#41 a.

W/N the Mayor of Makati could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit
streets? – YES
Bel-Air Association vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (1989)
b. If yes, what is the nature of the state power being invoked by the
STATEMENT OF THE CASE Mayor? – POLICE POWER
Before the Court are six consolidated petitions, docketed as G.R. nos. RATIO
71169, 74376, 76394, 78182, 82281 and 60727. The first five petitions for a
motion for reconsideration raise the issue of whether Jupiter Street is for a. BAVA cannot rightfully complain that the Mayor of Makati, in opening up
the exclusive use of Bel-Air Village residents. Meanwhile, the last petition Jupiter and Orbit streets, had acted arbitrarily.
(G.R. 60727) raises the lone issue of whether or not the Mayor of Makati
could have validly opened Jupiter and Orbit Streets to vehicular traffic. Citing Sangalang v. IAC, the Court held that Jupiter street lies as the
boundary between Bel-Air Village and Ayala Corporation’s commercial
Facts section. Being considered as merely a boundary – and hence not part of
Ayala’s real estate development projects – it cannot be said to have been
· Ayala Corporation (original owner of the property subsequently for the exclusive benefit of Bel-Air Village residents.
subdivided as Bel-Air Village) executed a Deed of Donation covering Jupiter
and Orbit streets to Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA). The very Deed of Donation executed by Ayala Corp. covering Jupiter and
Orbit Streets, amongst others, effectively required both passageways open
· Respondents allege that upon instructions of the Mayor of Makati, to the general public.
studies were made by the on the feasibility of opening streets in Bel-Air
Village calculated to alleviate traffic congestions along the public streets o “…the property will be used as a street for the use of the members of
adjacent to Bel-Air Village. the DONEE (BAVA), their families, personnel, guests, domestic help
and under certain reasonable conditions and restrictions, by the general
o Accordingly, it was deemed necessary by the Municipality of Makati in public…”
the interest of the general public to open to traffic several village streets
including Jupiter and Orbit streets. As the Court asserted in Sangalang, the opening of Jupiter and Orbit streets
was warranted by the demands of the common good, in terms of traffic
· Respondent’s claim: BAVA had agreed to the opening of Bel-Air decongestion and public convenience.
Village streets and that the opening was demanded by public necessity and
in the exercise of police power.

· Petitioner’s counter-argument: It has never agreed on the opening of b. The act of the Mayor now challenged is in the concept of police power.
Jupiter and Orbit streets. By virtue of its ownership of the streets, it should
not be deprived without due process of law and without just o The demolition of the gates at Orbit and Jupiter streets does not
compensation. amount to deprivation of property without due process of law or
expropriation without just compensation – there is no taking of property
involved.

ISSUES/HOLDING
o Police power as the “state authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the The respondent, to stop the opening of the said street and demolition of
general welfare.” the wall, filed a preliminary injunction and a temporary restraining order.
Respondent claimed that the MMDA had no authority to do so and the
o Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not unrestricted license to lower court decided in favor of the Respondent. Petitioner appealed the
act accordingly to one’s will. It is subject to the far more overriding decision of the lower courts and claimed that it has the authority to open
demands and requirements of the greater number. Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the State that can
practice police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila.
o Public welfare when clashing with the individual right to property
should not be made to prevail through the state’s exercise of its police
Issue: Whether or not the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street
power.
to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers.
o The exercise of police power, however, may not be done arbitrarily or
unreasonably. But theburden of showing that it is unjustified lies on the Held: The Court held that the MMDA does not have the capacity to
aggrieved party. exercise police power. Police power is primarily lodged in the National
Legislature. However, police power may be delegated to government units.
o In the case at bar, BAVA has failed to show that the opening up of Orbit Petitioner herein is a development authority and not a political
and Jupiter streets was unjustified or that the Mayor acted unreasonably. government unit. Therefore, the MMDA cannot exercise police power
because it cannot be delegated to them. It is not a legislative unit of the
o The fact that the opening has led to the loss of privacy of BAVA
government. Republic Act No. 7924 does not empower the MMDA to enact
residents is no argument against the Municipality’s effort to ease vehicular
ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general
traffic in Makati. The duty of local executive is to take care of the needs of
welfare of the inhabitants of Manila. There is no syllable in the said act that
the greater number, in many cases at the expense, of the minority.
grants MMDA police power.
DISPOSITIVE: Motion for reconsideration by Bel-Air Village Association is
DENIED with FINALITY. The petition in G.R. 60727 is GRANTED. It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with various national government agencies, people’s
#42 organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for
the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast
MMDA Vs. Bel-Air Village [328 SCRA 836; G.R. No. 135962; 27 Mar 2000] metropolitan area.

