Andrey Korotayev

Artemy Malkov
Daria Khaltourina

INTRODUCTION
TO SOCIAL MACRODYNAMICS:
Secular Cycles
and Millennial Trends

Moscow: URSS, 2006

RUSSIAN STATE UNIVERSITY FOR THE HUMANITIES
Faculty of History, Political Science and Law

RUSSIAN ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Center for Civilizational and Regional Studies
Institute of Oriental Studies

Andrey Korotayev
Artemy Malkov
Daria Khaltourina

INTRODUCTION
TO SOCIAL MACRODYNAMICS:
Secular Cycles
and Millennial Trends

Moscow: URSS, 2006

 22.318 60.5

This study has been supported by the Russian Foundation

for Basic Research (projects ## 060680459 and 040680225),
the Presidium of the Russian Academy of Sciences
("The Power and Society in History" Program),
and the Russian Science Support Foundation

Korotayev Andrey, Malkov Artemy, Khaltourina Daria

Introduction to Social Macrodynamics: Secular Cycles and Millennial

Trends. Moscow: Editorial URSS. 176 p.

ISBN 5484005590

Human society is a complex nonequilibrium system that changes and develops con-
stantly. Complexity, multivariability, and contradictions of social evolution lead researchers
to a logical conclusion that any simplification, reduction, or neglect of the multiplicity of fac-
tors leads inevitably to the multiplication of error and to significant misunderstanding of the
processes under study. The view that any simple general laws are not observed at all with re-
spect to social evolution has become totally dominant within the academic community, espe-
cially among those who specialize in the Humanities and who confront directly in their re-
search the manifold unpredictability of social processes. A way to approach human society as
an extremely complex system is to recognize differences of abstraction and time scale be-
tween different levels. If the main task of scientific analysis is to detect the main forces acting
on systems so as to discover fundamental laws at a sufficiently coarse scale, then abstracting
from details and deviations from general rules may help to identify measurable deviations
from these laws in finer detail and shorter time scales. Modern achievements in the field of
mathematical modeling suggest that social evolution can be described with rigorous and suf-
ficiently simple macrolaws.
The first book of the Introduction (Compact Macromodels of the World System
Growth. Moscow: Editorial URSS, 2006) discusses general regularities of the World System
long-term development. It is shown that they can be described mathematically in a rather ac-
curate way with rather simple models. In this book the authors analyze more complex regu-
larities of its dynamics on shorter scales, as well as dynamics of its constituent parts paying
special attention to "secular" cyclical dynamics. It is shown that the structure of millennial
trends cannot be adequately understood without secular cycles being taken into consideration.
In turn, for an adequate understanding of cyclical dynamics the millennial trend background
should be taken into account.
 Contents

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Introduction: Millennial Trends . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Chapter 1 Secular Cycles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Chapter 2 Historical Population Dynamics in China:
Some Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Chapter 3 A New Model of Pre-Industrial Political-
Demographic Cycles (by Natalia Komarova
and Andrey Korotayev) . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Chapter 4 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends . . . . . . 95

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
Appendix 1 An Empirical Test of
the Kuznets Kremer Hypothesis . . . . . . . . 141
Appendix 2 Compact Mathematical Models of
the World System's Development and
Macroperiodization of the World System's
History . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
 Acknowledgements
First and foremost, our thanks go to the Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton.
Without the first author's one-year membership in this Institute this book could
hardly have been written. We are especially grateful to the following professors
and members of this institute for valuable comments on the first sketches of this
monograph: Patricia Crone, Nicola Di Cosmo, John Shepherd, Ki Che Angela
Leung, and Michael Nylan. We are also grateful to the Russian Science Support
Foundation and the Russian Foundation for Basic Research for financial support
of this work (Projects ## 060680459 and 040680225).
We would like to express our special gratitude to Gregory Malinetsky, Sergey
Podlazov (Institute for Applied Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences),
Robert Graber (Truman State University), Victor de Munck (State University of
New York), Diana Pickworth (Aden University, Yemen), Antony J. Harper (New
Trier College), Duran Bell, Donald Saari, and Douglas R. White (University of
California, Irvine) for their invaluable help and advice.
We would also like to thank our colleagues who offered us useful comments
and insights on the subject of this book: Herbert Barry III (University of
Pittsburgh), Yuri Berezkin (Kunstkammer, St. Petersburg), Svetlana Borinskaya
(Institute of General Genetics, Russian Academy of Sciences), Dmitri
Bondarenko (Institute for African Studies, Russian Academy of Sciences), Robert
L. Carneiro (American Museum of Natural History, New York), Henry
J. M. Claessen (Leiden University), Dmitrij Chernavskij (Institute of Physics,
Russian Academy of Sciences), Marat Cheshkov (Institute of International
Economics, Russian Academy of Sciences), Georgi and Lubov Derlouguian
(Northwestern University, Evanston), William T. Divale (City University of New
York), Timothy K. Earle (Northwestern University), Carol and Melvin Ember
(Human Relations Area Files at Yale University), Leonid Grinin (Center for
Social Research, Volgograd), Sergey Nefedov (Russian Academy of Sciences,
Ural Branch, Ekaterinburg), Nikolay Kradin (Russian Academy of Sciences, Far
East Branch, Vladivostok), Vitalij Meliantsev (Institute of Asia and Africa,
Moscow State University), Akop Nazaretyan (Oriental Institute, Russian Academy
of Sciences), Nikolay Rozov (Novosibirsk State University), Igor Sledzevski
(Institute for African Studies, Moscow), Peter Turchin (University of Connecticut,
Storrs), and Paul Wason (Templeton Foundation). We would also like to thank
Tatiana Shifrina, the Director of the "Khalturka-Design" Company, for the design
of the cover of this monograph.
Needless to say, faults, mistakes, infelicities, etc., remain our own
responsibility.
 Introduction: Millennial Trends1

In the first part of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics (Korotayev,

Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a) we have shown that more than 99% of all the
variation in demographic, economic and cultural macrodynamics of the World
System over the last two millennia can be accounted for by very simple general
mathematical models. Let us start this part with a summary of these findings,
along with some relevant new findings that we obtained after the first part of
this Introduction had been published. This summary is intended for all those in-
terested in patterns of social evolution and development, including those who
are not familiar with higher mathematics. Accordingly, we have included some
basic material that mathematically sophisticated readers may wish to skip over
lightly or entirely ignore.
In 1960 von Foerster, Mora, and Amiot published, in the journal Science, a
striking discovery. They showed that between 1 and 1958 CE the world's popu-
lation (N) dynamics can be described in an extremely accurate way with an
astonishingly simple equation:2
C
Nt , (0.1)
t0 t
where Nt is the world population at time t, and C and t0 are constants, with t0
corresponding to an absolute limit ("singularity" point) at which N would be-
come infinite.
Parameter t0 was estimated by von Foerster and his colleagues as 2026.87,
which corresponds to November 13, 2006; this made it possible for them to

1
This book is a translation of an amended and enlarged version of the second part of the following
monograph originally published in Russian: , . ., . . . . -
. :
(. . ). .: , 2005.
2
To be exact, the equation proposed by von Foerster and his colleagues looked as follows:
C
Nt . However, as has been shown by von Hoerner (1975) and Kapitza (1992, 1999),
(t 0 t ) 0.99
it can be written more succinctly as N C .
t0 t
t
6 Introduction

supply their article with a public-relations masterpiece title "Doomsday: Fri-

day, 13 November, A.D. 2026".3
Note that the graphic representation of this equation is nothing but a hyper-
bola; thus, the growth pattern described is denoted as "hyperbolic".
Let us recollect that the basic hyperbolic equation is:
k
y . (0.2)
x
A graphic representation of this equation looks as follows (if k equals, e.g., 5)
(see Diagram 0.1):
5
Diagram 0.1. Hyperbolic Curve Produced by Equation y
x

y 250

200

150

100

50

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x

3
Of course, von Foerster and his colleagues did not imply that the world population on that day
could actually become infinite. The real implication was that the world population growth pattern
that was followed for many centuries prior to 1960 was about to come to an end and be trans-
formed into a radically different pattern. Note that this prediction began to be fulfilled only in a
few years after the "Doomsday" paper was published (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltou-
rina 2006a: Chapter 1).
 Millennial Trends 7

The hyperbolic equation can also be written in the following way:

k
y . (0.3)
x0 x
With x0 = 2 (and k still equal to 5) this equation will produce the following
curve (see Diagram 0.2):
5
Diagram 0.2. Hyperbolic Curve Produced by Equation y
2 x

y 250

200

150

100

50

0
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
x

As can be seen, the curve produced by equation (0.3) at Diagram 0.2 is precise-
ly a mirror image of the hyperbolic curve produced by equation (0.2) at Dia-
gram 0.1. Now let us interpret the X-axis as the axis of time (t-axis), the Y-axis
as the axis of the world's population (counted in millions), replace x0 with 2027
(that is the result of just rounding of von Foesters number, 2026.87), and re-
8 Introduction

place k with 215000.4 This gives us a version of von Foerster's equation with
certain parameters:
215000 .
Nt (0.4)
2027 t

In fact, von Foerster's equation suggests a rather unlikely thing. It "says" that if
you would like to know the world population (in millions) for a certain year,
then you should just subtract this year from 2027 and then divide 215000 by the
difference. At first glance, such an algorithm seems most unlikely to work;
however, let us check if it does. Let us start with 1970. To estimate the world
population in 1970 using von Foerster's equation we first subtract 1970 from
2027, to get 57. Now the only remaining thing is to divide 215000 by the figure
just obtained (that is, 57), and we should arrive at the figure for the world popu-
lation in 1970 (in millions): 215000 57 = 3771.9. According to the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census database (2006), the world population in 1970 was 3708.1
million. Of course, none of the U.S. Bureau of the Census experts would insist
that the world population in 1970 was precisely 3708.1 million. After all, the
census data is absent or unreliable for this year for many countries; in fact, the
result produced by von Foerster's equation falls well within the error margins
for empirical estimates.
Now let us calculate the world population in 1900. It is clear that in order to
do this we should simply divide 215000 million by 127; this gives 1693 million,
which turns out to be precisely within the range of the extant empirical esti-
mates (16001710 million).5
Let us do the same operation for the year 1800: 2027 1800 = 227;
215000 227 = 947.1 (million). According to empirical estimates, the world
population for 1800 indeed was between 900 and 980 million.6 Let us repeat the
operation for 1700: 2027 1700 = 337; 215000 337 = 640 (million). Once
again, we find ourselves within the margins of available empirical estimates
(600679 million).7 Let us repeat the algorithm once more, for the year 1400:
2027 1400 = 627; 215000 627 = 343 (million). Yet again, we see that the
result falls within the error margins of available world population estimates for
this date.8 The overall correlation between the curve generated by von Foerster's

4
Note that the value of coefficient k (equivalent to parameter in equation (1)) used by us is a bit
different from the one used by von Foerster.
5
Thomlinson 1975; Durand 1977; McEvedy and Jones 1978; Biraben 1980; Haub 1995; Modelski
2003; UN Population Division 2006; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006.
6
Thomlinson 1975; McEvedy and Jones 1978; Biraben 1980; Modelski 2003; UN Population Di-
vision 2006; U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006.
7
Thomlinson 1975; McEvedy and Jones 1978; Biraben 1980; Maddison 2001; Modelski 2003;
U.S. Bureau of the Census 2006.
8
350 million (McEvedy and Jones 1978), 374 million (Biraben 1980).
 Millennial Trends 9

equation and the most detailed series of empirical estimates looks as follows
(see Diagram 0.3):
Diagram 0.3. Correlation between Empirical Estimates of World
Population (in millions, 1000 1970) and the Curve
Generated by von Foerster's Equation
NOTE: black markers corre-
spond to empirical estimates of
the world population by
McEvedy and Jones (1978) for
10001950 and the U.S. Bu-
reau of the Census (2006) for
19501970. The grey curve has
been generated by von Foer-
ster's equation (0.4).

The formal characteristics are as follows: R = 0.998; R2 = 0.996;

p = 9.4 10-17 1 10-16. For readers unfamiliar with mathematical statistics:
R2 can be regarded as a measure of the fit between the dynamics generated by a
mathematical model and the empirically observed situation, and can be inter-
preted as the proportion of the variation accounted for by the respective equa-
tion. Note that 0.996 also can be expressed as 99.6%.9 Thus, von Foerster's
equation accounts for an astonishing 99.6% of all the macrovariation in world
population, from 1000 CE through 1970, as estimated by McEvedy and Jones
(1978) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006). 10

9
The second characteristic (p, standing for "probability") is a measure of the correlation's statisti-
cal significance. A bit counterintuitively, the lower the value of p, the higher the statistical signif-
icance of the respective correlation. This is because p indicates the probability that the observed
correlation could be accounted solely by chance. Thus, p = 0.99 indicates an extremely low sta-
tistical significance, as it means that there are 99 chances out of 100 that the observed correlation
is the result of a coincidence, and, thus, we can be quite confident that there is no systematic rela-
tionship (at least, of the kind that we study) between the two respective variables. On the other
hand, p = 1 10-16 indicates an extremely high statistical significance for the correlation, as it
means that there is only one chance out of 10000000000000000 that the observed correlation is
the result of pure coincidence (in fact, a correlation is usually considered as statistically signifi-
cant with p < 0.05).
10
In fact, with slightly different parameters ( = 164890.45; t0 = 2014) the fit (R2) between the dy-
namics generated by von Foerster's equation and the macrovariation of world population for CE
1000 1970 as estimated by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and the U.S. Bureau of the Census
10 Introduction

Note also that the empirical estimates of world population find themselves
aligned in an extremely neat way along the hyperbolic curve, which convincing-
ly justifies the designation of the pre-1970s world population growth pattern as
"hyperbolic".
Von Foerster and his colleagues detected the hyperbolic pattern of world
population growth for 1 CE 1958 CE; later it was shown that this pattern con-
tinued for a few years after 1958,11 and also that it can be traced for many mil-
lennia BCE (Kapitza 1992, 1999; Kremer 1993). 12 Indeed, the McEvedy and
Jones (1978) estimates for world population for the period 5000500 BCE are
described rather accurately by a hyperbolic equation (R2 = 0.996); and this fit
remains rather high for 40000 200 BCE (R2 = 0.990) (see below Appendix 2).
The overall shape of the worlds population dynamics in 40000 BCE 1970 CE
also follows the hyperbolic pattern quite well (see Diagram 0.4):
Diagram 0.4. World Population Dynamics, 40000 BCE 1970 CE
(in millions): the fit between predictions of a hyperbolic
model and the observed data
4000

3000

2000

1000

predicted

0 observed
-40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0
-35000 -25000 -15000 -5000 5000

NOTE: R = 0.998, R2 = 0.996, p << 0.0001. Black markers correspond to empirical estimates of
the world population by McEvedy and Jones (1978) and Kremer (1993) for 10001950, as well as

(2006) reaches 0.9992 (99.92%), whereas for 500 BCE 1970 CE this fit increases to 0.9993
(99.93%) (with the following parameters: = 171042.78; t0 = 2016).
11
Note that after the 1960s, world population deviated from the hyperbolic pattern more and more;
at present it definitely is no longer hyperbolic (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina
2006a: Chapter 1).
12
In fact, Kremer asserts the presence of this pattern since 1 million BCE; Kapitza, since 4 million
BCE! We, however, are not prepared to accept these claims, because it is far from clear even who
constituted the "world population" in, say, 1 million BCE, let alone how their number could have
been empirically estimated.
 Millennial Trends 11

the U.S. Bureau of the Census (2006) data for 19501970. The solid line has been generated by the
following version of von Foerster's equation:
189648.7
Nt .
2022 t
A usual objection (e.g., Shishkov 2005) against the statement that the overall
pattern of world population growth until the 1970s was hyperbolic is as follows.
Since we simply do not know the exact population of the world for most of hu-
man history (and especially, before CE), we do not have enough information to
detect the general shape of the world population dynamics through most of hu-
man history. Thus, there are insufficient grounds to accept the statement that the
overall shape of the world population dynamics in 40000 BCE 1970 CE was
hyperbolic.
At first glance this objection looks very convincing. For example, for 1 BCE
the world population estimates range from 170 million (McEvedy and Jones
1978) to 330 million (Durand 1977), whereas for 10000 BCE the estimate range
becomes even more dramatic: 110 million (Thomlinson 1975). Indeed, it
seems evident that with such uncertain empirical data, we are simply unable to
identify the long-term trend of world population macrodynamics.
However, notwithstanding the apparent persuasiveness of this objection, we
cannot accept it. Let us demonstrate why.
Let us start with 10000 CE. As was mentioned above, we have only a rather
vague idea about how many people lived on the Earth that time. However, we
can be reasonably confident that it was more than 1 million, and less than 10
million. Note that this is not even a guesstimate. Indeed, we know which parts
of the world were populated by that time (most of it, in fact), what kind of sub-
sistence economies were practiced13 (see, e.g., Peregrine and Ember 2001), and
what the maximum number of people 100 square kilometers could support with
any of these subsistence economies (see, e.g., Korotayev 1991). Thus, we know
that with foraging technologies practiced by human populations in 10000 BCE,
the Earth could not have supported more than 10 million people (and the actual
world population is very likely to have been substantially smaller). Regarding
world population in 40000 BCE, we can be sure only that it was somewhat
smaller than in 10000 BCE. We do not know what exactly the difference was,
but as we shall see below, this is not important for us in the context of this dis-
cussion.
The available estimates of world population between 10000 BCE and 1 CE
can, of course, be regarded as educated guesstimates. However, in 2 CE the sit-
uation changes substantially, because this is the year of the "earliest preserved
census in the world" (Bielenstein 1987: 14). Note also that this census was per-
formed in China, one of the countries that is most important for us in this con-

13
Note that at that time these economies were exclusively foraging (though quite intensive in a few
areas of the world [see, e.g., Grinin 2003b]).
12 Introduction

text. This census recorded 59 million taxable inhabitants of China (e.g., Bielen-
stein 1947: 126, 1986: 240; Durand 1960: 216; Loewe 1986: 206), or 57.671
million according to a later re-evaluation by Bielenstein (1987: 14).14 Up to the
18th century the Chinese counts tended to underestimate the population, since
before this they were not real census, but rather registrations for taxation pur-
poses; in any country a large number of people would do their best to escape
such a registration in order to avoid paying taxes, and it is quite clear that some
part of the Chinese population normally succeeded in this (see, e.g., Durand
1960). Hence, at least we can be confident that in 2 CE the world population
was no less than 57.671 million. It is also quite clear that the world population
was substantially more than that. For this time we also have data from a census
of the Roman citizenry (for 14 CE), which, together with information on Roman
social structure and data from narrative and archaeological sources, makes it
possible to identify with a rather high degree of confidence the order of magni-
tude of the population of the Roman Empire (with available estimates in the
range of 4580 million [Durand 1977: 274]). Textual sources and archaeologi-
cal data also make it possible to identify the order of magnitude of the popula-
tion of the Parthian Empire (1020 million), and of India (50100 million) (Du-
rand 1977). Data on the population for other regions warrant less confidence,
but it is still quite clear that their total population was much smaller than that of
the four above-mentioned regions (which in 2 CE comprised most of the world
population). Archaeological evidence suggests that population density for the
rest of the world would have been considerably lower than in the "Four Re-
gions" themselves. In general, then, we can be quite sure that the world popula-
tion in 2 CE could scarcely have been less than 150 million; it is very unlikely
that it was more than 350 million.
Let us move now to 1800 CE. For this time we have much better population
data than ever before for most of Europe, the United States, China15, Egypt16,
India, Japan, and so on (Durand 1977). Hence, for this year we can be quite
confident that world population could scarcely have been less than 850 million
and more than 1 billion. The situation with population statistics further im-
proves by 190017 for which time there is not much doubt that world population
this year was within the range of 16001750 million. Finally, by 1960 popula-
tion statistics had improved dramatically, and we can be quite confident that
world population then was within the range of 29003100 million.

14
Or 57.671 million according to a later re-evaluation by Bielenstein (1987: 14).
15
Due to the separation of the census registration from the tax assessment conducted in the first
half of the 18th century, the Chinese population in 1800 had no substantive reason for avoiding
the census registration. Therefore, the Chinese census data for this time are particularly reliable
(e.g., Durand 1960: 238; see also Chapter 2 of this book).
16
Due to the first scientific estimation of the Egyptian population performed by the members of
the scientific mission that accompanied Napoleon to Egypt (Jomard 1818).
17
With a notable exception of China (Durand 1960; see also below Chapter 2).
 Millennial Trends 13

Now let us plot the mid points of the above mentioned estimate ranges and
connect the respective points. We will get the following picture (see Dia-
gram 0.5):
Diagram 0.5

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
-40000 -35000 -30000 -25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0 5000

As we see the resulting pattern of world population dynamics has an unmistaka-

bly hyperbolic shape. Now you can experiment and move any points within the
estimate ranges as much as you like. You will see that the overall hyperbolic
shape of the long-term world population dynamics will remain intact. What is
more, you can fill the space between the points with any estimates you find.
You will see that the overall shape of the world population dynamics will al-
ways remain distinctly hyperbolic. Replace, for example, the estimates of
McEvedy and Jones (1978) used by us earlier for Diagram 0.4 in the range be-
tween 10000 BCE and 1900 CE with the ones of Biraben (1980) (note that gen-
erally Biraben's estimates are situated in the opposite side of the estimate range
in relation to the ones of McEvedy and Jones). You will get the following pic-
ture (see Diagram 0.6):
14 Introduction

Diagram 0.6

3000

2500

2000

1500

1000

500

0
-40000 -35000 -30000 -25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0 5000

As we see, the overall shape of the world population dynamics remains unmis-
takably hyperbolic.
So what is the explanation for this apparent paradox? Why, though world
population estimates are evidently infirm for most of human history, can we be
sure that long-term world population dynamics pattern was hyperbolic?
The answer is simple, for in the period in question the world population
grew by orders of magnitude. It is true that for most part of human history we
cannot be at all confident of the exact value within a given order of magnitude.
But with respect to any time-point within any period in question, we can be al-
ready perfectly confident about the order of magnitude of the world population.
Hence, it is clear that whatever discoveries are made in the future, whatever re-
evaluations are performed, the probability that they will show that the overall
world population growth pattern in 40000 BCE 1970 CE was not hyperbolic
(but, say, exponential or lineal) is very close to zero indeed.
Note that if von Foerster, Mora, and Amiot also had at their disposal, in ad-
dition to world population data, data on the world GDP dynamics for 11973
(published, however, only in 2001 by Maddison [Maddison 2001]), they could
have made another striking "prediction" that on Saturday, 23 July, A.D. 2005
an "economic doomsday" would take place; that is, on that day the world GDP
would become infinite if the economic growth trend observed in 11973 CE
 Millennial Trends 15

continued. They also would have found that in 11973 CE the world GDP
growth followed a quadratic-hyperbolic rather than simple hyperbolic pattern.
Indeed, Maddison's estimates of the world GDP dynamics for 11973 CE
are almost perfectly approximated by the following equation:
C
Gt , (0.5)
(t 0 t ) 2
where Gt is the world GDP (in billions of 1990 international dollars, in purchas-
ing power parity [PPP]) in year t, = 17355487.3 and t0 = 2005.56 (see Dia-
gram 0.7):
Diagram 0.7. World GDP Dynamics, 11973 CE (in billions of 1990 in-
ternational dollars, PPP): the fit between predictions of a quadratic-
hyperbolic model and the observed data

18000

16000

14000

12000

10000

8000

6000

4000

2000 predicted

0 observed
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000

NOTE: R = .9993, R2 = .9986, p << .0001. The black markers correspond to Maddison's (2001) es-
timates (Maddison's estimates of the world per capita GDP for 1000 CE has been corrected on the
basis of Meliantsev [1996, 2003, 2004a, 2004b]). The grey solid line has been generated by the fol-
lowing equation:
17749573.1.
G
(2006 t ) 2
16 Introduction

Actually, as was mentioned above, the best fit is achieved with = 17355487.3 and t0 = 2005.56
(which gives just the "doomsday Saturday, 23 July, 2005"), but we have decided to keep hereafter
to integer numbered years.

The only difference between the simple and quadratic hyperbolas is that the
simple hyperbola is described mathematically with equation (0.2):
k
y , (0.2)
x
whereas the quadratic hyperbolic equation has x2 instead of just x:
k
y . (0.6)
x2
Of course, this equation can also be written as follows:
k
y . (0.7)
( x0 x) 2
It is this equation that was used above to describe the world economic dynamics
between 1 and 1973 CE. The algorithm for calculating the world GDP still re-
mains very simple. E.g., to calculate the world GDP in 1905 (in billions of 1990
international dollars, PPP), one should first subtract 1905 from 2005, but than
to divide (17355487.3) not by the resultant difference (100), but by its square
(1002 = 10000).
Those readers who are not familiar with mathematical models of population
hyperbolic growth should have a lot of questions at this point.18 How could the
long-term macrodynamics of the most complex social system be described so
accurately with such simple equations? Why do these equations look so
strange? Why, indeed, can we estimate the world population in year x so accu-
rately just by subtracting x from the "Doomsday" year and dividing some con-
stant with the resultant difference? And why, if we want to know the world GDP
in this year, should we square the difference prior to dividing? Why was the hy-
perbolic growth of the world population accompanied by the quadratic hyper-
bolic growth of the world GDP? Is this a coincidence? Or are the hyperbolic
growth of the world population and the quadratic hyperbolic growth of the
world GDP just two sides of one coin, two logically connected aspects of the
same process?
In the first part of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics we have tried
to provide answers to this question and these answers are summarized below.

18
Whereas the answers to the questions regarding the quadratic hyperbolic growth of the world
GDP might not have been quite clear even for those readers who know the hyperbolic demo-
graphic models.
 Millennial Trends 17

However, before starting this we would like to state that our experience
shows that most readers who are not familiar with mathematics stop reading
books (at least our books) as soon as they come across the words "differential
equation". Thus, we have to ask such readers not to get scared with the presence
of these words in the next passage and to move further. You will see that it is
not as difficult to understand differential equations (or, at least, some of those
equations), as one might think.
To start with, the von Foerster equation, N t C , is just the solution
t0 t
for the following differential equation (see, e.g., Korotayev, Malkov, and
Khaltourina 2006a: 11920):

dN N2
. (0.8)
dt C

This equation can be also written as:

dN
aN 2 , (0.9)
dt
1
where a .
C
What is the meaning of this mathematical expression, dN ? In our
aN 2
dt
context dN/dt denotes the absolute population growth rate at some moment of
time. Hence, this equation states that the absolute population growth rate at any
moment of time should be proportional to the square of population at this mo-
ment.
Note that by dividing both parts of equation (0.9) with N we will get the fol-
lowing:

dN
: N aN , (0.10)
dt
dN
Further, note that : N is just a designation of the relative population
dt
growth rate. Indeed, as we remember, dN/dt is the absolute population growth
rate at a certain moment of time. Imagine that at this moment the population (N)
is 100 million and the absolute population growth rate (dN/dt) is 1 million a
year. If we divide now (dN/dt = 1 million) by (N = 100 million) we will get
0.01, or 1%; which would mean that the relative population growth rate at this
moment is 1% a year.
18 Introduction

If we denote relative population growth rate as rN, we will get a particularly

simple version of the hyperbolic equation:

rN aN . (0.10')

Thus, with hyperbolic growth the relative population growth rate (rN) is linearly
proportional to the population size (N). Note that this significantly demystifies
the problem of the world population hyperbolic growth. Now to explain this hy-
perbolic growth we should just explain why for many millennia the world popu-
lation's absolute growth rate tended to be proportional to the square of the popu-
lation.
We believe that the most significant progress towards the development of a
compact mathematical model providing a convincing answer to this question
has been achieved by Michael Kremer (1993), whose model will be summa-
rized next.
Kremer's model is based on the following assumptions:
1) First of all he makes "the Malthusian (1978) assumption that population
is limited by the available technology, so that the growth rate of population is
proportional to the growth rate of technology" (Kremer 1993: 6812).19 This
statement looks quite convincing. Indeed, throughout most of human history the
world population was limited by the technologically determined ceiling of the
carrying capacity of land. As was mentioned above, with foraging subsistence
technologies the Earth could not support more than 10 million people, because
the amount of naturally available useful biomass on this planet is limited, and
the world population could only grow over this limit when the people started to
apply various means to artificially increase the amount of available biomass,
that is with the transition from foraging to food production. However, the exten-
sive agriculture also can only support a limited number of people, and further
growth of the world population only became possible with the intensification of
agriculture and other technological improvements.
This assumption is modeled by Kremer in the following way. Kremer as-
sumes that overall output produced by the world economy equals

G rTN , (0.11)

where G is output, T is the level of technology, N is population, 0 < < 1 and r

are parameters.20 With constant T (that is, without any technological growth)

19
In addition to this, the absolute growth rate is proportional to the population itself with a given
relative growth rate a larger population will increase more in absolute numbers than a smaller
one.
20
Kremer uses the following symbols to denote respective variables: Y output, p population,
A the level of technology, etc.; while describing Kremer's models we will employ the symbols
(closer to the Kapitza's [1992, 1999]) used in our model, naturally without distorting the sense of
Kremer's equations.
 Millennial Trends 19

this equation generates Malthusian dynamics. For example, let us assume that
= 0.5, and that T is constant. Let us recollect that N0.5 is just N. Thus, a four
time expansion of the population will lead to a twofold increase in output (as
4 = 2). In fact, here Kremer models Ricardo's law of diminishing returns to la-
bor (1817), which in the absence of technological growth produces just Malthu-
sian dynamics. Indeed, if the population grows 4 times, and the output grows
only twice, this will naturally lead to a twofold decrease of per capita output.
How could this affect population dynamics?
Kremer assumes that "population increases above some steady state equilib-
rium level of per capita income, m, and decreases below it" (Kremer
1993: 685). Hence, with the decline of per capita income, the population growth
will slow down and will become close to zero when the per capita income ap-
proaches m. Note that such a dynamics was actually rather typical for agrarian
societies, and its mechanisms are known very well indeed, if per capita in-
comes decline closely to m, it means the decline of nutrition and health status of
most population, which will lead to an increase in mortality and a slow down of
population growth (see, e.g., Malthus 1978 [1798]; Postan 1950, 1972; Abel
1974, 1980; Cameron 1989; Artzrouni and Komlos 1985; Komlos and Nefedov
2002; Turchin 2003; Nefedov 2004 and Chapters 13 below). Thus, with con-
stant technology, population will not be able to exceed the level at which per
capita income (g = G/N) becomes equal to m. This implies that for any given
level of technological development (T) there is "a unique level of population,
n," that cannot be exceeded with the given level of technology (Kremer
1993: 685). Note that n can be also interpreted as the Earth carrying capacity,
that is, the maximum number of people that the Earth can support with the given
level of technology.
However, as is well known, the technological level is not a constant, but a
variable. And in order to describe its dynamics Kremer employs his second
basic assumption:
2) "High population spurs technological change because it increases the
number of potential inventors21 In a larger population there will be propor-
tionally more people lucky or smart enough to come up with new ideas" (Kre-
mer 1993: 685), thus, "the growth rate of technology is proportional to total
population".22 In fact, here Kremer uses the main assumption of the Endogenous
Technological Growth theory (Kuznets 1960; Grossman and Helpman 1991;
Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1998; Simon 1977, 1981, 2000; Komlos and Nefedov

21
"This implication flows naturally from the nonrivalry of technology The cost of inventing a
new technology is independent of the number of people who use it. Thus, holding constant the
share of resources devoted to research, an increase in population leads to an increase in techno-
logical change" (Kremer 1993: 681).
22
Note that "the growth rate of technology" means here the relative growth rate (i.e., the level to
which technology will grow in a given unit of time in proportion to the level observed at the be-
ginning of this period).
20 Introduction

