G.R. No.

96781 October 1, 1993 collision took place within the lane of the Scout car was supported by other
EMILIANO MANUEL and SUPERLINES TRANSPORTATION CO., conclusive evidence. "Indeed, a trail of broken glass which was scattered
INC., petitioners, along the car's side of the road, whereas the bus lane was entirely clear of
vs. debris (Exhibit "L-1," p. 34, Records, pp. 56-65; TSN, Session of March 14,
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ERNESTO A. RAMOS 1979)" (Rollo, p. 31).
substituted by Goyena Z. Ramos, Grace, David, Jobet, Portia and Furthermore, the fact that the Scout car was found after the impact at rest
Banjo, all surnamed RAMOS; and GOYENA ZANAROSA-RAMOS, for against the guard railing shows that it must have been hit and thrown
herself and as Guardian Ad Litem for the minors JOBET, BANJO, backwards by the bus (Rollo, p. 103). The physical evidence do not show
DAVID and GRACE, all surnamed RAMOS; FERNANDO ABCEDE, SR., that the Superlines Bus while traveling at high speed, usurped a portion of
for himself and as Guardian Ad Litem for minor FERNANDO G. the lane occupied by the Scout car before hitting it on its left side. On
ABCEDE, JR.; MIGUEL JERNZ MAGO, as Guardian Ad Litem for collision, the impact due to the force exerted by a heavier and bigger
minor ARLEEN R. MAGO, and ANACLETA J. ZANAROSA,respondents. passenger bus on the smaller and lighter Scout car, heavily damaged the
Benito P. Fabie for petitioners. latter and threw it against the guard railing.
Constante Banayos for private respondents. Petitioner's contention that the Scout car must have been moved
backwards is not only a speculation but is contrary to human experience.
QUIASON, J.: There was no reason to move it backwards against the guard railing. If the
This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court purpose was to clear the road, all that was done was to leave it where it
from the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 11780, and was at the time of the collision, which was well inside its assigned lane.
its Resolution dated January 8, 1991, denying petitioner's motion for Besides, even petitioners accept the fact that when the police arrived at
reconsideration. The decision subject of the appeal was an affirmation of the scene of the accident, they found no one thereat (Rollo, p. 13). This
the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, in Civil further weakens the possibility that some persons moved the Scout car to
Case No. 3020 and whose dispositive portion states: rest on the guard railing.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered : (1) The evidence with respect to the issue that Fernando Abcede, Jr. who was
finding the defendant Emiliano Manuel negligent, reckless and not duly licensed, was the one driving the Scout car at the time of the
imprudent in the operation of Superlines Bus No. 406, which was accident, could not simply exempt petitioner's liability because they were
the proximate cause of the injuries suffered by the plaintiffs and parties at fault for encroaching on the Scout car's lane (Rollo, pp. 29-30).
damage of the Scout Car in which they were riding; (2) ordering Nevertheless, the witnesses presented by petitioners who allegedly saw
the said defendant, jointly and solidarily, with the defendant "the younger Abcede pined behind the driver's wheels," testified on matters
Superlines Bus Co., Inc. to pay plaintiffs the amounts of that transpired after the accident. Discrediting this allegation, the Court of
P49,954,86, as itemized elsewhere in this decision and the Appeals noted that none of the aforesaid witnesses actually saw the
costs. younger Abcede driving the car and that the younger Abcede could have
It appearing that the defendants Superlines Transportation Co., simply been thrown off his seat toward the steering wheel (Rollo, p. 29).
Inc. is insured with the defendant Perla Compania de Seguros, Be that as it may, this Court has followed a well-entrenched principle that
which has admitted such insurance, the latter is hereby ordered the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are normally given great
to pay the former the amounts so stated up to the extent of its weight, more so when the findings tally with the findings of the trial court
insurance coverage" (Rollo, pp. 70-71). and are supported by the evidence (Francisco v. Magbitang, 173 SCRA
The operative facts culled from the decision of the Court of Appeals are as 382 [1989]; New Owners/Management of TML Garments, Inc. v. Zaragosa,
follows: 170 SCRA 563-564 [1989]).
Private respondents were passengers of an International Harvester Scout The reason for this entrenched principle is given in Chemplex (Phils.), Inc.,
Car (Scout Car) owned by respondent Ramos, which left Manila for et al. v. Ramon C. Pamatian, et al., 57 SCRA 408 [1974], thus:
Camarines Norte in the morning of December 27, 1977 with respondent This Court is not a trier of facts, and it is beyond its
Fernando Abcede, Sr. as the driver of the vehicle. function to make its own findings of certain vital facts
There was a drizzle at about 4:10 P.M. when the Scout car, which was different from those of the trial court, especially on the
then negotiating the zigzag road of Bo. Paraiso, Sta. Elena, Camarines basis of the conflicting claims of the parties and
Norte, was hit on its left side by a bus. The bus was owned by petitioner without the evidence being properly before it. For this
Emiliano Manuel. Due to the impact, the Scout car was thrown backwards Court to make such factual conclusions is entirely
against a protective railing. Were it not for the railing, the Scout car would unjustified — first, because if material facts are
have fallen into a deep ravine. All its ten occupants, which included four controverted, as in this case, and they are issues
children were injured, seven of the victims sustained serious physical being litigated before the lower court, the petition
injuries (Rollo, p. 28). for certiorari would not be in aid of the appellate
Emiliano Manuel, the driver of the bus, was prosecuted for multiple jurisdiction of this Court; and, secondly, because it
physical injuries through reckless imprudence in the Municipal Court of preempts the primary function of the lower court,
Sta. Elena, Camarines Norte. As he could not be found after he ceased namely, to try the case on the merits, receive all the
reporting for work a few days following the incident, the private evidence to presented by the parties, and only then
respondents filed the instant action for damages based onquasi-delict. come to a definite decision, including either the
After trial, the court a quo rendered judgment against petitioners and Perla maintenance or the discharge of the preliminary
Compania de Seguros, that covered the insurance of the bus. The court injunction it has issued.
ordered them to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of P49,954.86 in Appellants, likewise, contested the awarded damages as excessive and
damages to respondents. unsubstantiated. The trial court's findings show otherwise, as can be
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, affirmed the decision of the trial court. gleaned from the following excerpt of this decision:
In their appeal before us, petitioners contend that it was Fernando Abcede, Plaintiffs were able to prove their injuries and
Jr., driver of the Scout car, who was at fault. Besides, petitioners claim the submitted evidence to show expenses for their
Fernando Abcede, Jr., who was only 19-years old at the time of the treatment, hospitalization and incidental disbursement
incident, did not have a driver's license (Rollo, p. 10). (Exhs. AA to HH and their submarkings), having a
Proof of this, according to petitioners, was that: total amount of P12,204.86 which had admittedly (sic)
Immediately after the incident, the bus conductor shouldered by plaintiff Ernesto Ramos. Considering
Cesar Pica and passengers, including Maximino Jaro, the nature of the injuries as shown by the respective
alighted from the bus. A woman passenger of the IH Medical Certificates (Exhs. A to J and their
Scout car, Mrs. Ramos, was heard saying: "Iyan na submarkings) said amount is very reasonable. It was
nga ba ang sinasabi ko, napakalakas ng loob," also shown that the Scout car is a total wreck, the
referring to young man, Fernando Abcede, Jr. who value of which was estimated to be P20,000.00 which
was the driver of the IH Scout car (tsn., p. 43, may be the same amount to put (sic) into a running
November 19, 1979; tsn, p. 23-A. February 7, 1980) . . condition. We consider, likewise said amount
. (Rollo, p. 75). reasonable taking into account its brand (International
Likewise, petitioner questioned the accuracy of the pictures and sketches Harvester Scout car). The above mentioned damages
submitted by private respondents as evidence that the Superlines bus are considered actual or compensatory (Par. 1 Art.
encroached on the lane of the Scout car. According to them, the sketch 2197 in relation to Art. 2199, New Civil Code).
made by the police investigator showing the skid marks of the bus, is Evidence was also adduced showing that as a result
inadmissible as evidence because it was prepared the day after the of the incident and the resultant injuries there had
incident and the alleged "tell-tale" skid marks and other details had already been an impairment on the earning capacity of some
been obliterated by the heavy downpour which lasted for at least an hour of the plaintiffs (Fernando Abcede, Sr., Anacleta
after the accident (Rollo, p. 87). Likewise, they claim that the policeman Zanarosa, Ernesto Ramos and Goyena Ramos) which
who prepared the sketch was not the police officer assigned to conduct the are recoverable pursuant to Article 2205 of the New
investigation (Rollo, pp. 88-89). Civil Code. Considering the nature of their injuries one
While it may be accepted that some of the skid marks may have been month each loss of income seem reasonable.
erased by the "heavy downpour" on or about the time of the accident, it Attorney's fees and expenses of litigation is also
remains a possibility that not all skid marks were washed away. The strong proper. Since the act complained of falls under the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty (Rule 131, Sec. aegis of quasi-delict (culpa aquilina), moral damages
3(m), 1989 Rules on Evidence) erases, in the absence of evidence to the is likewise available to plaintiffs pursuant to Article
contrary, any suspicions that the police investigator just invented the skid 2219 also of the New Civil Code (Rollo, pp. 113-114).
marks indicated in his report. In addition, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate
Granting, however, that the skid marks in the questioned sketch were results of defendant's wrongful acts or omission as in this case (Banson
inaccurate, nonetheless, the finding of the Court of Appeals that the vs. CA, 175 SCRA 297 [1989]).
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the Court of Private respondents appealed the decision, attributing as errors of the trial
Appeals is AFFIRMED, with costs against petitioners. court its findings that: (1) the proximate cause of the fall of the counter was
SO ORDERED. ZHIENETH's misbehavior; (2) CRISELDA was negligent in her care of
ZHIENETH; (3) petitioners were not negligent in the maintenance of the
G.R. No. 129792 December 21, 1999 counter; and (4) petitioners were not liable for the death of ZHIENETH.
JARCO MARKETING CORPORATION, LEONARDO KONG, JOSE Further, private respondents asserted that ZHIENETH should be entitled to
TIOPE and ELISA PANELO, petitioners, the conclusive presumption that a child below nine (9) years is incapable of
vs. contributory negligence. And even if ZHIENETH, at six (6) years old, was
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, CONRADO C. AGUILAR and already capable of contributory negligence, still it was physically
CRISELDA R. AGUILAR, respondents. impossible for her to have propped herself on the counter. She had a small
frame (four feet high and seventy pounds) and the counter was much
DAVIDE, JR., J.: higher and heavier than she was. Also, the testimony of one of the store's
In this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, former employees, Gerardo Gonzales, who accompanied ZHIENETH
petitioners seek the reversal of the 17 June 1996 decision 1 of the Court of when she was brought to the emergency room of the Makati Medical
Appeals in C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 and the resolution 2 denying their Center belied petitioners' theory that ZHIENETH climbed the counter.
motion for reconsideration. The assailed decision set aside the 15 January Gonzales claimed that when ZHIENETH was asked by the doctor what she
1992 judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Makati City, Branch 60 did, ZHIENETH replied, "[N]othing, I did not come near the counter and the
in Civil Case No. 7119 and ordered petitioners to pay damages and counter just fell on me." 9 Accordingly, Gonzales' testimony on
attorney's fees to private respondents Conrado and Criselda (CRISELDA) ZHIENETH's spontaneous declaration should not only be considered as
Aguilar. part ofres gestae but also accorded credit.
Petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation is the owner of Syvel's Department Moreover, negligence could not be imputed to CRISELDA for it was
Store, Makati City. Petitioners Leonardo Kong, Jose Tiope and Elisa reasonable for her to have let go of ZHIENETH at the precise moment that
Panelo are the store's branch manager, operations manager, and she was signing the credit card slip.
supervisor, respectively. Private respondents are spouses and the parents Finally, private respondents vigorously maintained that the proximate
of Zhieneth Aguilar (ZHIENETH). cause of ZHIENETH's death, was petitioners' negligence in failing to
In the afternoon of 9 May 1983, CRISELDA and ZHIENETH were at the institute measures to have the counter permanently nailed.
2nd floor of Syvel's Department Store, Makati City. CRISELDA was signing On the other hand, petitioners argued that private respondents raised
her credit card slip at the payment and verification counter when she felt a purely factual issues which could no longer be disturbed. They explained
sudden gust of wind and heard a loud thud. She looked behind her. She that ZHIENETH's death while unfortunate and tragic, was an accident for
then beheld her daughter ZHIENETH on the floor, her young body pinned which neither CRISELDA nor even ZHIENETH could entirely be held
by the bulk of the store's gift-wrapping counter/structure. ZHIENETH was faultless and blameless. Further, petitioners adverted to the trial court's
crying and screaming for help. Although shocked, CRISELDA was quick to rejection of Gonzales' testimony as unworthy of credence.
ask the assistance of the people around in lifting the counter and retrieving As to private respondent's claim that the counter should have been nailed
ZHIENETH from the floor. 3 to the ground, petitioners justified that it was not necessary. The counter
ZHIENETH was quickly rushed to the Makati Medical Center where she had been in existence for several years without any prior accident and was
was operated on. The next day ZHIENETH lost her speech and thereafter deliberately placed at a corner to avoid such accidents. Truth to tell, they
communicated with CRISELDA by writing on a magic slate. The injuries acted without fault or negligence for they had exercised due diligence on
she sustained took their toil on her young body. She died fourteen (14) the matter. In fact, the criminal case 10 for homicide through simple
days after the accident or on 22 May 1983, on the hospital bed. She was negligence filed by private respondents against the individual petitioners
six years old. 4 was dismissed; a verdict of acquittal was rendered in their favor.
