BASIC LEGAL ETHICS (CASE DIGESTS)

1. In re: Cunanan
FACTS:
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. The
title of the law was, “An Act to Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations from 1946 up to
and including 1955.”
Section 1 provided the following passing marks:
1946-1951………………70%
1952 …………………….71%
1953……………………..72%
1954……………………..73%
1955……………………..74%
Provided however, that the examinee shall have no grade lower than 50%.
Section 2 of the Act provided that “A bar candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in any
subject shall be deemed to have already passed that subject and the grade/grades shall be
included in the computation of the general average in subsequent bar examinations.”
ISSUE:
Whether of not, R.A. No. 972 is constitutional.
RULING:
Section 2 was declared unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of not being embraced in the
title of the Act. As per its title, the Act should affect only the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations. Section2 establishes a permanent system for an indefinite time. It was also
struck down for allowing partial passing, thus failing to take account of the fact that laws and
jurisprudence are not stationary.
As to Section1, the portion for 1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional, while that for 1953 to
1955 was declared in force and effect. The portion that was stricken down was based under
the following reasons:
The law itself admits that the candidates for admission who flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952
had inadequate preparation due to the fact that this was very close to the end of World War II;
The law is, in effect, a judgment revoking the resolution of the court on the petitions of the said
candidates;
The law is an encroachment on the Court’s primary prerogative to determine who may be
admitted to practice of law and, therefore, in excess of legislative power to repeal, alter and
supplement the Rules of Court. The rules laid down by Congress under this power are only
minimum norms, not designed to substitute the judgment of the court on who can practice law;
and
The pretended classification is arbitrary and amounts to class legislation.
As to the portion declared in force and effect, the Court could not muster enough votes to
declare it void. Moreover, the law was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953. Hence, it will not
revoke existing Supreme Court resolutions denying admission to the bar of an petitioner. The
same may also rationally fall within the power to Congress to alter, supplement or modify rules
of admission to the practice of law.

2. In the matter of Haron S. Meling

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN
THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

Facts:
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar
Examinations and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the
Philippine Shari’a Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002
Bar Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court
in Cities (MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for
Grave Oral Defamation, and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when
Meling allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media
practitioners and other people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of
Melendrez’ wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title “Attorney” in his
communications, as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a
member of the Bar. Attached to the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling
used the appellation and appears on its face to have been received by the Sangguniang
Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Court’s Resolution dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the
OBC.

In his Answer, Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to
settle his misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be
settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former
professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually arose from a
single incident and involving the same parties as “closed and terminated.” Moreover, Meling
denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.

As regards the use of the title “Attorney,” Meling admits that some of his communications
really contained the word “Attorney” as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge
of non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to
take the Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of
competent jurisdiction can dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the
cases filed against Meling are still pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases
were already dismissed, he is still required to disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his
good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations are made under oath, and
should not be taken lightly by an applicant.

Issue: WON the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon Haron S. Meling is proper and shall
subsequently barred him from taking his lawyer’s oath and signing on the Roll of Attorneys

Held:

The Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar. Accordingly, the membership of
Haron S. Meling in the Philippine Shari’a Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from
the Court, the suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent
Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyer’s Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member
of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.

Rationale:

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Shari’a Court, is not a matter of right but
merely a privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are
also known to possess good moral character. The requirement of good moral character is not
only a condition precedent to admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant. The nature of whatever cases are pending
against the applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral
fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then
flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or
insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
3. Pentecostes vs. Marasigan

ROLLY PENTECOSTES v. ATTY. HERMENEGILDO

529 SCRA 146 (2007)

The clerk of court has the duty to safely keep all records, papers, files, exhibits and public
property.

Atty. Hermenegildo Marasigan, Clerk of Court VI of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the
Regional Trial Court North Cotabato, was administratively charged with grave misconduct and
conduct unbecoming a public officer for the loss of a motorcycle-subject matter of a criminal
case which was placed under his care and custody.