2002; Jones 1995, 2003, 2005 etc.). As this supposition, to our knowledge, was
first proposed by Simon Kuznets (1960), we shall denote the corresponding
type of dynamics as "Kuznetsian",23 while the systems in which the "Kuznet-
sian" population-technological dynamics is combined with the "Malthusian"
demographic one will be denoted as "Malthusian-Kuznetsian". In general, we
find this assumption rather plausible in fact, it is quite probable that, other
things being equal, within a given period of time, one billion people will make
approximately one thousand times more inventions than one million people.
This assumption is expressed by Kremer mathematically in the following
way:

dT
bNT . (0.12)
dt
Actually, this equation says just that the absolute technological growth rate at a
given moment of time is proportional to the technological level observed at this
moment (the wider is the technological base, the more inventions could be made
on its basis), and, on the other hand, it is proportional to the population (the
larger the population, the higher the number of potential inventors).24
In his basic model Kremer assumes "that population adjusts instantaneously
to n" (1993: 685); he further combines technology and population determina-
tion equations and demonstrates that their interaction produces just the hyper-
bolic population growth (Kremer 1993: 6856; see also Podlazov 2000, 2001,
2002, 2004; Tsirel 2004; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 2136).
Kremer's model provides a rather convincing explanation of why throughout
most of human history the world population followed the hyperbolic pattern
with the absolute population growth rate tending to be proportional to N2. For
example, why will the growth of population from, say, 10 million to 100 mil-
lion, result in the growth of dN/dt 100 times? Kremer's model explains this ra-
ther convincingly (though Kremer himself does not appear to have spelled this
out in a sufficiently clear way). The point is that the growth of world population
from 10 to 100 million implies that human technology also grew approximately
10 times (given that it will have proven, after all, to be able to support a ten
times larger population). On the other hand, the growth of a population 10 times
also implies a 10-fold growth of the number of potential inventors, and, hence, a
10-fold increase in the relative technological growth rate. Hence, the absolute
technological growth rate will grow 10 10 = 100 times (as, in accordance with
equation (0.12), an order of magnitude higher number of people having at their
disposal an order of magnitude wider technological basis would tend to make

23
In Economic Anthropology it is usually denoted as "Boserupian" (see, e.g., Boserup 1965; Lee
1986).
24
Kremer did not test this hypothesis empirically in a direct way. Note, however, that our own em-
pirical test of this hypothesis has supported it (see below Appendix 1).
 Millennial Trends 21

two orders of magnitude more inventions). And as N tends to the technological-

ly determined carrying capacity ceiling, we have good reason to expect that
dN/dt will also grow just by about 100 times.
In fact, Kremer's model suggests that the hyperbolic pattern of the world's
population growth could be accounted for by the nonlinear second order posi-
tive feedback mechanism that was shown long ago to generate just the hyper-
bolic growth, known also as the "blow-up regime" (see, e.g., Kurdjumov 1999;
Knjazeva and Kurdjumov 2005). In our case this nonlinear second order posi-
tive feedback looks as follows: the more people the more potential inventors
the faster technological growth the faster growth of the Earth's carrying capac-
ity the faster population growth with more people you also have more po-
tential inventors hence, faster technological growth, and so on (see Diagram
0.8):
Diagram 0.8. Block Scheme of the Nonlinear Second Order Positive
Feedback between Technological Development
and Demographic Growth (version 1)

In fact, this positive feedback can be graphed even more succinctly (see Dia-
gram 0.9a):
22 Introduction

Diagram 0.9a. Block Scheme of the Nonlinear Second Order Positive

Feedback between Technological Development
and Demographic Growth (version 2)

Note that the relationship between technological development and demographic

growth cannot be analyzed through any simple cause-and-effect model, as we
observe a true dynamic relationship between these two processes each of them
is both the cause and the effect of the other.
It is remarkable that Kremer's model suggests ways to answer one of the
main objections raised against the hyperbolic models of the world's population
growth. Indeed, at present the mathematical models of world population growth
as hyperbolic have not been accepted by the academic social science communi-
ty [The title of the most recent article by a social scientist discussing Kapitza's
model, "Demographic Adventures of a Physicist" (Shishkov 2005), is rather
telling in this respect]. We believe that there are substantial reasons for such a
position, and that the authors of the respective models are as much to blame for
this rejection as are social scientists.
Indeed, all these models are based on an assumption that world population
can be treated as having been an integrated system for many centuries, if not
millennia, before 1492. Already in 1960, von Foerster, Mora, and Amiot spelled
out this assumption in a rather explicit way:
"However, what may be true for elements which, because of lack of adequate communi-
cation among each other, have to resort to a competitive, (almost) zero-sum multiperson
game may be false for elements that possess a system of communication which enables
them to form coalitions until all elements are so strongly linked that the population as a
whole can be considered from a game-theoretical point of view as a single person play-
ing a two-person game with nature as its opponent" (von Foerster, Mora, and Amiot
1960: 1292).
However, did, e.g., in 11500 CE, the inhabitants of, say, Central Asia, Tasma-
nia, Hawaii, Terra del Fuego, the Kalahari etc. (that is, just the world popula-
tion) really have "adequate communication" to make "all elements so strong-
ly linked that the population as a whole can be considered from a game-
theoretical point of view as a single person playing a two-person game with na-
ture as its opponent"? For any historically minded social scientist the answer to
this question is perfectly clear and, of course, it is squarely negative. Against
 Millennial Trends 23

this background it is hardly surprising that those social scientists who have hap-
pened to come across hyperbolic models for world population growth have
tended to treat them merely as "demographic adventures of physicists" (note
that indeed, nine out of eleven currently known authors of such models are
physicists); none of the respective authors (von Foerster, Mora, and Amiot
1960; von Hoerner 1975; Kapitza 1992, 1999; Kremer 1993; Cohen 1995;
Podlazov 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004; Johansen and Sornette 2001; Tsirel 2004),
after all, has provided any convincing answer to the question above.
However, it is not so difficult to provide such an answer.
The hyperbolic trend observed for the world population growth after 10000
BCE does appear to be primarily a product of the growth of quite a real system,
a system that seems to have originated in West Asia around that time in direct
connection with the Neolithic Revolution. With Andre Gunder Frank (1990,
1993; Frank and Gills 1994), we denote this system as "the World System" (see
also, e.g., Modelski 2000, 2003; Devezas and Modelski 2003). The presence of
the hyperbolic trend itself indicates that the major part of the entity in question
had some systemic unity, and the evidence for this unity is readily available. In-
deed, we have evidence for the systematic spread of major innovations (domes-
ticated cereals, cattle, sheep, goats, horses, plow, wheel, copper, bronze, and
later iron technology, and so on) throughout the whole North African Eurasian
Oikumene for a few millennia BCE (see, e.g., Chubarov 1991, or Diamond
1999 for a synthesis of such evidence). As a result, the evolution of societies of
this part of the world already at this time cannot be regarded as truly independ-
ent. By the end of the 1st millennium BCE we observe a belt of cultures, stretch-
ing from the Atlantic to the Pacific, with an astonishingly similar level of cul-
tural complexity characterized by agricultural production of wheat and other
specific cereals, the breeding of cattle, sheep, and goats; use of the plow, iron
metallurgy, and wheeled transport; development of professional armies and
cavalries deploying rather similar weapons; elaborate bureaucracies, and Axial
Age ideologies, and so on this list could be extended for pages). A few mil-
lennia before, we would find another belt of societies strikingly similar in level
and character of cultural complexity, stretching from the Balkans up to the In-
dus Valley outskirts (Peregrine and Ember 2001: vols. 4 and 8; Peregrine
2003). Note that in both cases, the respective entities included the major part of
the contemporary world's population (see, e.g. McEvedy and Jones 1978; Du-
rand 1977 etc.). We would interpret this as a tangible result of the World Sys-
tem's functioning. The alternative explanations would involve a sort of miracu-
lous scenario that these cultures with strikingly similar levels and character of
complexity somehow developed independently of one another in a very large
but continuous zone, while for some reason nothing comparable to them ap-
peared elsewhere in the other parts of the world, which were not parts of the
World System. We find such an alternative explanation highly implausible.
24 Introduction

Thus, we would tend to treat the world population's hyperbolic growth pat-
tern as reflecting the growth of quite a real entity, the World System.
A few other points seem to be relevant here. Of course there would be no
grounds for speaking about a World System stretching from the Atlantic to the
Pacific, even at the beginning of the 1st millennium CE, if we applied the "bulk-
good" criterion suggested by Wallerstein (1974, 1987, 2004), as there was no
movement of bulk goods at all between, say, China and Europe at this time (as
we have no reason to disagree with Wallerstein in his classification of the 1st
century Chinese silk reaching Europe as a luxury rather than a bulk good).
However, the 1st century CE (and even the 1st millennium BCE) World System
definitely qualifies as such if we apply the "softer" information-network criteri-
on suggested by Chase-Dunn and Hall (1997). Note that at our level of analysis
the presence of an information network covering the whole World System is a
perfectly sufficient condition, which makes it possible to consider this system as
a single evolving entity. Yes, in the 1st millennium BCE any bulk goods could
hardly penetrate from the Pacific coast of Eurasia to its Atlantic coast. Howev-
er, the World System had reached by that time such a level of integration that
iron metallurgy could spread through the whole of the World System within a
few centuries.
Yes, in the millennia preceding the European colonization of Tasmania its
population dynamics oscillating around the 4000 level (e.g., Diamond 1999)
were not influenced by World System population dynamics and did not influ-
ence it at all. However, such facts just suggest that since the 10th millennium
BCE the dynamics of the world population reflect very closely just the dynam-
ics of the World System population.
On the basis of Kremer's model we (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina
2006a: 3466) have developed a mathematical model that describes not only
the hyperbolic world population growth, but also the macrodynamics of the
world GDP production up to 1973:
G k1TN , (0.11)

dN
k 2 SN , (0.13)
dt

dT
k 3 NT , (0.12)
dt
where G is the world GDP, T is the World System technological level, N is
population, and S is the surplus produced, per person, over the amount (m) min-
imally necessary to reproduce the population with a zero growth rate in a Mal-
thusian system (thus, S = g m, where g denotes per capita GDP); k1, k2, k3, and
(0 < < 1) are parameters.
 Millennial Trends 25

We have also shown (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 3466)

that this model can be further simplified to the following form:
dN
aSN , (0.13)
dt

dS
bNS , (0.14)
dt
while the world GDP (G) can be calculated using the following equation:
G = mN + SN . (0.15)
Note that the mathematical analysis of the basic model (0.11)-(0.13)-(0.12)
suggests that during the "Malthusian-Kuznetsian" macroperiod of human histo-
ry (that is, up to the 1960s) the amount of S (per capita surplus produced at the
given level of World System development) should be proportional, in the long
run, to the World System's population: S = kN. Our statistical analysis of avail-
able empirical data has confirmed this theoretical proportionality (Korotayev,
Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 4950). Thus, in the right-hand side of equa-
tion (0.13) S can be replaced with kN, and as a result we arrive at the following
equation:
dN (0.9)25
kaN 2
dt
As we remember, the solution of this type of differential equations is
C
Nt , (0.1)
(t0 t )
and this produces simply a hyperbolic curve.
As, according to our model, S can be approximated as kN, its long-term dy-
namics can be approximated with the following equation:
kC
S . (0.16)
t0 t
Thus, the long-term dynamics of the most dynamic component of the world
GDP, SN, "the world surplus product ", can be approximated as follows:
kC 2
SN . (0.17)
(t 0 t ) 2

25
Thus we arrive, on a theoretical basis, at the differential equation discovered empirically by von
Hoerner (1975) and Kapitza (1992, 1999).
26 Introduction

Of course, this suggests that the long-term world GDP dynamics up to the early
1970s must be approximated better by a quadratic hyperbola than by a simple
one; and, as we could see above (see Diagram 0.7), this approximation works
very effectively indeed.
Thus, up to the 1970s the hyperbolic growth of the world population was
accompanied by the quadratic-hyperbolic growth of the world GDP, just as is
suggested by our model. Note that the hyperbolic growth of the world popula-
tion and the quadratic hyperbolic growth of the world GDP are very tightly
connected processes, actually two sides of the same coin, two dimensions of one
process propelled by the nonlinear second order positive feedback loops be-
tween the technological development and demographic growth (see Diagram
0.9b):
Diagram 0.9b. Block Scheme of the Nonlinear Second Order Positive
Feedback between Technological Development
and Demographic Growth (version 3)

We have also demonstrated (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: 67

80) that the World System population's literacy (l) dynamics are rather accurate-
ly described by the following differential equation:
dl
aSl(1 l ) , (0.18)
dt
where l is the proportion of the population that is literate, S is per capita surplus,
and a is a constant. In fact, this is a version of the autocatalytic model. It has the
following sense: the literacy growth is proportional to the fraction of the popu-
lation that is literate, l (potential teachers), to the fraction of the population that
 Millennial Trends 27

is illiterate, (1 l) (potential pupils), and to the amount of per capita surplus S,

since it can be used to support educational programs (in addition to this, S re-
flects the technological level T that implies, among other things, the level of de-
velopment of educational technologies). Note that, from a mathematical point of
view, equation (0.18) can be regarded as logistic where saturation is reached at
literacy level l = 1, and S is responsible for the speed with which this level is
being approached.
It is important to stress that with low values of l (which would correspond to
most of human history, with recent decades being the exception), the rate of in-
crease in world literacy generated by this model (against the background of hy-
perbolic growth of S) can be approximated rather accurately as hyperbolic (see
Diagram 0.10):
Diagram 0.10. World Literacy Dynamics, 1 1980 CE (%%):
the fit between predictions of the hyperbolic model
and the observed data

70

60 observed
predicted
50

40

30

20

10

0
0 500 1000 1500 2000

NOTE: R = 0.997, R2 = 0.994, p << 0.0001. Black dots correspond to UNESCO/World Bank
(2005) estimates for the period since 1970, and to Meliantsev's (1996, 2003, 2004a, 2004b) esti-
mates for the earlier period. The grey solid line has been generated by the following equation:
3769.264
lt .
( 2040 t ) 2
The best-fit values of parameters (3769.264) and t0 (2040) have been calculated with the least
squares method.
28 Introduction

The overall number of literate people is proportional both to the literacy level
and to the overall population. As both of these variables experienced hyperbolic
growth until the 1960s/1970s, one has sufficient grounds to expect that until re-
cently the overall number of literate people in the world (L)26 was growing not
just hyperbolically, but rather in a quadratic-hyperbolic way (as was world
GDP). Our empirical test has confirmed this the quadratic-hyperbolic model
describes the growth of the literate population of this planet with an extremely
good fit indeed (see Diagram 0.11):
Diagram 0.11. World Literate Population Dynamics, 1 1980 CE
(L, millions): the fit between predictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic mod-
el and the observed data

1800
1600 observed
1400 predicted
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
0 500 1000 1500 2000

NOTE: R = 0.9997, R2 = 0.9994, p << 0.0001. The black dots correspond to UNESCO/World
Bank (2006) estimates for the period since 1970, and to Meliantsev's (1996, 2003, 2004a, 2004b)
estimates for the earlier period; we have also taken into account the changes of age structure on the
basis of UN Population Division (2006) data. The grey solid line has been generated by the follow-
ing equation:
4958551 .
Lt
(2033 t ) 2
The best-fit values of parameters (4958551) and t0 (2033) have been calculated with the least
squares method.

26
Since literacy appeared, almost all of the Earth's literate population has lived within the World
System; hence, the literate population of the Earth and the literate population of the World Sys-
tem have been almost perfectly synonymous.
 Millennial Trends 29

Similar processes are observed with respect to world urbanization, the macro-
dynamics of which appear to be described by the differential equation:
du
bSu(ulim u ) , (0.19)
dt
where u is the proportion of the population that is urban, S is per capita surplus
produced with the given level of the World System's technological develop-
ment, b is a constant, and ulim is the maximum possible proportion of the popu-
lation that can be urban. Note that this model implies that during the "Malthusi-
an-Kuznetsian" era of the blow-up regime, the hyperbolic growth of world ur-
banization must have been accompanied by a quadratic-hyperbolic growth of
the urban population of the world, which is supported by our empirical tests
(see Diagrams 0.1213):
Diagram 0.12. World Megaurbanization Dynamics (% of the world pop-
ulation living in cities with > 250 thousand inhabitants), 10000 BCE
1960 CE: the fit between predictions of the hyperbolic model and empiri-
cal estimates

NOTE: R = 0.987, R2 = 0.974, p << 0.0001. The black dots correspond to estimates of Chandler
(1987), UN Population Division (2005), and White et al. (2006). The grey solid line has been gen-
erated by the following equation:
403.012 .
ut
(1990 t )

The best-fit values of parameters (403.012) and t0 (1990) have been calculated with the least
squares method. For a comparison, the best fit (R2) obtained here for the exponential model is
0.492.
30 Introduction

Diagram 0.13. Dynamics of World Urban Population Living in Cities with

> 250000 Inhabitants (mlns.), 10000 BCE 1960 CE: the fit between
predictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic model and the observed data
NOTE: R = 0.998, R2 =
0.996, p << 0.0001. The
black markers correspond to
estimates of Chandler (1987),
UN Population Division
(2005), and White et al.
(2006). The grey solid line
has been generated by the fol-
lowing equation:
912057.9 .
Ut
(2008 t ) 2
The best-fit values of pa-
rameters (912057.9) and t0
(2008) have been calculated
with the least squares meth-
od. For a comparison, the
best fit (R2) obtained here for
the exponential model is
0.637.
Within this context it is hardly surprising to find that the general macrodynam-
ics of the size of the largest settlement within the World System are also quad-
ratic-hyperbolic (see Diagram 0.14):
Diagram 0.14. Dynamics of Size of the Largest Settlement of the World
(thousands of inhabitants), 10000 BCE 1950 CE: the fit between pre-
dictions of the quadratic-hyperbolic model and the observed data
NOTE: R = 0.992, R2 =
0.984, p << 0.0001. The
black markers correspond to
estimates of Modelski (2003)
and Chandler (1987). The
grey solid line has been gen-
erated by the following equa-
tion:
104020618,573 .
U max t
(2040 t ) 2
The best-fit values of pa-
rameters (104020618,5)
and t0 (2040) have been cal-
culated with the least squares
method. For a comparison,
the best fit (R2) obtained here
for the exponential model is
0.747.
 Millennial Trends 31

As has been demonstrated by cross-cultural anthropologists (see, e.g., Naroll

and Divale 1976; Levinson and Malone 1980: 34), for pre-agrarian, agrarian,
and early industrial cultures the size of the largest settlement is a rather effective
indicator of the general sociocultural complexity of a social system. This, of
course, suggests that the World System's general sociocultural complexity also
grew, in the "Malthusian-Kuznetsian" era, in a generally quadratic-hyperbolic
way.
It is world literacy for which it is most evident that its hyperbolic growth
could not continue, for any significant period, after the mid-1960s; after all, the
literacy rate by definition cannot exceed 100 per cent just by definition. What is
more, since the 1970s the saturation effect27 described by our model started be-
ing felt more and more strongly and the rate of world literacy's growth began to
slow (see Diagram 0.15):
Diagram 0.15. World Literacy Growth Dynamics, 1975 1995, the in-
crease in percentage of adult literate population, by five-year periods

5
4.47
4.5 4.15
4 3.64
3.5 3.13
3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
1975-1980 1980-1985 1985-1990 1990-1995

However, already before this, the hyperbolic growth of world literacy and of the
other indicators of the human capital development had launched the process of
diverging from the blow-up regime, signaling the end of the era of hyperbolic
growth. As has been shown by us earlier (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina
2006a: 6786), hyperbolic growth of population (as well as of cities, schools
etc.) is only observed at relatively low (< 0.5, i.e., < 50%) levels of world liter-
acy. In order to describe the World System's demographic dynamics in the last
decades (as well as in the near future), it has turned out to be necessary to ex-
tend the equation system (0.13)-(0.14) by adding to it equation (0.21), and by
adding to equation (0.13) the multiplier (1 l), which results in equation (0.20),
and produces a mathematical model that describes not only the hyperbolic de-

27
On the ground, the saturation effect means, for example, that raising literacy from 98 to 100 per
cent of the adult population would require much more time and effort than would raising it from
50 to 52 per cent.
32 Introduction

velopment of the World System up to the 1960s/1970s, but also its withdrawal
from the blow-up regime afterwards:
dN
aSN (1 l ) , (0.20)
dt

dS
bNS , (0.14)
dt

dl
cSl (1 l ) . (0.21)
dt

We would like to stress that in no way are we claiming that the literacy growth
is the only factor causing the demographic transition. Important roles were also
played here by such factors as, for example, the development of medical care
and social security subsystems. These variables, together with literacy, can be
regarded as different parameters of one integrative variable, the human capital
development index. These variables are connected with demographic dynamics
in a way rather similar to the one described above for literacy. At the beginning
of the demographic transition, the development of the social security subsystem
correlates rather closely with the decline of mortality rates, as both are caused
by essentially the same proximate factor the GDP per capita growth. Howev-
er, during the second phase, social security development produces quite a strong
independent effect on fertility rates through the elimination of one of the main
traditional incentives for the maximization of the number of children in the fam-
ily.
The influence of the development of medical care on demographic dynamics
shows even closer parallels with the effect produced by literacy growth. Note
first of all that the development of modern medical care is connected in the
most direct way with the development of the education subsystem. On the other
hand, during the first phase of the demographic transition, the development of
medical care acts as one of the most important factors in decreasing mortality.
In the meantime, when the need to decrease fertility rates reaches critical levels,
it is the medical care subsystem that develops more and more effective family
planning technologies. It is remarkable that this need arises as a result of the de-
crease in mortality rates, which could not reach critically low levels without the
medical care subsystem being sufficiently developed. Hence, when the need to
decrease fertility rates reaches critical levels, those in need, almost by defini-
tion, find the medical care subsystem sufficiently developed to satisfy this need
quite rapidly and effectively.
Let us recollect that the pattern of literacy's impact on demographic dynam-
ics has an almost identical shape: the maximum values of population growth
rates cannot be reached without a certain level of economic development, which
 Millennial Trends 33

cannot be achieved without literacy rates reaching substantial levels. Hence,

again almost by definition, the fact that the system reached the maximum level
of population growth rates implies that literacy especially of females had at-
tained such a level that its negative impact on fertility rates would cause popula-
tion growth rates to start to decline. On the other hand, the level of development
of both medical care and social security subsystems displays a very strong cor-
relation with literacy (see Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: Chap-
ter 7). Thus, literacy rate turns out to be a very strong predictor of the develop-
ment of both medical care and social security subsystems.
Note that in reality, as well as in our model, both the decline of mortality at
the beginning of the demographic transition (which caused a demographic ex-
plosion) and the decline of fertility during its second phase (causing a dramatic
decrease of population growth rates) were ultimately produced by essentially
the same factor (human capital growth); there is therefore no need for us to in-
clude mortality and fertility as separate variables in our model. On the other
hand, literacy has turned out to be a rather sensitive indicator of the develop-
ment level of human capital, which has made it possible to avoid including its
other parameters as separate variables in extended macromodels (for more de-
tail see Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006a: Chapter 7).
Model (0.20)-(0.14)-(0.21) describes mathematically the divergence from
the blow-up regime not only for world population and literacy dynamics, but al-
so for world economic dynamics. However, this model does not describe the
slowdown of the World System's economic growth observed after 1973. Ac-
cording to the model, the relative rate of world GDP growth should have con-
tinued to increase even after the World System began to diverge from the blow-
up regime, though more and more slowly. In reality, however, after 1973 we
observe not just a decline in the speed with which the world GDP rate grows
we observe a decline in the world GDP growth rate itself (see, e.g., Maddison
2001). It appears that model (0.20)-(0.14)-(0.21) would describe the recent
world economic dynamics if the (1 l) multiplier were added not only to its
first equation, but also to the second (0.14). This multiplier might have the fol-
lowing sense: the literate population is more inclined to direct a larger share of
its GDP to resource restoration and to prefer resource economizing strategies
than is the illiterate one, which, on the one hand, paves the way toward a sus-
tainable-development trajectory, but, on the other hand, slows down the eco-
nomic growth rate (cp., e.g., Liuri 2005).
Note that development, according to this scenario, does not invalidate Kre-
mer's technological growth equation (0.12). Thus, the modified model does im-
ply that the World System's divergence from the blow-up regime would stabi-
lize the world population, the world GDP, and some other World-System de-
velopment indicators (e.g., urbanization and literacy as a result of saturation,
i.e., the achievement of the ultimate possible level); technological growth, how-
ever, will continue, though in exponential rather than hyperbolic form.
34 Introduction

Due to the continuation of technological growth, the ending of growth in the

world's GDP will not entail a cessation of growth in the standard of living of the
world's population. A continuing rise in the world's standard of living is most
likely to be achieved due to the so-called "Nordhaus effect" (Nordhaus 1997).
The essence of this effect can be spelled out as follows: imagine that you are
going to buy a new computer and plan to spend $1000 on this. Now imagine
what computer you would have been able to buy with the same $1000 five years
ago. Of course, the computer that you will be able to buy with $1000 now will
be much better, much more effective, much more productive etc. than the com-
puter that you could have bought with the same $1000 five years ago. However,
open a current World Bank handbook and you will see that the present-day
$1000, in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), constitutes a significantly
smaller sum than did the $1000 of five years ago. The point is that traditional
measures of economic growth (above all, the GDP as measured in international
PPP dollars) reflect less and less the actual growth of the standard of living (es-
pecially in more developed countries). Imagine a firm that in 2001 produced 1
million computers and sold them at $1000 a piece, in 2006 the same firm pro-
duced 1 million 100 thousand new, much more effective computers, but still
sells them (due to increasing competition) at $1000 a piece (let us also imagine
that the firm has managed to reduce production costs and thus increased both its
profits and employees' salaries). How will this affect GDP, both in the country
in which the firm operates, and in the world as a whole? In fact, the effect is
most likely to be exactly zero. In 2006 the firm produces computers for a total
price of 1100 million 2006 international PPP dollars. However, the World Bank
will recalculate this sum into 2001 international PPP dollars and will find out
that 1100 million 2006 international PPP dollars equal just 1000 million 2001
international PPP dollars. Thus, technological progress sufficient to raise the
level of life of a significant number of people will in no way affect the World
Bank GDP statistics, according to which it will appear that the above-mentioned
technological advance has led to GDP increase at neither the country nor the
world level.
The point is that the traditional GDP measures of production growth work
really well when they are connected with the growth of consumption of scarce
resources (including labor resources); however, if the production growth takes
place without an increase in the consumption of scarce resources, it may well go
undetected. The modified macromodel predicts such a situation when the World
System's divergence from the blow-up regime will have resulted in the cessation
of the resource-consuming World GDP production in its traditional measures,
accompanied by the transition to exponential (in place of hyperbolic) growth of
technology through which an increasing standard of living will be achieved
without the growth of scarce-resource consumption.
Because the macrodynamics of the World System's development obey a set
of rather simple laws having extremely simple mathematical descriptions, the
 Millennial Trends 35

macroproportions between the main indicators of that development can be de-

scribed rather accurately with the following series of approximations:
N ~ S ~ l ~ u,
G ~ L ~ U ~ N2 ~ S2 ~ l2 ~ u2 ~ SN ~ etc.,
where (let us recollect) N is the world population; S is per capita surplus pro-
duced, at the given level of the World Systems technological development,
over the "hungry survival" level m that is necessary for simple (with zero
growth) demographic reproduction; l is world literacy, the proportion of literate
people among the adult (> 14 year old) population of the world; u is world ur-
banization, the proportion of the world population living in cities; G is the
world GDP; L is the literate population of the world; and U is the urban popula-
tion of the world. Yes, for the era of hyperbolic growth the absolute rate of
growth of N (but, incidentally, also of S, l and u) in the long-run is described ra-
ther accurately28 as kN2 (Kapitza 1992, 1999); yet, with a comparable degree of
accuracy it can be described as k2SN, k3S2 or (apparently with a somehow
smaller precision) as k4G, k5L, k6U, k7l2, k8u2, etc.
It appears important to stress that the present-day decrease of the World
System's growth rates differs radically from the decreases that inhered in oscil-
lations of the past. This is not merely part of a new oscillation; rather, it is a
phase transition to a new development regime that differs radically from the one
typical of all previous history. Note, first of all, that all previous cases of reduc-
tion of world population growth took place against the background of cata-
strophic declines in the standard of living, and were caused mainly by increases
in mortality as a result of various cataclysms wars, famines, epidemics; and
that after the end of such calamities the population, having restored its numbers
in a relatively rapid way, returned to the earlier hyperbolic trajectory. In sharp
contrast, the present day decline of the world population's growth rate takes
place against the background of rapid economic growth and is produced by a
radically different cause the decline of fertility rates that is occurring precisely
because rising standards of living for the majority of the World System's popu-
lation have meant the growth of education, health care (including various meth-
ods and means of family planning), social security, etc. Decrease in the rate of
growth of literacy and urbanization was not infrequent in the earlier epochs ei-
ther; but in those epochs it was connected with economic decline, whereas now
it takes place against the contrary background of rapid economic growth, and is
connected to the closeness of the saturation level. Earlier declines, we might
say, reflected a deficit of economic resources, whereas the present one reflects
their abundance.
It appears necessary to stress that the models discussed above have been de-
signed to describe long-term ("millennial") trends, whereas when we analyze
social macrodynamics at shorter ("secular") time scales we also have to take in-

28
However, for u the fit of this description appears to be smaller than for the rest of variables.
36 Introduction

to account its cyclical (as well as stochastic) components; it is these components

that will be the main task of the present part of our Introduction to Social
Macrodynamics. To begin with, the actual dynamics typical for agrarian politi-
cal-demographic cycles are usually the opposite of those that are theoretically
described by "millennial" models and actually observed at the millennial scale.
For example, as we shall see below, during agrarian political-demographic cy-
cles the population normally grew much faster than technology, which naturally
resulted in Malthusian dynamics: population growth was accompanied not by
increase, but by decrease of per capita production, usually leading to political-
demographic collapse and the start of a new cycle.
In Chapter 1, we shall review available mathematical models of political-
demographic cycles. In Chapter 2, we shall consider in more detail political-
demographic cycles in China, where long-term population dynamics have been
recorded more thoroughly than elsewhere. In Chapter 3 we shall present our
own model of pre-Industrial political-demographic cycles. Finally, in Chapter 4
we shall consider the interaction between long-term trends and cyclical dynam-
ics.
 Chapter 1

Secular Cycles

We believe that one of the most important recent findings in the study of the
long-term dynamic social processes was the discovery of the political-demo-
graphic cycles as a basic feature of complex agrarian systems' dynamics.1
The presence of political-demographic cycles in the pre-modern history of
Europe and China has been known for quite a long time (e.g., Postan 1950,
1973; Abel 1974, 1980; Le Roy Ladurie 1974; Hodder 1978; Braudel 1973;
Chao 1986; Cameron 1989; Goldstone 1991; Kul'pin 1990; Mugruzin 1986,
1994 etc.), and already in the 1980s more or less developed mathematical mod-
els of demographic cycles started to be produced (first of all for Chinese "dy-
nastic cycles") (Usher 1989). At the moment we have a very considerable num-
ber of such models (Chu and Lee 1994; Nefedov 1999e, 2002a; 2004;
S. Malkov, Kovalev, and A. Malkov 2000; S. Malkov and A. Malkov 2000;
Malkov and Sergeev 2002, 2004a, 2004b; Malkov et al. 2002; Malkov 2002,
2003, 2004; Turchin 2003, 2005a).2
Recently the most important contributions to the development of the mathe-
matical models of demographic cycles have been made by Sergey Nefedov, Pe-
ter Turchin and Sergey Malkov. What is important is that on the basis of their
models Nefedov, Turchin and Malkov have managed to demonstrate that demo-
graphic cycles were a basic feature of complex agrarian systems (and not a spe-
cifically Chinese, or European phenomenon).
Nefedov (2004) starts with the population model developed by Raymond
Pearl (1926) and described by the logistic equation suggested by Verhulst (Ver-
hulst 1838; see also, e.g., Riznichenko 2002; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltou-
rina 2006):

1
As these cycles are of an order of 12 centuries, it was suggested by Turchin (2003, 2005b) to
denote them as "secular cycles". We would also like to acknowledge that it also was Peter
Turchin who in October 2002 suggested to us to denote the macrotrends we are dealing with in
this Introduction to Social Macrodynamics as "millennial trends".
2
There are also a rather large number of pre-industrial population-economy dynamic models de-
signed to account for "the escape from Malthusian Trap", rather than for the structure of pre-
industrial population cycles (Artzrouni and Komlos 1985; Steinmann and Komlos 1988; Komlos
and Artzrouni 1990; Steinmann, Prskawetz, and Feichtinger 1998; Wood 1998; Kgel and
Prskawetz 2001).
38 Chapter 1

dN N
r (1 ) N ,
dt C
where N is population, r is rate of natural growth, and C is maximum carrying
capacity.