The cause of her death was attributed to the injuries she sustained. The The Court of Appeals, however, decided in favor of private respondents
provisional medical certificate 5 issued by ZHIENETH's attending doctor and reversed the appealed judgment. It found that petitioners were
described the extent of her injuries: negligent in maintaining a structurally dangerous counter. The counter was
Diagnoses: shaped like an inverted "L" 11 with a top wider than the base. It was top
1. Shock, severe, sec. to intra-abdominal injuries due heavy and the weight of the upper portion was neither evenly distributed
to blunt injury nor supported by its narrow base. Thus, the counter was defective,
2. Hemorrhage, massive, intraperitoneal sec. to unstable and dangerous; a downward pressure on the overhanging portion
laceration, (L) lobe liver or a push from the front could cause the counter to fall. Two former
3. Rupture, stomach, anterior & posterior walls employees of petitioners had already previously brought to the attention of
4. Complete transection, 4th position, duodenum the management the danger the counter could cause. But the latter
5. Hematoma, extensive, retroperitoneal ignored their concern. The Court of Appeals faulted the petitioners for this
6. Contusion, lungs, severe omission, and concluded that the incident that befell ZHIENETH could
CRITICAL have been avoided had petitioners repaired the defective counter. It was
After the burial of their daughter, private respondents demanded upon inconsequential that the counter had been in use for some time without a
petitioners the reimbursement of the hospitalization, medical bills and wake prior incident.
and funeral expenses 6 which they had incurred. Petitioners refused to The Court of Appeals declared that ZHIENETH, who was below seven (7)
pay. Consequently, private respondents filed a complaint for damages, years old at the time of the incident, was absolutely incapable of
docketed as Civil Case No. 7119 wherein they sought the payment of negligence or other tort. It reasoned that since a child under nine (9) years
P157,522.86 for actual damages, P300,000 for moral damages, P20,000 could not be held liable even for an intentional wrong, then the six-year old
for attorney's fees and an unspecified amount for loss of income and ZHIENETH could not be made to account for a mere mischief or reckless
exemplary damages. act. It also absolved CRISELDA of any negligence, finding nothing wrong
In their answer with counterclaim, petitioners denied any liability for the or out of the ordinary in momentarily allowing ZHIENETH to walk while she
injuries and consequent death of ZHIENETH. They claimed that signed the document at the nearby counter.
CRISELDA was negligent in exercising care and diligence over her The Court of Appeals also rejected the testimonies of the witnesses of
daughter by allowing her to freely roam around in a store filled with petitioners. It found them biased and prejudiced. It instead gave credit to
glassware and appliances. ZHIENETH too, was guilty of contributory the testimony of disinterested witness Gonzales. The Court of Appeals
negligence since she climbed the counter, triggering its eventual collapse then awarded P99,420.86 as actual damages, the amount representing the
on her. Petitioners also emphasized that the counter was made of sturdy hospitalization expenses incurred by private respondents as evidenced by
wood with a strong support; it never fell nor collapsed for the past fifteen the hospital's statement of account. 12 It denied an award for funeral
years since its construction. expenses for lack of proof to substantiate the same. Instead, a
Additionally, petitioner Jarco Marketing Corporation maintained that it compensatory damage of P50,000 was awarded for the death of
observed the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection, ZHIENETH.
supervision and control of its employees. The other petitioners likewise We quote the dispositive portion of the assailed decision, 13 thus:
raised due care and diligence in the performance of their duties and WHEREFORE, premises considered, the judgment of
countered that the complaint was malicious for which they suffered the lower court is SET ASIDE and another one is
besmirched reputation and mental anguish. They sought the dismissal of entered against [petitioners], ordering them to pay
the complaint and an award of moral and exemplary damages and jointly and severally unto [private respondents] the
attorney's fees in their favor. following:
In its decision 7 the trial court dismissed the complaint and counterclaim 1. P50,000.00 by way of compensatory
after finding that the preponderance of the evidence favored petitioners. It damages for the death of Zhieneth Aguilar,
ruled that the proximate cause of the fall of the counter on ZHIENETH was with legal interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April
her act of clinging to it. It believed petitioners' witnesses who testified that 1984;
ZHIENETH clung to the counter, afterwhich the structure and the girl fell 2. P99,420.86 as reimbursement for
with the structure falling on top of her, pinning her stomach. In contrast, hospitalization expenses incurred; with legal
none of private respondents' witnesses testified on how the counter fell. interest (6% p.a.) from 27 April 1984;
The trial court also held that CRISELDA's negligence contributed to 3. P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
ZHIENETH's accident. damages;
In absolving petitioners from any liability, the trial court reasoned that the 4. P20,000.00 in the concept of attorney's
counter was situated at the end or corner of the 2nd floor as a fees; and
precautionary measure hence, it could not be considered as an attractive 5. Costs.
nuisance. 8The counter was higher than ZHIENETH. It has been in Private respondents sought a reconsideration of the decision but the same
existence for fifteen years. Its structure was safe and well-balanced. was denied in the Court of Appeals' resolution 14 of 16 July 1997.
ZHIENETH, therefore, had noBUSINESS climbing on and clinging to it.
Petitioners now seek the reversal of the Court of Appeals' decision and the life. We therefore accord credence to Gonzales' testimony on the
reinstatement of the judgment of the trial court. Petitioners primarily argue matter, i.e., ZHIENETH performed no act that facilitated her tragic death.
that the Court of Appeals erred in disregarding the factual findings and Sadly, petitioners did, through their negligence or omission to secure or
conclusions of the trial court. They stress that since the action was based make stable the counter's base.
on tort, any finding of negligence on the part of the private respondents Gonzales' earlier testimony on petitioners' insistence to keep and maintain
would necessarily negate their claim for damages, where said negligence the structurally unstable gift-wrapping counter proved their negligence,
was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. The injury in the instant thus:
case was the death of ZHIENETH. The proximate cause was ZHIENETH's Q When you assumed the position as gift wrapper at
act of clinging to the counter. This act in turn caused the counter to fall on the second floor, will you please describe the gift
her. This and CRISELDA's contributory negligence, through her failure to wrapping counter, were you able to examine?
provide the proper care and attention to her child while inside the store, A Because every morning before I start working I used
nullified private respondents' claim for damages. It is also for these to clean that counter and since not nailed and it was
reasons that parents are made accountable for the damage or injury only standing on the floor, it was shaky.
inflicted on others by their minor children. Under these circumstances, xxx xxx xxx
petitioners could not be held responsible for the accident that befell Q Will you please describe the counter at 5:00 o'clock
ZHIENETH. [sic] in the afternoon on [sic] May 9 1983?
Petitioners also assail the credibility of Gonzales who was already A At that hour on May 9, 1983, that counter was
separated from Syvel's at the time he testified; hence, his testimony might standing beside the verification counter. And since the
have been tarnished by ill-feelings against them. top of it was heavy and considering that it was not
For their part, private respondents principally reiterated their arguments nailed, it can collapse at anytime, since the top is
that neither ZHIENETH nor CRISELDA was negligent at any time while heavy.
inside the store; the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals are xxx xxx xxx
substantiated by the evidence on record; the testimony of Gonzales, who Q And what did you do?
heard ZHIENETH comment on the incident while she was in the hospital's A I informed Mr. Maat about that counter which is [sic]
emergency room should receive credence; and finally, ZHIENETH's part of shaky and since Mr. Maat is fond of putting display
the res gestae declaration "that she did nothing to cause the heavy decorations on tables, he even told me that I would
structure to fall on her" should be considered as the correct version of the put some decorations. But since I told him that it not
gruesome events. [sic] nailed and it is shaky he told me "better inform
We deny the petition. also the company about it." And since the company
The two issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the death of ZHIENETH did not do anything about the counter, so I also did not
was accidental or attributable to negligence; and (2) in case of a finding of do anything about the counter. 24 [Emphasis supplied]
negligence, whether the same was attributable to private respondents for Ramon Guevarra, another former employee, corroborated the testimony of
maintaining a defective counter or to CRISELDA and ZHIENETH for failing Gonzales, thus:
to exercise due and reasonable care while inside the store premises. Q Will you please described [sic] to the honorable
An accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or Court the counter where you were assigned in
negligence attaches to the defendant. 15 It is "a fortuitous circumstance, January 1983?
event or happening; an event happening without any human agency, or if xxx xxx xxx
happening wholly or partly through human agency, an event which under A That counter assigned to me was when my
the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it supervisor ordered me to carry that counter to another
happens." 16 place. I told him that the counter needs nailing and it
On the other hand, negligence is the omission to do something which a has to be nailed because it might cause injury or
reasonable man, guided by those considerations which ordinarily regulate accident to another since it was shaky.
the conduct of human affairs, would do, or the doing of something which a Q When that gift wrapping counter was transferred at
prudent and reasonable man would not do. 17 Negligence is "the failure to the second floor on February 12, 1983, will you please
observe, for the protection of the interest of another person, that degree of describe that to the honorable Court?
care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, A I told her that the counter wrapper [sic] is really in
whereby such other person suffers injury." 18 good [sic] condition; it was shaky. I told her that we
Accident and negligence are intrinsically contradictory; one cannot exist had to nail it.
with the other. Accident occurs when the person concerned is exercising Q When you said she, to whom are you referring to
ordinary care, which is not caused by fault of any person and which could [sic]?
not have been prevented by any means suggested by common A I am referring to Ms. Panelo, sir.
prudence. 19 Q And what was the answer of Ms. Panelo when you
The test in determining the existence of negligence is enunciated in the told her that the counter was shaky?
landmark case of Plicart v. Smith, 20 thus: Did the defendant in doing the A She told me "Why do you have to teach me. You
alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an are only my subordinate and you are to teach me?"
ordinarily prudent person would have used in the same situation? If not, And she even got angry at me when I told her that.
then he is guilty of negligence. 21 xxx xxx xxx
We rule that the tragedy which befell ZHIENETH was no accident and that Q From February 12, 1983 up to May 9, 1983, what if
ZHIENETH's death could only be attributed to negligence. any, did Ms. Panelo or any employee of the
We quote the testimony of Gerardo Gonzales who was at the scene of the management do to that (sic)
incident and accompanied CRISELDA and ZHIENETH to the hospital: xxx xxx xxx
Q While at the Makati Medical Center, did you hear or notice Witness:
anything while the child was being treated? None, sir. They never nailed the counter. They only
A At the emergency room we were all surrounding the child. And nailed the counter after the accident
when the doctor asked the child "what did you do," the child said happened. 25 [Emphasis supplied]
"nothing, I did not come near the counter and the counter just fell Without doubt, petitioner Panelo and another store supervisor were
on me." personally informed of the danger posed by the unstable counter. Yet,
Q (COURT TO ATTY. BELTRAN) neither initiated any concrete action to remedy the situation nor ensure the
You want the words in Tagalog to be translated? safety of the store's employees and patrons as a reasonable and ordinary
ATTY. BELTRAN prudent man would have done. Thus, as confronted by the situation
Yes, your Honor. petitioners miserably failed to discharge the due diligence required of a
COURT good father of a family.
Granted. Intercalate "wala po, hindi po ako lumapit doon. Basta On the issue of the credibility of Gonzales and Guevarra, petitioners failed
bumagsak." 22 to establish that the former's testimonies were biased and tainted with
This testimony of Gonzales pertaining to ZHIENETH's statement formed partiality. Therefore, the allegation that Gonzales and Guevarra's
(and should be admitted as) part of theres gestae under Section 42, Rule testimonies were blemished by "ill feelings" against petitioners — since
130 of the Rules of Court, thus: they (Gonzales and Guevarra) were already separated from the company
Part of res gestae. Statements made by a person at the time their testimonies were offered in court — was but mere
while a startling occurrence is taking place or speculation and deserved scant consideration.
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect It is settled that when the issue concerns the credibility of witnesses, the
to the circumstances thereof, may be given in appellate courts will not as a general rule disturb the findings of the trial
evidence as part of the res gestae. So, also, court, which is in a better position to determine the same. The trial court
statements accompanying an equivocal act material to has the distinct advantage of actually hearing the testimony of and
the issue, and giving it a legal significance, may be observing the deportment of the witnesses. 26However, the rule admits of
received as part of the res gestae. exceptions such as when its evaluation was reached arbitrarily or it
It is axiomatic that matters relating to declarations of pain or suffering and overlooked or failed to appreciate some facts or circumstances of weight
statements made to a physician are generally considered declarations and and substance which could affect the result of the case. 27 In the instant
admissions. 23 All that is required for their admissibility as part of the res case, petitioners failed to bring their claim within the exception.
gestaeis that they be made or uttered under the influence of a startling Anent the negligence imputed to ZHIENETH, we apply the conclusive
event before the declarant had the time to think and concoct a falsehood presumption that favors children below nine (9) years old in that they are
as witnessed by the person who testified in court. Under the circumstances incapable of contributory negligence. In his book, 28 former Judge Cezar S.
thus described, it is unthinkable for ZHIENETH, a child of such tender age Sangco stated:
and in extreme pain, to have lied to a doctor whom she trusted with her
 In our jurisdiction, a person under nine years of age is defendant Susulin. The vehicle was registered in the name of defendant
conclusively presumed to have acted without Novelo but was owned and/or operated as a passenger bus jointly by
discernment, and is, on that account, exempt from defendants Magtibay and Serrado, under a franchise, with a line from Naic,
criminal liability. The same presumption and a like Cavite, to Baclaran, Paranaque, Metro Manila, and vice versa, which
exemption from criminal liability obtains in a case of a Novelo sold to Magtibay on November 8, 1981, and which the latter
person over nine and under fifteen years of age, transferred to Serrado (Cerrado) on January 18, 1983.