The administrative case against Atty. Hermenegildo stemmed from a sworn affidavit complaint
filed on November 11, 2004 by Rolly Pentecostes, the owner of a Kawasaki motorcycle, which
was recovered by members of the Philippine National Police of M’lang, North Cotabato from
suspected carnappers.

The release order for the motorcycle was issued but Pentecostes refused to receive it
because it was already ―cannibalized‖ and unserviceable.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) referred the case to the Executive Judge of RTC, Kabacan,
North Cotabato, for investigation, report and recommendation. Judge Rabang recommended
that the administrative complaint against Atty. Hermenegildo be dismissed because there was
no proof of Pentecostes’ claim that the vehicle was ―cannibalized‖ from the time that it was
under Atty. Hermenegildo’s custody until its transfer to Philippine National Police (PNP) of
Kabacan. The Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) affirmed the dismissal of the complaint.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Atty. Hermenegildo is guilty of misconduct

HELD: It is the duty of the clerk of court to keep safely all records, papers, files, exhibits and
public property committed to his charge.[12] Section D (4), Chapter VII of the 1991 Manual For
Clerks of Court (now Section E[2], paragraph 2.2.3, Chapter VI of the 2002 Revised Manual
for Clerks of Court) which provides all exhibits used as evidence and turned over to the court
and before the case/s involving such evidence shall have been terminated shall be under the
custody and safekeeping of the Clerk of Court.

From the above provisions, it is clear that as clerk of court of the RTC, Kabacan, Atty.
Hermenegildo was charged with the custody and safekeeping of Pentecostes’ motorcycle, and
to keep it until the termination of the case, barring circumstances that would justify its
safekeeping elsewhere, and upon the prior authority of the trial court.

The Court said ―no explanation was offered by Atty. Hermenegildo, however, for turning over
the motorcycle. But whatever the reason was, Atty. Hermenegildo was mandated to secure
prior consultations with and approval of the trial court.‖

Moreover disconcerting is the fact that the acknowledgment receipt evidencing the turnover of
the motorcycle from the trial court to the Kabacan police station was lost from the records, with
nary a lead as to who was responsible for it. These circumstance are viewed with disfavor as it
reflects badly on the safekeeping of court records, a duty entrusted to Atty. Hermenegildo as
clerk of court.

The Court has repeatedly emphasized that clerks of court are essential and ranking officers of
our judicial system who perform delicate functions vital to the prompt and proper
administration of justice. Their duties include the efficient recording, filing and management of
court records and, as previously pointed out, the safekeeping of exhibits and public property
committed to their charge.

4. Aquino vs. Pascua

 FATHER RANHILIO AQUINO et al V ATTY EDWIN PASCUA A.C. No. 5095, November
28, 2007

FACTS:
Father Ranhilio Aquino, as the Academic head of the Philippine Judiciary Academy,
together with other complainants filed a letter-complaint against Attorney Edwin Pascua, a
Notary Public for violation of the Notarial Practice Law. In his letter-complaint, Father
Aquino alleged that Atty. Pascua falsified two notarized documents in which he filed with
the Civil Service Commission. Atty. Pascua admitted having notarized the two documents,
but they were not entered in his Notarial Register due to the oversight of his legal
secretary. The case was referred to the Office of the Bar Confidant for investigation, report
and recommendation. The Office of the Bar Confidant found that Fr. Ranhilio and the other
complainants are, therefore, correct in maintaining that Atty. Pascua falsely assigned
fictitious numbers to the questioned affidavit-complaints, a clear dishonesty on his part not
only as a Notary Public, but also as a member of the Bar.