This results in dynamics demonstrated in Diagram 1.13:

Diagram 1.1. Dynamics Generated by Raymond Pearl's Model

population consumption per capita

Fig. 1. The logistics curve and the curve of

consumption per capita

Starting from this basis Nefedov developed his mathematical model of pre-
industrial sociodemographic cycles. The basic logic of these models looks as
follows: after the population reaches the ceiling of the carrying capacity of land
its growth rate declines toward zero values and the system experiences signifi-
cant stress with decline of the living standards of common population, increas-
ing severity of famines, growing rebellions etc. As has been shown by Nefedov,

3
From Nefedov 2004.
 Secular Cycles 39

most complex agrarian systems had considerable reserves for stability, however,
within 50150 years these reserves usually got exhausted and the system expe-
rienced a demographic collapse, when increasingly severe famines, epidemics,
increasing internal warfare and other disasters led to a considerable decline of
population. As a result of this collapse, free resources became available, per
capita production and consumption considerably increased, the population
growth resumed and a new demographic cycle started. It has turned out to be
possible to model these dynamics mathematically in a rather effective way.
It seems necessary to stress that a new generation of models has moved far
beyond this basic logic. For example, models now describe effects of class
structure and elite overproduction; the new models predict dynamics of a great
number of variables like food prices, urbanization levels, growth of wealth dif-
ferentiation and so on. These models have achieved a rather close fit with ob-
served data. As an example, we present a diagram from a recent article by
Nefedov (2004) displaying the social and economic dynamics for the East Han
cycle predicted by Nefedov's model and the ones actually observed in historical
sources (see Diagram 1.2):

Diagram 1.2. Social and Economic Dynamics of China

in the Later Han Period (Nefedov 2004: 77)

60
population (documents)

50
calculated population

40 farmers

sowing area (calculation)

30

stocks of the peasants

20
sowing area (documents)

10 number of the tenants

craftsmen and servant

0
57
64
71
78
85
92
99
106
113
120
127
134
141
148
155
162
169
176
183
190

As we have already mentioned, a new generation of demographic cycle models

has made it possible to show that demographic cycles were a basic feature of
complex agrarian systems (and not a specifically Chinese, or European phe-
nomenon).
40 Chapter 1

It is not very often that we have direct evidence for long-term trends for both
population numbers and consumption rates. It is very rare that we have long-
term data on both variable dynamics within a cycle (as for Qing China, see Dia-
gram 1.3):
Diagram 1.3. Population and Consumption in China in the Qing Epoch

400 3.5

350 3
300
2.5
250
2
200
1.5
150
1
100

50 0.5

0 0

17301750 17501800 18001820

- - - - - - consumption (daily wages, liters of rice)

population (millions)

NOTE: Adopted from Nefedov 2003: 5. The data on daily wages are from Chao 1986: 2189. The
data on population are from Zhao and Xie 1988: 5412.

Much more frequently we have data just for one of such variables. Thus, for
most Chinese dynastic cycles we have data on population dynamics (see, e.g.,
Diagrams 1.4 and 1.5), and usually they display dynamics quite close to the
those predicted by demographic cycle models:
 Secular Cycles 41

Diagram 1.4. Population in Early Tang China

(number of households in millions)
(Nefedov 1999c. Fig. 2).

Diagram 1.5. Population in Late Tang China

(the number of households in millions)
(Nefedov 1999c. Fig. 3).
42 Chapter 1

Note that the form of the population curves is quite close to the one predicted
by Nefedov's model.
We have practically no long-term population data outside China (and, to
some extent, Europe), and this made it difficult to detect demographic cycles
outside Europe and China. However, not so infrequently we can find long-term
data on some other variables predicted by Nefedov's model (first of all per capi-
ta consumption rates), and quite regularly they have just the form predicted by
Nefedov's model (see, e.g., Diagrams 1.68):

Diagram 1.6. Consumption Dynamics in Babylonia

in the 6th early 5th centuries BC
(Nefedov 2003: Fig. 4)

NOTE: The numbers indicate the amount of barley in liters that an unskilled worker could buy on
his daily wage.
 Secular Cycles 43

Diagram 1.7. Consumption Dynamics in Northern India

th th
in the late 16 17 centuries (Nefedov 2003: Fig. 12).

NOTE: The numbers indicate the amount of wheat in liters that an unskilled worker could buy for
his daily wage.

Diagram 1.8. Consumption Dynamics in Egypt

in the early 8th 11th centuries
(Nefedov 2003: Fig. 8)

737 830 970 1072

NOTE: Daily wages of unskilled workers. The data on nominal wages are from Ashtor 1976: 201.
The real wages were calculated by Nefedov as amount of wheat (in decaliters), which an unskilled
worker could buy for his daily wage.
44 Chapter 1

Using such indirect data, as well as his system of qualitative indicators of vari-
ous phases of demographic cycles Nefedov (1999a, 1999b, 1999c, 1999d,
1999e, 2000, 2001a, 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003, 2004, 2005 etc.) has managed
to detect more than 40 demographic cycles in the history of various ancient and
medieval societies of Eurasia and North Africa, thus demonstrating that the de-
mographic cycles are not specific for Chinese and European history only, but
should be regarded as a general feature of complex agrarian system dynamics.
We would like to discuss in some detail three approaches to modeling of
demographic cycles: Turchin's (2003) models, another by Chu and Lee (1994),
and finally, the model of Nefedov (1999e, 2002a; 2004).
The "demographic-fiscal" model developed by Turchin (2003: 11827,
20813) connects population dynamics, state resources and internal warfare. In
this model the elites controlling the state are not assumed to be selfish. It is ra-
ther assumed "that the state has a positive effect on population dynamics; spe-
cifically, it increases k [the carrying capacity]" (Turchin 2003: 122). "There are
many mechanisms by which the state can increase the carrying capacity The
strong state protects the productive population from external and internal (ban-
ditry, civil war) threats, and thus allows the whole cultivable area to be put into
production The second general mechanism is that states often invest in in-
creasing agricultural productivity by constructing irrigation canals and roads, by
implementing flood control measures, by clearing land from forests, etc. Again,
the end result of these measures is an increase in the number of people that can
be gainfully employed growing food, i.e., the carrying capacity" (Turchin 2003:
1201). Thus the depletion of state resources and state breakdown are assumed
to be leading to the decline of the carrying capacity and, thus, demographic col-
lapse. As in all the other demographic cycle models the per capita rate of sur-
plus production is assumed to be a declining function of population numbers,
whereas the state expenditures are assumed to be proportional to population
size. Within this model "the rate of change of S [state resources] is determined
by the balance of two opposing forces: revenues and expenditures. When N
[population] is low, increasing it results in greater revenues (more workers
means more taxes). The growth in state expenditures lags behind the revenues,
and the state's surplus accumulates. As N increases, however, the growth in rev-
enues ceases, and actually begins to decline. This is a result of diminishing re-
turns on agricultural labor. However, the expenditures continue to mount. At
population density N = Ncrit, the revenues and expenditures become (briefly)
balanced. Unfortunately, population growth continues toward the carrying ca-
pacity, k, and the gap between the state's expenditures and revenues rapidly be-
comes catastrophic. As a result, the state quickly spends any resources that have
been accumulated during better times. When S becomes zero, the state is unable
to pay the army, the bureaucrats, and maintain infrastructure: the state collaps-
 Secular Cycles 45

es", which leads to a radical decline of the carrying capacity of land and demo-
graphic collapse (Turchin 2003: 123).
Turchin has also developed a number of elegant models of population dy-
namics, where the peasant-elite interaction plays the role of the main mecha-
nism of state breakdown. When the population size becomes large, food sup-
plies are exhausted and the elite multiplies out of control then state collapse is
observed, followed by a significant decrease in the number of peasants. A large
number of elite cannot be supported by a shrunken population, so eventually the
elite decreases, and the cycle of growth starts over. A resulting feature is that we
do not observe the population to climb up to its carrying capacity and saturate at
a certain level before a collapse (for a more detailed analysis of these models
see the next issue of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics [Korotayev and
Khaltourina 2006]). Also, the elite behaves in a strictly selfish manner; it does
not play a role in food redistribution (e.g., to provide food for starving people
during time of famine); this mechanism, however, is important when modeling
Chinese demographic cycles.
The interesting model of Chu and Lee combines elements of mathematical
modeling and statistical analysis/best fit approach. The main idea is very attrac-
tive. The population consists of rulers, peasants and bandits (rulers being equat-
ed with soldiers, drafted every year at a constant rate). The population has some
intrinsic growth rate, that is, the rate at which it increases given unlimited re-
sources. As the density increases, the resources get scarce, and the growth rate
decreases (this is an effect of overpopulation). At the same time, there is a flux
of people from peasants to bandits and vice versa. Each person faces a choice of
either working in the field or "defecting" and getting his food by means of
force. The soldiers are supported by taxation and they fight the bandits. The ra-
tional choice is based on evaluating the "utility function" of peasants and ban-
dits and it depends on external circumstances such as the degree to which agri-
cultural resources are damaged by warfare. The utility function is a combination
of the food share received and the probability of survival.
As the density of the population grows, it becomes more and more likely
that people choose to become bandits and fight for their food instead of growing
it. This leads to the reduction in population numbers and the cycle starts over.
Chu and Lee did not specify their model to the extent where it can be im-
plemented directly. Instead, they used it as a tool to improve the fitting of real
historical data. Information on warfare and winter temperatures was included in
the form of exogenous variables, and the frequency of peasant rebellions was
modeled based on the expected fraction of the rebels, calculated by the model.
This gave an excellent fit to the existing data.
Another interesting idea presented by Chu and Li are the two possible ex-
planations of the irregularity of the historical political-demographic cycles. One
46 Chapter 1

explanation is simply the ("external") stochasticity of the climatic conditions.

The other one is the intrinsic chaotic behavior of the dynamics system. Depend-
ing on parameter values, the simplified system analyzed by the authors has been
shown to undergo a series of period-doubling bifurcations and a transition to
chaos.
What is slightly disappointing is that the authors did not include the effects
of an annually changing crop yield (which is a function of climate fluctuations).
Nor did they include the positive role of the ruling class in food redistribution
(which is especially salient precisely in the Chinese case on which their model
is based). Moreover, the historical temperature data proved to be irrelevant for
the fit. These points will be addressed in more detail when we talk about our
model (see Chapter 3 below).
Nefedov, who incorporated stochastic effects of year-to-year food yields on
the population dynamics, has taken another approach. He noticed that as the
population reaches the carrying capacity of land, and food storages become de-
pleted, then random effects of good and bad years can play a significant role in
the dynamics. As food becomes very scarce because of, say, a bad winter, peo-
ple tend to sell their land and leave for cities, or join bands of rebels. In ideal-
ized conditions, that is, given a perfectly constant food yield, no cycle is ex-
pected. However, a bad harvest triggers a mechanism of collapse with a signifi-
cant reduction in population number. Nefedov's models have several interesting
components. For example, because of the increasing numbers of people leaving
the land as population density increases, we expect to see an intense growth of
cities, which is confirmed by historical observations. What seems to be missing
from Nefedov's models is the direct role of rebellion and internal warfare on the
cycle behavior. If only economic factors are taken into account, then there
seems to be no inertia in the dynamics, and each demographic catastrophe is
followed immediately by a new rise. As we shall see below, this plainly contra-
dicts historical data where "intercycle" periods of variable (but always signifi-
cant) length are observed.
In the next chapter we shall consider in more detail political-demographic
cycles in China, where long-term population dynamics have been recorded
more thoroughly than elsewhere.
 Chapter 2

Historical Population Dynamics in China:

Some Observations

The estimates of Chinese population dynamics during the Western Han dynasty
(206 BCE 9 CE) look as follows (see Diagram 2.1):
Diagram 2.1. Population of China in millions:
Western Han Cycle (206 BCE 9 CE)

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
-225 -200 -175 -150 -125 -100 -75 -50 -25 0 25 50 75

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 536).

For most of the cycle these are estimates. However, we have more or less relia-
ble census data for 2 and 57 CE (e.g., Bielenstein 1947: 126, 1986: 240; Du-
48 Chapter 2

rand 1960: 216; Loewe 1986b: 206). We also have abundant historical data ev-
idencing a substantial period of extreme political instability separating the de-
mographic collapse of the second decade (precipitated by the catastrophic flood
of 11 CE) from the period of new demographic growth (e.g., Bielenstein 1986).
Thus, though we cannot be sure about the exact shape of the demographic cycle
curve for Western Han, we can be quite confident about the fact that the new
phase of demographic growth did not begin in this case immediately after de-
mographic collapse.
Chinese population dynamics during the Eastern Han dynasty (25 220 CE)
are delineated below in Diagram 2.2:
Diagram 2.2. Population of China in millions:
Eastern Han Cycle (25 220 CE)

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
25 50 75 100 125 150 175 200 225 250

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 536).

For this cycle we have census data for 9 years (57, 75, 88, 105, 125, 140, 144,
145, 146, and 156 CE [e.g., Bielenstein 1947: 126, 1986: 2402; Durand 1960:
216; Loewe 1986c: 485, etc.]), which, in fact, document rather well two main
phases of the cycle a rapid growth from 21,007,820 in 57 CE to 53,256,229 in
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 49

105 CE, followed by population stagnation at the level strikingly close to the
one from which the Western Han demographic collapse took place. 1
Note that during the first phase the average annual growth rate was quite
high, but in no way fantastic just 2%, which according to Turchin (2003: 125)
is just a normal growth rate for pre-industrial agrarian populations when they
are adequately provided with resources in conditions of political stability. In the
modern world such figures can, of course, be much higher. E.g., in 1960 1962
in Costa Rica and 1965, 1967, and 1970 in Kuwait the natural annual popula-
tion growth rate exceeded 4%. Even in poverty-stricken Yemen it was 3.7% on
average in the last two decades of the 20th century, and in really poor Niger it
was 3.3%. In Guinea the average growth rate in this period was 2.6%, whereas
the life expectancy at birth in this country in 1980 was even lower (40 years)2
than the one estimated for early Qing China (e.g., Harrell and Pullum 1995:
148) when (according to Zhao and Xie 1988: 5401) the population growth also
approached 2%.
Hence, we do not see any grounds to exclude the possibility that between 57
and 105 CE the Chinese population, well provided with resources in conditions
of considerable political stability and a well-functioning state apparatus, could
experience 2% a year growth (at least for a few years). Note that the second half
of the 1st century in China was described by contemporaries as indeed rather
prosperous and stable (Lee Mabel Ping-hua 1921: 1789; Bokshchanin and
Ling 1980: 30; Krjukov et al. 1983: 32; Maljavin 1983: 30; Loewe 1986a: 292
7; Nefedov 2002a: 140). The state had sufficient resources and infrastructure to
provide adequate relief in critical situations.3 It is remarkable that for the post-
105 CE period we have much evidence for overpopulation, poverty, state's de-
pletion of resources, and its growing inability to provide sufficient relief in crit-
ical years (Lee Mabel Ping-hua 1921: 1826; Maljavin 1983: 289, 7780;
Ebrey 1986: 621; Loewe 1986a: 30116; Nefedov 2002a: 1402), all of which
correlates very well with the census data on the population stagnation at the car-
rying capacity of land level in 105 156 CE. Thus, though the actual popula-

1
That the population stabilized in the Eastern Han period at a level lower than the one attested for
Western Han might be somehow connected with the loss of some territories to Northern neigh-
bors, and the incomplete recovery of lands controlled by Western Han in Southernmost China
during the Eastern Han period. Note that the maximum area of cultivated land attested for East-
ern Han (746,000,000 mu in 105 CE) is still lower than the one attested for Western Han
(827,000,000 mu in 2 CE) (the data are compiled by Nefedov 2002a on the basis of Lee 1921:
436; Kul'pin 1990: 216; Krjukov et al. 1983: 41).
2
The data on modern countries are from World Development Indicators (World Bank 2005).
3
"The government was remarkably successful in coping with each crisis. Wang Ch'ung (A.D. 27
ca. 100), a caustic critic who was seldom generous or complimentary in his judgments, thought
that no ancient ruler could have handled relief programs any better than the senior statesman Ti-
wu Lun (fl. A. D. 40 85) had during the cattle epidemic [of 76 CE A.K., A.M., D.K.]" (Ebrey
1986: 620).
50 Chapter 2

tion growth rate in 57 105 CE may well still have been below 2%,4 in general,
the census data seem to capture quite adequately the population dynamics dur-
ing the first two main phases of the Eastern Han. We have also abundant histor-
ical evidence for demographic collapse and a very prolonged period of internal
warfare and political instability at the end of Han period, as well as for a long
time after it (e.g., Bokshchanin and Ling 1980: 116; Krjukov, Maljavin, and So-
fronov 1979: 1337; Maljavin 1982; Beck 1986; Schmidt-Glintzer 1999: 34
55; Fairbank 1992: 723; Wright 2001: 601, etc.).
Chinese population dynamics during the Early T'ang cycle (618 755 CE)
are delineated below in Diagram 2.3a:
Diagram 2.3a. Population of China in millions of households:
Early T'ang Cycle (618 755 CE)

10

0
610 630 650 670 690 710 730 750 770

NOTE: The data are from Nefedov 1999c: 5; 2003: Fig. 10, on the basis of Lee Mabel Ping-hua
1921: 436, cp. Durand 1960: 223; Zhao and Xie 1988: 537.

4
An alternative explanation could be that in 57 CE there was still a considerable underregistration
of population, and the growth of registered population between 57 and 105 CE is to be accounted
for both by the actual population growth and increase in the proportion of registered population
(e.g., Durand 1960: 218).
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 51

Assuming 6 persons per household, this corresponds to the following popula-

tion dynamics during this cycle (see Diagram 2.3b):

Diagram 2.3b. Population of China in millions:

Early T'ang Cycle (618 755 CE)

60

50

40

30

20

10

0
610 630 650 670 690 710 730 750 770

There is much historical evidence of a significant period of political instability

following the late Sui demographic collapse (e.g., Wright 1979: 12849;
Wechsler 1979a). In fact, there is not much doubt that the population of China
did not decline as dramatically as would be suggested by a straightforward
comparison between the Sui census of 606 CE, which listed more than 46 mil-
lion persons and the first T'ang census (627 CE), which registered just
12,000,000 (e.g., Durand 1960: 223).
52 Chapter 2

No doubt, this apparent decline is to be accounted for to some extent by un-

derregistration (e.g., Wechsler 1979b: 2089; Twitchett and Wechsler 1979:
277). However, the rapid growth of registered households up to the early 660s
seems to reflect to a very considerable degree actual population growth. Note
that "T'ai-tsung's reign had in general been a period of prosperity and low pric-
es, and these continued until the early 660s" (Twitchett and Wechsler 1979:
277; see also, e.g., Wechsler 1979b: 20910); additionally, for this period we
have evidence of free resources (first of all, uncultivated land) still being avail-
able (e.g., Lee Mabel Ping-hua 1921: 233; Shang Yue 1959: 205; Nefedov
1999c: 4), whereas the annual population growth rate for this period implied by
the census data is just c. 2%, which is, as has been already mentioned above,
just a normal growth rate for pre-industrial agrarian populations when they are
adequately provided with resources in conditions of political stability.
On the other hand, for the subsequent period we have growing evidence of
overpopulation and famines (e.g., Twitchett and Wechsler 1979: 278; Lee Ma-
bel Ping-hua 1921: 2367; Nefedov 1999c: 4). It appears that this was the Em-
press Wu's reign (both unofficial and official), when the growth of registered
household numbers seems to be accounted for more by the successes in registra-
tion rather than by actual population growth (see, e.g., Guisso 1979: 293, 313).
Thus, the actual decline of the population growth rate during this phase might
have been much more considerable than is indicated in Diagram 2.4.
On the other hand, the accelerating population growth in the 730s early
750s suggested by the T'ang census figures seems to reflect actual population
dynamics rather than mere registration progress, and appears to have resulted
from a series of more or less successful (at least in the short run) administrative
reforms of the Hsan-tsung government (Twitchett 1979: 4001, 41920), as
well as, possibly, from technological innovations (e.g., Bray 1984: 114), which
helped to increase the carrying capacity of land and temporarily relieve the de-
mographic crisis, though they did not much delay the demographic collapse
("the An Lushan Rebellion", caused, however, mostly by the imperfections of
the Hsan-tsung military organization [Peterson 1979: 46874]). However, such
innovations (which might also account for a short period of renewed population
growth at the pre-collapse phase of the Eastern Han demographic cycle [e.g.,
Bray 1984: 58797]) were immensely important, as they created an overall mil-
lennial trend towards the rise of the carrying capacity of land (and, consequent-
ly, of population numbers). In fact, as we shall see below, in Sung China such
mid-cycle innovations (both administrative and technological) turned out to be
successful to such an extent that they resulted in the mid-cycle demographic cri-
sis leading not to a demographic collapse, but to the radical rise of the overall
carrying capacity of land.
Chinese population dynamics during the Late T'ang cycle (763 880 CE)
are delineated below in Diagram 2.4:
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 53

Diagram 2.4. Estimated Population of China in millions:

Late T'ang Cycle (763 880 CE)

40

35

30

25

20
760 780 800 820 840 860 880 900

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 537).

The post-780 population decline reflected both in Zhao and Xie estimates and
in the T'ang census data (e.g., Durand 1960: 223) is connected with the so-
called Ho-pei rebellions of 781 786, which could be regarded as a direct con-
tinuation of the An Lushan Rebellion events (Peterson 1979: 5007; Dalby
1979: 5826). Again there is no doubt that the population of China did not de-
cline as dramatically as this would be suggested by a straightforward compari-
son between the census of 755 CE, which listed almost 53 million persons and
the census of 764 CE, which registered just 16,900,000 (e.g., Durand 1960:
223). The actual population decline might have been even less than was esti-
mated by Zhao and Xie, as the underregistration in the post-An Lushan T'ang
Empire was especially heavy, because the T'ang administration did not have ef-
fective control over many vast and populous territories above all, in Ho-pei
(e.g., Durand 1960: 223; Peterson 1979: 485).
Nobody, however, seems to doubt that the population of China remained
well below the early T'ang maximum during the late T'ang cycle, though we
might never learn the exact difference between those two levels. There is still
some evidence of overpopulation, especially in the Lower Yangtze area (Lee
Mabel Ping-hua 1921: 260; Nefedov 1999c: 7; Peterson 1979: 5523). The fact
that the demographic crisis began during the late T'ang cycle at a level far be-
low the one reached by early T'ang might be connected with the fact that the
overall carrying capacity of land declined as a result of the central administra-
tion heavily reduced ability to redistribute excessive population and resources
between overpopulated and underpopulated areas. There is much historical evi-
dence for a very long period of extensive internal warfare at the end of the
T'ang period and during the T'ang Sung intercycle (e.g., Somers 1979;
54 Chapter 2

Schmidt-Glintzer 1999: 708; Fairbank 1992: 723; Wright 2001: 838, etc.).
On the other hand, it is not entirely clear that the Late T'ang period should not
be regarded as a part of the T'ang Sung intercycle rather than a separate cycle
(e.g., Fairbank 1992: 86).
Chinese population dynamics during the Sung cycle are delineated below in
Diagram 2.5:
Diagram 2.5. Estimated Population of China in millions: Sung "Cycle"

110

100

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10
950 975 1000 1025 1050 1075 1100 1125

NOTE: estimates of Nefedov (1999c: 10).

 Historical Population Dynamics in China 55

In fact, the official Sung census of 1103 lists only 45.98 million persons (but
20.52 million households) (e.g., Durand 1960: 226). However, "the Sung statis-
tics are unique in that they show very small average numbers of persons per
household, ranging in most years from only 2.0 to 2.3 persons The more
probable explanation seems to be that the statistics of persons were limited to
the male sex. It is unlikely that even the males were completely enumerated"
(Durand 1960: 227). In general, there seems to be an unusually high degree of
consensus that in the early 11th century the population of China was over 100
million (e.g., Ho 1959: 172; Durand 1960: 226; Banister 1987: 4; Fairbank
1992: 89; Feuerwerker 1995: 501; Deng 1999: 191; Mote 1999: 164; Nefedov
1999c: 10, etc).5
On the other hand, the official Sung statistics appear to describe adequately
the overall trends of population dynamics6 during this period. Indeed the Sung
census suggest a relatively rapid population growth rate in early decades of the
cycle, which correlate quite well with evidence of relative prosperity, relatively
high consumption rates and availability of free resources during this period (Lee
Mabel Ping-hua 1921: 2706; Shang Yue 1959: 287; Smolin 1974: 1001;
Nefedov 1999c: 9, etc.).
This growth continues up to 1006, then it slows down but still continues,
with some setbacks, until 1029, for which year the Sung census registered 10.56
million households (which corresponds to 5364 million persons). After this,
for three decades population stagnates, or even shows negative dynamics. This
is rather expected, as by the late 1020s Chinese population appears to have ap-
proached the old ceiling of the carrying capacity of land, that is, the level at
which the demographic collapses took place during earlier demographic cycles
(starting from Western Han). Indeed, for the Sung mid-phase we have extensive
evidence for all the symptoms of sociodemographic crisis preceding demo-
graphic collapse undernutrition, rising rebellions etc. (e.g., Lee Mabel Ping-
hua 1921: 2812; Smolin 1974: 31157; Nefedov 1999c: 9, etc.).
However, the Sung mid-phase demographic crisis resulted not in a demo-
graphic collapse, but in the non-catastrophic solution of the crisis through the
radical rise of the carrying capacity of land. For Sung we have extensive evi-
dence for numerous administrative and state-sponsored (as well as spontaneous)
technological innovations leading to this rise, culminating in Wang Anshi re-
forms (Ho 1956, 1959: 16970, 1778; Shiba 1970: 50; Chou 1974: 935; Bray
1984: 79, 1134, 2945, 4914, 597600; Mote 1999: 165). One of the most
5
As the average household size at this time is usually estimated between 5.0 and 6.0, the different
estimates, e.g. for 1103 CE, also vary between 103 and 123 million persons; this still gives a ra-
ther clear idea about the general level reached by the Chinese population by the early 11 th century
(that is why we speak about an unusually high level of consensus e.g., as we shall see below,
for the early 17th century estimates vary between 99 and 300 million).
6
Diagram 2.5 demonstrates these dynamics just according to these statistics, but with the number
of households according to the Sung census having been multiplied by 5.0 (Nefedov's estimation
of the average number of persons per household during this period).
56 Chapter 2

spectacular and effective among them was the quite conscious, systematic and
well-organized introduction and diffusion of new varieties of quick-ripening
rices from Champa, accompanied by the peasants' development of still new va-
rieties (Ho 1956; Perkins 1969: 38; Shiba 1970: 50; Bray 1984: 4914, 598). In
the early 12th century China appears to have reached a new ceiling for the carry-
ing capacity of land, which resulted in a new sociodemographic crisis (Smolin
1974: 42039; Nefedov 1999c: 101).
There are no grounds to exclude the possibility that Sung China had poten-
tial to solve this crisis too in a non-catastrophic way, eventually even escaping
from the "Malthusian trap" (see, e.g., Meliantsev 1996). However, the Sung cy-
cle was interrupted quite artificially by exogenous forces, namely, by the
Jurchen and finally Mongol conquests.
Chinese population dynamics during the Yan cycle are delineated below in
Diagram 2.6:

Diagram 2.6. Estimated Population of China in millions:

Yan Cycle

110

100

90

80

70

60

50
1250 1275 1300 1325 1350

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 539).

 Historical Population Dynamics in China 57

The Yan cycle was unusually short, and the population of China does not ap-
pear to have reached the Sung level.
There seems to be a rather straightforward and very convincing explanation
for this:
"It may be worth recalling that the fourteenth century was calamitous everywhere.
Within and beyond the various Mongol empires, from Iceland and England at one end
of Eurasia to Japan at the other, societies were suffering plagues, famines, agricultural
decline, depopulation, and civil upheaval. Few societies were spared at least some of the
symptoms. China was spared none of them. No fewer than thirty-six years in the four-
teenth century had exceptionally severe winters, more than any other century on record.
In the greater Yellow River region, major floods and droughts7 seem to have occurred
with unprecedented frequency in the fourteenth century. Serious epidemics broke out in
the 1340s and 1350s. Famines were recorded for almost every year of Toghn Temr's
reign [1333 1368 A.K., A.M., D.K.], leading to great mortality and costing the gov-
ernment vast sums in relief. These natural disasters created huge numbers of uprooted
and impoverished people, fodder for the revolts that wracked the realm in the 1350s It
might well be the case that the long-term cumulative effects of such repeated natural ca-
lamities were too great for any government to handle and that if normal conditions had
prevailed in China, the Yan dynasty might have lasted much longer than it did" (Dard-
ess 1994: 5856).
Indeed, in pre-industrial history we appear to find a correlation between annual
temperatures and population numbers, whereby radical declines in annual tem-
peratures correlated with considerable declines in population numbers (or slow-
ing down of population growth rates) in Europe, China, as well as in the world
population numbers (e.g., Malkov 2002: 297). Malkov provides the following
explanation for this correlation: "Global warming appears to have led to growth
of the demographic carrying capacities of territories (enhancing the survival
conditions within given modes of nature exploitation), which resulted in grow-
ing population densities. On the contrary, the cooling resulted in relative over-
population (excessive demographic pressure on the territory as a result of the
decline of food production basis caused by the drop in the yields), which led to
mass migrations, social cataclysms, wars, and, consequently to the decreasing
population densities" (Malkov 2002: 297).
Thus, in the 14th century the catastrophic decrease in annual temperatures
(e.g., Malkov 2002: Fig. 6) appears to have resulted in the decrease of the car-
rying capacities in most parts of Eurasia, leading (in conjunction with pandem-
ics) to shortening of demographic cycles and the chain of premature demo-
graphic collapses. And China here seems to have been no exception.
There is much historical evidence for a significant period of extensive inter-
nal warfare and political instability during the Yan Ming transition (e.g.,
Mote 1988; 1999: 51748; Dreyer 1988: 5897; Dardess 1994: 5804).

7
Note that in many parts of Eurasia the global cooling was accompanied (rather counterintuitively)
just by droughts and floods (e.g., Korotayev, Klimenko, and Proussakov 1999).
58 Chapter 2

Chinese population dynamics during the Ming cycle are delineated below in
Diagram 2.7:
Diagram 2.7. Estimated Population of China in millions:
Ming Cycle (version 1)

105

100

95

90

85

80

75

70

65

60
1375 1400 1425 1450 1475 1500 1525 1550 1575 1600 1625 1650

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 53940).

The official Ming census records give much lower figures, indicating that the
population grew up to 60.5 million by 1393 and then fluctuated between a bit
more than 50 million (1431 1435, 1487 1504) and 6365 million (1486,
1513, 1542 1562); in 1602 it was 56.3 million, in 1620 1626 it was 51.7
million (e.g., Durand 1960: 2312).
There is a perfect consensus that the actual population of Ming China was
much higher. What is more, this appears to have been clear to the Ming Chinese
themselves:
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 59

"The official census records were hopelessly out of touch with demographic reality. The
compiler of a Zhejiang gazetteer of 1575 insisted that the number of people off the offi-
cial census registers in his county was three times the number on. A Fujian gazetteer of
1613 similarly dismissed the impression of demographic stagnation conveyed by the of-
ficial statistics: 'The realm has enjoyed, for some two hundred years, an unbroken peace
which is unparalleled in history,' the editor pointed out. 'During this period of recupera-
tion and economic development the population should have multiplied several times
since the beginning of the dynasty. It is impossible that the population should have re-
mained stationary.' A Fujian contemporary agreed: 'During a period of 240 years when
peace and plenty in general have reigned [and] people no longer know what war is like,
population has grown so much that it is entirely without parallel in history.' Another of-
ficial in 1614 guessed that the increase since 1368 had been fivefold. China's population
did not grow between 1368 and 1614 by a factor of five, but it certainly more than dou-
bled" (Brook 1998: 62).
Thus, nobody appears to doubt that the actual population of Ming China was
much higher than it is indicated by the Ming census (what is more, many Ming
Chinese do not seem to have had doubts about this either); however, there is no
consensus at all as regards just how much higher it was. In fact, the estimates by
Zhao and Xie are among the lowest. Most experts suggest for the end of the
Ming much higher figures: 150 million (Ho 1959: 264), 120200 million (Per-
kins 1969: 16), 175 million (Brook 1998: 162), 200 million (Chao 1986: 89), or
even 230290 million (Heijdra 1998: 43840; Mote 1999: 745).
As can be seen, Heijdra and Mote propose the most radical revision of the
Ming census data, of the earlier estimates, and, in fact, of the population history
of Late Imperial China in general. Indeed, their suggestions provide an entirely
new vision of not only Ming, but also Qing population history. Heijdra (1994;
1998) who collected evidence for this revision, starts with re-estimation of pop-
ulation data for 1380, arriving at 85 instead of 60 million (Heijdra 1994: 52;
1998: 437); he then suggests that population growth rates tended to decrease
from early Ming till late Qing. As regards the concrete estimates of population
growth rates, Heijdra suggests three sets of figures ("low", "middle", and "high"
hypotheses):
"The high hypothesis envisages a 0.6 percent increase in population per year from 1380
to 1500, 0.5 percent from 1500 to 1600, and 0.4 percent from 1600 to 1650 (from which
could be subtracted losses through war and disasters, although those are probably cov-
ered in the lower rate for the final fifty years8). The middle hypothesis envisages growth
rates of 0.5 percent, 0.4 percent, and 0.3 percent respectively. An implausibly low set of
growth rates for the same three periods would be 0.4 percent, 0.3 percent, and 0.2 per-
cent. The results of applying these figures are revealing. The high hypothesis gives
175 million by 1500, 289 million for 1600, and 353 million for 1650. The last figure is
almost equal to the official figure from the year 1812, which is perhaps the most reliable

8
The emphasis is ours A.K., A.M., D.K.
60 Chapter 2

official figure after 1393.9 The middle hypothesis gives figures of 155, 231, and 268
million for the three dates, while the quite implausible10 lower hypothesis gives 137,
185, and 204 million" (Heijdra 1998: 438).
As was mentioned above, this suggests a radical revision of not only Ming, but
also Qing population history. For example, it implies the absence of separate
Ming and Qing demographic cycles, suggesting their merging into one cycle
(note that this was already suggested in 1990 by Kul'pin [p. 123]; hence, we
may speak about the Kul'pin Heijdra Mote revision, though it was only
Heijdra who provided any significant substantiation for this hypothesis).
Heijdra bases his revision mainly on the data (extracted from genealogical
[chia-p'u] materials) on the life expectancy dynamics in Ming and Qing China,
which he usefully summarizes in the following diagram (see Diagram 2.8):
Diagram 2.8. Regional Life Expectancy from 1500 to 1800
(= Fig. 9.3. from Heijdra 1998: 437).