unless it is shown that he has acted with discernment. Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck and the passenger bus
Since negligence may be a felony and aquasi- were approaching each other, coming from the opposite directions of the
delict and required discernment as a condition of highway. While the truck was still about 30 meters away, Susulin, the bus
liability, either criminal or civil, a child under nine years driver, saw the front wheels of the vehicle wiggling. He also observed that
of age is, by analogy, conclusively presumed to be the truck was heading towards his lane. Not minding this circumstance due
incapable of negligence; and that the presumption of to his belief that the driver of the truck was merely joking, Susulin shifted
lack of discernment or incapacity for negligence in the from fourth to third gear in order to give more power and speed to the bus,
case of a child over nine but under fifteen years of age which was ascending the inclined part of the road, in order to overtake or
is a rebuttable one, under our law. The rule, therefore, pass a Kubota hand tractor being pushed by a person along the shoulder
is that a child under nine years of age must be of the highway. While the bus was in the process of overtaking or passing
conclusively presumed incapable of contributory the hand tractor and the truck was approaching the bus, the two vehicles
negligence as a matter of law. [Emphasis supplied] sideswiped each other at each other's left side. After the impact, the truck
Even if we attribute contributory negligence to ZHIENETH and assume that skidded towards the other side of the road and landed on a nearby
she climbed over the counter, no injury should have occurred if we accept residential lot, hitting a coconut tree and felling it." (Rollo, pp. 48-50)
petitioners' theory that the counter was stable and sturdy. For if that was After a careful perusal of the circumstances of the case, the trial court
the truth, a frail six-year old could not have caused the counter to collapse. reached the conclusion "that the negligent acts of both drivers contributed
The physical analysis of the counter by both the trial court and Court of to or combined with each other in directly causing the accident which led to
Appeals and a scrutiny of the evidence 29 on record reveal otherwise, i.e., it the death of the aforementioned persons. It could not be determined from
was not durable after all. Shaped like an inverted "L," the counter was the evidence that it was only the negligent act of one of them which was
heavy, huge, and its top laden with formica. It protruded towards the the proximate cause of the collision. In view of this, the liability of the two
customer waiting area and its base was not secured. 30 drivers for their negligence must be solidary. (Rollo, pp. 50-51)
CRISELDA too, should be absolved from any contributory negligence. Accordingly, the trial court rendered a decision on March 7, 1986, the
Initially, ZHIENETH held on to CRISELDA's waist, later to the latter's dispositive portion is hereunder quoted as follows:
hand. 31 CRISELDA momentarily released the child's hand from her clutch WHEREFORE, defendants Valeriano Magtibay, Simplicio
when she signed her credit card slip. At this precise moment, it was Serrado, Ricardo Susulin, Efren Novelo, Federico del Pilar and
reasonable and usual for CRISELDA to let go of her child. Further, at the Edilberto Montesiano are hereby ordered to pay jointly and
time ZHIENETH was pinned down by the counter, she was just a foot severally to the plaintiffs, as follows:
away from her mother; and the gift-wrapping counter was just four meters 1. To plaintiffs Emma Adriano Bustamante and her minor
away from CRISELDA. 32 The time and distance were both significant. children, the sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of
ZHIENETH was near her mother and did not loiter as petitioners would Rogelio Bustamante; U.S. $127,680.00 as indemnity for the loss
want to impress upon us. She even admitted to the doctor who treated her of the earning capacity of the said deceased, at its prevailing
at the hospital that she did not do anything; the counter just fell on her. rate in pesos at the time this decision shall have become final
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the instant petition is DENIED and executory; P10,000.00 as moral damages; and P5,000.00
and the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 17 June 1996 in as exemplary damages;
C.A. G.R. No. CV 37937 is hereby AFFIRMED. 2. To plaintiffs Salvador and Patria Jocson, the sum of
Costs against petitioners. P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their daughter, Maria
SO ORDERED. Corazon Jocson; P10,000.00 as moral damages; and P5,000.00
as exemplary damages;
G.R. No. 89880 February 6, 1991 3. To plaintiffs Jose and Enriqueta Ramos, the sum of
EMMA ADRIANO BUSTAMANTE, in her own behalf as Guardian-Ad- P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their daughter, Jolet
Litem of minors: ROSSEL, GLORIA, YOLANDA, ERIC SON and Ramos; P10,000.00 as moral damages; and P5,000.00 as
EDERIC, all surnamed BUSTAMANTE, Spouses SALVADOR JOCSON exemplary damages; and
and PATRIA BONE-JOCSON, Spouses JOSE RAMOS and 4. To plaintiffs Narciso and Adoracion Himaya, the amount of
ENRIQUETA CEBU-RAMOS, Spouses NARCISO-HIMAYA and P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son, Enrico
ADORACION MARQUEZ-HIMAYA, and Spouses JOSE BERSAMINA Himaya, P10,000.00 as moral damages; and P5,000.00 as
and MA. COMMEMORACION PEREA-BUSTAMANTE, petitioners, exemplary damages; and
vs. 5. To plaintiffs Jose and Ma. Commemoracion Bersamina, the
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, FEDERICO DEL PILAR AND sum of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of their son, Noel
EDILBERTO MONTESIANO,respondents. Bersamina, P10,000.00 as moral damages and P5,000.00 as
Dolorfino and Dominguez Law Offices for petitioners. exemplary damages.
J.C. Baldoz & Associates for private respondents. The defendants are also required to pay the plaintiffs the sum of
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and to pay the costs of the suit.
The cross-claim of defendant Novelo is hereby allowed, and
MEDIALDEA, J.: defendants Magtibay and Serrado, the actual owners and/or
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the operators of the passenger bus concerned, are hereby ordered
decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated February 15, 1989 to indemnify Novelo in such amount as he may be required to
which reversed and set aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court of pay as damages to the plaintiffs.
Cavite, Branch XV ordering the defendants to pay jointly and severally the The cross-claims and counter-claims of the other defendants are
plaintiffs indemnity for death and damages; and in further dismissing the hereby dismissed for lack of merit.
complaint insofar as defendants-appellants Federico del Pilar and SO ORDERED. (pp. 55-57, Rollo)
Edilberto Montesiano are concerned; and its resolution dated August 17, From said decision, only defendants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto
1989 denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Montesiano, owner and driver, respectively, of the sand and gravel truck
The facts giving rise to the controversy at bar are recounted by the trial have interposed an appeal before the respondent Court of Appeals. The
court as follows: Court of Appeals decided the appeal on a different light. It rendered
At about 6:30 in the morning of April 20, 1983, a collision judgment on February 15, 1989, to wit:
occurred between a gravel and sand truck, with Plate No. DAP WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby REVERSED
717, and a Mazda passenger bus with Motor No. Y2231 and and SET ASIDE and the complaint dismissed insofar as
Plate No. DVT 259 along the national road at Calibuyo, Tanza, defendants-appellants Federico del Pilar and Edilberto
Cavite. The front left side portion (barandilla) of the body of the Montesiano are concerned. No costs in this instance.
truck sideswiped the left side wall of the passenger bus, ripping SO ORDERED. (p. 96, Rollo)
off the said wall from the driver's seat to the last rear seat. On March 9, 1989, the plaintiffs-appellees filed a motion for
Due to the impact, several passengers of the bus were thrown reconsideration of the aforementioned Court of Appeals' decision.
out and died as a result of the injuries they sustained, Among However, respondent Court of Appeals in a resolution dated August 17,
those killed were the following: 1989 denied the motion for lack of merit. Hence, this petition.
1. Rogelio Bustamante, 40, husband of plaintiff Emma Adriano Petitioners raised the following questions of law, namely:
Bustamante and father of plaintiffs Rossel, Gloria, Yolanda, First. Whether the respondent Court can legally and validly
Ericson, and Ederic, all surnamed Bustamante; absolve defendants-appellants from liability despite its own
2. Maria Corazon Jocson, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses finding, as well as that of the trial court that defendant-appellant
Salvador and Patria Jocson; Edilberto Montesiano, the cargo truck driver, was driving an old
3. Jolet C. Ramos, 16, daughter of plaintiffs spouses Jose and vehicle very fast, with its wheels already wiggling, such that he
Enriqueta Ramos; had no more control of his truck.
4. Enrico Himaya, 18, son of plaintiffs spouses Narciso and Second. Whether the respondent court can validly and legally
Adoracion Himaya; and disregard the findings of fact made by the trial court which was in
5. Noel Bersamina, 17, son of plaintiffs spouses Jose and Ma. a better position to observe the conduct and demeanor of the
Commemoracion Bersamina. (Rollo, p. 48) witnesses, particularly appellant Edilberto Montesiano, cargo
During the incident, the cargo truck was driven by defendant Montesiano truck driver, and which conclusively found appellant Montesiano
and owned by defendant Del Pilar; while the passenger bus was driven by
 as jointly and severally negligent in driving his truck very fast and chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the
had lost control of his truck. negligent acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed to the
Third. Whether the respondent court has properly and legally opponent is considered in law solely responsible for the consequences of
applied the doctrine of "last clear chance" in the present case the accident. (Sangco,Torts and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165).
despite its own finding that appellant cargo truck driver Edilberto The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent defendant is held
Montesiano was admittedly negligent in driving his cargo truck liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even to a plaintiff who has been grossly
very fast on a descending road and in the presence of the bus negligent in placing himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiffs peril, or
driver coming from the opposite direction. according to some authorities, should have been aware of it in the
Fourth. Whether the respondent court has applied the correct reasonable exercise of due case, had in fact an opportunity later than that
law and the correct doctrine so as to reverse and set aside the of the plaintiff to avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799).
judgment with respect to defendants-appellants. (Rollo, pp. 133- In the recent case of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. v. Intermediate
134) Appellate Court, et al. (G.R. Nos. 66102-04, August 30, 1990), the
As a rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive Court citing the landmark decision held in the case of Anuran, et al. v.
and cannot be reviewed on appeal, provided, they are borne out by the Buno, et al. (123 Phil. 1073) ruled that the principle of "last clear chance"
record or are based on substantial evidence However, this rule admits of applies "in a suit between the owners and drivers of colliding vehicles. It
certain exceptions, as when the findings of facts are conclusions without does not arise where a passenger demands responsibility from the carrier
citation of specific evidence on which they are based; or the appellate to enforce its contractual obligations. For it would be inequitable to exempt
court's findings are contrary to those of the trial court. (Sese v. the negligent driver of the jeepney and its owners on the ground that the
Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. 66168, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 585). other driver was likewise guilty of negligence."
Furthermore, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review Furthermore, "as between defendants: The doctrine cannot be extended
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. The jurisdiction into the field of joint tortfeasors as a test of whether only one of them
of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals is should be held liable to the injured person by reason of his discovery of the
limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to it, its findings latter's peril, and it cannot be invoked as between defendants concurrently
of fact being conclusive. It is not the function of the Supreme Court to negligent. As against third persons, a negligent actor cannot defend by
analyze or weigh such evidence all over again, its jurisdiction being limited pleading that another had negligently failed to take action which could
to reviewing errors of law that might have been committed. Barring, have avoided the injury." (57 Am. Jur. 2d, pp. 806-807).
therefore, a showing that the findings complained of are totally devoid of All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the respondent Court
support in the records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to committed an error of law in applying the doctrine of last clear chance as
constitute serious abuse of discretion, such findings must stand for the between the defendants, since the case at bar is not a suit between the
Supreme Court is not expected or required to examine or contrast the oral owners and drivers of the colliding vehicles but a suit brought by the heirs
and documentary evidence submitted by the parties. (Andres v. of the deceased passengers against both owners and drivers of the
Manufacturers Hanover and Trust Corp., G.R. 82670, 15 September 1989, colliding vehicles. Therefore, the respondent court erred in absolving the
177 SCRA 618). owner and driver of the cargo truck from liability.
Bearing in mind these basic principles, We have opted to re-examine the Pursuant to the new policy of this Court to grant an increased death
findings of fact mainly because the appellate court's findings are contrary indemnity to the heirs of the deceased, their respective awards of
to those of the trial court. P30,000.00 are hereby increased to P50,000.00.
The trial court, in declaring that the negligent acts of both drivers directly ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED; the appealed judgment and
caused the accident which led to the death of the aforementioned persons, resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
considered the following: and the judgment of the lower court is REINSTATED with the modification
It was negligent on the part of driver Montesiano to have driven on the indemnity for death of each of the victims which is hereby increased
his truck fast, considering that it was an old vehicle, being a to P50,000.00 each. No pronouncement as to costs.
1947 model as admitted by its owner, defendant Del Pilar; that SO ORDERED.
its front wheels were wiggling; that the road was descending;
and that there was a passenger bus approaching it. Likewise, G.R. No. L-68102 July 16, 1992
driver Susulin was also guilty of negligence in not taking the GEORGE MCKEE and ARACELI KOH MCKEE, petitioners,
necessary precaution to avoid the collision, in the light of his vs.
admission that, at a distance of 30 meters, he already saw the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
front wheels of the truck wiggling and that the vehicle was ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
usurping his lane coming towards his direction. Had he G.R. No. L-68103 July 16, 1992
exercised ordinary prudence, he could have stopped his bus or CARMEN DAYRIT KOH, LETICIA KOH, JULIETA KOH TUQUERO,
swerved it to the side of the road even down to its shoulder. And ARACELI KOH MCKEE, ANTONIO KOH and ELIZABETH KOH
yet, Susulin shifted to third gear so as to, as claimed by him, TURLA, petitioners,
give more power and speed to his bus in overtaking or passing a vs.
hand tractor which was being pushed along the shoulder of the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, JAIME TAYAG and
road. (Rollo, p. 50) ROSALINDA MANALO, respondents.
The respondent Court of Appeals ruling on the contrary, opined that "the
bus driver had the last clear chance to avoid the collision and his reckless DAVIDE, JR., J.:
negligence in proceeding to overtake the hand tractor was the proximate Petitioners urge this Court to review and reverse the Resolution of the
cause of the collision." (Rollo, p. 95). Said court also noted that "the record Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41, promulgated on 3 April
also discloses that the bus driver was not a competent and responsible 1984, which set aside its previous Decision dated 29 November 1983
driver. His driver's license was confiscated for a traffic violation on April 17, reversing the Decision of the trial court which dismissed petitioners'
1983 and he was using a ticket for said traffic violation on the day of the complaints in Civil Case No. 4477 and Civil Case No. 4478 of the then
accident in question (pp. 16-18, TSN, July 23, 1984). He also admitted that Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pampanga entitled
he was not a regular driver of the bus that figured in the mishap and was "Carmen Dayrit Koh, Leticia Koh, Julieta Koh Tuquero, Araceli Koh McKee
not given any practical examination. (pp. 11, 96, TSN, supra)." (Rollo, p96) and Elizabeth Koh Turla vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda Manalo," and
The respondent Court quoting People v. Vender, CA-G.R. 11114-41-CR, "George McKee and Araceli Koh McKee vs. Jaime Tayag and Rosalinda
August 28, 1975 held that "We are not prepared to uphold the trial court's Manalo," respectively, and granted the private respondents' counterclaim
finding that the truck was running fast before the impact. The national road, for moral damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
from its direction, was descending. Courts can take judicial notice of the The said civil cases for damages based on quasi-delict were filed as a
fact that a motor vehicle going down or descending is more liable to get out result of a vehicular accident which led to the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh
of control than one that is going up or ascending for the simple reason that McKee and Loida Bondoc and caused physical injuries to George Koh
the one which is going down gains added momentum while that which is McKee, Christopher Koh McKee and petitioner Araceli Koh McKee.
going up loses its initial speeding in so doing." Petitioners in G.R. No. 68102, parents of the minors George Koh McKee,
On the other hand, the trial court found and We are convinced that the Christopher Koh McKee and the deceased Kim Koh McKee, were the
cargo truck was running fast. It did not overlook the fact that the road was plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478, while petitioner Carmen Dayrit Koh and
descending as in fact it mentioned this circumstance as one of the factors her co-petitioners in G.R. No. 68103, who are the wife and children,
disregarded by the cargo truck driver along with the fact that he was respectively, of the late Jose Koh, were the plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
driving an old 1947 cargo truck whose front wheels are already wiggling 4477. Upon the other hand, private respondents are the owners of the
and the fact that there is a passenger bus approaching it. In holding that cargo truck which figured in the mishap; a certain Ruben Galang was the
the driver of the cargo truck was negligent, the trial court certainly took into driver of the truck at the time of the accident.
account all these factors so it was incorrect for the respondent court to The antecedent facts are not disputed.
disturb the factual findings of the trial court, which is in a better position to Between nine and ten o'clock in the morning of 8 January 1977, in Pulong
decide the question, having heard the witness themselves and observed Pulo Bridge along MacArthur Highway, between Angeles City and San
their deportment. Fernando, Pampanga, a head-on-collision took place between an
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last clear chance." The International cargo truck, Loadstar, with Plate No. RF912-T Philippines '76
doctrine, stated broadly, is that the negligence of the plaintiff does not owned by private respondents, and driven by Ruben Galang, and a Ford
preclude a recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it appears Escort car bearing Plate No. S2-850 Pampanga '76 driven by Jose Koh.