ISSUE:
WON Atty. Pascua is guilty of Misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to
register in his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints.
HELD:
Yes. After a close review of the records of this case, the court resolved to adopt the
findings of facts and conclusion of law by the Office of the Bar Confidant. They found that
Atty. Pascua guilty of misconduct in the performance of his duties for failing to register in
his Notarial Register the affidavit-complaints of Joseph B. Acorda and Remigio B.
Domingo. Misconduct generally means wrongful, improper or unlawful conduct motivated
by a premeditated, obstinate or intentional purpose. Atty. Pascua claims that the omission
was not intentional but due to oversight of his staff. Whichever is the case, Atty. Pascua
cannot escape liability. His failure to enter into his notarial register the documents that he
admittedly notarized is a dereliction of duty on his part as a notary public and he is bound
by the acts of his staff. Under the notarial law, the notary public shall enter in such
register, in chronological order, the nature of each instrument executed, sworn to, or
acknowledged before him, the person executing, swearing to, or acknowledging the
instrument. Failure of the notary to make the proper entry or entries in his notarial register
touching his notarial acts in the manner required by law is a ground for revocation of his
commission. In the present case, considering that this is Atty. Pascua’s first offense, court
believed that the imposition of a three-month suspension from the practice of law upon
him is in order. Likewise, since his offense is a ground for revocation of notarial
commission, the same should also be imposed upon him.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, Atty. Edwin Pascua is declared GUILTY of misconduct and is
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months with a STERN WARNING that
a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely. His notarial
commission, if still existing, is ordered REVOKED.

5. RODOLFO M. BERNARDO v ATTY. ISMAEL F. MEJIA Adm. Case No. 2984. August
31, 2007

FACTS:
Rodolfo M. Bernardo, Jr. accused his retained attorney, Ismael F. Mejia of several
administrative offenses such as misappropriating and converting to his personal use the
money entrusted to him for payment of real estate taxes on Bernardo’s property;
falsification of documents such as the Special Power of Attorney, Deed of Sale and Deed
of Assignment and lastly, issuing a check knowing that he was without funds in the bank,
in payment of a loan obtained from the former in the amount of P50,000.00, and
thereafter, replacing said check with others known also to be insufficiently funded. The
Supreme Court En Banc rendered a Decision Per Curiam which found the respondent
Atty. Mejia guilty of all the charges against him and imposed on him the penalty of
Disbarment. Respondent files a Petition praying that he be allowed to reengage in the
practice of law however, the Supreme Court En Banc denied his petition for reinstatement.
The respondent filed again this present petition for review of his Administrative case with a
plea for reinstatement in the practice of law. In the petition, Mejia acknowledged his
 indiscretions in the law profession. At the age of seventy-one, he is begging for
forgiveness and pleading for reinstatement. According to him, he has long repented and
he has suffered enough. Through his reinstatement, he wants to leave a legacy to his
children and redeem the indignity that they have suffered due to his disbarment.

ISSUE:
WON the respondent shall be reinstated.

HELD:
The Court granted the respondent’s petition. Fifteen years has passed since he was
punished with the severe penalty of disbarment. Although the Court does not lightly take
the bases for Mejias disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact that Mejia is
already of advanced years. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Thus, while the Court is ever mindful of its
duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the
penalty imposed has already served its purpose. After all, penalties, such as disbarment,
are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. However, the petitioner is reminded
that practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions. Adherence to the rigid
standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality and faithful
compliance with the rules of the legal profession are the continuing requirements for
enjoying the privilege to practice law.

DECISION:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys by Ismael F. Mejia is hereby GRANTED.

Bernardo, Jr. vs. Mejia, 211 SCRA 852 , July 29, 1992
Attorneys; An attorney who appropriated money entrusted by his client, and who falsely gave
assurances that he used the money for the purposes intended, and who issued bad checks to
re-pay them is ordered debarred.—A thoroughgoing review of the affidavits, pleadings and
other papers filed by the parties convinces this Court of the correctness of the foregoing
conclusions of the IBP Board of Governors. They are consequently hereby adopted and
approved. WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES the respondent, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia, guilty
of all the charges against him and hereby imposes on him the penalty of DISBARMENT.
Pending finality of this judgment, and effective immediately, Atty. Ismael F. Mejia is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be spread in his record in
the Bar Confidant’s Office, and notice thereof furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
as well as the Court Administrator who is DIRECTED to inform all the Courts concerned of this
Decision