NOTE: "The figures indicate the average age at death of the population already having reached the
Chinese age of 15" (Heijdra 1998: 437).

However, let us study this diagram more attentively. Note first of all a very
sharp and uniform decline of life expectancies in the 18 th century (relatively
slow in the first half of the 18th century [when, as we shall see below, according
to conventional accounts the population growth was relatively slow], and very

9
Note that this implies that in the 18 th century (generally believed to be the period of the fastest
population growth in the pre-20th century Chinese history) the population of China actually stag-
nated. As we shall see below, this hypothesis appears to be totally implausible A.K., A.M.,
D.K.
10
In fact, as we shall see below, these estimates are the most plausible (at least for the years 1500
and 1600) A.K., A.M., D.K.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 61

fast in the second half of this century when the population growth rate was es-
pecially high). In fact, this is entirely congruent with the data of other scholars
(e.g., with the materials of Liu 1995: 1189, or Harrell and Pullum 1995: 148,
who find in their 3 datasets life expectances at birth of 5054 for the 17th centu-
ry, 3141 for the 18th century and just 2528 for the years 1800 1874; see al-
so, e.g., Lavely and Wong 1998: 721). However, in conjunction with the data
on the equally rapidly decreasing per capita acreage and consumption rates
(e.g., Chao 1986: 89, 2189; Wang 1992: 405, 48, 50, 578, 63; Li 1992: 77;
Wong and Perdue 1992: 133; Nefedov 2000b: 19, etc.), what this actually sug-
gests is precisely a very rapid population growth.
Another salient feature of Heijdra's diagram is that though within both the
Ming and (especially) Qing we observe rather explicit trends towards decline in
life expectancies, the situation is not as evident during the Ming Qing transi-
tion, when three out of eight sample populations show significant growth of life
expectances, and two display significant slow down in their decline. The data of
other scholars suggest that this trend was much more salient than could be seen
in Heijdra's diagram (e.g., Liu 1995: 1189). Incidentally, Liu makes a very rel-
evant observation:
"The low mortality rate reflected in these data recorded from the early years of a lineage
should not be considered as representing the real situation of the time when cohorts
were active, for the data were apparently biased by a tendency for those men who lived
longer to become founders of lineages or lineage branches. In other words, a lineage
would not have formed if its ancestors were all very short-lived" (Liu 1995: 119; see al-
so Harrell and Pullum 1995: 148; Lavely and Wong 1998: 7223; Lee and Feng 1999:
173).
Liu's correction, of course, suggests that the life expectances in Ming China
were not as high as is indicated by the genealogical data. On the other hand, as
during the Ming Qing transition life expectancies tended to grow notwith-
standing "Liu's effect", their actual growth must have been considerably higher
than it is indicated by these data (especially, due to the strong bottleneck effect
observed during massive depopulations). This is actually very congruent with
the data indicating the decline of the per capita acreage, and the growth of per
capita consumption observed in the early Qing period as compared with late
Ming, thus confirming conventional accounts of a rather significant population
decline during the Ming Qing transition (e.g., Shang Yue 1959: 515; Chao
1986: 89, 218; Wang 1992: 40, 48, 50; Nefedov 2000b: 14).11
An improbable feature of Heijdra's reconstruction is his assumption that the
population can grow at a rate of say 0.6% a year for 120 years. In fact wherever
we have more or less reliable population figures, we do not find anything like
this. In agrarian society within fifty years such population growth leads to di-
minishing of per capita resources, after which population growth slows down;

11
For additional critique of the Kul'pin Heijdra Mote revision see Marks 2002.
62 Chapter 2

then either solutions to resource problems (through some innovations) are found
and population growth rate increases, or (more frequently) such solutions are
not found (or are not adequate), and population growth further declines (some-
times below zero).
On the other hand, the evidence produced by Telford (1995: 69) suggests
that the population growth rates experienced a sharp decline to close to zero
levels by the end of the Ming period, and to negative values during the Ming
Qing transition. Assuming Heijdra's estimation of Chinese population for the
year 1380, initial growth rate 0.4 and decline of population growth as 0.1 per-
cent every 50 years we would get the following picture of the Ming population
dynamics (see Diagram 2.9):

Diagram 2.9. Estimated Population of China in millions:

Ming Cycle (version 2)

160

140

120

100

80

60

40
1350 1375 1400 1425 1450 1475 1500 1525 1550 1575 1600 1625 1650 1675

These estimates, perhaps, should be regarded as rather conservative. Of course,

there do not seem to be sufficient grounds to rule out the possibility that the ini-
tial population growth rate was higher than suggested (and, hence, that by 1600
the Chinese population reached some figure between 150 and 200 million).
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 63

In general the estimates suggesting that the population during the Ming cy-
cle exceeded significantly the level achieved during the Sung cycle look quite
plausible against the background of the very large number of the carrying ca-
pacity enhancing innovations evidenced for the Ming period, from the introduc-
tion of some New World crops to the use of new fertilizers and increasing agri-
cultural labor intensification (Ho 1955; Ho 1959: 172, 179, 1834; Perkins
1969: 4851; Bray 1984: 2945, 526, 6001; Chao 1986: 195; Twitchett and
Mote 1998: 45; Heijdra 1998: 517, 51923, Mote 1999: 74950). Due to a
high degree of unreliability of the pre-1741 Qing statistics (e.g. Ho, 1959: 24
35; Durand 1960: 2348) the population estimates for Early Qin period vary
greatly (e.g., Ho, 1959: 2435; Durand 1960: 2348; Perkins 1969: 209; Peter-
son 2002: 5; Rowe 2002: 475, etc.); thus, the population of China well might
have declined during the Ming Qing transition to a level considerably over the
one indicated in the diagram above. Note that this would not still affect the gen-
eral shape of the Ming population dynamics.
However, it cannot be excluded that this shape was more like the Sung one
with two periods of relatively fast population growth (at the beginning of the
cycle, and in the 16th century, with the second decline of this growth towards its
end [as is suggested by data mentioned, e.g., by Skinner 1985: 2749; Shepherd
1988: 416], see Diagram 2.10):
Diagram 2.10. Estimated Population of China in millions:
Ming Cycle (version 3)

180

160

140

120

100

80

60
1350 1400 1450 1500 1550 1600 1650

There is extensive historical evidence for a rather long period of political insta-
bility and internal warfare during the Ming Qing transition (Simonovskaja
1966; Atwell 1988: 60340; Struve 1988; Dennerline 2002; Spence 2002: 120
150; Nepomnin 2005).
64 Chapter 2

Chinese population dynamics during the Qing cycle are delineated below in
Diagram 2.11:

Diagram 2.11. Population of China in millions: Qing Cycle

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50
1650 1700 1750 1800 1850

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 53940).

Though there is considerable disagreement as regards exact figures for Chinese

population, especially for the pre-1741 period, there is a very high degree of
agreement as regards the general features of the Qing population dynamics: a
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 65

rather fast growth in the 18th century, followed by a very significant slow down
of population growth during the pre-collapse phase of the cycle (Ho 1959: 36
64; Durand 1960: 23444; Perkins 1969: 2029; Lavely and Wong 1998: 717
20; Nefedov 2000b; Myers and Wang 2002: 571; Rowe 2002: 475). The only
contesting view is suggested by the Heijdra Mote revision, which has been
shown above to be untenable.
The population growth during the Qing cycle was sustained by a very con-
siderable number of carrying capacity enhancing innovations (to a considerable
extent supported and stimulated by the state), e.g., the continuing introduction
and wide diffusion of the New World crops, development of new varieties of
previously known cultivated plants, agricultural labor intensification, land rec-
lamation etc. (Ho 1955; Ho 1959: 1734, 180, 1859; Lee 1982; Bray 1984:
452, 601; Perkins 1969: 3940; Dikarev 1991: 6970; Fairbank 1992: 169;
Lavely and Wong 1998: 7256; Lee and Wang 1999: 3740; Mote 1999: 750,
942; Nefedov 2000b: 17; Myers and Wang 2002: 599, 6346; Rowe 2002: 479;
Zelin 2002: 2168). As a result of these innovations the carrying capacity of
land during this cycle was raised to a radically new level.
The main revision here has been proposed by Lee, Feng, Lavely, Wong, and
Campbell (Lee and Campbell 1997; Lavely and Wong 1998; Lee and Feng
1999, etc.), who deny altogether any demographic cycle dynamics during the
Qing period, as they deny the decline of consumption levels, life expectancies
etc., predicted by demographic cycle models. However, the evidence that they
present in support of this revision is not convincing. First of all, they dismiss
too easily the massive evidence which has accumulated, by now, in support of
the decline of the consumption rates, living standards, life expectancies etc. dur-
ing the Qing cycle. Thus, the massive evidenced compiled by Chao Kang
(1986: 193220), which shows a dramatic decline in real wages during the Qing
cycle, is dismissed outright by Lavely and Wang (1998: 731) as "hazardously
thin", and is just not mentioned by Lee and Feng (1999).
However, as we shall see below, it is the evidence produced by the "revi-
sionists" in support of their revision which is really "hazardously thin", espe-
cially in comparison with the massive and representative dataset compiled by
Chao Kang. The above mentioned massive evidence for the very significant de-
cline of the life expectancies during the Qing cycle compiled on the basis of ge-
nealogical data is dismissed in the following way alluding to what we called
above "Liu's effect":
"Harrell and Pullum [1995: 148] themselves acknowledge these problems [with genea-
logical data A.K., A.M., D.K.]: 'The apparent decline over time in the expectation of
life in each genealogy is so great that it must be regarded as spurious. It is likely that in
the seventeenth century, the chance that an individual would be included in the genealo-
gy was positively related to that individual's longevity' " (Lee and Wang 1999: 173; a
fairly similar argument is made by Lavely and Wong 1998: 7223).
66 Chapter 2

Lee and Wang do not appear to have understood what Harrell and Pullum
meant. In fact, they do not imply that their data cannot be considered as rather
firm evidence for a considerable decline of life expectancies in respective popu-
lations. They only mean that the decline in life expectancies might have been
somewhat smaller than is suggested by their data, but in no way do they imply
that a considerable decline of life expectancies did not occur at all. In fact as
has been shown by Liu (1995: 119), "Liu's effect" is really strong only for very
early periods (15th and especially 14th centuries), whereas "from the 1498
1557 cohorts on, as number of observations became large enough and the dis-
tribution of deaths covered almost every age group, the bias toward high age at
death seems to have diminished". Indeed, as we saw above, Liu's effect fails to
eliminate totally the trend towards the increase in life expectancies during the
Ming Qing transition predicted by demographic cycle models. Still, as is sug-
gested by Harrell and Pullum, Liu's effect may still be felt in the 17 th century da-
ta. However, the influence of this effect in the 18th century (and especially, the
second half of the eighteenth century) must be negligible. However, this period
of the most rapid population growth is precisely the period for which the genea-
logical data indicate the most rapid decline in life expectancies (see above Dia-
gram 2.8 and comments to it).
On the other hand, for the earliest phases of the Qing demographic cycle,
when the Liu's effect must have been greatest within the Qing period (but when
the population growth rate was relatively low, and hence according to the de-
mographic cycle model one does not have to expect significant declines in life
expectancies), the genealogical data do indicate only rather small declines in
life expectancies. All this, of course, suggests that the decline in life expectan-
cies indicated by genealogical data for the Qing period evidences first of all ac-
tual decline (caused by demographic cycle mechanisms), and is accounted for to
only a rather small degree by Liu's effect.
However, what positive evidence do the "revisionists" produce in support
for their claim that during the Qing cycle there was no decline in consumption
rates, living standards and life expectancies of commoner population? To start
with, Lee and Wang (1999) present considerable amounts of convincing evi-
dence showing the growth of per capita grain production, productivity of labor,
stature, life expectancy, decline of mortality etc. in China. Yet, all these data re-
fer to the 20th century.12 Such evidence for Qing China is "hazardously thin".
On the one hand, here the "revisionists" rely to a disproportionate extent on
the data referring to the Qing elites, first of all, the Qing imperial lineage. In
fact, they showed quite persuasively that the life of the Qing elites was much
better than the one of the commoners (actually, who would doubt this? 13) and

12
In fact, it demonstrates rather convincingly that in the second half of the 20 th century China
managed to escape quite successfully from the "Malthusian trap".
13
In fact, it was earlier already shown by Telford (1990) that the Qing (and not only Qing) elites
lived longer than commoners.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 67

tended to improve: their life expectancies grew sharply in the 18 th century (Lee,
Wang, and Campbell 1994: 401; Lavely and Wong 1998: 723), health care im-
proved and child mortality declined (Lee, Wang, and Campbell 1994; Lee and
Wang 1999: 467).
Of course, this tells us nothing about such trends among the commoner pop-
ulation. For the growth of labor productivity in Qing China the "revisionists" re-
ly solely on the Li Bozhong (1998) study (Lee and Wang 1999: 31). However,
Li Bozhong's data only refer to the Lower Yangzi area, and have been shown to
be totally unreliable and misinterpreted (Huang 2002).
As regards the data on increasing food consumption per capita in Qing Chi-
na, it is derived mainly from late imperial agricultural handbooks, which indi-
cate that "whereas an ordinary farm laborer in the sixteenth century was provid-
ed with meat 10 days a month during the busy season (our emphasis A.K.,
A.M., D.K.), this allotment increased to 15 days a month in the seventeenth cen-
tury and to 20 in the nineteenth" (Lee and Wang 1999: 34). Note, however, that
these handbooks were compiled by a sort of exemplary literati farm owners,
and in no way reflect the general situation (Heijdra 1994: 30810). Note also
that handbooks indicate not an increase in real wages, but rather in increase in
food provided by farmer owners to feed their workers in the field during the
busy season. One wonders if this was not designed to compensate the decreas-
ing real wages (Chao 1986: 193220) and to avoid the workers' productivity of
labor falling below a critical level during hard work at harvest time.
The other source used by the "revisionists" to prove the increase of living
standards of commoner population in Qing China is the study by Pomeranz
(2000) comparing living standards of the population of the most developed area
of Qing China, the Lower Yangzi, and Western Europe in the second half of the
18th century (Lee and Wang 1999: 345). As has been shown by Huang (2002)
Pomeranz significantly overestimates the living standards of the Yangzi Delta
commoner population.14 However, this is not the most important point.
Pomeranz may still be mostly right in his basic argument that the living
standards in the most developed part of Qing China in the second half of the
18th century might not have been so much lower than the contemporary Europe-
an ones. Yet, this study is simply not relevant for the revision of Qing demo-
graphic history. The main problem with it here is that it is synchronic rather
than diachronic, and hence cannot be used to support or reject any hypothesis
on the demographic dynamics. What would be relevant here is the comparison

14
Paradoxically, Rowe (2002: 501) uses Lee and Wang's data to criticize (in an entirely appropri-
ate way) the assertion that the standard of living in late 18 th century China was not lower than in
contemporary Western Europe: "Their remain, however, reasons for caution in our appreciation
of the mid-Ch'ing as an era of plenty. Lee and Wang themselves, while arguing that rising nutri-
tional levels support their thesis that prosperity bred relaxed population controls, admit that the
pronouncedly lower stature of the pre-Modern Chinese in comparison with contemporary Euro-
peans indicates lower living standards".
68 Chapter 2

between the living standards of this area's population, say, in 1750 1770 and
1820 1840. If such data show an increase in living standards during this peri-
od, this could be considered as some support for the "revisionist" hypothesis.
However, such a verification/falsification of a dynamic hypothesis simply can-
not be done on the basis of synchronic studies.
In general, the "revisionists" appear to have failed to produce convincing ev-
idence in support of their hypothesis, and to disregard evidence to the contrary;
thus, their hypothesis has to be rejected (for additional critique of the Lee et al.
revision see, e.g., Wolf 2001; Huang 2002).
Note that the historical demographic data of Lee et al. on Han banner popu-
lation in Liaoning (for 1774 1873) do not contradict conventional accounts,
though this is claimed by the "revisionists". For example, Lavely and Wong
claim that "although there are some fluctuations [in the Liaoning time series]
over the four decades for which Lee and his associates present data, there is no
discernable trend" (1998: 723 with reference to Lee, Campbell, and Anthony
1995: 177, Figs. 7.1 and 7.2).
However, a careful inspection of these two diagrams does reveal a signifi-
cant (though not very strong) trend towards increasing mortality and decreasing
life expectancies (with the lowest mortality rates at the beginning of the period
under consideration, in 1772 1780, and with the lowest life expectancies at the
end of the same period, in 1819 1840). In fact, Lavely and Wong themselves
notice that in their sample life expectancy at birth in 1798 1801 was 43 years,
but in 1837 1840 it was just 33 (1998: 721, Table 3A, where they display oth-
er data confirming the presence of a general trend towards declining life expec-
tancies within the Qing cycle15).
An important contribution of Lee et al. was that they demonstrated how im-
portant female infanticide was as a factor of population dynamics in pre-
Modern and early Modern China. Though the importance of this factor was well
known at least since the pioneer work of Fei Hsiao-t'ung (1939: 22, 334; see
also e.g. Ho 1959: 5862, 2745), Lee et alii's findings suggest that the decline
of population growth rates towards the end of the Qing cycle might be account-
ed for by the growth of female infanticide to a larger extent than by the growth
of adult mortality. Indeed, their findings suggest an enormous growth of the fe-
male infanticide rates in the latest phases of this cycle16 (see, e.g., Diagram
2.12):

15
The only exception they mention belongs squarely to that very type of exceptions, which only
confirm the rule this is just the Qing imperial lineage (Lavely and Wong 1998: 721).
16
We would also like to note their very interesting mathematical specification of the effects of fe-
male infanticide on population growth rate (Lavely and Wong 1998: 7368). We believe that in
the future this model should be definitely taken into account for development of advanced mod-
els of demographic cycles.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 69

Diagram 2.12. Crude Birth Rates in Daoyi, 1774 1864

(per 1,000 married women aged 1545)
(Lee, Campbell, and Tan 1992: 164, Fig. 5.5)

Another important finding of Lee et al. was their discovery of rather strong and
significant correlations between the staple prices and female infanticide rates
(e.g., Lee, Campbell, and Tan 1992: 15875). This of course suggests that the
growth of female infanticide was caused by the declining living standards, as
was already noticed, for example, by Mann: "The decline in population
growth during the nineteenth century owed much to a rise in female infanticide,
itself a direct response to declining economic opportunity" (Mann 2002: 451).
Thus, we believe Lee et alii's data do not prove the absence of demographic
cycles in Chinese history; rather they enrich our knowledge of concrete mecha-
nisms of functioning of those cycles.
Note, for example, that female infanticide was not just an innocuous "pre-
ventive check":
70 Chapter 2

"Recent research in Chinese legal history suggests that the same subsistence pressures
behind female infanticide led to widespread selling of women and girls Investigations
into case records show that the buying and selling of women were so widespread that lit-
igation stemming from such transactions accounted for perhaps 10 percent of all civil
cases handled by the local courts Another related social phenomenon was the rise of
an unmarried "rogue male" population, a result both of poverty (because the men could
not afford to get married) and of the imbalance in sex ratios that followed from female
infanticide. Recent research shows that this symptom of the mounting social crisis led,
among other things, to large changes in Qing legislation vis--vis illicit sex Even
more telling, perhaps, is the host of new legislation targeting specifically the 'baresticks'
single males (guanggun) and related 'criminal sticks' of bandits (guntu, feitu), clearly a
major social problem in the eyes of the authorities of the time. As with the mounting
problem of trafficking in women and girls, the Qing state promulgated no fewer than
eighteen substatutes to deal with the new social problem" (Huang 2002: 5289; see also,
e.g., Hudson and Den Boer 2002).
There is considerable evidence on the population decline and significant period
of political instability and internal warfare after 1851 (Iljushechkin 1967; Per-
kins 1969: 204; Larin 1986; Kuhn 1978; Liu 1978; Nepomnin 2005 etc.). In
fact, the extent of the late Qing demographic collapse might have been even
higher than is indicated in Diagram 58: "Cao Shujis new research, based on
exhaustive use of local gazetteers and prefecture-by-prefecture reconstructions
of population totals and changes, suggests a total death toll from these devasta-
tions between the years 1851 and 1877 of a whopping 118 million" (Huang
2002: 528). The Qing demographic cycle might look exceptional in sense that
the demographic collapse at its end did not lead to the immediate fall of the
Qing dynasty. However, the same is observed for the early T'ang cycle. And
here again it may be argued that the demographic collapse was "the beginning
of the end" of the dynasty.
Finally, one wonders if we cannot speak about one more demographic cycle
in the Chinese history, the "Republican" one, with the late 1930s demographic
collapse resulting finally in the "Mandate of Heaven" changing its hands once
again (see Diagram 2.13):
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 71

Diagram 2.13. Population of China in millions: "Republican" Cycle?

500

480

460

440

420

400

380

360

340
1845 1865 1885 1905 1925 1945

NOTE: estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 543).

Note that the famous Buck's Chinese Farm Survey (Buck 1937) indicates the
presence of all the pre-collapse symptoms. For example, the Princeton reanaly-
sis of this survey found life expectancy at birth in the early 1930s Chinese coun-
tryside being as low as 24 years (Barclay et al. 1976). However, the data on
"Republican" demographic cycle could scarcely be used for the reconstruction
of pre-Modern population dynamic patterns, as it seems to be closer to Modern
Third World demographic cycles, characterized by relatively short durations,
very short periods of pre-collapse slow-downs, the fast demographic growth re-
starting almost immediately after the demographic collapse, etc. (see, e.g., Ko-
rotayev and Khaltourina 2006: Chapters 78 and Diagram 2.14):
 72 Chapter 2

Diagram 2.14. Somalian Political-Demographic Cycles (1960 1990)

8000000

7000000

6000000

5000000
SOMALIA population

4000000

3000000

2000000
19
1960
19 1
1962
1963
19 4
1965
19 6
1967
1968
19 9
1970
19 1
1972
1973
19 4
1975
19 6
1977
19 8
1979
1980
19 1
1982
19 3
1984
1985
19 6
1987
19 8
1989
1990
19 1
6

9
92
YEAR
Data source: World Bank 2005.

Finally, though the population dynamics curve for "Communist" China (see Di-
agram 2.15) bears some superficial resemblance to previous demographic cy-
cles, we have no grounds to speak about a demographic cycle in this case, as the
decline of population growth took place against the background of rising living
standard and life expectancy, as well as decreasing mortality, and was account-
ed for by decreasing birth rates (e.g. Lee and Wang 1999):
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 73

Diagram 2.15. Population of China in millions:

Communist/Postcommunist Pseudocycle

1300

1200

1100

1000

900

800

700

600

500

400
1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
74 Chapter 2

Let us summarize some observations on the patterns of demographic cycles in

pre-Modern China. First of all, note that at first glance the data do not reveal
any significant trend to the lengthening (or shortening) of the demographic cy-
cle durations (see Diagram 2.16):
Diagram 2.16. Duration of Demographic Cycles

300
270
258
250
219
200
200

148
150
128

100 80 75

50

0
E.Han L.Han E.T'ang L.T'ang Sung Yan Ming Qing

NOTE: Rho = .095, p = .82. Incidentally, as we see, a typical duration of a Chinese demographic
cycle is 150250 years.

However, we find a definite trend towards the increase in the growth phase
lengths if we consider only the cycles for which direct historical demographic
evidence is available, and omit the Late T'ang period17, as well as the evidently
prematurely collapsed Yan dynasty (see Table 2.1 and Diagram 2.17):

17
As it is not entirely clear if the Late T'ang period should not be regarded as a part of the T'ang
Sung intercycle rather than a separate cycle; see above.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 75

Table 2.1 and

Diagram 2.17. Growth Phase Lengths of Chinese
Political-Demographic Cycles

Cycle Name Beginning of Beginning of de- Growth

growth phase mographic col- phase
(CE) lapse (CE) length
(years)
East (Late) Han Cycle 57 188 131
(Early) T'ang Cycle 650 754 104
Sung Cycle 960 1120 160
Ming Cycle 1368 1626 258
Qing Cycle 1680 1852 172

280
Ming
260

240

220

200
Growth phase length, years

180 Qing
Sung
160

140 Late Han

120
Eearly T'ang
100

80
0 1 2 3 4 5 6

Dynasty sequence number

NOTE: Rho = .8, p = .05 (1-tailed). The reasons for the use of a 1-tailed significance test here will
become apparent in the next chapter.

On the other hand, it is hardly surprising that the data indicate an unequivocal
upward trend for the maximum population numbers reached within a cycle (see
Diagram 2.18):
76 Chapter 2

Diagram 2.18. Highest Population Numbers

Reached during Dynastic Cycles (version 1).

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
E.Han L.Han E.T'ang L.T'ang Sung Yan Ming Qing

NOTE: Rho = .74, p = .037.

If we use estimates of Zhao and Xie (1988: 5367) for Han and Early T'ang,
and consider the Late T'ang period as a part of an intercycle, rather than as a
separate cycle, the trend will be even more pronounced (Diagram 2.19):
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 77

Diagram 2.19. Highest Population Numbers

Reached during Dynastic Cycles (version 2).

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
E.Han L.Han E.T'ang Sung Yan Ming Qing

NOTE: Rho = .93, p = .003.

What kind of trend do we observe here? Linear regression suggests a statistical-

ly significant (p < 0.001) relationship with R2 = 0.398.18 Exponential regression
produces an even stronger result with R2 = 0.685 (p < 0.001); see Dia-
gram 2.20:

18
All regressions for pre-industrial and industrial periods combined were calculated for years 57
2003.
78 Chapter 2

Diagram 2.20. Curve Estimations for Chinese Population Dynamics,

millions, 57 2003 CE (linear and exponential models)

1400

1200

1000

800

600

400

Observed
200
Linear

0 Exponential
10
11
12 0
13 0
14 0
15 0
16 0
17 0
18 0
19 0
20 0
21 0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
0

00
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
00
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

YEAR
NOTES: The thin black line corresponds to the observed population dynamics surveyed in this
chapter. Linear regression: R = 0.631, R2 = 0.398, p < 0.001. The respective best-fit thin light grey
line has been generated by the following equation: Nt = 0.2436t 124.25. Exponential regression:
R = 0.828, R2 = 0.685, p < 0.001. The respective best-fit thick dark grey line has been generated by
the following equation: 13.3575 e 0,0015t. The best-fit values of parameters have been calculated
with the least squares method.

However, a simple hyperbolic growth model produces a much better fit with the
observed data (R2 = 0.968, p << 0.00119), see Diagram 2.21:

19
In fact, to be exact, statistical significance of the fit in this case reaches an astronomical level of
1.67 10-19.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 79

Diagram 2.21. Population Dynamics of China (57 2003 CE), millions,

correlation between the observed values and
the ones predicted by a hyperbolic growth model

1400 NOTE: R = 0.984,

R2 = 0.968, p =
1200 1.7 10-19. The black
markers correspond to
empirical estimates
1000 surveyed in this chap-
ter. The grey solid line
800
has been generated by
the following equation:
63150.376
600 Nt .
2050 t
The best-fit values of
400
parameters
(63150.376) and t0
200 (2050) have been cal-
predicted culated with the least
0 observed
squares method.
0 300 600 900 1200 1500 1800 2100

t, years

Yet, even if we consider only the pre-Modern history of China (up to 1850), we
will still find the hyperbolic growth trend for this part of Chinese history too
(see Diagrams 1.223):
Diagram 2.22. Population Dynamics of Pre-Modern China
(700 BCE 1850 CE)
500

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50

0
-700 -400 -100 200 500 800 1100 1400 1700
80 Chapter 2

What kind of trend do we observe here? Linear regression again suggests a sta-
tistically significant (p < 0.001) relationship with R2 = 0.469. Exponential re-
gression again produces an even stronger result with R2 = 0.593 (p < 0.001);
see Diagram 2.23:
Diagram 2.23. Curve Estimations for Pre-Modern Chinese Population
Dynamics, millions, 57 1850 CE
(linear and exponential models)

500

400

300

200

100 Observed

Linear

0 Exponential
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800
100 300 500 700 900 1100 1300 1500 1700 1900

YEAR

NOTES: The thin black line corresponds to the observed population dynamics surveyed in this
chapter. Linear regression: R = 0.689, R2 = 0.469, p < 0.001. The respective best-fit thin light grey
line has been generated by the following equation: Nt = 0.1098t 27.97. Exponential regression: R
= 0.770, R2 = 0.593, p < 0.001. The respective best-fit thick dark grey line has been generated by
the following equation: 16.9785 e 0,0012t. The best-fit values of parameters have been calculated
with the least squares method.

However, a simple hyperbolic growth model once more produces a much better
fit with the observed data (R2 = 0.884, p << 0.00120), see Diagram 2.24:

20
To be exact, statistical significance of the fit in this case again reaches an astronomical level
(2.8 10-19).
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 81

Diagram 2.24. Population Dynamics of Pre-Modern China

(57 1850 CE), millions, correlation between
the observed values and the ones predicted
by a hyperbolic growth model

450

400

350

300

250

200

150

100

50 observed

0 predicted
50 250 450 650 850 1050 1250 1450 1650 1850

NOTE: R = 0.94, R2 = 0.884, p = 2.8 10-19. The black markers correspond to empirical estimates
surveyed in this chapter. The grey solid line has been generated by the following equation:
33430.518
Nt .
1915 t
The best-fit values of parameters (33430.518) and t0 (1915) have been calculated with the least
squares method.