that the defendant, by exercising reasonable care and prudence, might The collision resulted in the deaths of Jose Koh, Kim Koh McKee and
have avoided injurious consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the Loida Bondoc, and physical injuries to George Koh McKee, Christopher
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of last clear chance Koh McKee and Araceli Koh McKee, all passengers of the Ford Escort.
means that even though a person's own acts may have placed him in a Jose Koh was the father of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee, the mother of
position of peril, and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to minors George, Christopher and Kim Koh McKee. Loida Bondoc, on the
recovery. As the doctrine is usually stated, a person who has the last clear other hand, was the baby sitter of one and a half year old Kim. At the time
of the collision, Kim was seated on the lap of Loida Bondoc who was at the reconsider the order denying the motion for consolidation, 10 which Judge
front passenger's seat of the car while Araceli and her two (2) sons were Capulong granted in the Order of 5 September 1978; he then directed that
seated at the car's back seat. Civil Case No. 4478 be consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 in Branch III
Immediately before the collision, the cargo truck, which was loaded with of the court then presided over by Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr.
two hundred (200) cavans of rice weighing about 10,000 kilos, was Left then with Branch V of the trial court was Criminal Case No. 3751.
traveling southward from Angeles City to San Fernando Pampanga, and In the civil cases, the plaintiffs presented as witnesses Araceli Koh McKee,
was bound for Manila. The Ford Escort, on the other hand, was on its way Fernando Nuñag, Col. Robert Fitzgerald, Primitivo Parel, Eugenio
to Angeles City from San Fernando. When the northbound car was about Tanhueco, Carmen Koh and Antonio Koh, 11 and offered several
(10) meters away from the southern approach of the bridge, two (2) boys documentary exhibits. Upon the other hand, private respondents presented
suddenly darted from the right side of the road and into the lane of the car. as witnesses Ruben Galang, Zenaida Soliman, Jaime Tayag and Roman
The boys were moving back and forth, unsure of whether to cross all the Dayrit. 12
way to the other side or turn back. Jose Koh blew the horn of the car, In the criminal case, the prosecution presented as witnesses Mrs. Araceli
swerved to the left and entered the lane of the truck; he then switched on McKee, Salud Samia, Pfc. Fernando Nuñag, Dr. Ramon Panlilio, Dr.
the headlights of the car, applied the brakes and thereafter attempted to Robert Fitzgerald, Dr. Roberto Yuson, Dr. Hector, Ulanday, Pfc. Benigno
return to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck. de Leon, Marina Bolos, Primitivo Parel, Rogelio Pineda, Benito Caraan
The collision occurred in the lane of the truck, which was the opposite lane, and Eugenio Tanhueco, and offered several documentary exhibits. 13 Upon
on the said bridge. the other hand, the defense presented the accused Ruben Galang,
The incident was immediately reported to the police station in Angeles Luciano Punzalan, Zenaida Soliman and Roman Dayrit, and offered
City; consequently, a team of police officers was forthwith dispatched to documentary exhibits. 14
conduct an on the spot investigation. In the sketch 1 prepared by the On 1 October 1980, Judge Capulong rendered a decision against the
investigating officers, the bridge is described to be sixty (60) "footsteps" accused Ruben Galang in the aforesaid criminal case. The dispositive
long and fourteen (14) "footsteps" wide — seven (7) "footsteps" from the portion of the decision reads as follows:
center line to the inner edge of the side walk on both sides. 2 Pulong Pulo WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is
Bridge, which spans a dry brook, is made of concrete with soft shoulders hereby rendered finding the accused Ruben Galang
and concrete railings on both sides about three (3) feet high. guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged
The sketch of the investigating officer discloses that the right rear portion in the information and after applying the provisions of
of the cargo truck was two (2) "footsteps" from the edge of the right Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code and
sidewalk, while its left front portion was touching the center line of the indeterminate sentence law, this Court, imposes upon
bridge, with the smashed front side of the car resting on its front bumper. said accused Ruben Galang the penalty of six (6)
The truck was about sixteen (16) "footsteps" away from the northern end of months of arresto mayor as minimum to two (2) years,
the bridge while the car was about thirty-six (36) "footsteps" from the four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
opposite end. Skid marks produced by the right front tire of the truck correccional as maximum; the accused is further
measured nine (9) "footsteps", while skid marks produced by the left front sentenced to pay and indemnify the heirs of Loida
tire measured five (5) "footsteps." The two (2) rear tires of the truck, Bondoc the amount of P12,000.00 as indemnity for
however, produced no skid marks. her death; to reimburse the heirs of Loida Bondoc the
In his statement to the investigating police officers immediately after the amount of P2,000.00 representing the funeral
accident, Galang admitted that he was traveling at thirty (30) miles (48 expenses; to pay the heirs of Loida Bondoc the
kilometers) per hour. amount of P20,000.00 representing her loss of
As a consequence of the collision, two (2) cases, Civil Case No. 4477 and income; to indemnify and pay the heirs of the
No. 4478, were filed on 31 January 1977 before the then Court of First deceased Jose Koh the value of the car in the amount
Instance of Pampanga and were raffled to Branch III and Branch V of the of P53,910.95, and to pay the costs. 15
said court, respectively. In the first, herein petitioners in G.R. No. 68103 The aforecited decision was promulgated only on 17 November 1980; on
prayed for the award of P12,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Jose the same day, counsel for petitioners filed with Branch III of the court —
Koh, P150,000.00 as moral damages, P60,000.00 as exemplary damages, where the two (2) civil cases were pending — a manifestation to that effect
P10,000.00 for litigation expenses, P6,000.00 for burial expenses, and attached thereto a copy of the decision. 16
P3,650.00 for the burial lot and P9,500.00 for the tomb, plus attorney's Upon the other hand, Judge Mario Castañeda, Jr. dismissed the two (2)
fees. 3 In the second case, petitioners in G.R. No. 68102 prayed for the civil cases on 12 November 1980 and awarded the private respondents
following: (a) in connection with the death of Kim McKee, the sum of moral damages, exemplary damages and attorney's fees. 17 The
P12,000.00 as death benefit, P3,150.00 for funeral services, P3,650.00 for dispositive portion of the said decision reads as follows:
the cemetery lot, P3,000.00 for the tomb, P50,000.00 as moral damages, WHEREFORE, finding the preponderance of evidence
P10,000.00 as exemplary damages and P2,000.00 as miscellaneous to be in favor of the defendants and against the
damages; (b) in the case of Araceli Koh McKee, in connection with the plaintiffs, these cases are hereby ordered DISMISSED
serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of P100,000.00 as moral with costs against the plaintiffs. The defendants had
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages, P12,000.00 for loss of proven their counter-claim, thru evidences (sic)
earnings, P5,000.00 for the hospitalization expenses up to the date of the presented and unrebutted. Hence, they are hereby
filing of the complaint; and (c) with respect to George McKee, Jr., in awarded moral and exemplary damages in the amount
connection with the serious physical injuries suffered, the sum of of P100,000.00 plus attorney's fee of P15,000.00 and
P50,000.00 as moral damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and litigation expenses for (sic) P2,000.00. The actual
the following medical expenses: P3,400 payable to the Medical Center, damages claimed for (sic) by the defendants is (sic)
P3,500.00 payable to the St. Francis Medical Center, P5,175.00 payable to hereby dismissing for lack of proof to that effect
the Clark Air Base Hospital, and miscellaneous expenses amounting to (sic). 18
P5,000.00. They also sought an award of attorney's fees amounting to A copy of the decision was sent by registered mail to the petitioners on 28
25% of the total award plus traveling and hotel expenses, with costs. 4 November 1980 and was received on 2 December 1980. 19
On 1 March 1977, an Information charging Ruben Galang with the crime of Accused Ruben Galang appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court
"Reckless Imprudence Resulting to (sic) Multiple Homicide and Physical of Appeals. The appeal was docketed as C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR and
Injuries and Damage to Property" was filed with the trial court. It was was assigned to the court's Third Division. Plaintiffs in Civil Cases Nos.
docketed as Criminal Case No. 3751 and was raffled to Branch V of the 4477 and 4478 likewise separately appealed the 12 November 1980
court, the same Branch where Civil Case No. 4478 was assigned. 5 decision to the appellate court. The appeals were docketed as C.A.-G.R.
In their Answer with Counterclaim in Civil Case No. 4477, private No. 69041-R and C.A.-G.R. No. 69040-R, respectively, and were assigned
respondents asserted that it was the Ford Escort car which "invaded and to the Fourth Civil Cases Division.
bumped (sic) the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang and, as On 4 October 1982, the respondent Court promulgated its decision 20 in
counterclaim, prayed for the award of P15,000.00 as attorney's fees, C.A.-G.R. Blg. 24764-CR affirming the conviction of Galang. 21 The
P20,000.00 as actual and liquidated damages, P100,000.00 as moral dispositive portion of the decision reads:
damages and P30,000.00 as business losses. 6 In Civil Case No. 4478, DAHIL DITO, ang hatol na paksa ng naritong
private respondents first filed a motion to dismiss on grounds of pendency paghahabol ay Aming pinagtitibay sa kanyang
of another action (Civil Case No. 4477) and failure to implead an kabuuan. Ang naghahabol pa rin ang pinagbabayad
indispensable party, Ruben Galang, the truck driver; they also filed a ng gugol ng paghahabol.
motion to consolidate the case with Civil Case No. 4477 pending before A motion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the respondent
Branch III of the same court, which was opposed by the plaintiffs. 7 Both Court in its Kapasiyahan promulgated on 25 November 1982. 22 A petition
motions were denied by Branch V, then presided over by Judge Ignacio for its review 23 was filed with this Court; said petition was subsequently
Capulong. Thereupon, private respondents filed their Answer with Counter- denied. A motion for its reconsideration was denied with finality in the
claim 8 wherein they alleged that Jose Koh was the person "at fault having Resolution of 20 April 1983. 24
approached the lane of the truck driven by Ruben Galang, . . . which was On 29 November 1983, respondent Court, by then known as the
on the right lane going towards Manila and at a moderate speed observing Intermediate Appellate Court, promulgated its consolidated decision in
all traffic rules and regulations applicable under the circumstances then A.C.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040 and 69041, 25 the dispositive portion of which
prevailing;" in their counterclaim, they prayed for an award of damages as reads:
may be determined by the court after due hearing, and the sums of WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from it hereby
P10,000.00 as attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as expenses of litigation. reversed and set aside and another one is rendered,
Petitioners filed their Answers to the Counterclaims in both cases. ordering defendants-appellees to pay plaintiffs-
To expedite the proceedings, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4478 filed on appellants as follows:
27 March 1978 a motion to adopt the testimonies of witnesses taken For the death of Jose Koh:
during the hearing of Criminal Case No. 3751, which private respondents P 50,000.00 as moral damages
opposed and which the court denied. 9 Petitioners subsequently moved to P 12,000.00 as death indemnity
 P 16,000.00 for the lot and tomb A After avoiding the two (2) boys,
(Exhs. U and U-1) the car tried to go back to the right
P 4,000.00 expenses for holding a lane since the truck is (sic)
wake (p. 9, tsn April 19, 1979) coming, my father stepped on the
P 950.00 for the casket (Exh. M) brakes and all what (sic) I heard is
P 375.00 for the vault services the sound of impact (sic), sir. (tsn,
(Exhs. V and V-1) pp. 5-6, July 22, 1977); or (Exhibit
For the death of Kim Koh McKee: "O" in these Civil Cases).
P 50,000.00 as moral damages xxx xxx xxx
P 12,000.00 as death indemnity Q Mrs. how did you know that the
P 1,000.00 for the purchase of the truck driven by the herein
burial lot (Exh. M) accused, Ruben Galang did not
P 950.00 for funeral services reduce its speed before the actual
(Exh. M-1) impact of collision (sic) as you
P 375.00 for vault services (Exhs. narrated in this Exhibit "1," how
V and V-1) did you know (sic)?
For the physical injuries suffered by George Koh A It just kept on coming, sir. If
McKee: only he reduced his speed, we
P 25,000.00 as moral damages could have got (sic) back to our
P 672.00 for Clark Field Hospital right lane on side (sic) of the
(Exh. E) highway, sir. (tsn. pp. 33-34 July
P 4,384.00 paid to Angeles 22, 1977) or (Exhibit "O" in these
Medical Clinic (Exhs. D, D-1 and Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31,
D-2) Appellants' Brief).
P 1,555.00 paid to St. Francis Plaintiffs' version was successfully corroborated to Our satisfaction by the
Medical Center (Exhs. B and B-1) following facts and circumstances:
For the physical injuries suffered by Araceli Koh 1. An impartial eye-witness to the mishap, Eugenio
McKee: Tanhueco, declared that the truck stopped only when
P 25,000.00 as moral damages it had already collided with the car:
P 1,055.00 paid to St. Francis xxx xxx xxx
Medical Center (Exhs. G and Tanhueco repeated the same testimony during the
G-1) hearing in the criminal case:
P 75.00 paid to St. Francis xxx xxx xxx
Medical Center (Exhs. G-2 and G- Tanhueco could (sic) not be tagged as an
3) accommodation witness because he was one of the
P 428.00 to Carmelite General first to arrive at the scene of the accident. As a matter
Hospital (Exh. F) of fact, he brought one of the injured passengers to
P 114.20 to Muñoz Clinic (Exh. the hospital.
MM) We are not prepared to accord faith and credit to
For the physical injuries suffered by Christopher Koh defendants' witnesses, Zenaida Soliman, a passenger
McKee: of the truck, and Roman Dayrit, who supposedly lived
P 10,000.00 as moral damages across the street.
P 1,231.10 to St. Francis Medical Regarding Soliman, experience has shown that in the
Center (Exhs. L and L-1) ordinary course of events people usually take the side
P 321.95 to F.C.E.A. Hospital of the person with whom they are associated at the
(Exhs. G and D-1) time of the accident, because, as a general rule, they
In addition, We award P10,000.00 as counsel (sic) do not wish to be identified with the person who was at
fees in Civil Case No. 4477 and another P10,000.00; fault. Thus an imaginary bond is unconsciously
as counsel (sic) fees in Civil Case No. 4478. created among the several persons within the same
No pronouncement as to costs. group (People vs. Vivencio, CA-G.R. No. 00310-CR,
SO ORDERED. 26 Jan. 31, 1962).