6. Velez vs. De Vera

VELEZ V ATTY DE VERA

A.C. No. 6697, July 25, 2006

FACTS:
This case involves three consolidated cases revolving around Integrated Bar of the Philippines
(IBP) Governor and Executive Vice-President (EVP) Atty. Leonard de Vera. The first pertains
to a disbarment case questioning Atty. de Veras moral fitness to remain as a member of the
Philippine Bar, the second refers to Atty. de Veras letter-request to schedule his oath taking as
IBP National President, and the third case concerns the validity of his removal as Governor
and EVP of the IBP by the IBP Board. The complainant Zoilo Antonio Velez moved for the
suspension and/or disbarment of respondent Atty. Leonard de Vera based on the following
grounds: 1) respondents alleged misrepresentation in concealing the suspension order
rendered against him by the State Bar of California; and 2) respondents alleged violation of
the so-called rotation rule with the purpose of becoming the next IBP National President
Complainant averred that the respondent, in appropriating for his own benefit funds due his
client, was found to have performed an act constituting moral turpitude by the State Bar of
California. He also alleged that the respondent was then forced to resign or surrender his
license to practice law in the said state in order to evade the recommended three (3) year
suspension. Complainant asserted that the respondent lacks the moral competence necessary
to lead the country’s most noble profession. Complainant prayed that the respondent be
enjoined from assuming office as IBP National President. Respondent, in his comment, stated
that the issues raised in Complaint were the very issues raised in an earlier administrative
case filed by the same complainant against him. In fact, according to him, the said issues were
already extensively discussed and categorically ruled upon by this Court. Respondent prayed
that the instant administrative complaint be dismissed following the principle of res judicata.
On the other hand, complainant added that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the
case at bar. He asserted that the first administrative case filed against the respondent was one
for his disqualification. During the 20th Regular Meeting of the Board the IBP Board, by 2/3
vote, resolved to remove Atty. de Vera as member of the IBP Board of Governors and as IBP
Executive Vice President for having committed acts which were inimical to the IBP Board and
the IBP. On the other hand, Atty. de Vera aired his sentiments to this Court by writing the then
Hon. Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. a letter. In the said letter, he strongly and
categorically denied having committed acts inimical to the IBP and its Board. He alleged that
on the basis of an unverified letter complaint filed by IBP Governor Rivera, the IBP Board
voted to expel him posthaste, without just cause and in complete disregard of even the
minimum standards of due process. On their response, the IBP Board explained to the Court
that their decision to remove Atty. de Vera was based on valid grounds and was intended to
protect itself from a recalcitrant member. Atty. de Vera maintained that there was absolutely
no factual or legal basis to sustain the motion to remove him from the IBP Board because he
violated no law. He argued that if the basis for his removal as EVP was based on the same
grounds as his removal from the IBP Board, then his removal as EVP was likewise executed
without due notice and without the least compliance with the minimum standards of due
process of law.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not respondent Attorney Leonard S. Devera commited malpractice which
amounted to moral turpitude in the State Bar of California and in the Philippines, in the course
of his practice of law. 2. Whether or not the oath of office as lawyer is attached to the person
of Attorney Leonard S. Devera wherever he may go and not necessarily bound by the
territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. 3. Whether or not there is substantial evidence to
prove the moral turpitude, as basis for disbarment of respondent in an administrative
proceeding. 4. Whether or not res judicata applies in this case.