Thus, the trend observed in the Chinese historical population dynamics (both
for the whole Chinese history, and for its pre-industrial part) is not lineal; it is
not even exponential, but is in fact just hyperbolic.
As was mentioned above, this trend is accounted for by the innovations in
the raising of the carrying capacity of land. The most massive innovations of
this kind took place during the Sung and Qing cycles, which accounts for their
82 Chapter 2

shapes being rather different from the rest of the cycles in that they include very
strong "trend-creating" components.21
After detrending, a typical Chinese population cycle looks as follows: its
dynamics are characterized by a relatively fast population growth at the initial
phases of the cycle, followed by rather long periods (normally, of an order of a
century, or even more) of a very slow and unsteady population growth rate. This
is accompanied by increasing significant, but non-critical annual fluctuations in
the annual growth (occasionally dropping to zero, or even negative values).
These fluctuations are mostly caused by annual fluctuations in climatic condi-
tions causing fluctuations in annual yields, and hence rises of population growth
rates in good years, and their drops in lean years (accompanied by famines, mi-
nor epidemics, rebellions etc.). These fluctuations tended to be smoothed during
the initial phases, when the countercrisis potential was at its peak, but tended to
increase in magnitude during the pre-collapse phases, with decrease both in the
effectiveness of functioning of relief sub-systems, and in average consumption
levels. For example, Zhao and Xie (1988: 542) provide the following estimates
of the annual population growth rates on the basis of the official Qing statistics
for the pre-collapse decades (see Diagram 2.25):
Diagram 2.25. Annual Population Growth Rate Fluctuations
in Late Qing China (1820 1850, in )
14

12

10

0
1820 1830 1840 1850

-2

-4

21
As was mentioned above, rather massive innovations in the raise of the carrying capacity of land
appear to have taken place also during the Ming cycle, though this does not seem to be adequate-
ly reflected in the Ming population dynamics reconstructions described above.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 83

There are considerable doubts about the accuracy of the data on those fluctua-
tions (e.g., Durand 1960), but they still seem to reflect some reality, as for this
period we have much historical data on occasional famines poorly mitigated by
relief systems whose effectiveness was very low at this phase, increasing severi-
ty of floods (caused by the decline of the effectiveness of the flood-preventing
subsystem), rebellions etc. (e.g., Mann Jones and Kuhn 1978).
Nefedov's model captures rather well this part of population dynamics; how-
ever, there are a few problems with it. Within this model after a relatively short
initial period of rapid growth, population stagnates and fluctuates at the carrying
capacity level. Yet, in none of the cases analyzed above do we observe exactly
this. The closest fit to this model is found for the Eastern Han cycle (see Dia-
gram 2.2), whose dynamics seem to have been overgeneralized by Nefedov. In
fact, the point that 2030 years after 105 CE the population registered by the
Chinese census did not increase is accounted for, first of all (and this, inci-
dentally, was acknowledged by Nefedov [1999e: 8] himself), by the lost of sig-
nificant territories in the North-West by the Han state. Hence, the decrease of
population registered by the census reflects, above all, the loss of control by the
Han state over some of its territory (and population) rather than actual popula-
tion decline.
Note that as Nefedov's (2004) own data suggest, after the territory con-
trolled by the Eastern Han Empire had stabilized, the population growth re-
sumed again. So actually, in the history of China the periods of fast population
growth tended to be followed by periods of much slower growth (with consider-
able fluctuation), rather than population stagnation. Of course, this growth can
be accounted for partly by carrying capacity enhancing innovations; but as our
model suggests, some such growth could take place in the pre-final phases of a
cycle even if the carrying capacity of land remained stable. The other problem
with Nefedov's model is that within it fast population growth starts immediately
after demographic collapse, whereas, as we saw above, in reality the periods of
new fast population growth were always separated from demographic collapse
by significant "intercycles", when the population growth is suppressed by con-
tinuing internal warfare.
The overall functional scheme of Pre-Modern Chinese demographic cycles,
outlining most of the mechanisms of demographic collapse which we have
found in the literature, is presented below in Diagram 2.26:
84 Chapter 2

Diagram 2.26/1. Functional Scheme of a Pre-Industrial Chinese

Demographic Cycle (pre-collapse and collapse
phases) (Part 1)



Population
Growth


Bringing un-
Differential re- der cultivation
prod.: elite Elite over- Decreasing per
marginal
growth r. > production capita acreage
lands in up-
commoner g.r
stream areas



Peasants loose
Decreasing per
Elites become their land Decreasing
capita food pro-
richer and become state revenues
duction
tenants

Decreasing
ability of state
Growth of Decreasing per
to provide re-
female infan- capita food con-
lief during
ticide sumption
fam-
ines/epidemics



Growing ille- Growing % Increasing se-
gal trade in of males hav- Increasing sever-
ing no chance verity of epi-
ity of famines
women to get married demics



Decreasing abil-
ity of landown-
ers to provide
relief to com-
moners during

famines
Impoverishment of a part of elites
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 85

Diagram 2.26/2. Functional Scheme of a Pre-Industrial Chinese

Demographic Cycle (pre-collapse and collapse
phases) (Part 2)

Overstaff-
ing of the
state appa-
ratus

Bringing under Deforesta-
Silting of the
cultivation mar-
tion/soil deg-
Yellow River
ginal lands in radation in up-
bottom
upstream areas stream areas



Decreasing abil-
Decreasing ability of ity of state to
Decreasing Increasing sever-
state to perform its perform flood-
state revenues ity of floods
functions preventing opera-

tions

Decreasing

ability of state Decreasing mili-
Decreasing ability of
to provide relief tary potential of
state to enforce order
during fam- the state

ines/epidemics
Growing number
of indicators that

the dynasty has
lost the "Man-
Increasing se- date of Haven"
Defeats by ex-
verity of epi- Growth of banditry and should be re-
ternal enemies
demics placed by a new

dynasty


Rebellions

State break-
down

Demographic
collapse

86 Chapter 2

Due to the shortage of space it turned out to be impossible to mark in the

scheme above all the relationships.
For example, defeats by external enemies and growth of banditry lead to fur-
ther declines in state revenues; increasing severity of famines leads to growth of
banditry, which in its turn contributes to the rise of rebellions.
Only some peasants who loose their lands become tenants.22 As was shown
by Nefedov (2002a; 2004), it does not make sense for a landlord to rent out his
land in plots barely sufficient to provide subsistence for a tenant and his family.
As the standard rent rate in China was 50%, such plots would be at least twice
as large. Hence, if two poor peasants having minimum size plots each have to
sell their land, only one of them will be able to accommodate himself in his vil-
lage as a tenant. The other will have to accommodate himself in some other
ways. One of the possibilities was to find an alternative employment in non-
agricultural sector, e.g., in cities. As was suggested by Nefedov, the very pro-
cess described above would in fact tend to create new possibilities for such em-
ployment, as landowners were more likely than poor farmers to buy goods pro-
duced in cities. This is confirmed by historical data indicating that the fastest
growth of cities (and, hence, overall sociocultural complexity) tends to occur
during the last phases of demographic cycles. However, not all the product paid
by tenants to the landlords would find its way to those landless who tried to ac-
commodate themselves in the non-agricultural sector of economy; hence, some
of them would tend to accommodate themselves through illegal means, thus,
leading to the growth of banditry. Other important relations not indicated in the
scheme are the negative feedbacks between famines, infanticide etc. and popu-
lation growth.
With respect to the relationship Elite Overpopulation Overstaffing of the
state apparatus Decreasing ability of state to provide relief during famines
the following illustration seems to be relevant:
"By Chia-ch'ing times (1796 1820 A.K, A.M., D.K.) this vast grain administration
had been corrupted by the accumulation of superfluous personnel at all levels, and by
the customary fees payable every time grain changed hands or passed an inspection
point The grain transport stations served as one of the focal points for patronage in of-
ficial circles. Hundreds of expectant officials clustered at these posts, salaried as depu-
ties (ch'ai-wei or ts'ao-wei) of the central government. As the numbers of personnel in
the grain tribute administration grew and as costs rose through the eighteenth century,
the fees payable for each grain junk increased accordingly. Where in 1732 fees had
ranged from 130 to 200 taels per boat, by 1800 they had grown to 300 taels, in 1810 to

22
As was shown by Shepherd (1988), this was just one of the sources of the origins of tenancy.
Another was created by the capital investments of landowners in various land-improvement
schemes (irrigation, land reclamation etc.). What is more, Shepherd suggests that in Late Imperial
and especially Republican China the second source was even more important than the first. How-
ever, his own data also indicate that during earlier cycles the first source of tenancy was more
important than in the latest periods of Chinese history.
 Historical Population Dynamics in China 87

500, and by the early Tao-kuang period (1821), to 700 or 800 taels" (Mann Jones and
Kuhn 1978: 121).
Note that we are dealing here with a system that had been extremely effective
during earlier phases of the cycle:
"In the autumn and winter of 1743 1744, a major drought afflicted an extensive por-
tion of the North China core, resulting in a virtually complete crop failure. The famine-
relief effort mounted by the court and carried out by ranked bureaucrats was stunning-
ly effective. Ever-normal and community granaries were generally found to be well
stocked, and the huge resources of grain in Tongzhou and other depots were transported
in time to key points throughout the stricken area. Networks of centers were quickly set
up to distribute grain and cash, and soup kitchens were organized in every city to which
refugees fled. In the following spring, seed grain and even oxen were distributed to af-
flicted farming households. As a result of this remarkable organizational and logistic
feat, starvation was largely averted, and what might have been a major economic dislo-
cation had negligible effect on the region's economic growth" (Skinner 1985: 283).
Floods: "Crises in the grain transport system were part of a general breakdown of pub-
lic functions in the early decades of the [19th] century, stemming in part from bureau-
cratic malfeasance. In the case of grain transport, malfeasance merely compounded
physical difficulties in a complex canal system that was joined at its mid-point to the
Yellow River Conservancy (responsible for flood-prevention activities A.K., A.M.,
D.K.). The physical difficulties of the system stemmed from silting caused by heavy soil
erosion By the late eighteenth century, the bed of the Yellow River had risen to dan-
gerous heights, threatening the dikes and causing observers to predict the change in its
course which finally came in 1853 Carelessness, ill-advised economies and intention-
al negligence in the Yellow River Conservancy had become a marked concern in official
memorials after 1780, and corruption continued to plague the administration in the early
nineteenth century. By many accounts, the aim of the water conservancy administration
appears not to have been flood prevention, but rather the keeping of a careful balance
whereby floods could occur at intervals regular enough to justify a continuing flow of
funds into the water conservancy administration. Stories of three-day banqueting circuits
and continuous theatrical performances along the south river conservancy suggested that
only 10 per cent of the sixty million taels that annually supported the water conservancy
were spent legitimately By the Tuo-kuang era (1821 1850 A.K., A.M., D.K.) the
water conservancy, like the Grand Canal, had become a haven for unemployed bureau-
crats" (Mann Jones and Kuhn 1978: 121).
It appears important to note that the functional scheme above does not account
for negative feedbacks (e.g., the negative feedback between the growth of fe-
male infanticide rates [ultimately caused by population pressure] and the popu-
lation growth rates). Note that not all such negative feedbacks have been ade-
quately spelled out even yet e.g., the influence of the growth of monasticism
(caused to a considerable extent ultimately by population pressure) on popula-
tion growth rates.
Some of the mechanisms outlined in the scheme above are rather China-
specific, for example, Bringing under cultivation marginal lands in upstream areas De-
forestation/soil degradation in upstream areas Silting of the Yellow River bottom Increas-
88 Chapter 2

ing severity of floods Growing number of indicators that the dynasty has lost the "Mandate of
Haven" and should be replaced by a new dynasty Rebellions. One could hardly find this
mechanism working in, say, Egyptian political demographic cycles (see the next
issue of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics [Korotayev and Khaltourina
2006: Chapters 25]).
Some other factors have countervailing effects. For example, female infanti-
cide, on the one hand, delays demographic collapse by decreasing population
growth rate; but, on the other hand, it speeds it up by promoting the growth of
banditry, as well as numbers of males having no chance to get married, who
make ideal potential recruits both for bandit networks and for rebel armies.
Though such factors are immensely important if we would like to model dynam-
ics of many particular variables during demographic cycles (for example, life
expectancies at age 1 and higher [as was convincingly demonstrated by Lavely
and Wong 1998: 7368])23, it seems possible to ignore them on the level of
basic models of demographic cycles. Hence, in the next chapter we will restrict
ourselves to the modeling of just a few of what we consider the most basic
mechanisms of political-demographic cycle dynamics.

23
And we believe such factors should be taken into account in future more comprehensive models.
 Chapter 3

A New Model of Pre-Industrial

Political-Demographic Cycles
by Natalia Komarova and Andrey Korotayev

The focus of the present chapter is not to fit the existing historical data, with all
of its intricate features. Therefore, we do not feed into the model external war-
fare or temperature variables. Instead, we would like to mimic the qualitative
behavior of the system in order to see whether the historical dynamics are con-
sistent with the verbal explanations offered by various authors. We would like
to understand the way annual climatic variations interact with population densi-
ty to produce a demographic collapse through an increased frequency of inter-
nal warfare. We would also like to see how a country emerges from such a
"state of disarray", and what factors influence this "intercycle" period. Internal
warfare and its inertia will play an important part in this model.
The only exogenous variable in our model is fluctuating climate (as reflect-
ed by a fluctuating harvest yield). We will run our model and observe how cy-
cles are formed, and what influences their period and amplitude. We set up the
model as a system of difference equations where the value of the variable in a
certain year is defined by the state of the system for the previous year.
We denote by Ni the number of peasants in year i. Let us suppose that the to-
tal area of the land available for agriculture, is Atotal, and the area per peasant is
Areai. In times of peace, the amount of land per peasant is Areai = Atotal/Ni, that
is, all available arable land is being used.
Let us denote by H0 the average amount of food harvested by a peasant each
year, measured per unit area. Every year, due to changing weather factors, the
harvest yields will be different. We model this by letting the harvest variable be
Harvesti = H0 random numberi1. (3.1)
The amount of food per person in year i is then given by Foodi = Har-
vesti Areai.
There is a minimum amount of food needed for a peasant to survive each
year; we call it Foodmin. Then the quantity dF = Food Foodmin is the per capi-

1
In the simulation whose results are presented at the end of this chapter its range is set at 0.85 to
1.15.
90 Chapter 3

ta food surplus. In a good year, this quantity is positive, in a bad year it is nega-
tive (food shortage). The population grows, or shrinks, depending on this factor.
Namely, the amount of population growth per year is directly proportional to
dF, and if dF > 0, then the population will grow; if dF < 0, it will shrink. This is
captured by the following basic population dynamics model:
Ni+1=Ni (1 + dF),
where is a coefficient; we restrict the growth rate, dF to a maximum of
3% a year. This model implicitly includes the carrying capacity in the following
way: if there is much available land, then the peasants will have large allotments
and will collect enough food to feed themselves, even in difficult years. As a re-
sult, the food surplus will be positive, and the population will grow. New peas-
ants will need land, and therefore the area per peasant will decrease (the total
area of land available for agriculture is assumed to be fixed). As a result, the
food surplus will be lower, and the growth will slow down, until the system
reaches a "dynamic equilibrium". This is a typical Malthusian growth model,
leading to a logistic growth curve with saturation.
In reality, things are more complicated, and the first factor that we take into
account is the presence of the state. We assume that the state collects taxes; with
the amount of taxes per household (in years of peace) determined on the basis
of food surplus. We assume the following taxation scheme: If there is additional
food, the state collects a fixed fraction of food surplus. If there is shortage of
food, the state does not collect taxes. A state-owned food reserve is formed,
which is then used to feed the starving people in the years of poor yield. We
keep track of the state-owned food reserve by means of the variable Si. If the
food surplus is positive, there will be an increase in the food reserve by the
amount of Ni tax dF, where tax is the proportion of the food surplus that is
moved to the counter-famine reserve2. If there is a shortage of food, then the
necessary amount of stored food is distributed among the peasants, and the
overall amount of stored food decreases; indeed, it can be completely depleted
in bad years. If we include food storage in the model, we see that in the begin-
ning, as the population grows, the food storage increases, and when the popula-
2
The presence of a state-sponsored relief system may seem to be too China-specific. Admittedly,
developed systems of this kind are very rarely found within complex agrarian systems outside
East Asia. However, famine-relief counter-crisis subsystems of some kind are found within an
overwhelming majority of complex preindustrial states. The most wide-spread type was based on
the private stores of food resources held by elites (landowners etc.). During famines the elites
would tend to use those storages to provide a sort of relief to at least some categories of common-
er population. Landowners, after all, normally would have an interest in their tenants not dying
out, and naturally would provide some support to them in such cases. No doubt such relief was
rarely altogether altruistic: landowners could provide food to peasants in order to indenture them
and to get their land. But regardless of its motive, such aid would have helped substantial parts of
affected populations to survive through lean years. For the sake of simplicity, in our model both
main types of pre-industrial counter-crisis relief subsystems are merged in one (hence, taxes are
merged with rents).
 A New Model of Pre-Industrial Demographic Cycles 91

tion reaches saturation at the carrying capacity level, the food storage gets de-
pleted after a few bad years, and continues to oscillate at low levels.
Next, we need to add some political factors to this purely economic model.
In times of trouble, some peasants may be tempted to leave/sell their land and
obtain food by joining bandits or rebels3. The less food is available, the more
likely peasants will be to make this decision. Thus we introduce the variable Ri,
the number of bandits in year i. The number of peasants turning bandits each
year is set at dRi = Ni dF/Foodmin out in the years when there is food
shortage, and 0 in prosperous years. Here, the constant out is "peasant-bandit
transformation rate", basically describing the likelihood that each person will
make the decision to become a bandit, depending on how large the food short-
age is.
In order to describe the population dynamics of the bandits, let us suppose
that the bandits survive by robbing the peasants. The more peasants are availa-
ble, the easier it is for a bandit to survive. Let us introduce the quantity i,, equal
to i = 1 Ni / (10 Ri) if Ni 10 Riand i = 0 otherwise. Then the equation
for the number of bandits each year can be written as
Ri+1=Ri (1 i, ) + dRi .
This equation states that the population of bandits decreases in the absence of
new recruits. We assume that bandits rarely have families, and that they have an
increased death rate as a result of the hardships of their life style. The death rate
of bandits consists of two parts, the constant background rate, and i which
depends on how successful the bandits are at extracting food from the peasants.
If the peasant bandit ratio is greater than 10, we assume that the bandits can
easily feed themselves; the smaller the ratio, the harder it is for the bandits to
survive.
For the next step, we need to discuss the impact of banditry on the lives of
peasants and on the general condition of the state. First of all, the presence of
bandits ravaging the countryside introduces a certain "fear factor". If the popu-
lation of the country decreases due to the intensification of internal warfare,
much land becomes free, and in principle could be cultivated by the remaining
peasants. However, this is not likely to happen, since peasants tend to stay in
protected areas, and agricultural activities outside the limited protected region
are considered unsafe. This can be modeled by assuming that in the presence of
bandits, some parts of unoccupied land are not available for peasants: Areai+1 =
Atotal/(Ni + 10Ri). This means that in times of peace (10Ri << Ni), all available
area is distributed among the peasants. In times of war (10Ri ~ Ni), the peasants

3
We follow Chu and Lee (1994) in denoting as "bandits" both bandits and rebels (note that Chu
and Lee in their turn follow the Chinese tradition in denoting both categories with one term
[fizi]). The logic behind this merging is that both groups produce rather similar effects on pop-
ulation dynamics: rebels, even when fighting with the aim of improving the life of peasants, in
order to feed themselves would still have to take food from peasants.
92 Chapter 3

tend to stick to their land in safe areas, expansion to available uncultivated

lands in unsafe areas does not happen, and effective carrying capacity of land
decreases. Thus banditry/rebellions/internal warfare are the basic reasons for
demographic collapse as described in our model.
Secondly, warfare has a negative impact on the ability of the state to collect
taxes. In order to capture this, we introduce the "tax collection effectiveness co-
efficient", U. Depending on the level of internal warfare (measured best by the
number of bandits), this coefficient is equal to 0 in times of war, and it is equal
to 1 in times of peace. We assume that during war, the state is weakened and its
ability to collect taxes is impaired. This is captured by the following equation:
Si+1 = Si + dS U ,
where dS is the tax collected or the food from the storage given back to the
peasants, exactly as described above, and U quantifies the efficiency of the state
and the impact of war on tax collection. In time of war, U is close, or equal, to
zero, and taxes are not collected efficiently because the state infrastructure is
partially destroyed.
To summarize, we have included three main elements in this model. (1) The
Malthusian-type economic model, with elements of the state as tax collector
(and counter-famine reserve sponsor), and fluctuating annual harvest yields; this
describes the logistic shape of population growth. It explains well the upward
curve in the demographic cycle and saturation when the carrying capacity of
land is reached. (2) Banditry and the rise of internal warfare in time of need are
the main mechanism of demographic collapse. Personal decisions of peasants to
leave their land and become warriors/bandits/rebels are influenced by economic
factors. (3) The inertia of warfare (which manifests itself in the fear factor and
the destruction of infrastructures) is responsible for a slow initial growth and the
phenomenon of the "intercycle".
Let us put all the definitions and equations together in a coherent set, de-
scribing demographic cycles of complex agrarian systems:
Ni is the number of peasants;
Ri is the number of bandits;
Si is the amount of food storage;
Harvest = H0 + random fluctuations; (3.1)
U is the "tax collection effectiveness coefficient":
U = (1 Ri/0.03Ni)3 if Ri < 0.03Ni,
0 otherwise;
Areai+1 = Atotal / (Ni + 10Ri);
Foodi = Harvesti Areai;
dF is per capita "food surplus" (which could be not only positive, but
also negative):
dFi = Foodi/Ni Foodmin;
 A New Model of Pre-Industrial Demographic Cycles 93

dSi = Ni tax dFi if there is additional product,

Ni dFi if there is shortage of food (dF < 0) and enough
storage (|Ni dF| < Si),
Si if there is considerable shortage of food
(dF < 0; |Ni dF| < Si);
dF'i is "effective" food surplus, after tax/rent payment, or after receiv-
ing state help;
dF' = dFi dSi/Ni ;
is related to the growth rate of peasants. We assume that the quantity
dF' cannot exceed 0.03.
dRi is number of peasants turned into bandits in year i:
dRi = Ni out dF/Foodmin if there is not enough food,
0 if there is enough food;
out is "peasant-bandit transformation rate";
+ I is death rate of bandits; is the constant background rate;
i = 1 Ni/10Ri if Ni 10Ri
0 otherwise;
rob bandit-related death rate of peasants.
The difference equations (equipped with appropriate initial conditions), are:
Si+1 = Si + dS U , (3.2)
Ni+1 = Ni (1 + dF') dRi rob Ni Ri , (3.3)
Ri+1 = Ri (1 i) + dRi . (3.4)
This model generates the following dynamics (see Diagram 3.1):
Diagram 3.1. Dynamics Shape Generated by the Model

50,000,000
45,000,000
40,000,000
35,000,000
30,000,000
25,000,000
20,000,000
15,000,000
10,000,000
5,000,000
0
200 300 400 500 600 700
t, years

NOTE: thick solid black curve total population ("peasants" + "bandits"), persons; thick solid
grey curve number of "bandits"; thin broken black curve food reserve, minimum annual food
94 Chapter 3

rations (each of which secures a survival of one person through one year). The diagram reproduces
the results of a simulation with the following values of parameters and initial conditions: N0 =
30,000,000 peasants; Atotal = 50,000,000 units, it is assumed that one unit produces under average
climatic conditions one minimum annual food ration (MAFR), i.e., an amount of food that is bare-
ly sufficient to support one person for one year, that is, H0 = 1 MAFR per unit per year; random
number range is between 0.85 and 1.15, thus Harvesti (per unit yield in year i) randomly assumes
values in the range 0.85 to 1.15 MAFR per unit per year; Foodmin = 1 MAFR; R0 = 1000 bandits;
S0 = 0 MAFR; = 0.04 MAFR-1; tax = 0.05; out = 0.1; = 0.03; rob = 0.000000002.

A numerical investigation of the effect of parameter values on the dynamics of

our model indicates that the main parameters that affect the period of the cycle
are the proportion of resources annually accumulated in counter-famine reserves
(tax), peasant-bandit transformation rate (out), and the magnitude of climatic
fluctuations (Mc).4 Longer cycles of more than three centuries in period obtain
for higher values of tax and lower values of out and Mc, whereas the cycles'
length becomes shorter with lower tax, and higher out and Mc. This suggests
that the length of the cycles would increase with the growth of the strength of
counter-famine and law-enforcement subsystems, which seems to correspond
quite well to the actually observed historical dynamics (see, e.g., Nefedov
2000a, or the next issue of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics [Korota-
yev and Khaltourina 2006]).
We believe that the proposed model combines positive aspects of earlier
models that have not previously been combined within one model. Unlike
Nefedov's model, but like some predator-prey logic based models it accounts
for significant intercycle periods. On the other hand, unlike the latter, due to the
inclusion of the famine relief subsystem dynamics our model can now account
for lengthy periods of very slow and unsteady population growth (when much of
the population had inadequate per capita acreage and there existed very strong
incentives to innovate in order to raise the carrying capacity of land).5 However,
like most of the earlier models, it is based on the assumption that subsistence
technology development level is a constant. As a result it only describes "secu-
lar cycles", but not "millennial trends". Is it possible to develop mathematical
models that describe both secular cycles and millennial trend dynamics? We
shall try to answer this question in the next chapter.

4
On the other hand, the "bandit death rate" () affects strongly the length of the intercycles (the
smaller the bandit death rate, the longer the intercycles), whereas bandit-related death rate of
peasants (rob) affects strongly the amplitude of cycles (the higher the bandit-related death rate of
peasants, the higher the cycle amplitude). Note that can be regarded as a measure of a political
system effectiveness in suppression of banditry, whereas the serious impact of rob seems to re-
flect the importance of a systems's cultural characteristics influencing the ease with which a life
of another person could be taken.
5
In the next chapter we will see why this is so important (see also the next issue of our Introduc-
tion to Social Macrodynamics [Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006]).
 Chapter 4

Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends1

Initially, we want to consider what effects could be produced by the long-term

interaction of millennial macrotrends of the World System development and
shorter-term cyclical dynamics. Among other things this will make it possible
for us to demonstrate how even rather simple mathematical models of pre-
industrial political-demographic cycles could help us to account for a paradox
that has been encountered recently by political anthropologists.
At least since 1798 when Thomas Malthus published his Essay on the Prin-
ciple of Population (1798) it has been commonly assumed that in pre-industrial
societies the growth of population density tends to lead to increase in warfare
frequency.2 For example, in Anthropology this assumption forms one of the
foundations of the "warfare theory" of state formation. Indeed, according to this
theory population growth leads to an increase in warfare which can lead, under
certain circumstances, to political centralization (Sanders and Price 1968: 230
2; Harner 1970: 68; Carneiro 1970, 1972, 1978, 1981, 1987, 1988, 2000a: 182
6; Harris 1972, 1978; 1997: 28690; 2001: 92; Larson 1972; Webster 1975;
Ferguson 1984; 1990: 313; Johnson and Earle 1987: 168).
However, some anthropologists have raised doubts regarding this relation-
ship (Vayda 1974: 183; Cowgill 1979: 5960; Redmond 1994; Kang 2000). On
the other hand, Wright and Johnson (1975) have shown that in South-West Iran
population density in the state formation period did not grow, but rather de-
clined, while Kang's analysis of data for the state formation period Korea re-
veals only a very weak correlation between warfare frequency and population
density (Kang 2000). Finally, cross-cultural testing performed by Keeley (1996:
11721, 202) did not confirm the existence of any significant positive correla-
tion between the two variables, which seems to have convinced Johnson and
Earle to drop, from the second edition of their book, the mention of population
pressure as a major cause of warfare in pre-industrial cultures (Johnson and
Earle 2000: 156).

1
The first half of this chapter has been prepared on the basis of an article written by the first author
of this monograph in collaboration with Peter Turchin (Turchin and Korotayev 2006).
2
Indeed, Malthus (1798/1978) saw war as one of the standard consequences of overpopulation
along with disease and famine.
96 Chapter 4

We tested this hypothesis ourselves using the Standard Cross-Cultural Sam-

ple database (STDS 2002). The first test seems to have confirmed the total ab-
sence of any significant correlation between population density and warfare fre-
quency (see Diagram 4.1):
Diagram 4.1. Population Density Warfare Frequency.
Scatterplot with fitted Lowess line.
For the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample
(Murdock and White 1969)
20

10

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Population Density
NOTE: Rho = 0.04, p = 0.59 (2-tailed)3. POPULATION DENSITY CODES: 1 = < 1 person per 5
sq. mile; 2 = 1 person per 15 sq. mile; 3 = 15 persons per sq. mile; 4 = 125 persons per sq.
mile; 5 = 26100 persons per sq. mile; 6 = 101500 persons per sq. mile; 7 = over 500 persons per
sq. mile. WARFARE FREQUENCY CODES: 1 = absent or rare; 24 = values intermediate be-
tween "1" and "5"; 5 = occurs once every 3 to 10 years; 68 = values intermediate between "5" and
"9"; 9 = occurs once every 2 years; 1012 = values intermediate between "9" and "13"; 13 = occurs
every year, but usually only during a particular season; 1416 = values intermediate between "13"
and "17; 17 = occurs almost constantly and at any time of the year. DATA SOURCES. For popula-
tion density: Murdock and Wilson 1972, 1985; Murdock and Provost 1973, 1985; Pryor 1985,
1986, 1989; STDS 2002. Files stds03.sav (v64), stds06.sav (v156), stds54.sav (v1130). For war-

3
Use of Spearman's Rho (and associated measures of significance) reflects the fact that we were
dealing with variables measured on an ordinal scale.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 97

fare frequency: Ross 1983, 1986; Ember and Ember 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1995; Lang 1998; STDS
2002. Files stds30.sav (v773, v774), stds78.sav (v164850), stds81.sav (v174850).

The absence of a significant correlation between the two variables seems to be

entirely evident. However, let us ask ourselves the following question: Does the
proposition that growing population density tends to lead to a rise in warfare's
frequency necessarily imply the presence of a positive correlation between the
two variables under consideration? Some scholars certainly seem to think exact-
ly this way. Note, e.g., that Keeley (1996: 11721, 202) thinks that he has refut-
ed the hypothesis under consideration precisely by demonstrating the absence of
such a correlation. However, we believe that to operationalize the hypothesis
under consideration this way is nave.
The point is that, as we shall see below, the growth of population density in
preindustrial cultures does lead to a rise in warfare's frequency. But how would
the rise of warfare frequency affect population density? Certainly, it would lead
to the decline of population density. This is not only because frequent warfare
would decrease the number of people in any given zone. The other important
point is that frequent warfare also would reduce the carrying capacity of the
given zone. Within such zones affected by constant warfare, people would tend
to inhabit places that can be made defensible (see, e.g., Wickham 1981; Earle
1997: 10542; Turchin 2003b: 120). Fearful of attack, people cultivate (or ex-
ploit in other ways) only a fraction of the productive area, specifically, the frac-
tion in proximity to fortified settlements.
In fact, it is quite clear that we have a dynamic relationship here which can
be described by non-linear dynamic models: the rise of population density leads
to the rise of warfare frequency, but the growth of warfare frequency leads in its
turn to a decline of population density. What kind of linear correlation would
such a relationship produce?
The simplest model describing this type of relationship is the "predator
prey" one (Lotka 1925; Volterra 1926). There are good grounds to expect this
model to be relevant in our case, because the relationship between population
density and warfare frequency appears to have the same basic logic as the one
between prey and predator populations.
This simple model looks as follows:

dx
Ax Bxy
dt (4.1)
dy
Cxy Dy ,
dt
where x is population density ["prey"], y is warfare frequency ["predator"], and
A, B, C, D are coefficients.
Note that though this model implies a perfect 1.0 level nonlinear correla-
tion between the variables, it predicts that tests of linear relationship for the
 98 Chapter 4

same data will detect a weak negative correlation between warfare frequency
and population density (especially if the linear ranked correlation is measured).
For example, with A = 0.02 (which is, by the way, the normal unlimited an-
nual demographic growth rate for preindustrial cultures [Turchin 2003b]), B =
0.02, C = 0.025, and D = 0.1, the temporal dynamics appear as follows (see Di-
agram 4.2):
Diagram 4.2. Temporal Dynamics of Population Density X
(thick curve) and Warfare Frequency Y (thin curve)
with A = 0.02, B = 0.02, C = 0.025, and D = 0.1

0 250 500
Time (years)
The scatterplot of relationship between the two variables under consideration in
this case will look as follows (see Diagram 4.3):
Diagram 4.3. Scatterplot of Relationship between Population Density
and Warfare Frequency predicted by the model with
A = 0.02, B = 0.02, C = 0.025, and D = 0.1
6

3
Warfare Frequency Index

-1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Population Density Index

 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 99

Quite predictably with such a shape of distribution the test of linear relationship
for 500 cases detects beyond any doubt a weak but highly significant negative
ranked correlation (Rho = 0.19, p = 0.00001, 2 tailed).
With A = 0.02, B = 0.04, C = 0.04, and D = 0.1, the temporal plot of the var-
iables under consideration looks as follows (see Diagram 4.4):
Diagram 4.4. Temporal Dynamics of Population Density X
(thick curve) and warfare frequency Y (thin curve)
with A = 0.02, B = 0.04, C = 0.04, and D = 0.1

0 250 500
Time (years)

The scatterplot of relationship between the two variables under consideration in

this case will look as follows (see Diagram 4.5):
Diagram 4.5. Scatterplot of Relationship between Population Density
and Warfare Frequency predicted by the model
with A = 0.02, B = 0.04, C = 0.04, and D = 0.1
6

3
Warfare Frequency Index

-1
0 2 4 6 8 10 12

Population Density Index

100 Chapter 4

With this shape of distribution the test of linear relationship for 500 cases de-
tects a much stronger and even more highly significant negative ranked correla-
tion between the variables under consideration (Rho = 0.45, p = 0.000002, 2
tailed).4
This negative correlation is easy to explain. What is more, the model seems
to correspond quite well to known facts. After all, population growth will be to
some extent inhibited by frequent warfare; hence, periods of significant popula-
tion growth should almost by definition coincide with periods of relatively low
warfare frequency. On the other hand, as was mentioned above, the growth of
warfare frequency above a certain level will lead to immediate and rapid decline
of population density, whereas the drop of warfare frequency would lead to
immediate increase in the population density.5
The other important point is that warfare has a certain amount of inertia, and
so does not decline immediately after the drop of population. For most prein-
dustrial cultures this inertia has a very straightforward explanation. As has been
shown by Keeley (1996), the most frequent cause of warfare is simply revenge.
Now, suppose that as a result of a sharp decline of population density caused by
extensive warfare the population-pressure-induced reasons for war have disap-
peared; yet, the very high level of warfare in the previous period of time would
almost by definition imply a high level of warfare in the given period, since the
earlier period would have left a large number of killings and other hostile acts
still to be avenged.6
Thus we appear to have two time lags which would tend to produce negative
correlations. As a result, we would have relatively many cases of high popula-
tion density accompanied by low warfare frequency, as well as low population
density accompanied by high warfare frequency, whereas the number of cases
with high population density accompanied by high warfare frequency would be
zero, or very close to zero; hence, such lag effects would result in negative line-
ar correlations.
Due to reasons which we will discuss at the end of this chapter, this negative
correlation is observed especially among cultures with relatively similar techno-
logical bases resulting in fairly similar values of the carrying capacity of land.
In the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample this correlation can be detected for a
subsample of chiefdoms (i.e., cultures with 1 or 2 levels of political integration

4
Negative correlations for this kind of model are much more likely to be detected if one measures
Spearman's Rho, rather than Pearson's r. It might be argued, then, that we have "stacked the
deck" by using the former rather than the latter. Note, however, that both the population density
and the warfare frequency variables available in cross-cultural databases are ordinal-level, so that
rank correlation (Spearman's Rho) turns out to be simply more appropriate methodologically.
5
This is almost inevitable as the drop of the population density in the preceding prolonged period
of frequent warfare would mean that the remaining population would have abundant resources
immediately after the end of this period.
6
Hence, those versions of the model above with the coefficient combinations implying such a time
lag seem to correspond to historical reality rather closely.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 101

above that of the individual community, having mostly fairly similar technolog-
ical bases). This test detected the actual presence of a significant negative corre-
lation between the population density and warfare frequency for chiefdoms
(Rho = 0.26, p = 0.02). Note that the correlation between population density
and external warfare frequency for this subsample turned out to be stronger
(Rho = 0.40). Predictably it turned out to be particularly strong when the sam-
ple was further split into simple and complex chiefdoms (see Diagrams 4.6 and
4.7):
Diagram 4.6. Population Density Warfare Frequency. Scatterplot
with linear regression line. For the Standard Cross-
7
Cultural Sample, subsample of simple chiefdoms .
8

4
Population Density

0
0 10 20

Frequency of external warfare (resolved rating)

NOTE: Rho = 0.44, p = 0.002 (1-tailed).8 For sources and codes see Diagram 4.1.

