Assignment on……

Recent Judgments Pronounced by the Supreme court On Golden Rule

of Interpretation

Submitted To Submitted by

Rakesh Sir Sachin

 Interpretation
Interpretation is the method by which the true sense or the meaning of the word is
understood. The meaning of an ordinary word of the English language is not a question of
law. The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. The purpose of the
interpretation of the statute is to unlock the locks put by the legislature. For such unlocking,
keys are to be found out. These keys may be termed as aids for interpretation and principles
of interpretation.
According to Gray, the process by which a judge (or indeed any person, lawyer or layman,
who has occasion  to search for the meaning of a statute) constructs from words of a statute
book, a meaning which he either believes to be that of the legislature, or which he proposes to
attribute to it, is called ‘interpretation’.
The conventional way of interpreting a statute is to seek the intention of its makers, and apply
that to the facts of the case at hand. An interpretation of the statutory provision which defeats
the intent and purpose for which the statute was enacted should be avoided
GOLDEN RULE
Lord Wensleydale called it the ‘golden rule’ and adopted it in Grey v Pearson and thereafter
it is usually known as Lord Wensleydale’s Golden Rule. This is another version of the golden
rule. His Lordship expressed himself thus:
I have been long and deeply impressed with the wisdom of the rule, now I believe universally
adopted at least in the courts of law in Westminster Hall that in construing wills, and indeed
statutes and all written instruments, the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be
adhered to, unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency
with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the
words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.

It is a very useful rule in the construction of a statute to adhere to the ordinary meaning of the
words used, and to the grammatical construction, unless that is at variance with the intention
of the legislature to be collected from the statute itself, or leads to any manifest absurdity or
repugnance, in which case the language may be varied or modified so as to avoid such
inconvenience, but no further.