HELD:
1. The recommendation of the hearing officer of the State Bar of California, standing alone, is
not proof of malpractice. There’s no final judgment for suspension or disbarment was meted
against Atty. de Vera despite a recommendation of suspension of three years as he
surrendered his license to practice law before his case could be taken up by the Supreme
Court of California. Judgment of suspension against a Filipino lawyer may transmute into a
similar judgment of suspension in the Philippines only if the basis of the foreign courts action
includes any of the grounds for disbarment or suspension in this jurisdiction. In herein case,
considering that there is technically no foreign judgment to speak of, the recommendation by
the hearing officer of the State Bar of California does not constitute prima facie evidence of
unethical behavior by Atty. de Vera. Complainant must prove by substantial evidence the facts
upon which the recommendation by the hearing officer was based. If he is successful in this,
he must then prove that these acts are likewise unethical under Philippine law. 2. Petitioners
contend that respondent de Vera is disqualified for the post because he is not really from
Eastern Mindanao. His place of residence is in Paranaque and he was originally a member of
the PPLM IBP Chapter. He only changed his IBP Chapter membership to pave the way for his
ultimate goal of attaining the highest IBP post, which is the national presidency. Petitioners
aver that in changing his IBP membership, respondent De Vera violated the domicile rule. The
contention has no merit. Under the last paragraph of Section 19, Article II, a lawyer included in
the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court can register with the particular IBP Chapter of his
preference or choice. 3. The distinctions between the two cases are far from trivial. The
previous case was resolved on the basis of the parties rights and obligations under the IBP
By-laws. We held therein that Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified from running as Regional
Governor as there is nothing in the present IBP By-laws that sanctions the disqualification of
candidates for IBP governors. Consequently, we stressed that the petition had no firm ground
to stand on. The Courts statement, therefore, that Atty. De Vera cannot be disqualified on the
ground that he was not morally fit was mere obiter dictum. Precisely, the IBP By-laws do not
allow for pre-election disqualification proceedings; hence, Atty. de Vera cannot be disqualified
on the basis of the administrative findings of a hearing officer of the State Bar of California
suspending him from the practice of law for three years. There is nothing in the By-Laws which
explicitly provides that one must be morally fit before he can run for IBP governorship. For
one, this is so because the determination of moral fitness of a candidate lies in the individual
judgment of the members of the House of Delegates. Indeed, based on each member's
standard of morality, he is free to nominate and elect any member, so long as the latter
possesses the basic requirements under the law. For another, basically the disqualification of
a candidate involving lack of moral fitness should emanate from his disbarment or suspension
from the practice of law by this Court, or conviction by final judgment of an offense which
involves moral turpitude. 4. In the instant administrative case, it is clear that the issues raised
by the complainant had already been resolved by this Court in an earlier administrative case.
The complainant’s contention that the principle of res judicata would not apply in the case at
bar as the first administrative case was one for disqualification while the instant administrative
complaint is one for suspension and/or disbarment should be given least credence. It is worthy
to note that while the instant administrative complaint is denominated as one for suspension
and/or disbarment, it prayed neither the suspension nor the disbarment of the respondent but
instead merely sought to enjoin the respondent from assuming office as IBP National
President. Although the parties in the present administrative case and in Adm. Case No. 6052
are identical, their capacities in these cases and the issues presented therein are not the
same, thereby barring the application of res judicata. In order that the principle of res judicata
may be made to apply, four essential conditions must concur, namely: (1) the judgment sought
to bar the new action must be final; (2) the decision must have been rendered by a court
having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the disposition of the case must
be a judgment or order on the merits, and (4) there must be between the first and second
action identity of parties, identity of subject matter, and identity of causes of action. In the
absence of any one of these elements, Atty. de Vera cannot argue res judicata in his favor.
Finally, the two administrative cases do not seek the same relief. In the first case, the
complainants sought to prevent Atty. de Vera from assuming his post as IBP Governor for
Eastern Mindanao. In the present case, as clarified by complainant in his Memorandum, what
is being principally sought is Atty. De Vera’s suspension or disbarment.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows: 1. SUSPEND Atty. Leonard de
Vera in A.C. No. 6697 from the practice of law for TWO (2) YEARS, effective from the finality
of this Resolution. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to the personal record of Atty.
Leonard de Vera and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of
the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts; 2. DISMISS the letter-complaint of Atty.
Leonard de Vera, dated 18 May 2005, in A.M. No. 05-5-15-SC, praying for the disapproval of
the Resolution, dated 13 May 2005, of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines removing him from his posts as Governor and Executive Vice President of the
Integrated Bar of thePhilippines, the said Resolution having been rendered without grave
abuse of discretion; 3. AFFIRM the election by the Board of Governors of Atty. Jose Vicente B.
Salazar as Executive Vice President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the remainder
of the term 2003-2005, such having been conducted in accordance with its By-Laws and
absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion; and 4. DIRECT Atty. Jose Vicente B.
Salazar to immediately take his oath of office and assume the Presidency of the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines for the term 2005-2007 in accordance with the automatic succession
rule in Article VII, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws, upon receipt of this Resolution.
7.
8. DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE v EDWIN L. RANA
Bar Matter No. 1036. June 10, 2003