Facts: Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), petitioner #43

herein, is a Government Agency tasked with the delivery of basic
servicesin Metro Manila. Bel-Air Village Association (BAVA), respondent LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC. v. JAC LINER, INC. 452 SCRA
herein, received a letter of request from the petitioner to open Neptune 174 (2005)
Street of Bel-Air Village for the use of the public. The said opening of
Neptune Street will be for the safe and convenient movement of persons Two ordinances were enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena
and to regulate the flow of traffic in Makati City. This was pursuant to with the objective of alleviating the traffic congestion said to have been
MMDA law or Republic Act No. 7924. On the same day, the respondent was caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the
appraised that the perimeter wall separating the subdivision and Kalayaan city. City Ordinance 1631 grants franchise to the Lucena Grand Central
Avenue would be demolished. Terminal, Inc. to construct, finance, establish, operate and maintain
common bus- jeepney terminal facility in the City of Lucena. City Ordinance buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not,
1778, on the other hand, strips out all the temporary terminals in the City however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic. How the outright
of Lucena the right to operate which as a result favors only the Lucena proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The Regional Trial Court of Lucena declared franchised to Lucena, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve
City Ordinance 1631 as a valid excercise of police power while declaring the traffic problem, the Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack
City Ordinance 1778 as null and void for being invalid. Petitioner Lucena adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload
Grand Central Terminal, Inc. filed its Motion for Reconsideration which was passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable
denied. Lucena then elevated it via petition for review under Rule 45 specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to
before the Court. The Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the
(CA) with which it has concurrent jurisdiction. The CA dismissed the specifications. In the subject ordinances, however, the scope of the
petition and affirmed the challenged orders of the trial court. Its motion for proscription against the maintenance of terminals is so broad that even
reconsideration having been denied by the CA, Lucena now comes to the entities which might be able to provide facilities better than the franchised
Court via petition for review to assail the Decision and Resolution of the terminal are barred from operating at all. The Court is not unaware of the
CA. resolutions of various barangays in Lucena City supporting the
establishment of a common terminal, and similar expressions of support
ISSUE: from the private sector, copies of which were submitted to this Court by
Lucena Grand Central Terminal, Inc. The weight of popular opinion,
Whether or not the means employed by the Lucena Sannguniang
however, must be balanced with that of an individual‘s rights.
Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably necessary and
not duly oppressive upon individuals. #44

HELD: City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

With the aim of localizing the source of traffic congestion in the city to a On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN
single location, the subject ordinances prohibit the operation of all bus and ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF
jeepney terminals within Lucena, including those already existing, and BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT,
allow the operation of only one common terminal located outside the city ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA,
proper, the franchise for which was granted to Lucena. The common PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
carriers plying routes to and from Lucena City are thus compelled to close PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke
down their existing terminals and use the facilities of Lucena. The true role bars, motels and hotels from operating in the Malate District which was
of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and notoriously viewed as a red light district harboring thrill seekers. Malate
liberty so that rights are exercised within the framework of the law and the Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is invalid as it
laws are enacted with due deference to rights. A due deference to the includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering
rights of the individual thus requires a more careful formulation of amusement or entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market
solutions to societal problems. From the memorandum filed before the such nor do they use women as tools for entertainment. MTDC also avers
Court by Lucena, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but cannot prohibit
identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized
hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of that the purpose of the law is to promote morality in the City.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid. The RTC favoured Rambuyong. The CA upheld the decision of the lower
court. Hence, this petition
HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted
that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate ISSUE: Whether NPC is an instrumentality of government such Atty.
powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed Rambuyong, as a sanggunian member, should not appear as counsel
according to the procedure prescribed by law, it must also conform to the against it.
following substantive requirements:
HELD: Yes, NPC is government instrumentality thus, Atty. Rambuyong
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; should not appear as counsel against it.