The decision is anchored principally on the respondent Court's findings With respect to Dayrit, We can not help suspecting
that it was Ruben Galang's inattentiveness or reckless imprudence which (sic) that he is an accommodation witness. He did not
caused the accident. The appellate court further said that the law go to the succor of the injured persons. He said he
presumes negligence on the part of the defendants (private respondents), wanted to call the police authorities about the mishap,
as employers of Galang, in the selection and supervision of the latter; it but his phone had no dial tone. Be this (sic) as it may,
was further asserted that these defendants did not allege in their Answers the trial court in the criminal case acted correctly in
the defense of having exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in refusing to believe Dayrit.
selecting and supervising the said employee. 27 This conclusion of reckless 2. Exhibit 2, the statement of Galang, does not include
imprudence is based on the following findings of fact: the claim that Galang stopped his truck at a safe
In the face of these diametrically opposed judicial distance from the car, according to plaintiffs (p. 25,
positions, the determinative issue in this appeal is Appellants' Brief). This contention of appellants was
posited in the fourth assigned error as follows: completely passed sub-silencio or was not refuted by
IV appellees in their brief. Exhibit 2 is one of the exhibits
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THE not included in the record. According to the Table of
(sic) DRIVER OF THE TRUCK STOPPED HIS Contents submitted by the court below, said Exhibit 2
TRUCK BLEW HIS HORN SWITCHED ON HIS was not submitted by defendants-appellees. In this
HEADLIGHTS AND COULD NOT SWERVE TO THE light, it is not far-fetched to surmise that Galang's
RIGHT. claim that he stopped was an eleventh-hour desperate
Supportive of plaintiffs' version, principal witness Araceli Koh McKee attempt to exculpate himself from imprisonment and
testified thus: damages.
Q What happened after that, as 3. Galang divulged that he stopped after seeing the
you approached the bridge? car about 10 meters away:
A When we were approaching the ATTY. SOTTO:
bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross Q Do I understand from your
the right lane on the right side of testimony that inspite of the fact
the highway going to San that you admitted that the road is
Fernando. My father, who is (sic) straight and you may be able to
the driver of the car tried to avoid (sic) see 500-1000 meters away
the two (2) boys who were from you any vehicle, you first
crossing, he blew his horn and saw that car only about ten (10)
swerved to the left to avoid hitting meters away from you for the first
the two (2) boys. We noticed the time?
truck, he switched on the xxx xxx xxx
headlights to warn the truck A I noticed it, sir, that it was about
driver, to slow down to give us the ten (10) meters away.
right of way to come back to our ATTY. SOTTO:
right lane. Q So, for clarification, you clarify
Q Did the truck slow down? and state under your oath that
A No, sir, it did not, just (sic) you have (sic) not noticed it
continued on its way. before that ten (10) meters? (Tsn.
Q What happened after that? 3 to 5, Sept. 18, 1979). (p. 16,
Appellants' Brief)
 Galang's testimony substantiate (sic) Tanhueco's . . . COMMITTED A PATENT ERROR AND GRAVELY
statement that Galang stopped only because of the ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING THE
impact. At ten (10) meters away, with the truck running FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH ARE
at 30 miles per hour, as revealed in Galang's affidavit CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND CONTRARY TO THE
(Exh. 2; p. 25, Appellants' brief), it is well-nigh EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE RECORDS, SPECIALLY
impossible to avoid a collision on a bridge. THEY (sic) ARE CONTRARY TO THE ADMITTED
5. Galang's truck stopped because of the collision, FACTS AND JUDICIAL ADMISSIONS MADE BY THE
and not because he waited for Jose Koh to return to PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' DRIVER.
his proper lane. The police investigator, Pfc. Fernando VI
L. Nuñag, stated that he found skid marks under the . . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED
truck but there were not (sic) skid marks behind the GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY
truck (pp. 19-20, t.s.n., Nov. 3, 1978). The presence of ERRED WHEN IT AWARDED DAMAGES TO THE
skid marks show (sic) that the truck was speeding. PRIVATE RESPONDENTS WHEN SAID AWARD IS
Since the skid marks were found under the truck and NOT SUPPORTED BY EVIDENCE, IN THE
none were found at the rear of the truck, the RECORDS, AND SAID AWARD IS NOT ALLOWED
reasonable conclusion is that the skid marks under the BY LAW AND THE CONSISTENT DECISIONS OF
truck were caused by the truck's front wheels when THIS HONORABLE COURT.
the trucks (sic) suddenly stopped seconds before the VII
mishap in an endeavor to avoid the same. But, as . . . EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION, COMMITTED
aforesaid, Galang saw the car at barely 10 meters GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND GRAVELY
away, a very short distance to avoid a collision, and in ERRED WHEN IT ERRONEOUSLY SET ASIDE ITS
his futile endeavor to avoid the collision he abruptly DECISION AWARDING DAMAGES TO
stepped on his brakes but the smashup happened just PETITIONERS WHICH IS CLEARLY IN
the same. ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE, THE LAW
For the inattentiveness or reckless imprudence of AND JURISPRUDENCE RELATIVE TO THE AWARD
Galang, the law presumes negligence on the part of OF DAMAGES. 31
the defendants in the selection of their driver or in the In the Resolution of 12 September 1984, We required private respondents
supervision over him. Appellees did not allege such to Comment on the petition. 32 After the said Comment 33 was filed,
defense of having exercised the duties of a good petitioners submitted a Reply 34 thereto; this Court then gave due course to
father of a family in the selection and supervision of the instant petitions and required petitioners to file their Brief, 35 which they
their employees in their answers. They did not even accordingly complied with.
adduce evidence that they did in fact have methods of There is merit in the petition. Before We take on the main task of
selection and programs of supervision. The dissecting the arguments and counter-arguments, some observations on
inattentiveness or negligence of Galang was the the procedural vicissitudes of these cases are in order.
proximate cause of the mishap. If Galang's attention Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478, which were for the recovery of civil
was on the highway, he would have sighted the car liability arising from a quasi-delict under Article 2176 in relation to Article
earlier or at a very safe distance than (sic) 10 meters. 2180 of the Civil Code, were filed ahead of Criminal Case No. 3751. Civil
He proceeded to cross the bridge, and tried to stop Case No. 4478 was eventually consolidated with Civil Case No. 4477 for
when a collision was already inevitable, because at joint trial in Branch III of the trial court. The records do not indicate any
the time that he entered the bridge his attention was attempt on the part of the parties, and it may therefore be reasonably
not riveted to the road in front of him. concluded that none was made, to consolidate Criminal Case No. 3751
On the question of damages, the claims of appellants with the civil cases, or vice-versa. The parties may have then believed, and
were amply proven, but the items must be reduced. 28 understandably so, since by then no specific provision of law or ruling of
A motion for reconsideration alleging improper appreciation of the facts this Court expressly allowed such a consolidation, that an independent civil
was subsequently filed by private respondents on the basis of which the action, authorized under Article 33 in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil
respondent Court, in its Resolution of 3 April 1984, 29 reconsidered and set Code, such as the civil cases in this case, cannot be consolidated with the
aside its 29 November 1983 decision and affirmed in toto the trial court's criminal case. Indeed, such consolidation could have been farthest from
judgment of 12 November 1980. A motion to reconsider this Resolution their minds as Article 33 itself expressly provides that the "civil action shall
was denied by the respondent Court on 4 July 1984. 30 proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a
Hence, this petition. preponderance of evidence." Be that as it may, there was then no legal
Petitioners allege that respondent Court: impediment against such consolidation. Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of
I Court, which seeks to avoid a multiplicity of suits, guard against oppression
. . . COMMITTED A VERY SERIOUS AND GRAVE and abuse, prevent delays, clear congested dockets to simplify the work of
ERROR WHEN IT TOTALLY REVERSED ITS the trial court, or in short, attain justice with the least expense to the parties
DECISION BY MERELY BASING IT FROM (sic) A litigants, 36 would have easily sustained a consolidation, thereby preventing
MERE "PRESUMPTION," TOTALLY the unseeming, if no ludicrous, spectacle of two (2) judges appreciating,
DISREGARDING THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' according to their respective orientation, perception and perhaps even
DRIVER'S ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS, WHO prejudice, the same facts differently, and thereafter
EXCLUSIVELY COMMITTED THE PROXIMATE rendering conflicting decisions. Such was what happened in this case. It
CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT (sic), FURTHER, IT should not, hopefully, happen anymore. In the recent case of Cojuangco
ALSO DISREGARDED THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED vs. Court or Appeals, 37 this Court held that the present provisions of Rule
AND FOUND IN THE RECORDS; THEREFORE, 111 of the Revised Rules of Court allow a consolidation of an independent
RESPONDENT COURT'S RESOLUTIONS civil action for the recovery of civil liability authorized under Articles 32, 33,
(ANNEXES A and B, PETITION) ARE CLEARLY 34 or 2176 of the Civil Code with the criminal action subject, however, to
ERRONEOUS, PURELY BASED ON the condition that no final judgment has been rendered in that criminal
SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES AND WITHOUT case.
SURE FOUNDATION IN THE EVIDENCE. Let it be stressed, however, that the judgment in Criminal Case No. 3751
II finding Galang guilty of reckless imprudence, although already final by
. . . GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION AND virtue of the denial by no less than this Court of his last attempt to set
ERRED WHEN IN EFFECT IT DISREGARDED A aside the respondent Court's affirmance of the verdict of conviction, has no
DOCTRINE LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE relevance or importance to this case.
COURT BY STATING AMONG OTHERS, "IT As We held in Dionisio vs. Alvendia, 38 the responsibility arising from fault
CANNOT CATEGORICALLY ADOPT THE FINDINGS or negligence in a quasi-delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil
OF GUILT IN THE CRIMINAL CASE WHERE THE liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. And, as more
DRIVER OF THE TRUCK INVOLVED IN THE concretely stated in the concurring opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, "in the
ACCIDENT WAS INDICTED. case of independent civil actions under the new Civil Code, the result of
III the criminal case, whether acquittal or conviction, would be entirely
. . . PATENTLY COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF irrelevant to the civil action." 39 In Salta vs. De Veyra and PNB vs.
DISCRETION AND MADE A MISLEADING Purisima, 40 this Court stated:
PRONOUNCEMENT, WHEN IT HELD: "IT IS THUS . . . It seems perfectly reasonable to conclude that the
INCUMBENT UPON THE PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS civil actions mentioned in Article 33, permitted in the
(APPELLEES WRONGLY MENTIONED IN THE same manner to be filed separately from the criminal
RESOLUTION) TO PROVE THEIR ALLEGATIONS case, may proceed similarly regardless of the result of
THAT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE ACCIDENT the criminal case.
WAS THE NEGLIGENCE OF PRIVATE Indeed, when the law has allowed a civil case related
RESPONDENTS' DRIVER. to a criminal case, to be filed separately and to
IV proceed independently even during the pendency of
. . . COMMITTED ANOTHER GRIEVIOUS (sic) the latter case, the intention is patent to make the
ERROR; COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF court's disposition of the criminal case of no effect
DISCRETION AND CITED ANOTHER CASE WHICH whatsoever on the separate civil case. This must be
IS CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE TO THESE CASES. so because the offenses specified in Article 33 are of
V such a nature, unlike other offenses not mentioned,
that they may be made the subject of a separate civil
 action because of the distinct separability of their The test by which to determine
respective juridical cause or basis of action . . . . the existence of negligence in a
What remains to be the most important consideration as to why the particular case may be stated as
decision in the criminal case should not be considered in this appeal is the follows: Did the defendant in
fact that private respondents were not parties therein. It would have been doing the alleged negligent act
entirely different if the petitioners' cause of action was for damages arising use that(reasonable care and
from a delict, in which case private respondents' liability could only be caution which an ordinarily
subsidiary pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. In the prudent person would have used
absence of any collusion, the judgment of conviction in the criminal case in the same situation?) If not, then
against Galang would have been conclusive in the civil cases for the he is guilty of negligence. The law
subsidiary liability of the private respondents. 41 here in effect adopts the standard
And now to the merits of the petition. supposed to be supplied by the
It is readily apparent from the pleadings that the principal issue raised in imaginary conduct of the
this petition is whether or not respondent Court's findings in its challenged discreet paterfamiliasof the
resolution are supported by evidence or are based on mere speculations, Roman
conjectures and presumptions. law. . . .
The principle is well-established that this Court is not a trier of facts. In Corliss vs. Manila Railroad Company, 48 We held:
Therefore, in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of . . . Negligence is want of the care required by the
Court, only questions of law may be raised. The resolution of factual issues circumstances. It is a relative or comparative, not an
is the function of the lower courts whose findings on these matters are absolute, term and its application depends upon the
received with respect and are, as a rule, binding on this Court. 42 situation of the parties and the degree of care and
The foregoing rule, however, is not without exceptions. Findings of facts of vigilance which the circumstances reasonably require.
the trial courts and the Court of Appeals may be set aside when such Where the danger is great, a high degree of care is
findings are not supported by the evidence or when the trial court failed to necessary, and the failure to observe it is a want of
consider the material facts which would have led to a conclusion different ordinary care under the circumstances. (citing Ahern
from what was stated in its judgment. 43The same is true where the v. Oregon Telephone Co., 35 Pac. 549 (1894).
appellate court's conclusions are grounded entirely on conjectures, On the basis of the foregoing definition, the test of negligence and the facts
speculations and surmises44 or where the conclusions of the lower courts obtaining in this case, it is manifest that no negligence could be imputed to
are based on a misapprehension of facts. 45 Jose Koh. Any reasonable and ordinary prudent man would have tried to
It is at once obvious to this Court that the instant case qualifies as one of avoid running over the two boys by swerving the car away from where they
the aforementioned exceptions as the findings and conclusions of the trial were even if this would mean entering the opposite lane. Avoiding such
court and the respondent Court in its challenged resolution are not immediate peril would be the natural course to take particularly where the
supported by the evidence, are based on an misapprehension of facts and vehicle in the opposite lane would be several meters away and could very
the inferences made therefrom are manifestly mistaken. The respondent well slow down, move to the side of the road and give way to the oncoming
Court's decision of 29 November 1983 makes the correct findings of fact. car. Moreover, under what is known as the emergency rule, "one who
In the assailed resolution, the respondent Court held that the fact that the suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is required to act without
car improperly invaded the lane of the truck and that the collision occurred time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the
in said lane gave rise to the presumption that the driver of the car, Jose impending danger, is not guilty of negligence, if he fails to adopt what
Koh, was negligent. On the basis of this presumed negligence, the subsequently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better
appellate court immediately concluded that it was Jose Koh's negligence method, unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about
that was the immediate and proximate cause of the collision. This is an by his own negligence." 49
unwarranted deduction as the evidence for the petitioners convincingly Considering the sudden intrusion of the two (2) boys into the lane of the
shows that the car swerved into the truck's lane because as it approached car, We find that Jose Koh adopted the best means possible in the given
the southern end of the bridge, two (2) boys darted across the road from situation to avoid hitting them. Applying the above test, therefore, it is clear
the right sidewalk into the lane of the car. As testified to by petitioner that he was not guilty of negligence.