FACTS
Respondent Edwin L. Rana was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations. One
day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as members of the
Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre filed against the respondent. Complainant
charged respondent with unauthorized practice of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and
grave misrepresentation. The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the
Bar. However, the Court ruled that respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the
resolution of the charge against him. Thus, respondent took the lawyer’s oath on the
scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now. Complainant alleges that
respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a candidate in the May 2001
elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (“MBEC”) of Mandaon, Masbate.
Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading wherein the
respondent represented himself as counsel for and in be Vice Mayoralty Candidate and signed
the pleading as counsel for him. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a
ploy to prevent the proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate. Complainant
questioned his appearance on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a
lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the government. In his Comment, respondent admits
that Bunan sought his “specific assistance” to represent him before the MBEC. Respondent
claims that “he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a person who
knows the law.” Respondent admits signing the pleading that objected to the inclusion of
certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an “attorney” in the pleading. Respondent prays that the
complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

ISSUE
WON respondent engaged in the unauthorized practice of law and thus does not deserve
admission to the Philippine Bar.
HELD
The records show that respondent appeared as counsel for Bunan and has also retained by a
mayoralty candidate as her counsel. All these happened even before respondent took the
lawyer’s oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in the practice of law without being a member of
the Philippine Bar. In Cayetano v. Monsod, the Court held that “practice of law” means any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually
performed by members of the legal profession. Generally, to practice law is to render any kind
of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill. Verily, respondent was engaged
in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before the MBEC and filed various
pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of unauthorized
practice of law. Respondent called himself “counsel” knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as “counsel” knowing that he had no authority to
practice law, respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. A
bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law simply by passing the bar
examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from one who has
passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an attorney-at-law.8
Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to be
performed, namely: his lawyer’s oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the
Roll of Attorneys On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows
that Bunan indeed authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC
and similar bodies. While there was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no
authority to practice law.

DECISION
WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

9. Petition for Leave to Resume Practice of Law, Benjamin Dacanay 540 SCRA 424

FACTS: Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he
migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He
subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program.
His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004.
In July 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition
Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship. On that day, he took his oath of
allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada.
Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner may still resume practice?
RULING: Section 2, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides an applicant for admission to the
bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character
and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude,
have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates
membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of
law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice
law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.
The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of
another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because “all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost
their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225].” Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who
becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if
he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225.
Before he can can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority
to do so, conditioned on:
 the updating and payment of of IBP membership dues;
 the payment of professional tax;
 the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this
is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
 the retaking of the lawyer’s oath.