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive; Reason: Based on jurisprudence, Maceda vs Macaraig, Jr., 1997 197 SCRA
771 (1991), the Court stated that NPC is a government instrumentality with
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory; the enormous task of undertaking development of hydroelectric
generation of power and production of electricity from other sources, as
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
well as transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis, to improve
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and the quality of life pursuant to the State policy embodied in Section 9,
Article 2 of 1987 Constitution. With this, the LGC prohibits a sanggunian
(6) must not be unreasonable. member (Atty. Rambuyong) to appear as counsel of a party adverse to the
NPC.
The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is
subordinate to the constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the #46
limitation that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good. In
the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of CATU VS. RELLOSA
delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
A.C. NO. 5738 02/19/2008
#45
FACTS: Petitioner initiated a complaint against Elizabeth Catu and Antonio
Republic of the Philippines, Represented by the NPC vs Atty. Rambuyong Pastor who were occupying one of the units in a building in Malate which
was owned by the former. The said complaint was filed in the Lupong
G.R. No. 167810, October 04, 2010 Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of Manila
where respondent was the punong barangay. The parties, having been
FACTS: Alfred Chu filed a case for collection of a sum of money and/ or
summoned for conciliation proceedings and failing to arrive at an amicable
damages against the National Power Corporation which was raffled to the
settlement, were issued by the respondent a certification for the filing of
RTC of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Branch 24. Appearing for Chu is Atty.
the appropriate action in court. Petitioner, thus, filed a complaint for
Richard Rambuyong who was the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Ipil,
ejectment against Elizabeth and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Zamboanga Sibugay, NPC filed a Motion for Inhibition of Atty. Rambuyong
Manila where respondent entered his appearance as counsel for the
arguing that under Sec. 90(b) RA 7160 (LGC), sanggunian members are
defendants. Because of this, petitioner filed the instant administrative
prohibited to appear as counsel before any court wherein any office,
complaint against the respondent on the ground that he committed an act
agency or instrumentality of the government is the adverse party. NPC
of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood as counsel
argued that being a GOCC, it is embraced within the term instrumentality.
for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay. In his defense, Third, notwithstanding all of these, respondent still should have procured a
respondent claimed that as punong barangay, he performed his task prior permission or authorization from the head of his Department, as
without bias and that he acceded to Elizabeth’s request to handle the case required by civil service regulations. The failure of respondent to comply
for free as she was financially distressed. The complaint was then referred with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules constitutes a
to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) where after evaluation, they violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws. In acting as counsel for a
found sufficient ground to discipline respondent. According to them, party without first securing the required written permission, respondent
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated a
and, as an elective official, the prohibition under Section 7(b) (2) of RA civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
6713. Consequently, for the violation of the latter prohibition, respondent Responsibility:
committed a breach of Canon 1. Consequently, for the violation of the
latter prohibition, respondent was then recommended suspension from Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the deceitful conduct.
commission of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting
ISSUE: Whether or not the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of ethical standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with
respondent as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:
the respondent were proper.
CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND
HELD: No. First, respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF
6.03 the Code of Professional Responsibility as this applies only to a lawyer THE INTEGRATED BAR.
who has left government service and in connection to former government
A lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he disregards
lawyers who are prohibited from accepting employment in connection
legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession. Every lawyer
with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in their service. In the
should act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public
case at bar, respondent was an incumbent punong barangay. Apparently,
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. A member of the bar
he does not fall within the purview of the said provision.
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney for violation
Second, it is not Section 90 of RA 7160 but Section 7(b) (2) of RA 6713 of the lawyer's oath and/or for breach of the ethics of the legal profession
which governs the practice of profession of elective local government as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
officials. While RA 6713 generally applies to all public officials and
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of
employees, RA 7160, being a special law, constitutes an exception to RA
professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and
6713 .Moreover, while under RA 7160,certain local elective officials (like
7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is therefore
governors, mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months effective
expressly subjected to a total or partial proscription to practice their
from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
profession or engage in any occupation, no such interdiction is made on the
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
punong barangay and the members of the sangguniang barangay.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius since they are excluded from any Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of
prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice their the word delicadeza.
profession. Respondent, therefore, is not forbidden to practice his
profession.
#47 the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City,
to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely
FLORES V DRILON what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a
local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position
G.R. No. 104732 June 22, 1993
in government, and thus neglect his constitutents.
FACTS: Petitioners, taxpayers and employees of U.S facilities at Subic,
(2) NO, Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as
challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 13 (d) of the Bases Conversion and
automatically attached to the Office of the Mayor without need of
Development Act of 1992 which directs the President to appoint a
appointment. The phrase “shall be appointed” unquestionably shows the
professional manager as administrator of the SBMA…provided that “for the
intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the
1st year of its operations, the mayor of Olongapo City (Richard Gordon)
post of Mayor of Olongapo City.
shall be appointed as the chairman and the CEO of the Subic Authority.”
(3) NO, Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In
ISSUES
any case, the Vice-President for example, an elective official who may be
(1) Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointed to a cabinet post, may receive the compensation attached to the
appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts. cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.