7
Simple chiefdoms were selected using the variable JURISDICTIONAL HIERARCHY BEYOND
LOCAL COMMUNITY (Murdock 1967, 1985; Murdock et al. 19992000; STDS 2002: file
STDS10.SAV [v237]). The cultures with one level of political integration above the community
were identified as having been organized politically as simple chiefdoms, or political forms of
equivalent complexity (e.g., federations of communities).
 102 Chapter 4

Diagram 4.7. Population Density Warfare Frequency. Scatterplot

with linear regression line. For the Standard Cross-
9
Cultural Sample, subsample of complex chiefdoms

4
Population Density

0
0 10 20

Frequency of external warfare (resolved rating)

NOTE: Rho = 0.41, p = 0.04 (1-tailed). For sources and codes see Diagram 4.1.

8
As we had clear hypotheses predicting the correlation directions, and as all the correlations tested
here and below turned out to be in the predicted direction, we used 1-tailed significance tests.
9
Complex chiefdoms were selected using the variable JURISDICTIONAL HIERARCHY
BEYOND LOCAL COMMUNITY (Murdock 1967, 1985; Murdock et al. 19992000; STDS
2002: file STDS10.SAV [v237]). The cultures with two levels of political integration above that
of community were identified as having been organized politically as complex chiefdoms, or po-
litical forms of equivalent complexity (e.g., tribal confederations of the Iroquois type).
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 103

A similar correlation is also observed, for example, for cultures based on exten-
sive agriculture (see Diagram 4.8):
Diagram 4.8. Population Density Warfare Frequency. Scatterplot
with linear regression line. For the Standard Cross-
Cultural Sample, subsample of cultures based on
extensive agriculture10,
scatterplot with a fitted regression line
20

10

0
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8

Population Density

NOTES: Rho = 0.3, p = 0.025 (1-tailed). For sources and codes see notes to Diagram 4.1.

The fact that population density and warfare frequency are characterized by an
extremely close non-linear dynamic relationship, which on the surface appears
as a relatively weak negative linear correlation, is especially clear when we have
more or less exact long-term data for population density and warfare frequency

10
Cultures based on extensive agriculture were selected using the variable INTENSITY OF
CULTIVATION (Murdock 1967, 1985; Murdock et al. 1986, 1990, 19992000; STDS 2002:
file STDS10.SAV [v232]). We selected cultures with value "3" of this variable ("Extensive or
shifting cultivation, as where new fields are cleared annually, cultivated for a year or two, and
then allowed to revert to forest or bush for a long fallow period" [Murdock 1967: 159, etc.]).
104 Chapter 4

for concrete pre-industrial cultures (Turchin 2003b; Turchin and Korotayev

2006, see, e.g., Diagram 4.9):
Diagram 4.9. Dynamics of Population (solid line) and Internal Warfare
(broken line) in China from 200 BCE to 300 CE, temporal plot (Turchin
and Korotayev 2006)

NOTES: (a) trajectories of population and internal warfare index; (b) variable dynamics in the
phase space (X axis logarithm of population; Y axis logarithm of internal warfare index):
r = 0.37, p < 0.01.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 105

It might be revealing to compare these figures with the ones illustrating a classi-
cal prey-predator relationship. The data document population oscillations of
prey, a caterpillar that eats the needles of larch trees in the Swiss Alps, and its
predators, parasitic wasps. The caterpillar population goes through very regular
population oscillations with the period of 89 years. Predators (here measured
by the mortality rate that they inflict on the caterpillars) also go through oscilla-
tions of the same period, but shifted in phase by 2 years with respect to the prey
(Diagram 4.10a). Almost 95% of variation in caterpillar numbers is explained
by wasp predation (Turchin 2003a), but when we plot the two variables against
each other we see only a weak, and negative correlation (Diagram 4.10b). If we
plot predators against the lagged prey numbers, then we clearly see the positive
correlation (Diagram 4.10c):
Diagram 4.10. Population dynamics of the caterpillar (larch budmoth)
and its predators (parasitic wasps). (a) Population oscillations of the cat-
erpillar (solid curve) and predators (broken curve). (b) A scatter plot of
the predator against the prey. The solid line is the regression. Broken
lines connect consecutive data points, revealing the presence of cycles.
(c) A scatter plot of the predator against prey lagged by two years
(Turchin 2003a)
(a)
3 1.0

2
Prey density (log-transformed)

0.8

1
0.6

Predator
0

0.4
-1

0.2
-2

-3 0.0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975

Year
(b) (c)
1.0 1.0

0.8 0.8
Predator at t

Predator

0.6 0.6

0.4 0.4

0.2 0.2

0.0 0.0
-3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3

Prey at t Prey at t-2

106 Chapter 4

However, why did our first cross-cultural test, which employed a sample that
included societies with all possible degrees of cultural complexity stretching
from the !Kung Bushmen to the Modern Chinese, fail to reveal any significant
correlation between the variables under consideration?
To answer this question, let us try first to model how the military-
demographic dynamics could change with the growth of political centralization.
First of all, note that the growth of political centralization (that is, the transition
from independent communities to simple, and then complex, chiefdoms and lat-
er to states and empires, which is accompanied by a hyperbolic growth of polity
sizes) leads to the decrease of the relative "lethality" of warfare (see, e.g.: Naza-
retyan 1995, 1999a, 1999b, 2001).
Indeed, on the one hand, for a small (< 50) independent local group the
maximum value of the warfare frequency index ("17 = occurs almost constantly
and at any time of the year") implies an almost inevitable and very serious de-
population. On the other hand, any accurate coder of cross-cultural data could
hardly fail to assign to, say, Russia between 1820 and 1860 exactly the maxi-
mum value of this index (at least because of the Caucasus War that continued
between 1817 and 1864, let alone numerous other wars, like the Crimean one).
However, in this case this maximum value of the warfare frequency index was
not accompanied by anything even remotely similar to the depopulation of Rus-
sia; what is more, throughout this exact period, Russia experienced a very rapid
demographic growth (see, e.g., Nefedov 2005). The explanation for this appar-
ent paradox is, of course, very simple. The point is that within the developed
states (even if still pre-Industrial), wars (especially external ones) were usually
waged by relatively small professional well armed and trained armies. As a re-
sult, a country could be nominally in the state of war for many decades without
experiencing any depopulation at all.
Note that such external wars would not normally lead to any significant de-
crease of the carrying capacity with respect to the territory in which the majority
of the respective state's population lives.11 In general, the larger the polity, the
lower the negative influence of this polity's external wars on the carrying capac-
ity of the territory controlled by this polity. Indeed, along the borders between
those polities that wage constant wars against each other we usually observe
considerable belts of economically unexploited (or underexploited) territories
(see, e.g., Blanton et al. 1999).
It appears possible to demonstrate the effect of polity size growth in reduc-
ing external warfare's negative influence on carrying capacity with the help of
the following model (see Diagram 4.11):

11
This is valid more for external than for internal warfare. Thus, within supercomplex agrarian so-
cieties it is the internal warfare frequency that turns out to be connected with population density
along the "predator prey" model's lines. On the other hand, the external warfare frequency dy-
namics also turn out to be connected with the population density dynamics, but, as we shall see
below, according to a totally different model.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 107

Diagram 4.11. Influence of Frequent External Warfare

on Carrying Capacity in a Zone Consisting of Simple
Chiefdoms (a) and Complex Chiefdoms (b), a Model
(a) Simple Chiefdoms

(b) Complex Chiefdoms

NOTE: Borders between polities are marked with solid lines. This model assumes that strips along
the borders (marked with grey filling) are not exploited economically. As a result, frequent warfare
decreases carrying capacity of a zone consisting of simple chiefdoms by almost 89%, whereas in an
analogous zone consisting of complex chiefdoms it decreases the carrying capacity by less than
56%.

During the course of human history, the polity sizes have increased by 5 to 6
orders of magnitude (see, e.g.: Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997;
Carneiro 1978; Graber 1995 etc.); therefore the influence of this factor should
have been very sizeable. The long-term trend towards the growth of political
centralization tended to reduce the negative influence of frequent warfare on
demographic dynamics in two ways: (1) through the professionalization of war-
fare and (2) through the growth of polity sizes, which entailed reduction of the
negative influence of frequent warfare on carrying capacity. Is it possible to use
the Lotka Volterra equations to model how warfare's frequency would be af-
108 Chapter 4

fected by the long-term decrease of warfare's "lethality" that accompanied

growing political centralization? This could be done very easily through the re-
duction of the value of coefficient B, which is none other than a coefficient of
the lethal influence of the predator/warfare presence on the prey popula-
tion/population density. If this is done, what will happen to the predator popula-
tion dynamics? Ceteris paribus (that is with the same values of initial prey and
predator populations, as well as with the same values of coefficients A, C, and
D), the decrease of the value of coefficient B will lead to an upward drift of the
system singular point (center)12 in the phase space (see Diagram 4.12):
Diagram 4.12. Drift of the "Prey Predator" System Center
with Decrease of Lotka Volterra
Coefficient B Value from 1.5 to 0.5
Predator population

0 Prey population
NOTE: The values of coefficients A, C, and D were taken as 1.0 for all three simulations. The ini-
tial values of prey and predator populations were also identical for all three simulations.

The upward singular point (center) drift within such a phase space implies that
the predator population increases for all the cycle phases; thus, the average
predator population increases for any given year of the cycle.13
Hence, for traditional cultures14 we have sufficient reason to expect the
presence of a positive correlation between the level of political complexity and

12
With a considerable degree of oversimplification it can be said that in this case the system singu-
lar point (center) can be considered as that point around which the system rotation takes place in
the phase space during the cycles.
13
Within real ecological systems this may be observed, for example, if the predators' size decreases
due to some evolutionary pressures. Indeed, if in order to support its survival a predator needs
just one prey animal a day (instead of, say, five analogous prey animals), then the same prey
population may support reproduction of a much larger predator population.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 109

warfare frequency. Our cross-cultural test employing the same database has
shown that such a correlation is actually observed (see Diagram 4.13):
Diagram 4.13. Correlation between Political Complexity Level
and Warfare Frequency, for the Standard Cross-Cultural
Sample, scatterplot with a fitted regression line

NOTES: Rho = + 0.262, p = 0.002. Sources and codes for the warfare frequency index are
described in notes to Diagram 4.1. The number of supracommunal political integration levels has
been determined on the basis of the variable JURISDICTIONAL HIERARCHY BEYOND LOCAL
COMMUNITY (Murdock 1967, 1985; Murdock et al. 19992000; STDS 2002: file stds10.sav
[v237]).

Political centralization, however, is only one of several relevant millennial

trends. No less relevant, for us here, is a trend already considered by us in detail
earlier (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006): the long-term increase in
carrying capacity that has been driven by the millennial trend of technological
growth.
Is it possible to use the Lotka Volterra equations to model how this long-
term trend would be expected to affect the warfare's frequency? Let us recollect
the basic model of population dynamics developed by Verhulst (1838):
dN N ,
rN (1 ) (4.2)
dt K
where N is population, K is carrying capacity, and r is the intrinsic population
growth rate in the absence of any resource limitations.
According to this model, an increase in carrying capacity, in the absence of
predators, will lead (ceteris paribus) to an increase in the relative growth rate of

14
As we shall see below, for modern cultures the Lotka Volterra model turns out to be inapplica-
ble (at least in the context that is of interest for us here).
110 Chapter 4

the prey population. Hence, the influence of carrying capacity growth on mili-
tary-demographic dynamics can be easily modeled by increasing the value of
coefficient A in the Lotka Volterra model. As this coefficient is increased,
what will happen with the predator population dynamics?
Ceteris paribus (that is, with the same values for initial prey and predator
populations, as well as for coefficients B, C, and D), the increase in the value of
coefficient A will also lead to un upward drift of the system singular point (cen-
ter) in the phase space, as we have already observed for a decrease in coeffi-
cient B (see Diagram 4.14):
Diagram 4.14. Drift of the "Predator Prey" System Center
with the Increase in Lotka Volterra
Coefficient A Value from 0.5 to 2.0
Predator population

0 Prey popupation
NOTE: The value of coefficients B, C, and D was taken as 1.0 for all three simulations. The initial
values of prey and predator populations were also identical for all three simulations.

In this case too, the upward singular point (center) drift within the phase space
implies that the predator population increases for all the cycle phases; thus, the
average predator population increases for any given year of the cycle.15
Thus, for traditional societies16 we have definite grounds to expect a positive
correlation between the technologically determined carrying capacity and war-
fare frequency. To test this hypothesis cross-culturally we can compare warfare
frequencies in pre-agricultural societies with those in cultures practicing casual,
15
It is easy to understand why such a dynamics will be observed in actual ecological systems. In-
deed, if the carrying capacity increased n times with respect to the prey population, it would
mean that the respective zone could support n times more prey animals, and, hence, it would tend
to be able to support n times more predators.
16
In modern (and even "protomodern") societies, as we shall see this below, the technologically de-
termined increase in carrying capacity tends to decrease rather than to increase warfare frequen-
cy.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 111

extensive, and intensive agriculture. The transition to agriculture and its intensi-
fication was accompanied by a radical increase in the carrying capacity. There-
fore our hypothesis may be operationalized in the following way: the highest
warfare frequency should be observed among the intensive agriculturalists, the
frequency should be significantly lower among the extensive agriculturalists,
and so on. Our cross-cultural test employing the same database indicates that
such a correlation is actually observed (see Diagram 4.15):
Diagram 4.15. Correlation between Intensity of Subsistence
Economy and Warfare Frequency,
for the Standard Cross-Cultural Sample,
scatterplot with a fitted regression line
Warfare Frequency Index

Agricultural Intensity Index

NOTES: Rho = + 0.136, p = 0.044 (1-tailed). Sources and codes for warfare frequency in-
dex are described in notes to Diagram 4.1. The intensity of subsistence economy has been deter-
mined on the basis of the variable INTENSITY OF CULTIVATION (Murdock 1967, 1985;
Murdock et al. 19992000; STDS 2002: file stds10.sav [v232]).

As we see, our cross-cultural test has detected the presence of a statistically sig-
nificant correlation in the predicted direction. It may be no coincidence, moreo-
ver, that in the present test the correlation is only about half as strong as in the
previous test (see Diagram 4.13). The point is that the growth of political com-
plexity tends to be accompanied by the growth of carrying capacity. In fact,
these variables are dynamically related with each other. The intensification of
subsistence economy creates powerful stimuli towards the growth of political
complexity (of course, the presence of such stimuli does not always lead to the
actual growth of political complexity, but it is by no means infrequently that it
does so). On the other hand, the growth of political complexity creates powerful
stimuli towards the intensification of the subsistence economy (see, e.g., Koro-
tayev 1991). As a result, we observe a rather pronounced correlation between
the intensity of subsistence economy and political complexity (see Table 4.1):
112 Chapter 4

Table 4.1. Correlation between Intensity of Subsistence Economy

and Political Complexity
Political Complexity Index = Number of Political Inte-
gration Levels over Community
Subsistence
0 1 2 3 4
Economy In- Total
(independ- (simple (complex (simple (complex
tensity Index 19
ent com- chief- chief- states ) states/empi
munities) doms17) doms18) res)
1 (agriculture 34 8 0 0 0 42
is absent)
81% 19% 0% 0% 0% 100%
2 (incipient 5 3 0 2 0 10
agriculture) 50% 30% 0% 20% 0% 100%
3 (extensive 20 21 11 2 0 54
agriculture) 37% 38.9% 20.4% 3.7% 0% 100%
4 (intensive 8 5 5 9 4 31
agriculture)
25.8% 16.1% 16.1% 29.0% 12.9% 100%
5 (intensive 6 5 4 6 8 29
irrigated
20.7% 17.2% 13.8% 20.7% 27.6% 100%
agriculture)
Total 73 42 20 19 12 166

NOTE: Rho = + 0.540, p = 0,00000000000006

Gamma = + 0.612, p < 0,00000000000000001
As we see, all the above mentioned advances in subsistence technology corre-
late rather strongly with the growth of political complexity.
Consistent with this is the fact that preagricultural societies appear almost
never to have been organized as states; intensive agriculturalists, conversely,
had, as their most typical form of political organization, precisely the state.
As we see from Table 4.1, a certain degree of subsistence economy intensi-
fication is an absolutely necessary condition for the formation of a complex po-
litical organization; however, even a very high level of subsistence economy in-
tensification is not a sufficient condition for the development of very complex
forms of political organization, such as the state and its alternatives.
On the other hand, as we have seen in earlier chapters, the growth of politi-
cal complexity can be regarded in itself as one of the possible ways to increase
the carrying capacity.

17
Or alternative forms of political organization of an equivalent complexity level.
18
Or alternative forms of political organization of an equivalent complexity level.
19
Or alternative forms of political organization of an equivalent complexity level (on the forms of
political organization that are alternative to chiefdoms and states see, e.g., Bondarenko 2001;
Kradin et al. 2000; Kradin 2001; Bondarenko and Korotayev 2000, 2002; Bondarenko, Grinin,
and Korotayev 2002; Grinin 2003; Grinin et al. 2004 etc.).
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 113

In this regard it is remarkable that more politically complex societies tend to

have higher population density than societies with the same subsistence econo-
my intensity, but with a simple political organization (see, e.g., Table 4.2):
Table 4.2. Correlation between Political Complexity and Population
Density (for societies with subsistence economy
based on intensive irrigated agriculture)
Political Complexity Index = Number of Political Inte-
gration Levels over Community
Population 0 1 2 3 4 Total
Density (independ- (simple (complex (simple (complex
ent com- chiefdoms) chiefdoms) states) states/empi
munities) res)
< 1 person per
1 1 1 0 0 3
5 sq. miles
15 persons per
1 3 0 0 0 4
sq. mile
625 persons
0 0 0 0 2 2
per sq. mile
26100 persons
2 0 0 1 0 3
per sq. mile
101500 per-
sons per sq. 1 1 1 1 1 5
mile
> 500 persons
0 0 2 4 5 11
per sq. mile
5 5 4 6 8 28

NOTE: Rho = + 0.53, p = 0,00002

Though a higher level of subsistence economy intensity does not necessarily
imply the presence of a radically more complex political organization, a radical
growth of political complexity is almost inevitably accompanied (at least in a
long-term perspective) by a radical increase in carrying capacity.20 This appears
to explain, to a considerable degree, why warfare frequency correlates with po-
litical complexity more strongly than it does with subsistence economy
intensity. Indeed, within the Lotka Volterra model the highest predator popu-
lation will be observed if we increase the value of coefficient A, while simulta-
neously decreasing coefficient B (which in social reality would correspond to
the simultaneous growth of carrying capacity and decrease of warfare
"lethality"), see Diagram 4.16:

20
It seems necessary to stress again that these two variables are connected with each other by a
mutual positive dynamic relationship; thus it appears to be incorrect to define either of them as
independent, while considering the other as unequivocally dependent.
114 Chapter 4

Diagram 4.16. Drift of the "Prey Predator" System Center

with the Simultaneous Increase in Lotka Volterra
Coefficient A Value from 0.5 to 3.0 and Decrease in
Coefficient B Value from 3.0 to 0.5
Predator population

0 Prey population
NOTE: The value of coefficients C and D was taken as 1.0 for all three simulations. The initial
values of prey and predator populations were also identical for all three simulations.

Subsistence economy intensification will be inevitably accompanied only by

carrying capacity growth (i.e., by "increase in the value of coefficient A"),
whereas a radical increase in political complexity is almost inevitably accompa-
nied simultaneously both by carrying capacity growth (i.e., by "increase in the
value of coefficient A") and by decrease of warfare "lethality" (i.e., by the "de-
crease of the value of coefficient B"); this appears to account for political com-
plexity's correlating more strongly with warfare frequency than does subsistence
economy intensity.
Throughout human history we observe a long-term trend towards (1) the
growth of carrying capacity, closely associated with trends towards (2) increase
in population density, and (3) growth of political complexity. As we have seen
above, at least trends (1) and (3) should correlate with the growth of warfare
frequency. Thus, should we not expect that in the long-term perspective we
should also observe a rather strong correlation between population density and
warfare frequency? Of course we should.
However, in order to detect this correlation we should alter the unit of com-
parison and compare the mean values of population density and warfare fre-
quency that are typical for societies with different levels of political complexity
(see Diagram 4.17):
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 115

Diagram 4.17. Correlation between Population Density

and Warfare Frequency,
for cultures with different levels of political complexity

Mean value of warfare frequency index

Mean value of population density index

NOTE: r = + 0.984, = 0.002. Sources and codes for the warfare frequency index are de-
scribed in notes to Diagram 4.1. The diagram's five points can be interpreted as roughly corre-
sponding to the positions of the most typical singular points (centers) of military-demographic cy-
cles for respective types of cultures.

Thus, our hypothesis has been supported. Indeed, the tightly interconnected mil-
lennial trends towards the development of subsistence technologies, growth of
political complexity, carrying capacity, and population density21 were accompa-
nied by a pronounced increase in frequency of warfare (which was, incidentally,
the principal means through which the growth of political complexity was tak-
ing place [see, e.g., Carneiro 1970, 1981, 1987, 1991, 2000a, 2000b; Graber
1995 etc.]). This trend could finally result in such situations as that described,
for example, for Ancient Rome, where "the doors of the Janus Temple (that ac-
cording to the Roman traditions should have been kept open when the Roman
polity was in the state of war) remained open for more than 200 years" (Knabe
1983: 80).
It appears necessary to stress that warfare frequency correlates positively
with population density only when technological growth fails, for a considerable

21
For an interesting mathematical model describing the relationship between population density
and political complexity see Graber 1995.
116 Chapter 4

period, to raise carrying capacity as rapidly as population is growing. After the

carrying capacity starts growing substantially faster than population, the demo-
graphic growth is no longer accompanied by increase in population pressure,
and warfare, as described in a mathematical model presented at the end of this
chapter, begins to decline.
Thus, our research has confirmed that, notwithstanding recent arguments to
the contrary, population density was a major determinant of warfare frequency
in pre-industrial societies. However, the relationship between the two variables
is dynamic, and could only be adequately described by nonlinear dynamic mod-
els. Hence, we confront a rather paradoxical situation. On the one hand, we ob-
serve a millennial trend leading to the growth of both population density and
warfare frequency. As a result, from a long-term perspective, we observe a very
strong positive correlation between these two variables. But on the other hand,
we also observe secular demographic-warfare cycles, which produce negative
correlations both for individual cultures and for subsamples of cultures with
similar levels of technological and/or political development. So finally, if we
make a straightforward cross-cultural test of the linear relationship between the
two variables using a world-wide sample including cultures with all levels of
technological and political development, we do not find any significant correla-
tion at all. However it appears that hiding behind this "non-correlation" is the
presence of an extremely strong and significant dynamic non-linear relationship.
Models of the type analyzed in the previous chapters could be used as a ba-
sis for development of a new generation of models accounting both for "secular
cycles" and "millennial trends". In order to do this, we suggest altering some
basic assumptions of the earlier generations of demographic cycle models, spe-
cifically, their assumptions that both the carrying capacity of land and the polity
size are constant. Carrying capacity, cultural complexity, and polity size, for ex-
ample, far from being constant, are nothing less than the variables with pro-
nounced trend dynamics that the new generation of models needs to account for.
Demographic cycle models account at present only for cyclical dynamics; the
new modeling should be able to interconnect trend with phase dynamics.
For example, there are both theoretical and empirical grounds to maintain
that the carrying capacity not only experienced a long-term upward hyperbolic
trend (as has been analyzed in detail in Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina
2006), but also that the innovations contributing to this trend occurred in partic-
ular phases of demographic-political cycles. Incentives created by the relative
abundance of resources in the initial upward growth phases of agrarian state
demographic-political cycles tend to be insufficient to create the innovations
leading to the rise of the carrying capacity (these phases, however, were also
very important, since during them there were strong incentives for the innova-
tions that eventuated in the rise of the productivity of labor). Rather, innova-
tions raising the carrying capacity tended to occur during intermediate growth
phases before the demographic collapse phase. While such innovations usually
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 117

acted only to delay demographic collapses, they secured the existence of a very
important upward trend, which could be accounted for, to some extent, as a by-
product of sociodemographic cycle dynamics.
Another trend is the one towards larger polity sizes (see Diagrams 4.18 and
4.19 for West and East Asia).
Diagram 4.18. Growth Trend of Largest State/Empire
Territory Size (millions of square km) in West
Asian/Mesopotamia Centered System,
3000 BCE 750 CE

12

10

0
-3000 -2500 -2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 500

SOURCES: Taagepera 1968; 1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1997:

118 Chapter 4

Diagram 4.19. Growth Trend of Largest State/Empire

Territory (millions of square km) in the East Asian/China
Centered Regional System, 1900 BCE 1850 CE
25

20

15

10

0
-2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500

SOURCES: Taagepera 1968; 1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1997.

This trend seems to be accounted by the fact that infrastructures created by em-
pires do not usually disappear entirely with the collapse of the systems that cre-
ated them. Hence, new empires frequently do not have to build imperial infra-
structures entirely anew and can rely to a considerable extent on preexisting in-
frastructures, making it more likely that later empires will outgrow earlier ones.
It is revealing to compare the diagram above with the one depicting popula-
tion dynamics of China during the same period (see Diagram 4.20):
Diagram 4.20. Chinese Population Dynamics (in millions),
400 BCE 1850 CE

450
400
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
-400 0 400 800 1200 1600

NOTE: The diagram reproduces estimates surveyed above in Chapter 2

 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 119

While comparing Diagrams 4.19 and 4.20 it is difficult not to notice a rather
close fit between demographic cycles and cycles of territorial expan-
sion/contraction. We do not think this is a coincidence.
What theoretical expectations might we have for the relationship between
phases of these cycles? It has turned out that a considerable number of relevant
theoretical predictions can be generated by Turchin's demographic-fiscal model
(Turchin 2003: 1217), based on Goldstone (1991). Let us recollect the main
logic of this model, which can be outlined as follows:
During the initial phase of a demographic cycle we observe relatively high
levels of per capita production and consumption, leading not only to relatively
high population growth rates, but also to relatively high rates of surplus produc-
tion. As a result, during this phase the population can afford paying taxes with-
out great problems, the taxes are quite easily collectable, and the population
growth is accompanied by growth of state revenues. During the intermediate
phase, the increasing overpopulation leads to decrease of per capita production
and consumption levels, it becomes more and more difficult to collect taxes,
and state revenues stop growing, whereas state expenditures grow due to the
growth of the population controlled by the state. As a result, during this phase
the state starts experiencing considerable fiscal difficulty. During the final pre-
collapse phases the overpopulation leads to further decrease of per capita pro-
duction, the surplus production further decreases, and state revenues shrink,
whereas the state requires more and more resources to control the population
(which is still growing, though at lower and lower rates). Eventually this leads
to state breakdown and demographic collapse, after which a new demographic
cycle begins.
What kind of territorial expansion/contraction pattern would be generated
by such demographic-fiscal dynamics? During the initial phase state revenues
are high and continue to grow, making it possible for a state to support large
armies and to undertake active territorial expansion. Note that this is only valid
for unipolar regional systems, i.e., systems with a single strong state. In multi-
polar regional systems comprising a few equally strong states we can only ex-
pect that the composite states will try to undertake attempts at territorial expan-
sion. However, there are naturally no guarantees that the attempts of any partic-
ular state will be successful. What is more, within a fairly balanced multipolar
system such attempts undertaken by a few states could result in a stalemate, as a
result of which none of the participant states would enjoy considerable territori-
al gains.
During the intermediate phase the state starts experiencing fiscal problems,
its ability to support large and effective armies decreases. Thus, we have
grounds to expect that during this phase imperial territorial expansion will slow
down.
During the final pre-collapse phase state revenues considerably decrease,
which leads to a considerable decrease of the size and effectiveness of military
120 Chapter 4

forces supported by the state. Hence, we have grounds to expect that during this
phase imperial territorial expansion will stop. What is more, during this phase
the state territory is likely to start contracting.
To test these predictions we have used Taagapera's database on historical
dynamics of empire sizes (Taagepera 1968; 1978a; 1978b; 1979; 1997), as well
as Nefedov's (1999b, 1999d, 2000a, 2001b, 2003) and Turchin's (2003b) data
on population and consumption dynamics.22
The first (and the least counterintuitive) prediction tested by us is that the
phases of relatively rapid population growth should correlate with phases of rel-
atively rapid territorial expansion.
The test has supported this hypothesis: the correlation has turned out to be in
the predicted direction, very strong, and significant beyond any doubt (see Dia-
gram 4.21 and Table 4.3):
Diagram 4.21. Population Growth Rate Territorial
Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare
(scatterplot with fitted Lowess line)

-1

-2
-.5 0.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Population Growth Rate

22
Note that in both cases we are not really dealing with a sample, but rather with the general popu-
lation of all cases, for which empirical data are available.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 121

Table 4.3. Population Growth Rate (direct and indirect evidence)

Territorial Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare

Territorial Expansion/Aggressive External

Warfare

-1 0 1 2 3
(mostly (almost (rela- (inter- (rela- Total
defen- absent) tively medi- tively
sive low) ate) high)
war-
fare)

0 (stagnation) 323 3
Population
Growth 1 (relatively low) 324 125 226 6
Rate (di-
rect and
indirect ev- 2 (intermediate) 127 128 229 130 5
idence)
3 (relatively high) 131 832 9

Total 7 1 3 3 9 23

NOTES: For all cases: Tau-b = + 0.81, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.83, p =
0.00000002. For cases with direct evidence on population growth rate (all Chinese): Tau-b =
+ 0.79, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.87, p = .000003. For non-Chinese cases (Roman,
direct evidence; Babylonian, indirect evidence): no correlation coefficient can be computed due to
the small number of cases, but the contrastive periods for the Roman and Babylonian cases are
consistent with the hypothesis.