Araceli Koh McKee: In any case, assuming, arguendo that Jose Koh is negligent, it cannot be
Q What happened after that, as said that his negligence was the proximate cause of the collision.
you approached the bridge? Proximate cause has been defined as:
A When we were approaching the . . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous
bridge, two (2) boys tried to cross sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening
the right lane on the right side of cause, produces the injury, and without which the
the highway going to San result would not have occurred. And more
Fernando. My father, who is (sic) comprehensively, the proximate legal cause is that
the driver of the car tried to avoid acting first and producing the injury, either immediately
the two (2) boys who were or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a
crossing, he blew his horn and natural and continuous chain of events, each having a
swerved to the left to avoid hitting close causal connection with its immediate
the two (2) boys. We noticed the predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately
truck, he switched on the effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of
headlights to warn the truck the cause which first acted, under such circumstances
driver, to slow down to give us the that the person responsible for the first event should,
right of way to come back to our as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have
right lane. reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act
Q Did the truck slow down? or default that an injury to some person might probably
A No sir, it did not, just (sic) result therefrom. 50
continued on its way. Applying the above definition, although it may be said that the act of Jose
Q What happened after that? Koh, if at all negligent, was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be
A After avoiding the two (2) boys, said that the same caused the eventual injuries and deaths because of the
the car tried to go back to the right occurrence of a sufficient intervening event, the negligent act of the truck
lane since the truck is (sic) driver, which was the actual cause of the tragedy. The entry of the car into
coming, my father stepped on the the lane of the truck would not have resulted in the collision had the latter
brakes and all what (sic) I heard is heeded the emergency signals given by the former to slow down and give
the sound of impact (sic), sir. 46 the car an opportunity to go back into its proper lane. Instead of slowing
Her credibility and testimony remained intact even during cross down and swerving to the far right of the road, which was the proper
examination. Jose Koh's entry into the lane of the truck was necessary in precautionary measure under the given circumstances, the truck driver
order to avoid what was, in his mind at that time, a greater peril — death or continued at full speed towards the car. The truck driver's negligence
injury to the two (2) boys. Such act can hardly be classified as negligent. becomes more apparent in view of the fact that the road is 7.50 meters
Negligence was defined and described by this Court in Layugan vs. wide while the car measures 1.598 meters and the truck, 2.286 meters, in
Intermediate Appellate Court, 47 thus: width. This would mean that both car and truck could pass side by side
. . . Negligence is the omission to do something which with a clearance of 3.661 meters to spare. 51 Furthermore, the bridge has a
a reasonable man, guided by those considerations level sidewalk which could have partially accommodated the truck. Any
which ordinarily regulate the conduct of human affairs, reasonable man finding himself in the given situation would have tried to
would do, or the doing of something which a prudent avoid the car instead of meeting it head-on.
and reasonable man would not do (Black's Law The truck driver's negligence is apparent in the records. He himself said
Dictionary, Fifth Edition, 930), or as Judge Cooley that his truck was running at 30 miles (48 kilometers) per hour along the
defines it, "(T)he failure to observe for the protection of bridge while the maximum speed allowed by law on a bridge 52 is only 30
the interests of another person, that degree of care, kilometers per hour. Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, a person driving
precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances a vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was
justly demand, whereby such other person suffers violating any traffic regulation. We cannot give credence to private
injury." (Cooley on Torts, Fourth Edition, vol. 3, 265) respondents' claim that there was an error in the translation by the
In Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil 809, 813), decided more investigating officer of the truck driver's response in Pampango as to
than seventy years ago but still a sound rule, (W)e whether the speed cited was in kilometers per hour or miles per hour. The
held: law presumes that official duty has been regularly performed; 53 unless
there is proof to the contrary, this presumption holds. In the instant case, appears that the latter, by
private respondents' claim is based on mere conjecture. exercising reasonable care and
The truck driver's negligence was likewise duly established through the prudence, might have avoided
earlier quoted testimony of petitioner Araceli Koh McKee which was duly injurious consequences to
corroborated by the testimony of Eugenio Tanhueco, an impartial claimant notwithstanding his
eyewitness to the mishap. negligence.
Araceli Koh McKee testified further, thus: The doctrine applies only in a situation where the
xxx xxx xxx plaintiff was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence
Q Mrs. how did you know that the but the defendant, who had the last fair chance to
truck driven by the herein avoid the impending harm and failed to do so, is made
accused, Ruben Galang did not liable for all the consequences of the accident
reduce its speed before the actual notwithstanding the prior negligence of the plaintiff
impact of collision as you narrated [Picart v. Smith, 37 Phil. 809 (1918); Glan People's
in this Exhibit "1," how did you Lumber and Hardware, et al. vs. Intermediate
know? Appellate Court, Cecilia Alferez Vda. de Calibo, et al.,
A It just kept on coming, sir. If G.R. No. 70493, May, 18, 1989]. The subsequent
only he reduced his speed, we negligence of the defendant in failing to exercise
could have got (sic) back to our ordinary care to avoid injury to plaintiff becomes the
right lane on side (sic) of the immediate or proximate cause of the accident which
highway, sir. (tsn, pp. 33-34, July intervenes between the accident and the more remote
22, 1977) or (Exhibit; "O" in these negligence of the plaintiff, thus making the defendant
Civil Cases) (pp. 30-31, liable to the plaintiff [Picart v. Smith, supra].
Appellants' Brief) 54 Generally, the last clear chance doctrine is invoked for
while Eugenio Tanhueco testified thus: the purpose of making a defendant liable to a plaintiff
Q When you saw the truck, how who was guilty of prior or antecedent negligence,
was it moving? although it may also be raised as a defense to defeat
A It was moving 50 to 60 claim (sic) for damages.
kilometers per hour, sir. Applying the foregoing doctrine, it is not difficult to rule, as We now rule,
Q Immediately after you saw this that it was the truck driver's negligence in failing to exert ordinary care to
truck, do you know what avoid the collision which was, in law, the proximate cause of the collision.
happened? As employers of the truck driver, the private respondents are, under Article
A I saw the truck and a car 2180 of the Civil Code, directly and primarily liable for the resulting
collided (sic), sir, and I went to the damages. The presumption that they are negligent flows from the
place to help the victims. (tsn. 28, negligence of their employee. That presumption, however, is only juris
April 19, 1979) tantum, not juris et de jure. 59 Their only possible defense is that they
xxx xxx xxx exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the
Q From the time you saw the damage. Article 2180 reads as follows:
truck to the time of the impact, will The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable
you tell us if the said truck ever not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for
stopped? those of persons for whom one is responsible.
A I saw it stopped (sic) when it xxx xxx xxx
has (sic) already collided with the Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by
car and it was already motionless. their employees and household helpers acting within
(tsn. 31, April 19, 1979; Emphasis the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the
Supplied). (p. 27, Appellants' former are not engaged in anyBUSINESS or
Brief). 55 industry.
Clearly, therefore, it was the truck driver's subsequent negligence in failing xxx xxx xxx
to take the proper measures and degree of care necessary to avoid the The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
collision which was the proximate cause of the resulting accident. when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
Even if Jose Koh was indeed negligent, the doctrine of last clear chance observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
finds application here. Last clear chance is a doctrine in the law of torts to prevent damage.
which states that the contributory negligence of the party injured will not The diligence of a good father referred to means the diligence in the
defeat the claim for damages if it is shown that the defendant might, by the selection and supervision of employees. 60The answers of the private
exercise of reasonable care and prudence, have avoided the respondents in Civil Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478 did not interpose this
consequences of the negligence of the injured party. In such cases, the defense. Neither did they attempt to prove it.
person who had the last clear chance to avoid the mishap is considered in The respondent Court was then correct in its Decision of 29 November
law solely responsible for the consequences thereof. 56 1983 in reversing the decision of the trial court which dismissed Civil
In Bustamante vs. Court of Appeals, 57 We held: Cases Nos. 4477 and 4478. Its assailed Resolution of 3 April 1984 finds no
The respondent court adopted the doctrine of "last sufficient legal and factual moorings.
clear chance." The doctrine, stated broadly, is that the In the light of recent decisions of this Court, 61 the indemnity for death
negligence of the plaintiff does not preclude a must, however, be increased from P12,000.00 to P50,000.00.
recovery for the negligence of the defendant where it WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution
appears that the defendant, by exercising reasonable of the respondent Court of 3 April 1984 is SET ASIDE while its Decision of
care and prudence, might have avoided injurious 29 November 1983 in C.A.-G.R. CV Nos. 69040-41 is REINSTATED,
consequences to the plaintiff notwithstanding the subject to the modification that the indemnity for death is increased from
plaintiff's negligence. In other words, the doctrine of P12,000.00 to P50,000.00 each for the death of Jose Koh and Kim Koh
last clear chance means that even though a person's McKee.
own acts may have placed him in a position of peril, Costs against private respondents.
and an injury results, the injured person is entitled to SO ORDERED.
recovery (sic). As the doctrine is usually stated, a
person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of G.R. Nos. 103442-45 May 21, 1993
avoiding an accident, notwithstanding the negligent NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, ET AL., petitioners,
acts of his opponent or that of a third person imputed vs.
to the opponent is considered in law solely responsible THE COURT OF APPEALS, GAUDENCIO C. RAYO, ET
for the consequences of the accident. (Sangco, Torts AL., respondents.
and Damages, 4th Ed., 1986, p. 165). The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
The practical import of the doctrine is that a negligent Ponciano G. Hernandez for private respondents.
defendant is held liable to a negligent plaintiff, or even
to a plaintiff who has been grossly negligent in placing DAVIDE, JR., J.:
himself in peril, if he, aware of the plaintiff's peril, or This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised
according to some authorities, should have been Rules of Court urging this Court to set aside the 19 August 1991
aware of it in the reasonable exercise of due care, had consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA.-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-
in fact an opportunity later than that of the plaintiff to 93 1 which reversed the Decision of Branch 5 of the then Court of First
avoid an accident (57 Am. Jur., 2d, pp. 798-799). Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, and held petitioners
In Pantranco North Express, Inc., vs. Baesa, 58 We ruled: National Power Corporation (NPC) and Benjamin Chavez jointly and
The doctrine of last clear chance was defined by this severally liable to the private respondents for actual and moral damages,
Court in the case of Ong v. Metropolitan Water litigation expenses and attorney's fees.
District, 104 Phil. 397 (1958), in this wise: This present controversy traces its beginnings to four (4) separate
The doctrine of the last clear complaints 2 for damages filed against the NPC and Benjamin Chavez
chance simply, means that the before the trial court. The plaintiffs therein, now private respondents,
negligence of a claimant does not sought to recover actual and other damages for the loss of lives and the
preclude a recovery for the destruction to property caused by the inundation of the town of
negligence of defendant where it Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978. The flooding was
purportedly caused by the negligent release by the defendants of water B. Moral damages of five hundred
through the spillways of the Angat Dam (Hydroelectric Plant). In said Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00);
complaints, the plaintiffs alleged, inter alia, that: 1) defendant NPC and.
operated and maintained a multi-purpose hydroelectric plant in the Angat C. Litigation expenses of Ten
River at Hilltop, Norzagaray, Bulacan; 2) defendant Benjamin Chavez was Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);.
the plant supervisor at the time of the incident in question; 3) despite the 3. In Civil Case No. SM-953, ordering defendants-
defendants' knowledge, as early as 24 October 1978, of the impending appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with legal
entry of typhoon "Kading," they failed to exercise due diligence in interest from the date when this decision shall have
monitoring the water level at the dam; 4) when the said water level went become final and executory;
beyond the maximum allowable limit at the height of the typhoon, the A. Plaintiff-appellant Angel C. Torres:
defendants suddenly, negligently and recklessly opened three (3) of the 1) Actual damages of One Hundred Ninety Nine
dam's spillways, thereby releasing a large amount of water which Thousand One Hundred Twenty Pesos (P199,120.00);
inundated the banks of the Angat River; and 5) as a consequence, 2) Moral Damages of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
members of the household of the plaintiffs, together with their animals, Pesos (P150,000.00);
drowned, and their properties were washed away in the evening of 26 B. Plaintiff-appellant Norberto Torres:
October and the early hours of 27 October 1978. 3 1) Actual damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
In their Answers, the defendants, now petitioners, alleged that: 1) the NPC (P50,000.00);
exercised due care, diligence and prudence in the operation and 2) Moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos
maintenance of the hydroelectric plant; 2) the NPC exercised the diligence (P50,000.00);
of a good father in the selection of its employees; 3) written notices were C. Plaintiff-appellant Rodelio Joaquin:
sent to the different municipalities of Bulacan warning the residents therein 1) Actual damages of One
about the impending release of a large volume of water with the onset of Hundred Thousand Pesos
typhoon "Kading" and advise them to take the necessary precautions; 4) (P100,000.00);
the water released during the typhoon was needed to prevent the collapse 2) Moral damages of One
of the dam and avoid greater damage to people and property; 5) in spite of Hundred Thousand Pesos
the precautions undertaken and the diligence exercised, they could still not (P100,000.00); and
contain or control the flood that resulted and; 6) the damages incurred by D. Plaintifsf-appellants litigation expenses of Ten
the private respondents were caused by a fortuitous event or force Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00);
majeure and are in the nature and character of damnum absque injuria. By 4. In Civil case No. SM-1247, ordering defendants-
way of special affirmative defense, the defendants averred that the NPC appellees to pay, jointly and severally, with legal
cannot be sued because it performs a purely governmental function. 4 interest from the date when this decision shall have
Upon motion of the defendants, a preliminary hearing on the special become final and executory :
defense was conducted. As a result thereof, the trial court dismissed the A. Plaintiffs-appellants Presentacion Lorenzo and
complaints as against the NPC on the ground that the provision of its Clodualdo Lorenzo:
charter allowing it to sue and be sued does not contemplate actions based 1) Actual damages of Two
on tort. The parties do not, however, dispute the fact that this Court Hundred Fifty Six Thousand Six
overruled the trial court and ordered the reinstatement of the complaints as Hundred Pesos (P256,600.00);
against the NPC. 5 2) Moral damages of Fifty
Being closely interrelated, the cases were consolidated and trial thereafter Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
ensued. B. Plaintiff-appellant Consolacion Guzman :
The lower court rendered its decision on 30 April 1990 dismissing the 1) Actual damages of One
complaints "for lack of sufficient and credible evidence." 6 Consequently, Hundred forty Thousand Pesos
the private respondents seasonably appealed therefrom to the respondent (P140,000.00);
Court which then docketed the cases as CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93. 2) Moral damages of Fifty
In its joint decision promulgated on 19 August 1991, the Court of Appeals Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00);
reversed the appealed decision and awarded damages in favor of the C. Plaintiff-appellant Virginia Guzman :
private respondents. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: 1) Actual damages of Two
CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, the joint Hundred Five Hundred Twenty
decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and Pesos (205,520.00); and
SET ASIDE, and a new one is hereby rendered: D. Plaintiffs-appellants litigation expenses of Ten
1. In Civil Case No. SM-950, ordering defendants- Thousand Pesos (10,000.00).
appellees to pay, jointly and severally, plaintiffs- In addition, in all the four (4) instant cases, ordering
appellants, with legal interest from the date when this defendants-appellees to pay, jointly and severally,
decision shall become final and executory, the plaintiffs-appellants attorney fees in an amount
following: equivalent to 15% of the total amount awarded.