(2) Whether or not the SBMA posts are merely ex officio to the position of (4) YES, although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to
Mayor of Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance. appoint the Chairman of SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of choice is the heart of the power to
(3) Whether or not the Constitutional provision allowing an elective official appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of whom to
to receive double compensation (Sec. 8, Art. IX-B) would be useless if no appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to
elective official may be appointed to another post. appoint an officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the
President to only one candidate. Such enactment effectively eliminates the
(4) Whether there is legislative encroachment on the appointing authority
discretion of the appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
of the President.
restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that the
(5) Whether Mayor Gordon may retain any and all per diems, allowances proviso merely sets the qualifications of the officer during the first year of
and other emoluments which he may have received pursuant to his operations of SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is
appointment. manifestly an abuse of congressional authority to prescribe qualifications
where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the ineligibility of an
HELD elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or
during his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post
(1) YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official to cast off the constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any considered fit for appointment. Consequently, as long as he is an
public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for appointment to
or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold another public office.
any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or (5) YES, as incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs to the position of Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto cannot be sustained. He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, HELD: Yes. It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile
and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be of origin, the place of his birth. His domicile was changed from Quezon City
considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence, is to Australia when he migrated there at the age of eight, acquired Australian
entitled to such benefits. citizenship, and lived in that country for 26 years. Australia became his
domicile by operation of law and by choice. But, when he came to the
#48 Philippines in November 2008 to live with his brother in Zamboanga
Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so with intent to change his domicile
Jalosjos v. COMELEC
for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship, and
G.R. No. 193237, October 9, 2012 renounced his allegiance to that country. In addition, he reacquired his old
citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
FACTS: Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City on October 26, 1973. He Philippines, resulting in his being issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of
migrated to Australia in 1981 when he was eight years old and there Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration. By his acts, Jalosjos
acquired Australian citizenship. On November 22, 2008, at age 35, he forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving that he gave up
decided to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Ipil, his domicile there. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
Zamboanga Sibugay. Four days upon his return, he took an oath of Zamboanga Sibugay.
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, he was issued a
Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of #49
Immigration. On September 1, 2009 he renounced his Australian
Jalosjos v. COMELEC
citizenship, executing a sworn renunciation of the same in compliance with
Republic Act (R.A.) 9225. From the time of his return, Jalosjos acquired a G.R. No. 205033 : June 18, 2013
residential property in the same village where he lived. He applied for
registration as a voter in the Municipality of Ipil but respondent Erasmo, FACTS: On November 16, 2001, the Court promulgated its Decision
the Barangay Captain, opposed the said act. Election Registration Board convicting petitioner by final judgment.Consequently, he was sentenced to
approved it and included Jalosjos’ name in the COMELEC voters list. Erasmo suffer the principal penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal
filed before the MTC a petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name from the for each count, respectively, which carried the accessory penalty of
official voters list. MTC denied Erasmo’s petition. He appealed to RTC but perpetual absolute disqualification pursuant to Article 41 of the Revised
RTC ruled same as MTC’s. On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Penal Code. On April 30, 2007, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay issued an order commuting his prison term to sixteen (16) years, three (3)
Province for the May 10, 2010 elections. Erasmo filed a petition to deny months and three (3) days.
due course or to cancel Jalosjos’ COC on the ground that Jalosjos made
material misrepresentation in the same since he failed to comply with (1) On April 26, 2012,petitioner applied to register as a voter in Zamboanga
the requirements of R.A. 9225 and (2) the one-year residency requirement City. However, because of his previous conviction, his application was
of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled against Jalosjos, because it denied by the Acting City Election Officer of the Election Registration Board
failed to comply with the 1-year residency ruequirement. Jalosjos won the (ERB), prompting him to file a Petition for Inclusion in the Permanent List of
elections Voters before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Zamboanga City.
Pending resolution of the same, he filed a CoCon October 5, 2012, seeking
ISSUE: w/n Jalosjos failed to comply with the 1-year residency requirement to run as mayor for Zamboanga City in the upcoming local elections
scheduled on May 13, 2013. In his CoC, petitioner stated,inter alia,that he
is eligible for the said office and that he is a registered voter of Barangay reconsideration of a division ruling under Section 3, Article IX-C of the
Tetuan, Zamboanga City. Constitution, the same being required only in quasi-judicial proceedings.

On October 18, 2012,the MTCC denied his Petition for Inclusion on account The denial of due course to and/or cancellation of one's CoC generally
of his perpetual absolute disqualification which in effect, deprived him of necessitates the exercise of the COMELEC's quasi-judicial functions
the right to vote in any election. Such denial was affirmed by the Regional commenced through a petition based on either Sections 12 or 78of the
Trial Court in its Order which, pursuant to Section 138 of Batas Pambansa OEC, or Section 40 of the LGC, when the grounds therefor are rendered
Bilang 881, as amended, otherwise known as the "Omnibus Election Code" conclusive on account of final and executory judgments as when a
(OEC), was immediately final and executory. candidate's disqualification to run for public office is based on a final
conviction.
The COMELEC En Banc issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 on
January 15, 2013, resolving "to CANCEL and DENY due course the There is also no violation of procedural due process since the COMELECEn
Certificate of Candidacy filed by Romeo G. Jalosjos as Mayor of Zamboanga Banc would be acting in a purely administrative manner.
City in the May 13, 2013 National and Local Elections" due to his perpetual
absolute disqualification as well as his failure to comply with the voter POLITICAL LAW: right to run for elective office
registration requirement.
The petitioner was sentenced to suffer the principal penalties of reclusion
ISSUES: perpetua and reclusion temporal which, pursuant to Article 41 of the RPC,
carried with it the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification
(a)Whether or not the COMELEC En Banc acted beyond its jurisdiction and in turn, pursuant to Article 30 of the RPC, disqualified him to run for
when it issued motu proprio Resolution No. 9613 and in so doing, violated elective office. As discussed, Section 40 (a) of the LGC would not apply to
petitioner's right to due process; cases wherein a penal provision such as Article 41 in this case directly and
specifically prohibits the convict from running for elective office. Hence,
(b)Whether or not petitioner's perpetual absolute disqualification to run despite the lapse of two (2) years from petitioner's service of his
for elective office had already been removed by Section 40 (a) of Republic commuted prison term, he remains bound to suffer the accessory penalty
Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the "Local Government Code of 1991" of perpetual absolute disqualification which consequently, disqualifies him
(LGC). to run as mayor for Zamboanga City.

HELD: Decision of the appellate court is affirmed. It is well to note that the use of the word "perpetual" in the
aforementioned accessory penalty connotes a lifetime restriction and in
POLITICAL LAW: cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy
this respect, does not depend on the length of the prison term, which is
The COMELECEn Bancdid not exercise its quasi-judicial functions when it imposed as its principal penalty. Instructive on this point is the Court's
issued Resolution No. 9613 as it did not assume jurisdiction over any ruling in Lacuna v. Abes,where the Court explained the meaning of the
pending petition or resolve any election case before it or any of its term "perpetual" as applied to the penalty of disqualification to run for
divisions.Rather, it merely performed its duty to enforce and administer public office.
election laws in cancelling petitioner's CoC on the basis of his perpetual
The accessory penalty of temporary absolute disqualification disqualified
absolute disqualification, the fact of which had already been established by
the convict for public office and for the right to vote, such disqualification
his final conviction.In this regard, the COMELECEn Bancwas exercising its
to last only during the term of the sentence (Article 27, paragraph 3, &
administrative functions, dispensing with the need for a motion for
Article 30, Revised Penal Code) that, in the case of Abes, would have Aratea took his oath of office as Acting Mayor before Regional Trial Court
expired on 13 October 1961. (RTC) Judge of Olongapo. On the same date, Aratea wrote the DILG and
requested for an opinion on whether, as Vice-Mayor, he was legally
But this does not hold true with respect to the other accessory penalty of required to assume the Office of the Mayor in view of Lonzanida’s
perpetual special disqualification for the exercise of the right of disqualification.
suffrage.This accessory penalty deprives the convict of the right to vote or
to be elected to or hold public office perpetually, as distinguished from DILG stated that Lonzanida was disqualified to hold office by reason of his
temporary special disqualification, which lasts during the term of the criminal conviction, and as a consequence, his office was deemed
sentence. permanently vacant, and thus, Aratea should assume the Office of the
Mayor in an acting capacity without prejudice to the COMELEC’s resolution
Petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED. of Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration.

#50 In another letter dated 6 August 2010, Aratea requested the DILG to allow
him to take the oath of office as Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales. In his
EFREN ARATEA v. COMELEC AND ESTELA ANTIPOLO
response, then Secretary Jesse M. Robredo allowed Aratea to take an oath
G.R. No. 195229, October 9, 2012, Carpio, J. of office as "the permanent Municipal Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales
without prejudice however to the outcome of the cases pending before the
FACTS: Romeo D. Lonzanida (Lonzanida) and Estela D. Antipolo (Antipolo) COMELEC.
were candidates for Mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in the May 2010
National and Local Elections. Dra. Sigrid S. Rodolfo (Rodolfo) filed a petition On 11 August 2010, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Resolution disqualifying
under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code to disqualify Lonzanida and Lonzanida from running for Mayor in the May 2010 elections. The
to deny due course or to cancel Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy on the COMELEC En Banc’s resolution was based on two grounds: first, Lonzanida
ground that Lonzanida was elected, and had served, as mayor of San had been elected and had served as Mayor for more than three
Antonio, Zambales for four (4) consecutive terms immediately prior to the consecutive terms without interruption; and second, Lonzanida had been
term for the May 2010 elections. convicted by final judgment of 10 counts of falsification under the Revised
Penal Code. Lonzanida was sentenced for each count of falsification to
Rodolfo asserted that Lonzanida made a false material representation in his imprisonment of 4 years and 1 day of prisión correccional as minimum, to 8
certificate of candidacy when Lonzanida certified under oath that he was years and 1 day of prisión mayor as maximum. The judgment of conviction
eligible for the office he sought election. Section 8, Article X of the 1987 became final on 23 October 2009 in the Decision of this Court in Lonzanida
Constitution and Section 43(b) of the Local Government Code both prohibit v. People, before Lonzanida filed his certificate of candidacy on 1 December
a local elective official from being elected and serving for more than three 2009.
consecutive terms for the same position.
The manner of filling up the permanent vacancy in the Office of the Mayor
The COMELEC Second Division rendered a Resolutionon 18 February 2010 of San Antonio, Zambales is dependent upon the determination of
cancelling Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy. Lonzanida’s removal. Whether Lonzanida was disqualified under Section 68
of the Omnibus Election Code, or made a false material representation
Lonzanida’s motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc
under Section 78 of the same Code that resulted in his certificate of
remained pending during the May 2010 elections. Lonzanida and Efren
candidacy being void ab initio, is determinative of whether Aratea or
Racel Aratea (Aratea) garnered the highest number of votes and were
respectively proclaimed Mayor and Vice-Mayor.
Antipolo is the rightful occupant to the Office of the Mayor of San Antonio, The penalty of prisión mayor automatically carries with it, by operation of
Zambales. law, the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification
and perpetual special disqualification. Under Article 30 of the Revised
HELD: Antipolo, the alleged "second placer," should be proclaimed Mayor Penal Code, temporary absolute disqualification produces the effect of
because Lonzanida’s certificate of candidacy was void ab initio. In short, "deprivation of the right to vote in any election for any popular elective
Lonzanida was never a candidate at all. All votes for Lonzanida were stray office or to be elected to such office.” The duration of temporary absolute
votes. Thus, Antipolo, the only qualified candidate, actually garnered the disqualification is the same as that of the principal penalty of prisión
highest number of votes for the position of Mayor. mayor.

The grounds for disqualification for a petition under Section 68 1 of the On the other hand, under Article 32 of the Revised Penal Code, perpetual
Omnibus Election Code are specifically enumerated. special disqualification means that "the offender shall not be permitted to
hold any public office during the period of his disqualification,” which is
A petition for disqualification under Section 68 clearly refers to "the
perpetually. Both temporary absolute disqualification and perpetual special
commission of prohibited acts and possession of a permanent resident
disqualification constitute ineligibilities to hold elective public office.
status in a foreign country." All the offenses mentioned in Section 68 refer
to election offenses under the Omnibus Election Code, not to violations of A person suffering from these ineligibilities is ineligible to run for elective
other penal laws. There is absolutely nothing in the language of Section 68 public office, and commits a false material representation if he states in his
that would justify including violation of the three-term limit rule, or certificate of candidacy that he is eligible to so run.
conviction by final judgment of the crime of falsification under the Revised
Penal Code, as one of the grounds or offenses covered under Section 68. Effect of a Void Certificate of Candidacy

On the other hand, Section 782 of the Omnibus Election Code states that a A cancelled certificate of candidacy void ab initio cannot give rise to a valid
certificate of candidacy may be denied or cancelled when there is false candidacy, and much less to valid votes.
material representation of the contents of the certificate of candidacy:
As the Comelec stated in their February 2011 Resolution: Since Lonzanida
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code details the contents of the was never a candidate for the position of Mayor [of] San Antonio,
certificate of candidacy: Zambales, the votes cast for him should be considered stray votes.
Consequently, Intervenor Antipolo, who remains as the sole qualified
Sec. 74. Contents of certificate of candidacy. ‒ The certificate of candidacy candidate for the mayoralty post and obtained the highest number of
shall state that the person filing it is announcing his candidacy for the office votes, should now be proclaimed as the duly elected Mayor of San Antonio,
stated therein and that he is eligible for said office x x x Zambales.

The conviction of Lonzanida by final judgment, with the penalty of prisión Lonzanida's certificate of candidacy was cancelled because he was
mayor, disqualifies him perpetually from holding any public office, or from ineligible or not qualified to run for Mayor. Whether his certificate of
being elected to any public office. This perpetual disqualification took candidacy is cancelled before or after the elections is immaterial because
effect upon the finality of the judgment of conviction, before Lonzanida the cancellation on such ground means he was never a candidate from the
filed his certificate of candidacy. very beginning, his certificate of candidacy being void ab initio. There was
only one qualified candidate for Mayor in the May 2010 elections -
1
Antipolo, who therefore received the highest number of votes. Petition
dismissed.
2