10. Cayetano vs. Monsod

RENATO L. CAYETANO v. CHRISTIAN MONSOD, GR No. 100113, 1991-09-03

Facts:
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
"There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been...
candidates for any elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a
majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years."
Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman
of the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments
on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does... not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his... professional
license fees as a lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod
worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970),
Monsod worked as an operations officer for about two years in Costa Rica and
Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries, negotiating
loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon returning to the
Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of...
an investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has
rendered services to various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL,
Monsod's,... work involved being knowledgeable in election law. He appeared for NAMFREL
in its accredition hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his
personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human
Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban
poor groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform
law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal... knowledge as a
member of the Davide Commission, a guasi-judicial body, which conducted numerous
hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and
Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited by the
President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia-Munoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the
party-list system for the House of Representative.
Issues:
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
praying that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod... as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Ruling:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted during the public hearings on Monsod's
confirmation, implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required
by law. The judgment rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an
acknowledged... power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1
Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the
Court... interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for
the exercise of the Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the
issuance... of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Principles:
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term "practice of law", particularly the
modern concept of law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended
by the framers of the Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a... lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor - verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement - that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least... ten
years.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
"We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life."
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked
Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on
condition that
"No blade shall touch his skin; No blood shall flow from his veins."
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod
burning white-hot two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the
man. Upon hearing of what had happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself... with
anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his word. The
procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood flow from his veins?"
The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the... agreement.

11. Cruz vs. Cabrera

Facts:
Complainant alleges that he is a fourth year law student; since the latter part of 2001, he
instituted several actions against his neighbors; he appeared for and in his behalf in his own
cases; he met respondent who acted as the counsel of his neighbors; during a hearing on
January 14, 2002, in one case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 112, Pasay City,
presided by Judge Caridad Cuerdo.
Respondent’s imputations were uncalled for and the latter’s act of compelling the court to ask
complainant whether he is a lawyer or not was intended to malign him before the public,
inasmuch as respondent knew that complainant is not a lawyer, having appeared for and in his
behalf as a party litigant in prior cases; respondent’s imputations of complainant’s
misrepresentation as a lawyer was patently with malice to discredit his honor, with the
intention to threaten him not to appear anymore in cases respondent was handling; the
manner, substance, tone of voice and how the words “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka
muna!” were uttered were totally with the intention to annoy, vex and humiliate, malign,
ridicule, incriminate and discredit complainant before the public.

Issue:
Whether or not respondent violated Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Whether or not complainant is not precluded from litigating personally his cases
Whether or not complainant is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:
1. We hold that respondent’s outburst of “appear ka ng appear, pumasa ka muna” does not
amount to a violation of Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Such single
outburst, though uncalled for, is not of such magnitude as to warrant respondent’s suspension
or reproof. It is but a product of impulsiveness or the heat of the moment in the course of an
argument between them. It has been said that lawyers should not be held to too strict an
account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that
the big way is for the court to condone even contemptuous language.
2. Nonetheless, we remind respondent that complainant is not precluded from litigating
personally his cases. A party’s right to conduct litigation personally is recognized by Section
34 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court: SEC. 34. By whom litigation conducted. — In the court of
a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in person, with the aid of an agent or
friend appointed by him for that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. In any other court, a
party may conduct his litigation personally or by aid of an attorney, and his appearance must
be either personal or by a duly authorized member of the bar.

3. The practice of law, though impossible to define exactly, involves the exercise of a
profession or vocation usually for gain, mainly as attorney by acting in a representative
capacity and as counsel by rendering legal advise to others. Private practice has been defined
by this Court as follows:
x x x. Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary
action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise.
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute [referring to the prohibition for judges and
other officials or employees of the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General from
engaging in private practice] has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one’s
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such services. x x x.
Clearly, in appearing for herself, complainant was not customarily or habitually holding herself
out to the public as a lawyer. Neither was she demanding payment for such services. Hence,
she cannot be said to be in the practice of law.
On the other hand, all lawyers should take heed that lawyers are licensed officers of the courts
who are empowered to appear, prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties,
responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the bar
imposes upon them certain obligations. Mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal
profession, they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Though a lawyer’s language
may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity
of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place
in the dignity of judicial forum.