A. Actual damages, to wit: No pronouncement as to costs. 7
1) Gaudencio C. Rayo, Two The foregoing judgment is based on the public respondent's conclusion
Hundred Thirty One Thousand that the petitioners were guilty of:
Two Hundred Sixty Pesos . . . a patent gross and evident lack of foresight,
(P231,260.00); imprudence and negligence . . . in the management
2) Bienvenido P. Pascual, Two and operation of Angat Dam. The unholiness of the
Hundred Four Thousand Five hour, the extent of the opening of the spillways, And
Hundred Pesos (P204.500.00); the magnitude of the water released, are all but
3) Tomas Manuel, One Hundred products of defendants-appellees' headlessness,
Fifty Five Thousand Pesos slovenliness, and carelessness. The resulting flash
(P155,000.00); flood and inundation of even areas (sic) one (1)
4) Pedro C. Bartolome, One kilometer away from the Angat River bank would have
Hundred Forty Seven Thousand been avoided had defendants-appellees prepared the
Pesos (P147,000.00);. Angat Dam by maintaining in the first place, a water
5) Bernardino Cruz, One Hundred elevation which would allow room for the expected
Forty Three Thousand Five torrential rains. 8
Hundred Fifty Two Pesos and This conclusion, in turn, is anchored on its findings of fact, to wit:
Fifty Centavos (P143,552.50); As early as October 21, 1978, defendants-appellees
6) Jose Palad, Fifty Seven knew of the impending onslaught of and imminent
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos danger posed by typhoon "Kading". For as alleged by
(P57,500.00); defendants-appellees themselves, the coming of said
7) Mariano S. Cruz, Forty super typhoon was bannered by Bulletin Today, a
Thousand Pesos (P40,000.00); newspaper of national circulation, on October 25,
8) Lucio Fajardo, Twenty nine 1978, as "Super Howler to hit R.P." The next day,
Thousand Eighty Pesos October 26, 1978, said typhoon once again merited a
(P29,080.00); and headline in said newspaper as "Kading's Big Blow
B. Litigation expenses of Ten Thousand Pesos expected this afternoon" (Appellee's Brief, p. 6). Apart
(P10,000.00); from the newspapers, defendants-appellees learned of
2. In Civil case No. SM-951, ordering defendants- typhoon "Kading' through radio announcements (Civil
appellees to pay jointly and severally, plaintiff- Case No. SM-950, TSN, Benjamin Chavez, December
appellant, with legal interest from the date when this 4, 1984, pp. 7-9).
decision shall have become final and executory, the Defendants-appellees doubly knew that the Angat
following : Dam can safely hold a normal maximum headwater
A. Actual damages of Five elevation of 217 meters (Appellee's brief, p. 12; Civil
Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos Case No. SM-951, Exhibit "I-6"; Civil Case No. SM-
(P520,000.00);. 953, Exhibit "J-6"; Civil Case No. SM-1247, Exhibit "G-
6").
 Yet, despite such knowledge, defendants-appellees The petitioners raised the following errors allegedly committed by the
maintained a reservoir water elevation even beyond its respondent Court :
maximum and safe level, thereby giving no sufficient I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN APPLYING
allowance for the reservoir to contain the rain water THE RULING OF NAKPIL & SONS V. COURT OF
that will inevitably be brought by the coming typhoon. APPEALS AND HOLDING THAT PETITIONERS
On October 24, 1978, before typhoon "Kading" WERE GUILTY OF NEGLIGENCE.
entered the Philippine area of responsibility, water II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
elevation ranged from 217.61 to 217.53, with very little THAT THE WRITTEN NOTICES OF WARNING
opening of the spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1 meter. ISSUED BY PETITIONERS WERE INSUFFICIENT.
On October 25, 1978, when typhoon "Kading" entered III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
the Philippine area of responsibility, and public storm THAT THE DAMAGE SUFFERED BY PRIVATE
signal number one was hoisted over Bulacan at 10:45 RESPONDENTS WAS NOT DAMNUM ABSQUE
a.m., later raised to number two at 4:45 p.m., and then INJURIA.
to number three at 10:45 p.m., water elevation ranged IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
from 217.47 to 217.57, with very little opening of the AWARDING THE COUNTERCLAIM OF
spillways, ranging from 1/2 to 1 meter. On October 26, PETITIONERS FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES AND
1978, when public storm signal number three EXPENSES OF LITIGATION. 16
remained hoisted over Bulacan, the water elevation These same errors were raised by herein petitioners in G.R. No. 96410,
still remained at its maximum level of 217.00 to 218.00 entitled National Power Corporation, et al., vs. Court of Appeals, et
with very little opening of the spillways ranging from al., 17 which this Court decided on 3 July 1992. The said case involved the
1/2 to 2 meters, until at or about midnight, the very same incident subject of the instant petition. In no uncertain terms,
spillways were suddenly opened at 5 meters, then We declared therein that the proximate cause of the loss and damage
increasing swiftly to 8, 10, 12, 12.5, 13, 13.5, 14, 14.5 sustained by the plaintiffs therein — who were similarly situated as the
in the early morning hours of October 27, 1978, private respondents herein — was the negligence of the petitioners, and
releasing water at the rate of 4,500 cubic meters per that the 24 October 1978 "early warning notice" supposedly sent to the
second, more or less. On October 27, 1978, water affected municipalities, the same notice involved in the case at bar, was
elevation remained at a range of 218.30 to 217.05 insufficient. We thus cannot now rule otherwise not only because such a
(Civil Case No. SM-950, Exhibits "D" and series, "L", decision binds this Court with respect to the cause of the inundation of the
"M", "N", and "O" and Exhibits "3" and "4"; Civil Case town of Norzagaray, Bulacan on 26-27 October 1978 which resulted in the
No. SM-951, Exhibits "H" and "H-1"; Civil Case No. loss of lives and the destruction to property in both cases, but also
SM-953, Exhibits "I" and "I-1"; Civil Case No. SM because of the fact that on the basis of its meticulous analysis and
1247, Exhibits "F" and "F-1"). evaluation of the evidence adduced by the parties in the cases subject of
xxx xxx xxx CA-G.R. CV Nos. 27290-93, public respondent found as conclusively
From the mass of evidence extant in the record, We established that indeed, the petitioners were guilty of "patent gross and
are convinced, and so hold that the flash flood on evident lack of foresight, imprudence and negligence in the management
October 27, 1978, was caused not by rain waters (sic), and operation of Angat Dam," and that "the extent of the opening of the
but by stored waters (sic) suddenly and spillways, and the magnitude of the water released, are all but products of
simultaneously released from the Angat Dam by defendants-appellees' headlessness, slovenliness, and
defendants-appellees, particularly from midnight of carelessness." 18 Its findings and conclusions are biding upon Us, there
October 26, 1978 up to the morning hours of October being no showing of the existence of any of the exceptions to the general
27, rule that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive upon this
1978. 9 Court. 19 Elsewise stated, the challenged decision can stand on its own
The appellate court rejected the petitioners' defense that they had sent merits independently of Our decision in G.R. No. 96410. In any event, We
"early warning written notices" to the towns of Norzagaray, Angat, Bustos, reiterate here in Our pronouncement in the latter case that Juan F. Nakpil
Plaridel, Baliwag and Calumpit dated 24 October 1978 which read: & Sons vs. Court of Appeals 20 is still good law as far as the concurrent
TO ALL CONCERN (sic): liability of an obligor in the case of force majeure is concerned. In
Please be informed that at present our reservoir (dam) the Nakpil case, We held:
is full and that we have been releasing water To exempt the obligor from liability under Article 1174
intermittently for the past several days. of the Civil Code, for a breach of an obligation due to
With the coming of typhoon "Rita" (Kading) we expect an "act of God," the following must concur: (a) the
to release greater (sic) volume of water, if it pass (sic) cause of the breach of the obligation must be
over our place. independent of the will of the debtor; (b) the event
In view of this kindly advise people residing along must be either unforseeable or unavoidable; (c) the
Angat River to keep alert and stay in safe places. event must be such as to render it impossible for the
because: debtor to fulfill his obligation in a moral manner; and
Said notice was delivered to the "towns of Bulacan" on (d) the debtor must be free from any participation in, or
October 26, 1978 by defendants-appellees driver, aggravation of the injury to the creditor. (Vasquez v.
Leonardo Nepomuceno (Civil Case No. SM-950, TSN, Court of Appeals, 138 SCRA 553; Estrada v.
Benjamin Chavez, December 4, 1984, pp. 7-11 and Consolacion, 71 SCRA 423; Austria v. Court of
TSN, Leonardo Nepomuceno, March 7, 1985, pp. 10- Appeals, 39 SCRA 527; Republic of the Phil. v. Luzon
12). Stevedoring Corp., 21 SCRA 279; Lasam v. Smith, 45
Said notice is ineffectual, insufficient and inadequate Phil. 657).
for purposes of the opening of the spillway gates at Thus, if upon the happening of a fortuitous event or an
midnight of October 26, 1978 and on October 27, act of God, there concurs a corresponding fraud,
1978. It did not prepare or warn the persons so negligence, delay or violation or contravention in any
served, for the volume of water to be released, which manner of the tenor of the obligation as provided for in
turned out to be of such magnitude, that residents Article 1170 of the Civil Code, which results in loss or
near or along the Angat River, even those one (1) damage, the obligor cannot escape liability.
kilometer away, should have been advised to The principle embodied in the act of God doctrine
evacuate. Said notice, addressed "TO ALL CONCERN strictly requires that the act must be one occasioned
(sic)," was delivered to a policeman (Civil Case No. exclusively by the violence of nature and all human
SM-950, pp. 10-12 and Exhibit "2-A") for the agencies are to be excluded from creating or entering
municipality of Norzagaray. Said notice was not thus into the cause of the mischief. When the effect, the
addressed and delivered to the proper and cause of which is to be considered, is found to be in
responsible officials who could have disseminated the part the result of the participation of man, whether it be
warning to the residents directly affected. As for the from active intervention or neglect, or failure to act, the
municipality of Sta. Maria, where plaintiffs-appellants whole occurrence is thereby humanized, as it were,
in Civil Case No. SM-1246 reside, said notice does not and removed from the rules applicable to the acts of
appear to have been served. 11 God. (1 Corpus Juris, pp. 1174-1175).
Relying on Juan F. Nakpil & Sons vs. Court of Appeals, 12 public Thus it has been held that when the negligence of a
respondent rejected the petitioners' plea that the incident in question was person concurs with an act of God in producing a loss,
caused by force majeure and that they are, therefore, not liable to the such person is not exempt from liability by showing
private respondents for any kind of damage — such damage being in the that the immediate cause of the damage was the act
nature of damnum absque injuria. of God. To be exempt from liability for loss because of
The motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners, as well as the an act of God, he must be free from any previous
motion to modify judgment filed by the public respondents, 13 were denied negligence or misconduct by which that loss or
by the public respondent in its Resolution of 27 December 1991. 14 damage may have been occasioned. (Fish & Elective
Petitioners thus filed the instant petition on 21 February 1992. Co. v. Phil. Motors, 55 Phil. 129; Tucker v. Milan, 49
After the Comment to the petition was filed by the private respondents and O.G. 4379; Limpangco & Sons v. Yangco Steamship
the Reply thereto was filed by the petitioners, We gave due course to the Co., 34 Phil. 594, 604; Lasam v. Smith, 45 Phil.
petition on 17 June 1992 and directed the parties to submit their respective 657). 21
Memoranda, 15 which they subsequently complied with. Accordingly, petitioners cannot be heard to invoke the act of God or force
majeure to escape liability for the loss or damage sustained by private
respondents since they, the petitioners, were guilty of negligence. The their claim ex-delicto, that is, under the provisions of the Penal Code, when
event then was not occasioned exclusively by an act of God or force they intervened in the criminal case against Jon Elordi. The information
majeure; a human factor — negligence or imprudence — had intervened. therein, it may be recalled, was amended precisely to include an allegation
The effect then of the force majeure in question may be deemed to have, concerning damages suffered by the heirs of the victims of the accident for
even if only partly, resulted from the participation of man. Thus, the whole which Elordi was being prosecuted. But appellants' intervention was
occurrence was thereby humanized, as it were, and removed from the subsequently disallowed and they did not appeal from the Court's order to
laws applicable to acts of God. the effect. And when they commenced the civil action on September 26,
WHEREFORE, for want of merit, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED 1958 the criminal case was still pending, showing that appellants then
and the Consolidated Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV Nos. chose to pursue the remedy afforded by the Civil Code, for otherwise that
27290-93 is AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. action would have been premature and in any event would have been
SO ORDERED. concluded by the subsequent judgment of acquittal in the criminal case.