Note, however, that for the direct test of this hypothesis we had to rely almost
exclusively on the Chinese data, as East Asia is the only region (and the only

23
Roman Empire 120 200 CE, Western Han 40 BCE 10 CE, Eastern Han 105 157 CE (Ro-
man type is used for cases for which direct evidence is available for both variables, and italics
where evidence is indirect for one or both variables).
24
Babylonia 556 539 BCE, T'ang 733 754, Ming 1450 1620.
25
Qing 1800 1830.
26
Moghol Empire 1670 1690, Roman Empire 50 120 CE.
27
Sung 1000 1066.
28
Ming 1410 1450.
29
Moghol Empire 1620 1670, Western Han 110 40 BCE.
30
Qing 1720 1750.
31
Qing 1750 1800.
32
Babylonia 605 562 BCE, Moghol Empire 1560 1620, Roman Empire 40 BCE 50 CE,
Western Han 180 110 BCE, Eastern Han 57 105 CE, T'ang 627 733, Sung 960 1000,
Ming 1360 1410.
122 Chapter 4

unipolar region) for which we have direct data on historical population dynam-
ics. On the other hand, it has proven possible to collect sufficient extra-Chinese
data to test our next hypothesis, namely, the one linking relative per capita con-
sumption levels and territorial expansion/contraction. What are our theoretical
predictions in this case?
To start with, the demographic cycle models predict that the relatively fast
population growth should correlate with relatively high consumption levels. Our
empirical test of this assumption has confirmed its validity (see Diagram 4.22
and Table 4.4):

Diagram 4.22. Relative Consumption Rate Territorial

Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare
(scatterplot with fitted Lowess line)

3.5

3.0

2.5

2.0

1.5

1.0

.5

0.0

-.5
-.5 0.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Population Growth Rate

 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 123

Table 4.4. Population Growth Rate (direct and indirect evidence)

Relative Consumption Rate (direct and indirect evidence)

Relative Consumption Rate (direct and indi-

rect evidence)

0 1 2 3 Total
(very (relatively (intermediate) (relatively
low) low) high)

0 (stagnation) 233 134 3

Population
Growth 1 (relatively low) 635 6
Rate (direct
36 37 38
and indi- 2 (intermediate) 1 3 1 5
rect evi-
dence) 3 (relatively
139 840 9
high)

Total 2 8 4 9 23
For all cases: Tau-b = + 0.88, p < 0.00000000000000001
Rho = + 0.92, p = 0.0000000009
For cases with direct evidence on population growth rate:
Tau-b = + 0.85, p = 0.000004
Rho = + 0.92, p = 0.0000000009

Against the background of our first test, this of course suggests that relatively
high consumption levels should correlate positively with relatively rapid territo-
rial expansion. Note that as the consumption rates are usually measured through
the real wages of unskilled workers (the amount of staple food an unskilled
worker could buy from daily wages), the operationalization of this hypothesis
may sound especially counterintuitive: we claim that if we know the relative re-
al wages of unskilled workers, at least in the center of a unipolar system, we can
predict with a very high degree of confidence whether the respective empire ex-
perienced a relatively rapid expansion, expanded slowly, or contracted. In fact,
there is nothing mysterious in this relationship. Relatively high real wages imply

33
Roman Empire 120 200 CE, Western Han 40 BCE 10 CE.
34
Eastern Han 105 157 CE.
35
Babylonia 556 539 BCE, Roman Empire 50 120 CE, Moghol Empire 1670 1690, T'ang
733 754, Ming 1450 1620, Qing 1800 1830.
36
Western Han 110 40 BCE.
37
Moghol Empire 1620 1670, Sung 1000 1066, Ming 1410 1450.
38
Qing 1720 1750.
39
Qing 1750 1800.
40
Babylonia 605 562 BCE, Roman Empire 40 BCE 50 CE, Moghol Empire 1560 1620,
Western Han 180 110 BCE, Eeastern Han 57 105 CE, T'ang 627 733, Sung 960 1000,
Ming 1360 1410.
124 Chapter 4

that labor is a scarce resource, hence, there is no overpopulation; the popula-

tion, being well provided with resources, rapidly grows, producing large sur-
pluses; and the state has high and growing revenues with which to support a
large, effective army and to undertake rapid territorial expansion. On the other
hand, relatively low real wages imply that labor is overabundant, hence, there is
overpopulation; the population, being insufficiently provided with resources,
grows slowly, producing almost no surplus, and the state having low and shrink-
ing revenues is unable to support a large, effective army and to undertake a rap-
id territorial expansion; indeed, it may fail even to organize adequate defense of
territories under its control.
The test has supported this hypothesis: the correlation has turned out to be in
the predicted direction, very strong, and significant beyond any doubt (see Dia-
gram 4.23 and Table 4.5):

Diagram 4.23. Relative Consumption Rate Territorial

Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare

-1

-2
-.5 0.0 .5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Relative Consumption Rate

 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 125

Table 4.5. Relative Consumption Rate (direct and indirect evidence)

Territorial Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare

Territorial Expansion/Aggressive External

Warfare

0 1 2 3 To
-1
(al- (rela- (inter- (rela- tal
(mostly de-
most tively medi- tively
fensive
ab- low) ate) high)
warfare)
sent)

0 (very low) 241 2

Relative
4 143 244 145
42
1 (relatively low) 8
Consump-
tion Rate
(direct and
indirect evi-
2 (intermediate) 146 147 248 4
dence)

3relatively high 949 9

Total 7 1 3 3 9 23

For all cases: Tau-b = + 0.83, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.90, p = 0.00000001
For cases with direct evidence on population growth rate:
Tau-b = + 0.85, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.91, p = 0.00000002
For non-Chinese cases: Tau-b = + 0.93, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.96, p = 0.0001

The population of the core area50 is smallest during the initial phase of the de-
mographic cycle and is highest during the final pre-collapse phase. This results
41
Roman Empire 120 200 CE, Western Han 40BCE 10CE.
42
Eastern Han 105 157 CE, Babylonia 556 539 BCE, T'ang 733 754, Ming 1450 1620.
43
Qing 1800 1830.
44
Roman Empire 50 120, Moghol Empire 1670 1690.
45
Western Han 110 40 BCE.
46
Sung 1000 1066.
47
Qing 1720 1750.
48
Moghol Empire 1620 1670, Qing 1750 1800.
49
Babylonia 605 562 BCE, Roman Empire 40 BCE 50 CE, Moghol Empire 1560 1620,
Western Han 180 110 BCE, Eeastern Han 57 105 CE, T'ang 627 733, Sung 960 1000,
Ming 1360 1410, Qing 1720 1750.
126 Chapter 4

in another counterintuitive hypothesis the relatively higher the population of

the empire core area, the lower its expansion rate. Our empirical test has sup-
ported this hypothesis too (see Diagram 4.24 and Table 4.6):

Diagram 4.24. Core Area Population Territorial

Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare

-1

-2
.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5

Core Area Population (direct and indirect evidence)

1 low in comparison with other phases of respective cycle

2 intermediate in comparison with other phases of respective cycle
3 high in comparison with other phases of respective cycle

50
The core area is defined here as the area of the central polity of a unipolar region before the start
of its expansion at the beginning of a political-demographic cycle.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 127

Table 4.6. Correlation between Core Area Population

(direct and indirect evidence) and
Territorial Expansion/Aggressive External Warfare

Territorial Expansion/Aggressive Ex-

ternal Warfare

-1 0 1 2 3
To-
(mostly (almost (rela- (inter- (rela-
tal
defen- absent) tively medi- tively
sive low) ate) high)
war-
fare)

1 (relatively low) 951 9

Core Area Popu-
2
lation (direct and 252 353 5
(intermediate)
indirect evidence)
3 (relatively high) 754 155 156 9

Total 7 1 3 3 9 23

NOTE: Tau-b = 0.94, p < 0.00000000000000001; Rho = + 0.97, p = 0.00000000000001.

Hence, these findings support a point made earlier, that the structure of millen-
nial trends cannot be adequately understood without secular cycles being taken
into account. At a certain level of analysis, millennial trends appear to be virtual
byproducts of the demographic cycle mechanisms, which turn out to incorporate
certain trend-creating mechanisms. Demographic-political cycle models can
serve as a basis for the development and testing of models accounting not only
for secular cycles but also for millennial trends. In order to do this, we suggest
altering the basic assumptions of earlier generations of demographic cycle mod-
els (such as that both the carrying capacity and the polity size are constant).

51
Babylonia 605 562 BCE, Roman Empire 40 BCE 50 CE, Moghol Empire 1560 1620,
Western Han 180 110 BCE, Eeastern Han 57 105 CE, T'ang 627 733, Sung 960 1000,
Ming 1360 1410, Qing 1720 1750.
52
Roman Empire 50 120 CE, Ming 1410 1450.
53
Moghol Empire 1620 1670, Western Han 110 40 BCE, Qing 1750 1800.
54
Babylonia 556 539 BCE, Roman Empire 120 200 CE, Western Han 40 BCE 10 CE, East-
ern Han 105 157 CE, T'ang 733 754, Sung 1000 1066, Ming 1450 1620.
55
Qing 1800 1830.
56
Moghol Empire 1670 1690.
128 Chapter 4

These are variables with long-term trend dynamics in the rise of carrying capac-
ity, cultural complexity, and empire sizes that the new generation of models
needs to account for.
An interesting mathematical model that describes both secular political-
demographic cycles and millennial growth trends has been proposed by Komlos
and Nefedov (Komlos and Nefedov 2002). However, note that irrespective of
all its merits it does not describe the hyperbolic trend analyzed in the first part
of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khalto-
urina 2006).
At the end of this chapter we would like to propose our own preliminary
model designed to describe both secular cycles and millennial trends. We have
developed it on the basis of our "secular cycle" model presented in the previous
chapter, basically by adding to it Kremer's equation of technological growth:

dT
aNT ,
(0.8)
dt
where T is the level of technology, N is population, and a is average technologi-
cally innovating productivity per person.
Let us remind you that actually Kremer uses here the following key assump-
tion of the Endogenous Technological Growth theory, which we have already
used above for the development of the first compact macromodel (Kuznets
1960; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1998; Simon
1977, 1981, 2000; Komlos and Nefedov 2002; Jones 1995, 2003, 2005 etc.):
"High population spurs technological change because it increases the number of poten-
tial inventors57. All else equal, each person's chance of inventing something is inde-
pendent of population. Thus, in a larger population there will be proportionally more
people lucky or smart enough to come up with new ideas" (Kremer 1993: 685); thus,
"the growth rate of technology is proportional to total population" (Kremer 1993: 682).
We also model the "Boserupian" effect (Boserup 1965). As was shown by
Boserup relative overpopulation creates additional stimuli to generate and apply
carrying-capacity-of-land-raising innovations. Indeed, if land shortage is absent,
such stimuli are relatively weak, whereas in conditions of relative overpopula-
tion the introduction of such innovations becomes literally a "question of life
and death" for a major part of the population, and the intensity of the generation
and diffusion of the carrying capacity enhancing innovations significantly in-
creases. In our model this effect is modeled in the following way:

57
"This implication flows naturally from the nonrivalry of technology The cost of inventing a
new technology is independent of the number of people who use it. Thus, holding constant the
share of resources devoted to research, an increase in population leads to an increase in techno-
logical change" (Kremer 1993: 681).
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 129

Ti + 2aNiTi if Foodi/Ni 1.2 MAFR58, (4.3)

Ti+1 = {
Ti + aNiTi if Foodi/Ni > 1.2 MAFR . (4.4)

The influence of technological growth on production is taken into account

through the introduction of multiplier T into (3.1), producing the following
equation:

Harvesti = H0 random numberi Ti. (4.5)

Thus, in our "trend-cyclical" model, the per unit yield in year i depends not only
on the climatic conditions in year i (simulated with random numberi), but also
on the level of subsistence technology achieved at this year.
The extension of model (3.2)-(3.4) with equations (4.3)-(4.5) alters the dy-
namics generated by the model in a very significant way (see Diagrams 4.25
27):
Diagram 4.25. Dynamics Generated by the Compact Trend-Cyclical
Model: population (black curve, persons)
and food reserves (grey curve, in MAFRs)

4,000,000,000
3,500,000,000
3,000,000,000
2,500,000,000
2,000,000,000
1,500,000,000
1,000,000,000
500,000,000
0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600
t, years

NOTE: the diagram reproduces the results of a simulation with the following values of parameters
and initial conditions: N0 = 50,000,000 peasants; Atotal = 100,000,000 units, it is assumed that one
unit produces, under average climatic conditions and initial technological level (T0 = 1), one mini-
mum annual food ration (MAFR), i.e., an amount of food that is barely sufficient to support one

58
Minimum annual food ration, an amount of food that is barely sufficient to support one person
for one year.
130 Chapter 4

person for one year, that is, H0 = 1 MAFR per unit per year; random number range is between 0.85
and 1.15, thus Harvesti (per unit yield in year i) randomly assumes values in the range 0.85T to
1.15T MAFR per unit per year; Foodmin = 1 MAFR; R0 = 1000 bandits; S0 = 0 MAFR; = 0.04
MAFR-1; tax = 0.1; out = 0.1; = 0.03; rob = 0.000000001; a (innovation productivity coeffi-
cient) = 0.000000000005.

This model describes not only cyclical, but also the hyperbolic trend dynamics.
Note that it also describes the lengthening of growth phases detected in Chap-
ter 2 for historical population dynamics in China, which was not described by
our simple cyclical model. The mechanism that produces this lengthening in the
model (and apparently in reality) is as follows: the later cycles are characterized
by a higher technology, and, thus, higher carrying capacity and population,
which, according to Kremer's technological development equation embedded
into our model, produces higher rates of technological (and, thus, carrying ca-
pacity) growth. Thus, with every new cycle it takes the population more and
more time to approach the carrying capacity ceiling to a critical extent; finally it
"fails" to do so, the technological growth rates begin to exceed systematically
the population growth rates, and population escapes from the "Malthusian trap"
(see Diagram 4.26):

Diagram 4.26. Dynamics Generated by the Compact Trend-Cyclical

Macromodel: per capita production, in MAFR

6
Per capita production, MAFRs

0
0 500 1000 1500
t, years
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 131

A numerical investigation of the effect of parameter values on the dynamics of

our model indicates that that the main parameters that affect the period of the
cycle are still the proportion of resources accumulated in counter-famine re-
serves (tax), peasant-bandit transformation rate (out), and the magnitude of cli-
matic fluctuations (Mc). Longer cycles still obtain for higher values of tax and
lower values of out and Mc, whereas the cycles' length becomes shorter with
lower tax, and higher out and Mc. Thus we find again that the length of the cy-
cles would increase with the growth of the strength of counter-famine and law-
enforcement subsystems, and could be decreased by the increase in the magni-
tude of climatic fluctuations. Of special importance is that our numerical inves-
tigation indicates that with shorter average period of cycles a system experienc-
es a slower technological growth, and it takes a system longer to escape from
the "Malthusian trap" than with a longer average cycle period. The implications
of this finding will be studied in more detail in the subsequent volume of our In-
troduction to Social Macrodynamics (Korotayev and Khaltourina 2006).
Of special interest for us here are the internal warfare dynamics described by
the compact trend-cyclical model (see Diagram 4.27):

Diagram 4.27. Dynamics Generated by the Compact Trend-Cyclical

Macromodel: internal warfare intensity,
number of "peasants" killed by "bandits" per year

5,000,000
Internal warfare intensity, persons

4,500,000
4,000,000
3,500,000
killed per year

3,000,000
2,500,000
2,000,000
1,500,000
1,000,000
500,000
0
0 500 1000 1500
t, years
132 Chapter 4

As we see, the intensity of internal warfare observed during demographic col-

lapse phases tends to grow significantly. The mechanism that generates this ef-
fect in the model is produced by the "prey predator" model logic whose ele-
ments are incorporated into the trend-cyclical model: a higher population of
"peasants" can support a higher "bandit population" that in its turn would kill
more "peasants". On the other hand, note that the population's "escape from the
Malthusian trap" leads to internal warfare's "extinction": the recurrent outbreaks
of internal warfare completely disappear.
Naturally, the trend-cyclical model describes historical dynamics in a more
accurate way when it is extended along the lines suggested in model (0.20)-
(0.14)-(0.21) (see Introduction) so that it can also describe the system's with-
drawal from the blow-up regime via the demographic transition. This is done by
adding to the model an equation describing literacy dynamics:

li+1 = li + b dFi li (1 li), (4.6)

where li is the proportion of population that is literate in year i, dFi is per capita
surplus, and b is a constant. Of course, equation (4.6) is simply a modified ver-
sion of equation (0.21), substantiated in the Introduction, as well as in Korota-
yev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006. The influence of literacy59 on the demo-
graphic transition is expressed through the addition to (3.3) of the multiplier (1
l), which results in equation (4.7):

Ni+1=Ni (1 + dF') (1 l) dRi rob Ni Ri . (4.7)

Typical dynamics generated by the resulting model is presented in Diagram

4.28:

59
And other dimensions of the human capital level that strongly correlate with literacy.
 Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends 133

Diagram 4.28. Dynamics Generated by the Extended Trend-Cyclical

Model: population (black curve, persons)
and food reserves (grey curve, MAFRs)

1,600,000,000

1,400,000,000

1,200,000,000

1,000,000,000

800,000,000

600,000,000

400,000,000

200,000,000

0
0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200
t, years

NOTE: The diagram reproduces the results of a simulation with the following values of parameters
and initial conditions: N0 = 100,000,000 peasants; Atotal = 150,000,000 units, it is assumed that one
unit produces under average climatic conditions and initial technological level (T0 = 1) one mini-
mum annual food ration (MAFR), i.e., an amount of food that is barely sufficient to support one
person for one year, that is, H0 = 1 MAFR per unit per year; random number range is between 0.65
and 1.35, thus Harvesti (per unit yield in year i) randomly assumes values in the range 0.65T to
1.35T MAFR per unit per year; Foodmin = 1 MAFR; R0 = 1000 bandits; S0 = 0 MAFR; = 0.04
MAFR-1; tax = 0.1; out = 0.2; = 0.03; rob = 0.000000001; a (innovation productivity coeffi-
cient) = 0.0000000000065; b (literacy growth coefficient) = 0.01.

Of course, these models can be only regarded as first steps towards the devel-
opment of effective models describing both secular cycles and millennial up-
ward trend dynamics.
 Conclusion1

Let us start the conclusion with a brief consideration of the employment of

mathematical modeling in physics.
The dynamics of every physical body are influenced by a huge number of
factors. Modern physics abundantly evidences this. Even if we consider such a
simple case as a falling ball, we inevitably face such forces as gravitation, fric-
tion, electromagnetic forces, forces caused by pressure, by radiation, by anisot-
ropy of medium and so on.
All these forces do have some effect on the motion of the considered body.
It is a physical fact. Consequently in order to describe this motion we should
construct an equation involving all these factors. Only in this case may we
"guarantee" the "right" description. Moreover, even such an equation would not
be quite "right", because we have not included those factors and forces which
actually exist but have not been discovered yet.
It is evident that such a puristic approach and rush for precision lead to ag-
nosticism and nothing else. Fortunately, from the physical point of view, all the
processes have their characteristic time scales and their application conditions.
Even if there are a great number of significant factors we can sometimes neglect
all of them except the most evident one.
There are two main cases for simplification:
1. When a force caused by a selected factor is much stronger than all the
other forces.
2. When a selected factor has a characteristic time scale which is adequate to
the scale of the considered process, while all the other factors have significantly
different time scales
The first case seems to be clear. As for the second, it is substantiated by the
Tikhonov theorem (1952). It states that if there is a system of three differential
equations, and if the first variable is changing very quickly, the second changes
very slowly, and the third is changing with an acceptable characteristic time
scale, then we can discard the first and the second equations and pay attention
only to the third one. In this case the first equation must be solved as an alge-

1
It is not necessary for those of the readers who have already read the first part of our Introduction
to Social Macrodynamics (Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006) to read this conclusion
(except its last paragraphs), as it was originally intended as a conclusion to both parts published
as a single monograph. However, our publishers have insisted on splitting this monograph into
two. Yet, this conclusion remains as relevant for Secular Cycles and Millennial Trends as it was
for Compact Macromodels of the World System Growth; thus, it is reproduced at the end of this
book only with minor changes.
 Conclusion 135

braic equation (not as a differential one), and the second variable must be han-
dled as a parameter.
Let us consider some extremely complicated process, for example, photo-
synthesis. Within this process characteristic time scales (in seconds) are as fol-
lows:

1. Light absorption: ~ 0.000000000000001.

2. Reaction of charge separation: ~ 0.000000000001.
3. Electron transport: ~ 0.0000000001.
4. Carbon fixation: ~ 110.
5. Transport of nutrients: ~ 1001000.
6. Plant growth: ~ 10000100000.

Such a spread in scales allows constructing rather simple and valid models for
each process without taking all the other processes into consideration. Each
time scale has its own laws and is described by equations that are limited by the
corresponding conditions. If the system exceeds the limits of respective scale,
its behavior will change, and the equations will also change. It is not a defect of
the description it is just a transition from one regime to another.
For example, solid bodies can be described perfectly by solid body models
employing respective equations and sets of laws of motion (e.g., the mechanics
of rigid bodies); but increasing the temperature will cause melting, and the same
body will be transformed into a liquid, which must be described by absolutely
different sets of laws (e.g., hydrodynamics). Finally, the same body could be
transformed into a gas that obeys another set of laws (e.g., Boyle's law, etc.)
It may look like a mystification that the same body may obey different laws
and be described by different equations when temperature changes slightly (e.g.,
from 95 to 105C)! But this is a fact. Moreover, from the microscopic point
of view, all these laws originate from microinteraction of molecules, which re-
mains the same for solid bodies, liquids, and gases. But from the point of view
of macroprocesses, macrobehavior is different and the respective equations are
also different. So there is nothing abnormal in the dynamics of a complex sys-
tem could have phase transitions and sudden changes of regimes.
For every change in physics there are always limitations that modify the law
of change in the neighborhood of some limit. Examples of such limitations are
absolute zero of temperature and velocity of light. If temperature is high enough
or, respectively, velocity is small, then classical laws work perfectly, but if tem-
perature is close to absolute zero or velocity is close to the velocity of light, be-
havior may change incredibly. Such effects as superconductivity or space-time
distortion may be observed.
As for demographic growth, there are a number of limitations, each of them
having its characteristic scales and applicability conditions. Analyzing the sys-
tem we can define some of these limitations.
136 Conclusion

Growth is limited by:

1. RESOURCE limitations:

1.1. Starvation if there is no food (or other resources essential for vital
functions) there must be not growth, but collapse;
time scale ~ 0.11 year;
conditions: RESOURCE SHORTAGE.

This is a strong limitation and it works inevitably.

1.2. Technological technology may support a limited number of work-

ers;
time scale ~ 10100 years;
conditions: TECHNOLOGY IS "LOWER" THAN POPULATION.

This is a relatively rapid process, which causes political-demographic cycles

discussed in this part of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics.

2. BIOLOGICAL

2.1. Birth rate a woman cannot bear more than once a year;
time scale ~ 1 year;
condition: BIRTH RATE IS EXTREMELY HIGH.

This is a very strong limitation with a short time scale, so it will be the only
rule of growth if for any possible reasons the respective condition (birth rate is
extremely high) is observed.

2.2. Pubescence a woman cannot produce children until she is mature;

time scale ~ 1520 years;
conditions: EARLY CHILD-BEARING.

This condition is less strong than 2.1., but in fact condition 2.1. is rarely ob-
served. For real demographic processes limitation 2.2. is more important than
2.1. because in most pre-modern societies women started giving birth very soon
after puberty.

3. SOCIAL

3.1. Infant mortality mortality obviously decreases population growth;

time scale ~ 15 years;
condition: LOW HEALTH PROTECTION.
 Conclusion 137

Short time scale; strong and actual limitation for pre-modern societies.

3.2. Mobility in preagrarian nomadic societies woman cannot have

many children, because this reduces mobility;
time scale: ~3 years;
condition: NOMADIC HUNTER-GATHERER WAY OF LIFE.

3.3. Education education increases the "cost" of individuals; it requires

many years of education making high procreation undesirable. High
human cost allows an educated person to stand on his own economi-
cally, even in old age, without the help of offspring. These limitations
reduce the birth rate;
time scale: ~2540 years;
condition: HIGHLY DEVELOPED EDUCATION SUBSYSTEM.

All these limitations are objective. But each of them is ACTUAL (that is it must
be included in equations) ONLY IF RESPECTIVE CONDITIONS ARE
OBSERVED.
If for any considered historical period several limitations are actual (under
their conditions) then, neglecting the others, equations for this period must in-
volve their implementation.
According to the Tikhonov theorem, the strongest factors are the ones hav-
ing the shortest time scale. HOWEVER, factors with a longer time scale may
"start working" under less severe requirements, making short-time-scale factors
not actual, but POTENTIAL.
Let us observe and analyze the following epochs:

I. pre-agrarian societies;
II. agrarian societies;
III. post-agrarian societies.

We shall use the following notation:

atypical means that the properties of the epoch make the conditions practi-
cally impossible;

actual means that such conditions are observed, so this limitation is actual
and must be involved in implementation;

potential means that such conditions are not observed, but if some other lim-
itations are removed, this limitation may become actual.
138 Conclusion

I. Pre-agrarian societies (limitation statuses):

1.1. ACTUAL2
1.2. ACTUAL3
2.1. potential
2.2. ACTUAL
3.1. ACTUAL
3.2. ACTUAL
3.3. atypical

II. Agrarian societies (limitation statuses):

1.1. ACTUAL
1.2. ACTUAL
2.1. potential
2.2. ACTUAL
3.1. ACTUAL
3.2. atypical
3.3. potential

III. Post-agrarian societies (limitation statuses):

1.1. atypical
1.2. potential/ACTUAL4
2.1. potential
2.2. potential
3.1. atypical
3.2. atypical
3.3. ACTUAL

With our macromodels we only described agrarian and post-agrarian societies

(due to the lack of some necessary data for pre-agrarian societies). According to
the Tikhonov theorem, to describe the DYNAMICS of the system we should
take the actual factor which has the LONGEST time-scale (it will represent dy-
namics, while shorter scale factors will be involved as coefficients solutions
of algebraic equations).
So epoch [II] is characterized by 1.2, and [III] by 3.3. ([III] also involves
1.2, but for [III] resource limitation 1.2 is much less essential, because it con-

2
Systematic (not occasional short-term) starvation is caused by imbalance of technology and popu-
lation, so 1.1. may be included in 1.2.
3
According to the Tikhonov theorem, we may neglect the oscillations of population (demographic
cycles), because their time scales are at least 10 times shorter than the scale of the historical peri-
od which is taken into account.
4
Technology produces much more than is necessary for sustenance, but the growing living stand-
ards also require more resources.
 Conclusion 139

cerns growing life standards, and not vitally important needs). Thus, the demo-
graphic transition is a process of transition from II:[1.2] to III:[3.3].
Limitation 3.3 at [III] makes biological limitations unessential but potential
(possibly, in the future, limitation 3.3 could be reduced, for example, through
the reduction of education time due to the introduction of advanced educational
technologies, thereby making [2.2] actual again; possibly cloning might make
[2.1] and [2.2] obsolete, so there would become apparent new limitations).
In conclusion, we want to note that hyperbolic growth is a feature which
corresponds to II:[1.2]; there is no contradiction between hyperbolic growth it-
self and [2.1] or [2.2]. Hyperbolic agrarian growth never does reach the birth-
rate, which is close to conditions of [2.1]. If it was so, hyperbola will obviously
convert into an exponent, when birth-rate comes close to [2.1] (just as physical
velocity may never exceed the velocity of light) and it would not be a weak-
ness of the model, just common sense. It would be just [1.2] [2.1, 2.2].
But actual demographic transition [1.2] [3.3] is more drastic than this
[1.2] [2.1, 2.2]! [3.3] is reducing the birth-rate much more actively, and it
may seem strange: the system WAS MUCH CLOSER TO [2.1] and [2.2]
WHEN IT WAS GROWING SLOWER during the epoch of [II]! (This is not
nonsense, because slower growth was the reason of [2.1] and [3.1]).
As for the "after-doomsday dynamics", if there is no resource or spatial limi-
tation (as well as [3.1]), then [2.1] and [2.2] will become actual. If they are also
removed (through cloning, etc.), then there will appear new limitations.
But if we consider the solution of C/(t0 t) just formally, the after-doomsday
dynamics make no sense. But this is "normal", just as temperature below abso-
lute zero, or velocity above the velocity of light, makes no sense.
Thus, as we have seen, 99.399.78 per cent of all the variation in demo-
graphic, economic and cultural macrodynamics of the world over the last two
millennia can be accounted for by very simple general models.
Actually, this could be regarded as a striking illustration of the fact well
known in complexity studies that chaotic dynamics at the microlevel can gen-
erate highly deterministic macrolevel behavior (e.g., Chernavskij 2004).
To describe the behavior of a few dozen gas molecules in a closed vessel we
need very complex mathematical models, which will still be unable to predict
the long-run dynamics of such a system due to an inevitable irreducible chaotic
component. However, the behavior of zillions of gas molecules can be de-
scribed with extremely simple sets of equations, which are capable of predicting
almost perfectly the macrodynamics of all the basic parameters (and just be-
cause of chaotic behavior at the microlevel).
Our analysis suggests that a similar set of regularities is observed in the hu-
man world too. To predict the demographic behavior of a concrete family we
would need extremely complex mathematical models, which would still predict
a very small fraction of actual variation due simply to inevitable irreducible
chaotic components. For systems including orders of magnitude higher numbers
140 Conclusion

of people (cities, states, civilizations), we would need simpler mathematical

models having much higher predictive capacity. Against this background it is
hardly surprising to find that the simplest regularities accounting for extremely
large proportions of all the macrovariation can be found precisely for the largest
possible social system the human world.
This, of course, suggests a novel approach to the formation of a general the-
ory of social macroevolution. The approach prevalent in social evolutionism is
based on the assumption that evolutionary regularities of simple systems are
significantly simpler than the ones characteristic of complex systems. A rather
logical outcome of this almost self-evident assumption is that one should first
study the evolutionary regularities of simple systems and only after understand-
ing them move to more complex ones.5 We believe this misguided approach
helped lead to an almost total disenchantment with the evolutionary approach in
the social sciences as a whole.6
In the first part our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics we tried to con-
sider the simple macroregularities of the long-term World System growth. In
this part we have tried to analyze more complex regularities of its dynamics on
shorter scales, as well as dynamics of its constituent parts paying special atten-
tion to cyclical dynamics on a "secular" scale.
We have found that the structure of millennial trends cannot be adequately
understood without secular cycles being taken into consideration. At a certain
level of analysis millennial trends turn out to be a virtual byproduct of the polit-
ical-demographic cycle mechanisms, which turn out to incorporate certain
trend-creating mechanisms. Demographic-political cycle models can serve as a
basis for the development and testing of models accounting not only for secular
cycles but also for millennial trends. In order to do this, we suggest to alter the
basic assumptions of the earlier generations of political-demographic cycle
models (first of all, that subsistence technology and carrying capacity of land
are constant). These are variables with long-term trend dynamics in the rise of
carrying capacity of land and sociocultural complexity that the new generation
of models needs to account for, which could provide a more accurate descrip-
tion of secular cyclical dynamics as well. We shall try to demonstrate this in the
next part of our Introduction to Social Macrodynamics.

5
A major exception here is constituted by the world-system approach (e.g., Braudel 1973; Waller-
stein 1974, 1987, 2004; Frank 1990, 1993; Frank and Gills 1994; Chase-Dunn and Hall 1997;
Denemark et al. 2000; Chase-Dunn et al. 2003; Modelski 2003; Devezas and Modelski 2003;
Chase-Dunn and Anderson 2005, etc.), but the research of world-system theorists has up to now
yielded rather limited results, to a significant extent, because they avoided the use of standard
scientific methods and mostly remained on the level of verbal constructions (with a notable ex-
ception of Devezas and Modelski [2003]).
6
In fact, a similar fate would have stricken physicists if a few centuries ago they had decided that
there is no real thing such as gas, that gas is a mental construction, and that one should start with
such a "simple" thing as a mathematical model of a few free-floating molecules in a closed ves-
sel.
 Appendix 1

An Empirical Test of
the Kuznets Kremer Hypothesis

In 1993 Michael Kremer proposed the following equation for the description of
the relationship between technological growth rate and population:

dT
bNT , (0.8)
dt
where T is technology, N is population, and b is average innovating productivity
per person.
This hypothesis1 can be formulated verbally in the following way: the abso-
lute growth rate of technology at moment t is proportional, on the one hand, to
technological level achieved by this moment,2 and on the other hand, to popula-
tion size observed at this moment (that is, to the number of potential inventors).
This equation has already been used in a rather extensive way for the math-
ematical modeling of historical macroprocesses (Cohen 1995; Komlos and
Nefedov 2002; Tsirel 2004; Podlazov 2000, 2001, 2002, 2004;3 Korotayev,
Malkov, and Khaltourina 2006 etc.), though, as far as we know, this hypothesis
has never been tested empirically, which makes the necessity to perform such a
test especially pressing.
To perform such a test we used the World System Technological Develop-
ment Index, which we calculated on the basis of Hellemans Bunch database
(1988). In this database Hellemans and Bunch tried to record all the main in-
ventions and discoveries that had been made by the 1980s. We defined the in-
dex's value for year t as the total number of important inventions and discover-
ies made within the World System by this year.
The overall dynamics of the World System Technological Development In-
dex look as follows (see Diagram A1.1):

1
As the basic idea underlying Kremer's equation was (to our knowledge) first expressed by Simon
Kuznets (1960), we shall denote the respective hypothesis as the Kuznets Kremer one.
2
The wider is the technological base, the more possibilities for new technological innova-
tions/inventions it provides.
3
It appears necessary to mention that Andrey Podlazov and Sergei Tsirel arrived at this equation
quite independently from Kremer.
 142 Appendix 1

Diagram A1.1. Technological Development Index

Dynamics (40000 BCE 1970 CE)

5000

4000

3000

2000

1000

0
-40000 -35000 -30000 -25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0 5000

Note that this index shows a very strong correlation with the calibrated version
of the Technological Development Index calculated by Leonid Grinin (2006)
using a very different methodology (see Diagram A1.2):
Diagram A1.2. Correlation between the Technological Development In-
dex (T) and Calibrated Grinin Index (Ic) (40000 BCE 1955 CE): scat-
terplot with a fitted regression line
2000

1000

500
400
300
200

100
Gic, Calibrated Grinin Index

50
40
30
20

10

5
4
3
2

1
10

20

30
40 0
5000
10

20

30
40
500
10

20
30
40
50

00

00

00
0

T, Technological Development Index

NOTE: R = 0.978, R2 = 0.956, p = 4.6 10-13.
 An Empirical Test of the Kuznets Kremer Hypothesis 143

Quite predictably the Technological Development Index demonstrates a pro-

nounced long-term hyperbolic dynamics (see Diagram A1.3):
Diagram A1.3. Technological Development Index
Dynamics, 40000 BCE 1960 CE:
correlation between predictions of simple
hyperbolic model and observed data
5200
NOTES: R = 0.996, R2 = 0.992,
4800
p << 0.0001. Black markers correspond
Technological development index, points

4400
to our empirical estimates based on the
4000
Hellemans Bunch database (1988).
3600
The solid grey curve has been generated
3200
by the following equation:
464803,8
2800
Tt .
2400
( 2047 t )
2000
1600
Parameters (341303.3) and t0 (2047)
1200
have been determined with the least
800 squares method. For comparison the
predicted
400 best-fit exponential model gives here
0
2
observed R = 0.785. The value of t0 appears to be
-40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0
-35000 -25000 -15000 -5000 5000
overestimated due to the underestima-
tion of the number of important inven-
t, years tions made after 1870 by the Hel-
lemans Bunch database.4

If the Kuznets Kremer Hypothesis is true, then the average number of inven-
tions and discoveries made per year during period A should be proportional to
the product of the number of inventions made before this period 5 and the popu-
lation size (that is the number of potential inventors) observed by the beginning
of this period.

4
Indeed, there are sufficient grounds to suppose that, from the mid 19th century on, Bunch and
Hellemans tend to undercount more and more the inventions and discoveries made in each re-
spective year. Thus, they definitely underestimate the growth of technological innovation activity
in the second half of the 19th century, when, for example, in the USA 23140 inventions registered
in the 1850s were succeeded by c. 440,000 inventions registered in the three subsequent decades,
and the overall "rate of technological innovation grew 7 times between 1860 and 1890" (Grinin
2003: 145); yet Hellemans and Bunch (1989: 31872) register for this period just a twofold in-
crease, which therefore appears to be an underregistration, even taking into consideration the fact
that this growth in the USA exceeded the one in almost all the other countries of the world. This
underregistration appears to be accounted for mainly by technical reasons. The fact is that by the
mid 19th century Hellemans and Bunch confronted such a level of innovation activity that even a
short description of all the important inventions and discoveries made in a respective year started
to occupy more than 2 large-format pages, so that from this time on they had to omit more and
more important inventions and discoveries simply to avoid the excessive growth of their volume
(which still runs to 700 large-format pages).
5
That is, Technological Development Index at the beginning of period A.
144 Appendix 1

Our analysis of the Hellemans Bunch database has produced the following
results (see Table A1.1 and Diagram A1.4):
Table A1.1. Long-Term Demographic-Technological Dynamics
i Ti N NT dT dT/dt
(years) (technological devel- (world (number of in- (average number of
opment index = num- popula- ventions and inventions and dis-
ber of important in- tion, mlns. discoveries coveries made per
ventions and discov- in year i) made during the year during the peri-
eries made by year i) period begin- od beginning
ning in year i) in year i)
-40000 10 3 30 3 0.0002
-25000 13 3.34 43.42 10 0.000667
-10000 23 4 92 40 0.008
-5000 63 5 315 10 0.01
-4000 73 7 511 22 0.022
-3000 95 14 1330 35 0.035
-2000 130 27 3510 41 0.041
-1000 171 50 8550 39 0.078
-500 210 100 21000 100 0.333333
-200 310 150 46500 47 0.235
0 357 170 60690 48 0.228571
210 405 190 76950 12 0.06
410 417 190 79230 12 0.06
610 429 200 85800 14 0.07
810 443 220 97460 21 0.105
1010 464 265 122960 11 0.122222
1100 475 320 152000 18 0.18
1200 493 360 177480 28 0.28
1300 521 360 187560 24 0.24
1400 545 350 190750 53 0.53
1500 598 425 254150 141 1.41
1600 739 545 402755 305 3.05
1700 1044 610 636840 249 4.98
1750 1293 720 930960 476 9.52
1800 1769 900 1592100 690 13.8
1850 2459 1200 2950800 302 15.1
1870 2761 1300 3589300 556 18.53333
1900 3317 1625 5390125 583 29.15
 An Empirical Test of the Kuznets Kremer Hypothesis 145

i Ti N NT dT dT/dt
(years) (technological devel- (world (number of in- (average number of
opment index = num- popula- ventions and inventions and dis-
ber of important in- tion, mlns. discoveries coveries made per
ventions and discov- in year i) made during the year during the peri-
eries made by year i) period begin- od beginning
ning in year i) in year i)
1920 3900 1813 7070700 271 27.1
1930 4171 1987 8287777 330 33
1940 4501 2213 9960713 212 21.2
1950 4713 2555.36 12043412 355 35.5
1960 5068 3039.67 15405048 370 37
1970 5438 3708.07 20164485
NOTE: world population data are from Kremer 1993.

Diagram A1.4. Correlation between NT and Absolute

Technological Growth Rate (dT/dt):
scatterplot in double logarithmic scale with
fitted regression line, 40000 BCE 1970 CE

10
5

1
.5

.1
.05

.01
.005

.001
.0005

.0001
50 500 5000 50000 500000 5000000
100 1000 10000 100000 1000000 10000000

NT (logarithmic scale)
NOTE: R = + 0.934, R2 = 0.872, p = 2.9 10-16
146 Appendix 1

As we see, our empirical test has provided unequivocal support for the Kuz-
nets Kremer Hypothesis: the correlation has turned out to be in the predicted
direction, very strong and significant beyond any doubt. It suggests that varia-
tion of NT accounts for more than 87% of the macrovariation of absolute tech-
nological growth.
 Appendix 2

Compact Mathematical Models of the World

System Development and Macroperiodization of
the World System History

Compact mathematical models of the World System development (surveyed in

the Introduction) suggest the following macroperiodization of its history:
1. the era of hyperbolic growth, blow-up regime development (= "Mal-
thusian-Kuznetsian" era), up to the 1960s 1970s;
2. the era of the divergence from the blow-up regime (= "post-
Malthusian" era).
Within this context the 1960s 1970s could be regarded as a transitional period
between the two eras.
On the other hand, the blow-up regime development era can be subdivided
into two relatively independent epochs of hyperbolic growth (the Older Hyper-
bola and the Younger Hyperbola), the border between which appears to be
marked by the end of the Axial Age (for the notion of the Axial Age see, e.g.,
Jaspers 1953; Eisenstadt 1982, 1986; Gellner 1988).
Note that the sec-
Diagram A2.1. Technological Development In-
ond ("Younger") hy-
dex Dynamics (1500 BC 1700 CE), logarithmic
perbola entirely over-
scale
whelms the first.
Thus, at Diagram
A1.1 above the Axial
Age looks like merely
a small "bump" that
disrupts, in a slightly
annoying way, the el-
egant form of the al-
most perfect techno-
logical growth hyper-
bola. To see that the
Big Hyperbola con-
sists of two smaller
ones we have to
"zoom in" at the Axial Age part of the Diagram (see Diagram A2.1).
 148 Appendix 2

Let us recollect, that in logarithmic scale a hyperbolic curve looks like an expo-
nential one, which lets us see in a rather distinct way that the large hyperbola
actually consists of two smaller ones, with the exit from the first hyperbola be-
ing accompanied by entering the second.
Yet, are there sufficient grounds to consider the overall World System tech-
nological dynamics before the end of the Axial Age as generally hyperbolic?
The mathematical analysis suggests that the hyperbolic model describes these
dynamics in a rather accurate way (see Diagram A2.2):
Diagram A2.2. Technological Development Index Dynamics,
40000 BCE 200 CE: correlation between predictions of
simple hyperbolic model and observed data
350
NOTES: R = 0.993,
R2 = 0.986, p << 0.0001. Black
markers correspond to our esti-
300
mates made on the basis of the
Hellemans Bunch (1988) data-
250
base. The solid grey curve has
been generated by the following
200 equation:
341303.1
150 Tt .
(950 t )
100 Parameters (341303.3) and t0
(950) have been calculated with
50
the least squares method. For a
predicted comparison, the best-fit exponen-
0 observed tial model gives here a signifi-
-40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0 cantly worse fit with the empirical
estimates (R2 = 0.785).
It is by no means easier to see that the macrocurve of the World System hyper-
bolic growth consists of two hyperbolas when we inspect an overall diagram of
the world population growth (see Diagram A2.3):
Diagram A2.3. World Population Dynamics,
40000 BCE 1960 CE, millions
3000

2000
N, world population, millions

1000

0
-40000 -35000 -30000 -25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0 5000

t, years
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 149

However, in this case too the "zooming in" at the "Axial Age bump" in loga-
rithmic scale detects two adjacent hyperbolic curves such that exit from the first
is accompanied by entering the second (see Diagram A2.4):
Diagram A2.4. World Population Dynamics (1900 BCE 1100 CE),
millions, logarithmic scale

The mathematical analysis confirms the overall hyperbolic pattern of the World
System demographic dynamics until the end of the Axial Age (see Diagram
A2.5):
150 Appendix 2

Diagram A2.5. World Population Dynamics (in millions),

5000 500 BCE: correlation between predictions of
simple hyperbolic model and empirical estimates

160

140

120

100

80

60

40

20
predicted

0 observed
-5000 -4000 -3000 -2000 -1000 0
NOTES: R = 0.998, R2 = 0.996, p << 0.0001. Black markers correspond to Kremer's estimates
(1993). The grey solid curve has been generated by the following equation:
99674.642
Nt 15.29 .
(400 t )
Parameters (99674.642), t0 (400) and constant ( 15,29) have been calculated with the least
squares method. For the period 40000 200 BCE the correlation with the best-fit hyperbolic model
is a bit weaker (R2 = 0.990 with t0 = 275). For comparison, the best-fit exponential model here
gives R2 = 0.459 for the period 40000 200 BCE and R2 = 0.973 for the period 5000 200 BCE.

As the world GDP up to 1973 grew in a quadratic-hyperbolic (rather than sim-

ple hyperbolic) way, it appears simply impossible to see two hyperbolas in a di-
agram of its growth made on the basis of DeLong's (1999) estimates, inasmuch
as the Younger Hyperbola totally overshadows the Older one (see Diagram
A2.6):
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 151

Diagram A2.6. World GDP Growth, 25000 BCE 1973 CE,

billions of international 1990 dollars, PPP

16000
14000
12000
10000
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
-25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0

However, even here an inspection of the diagram in logarithmic scale clearly

reveals the presence of two adjacent heterometric hyperbolas flowing into each
other around the end of the Axial Age (see Diagram A2.7):
Diagram A2.7. World GDP (G) Growth from 10000 BCE
th
to the second half of the 18 century, in billions of
international 1990 dollars, PPP, logarithmic scale

Mathematical analysis of DeLong's estimates indicates that the overall econom-

ic dynamics of the World System until the end of the Axial Age was quadratic-
hyperbolic (see Diagram A2.8):
152 Appendix 2

Diagram A2.8. World GDP Dynamics (in billions of

international 1990 dollars, PPP), 40000 500 BCE:
correlation between predictions of
quadratic-hyperbolic model and DeLong's estimates

55

50

45

40

35

30

25

20

15

10

5 observed

0 predicted
-40000 -35000 -30000 -25000 -20000 -15000 -10000 -5000 0

NOTES: R = 0.999, R2 = 0.998, p << 0.0001. Black markers correspond to DeLong's (1999) esti-
mates. The solid grey curve has been generated by the following equation:
61303619.77 .
Gt
(595 t ) 2
Parameters (61303619.77) and t0 (595) have been calculated with the least squares method. For
the period 40000 200 BCE the correlation with the quadratic-hyperbolic model is a bit weaker
(R2 = 0.986 with t0 = 1200). For comparison, the best-fit exponential model here gives R2 = 0.420
for the period 40000 200 BCE and R2 = 0.475 for the period 40000 500 BCE.

Two hyperbolic curves can also be traced in the dynamics of so important an

indicator as the population of the largest city of the World System (see Diagram
A2.9):
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 153

Diagram A2.9. Dynamics of Population of the Largest Settlement of

the World System, in thousands, 3000 BCE 1870 CE,
logarithmic scale

5000
4000
3000

2000

1000

500
400
300

200

100

50
40
-3100 -2100 -1100 -100 900 1900

t, years

The mathematical analysis confirms that the overall dynamics of the largest
World System settlement population were quadratic-hyperbolic up to the end of
the Axial Age (see Diagram A2.10):
 154 Appendix 2

Diagram A2.10. Dynamics of Population of the Largest Settlement of

the World System, in thousands, 40000 200 BCE:
correlation between predictions of quadratic-
hyperbolic model and empirical estimates
Umax, pop. of the largest settlement, thousands

500

400

300

200

100

predicted

0 observed
-40000 -30000 -20000 -10000 0
-35000 -25000 -15000 -5000

t, years
NOTES: R = 0.989, R2 = 0.978, p << 0,0001. Black markers correspond to the estimates of Mod-
elski (2003) and Chandler (1987). The solid grey curve has been generated by the following equa-
tion:
56637733.865
U max t
(175 t ) 2
Parameters (56637733.865) and t0 (175) have been calculated with the least squares method. For
comparison, the best-fit exponential model here gives R2 = 0.805.1
Taking into consideration what was mentioned in the Introduction, this suggests
that the overall dynamics of the growth of general sociocultural complexity of
the World System also followed a quadratic-hyperbolic pattern up to the end of
the Axial Age. Note that for the "Younger Hyperbola" epoch we observe very
strong correlations between the population of the largest city of the World Sys-
tem and such variables as its urbanization/percentage of urban population
(R = 0.99; p < 0.001), overall urban population (R = 0.98; p < 0.001), world lit-
eracy (R = 0,98; < 0,001), and overall literate population (R = 0.99;
p < 0.001).2 If the proportions between the main indicators of the World System

1
Note that this diagram suggests the question whether the "Older Hyperbola" does not consist it-
self of two hyperbolic curves. At the moment we do not have sufficient empirical data to answer
this question.
2
Calculated on the basis of data sources described in notes to diagrams of this appendix and the
Introduction.
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 155

development are basically the same within the Older Hyperbola as they are
within the Younger Hyperbola, the quadratic-hyperbolic growth of the largest
World System settlement population could be regarded as an indirect indicator
of the fact that up to the end of the Axial Age the World System development
was characterized by hyperbolic trends of urbanization and literacy growth, as
well as by quadratic-hyperbolic trends of the growth of urban and literate popu-
lation.3
An interesting mathematical model developed by Robert Graber (1995) sug-
gests that in the long run the hyperbolic growth of population in a limited area
should be accompanied by the hyperbolic growth of an average territorial size
of this zone's polities. Against this background it is hardly surprising to find that
the hyperbolic growth of the World System population up to the end of the Axi-
al Age was accompanied by the hyperbolic growth of the largest World System
polity, especially pronounced before 500 BCE (see Diagram A1.11):
Diagram A2.11. The Size of the Largest Polity of the World System
2
Dynamics (in millions km ), 10000 500 BCE:
correlation between predictions of hyperbolic model
and Taagapera's estimates
6

observed

0 predicted
-10000 -8000 -6000 -4000 -2000 0

NOTES: R = 0.952, R2 = 0.906, p << 0.0001. Black markers correspond to Taagapera's (1968,
1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997) estimates. The solid grey curve has been generated by the following
equation:
250.462 .
Pt
(458 t )
Parameters (250.462) and t0 ( 458) has been calculated with the least squares method. For com-
parison, the best-fit exponential model here gives R2 = 0.858. Note that for the period 10000

3
Of course, this statement needs an independent empirical test that appears impossible at the mo-
ment due to the lack of respective empirical quantitative data. Note that we cannot use here even
the data (which we used above in the Introduction) on dynamics of urban population living in cit-
ies with > 250,000 inhabitants, as such cities only appeared specifically in the Axial Age.
156 Appendix 2

176 BCE the correlation with the hyperbolic model is substantially weaker (R2 = 0.906 with t0 =
15), and is not significantly different from a best-fit exponential model.
It appears relevant to pay attention to which dates we find as critical time (t0)
for the "Older Hyperbolas" (see notes to Diagrams A2.2, 5, 8, and 10). These
dates are as follows: 950 CE for technology, 400 CE for population, 595 CE for
GDP, 175 CE for the population of the largest city, and 15 CE for the largest
polity size. In other words, if the hyperbolic trends of the World System devel-
opment observed up to the end of the Axial Age had continued further just for a
few centuries, already in the 1st millennium CE all the main indicators of the
World System development would have become infinite. It is very clear that
such a scenario was impossible by definition. Thus, in any case the hyperbolic
regime of the World System growth observed up to the end of the Axial Age
could not continue further for any significant period of time, and was bound to
change within a few centuries (as its continuation would have involved such ab-
solutely impossible things as, e.g., the growth of the largest city up to 57 bil-
lion4 by 174 CE and its departure to infinity the following year). And, indeed,
after the end of the Axial Age the World System diverges from the blow-up re-
gime. The hyperbolic World System dynamics change to logistic for a signifi-
cant period of time, which resembles the present-day macroepoch. But this re-
semblance is very superfluous indeed.
As was mentioned in the Introduction, in the present epoch the divergence
from the blow-up regime takes place against the background of a rapidly rising
standard of living for most inhabitants of the world and is caused by this very
growth, which, for example, allows educational level to rise to such an extent
that it causes fertility decline (and thus the transition of the World System popu-
lation growth pattern from hyperbolic to logistic), on the one hand; and on the
other hand, it brings world literacy ever more rapidly to the saturation level (and
with the same result the transition from hyperbolic to logistic dynamics).
During "the First Transitional Epoch", divergence from the blow-up regime
took place in just the opposite way through the decline (frequently down to
negative values) of economic growth rates and, consequently, declining living
standards for most of the World System population; rising mortality; and de-
cline (frequently down to negative values) of the rates of literacy and urbaniza-
tion growth, notwithstanding the fact that both of them were very far from the
saturation level.
As has been already mentioned, the divergence from the "Older Hyperbola"
was at the same time tantamount to entering the new, "Younger Hyperbola". It
is important to stress that this process was by no means a mere return to the old
hyperbolic trajectory; rather, it was a radical change of hyperbolic growth re-
gimes that accompanied the radical transformation of the World System itself. It
may be said in a somewhat metaphoric way that the World System could not
stand the fast acceleration of the hyperbolic growth regime that it experienced
for a few thousand years after the start of the Agrarian Revolution; and after the
Axial Age it moved to a new regime of a smoother, but more stable hyperbolic
acceleration.

4
See equation in the note to Diagram A1.10.
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 157

This can be seen rather clearly if we inspect the dynamics of the four indices
of World System development for which we have very long-term estimates at
our disposal (except the largest polity size5), in double logarithmic scale (see
Diagram A2.1215):
Diagrams A2.1215. Long-Term Dynamics of the Main Indicators of
the World System Development,
double logarithmic scale
A2.12. World population (till 1960) A2.13. World GDP (till 1960)
10000 10000

World Population, millions (log.scale)

World GDP, billions of 1990 int.dollars, PPP

1000 1000

(log.scale)
100 100

10 10

1 1
10000 1000 100 10 10000 1000 100 10

Years BP (logarithmic scale) Years BP (logarithmic scale)

A2.14. The largest settlement A2.15 Technological development

th
population (until 1950) index (until the late 19 century)
10000
100000
Tle Largest Settlement Population, thousands

World System Technological Development

10000

Index, points (log.scale)

1000
1000
(log.scale)

100

10

100
1

0.1

0.01
10
100000 10000 1000 100 10
10000 1000 100
Years BP (logarithmic scale) Years BP (logarithmic scale)

NOTE: the black round marker denotes data point corresponding too 200 BCE, that is, roughly the
end of the Axial Age.

5
In the post-Axial era, the hyperbolic growth trend for largest polity size within the World System
seems to disappear (see Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997), which testifies additionally
for a qualitative difference between the Older and Younger Hyperbolas.
158 Appendix 2

Let us recollect that in double logarithmic scale a hyperbola looks like a straight
line, with a steeper slope of this line corresponding to a higher rate of hyperbol-
ic acceleration. Thus, the dynamics of all four of the indicators for which we
have very long-term quantitative empirical estimates suggest the same picture:
transition from a regime of relatively more rapid hyperbolic acceleration that
was typical for the World System's development before the end of the Axial
Age to a regime of slower (but apparently more stable) "post-Axial" hyperbolic
acceleration. Thus, the "Big Hyperbola" of the World System's development
breaks up into two "Small Hyperbolas" the "Older" and "Younger" ones
that differ from each other in their basic characteristics.
The fact that we are dealing here with two different regimes of hyperbolic
growth could be seen, for example, through the comparison of values of coeffi-
cient b (from Kremer's technological growth equation [0.8]), which is interpret-
ed by Kremer himself as "research productivity per person" (Kremer 1993: 686)
(see Diagram A2.16):
Diagram A2.16. Dynamics of Per Capita Invention Productivity
Coefficient (logarithmic scale)
0.0001

0.00001

0.000001

0.0000001
1-200 CE
200-1 BCE

200-400 CE
400-600 CE
600-800 CE
1000-500 BCE
500-200 BCE

800-1000 CE
1000-1100 CE
1100-1200 CE
1200-1300 CE
1300-1400 CE
1400-1500 CE
1500-1600 CE
1600-1700 CE
1700-1750 CE
1750-1800 CE
1800-1850 CE
1850-1870 CE
1870-1900 CE
1900-1920 CE
1920-1930 CE
1930-1940 CE
1940-1950 CE
1950-1960 CE
10000-5000 BCE
5000-4000 BCE
4000-3000 BCE
3000-2000 BCE
2000-1000 BCE

"Older Hyperbola" 1st "Younger Hyperbola"

trans.
epoch

NOTE: calculated on the basis of Table A1.1.

As has been already noted above, the values of this coefficient seem to be un-
derestimated for the post-1850 period; however, even taking this point into con-
sideration, the radical difference between the "Older" and "Younger" hyperbo-
las is rather evident.6

6
Of course, the supposition that per capita invention productivity of the Modern World System
could be substantially lower than the one of the Neolithic or Chalcolithic World System may look
totally implausible, as modern technological growth rate is so evidently and radically faster than
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 159

A detailed consideration of the concrete causes and mechanisms of the

World System's divergence from the blow-up regime in the post-Axial period, a
significant slow-down of the speed of World System development, and the
change of hyperbolic growth regimes lies beyond the scope of this monograph.
Here we shall restrict ourselves to an attempt to trace just a few possible ways
to address this question (note that they are not mutually exclusive):
1) The growth of the World System population by the end of the 1 st millen-
nium BCE up to 9-digit numbers produced a breeding ground that led to an al-
most inevitable appearance of a new generation of more lethal and epidemically
destructive pathogens that could not reproduce themselves in smaller popula-
tions (Diamond 1999: 2025; Korotayev, Malkov, and Khaltourina 2005: 105
13), whereas the level of health care technologies achieved by the World Sys-
tem by the beginning of the 1st millennium CE turned out to be totally inade-
quate for the radically increased level of pathogen threat. Thus, the Antonine
and Justinian's pandemics led to global depopulations of the 2 nd and 6th centu-
ries, contributing in a very significant way to the slow down of the World Sys-
tem demographic growth in the 1st millennium CE. Note that due to this, since
the early 1st millennium CE the role of health care technologies as a determinant
of the carrying capacity of the Earth dramatically increases, which at least partly
accounts for the change of the hyperbolic growth regime.
2) Some hint here seems to be suggested by mathematical models (0.11)-
(0.13)-(0.12) and (0.13)-(0.14) described in the Introduction. According to
these models any long-term decrease of per capita surplus (S) must lead to the
decrease of population growth rates and, hence, the slow-down of technological
growth. In the meantime, by the end of the Axial Age we seem to observe a
World System trend towards the decline of precisely this indicator. This was
connected not with decline of production, but rather with the growth of m, the
per capita product that is necessary for the population reproduction with zero
growth rate, the "minimum necessary product" (MNP). In the 1st millennium
BCE the rapid population growth sustained the hyperbolic growth of the com-
plexity of sociopolitical infrastructures (on the other hand, of course, the hyper-

it was in the Neolithic. However, it appears necessary to take into consideration the fact that
modern technological progress is being achieved with an orders-of-magnitude higher number of
potential inventors, and on an orders-of-magnitude wider technological base. In the meantime, an
orders-of-magnitude smaller population of the pre-Axial World System that had at its disposal an
orders-of-magnitude less developed technology managed to make an immense number of the
most fundamental inventions and technological innovations that formed the backbone of the
modern technology suffice to mention the domestication of wheat, barley, cattle, sheep and
goats, development of technologies of ceramic and textile production, copper, bronze, and later
iron metallurgy and metal work, invention of wheel, plow, writing, money, credit, taxation, for-
mal education and so on. It appears difficult to provide a simple answer to the question on possi-
ble causes of the sharp decrease of per capita invention productivity after the Axial Age. Could it
not have some connection with the Axial Age transition from pre-Axial "sympractical" (Roma-
nov 1991) thinking to the transcendentally oriented one (Eisenstadt 1982)? Note that, though this
transition involved a minority of population, this was just the most creative minority.
160 Appendix 2

bolic population growth was also sustained by a hyperbolic growth of sociopo-

litical complexity once more we are dealing here with the positive feedback
phenomenon). However, the radical increase in sociopolitical complexity meant
a radical increase in the MNP, as the substantial expenses necessary for the
normal functioning of these sociopolitical infrastructures should be regarded, in
this context, as a part of the minimum necessary product (rather than as sur-
plus). Indeed, by the end of the 1st millennium BCE the World System popula-
tion reached 9-digit numbers; simply reproducing (at zero growth rate) so huge
a population required maintenance of normal functioning of all those infrastruc-
tures (transportation, judicial, administrative and other such subsystems). With-
in such a context, if the product produced this year by a peasant is only suffi-
cient to secure the survival of himself and his household, but not sufficient to
pay any taxes, it is impossible to say that this peasant has produced this year the
minimum necessary product. In fact, what he has produced this year is smaller
than the MNP. Indeed, as the experience of post-Axial centuries showed on
numerous occasions, in supercomplex agrarian societies the decrease of per
capita production (usually as a result of relative overpopulation) down to a level
that does not allow the population to pay taxes led to the disintegration of soci-
opolitical infrastructures and demographic collapse (see Chapters 14 above).
There are grounds to maintain that the rapid growth of the MNP in the 1 st mil-
lennium BC exceeded the growth of the equilibrium per capita production,
which resulted in the long-term decrease of real S, and, hence, the decrease of
the World System population growth rates. On the other hand, it led to the de-
crease of sociopolitical system stability, and, hence, to the increase in the im-
portance of the role of cyclical and chaotic components of the macrohistorical
dynamics in comparison with the trend component. Note, however, that this
point can account only for the decrease of the speed of technological growth ac-
celeration; it cannot explain the decrease in the absolute rates of technological
growth apparently observed in the 1st millennium CE.
3) The point that the change of the hyperbolic growth regime took place af-
ter the political centralization of the World System had reached, at hyperbolical
speed, a critical level (by the end of the 1st century CE the absolute majority of
the World System inhabitants found themselves under the control of just four
polities the Roman, Parthian, Kushana, and Han empires) does not appear co-
incidental, in light of some additional considerations. The precipitous growth of
the World System political centralization observed in the 1 st millennium BCE
(Taagapera 1968, 1978a, 1978b, 1979, 1997) was propelled, among other
things, by the diffusion and development of iron metallurgy, which not only
raised substantially the carrying capacity of the Earth but also led to the devel-
opment of mass production of relatively cheap but effective weapons; and these
allowed the formation of mass armies, which were in their turn a necessary con-
dition for empire formation. However, those processes had important side ef-
fects. Politically centralized systems frequently achieve military superiority
 Macroperiodization of the World System History 161

through the development of specialized military subsystems with relatively

small but well trained and armed professional armies. However, a necessary
condition of the continuation of such superiority is normally the monopoly over
certain effective weapons (chariots, bronze arms etc.). If a certain revolution in
the production of the means of violence leads to the appearance of some effec-
tive weapons the monopoly over which could not be effectively maintained (e.g.
iron arms), less politically-centralized societies with a higher military participa-
tion ratio then acquire considerable advantages, and could become militarily
stronger than more politically centralized ones (which appears to have taken
place in many parts of the Old World Oikumene in the early Iron Age, or the
Late Antiquity). In addition to that, less politically-centralized societies with a
high military participation ratio could increase significantly their military effi-
ciency, without any considerable increase in their political centralization or in-
ternal differentiation (e.g. through nomadization), by increasing specialization
in animal husbandry, inasmuch as the routine economic activity and socializa-
tion of a herder tends to produce a warrior (see, e.g., Irons 2004). The full-scale
nomadic economy (employing extensive use of the mounts) would increase the
military potential of such societies in an especially significant way without any
corresponding significant increase in the degree of their political centralization
and functional differentiation. What seems important in this context is that the
technological developments of the 1st millennium BCE eventually led to the
military strengthening of the barbarian periphery in general and of the nomadic
systems in particular. It seems possible to argue that for many centuries after-
wards (that is, for most of the Younger Hyperbola epoch), the World System
experienced a phase of its technological development during which the nomads
had a systematic military advantage over sedentary systems (an advantage en-
hanced by the invention and rapid diffusion of stirrups and sabers) that contrib-
uted in the most significant way to the slow-down of the World System's popu-
lation growth in the post-Axial millennium. Note that this is to a very consider-
able extent accounted for precisely by a series of barbarian invasions, which
produced depopulations in all the parts of the world system. Note that, e.g.,
Western European population managed to grow over the 2 nd century CE level
only after the end of barbarian invasions (see, e.g., McEvedy and Jones 1978).
Indeed, during this period the pressure of the barbarian peripheries in general
(and nomadic ones in particular) seems to have been, along with epidemics, an
extremely important factor checking the World System's population growth.
What was important was not just that the barbarian invasions led to significant
depopulations (like the 13th century Mongolian invasions); what was perhaps
more important yet is that the pressure of the barbarian (and especially nomad-
ic) peripheries systematically lowered the carrying capacity of land in many
parts of the World System. For example, the "Black Soil" area of Southern Rus-
sia and Ukraine (which since the 19th century produced most marketable food
within the Russian Empire/USSR) was known for most of the 2 nd millennium
162 Appendix 2

CE as the "Wild Field" because, for most of this millennium, most of the land in
this area remained uncultivated due precisely to the nomadic threat (see, e.g.,
Turchin 2005b).
Thus, the analysis of the World System's history against the background of
mathematical models of its development confirms the fundamental correctness
of Karl Jaspers' (1953) suggestion to consider the Axial Age (the expressive no-
tion of which was introduced just by Jaspers) as a sort of central milestone that
divides the World System history into two comparable parts.
Note that the available periodizations of the World System's history (e.g.,
Shofman 1984; Gellner 1988; Diakonov 1994; Goudsblom 1996; Green 1992,
1995; McNeill 1995; Rozov 2001) have failed to capture the complex character
of the hyperbola of the World System's development, the precipitous accelera-
tion by the end of the Axial Age, a radical slow-down during the subsequent pe-
riod, the change of regimes of hyperbolic growth, and, finally, the current di-
vergence from the blow-up regime. Karl Jaspers' work suggests possible ap-
proaches to the development of more adequate periodizations, which still re-
mains a task for the future.
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