12. Lim-Santiago vs. Sagucio

EN BANC[ A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006 ]

RUTHIE LIM-SANTIAGO, COMPLAINANT,
VS.
ATTY. CARLOS B. SAGUCIO, RESPONDENT

Facts:
Complainant charges respondent with the following violations:

1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests.

Respondent, being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the
operations of Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing,
investigating and deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant
claims that respondent instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened
Taggat employees to accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.

2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor

Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995,
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, and P5,000 for the month of April
1996.
Issue:
whether or not being a former lawyer of Taggat conflicts with respondent’s role as Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor
Whether or not respondent is engaged in the practice of law

Ruling:
1. The Court exonerates respondent from the charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (“Code”). However, the Court finds respondent liable for violation
of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility against unlawful conduct.
Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees or Republic Act No. 6713
(“RA 6713”).

Canon 6 provides that the Code “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official duties.” A government lawyer is thus bound by the prohibition “not [to] represent
conflicting interests.” However, this rule is subject to certain limitations. The prohibition to
represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of interest exists, when a written
consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts or when no true attorney-
client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious consequence of the disbarment or
suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty.

Respondent is also mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in “unlawful x x x
conduct.” Unlawful conduct includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government
employee to “engage in the private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the
Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his]
official functions.”

2. “Private practice of law” contemplates a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer.

Respondent argues that he only rendered consultancy services to Taggat intermittently and he
was not a retained counsel of Taggat from 1995 to 1996 as alleged. This argument is without
merit because the law does not distinguish between consultancy services and retainer
agreement. For as long as respondent performed acts that are usually rendered by lawyers
with the use of their legal knowledge, the same falls within the ambit of the term “practice of
law.”

13. In Re: Al C. Argosino 246 SCRA 14 (1995)

FACTS:
On February 4, 1992 ,Argosino, together with 13 others, was charged with the crime of
homicide in connection with the death of one Raul Camaligan. The death of Camaligan
stemmed from the affliction of severe physical injuries uponhim in course of "hazing"
conducted as part of the university fraternity initiation rites. On February 11, 1993, the accused
were consequently sentenced to suffer imprisonment for a period ranging from two (2) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his
colleagues filed an application for probation with the lower court. The application was granted
on June 18 1993. The period of probation was set at two (2) years, counted from the
probationer's initial report to the probation officer assigned to supervise him. Less than a
month later, Argosino filed a petition to take the bar exam. He was allowed and he passed the
exam, but was not allowed to take the lawyer's oath of office.On April 15, 1994, Argosino
filed a petition to allow him to take the attorney's oath and be admitted to the practice of law.
He averred that his probation period had been terminated. It is noted that his probation period
did not last for more than 10 months.

ISSUE:
Whether Argosino should be allowed to take the oath of attorney and be admitted to the
practice of law
HELD:
Mr. Argosino must submit to this Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those who are seeking admission
to the bar. He should show to the Court how he has tried to make up for the senseless killing
of a helpless student to the family of the deceased student and to the community at large. In
short, he mustshow evidence that he is a different person now, that he has become morally
fitfor admission to the profession of law.
He is already directed to inform the Court, by appropriate written manifestation, of the names
of the parents or brothers and sisters of Camaligan from notice.

NOTES:
 The practice of law is a high personal privilege limited to citizens of goodmoral character,
with special education qualifications, duly ascertained and certified.
 Requirement of good moral character is of greater importance so far as the general public
and proper administration of justice is concerned.
 All aspects of moral character and behavior may be inquired into in respect of those seeking
admission to the Bar.
 Requirement of good moral character to be satisfied by those who wouldseek admission to
the bar must be a necessity more stringent than the norm of conduct expected from members
of the general public.
 Participation in the prolonged mindless physical beatings inflicted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident rejection of that moral duty and was totally irresponsible behavior, which
makes impossible a finding that the participant was possessed of good moral character.
 Good moral character is a requirement possession of which must be demonstrated at the
time of the application for permission to take the barexaminations and more importantly at the
time of application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney's oath of office.