In filing the civil action as they did appellants correctly considered it as
G.R. No. L-19331 April 30, 1965 entirely independent of the criminal action, pursuant to Articles 31 and 33
VICTORIA G. CAPUNO and JOSEPHINE G. CAPUNO, plaintiffs- of the Civil Code, which read:
appellants, ART. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not
vs. arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony, such
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES and JON civil action may proceed independently of the criminal
ELORDI, defendants-appellees. proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Federico Andres for plaintiffs-appellants. ART. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a
Vicente J. Francisco for defendants-appellees. civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the
MAKALINTAL, J.: criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil
This appeal (in forma pauperis), certified here by the Court of Appeals, is action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution,
from the order of the Court of First Instance of Tarlac dismissing and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
appellant's complaint in Civil Case No. 3315 for recovery of damages for The term "physical injuries" in Article 33 includes bodily injuries causing
the death of Cipriano Capuno. death (Dyogi v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-9623, Jan. 22, 1957, 22 L.J. 175). In
The case arose from a vehicular collision which occurred on January 3, other words, the civil action for damages could have been commenced by
1953 in Apalit, Pampanga. Involved were a Pepsi-Cola delivery truck appellants immediately upon the death of their decedent, Cipriano Capuno,
driven by Jon Elordi and a private car driven by Capuno. The collision on January 3, 1953 or thereabouts, and the same would not have been
proved fatal to the latter as well as to his passengers, the spouses stayed by the filing of the criminal action for homicide through reckless
Florencio Buan and Rizalina Paras. imprudence. But the complaint here was filed only on September 26, 1958,
On January 5, 1953 Elordi was charged with triple homicide through or after the lapse of more than five years.
reckless imprudence in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga (criminal In the case of Diocosa Paulan, et al. vs. Zacarias Sarabia, et al., G.R. No.
case No. 1591). The information was subsequently amended to include L-10542, promulgated July 31, 1958, this Court held that an action based
claims for damages by the heirs of the three victims. on a quasi-delict is governed by Article 1150 of the Civil Code as to the
It is urged for the applicant that no opposition has been registered against question of when the prescriptive period of four years shall begin to run,
his petition on the issues above-discussed. Absence of opposition, that is, "from the day (the action) may be brought," which means from the
however, does not preclude the scanning of the whole record by the day the quasi-delict occurred or was committed.
appellate court, with a view to preventing the conferment of citizenship to The foregoing considerations dispose of appellants' contention that the
persons not fully qualified therefor (Lee Ng Len vs. Republic, G.R. No. L- four-year period of prescription in this case was interrupted by the filing of
20151, March 31, 1965). The applicant's complaint of unfairness could the criminal action against Jon Elordi inasmuch as they had neither waived
have some weight if the objections on appeal had been on points not the civil action nor reserved the right to institute it separately. Such
previously passed upon. But the deficiencies here in question are not new reservation was not then necessary; without having made it they could file
but well-known, having been ruled upon repeatedly by this Court, and we — as in fact they did — a separate civil action even during the pendency of
see no excuse for failing to take them into account.1äwphï1.ñët the criminal case (Pacheco v. Tumangday, L-14500, May 25, 1960;
On October 1, 1953, while the criminal case was pending, the Intestate Azucena v. Potenciano, L-14028, June 30, 1962); and consequently, as
Estate of the Buan spouses and their heirs filed a civil action, also for held in Paulan v. Sarabia, supra, "the institution of a criminal action cannot
damages, in the Court of First Instance of Tarlac against the Pepsi-Cola have the effect of interrupting the institution of a civil action based on
Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi (civil case No. 838). a quasi-delict."
Included in the complaint was a claim for indemnity in the sum of As to whether or not Rule 111, Section 2, of the Revised Rules of Court
P2,623.00 allegedly paid by the Estate to the heirs of Capuno under the which requires the reservation of the right to institute a separate and
Workmen's Compensation Act. independent civil action in the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34,
In the criminal case both the heirs of Capuno and the Estate of Buan — and 2177 of the Civil Code affects the question of prescription, we do not
the former being appellants herein — were represented by their respective now decide. The said rule does not apply in the present case.
counsel as private prosecutors: Attorney Ricardo Y. Navarro and Attorneys Having found the action of appellants barred by the statute of limitations,
Jose W. Diokno and Augusto M. Ilagan. In view of the filing of the civil we do not consider it necessary to pass upon the other issues raised in
action the accused Jon Elordi moved to strike out the appearances of their brief.
these private prosecutors in the criminal case. Grounds for the motion The order appealed from is affirmed, without costs.
were (1) that as the Capuno heirs were concerned, they no longer had any
interest to protect in the criminal case since they had already claimed and G.R. No. L-10134 June 29, 1957
received compensation for the death of their decedent; and (2) that on the SABINA EXCONDE, plaintiff-appellant,
part of the Estate of Buan its right to intervene in said case had been vs.
abated by the civil action. DELFIN CAPUNO and DANTE CAPUNO, defendants-appellees.
The appearance and intervention of Attorneys Diokno and Ilagan was
disallowed by the Court in an order dated September 23, 1953, and that of BAUTISTA ANGELO, J.:
Attorney Navarro was disallowed in an amending order dated October 23, Dante Capuno, son of Delfin Capuno, was accused of double homicide
1954. No appeal was taken from either of the two orders. through reckless imprudence for the death of Isidoro Caperina and Amado
On June 11, 1958 the parties in Civil Case No. 838 entered into a Ticzon on March 31, 1949 in the Court of First Instance of Laguna
"Compromise and Settlement." For P290,000.00 the Buan Estate gave up (Criminal Case No. 15001). During the trial, Sabina Exconde, as mother of
its claims for damages, including the claim for reimbursement of the sum of the deceased Isidoro Caperina, reserved her right to bring a separate civil
P2,623.00 previously paid to the heirs of Capuno "under the Workmen's action for damages against the accused. After trial, Dante Capuno was
Compensation Act." The Court approved the compromise and accordingly found guilty of the crime charged and, on appeal, the Court Appeals
dismissed the case on the following June 17. affirmed the decision. Dante Capuno was only (15) years old when he
At that time the criminal case was still pending; judgment was rendered committed the crime.
only on April 15, 1959, wherein the accused Elordi was acquitted of the In line with her reservation, Sabina Exconde filed the present action
charges against him. Prior thereto, or on September 26, 1958, however, against Delfin Capuno and his son Dante Capuno asking for damages in
herein appellants commenced a civil action for damages against the Pepsi- the aggregate amount of P2,959.00 for the death of her son Isidoro
Cola Bottling Company of the Philippines and Jon Elordi. This is the action Caperiña. Defendants set up the defense that if any one should be held
which, upon appellees' motion, was dismissed by the Court a quo in its liable for the death of Isidoro Caperina, he is Dante Capuno and not his
order of February 29, 1960, from which order the present appeal has been father Delfin because at the time of the accident, the former was not under
taken. the control, supervision and custody, of the latter. This defense was
The grounds upon which appellees based their motion for dismissal and sustained by the lower court and, as a consequence it only convicted
which the Court found to be "well taken" were; (1) that the action had Dante Capuno to pay the damages claimed in the complaint. From
already prescribed; and (2) that appellees had been released from decision, plaintiff appealed to the Court of Appeals but the case was
appellants' claim for damages by virtue of the payment to the latter of the certified to us on the ground that the appeal only involves questions of law.
sum of P2,623.00 by the Buan Estate under the Workmen's Compensation It appears that Dante Capuno was a member of the Boy Scouts
Act, which sum, in turn, was sought to be recovered by the said Estate Organization and a student of the Bilintawak Elementary School situated in
from appellees in Civil Case No. 838 but finally settled by them in their a barrio in the City of San Pablo and on March 31, 1949 he attended a
compromise. parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal in said city upon instruction of the city
The ruling of the court below on both points is now assailed by appellants school's supervisor. From the school Dante, with other students, boarded a
as erroneous. In our opinion the question of prescription is decisive. There jeep and when the same started to run, he took hold of the wheel and
can be no doubt that the present action is one for recovery of damages drove it while the driver sat on his left side. They have not gone far when
based on a quasi-delict, which action must be instituted within four (4) the jeep turned turtle and two of its passengers, Amado Ticzon and Isidore
years (Article 1146, Civil Code). Appellants originally sought to enforce Caperiña, died as a consequence. It further appears that Delfin Capuno,
father of Dante, was not with his son at the time of the accident, nor did he ART. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes
know that his son was going to attend a parade. He only came to know it damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is
when his son told him after the accident that he attended the parade upon obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or
instruction of his teacher. negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
The only issue involved in this appeal is whether defendant Delfin Capuno relation between the parties, is called a quasi-
can be held civilly liable, jointly and severally with his son Dante, for delict and is governed by provisions of this Chapter.
damages resulting from the death of Isidoro Caperiña caused by the ART 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is
negligent act of minor Dante Capuno. demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions,
The case comes under Article 1903 of the Spanish Civil Code, paragraph 1 but also for those of persons for whom one is
and 5, which provides: responsible.
ART. 1903. The obligation impossed by the next preceding The father and, in case of his death or incapacity are
articles is enforceable not only for personal acts and omissions, responsible for the damages caused by the minor
but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible. children who live in their company.
The father, and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, xxx xxx xxx
are liable for any damages caused by the minor children who The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease
live with them. when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
xxx xxx xxx observed all the diligence of a good father of a family
Finally, teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any to prevent damage.
damages caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are The underlying basis of the liability imposed by Article 2176 is the fault or
under their custody. negligence accompanying the act or the omission, there being no
Plaintiff contends that defendant Delfin Capuno is liable for the damages in willfulness or intent to cause damage thereby. When the act or omission is
question jointly and severally with his son Dante because at the time the that of one person for whom another is responsible, the latter then
latter committed the negligent act which resulted in the death of the victim, becomes himself liable under Article 2180, in the different cases
he was a minor and was then living with his father, and inasmuch as these enumerated therein, such as that of the father or the mother under the
facts are not disputed, the civil liability of the father is evident. And so, circumstances above quoted. The basis of this vicarious, although primary,
plaintiff contends, the lower court erred in relieving the father from liability. liability is, as in Article 2176, fault or negligence, which is presumed from
We find merit in this claim. It is true that under the law above quoted, that which accompanied the causative act or omission. The presumption is
"teachers or directors of arts and trades are liable for any damages caused merely prima facie and may therefore be rebutted. This is the clear and
by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their custody", but this logical inference that may be drawn from the last paragraph of Article
provision only applies to an institution of arts and trades and not to any 2180, which states "that the responsibility treated of in this Article shall
academic educational institution (Padilla, Civil Law, 1953, Ed., Vol. IV, p. cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
841; See 12 Manresa, 4th Ed., p. 557). Here Dante capuno was then a diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage."
student of the Balintawak Elementary School and as part of his extra- Since the fact thus required to be proven is a matter of defense, the
curricular activity, he attended the parade in honor of Dr. Jose Rizal upon burden of proof necessarily rests on the defendant. But what is the exact
instruction of the city school's supervisor. And it was in connection with degree of diligence contemplated, and how does a parent prove it in
that parade that Dante boarded a jeep with some companions and while connection with a particular act or omission of a minor child, especially
driving it, the accident occurred. In the circumstances, it is clear that when it takes place in his absence or outside his immediate company?
neither the head of that school, nor the city school's supervisor, could be Obviously there can be no meticulously calibrated measure applicable; and
held liable for the negligent act of Dante because he was not then a when the law simply refers to "all the diligence of a good father of the
student of an institute of arts and trades as provided by law. family to prevent damage," it implies a consideration of the attendant
The civil liability which the law impose upon the father, and, in case of his circumstances in every individual case, to determine whether or not by the
death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be caused by exercise of such diligence the damage could have been prevented.
the minor children who live with them, is obvious. This is necessary In the present case there is nothing from which it may be inferred that the
consequence of the parental authority they exercise over them which defendant could have prevented the damage by the observance of due
imposes upon the parents the "duty of supporting them, keeping them in care, or that he was in any way remiss in the exercise of his parental
their company, educating them and instructing them in proportion to their authority in failing to foresee such damage, or the act which caused it. On
means", while, on the other hand, gives them the "right to correct and the contrary, his child was at school, where it was his duty to send her and
punish them in moderation" (Articles 154 and 155, Spanish Civil Code). where she was, as he had the right to expect her to be, under the care and
The only way by which they can relieve themselves of this liability is if they supervision of the teacher. And as far as the act which caused the injury
prove that they exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to was concerned, it was an innocent prank not unusual among children at
prevent the damage(Article 1903, last paragraph, Spanish Civil Code). play and which no parent, however careful, would have any special reason
This defendants failed to prove. to anticipate much less guard against. Nor did it reveal any mischievous
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is modified in the sense that propensity, or indeed any trait in the child's character which would reflect
defendants Delfin Capuno and Dante Capuno shall pay to plaintiff, jointly unfavorably on her upbringing and for which the blame could be attributed
and severally, the sum of P2,959.00 as damages, and the costs of action. to her parents.
The victim, no doubt, deserves no little commiseration and sympathy for
G.R. No. L-24101 September 30, 1970 the tragedy that befell her. But if the defendant is at all obligated to
MARIA TERESA Y. CUADRA, minor represented by her father ULISES compensate her suffering, the obligation has no legal sanction enforceable
P. CUADRA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, in court, but only the moral compulsion of good conscience.
vs. The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint is dismissed,
ALFONSO MONFORT, defendant-appellant. without pronouncement as to costs.

MAKALINTAL, J.: Separate Opinions

This is an action for damages based on quasi-delict, decided by the Court BARREDO, J., dissenting:
of First Instance of Negros Occidental favorably to the plaintiffs and I am afraid I cannot go along with my esteemed colleagues in holding that
appealed by the defendant to the Court of Appeals, which certified the the act of appellant's daughter does not constitute fault within the
same to us since the facts are not in issue. contemplation of our law or torts. She was 13 years and should have
Maria Teresa Cuadra, 12, and Maria Teresa Monfort, 13, were classmates known that by jokingly saying "aloud that she had found an earthworm
in Grade Six at the Mabini Elementary School in Bacolod City. On July 9, and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object at her," it was
1962 their teacher assigned them, together with three other classmates, to likely that something would happen to her friend, as in fact, she was hurt.
weed the grass in the school premises. While thus engaged Maria Teresa As to the liability of appellant as father, I prefer to hold that there being no
Monfort found a plastic headband, an ornamental object commonly worn evidence that he had properly advised his daughter to behave properly and
by young girls over their hair. Jokingly she said aloud that she had found not to play dangerous jokes on her classmate and playmates, he can be
an earthworm and, evidently to frighten the Cuadra girl, tossed the object liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. There is nothing in the record to
at her. At that precise moment the latter turned around to face her friend, show that he had done anything at all to even try to minimize the damage
and the object hit her right eye. Smarting from the pain, she rubbed the caused upon plaintiff child.
injured part and treated it with some powder. The next day, July 10, the
eye became swollen and it was then that the girl related the incident to her
parents, who thereupon took her to a doctor for treatment. She underwent
surgical operation twice, first on July 20 and again on August 4, 1962, and
stayed in the hospital for a total of twenty-three days, for all of which the
parents spent the sum of P1,703.75. Despite the medical efforts, however,
Maria Teresa Cuadra completely lost the sight of her right eye.
In the civil suit subsequently instituted by the parents in behalf of their
minor daughter against Alfonso Monfort, Maria Teresa Monfort's father, the
defendant was ordered to pay P1,703.00 as actual damages; P20,000.00
as moral damages; and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees, plus the costs of the
suit.
The legal issue posed in this appeal is the liability of a parent for an act of
his minor child which causes damage to another under the specific facts
related above and the applicable provisions of the Civil Code, particularly
Articles 2176 and 2180 thereof, which read: