only to those possessing good moral character.20 A
companion Christopher Yapchangco (Yapchangco) were walking and just passed by violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession justifies the imposition
Sesbreos house when the latter, without any provocation from the former, went of the appropriate penalty against a lawyer, including the penalty of
out of his house, aimed his rifle, and started firing at them. According to disbarment.21chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrarychanrobleslaw
Yapchangco, they were about five meters, more or less, from the gate of Sesbreo
when they heard the screeching sound of the gate and when they turned around, WHEREFORE, respondent Raul H. Sesbreo is DISBARRED effective immediately
they saw Sesbreo aiming his rifle at them. Yapchangco and Amparado ran away upon his receipt of this Decision.
but Amparado was hit. An eyewitness, Rizaldy Rabanes (Rabanes), recalled that he
heard shots and opened the window of his house. He saw Yapchangco and Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Amparado running away while Sesbreo was firing his firearm rapidly, hitting Integrated Bar of the Philippines for distribution to all its chapters, and the Office of
Rabanes house in the process. Another witness, Edwin Parune, saw Amparado fall the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts all over the country. Let a
down after being shot, then saw Sesbreo in the middle of the street, carrying a long copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of respondent.
firearm, and walking back towards the gate of his house. The IBP-CBD correctly
stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They SO ORDERED.
did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreo that
eventually led to the death of Amparado.
Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the
Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Perlas-Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur. Revised Penal Code.10cralawred
Brion, J., on leave.
Reyes, J., no part. The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008
finding probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315,
paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for
SECOND DIVISION estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued
A.C. No. 8330, March 16, 2015 by the trial court.11cralawred

TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ, Complainant, v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA, Respondent. In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or
suspended for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of
RESOLUTION Court.12cralawred

LEONEN, J.: On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the
Complaint.13cralawred
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by
complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. De Vera filed her Answer14 dated June 24, 2010. She presented her version of
Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held the facts.
administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and
Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit1 on June 26, 2009 before Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29)
this court. The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment Globe' Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred
or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-
payment of a loan.2cralawred Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per
site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization
According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits.
She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per site.16cralawred
site acquisition to Atty. De Vera.3cralawred
Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006.17 At that
Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with time, Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom.18 However,
interest of P20,000.00 per month until fully paid.4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have Teresita did not have the funds required for the application of building permits that
the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site.19cralawred
friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her property located in
Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently,
2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to
the interest agreed upon.7cralawred guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently
arguing with her husband regarding the loan.20cralawred
Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from
Teresita's sister in the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister.21 She only lent
Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita another check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]"22cralawred
Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De
Vera.8cralawred Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to
Teresita for value. The checks were not meant to be deposited.23cralawred
Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However,
the checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless.
to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored She points out that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were
because the account was closed.9cralawred under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal
complaint.24cralawred
Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her
obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation
Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By
administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any issuing checks in violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious
manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests misconduct.
of the complainant."25cralawred
...
Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused.26 In addition, "[a] 11
the bare allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to [A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his
mortgage her property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.]33
upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Vera]."27cralawred
In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she
On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation Professional Responsibility.34 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De
or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"28cralawred Vera violated the following provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land
mandatory conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and promote respect for the law and legal processes.
and marked exhibits.29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the
parties were "directed to submit their respective verified position papers within a Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order."30. conduct.

Both parties failed to file their position papers.31cralawred Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
from the practice of law.32 The Investigating Commissioner manner to the discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary
ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The dispositive portion of the Investigating Commissioner's Report and
Recommendation36 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security
for the loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it
no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience. is recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the
practice of law.37cralawred
... cralawlawlibrary

. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-61238 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated
respondent incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating
postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the payment of the loans. Commissioner's recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
serious misconduct. APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in
the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and
The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by
presentation for payment. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and
pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby
making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year.39 (Emphasis in the
debt though not intended to be presented for payment has the same effect as original)cralawlawlibrary
an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22.
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration40 dated September 17, 2013 of constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar.46 (Emphasis
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary
filed the Motion for Reconsideration41 dated September 21, 2013.
Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";47 it is
In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-24142 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated serious or gross when it is flagrant.48cralawred
Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties' respective
motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary We recently reiterated the purpose and nature of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 in relation
to an administrative case against a member of the bar:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and
Respondent, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 has been enacted in order to safeguard the interest of the
and the resolution .subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the banking system and the legitimate public checking account users. The gravamen of
matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. the offense defined and punished by Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 . . . is the act of
Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to making and issuing a worthless check, or any check that is dishonored upon its
his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of presentment for payment and putting it in circulation; the law is designed to prohibit
the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution and altogether eliminate the deleterious and pernicious practice of issuing checks
No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the with insufficient funds, or with no credit, because the practice is deemed a public
original) nuisance, a crime against public order to be abated.
cralawlawlibrary
...
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should
be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in Being a lawyer, [respondent] was well aware of the objectives and coverage of Batas
violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. Pambansa Blg. 22. If he did not, he was nonetheless presumed to know them, for.
the law was penal in character and application. His issuance of the unfunded check
After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to involved herein knowingly violated Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, and exhibited his
adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines indifference towards the pernicious effect of his illegal act to public interest and
Board of Governors. public order. He thereby swept aside his Lawyer's Oath that enjoined him to support
the Constitution and obey the laws.49 (Citations omitted)cralawlawlibrary
Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the
loans alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not A lawyer is required to observe the law and be mindful of his or her actions whether
as payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative acting in a public or private capacity.50 The Code of Professional Responsibility
complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts
complained of."44cralawred CANON 1 -
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
issuing worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes Rule 1.01 -
serious misconduct. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
....
In De Jesus v. Collado,45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious CANON 7 -
misconduct for issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY- AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
for payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
....
In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained Rule 7.03 -
against respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to
civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is concerned. Since she had the discredit of the legal profession.
admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank cralawlawlibrary
account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with
which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera incurred monetary
consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 obligations from Teresita. Atty. De Vera admitted issuing the checks to Teresita. She
refused to answer for her liabilities by denying the existence of the loan and
claiming that the checks were mere "show checks."51 However, she failed to 'not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his profession, but also for gross
present evidence to prove those allegations. misconduct not connected with his professional duties, which showed him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which his license and the law confer to
The Decision52 wherein the trial court found Teresita civilly liable to Mary Jane for him.'"57cralawred
P540,000.00,53 and on which Atty. De Vera relies upon, is not sufficient evidence to
hold that there was no separate transaction between Teresita and Atty. De Vera. The WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Trina De Vera is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
Decision involved the post-dated checks issued by Teresita to Mary Jane only.54 Mary for one (1) year. Let a copy of this Resolution be entered in Atty. De Vera's personal
Jane merely claimed that she had no personal knowledge of any transaction record with the Office of the Bar Confidant, and a copy be served to the Integrated
between Teresita and Atty. De Vera.55cralawred Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all
the courts in the land.
The Investigating Commissioner correctly pointed out that Atty. De Vera's allegation
of "lending" her checks to Teresita is contrary to ordinary human experience. As a SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary
lawyer, Atty. De Vera is presumed to know the consequences of her acts. She issued
several post-dated checks for value that were dishonored upon presentation for Carpio, (Chairperson), Brion, Del Castillo, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
payment.

Membership in the bar requires a high degree of fidelity to the laws whether in a Falsified / altered evidence
private or professional capacity. "Any transgression of this duty on his part would not
only diminish his reputation as a lawyer but would also erode the public's faith in the
Legal Profession as a whole."56 A lawyer "may be removed or otherwise disciplined