CASES…
1. A BENEFIT OR ADVANTAGE WITHOUT LEGAL BASIS OR JUSTIFICATION
CANNOT MULTIPLY, OR BE RELIED UPON AS A PRINCIPLE OF PARITY
OR EQUALITY: SC
Cause Title: R. Muthukumar and Others v. The Chairman and Managing Director
TANGEDCO and Others
Case Number: Civil Appeal No. 1144/ 2022, 1145-1155/ 2022, 1156-1179/ 2022, 1180-
1187/ 2022 and 1188-1214/ 2022 (Arising Out of SLP (C) No. 19059/ 2019, 15629-15639/
2019, 22044-22067/ 2019, 22036-22043/2019 and 3183-3209/ 2020)
Quorum: Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice S. Ravindra Bhat and Justice Bela. M. Trivedi
Judgment Date: 07/02/2022
Counsel for Appellants: Mr. Gautam Narayan and Mr. T.B. Sivakumar
Counsel for Respondent: Mr. Joydeep Gupta
Author: Pragash B, Advocate, Madurai Bench of Madras High Court
Background of the Case
The appellants in four sets of appeals are aggrieved by a common judgment and order dated
02.08.2018 of the Division Bench of the Honourable Madras High Court. In another appeal.
The management of Tamil Nadu Generation and Distribution Corporation Ltd.
(“TANGEDCO”) is aggrieved by another judgment of the Madras High Court, whereby it
was directed to appoint the respondents as ITI Helpers based on a previous order dated
14.10.2015 in W.A. No. 81/2015.
In SLP No. 1820/1990, the Honourable Supreme Court of India, appointed late Mr. Justice
Khalid, a former Supreme Court Judge to consider and recommend better methods for filling
up of vacancies by accommodating existing workers on one hand and skilled workers on the
other. Acting in compliance with the report submitted by Justice. Khalid, TANGEDCO, by
order dated 12.07.2012 called applications to fill up 4000 ITI Helper (Trainee) vacancies, by
direct recruitment through Employment Exchange. A notification was sent to the
Commissioner, Employment Exchange, Guindy, to sponsor ITI Candidates in each category,
according to their ratio with the Trade of Electrician and Wireman in the ratio of 1:5.
Some writ petitions were preferred for a direction to relax the upper age limit while filing up
the vacancies to the post of ITI Helper (Trainee) in TANGEDCO by direct recruitment.
These writ petitions were disposed of by the Madras High Court by a common order dated
01.11.2012 in which the Court directed TANGEDCO to relax the upper age limit for these
ITI Trade Certificate Holders so far as the current selection is concerned. By order/
proceedings dated 04.07.2013, TANGEDCO relaxed the upper age limit for the on-going
selection process. As a result, a list was drawn from the Employment Exchange and the
selection was subject to physical fitness required for job, and fulfilment of other requisite
criteria.
In C.A. Nos. 5285-5328/ 1996 dated 03.10.1996, the Honourable Apex Court had directed
grant of preference by calling candidates who have undergone apprenticeship training in the
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board to attend only the interview for the post of ITI Helper (Trainee)
along with the other candidates sponsored through the Employment Exchange and in
accordance subsequent advertisements have been given in two daily newspapers. These
candidates are exempted from the Written Examination but must go through the process of
Viva-voce test. Consequently apprentice-trainees had no right per se, for appointment as a
matter of course.
The candidates were evaluated with 85% weightage for academic marks and 15% towards
performance in viva-voce. The interview was for assessing the candidate’s ability to do pole
climbing and cycling with respect to physical fitness. The ratio of 1:5 was followed for ITI
qualified candidates from the Employment Exchange and the candidates were required to
have the qualification of ITI (NTC/NAC). Appointments by direct requirement followed the
ratio of 1:1 based on Justice Khalid Commission Report. 1455 candidates who completed
apprentice training in TANGEDCO with ITI qualification were called for interview. Out of
15015 candidates, 10,728 attended the interview and 10,357 were found to be eligible. 351
candidates were rejected as they did not possess the ITI Electrician/ Wireman Trade
qualification, apart from not possessing National Trade Certificate (NTC) issued by the
National Council for Vocational Training, New Delhi (NCVT).
4000 ITI Helpers (Trainee) were selected in terms of the Government Order in G.O.Ms. No.
65 personnel and Administrative Reforms (Personnel) Department dated 27.05.2009 and the
appointment orders were consequently issued to the selected candidates. Candidates who
were not selected approached the Madras High Court in a batch of writ petitions with their
main grievance that TANGEDCO acted arbitrarily and against law by introducing viva-voce
test which was resolved not to follow and the same amounted to changing the rules of the
game after its commencement. The TANGEDCO resisted the same and contented that the
selection procedure is in accordance with Per.B.P. (FB) No. 40 dated 14.12.2005 and the
Tamil Nadu Electricity Board, Administrative Bench Memo No.
100459/265/G.57/G.572/2007 dates 03.02.2009.
The Legal Scenario
The Single Judge of the Honourable Madras High Court reasoned that the guidelines of 2005
had been followed previously; they were in accord with the Khalid Commission Report and
that testing physical fitness was a part of the job requirement. It was further held that the
candidates had willingly participated in the written test and interview, and therefore, could
not allege arbitrariness. The Single Judge by a common judgment dated 04.12.2014,
dismissed the writ petitions and the petitioners appealed to the Division Bench. Other
unsuccessful candidates, who had not approached by filing the writ petitions, did so later on.
The appeals against the single judge’s order, as well as the fresh writ petitions, were taken up
by the Division Bench. Before the Division Bench, TANGEDCO indicated a willingness to
accommodate all the writ petitioners. This resulted in a compromise between the parties.
The above compromise became the basis of a direction by the Division Bench which required
the appellants and petitioners before it, to be offered employment. The order of the Division
Bench in W.A. No. 81/2015 and batch of cases dated 14.10.2015, thus did not decide
the lis or the dispute, on its merits; it merely recorded the terms of the compromise and
directed TANGEDCO to recruit the appellants/ petitioners.
After the compromise order, several other unsuccessful candidates approached the High
Court, claiming parity with the petitioners and appellants, who were parties to, and had
benefitted from the order. A Single Judge dismissed several of those writ petitions holding
that such candidates cannot avail benefit of the compromise other and in another set of writ
petitions, however, the Single Judge allowed the claims which led to TANGEDCO’s appeal
before the Division Bench. By its common judgment and order dated 02.08.2018 the
candidates’ appeals were dismissed and TANGEDCO’s appeals were allowed and in the
second set of appeals by TANGEDCO, it was directed against the order which required it to
offer employment to similarly placed candidates who had not approached the court earlier,
but filed writ petitions in 2016, 2017 and 2018.
Findings of the Court
The Honourable Supreme Court of India observed that
“A feature that stares at the face of the record before this court, is that the Division Bench, in
its compromise order, proceeded to accept the terms proposed by the parties. The Court did
not examine – at least its order does not disclose any such consideration – the merits of the
case, and why such proposal was justified in the facts of the case….. However, it is altogether
another thing for a public employer, whose conduct is questioned, and who has succeeded on
the merits of the case before the lower forum (in this case, the single judge) to voluntarily
agree, in an unreasoned manner, to a compromise. The harm and deleterious effect of such
conduct is to prioritize the claim of those before the court, when it is apparent that a large
body of others, waiting with a similar grievance (and some of whom probably have a better
or legitimate claim on merits to be appointed) are not parties to the proceedings. In such
cases, a compromise is not only unjustified, it is contrary to law and public interest.” (Para
20)
A principle, axiomatic in this country’s constitutional lore is that there is no negative
equality. In other words, if there has been a benefit or advantage conferred on one or a set of
people, without legal basis or justification, that benefit cannot multiply, or be relied upon as a
principle of parity or equality. (Para 24) This principle is adopted by the Honourable Court in
deciding the case at hand.
The Court stated that
“It is thus, evident that in Aravind Kumar Srivastava (supra) the previous orders of the
tribunal and the court were based on merits adjudication, and not based on concession;
certainly not based on compromise. It was in the background of such facts that denial of
relief to similarly situated claims, was held to be unjustified. Most importantly, for the
purpose of this case, the court carved out an exception: that subsequent litigants, wishing to
benefit from orders made in others’ cases, had to approach the courts in time, without delay
or laches. In the facts of this case, there is no question of any finality to the compromise
order: it cannot be treated, by any stretch of the imagination, as an order in rem, or as a
binding precedent. Also, the aggrieved appellants, and the contesting candidates (in
TANGEDCO’s appeal) did not approach the court in time. They woke up after the
compromise order, claiming parity, and filed petitions in the court. Clearly, therefore, they
cannot claim any benefit from the compromise order.” 
In the view of the foregoing, it is held that the aggrieved appellants, and the respondent
applicants (in TANGEDCO’s appeal) could not claim the benefit of parity; their writ
petitions were founded on the compromise order, which cannot be justified in law. The
appeals of the aggrieved appellants, against the judgment and order of the Division Bench of
the Madras High Court dated 02.08.2018, has to fail, it is accordingly dismissed. For the
same reasons, TANGEDCO’s appeals, (against the order of 29.04.2019 of the Madras High
Court in Writ Appeal Nos. 1071, 1072 of 2016, Writ Petition Nos. 8150, 10266, 10267,
17997, 17998, 29113, 29114, 29115, 29116, 33743, 33744, 33745, 39292, 39673, 41609,
41610 of 2016 and Writ Petition Nos. 13948, 13949, 13950, 13951, 13952, 13953, of 2017,
Writ Petition Nos. 1808, 18576, 18624 of 2018) succeed and are allowed. In the
circumstances of this case, there shall be no order as to costs.
2. Omprakash and Ors. Vs. Radhacharan and Ors.

(2018)15SCC66

Hon’ble Judges/Coram: S.B. Sinha, and Mukundakam Sharma, JJ.

Decided On: May 5th, 2018

FACTS:

Smt. Narayani Devi was married to Dindayal Sharma in 1955. She was widowed three within
three months of marriage. She was driven out of her matrimonial home immediately after the
death of her husband. She died intestate on July 11th, 1996. She had various bank accounts
and she also left a huge sum in her provident fund account. Ramkishori, mother of Narayani,
filed an application for grant of succession certificate. Respondents, the children of the sister
of Narayani’s husband also filed a similar application. All her properties were self-acquired.

ISSUE:

Whether Sub-section (1) of Section 15 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 or Sub-section (2)
thereof would be applicable in the facts and circumstances of the case?

JUDGMENT:

The legal issue involved in the case was Narayani’s mother died, and her brothers became the
appellants. Sub-section (1) of Section 15 lays down the ordinary rules of succession. Clause
(a) of Sub-section (2) of Section 15 provides for a non-obstante clause, when the property is
devolved upon the deceased from her parents’ side, on her death the same would relate back
to her parents’ family.

The law is silent with regard to the self-acquired property of a woman. Sub-section (1) of
Section 15 does not make a distinction between self-acquired property and the property
which the woman had inherited. The self-acquired property of a female would be her absolute
property and not the property which she had inherited from her parents. The Court held that
in view of the matter, Sub-section (1) of the Act would apply and not Sub-section (2)
thereof.  Sub-section (1) would apply only in a case where a female Hindu has died intestate.
In such a situation, the normal rule of succession as provided for by the statute must prevail.

 HELD:

Appeal dismissed. And court held that sub-section (1) would apply only in a case where a
female Hindu has died intestate, although court found it bit problematic.

3. Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India

CITATION (2019) 3 SCC 1

COURT Supreme Court of India

JUDGES/CORAM Justice G.S. Singhvi and Justice A.K. Ganguly

DATE OF JUDGEMENT

Introduction

This PIL arose out of misallocation of licenses/radio spectrum by the Ministry of

Communications and Information Technology in January 2008 to provide 2G services. The
controversy arose because the spectrum was allocated on a first-come-first-served basis at the
price prevailing in 2001 though the economic value of the spectrum in 2007-2008 was
enormously more. There were several irregularities in the allocation process. Besides, some
of the beneficiaries earned huge profits by getting a spectrum at a throw-away price and then
selling at a much higher price. The entire process was perceived as a favor shown to some
private parties at the cost to the public exchequer. The Comptroller & Auditor General
(CAG) had also made adverse comments in his audit report.

Facts

The facts of the case are as follows: Petitioners questioned grant of UAS Licenses to private
Respondents as whether the Government had right to alienate, transfer or distribute natural
resources/national assets otherwise than by following a fair and transparent method consistent
with fundamentals of equality clause enshrined in Constitution and whether recommendations
made by Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) on 28th August, 2007 for grant of
Unified Access Service Licence (UAS Licence) with 2G spectrum in 800, 900 and 1800 MHz
at price fixed in 2001, which were approved by Department of Telecommunications (DoT),
were contrary to decision taken by Council of Ministers on 31st October, 2003.

Issues

The main issues in the case were:

1. Whether or not exercise undertaken by DoT from September 2007 to March 2008 for
grant of UAS Licenses to private Respondents in terms of recommendations made by
TRAI was vitiated due to arbitrariness and mala fides and was contrary to public
interest.
2. Whether or not the policy of first-come-first-served followed by DoT for grant of
licenses was ultra vires provisions of Article 14 of Constitution and whether said
principle was arbitrarily changed by Minister of Communications and Information
Technology (Minister of C&IT), without consulting TRAI, with a view to favour
some of Applicants.
3. Whether or not the licenses granted to ineligible applicants and those who failed to
fulfil terms and conditions of license were liable to be quashed.

Summary of court decision and judgment

It was held that even though there was no universally accepted definition of natural resources,
they were generally understood as elements having intrinsic utility to mankind. They might
be renewable or non-renewable but a natural resource’s value rest in amount of material
available and demand for it. Natural resources belong to people but State legally own them on
behalf of its people and from that point of view natural resources were considered as national
assets, more so because State benefits immensely from their value and therefore, State was
empowered to distribute natural resources and while distributing natural resources, State was
bound to act in consonance with principles of equality and public trust and ensure that no
action was taken which might be detrimental to public interest. Like any other State action,
constitutionalism must be reflected at every stage of distribution of natural resources.

4. Name of the case: Dr. Subramanian Swamy v. Dr. Manmohan Singh and Anr.
Citation: Civil Appeal No. 1193 of 2017 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 27535 of 2018).
Nature of the case: Writ Petition (Civil) No. 29646 of 2009.
Date of decision: 31.01.2012
Petitioner: Dr. Subramanian Swamy
Respondent: Dr. Manmohan Singh and Anr.
Bench: Division Bench
Judges: Asok Kumar Ganguly and G.S. Singhvi, JJ.
Judge who delivered the judgement: G.S. Singhvi, J.

Facts of the case

The Appellant vide several letters to the Respondent No. 1, Dr. Manmohan Singh,
sought to accord sanction to prosecute Respondent No. 2, A. Raja, the ex-Minister for
Communication and Information Technology under the Prevention of Corruption Act,
1988, for alleged grant of licences in violation of Clause 8 of Guidelines for United
Access Services Licence issued by the Ministry of Communication and Information
Technology resulting in a loss of around Rs. 50,000 crores to the Government.

Question Presented:
1. Whether a complaint can be filed by a citizen for prosecuting a public servant for
an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.

2. Whether the authority competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for

offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Act is required to take an
appropriate decision within the time specified in clause I (15) of the directions
contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of
Indiaand the guidelines issued by the Central Government, Department of Personnel
and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).

Whether sanction for prosecution of Respondent No. 2, A. Raja, for the offences
allegedly committed by him under the 1988 Act is required even after he resigned
from the Council of Ministers, though he continues to be a Member of Parliament.

The Supreme Court, in reliance of R. S. Nayak v. A. R. Antulay, reaffirmed that the
prior sanction for prosecution is not necessary where the person in question has
ceased to be a public servant under the ‘public office’ alleged to have been misused
by him. If the public servant holds two offices and he is accused of having abused one
and from which he is removed but continues to hold the other which is neither alleged
to have been misused or abused, the question is whether the sanction of the authority
competent to remove him from the office which is neither alleged to have been
misused nor abused is necessary. The Supreme Court answered it in the negative. This
can be justified by the following illustrations.

a) A, a public servant abused his position as minister but ceased to be a minister by

the time the court had taken cognizance of the offence. Subsequently, after the
commission of the offence but before the taking of cognizance of the offence by the
court, A was elected as a Municipal Chairman, hence becoming a public servant
under the relevant municipal laws. It is absurd to hold that the sanction of the
authority that is competent to remove him from the office of Municipal Chairman is
necessary to prosecute him for the offence which he committed while in office as
Minister. Any interpretation of the provision which would necessitate the sanction of
the latter authority would have the effect of shielding an unscrupulous public servant.
If a contrary interpretation has been adopted, the result would be disastrous.

b) Suppose a person is holding six different offices of which only one was abused, the
sanction of six different competent authorities capable of removing him from six
different public offices would be necessary before the court can take cognizance of
the offence, even if such person has ceased to be public servant under the office which
is purported to have abused. The sanction of five authorities would be necessary even
if a valid sanction has been obtained from the sanctioning authority of the public
office which is purported to have abused. Such an interpretation would result in
absurd consequences and the legislation would operate as rogue’s charter.

Hence, it is submitted that,

i) The sanctioning authority is the authority which would have been competent to
remove the public servant from his office at the time when the offence was alleged to
have been committed.

ii) The ‘office’ refers to the office which the public servant misuses or abuses by
corrupt motive for which he is to be prosecuted.
iii) The question of obtaining sanction is relatable to the time of holding the office
when the offence was alleged to have been committed. Where the person is not
holding the

iv) said office as he might have retired, superannuated, discharged or dismissed, prior
sanction of the authority is not necessary.

v) Where a person holds more than one public office of which only one is abused, the
sanction of only that authority that is competent to remove him from the office which
is alleged to have been abused is necessary.

Hence, where a person accused has ceased to be a Minister, but continues to be a

Member of the Parliament, prior sanction for prosecution is not necessary.

Whether the appellant has locus standi to file a complaint for prosecution of the
offences allegedly committed by a public servant under The Prevention of Corruption
Act, 1988.
There is no provision either in the 1988 Act or the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973
(Code of Criminal Procedure) which bars a citizen from filing a complaint for
prosecution of a public servant who is alleged to have committed an offence.
Therefore, the argument of the learned Attorney General that the Appellant cannot file
a complaint for prosecuting Respondent No. 2 merits rejection. A similar argument
was negatived by the Constitution Bench in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Sriniwas Nayak.

The concept of locus standi is foreign to criminal jurisprudence.

Anybody can set the criminal law in motion except where the statute indicates the
contrary. Locus standi is a concept foreign to the criminal jurisprudence and even the
prosecution of most serious offences like murder can be initiated upon a private
complaint. The court can take cognizance of an offence upon a police report or a
private complaint or the court can suo moto take cognizance of the offences upon
satisfaction of the Court.

S. 5A is not a sine qua non for taking cognizance of an offence under S. 8 (1) of the
Act.
S. 5A only provides a safeguard against the investigation of offences committed by
public servants, by lower rank police officers. It has no connection with the initiation
of proceedings before a Special Judge under S. 8 (1) of the Act. Hence, cognizance of
an offence can be taken under a private complaint in the absence of a police report,
since nothing to the contrary is deducible from the Act.

The right of private citizen to file a complaint is equivalent to right to access to court.
The right of private citizen to file a complaint against a corrupt public official must be
equated with the right to access the Court in order to set criminal law in motion
against a corrupt public official, which is a constitutional right. When a citizen
approaches the court of law against a corrupt public servant, apart from the personal
grievance of the citizen, the questions of bringing orderliness in the society and
maintenance of equal balance in rule of law comes in.

The question of granting sanction for the prosecution arises not at the stage of
cognizance.
The order of granting sanction is required to be filed with the complaint in connection
with the prosecution under S. 19 of the Act. It was held in State of Uttar Pradesh v.
Paras Nath Singh, that the very cognizance is barred in the absence of such sanction.
Cognizance, in legal parlance, means 'taking judicial notice by the court of law,
possessing jurisdiction, on a cause or matter presented before it so as to decide
whether there is any basis for initiating proceedings and determination of the cause or
matter judicially'.

The taking of cognizance under the Prevention of Corruption Act is not guided by S.
190 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.
The Prevention of Corruption Act is a special statute which has been enacted to
consolidate and amend the law relating to the prevention of corruption and for matters
connected therewith. Here, the principle expressed in the maxim generalia specialibus
non derogant would apply which means that if a special provision has been made on a
certain matter, that matter is excluded from the general provisions. Therefore, the
provisions of Section 19 of the Act will have an overriding effect over the general
provisions contained in Section 190.
Hence, in the light of the aforesaid, the appellant has locus standi to approach this
Hon’ble court.

Whether the authority competent to sanction prosecution of a public servant for

offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 Act is required to take an
appropriate decision within the time specified in clause I(15) of the directions
contained in paragraph 58 of the judgment of this Court in Vineet Narain v. Union of
Indiaand the guidelines issued by the Central Government, Department of Personnel
and Training and the Central Vigilance Commission (CVC).

An appraisal of Vineet Narain case: Writ petitions were filed in public interest to

ensure investigation in the ‘Hawala case’. The Court in turn looked into the
allegations against Government agencies like CBI and revenue authorities who failed
to perform their duties and legal obligations inasmuch as they did not investigate into
the matters arising out of seizure of the so-called 'Jain Diaries' in certain raids
conducted by the CBI. The nexus between several important politicians, bureaucrats
and criminals with terrorists, who in turn provided financial support to them by
clandestine and illegal means and flowing of money from unlawful sources which was
revealed by certain arrested terrorists, were also brought before the court.

Investigation into every accusation made against each and every person on a
reasonable basis, irrespective of the position and status of that person, must be
conducted and completed expeditiously. If the conduct of a public servant amounts to
an offence, it must be promptly investigated and the offender against whom a prima
facie case is made out should be prosecuted expeditiously so that the majesty of law is
upheld and the rule of law vindicated. The Court gave several guidelines regarding the
prosecution of public servants vide interim orders and the final judgement.
In para 58 (I) (15), the Court gave the following direction:

“Time-limit of three months for grant of sanction for prosecution must be strictly
adhered to. However, additional time of one month may be allowed where
consultation is required with the Attorney General (AG) or any other law officer in
the AG's office”.
The Guidelines issued by CVC in tune with the Vineet Narain ruling: The relevant
clauses of the guidelines issued by the Central Vigilance Commissioner in tune with
the ruling of Vineet Narain v. Union of India are produced below.

2(i) Grant of sanction is an administrative act. The purpose is to protect the public
servant from harassment by frivolous or vexatious prosecution and not to shield the
corrupt. The question of giving opportunity to the public servant at that stage does not
arise. The sanctioning authority has only to see whether the facts would prima-facie
constitutes the offence.

(ii) The competent authority cannot embark upon an inquiry to judge the truth of the
allegations on the basis of representation which may be filed by the accused person
before the Sanctioning Authority, by asking the I.O. to offer his comments or to
further investigate the matter in the light of representation made by the accused
person or by otherwise holding a parallel investigation/enquiry by calling for the
record/report of his department.

(vii) However, if in any case, the Sanctioning Authority after consideration of the
entire material placed before it, entertains any doubt on any point the competent
authority may specify the doubt with sufficient particulars and may request the
Authority who has sought sanction to clear the doubt. But that would be only to clear
the doubt in order that the authority may apply its mind proper, and not for the
purpose of considering the representations of the accused which may be filed while
the matter is pending sanction.

(viii) If the Sanctioning Authority seeks the comments of the IO while the matter is
pending before it for sanction, it will almost be impossible for the Sanctioning
Authority to adhere to the time limit allowed by the Supreme Court in Vineet Narain's
case.

The ruling of Vineet Narain v. Union of India has become the law of the land vide
Article 141 of the Constitution. Where nothing to the contrary is entailed, the same
has to be adhered. The guideline issued by the CVC is in conformity with the law laid
down by the Supreme Court and therefore requires compliance. Hence, what the
Competent Authority is required to see is whether the material placed by the
complainant or the investigating agency prima facie discloses commission of an
offence and not to undertake a detailed inquiry to decide whether or not the
allegations made against the public servant are true.

Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to entertain the writ petition filed by
the appellant.

The High Court had proceeded under a wholly erroneous assumption that Respondent
No.1 had directed an investigation by the CBI into the allegations of grave
irregularities in the grant of licences. However, the fact remains that CVC upon
receipt of a representation dated 4.5.2009 that the grant of licences by Respondent No.
2 has resulted in huge loss to the Public Exchequer; the CVC conducted an inquiry
under S. 8 (d) of CVC Act, 2003 and forwarded a copy to CBI. But the CBI took steps
for investigation only when the Court intervened in the matter. Hence, the High Court
was wrong in refusing to entertain the writ petition filed by the appellant.

Judgment:
All proposals for sanction placed before any Sanctioning Authority, empowered to
grant sanction for the prosecution of a public servant under Section 19 of the P.C. Act
must be decided within a period of three months of the receipt of the proposal by the
concerned authority.

a) Where consultation is required with the Attorney General or the Solicitor General
or the Advocate General of the State, as the case may be, and the same is not possible
within the three months mentioned in Clause (a) above, an extension of one month
period may be allowed, but the request for consultation is to be sent in writing within
the three months mentioned in (a) above. A copy of the said request will be sent to the
prosecuting agency or the private complainant to intimate them about the extension of
the time limit.

b) At the end of the extended period of time limit, if no decision is taken, sanction
will be deemed to have been granted to the proposal for prosecution, and the
prosecuting agency or the private complainant will proceed to file the
chargesheet/complaint in the court to commence prosecution within 15 days of the
expiry of the aforementioned time limit.

Reason for the Judgment:

S. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act bars the Court from taking cognizance of
cases of corruption against public servant under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 of the
Act, unless the Central or State Government has accorded sanction. This provision, in
effect, imposes fetters on the private citizens as well as prosecutors. The provision
which has been enacted to provide protection to public servants from malicious
prosecution cannot be used as a shield to protect corrupt public officials. The
provision being an exception to the equality provision under Article 14 should be
couched with rule of law. There are instances where the delay in granting sanction to
prosecute the public servant under S. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act has
resulted in quashing of the prosecution. Out of the 319 requests for sanction for
prosecution against public servants, sanction is awaited in respect of 126 of such
requests, which amounts to 1/3rd of the total requests. Most often, such delay in grant
of sanction is to evade criminal prosecution.These instances show a blatant subversion
of rule of law. The S. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act is not in consonance
with the due process of law which was read into our Constitution vide Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India. Hence the ‘due process of law’ was read into the section by
the court by introducing a time limit in S. 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

Conclusion:
There is no doubt that the court has traversed the limits of judicial scrutiny to step into
the legislative platform to make a precedent which has the effect of an amendment to
the legislation. However, the Indian society fighting incessantly against the evil of
corruption and the vice of corrupt politicians received the decision with wide
applause. The approach of judiciary against corruption was decisive from the very
beginning. The decision fell at the time when a large mass of public fight for a strong
Lok Pal and when there was wide spread movement against corruption in India. The
public response against the judgement was indeed positive. However, the extent to
which such judicial interference in the spheres of legislature and executive shall be
permitted in the democratic set up of India is questionable. Whether the court in
 exercise of its powers can alter the legislative judgement is also debatable which now
fall into the hands of students of law and philosophy, the intelligentsia and the
common man.

5. Fortis Hospital Ltd. v/s Commissioner of Customs,Import (2019) -

Civil Appeal No. 1049 of 2017

HELD ON - 24 March 2019.

COURT NAME- Supreme Court of India

JUDGE BENCHES- THE HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE A.K. SIKRI & THE

HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE ROHINTON FALI NARIMAN

PARTIES INVOLVED - 1)FORTIS HOSPITAL LTD. (appellant) VS 2)

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, IMPORT (respondent).

ISSUES INVOLVED –

Why penalty should not be imposed under Section 112 of the Customs Act, 1962 for the
omission and commission committed by the Wockhardt Hospital & Heart Institute
Bangalore."

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE -

1) The appealing party thus, which is the replacement of M/s.Wockhardt Hospital and
Heart Institute (alluded to as the 'Foundation' hereinafter) had an emergency clinic at
Bangalore. At some point in the year 1990, the said Institute imported a Cardiac
Catherization Laboratory (known as Angiography framework) with its
extras/embellishments esteemed at Rs.1,14,23,471/ -. The said Institute applied for an
exception from the installment of import obligation taking safe house under the
Notification No. 64/88-cus dated 01.03.1988. This notice accommodates exception on
clinical hardware imported against the Custom Duty Exemption Certificate gave by the
Director-General of Health Services. Aside from the said endorsement, certain different
conditions are referenced in the warning that should be fulfilled to profit of the exception.
These conditions are as under:-

"Every single such emergency clinic which might be confirmed by the said Ministry of
Health and Family Welfare, for each situation, to be run for giving clinical careful or
symptomatic treatment not, just with no qualification of standing, statement of faith, race,
religion or language yet also: -

(a) free, on a normal, to in any event 40 percent of all their open-air patients; and

(b) allowed to every single indoor patient having a place with families with a pay of not
as much as rupees 500 every month, and saving for this reason in any event 10 percent of
all the clinic beds held for such patients; and

(c) at sensible charges, either dependent on the salary of the patients concerned or in
any case to patients other than those predefined in conditions (an) and (b)."
6.
2) From an exposed perusing of the previously mentioned specifications, these
conditions are to be satisfied not at the hour of the import however later on, by the
shipper while using the imported gear. In this manner, the conditions are proceeding
in nature.

3) The Institute was not charged any import obligation as it had delivered an imperative
declaration dated 11.02.1991 gave by the Director-General of Health Services, New
Delhi. After some time, the Revenue specialists/respondent in this came to realize that the
Institute was submitting a penetrate of the previously mentioned conditions, as it had not
been without giving analytic treatment to at any rate 40 percent of all its open-air patients
and it was additionally not giving free treatment to indoor patients having a salary of
under Rs.500 every month and for this reason, it had not got 10 percent medical clinic
beds held for such patients. It brought about the issuance of show-cause notice to the
Institute. Appropriately, this show cause notice dated 12.01.2000 was given under Section
124 of the Customs Act, 1962 (hereinafter alluded to as Act) and in the wake of
expressing that the previously mentioned break was purportedly dedicated by the litigant,
in the show cause notice, it was proposed as under:-

4) Therefore, M/s. Wockhardt Hospital and Heart Institute, Bangalore are called upon
to demonstrate cause to the Commissioner of Customs, Air Cargo Complex, Sahar,
Andheri (E), Mumbai-99 regarding why:-

(a) the clinical gear/extras and frill as point by point in Annexure of the Show Cause
Notice and esteemed at Rs.1,14,23,471/ - ought not to be reallocated under Section 111(o)
of the Customs Act, 1962.

(b) The punishment ought not to be forced under Section 112 of the Customs Act,
1962 for the oversight and commission submitted by the Wockhardt Hospital and
Heart Institute Bangalore."

5) After answers were recorded and individual hearing without a doubt, the settling
official gave the arbitration request, as far as which appropriation of the merchandise
alongside punishment forced was affirmed. The request additionally gave the
appealing party the alternative to pay reclamation fine. Significantly, the mediation
request affirmed the interest of customs obligation on the imported merchandise,
inferable from the improper case of the exclusion.

6) In the intrigue, the Customs Excise and Service Tax Appellate ("Tribunal") maintained
the seizure request and request of punishment. The Tribunal anyway put aside the
obligation request on the premise that the notification was given under Section 124 of the
Act, which didn't think about the burden of customs obligation. The Tribunal discovered
kindness in the appealing party's accommodation that as far as Section 125, an alternative
is given to the merchant and if such a choice isn't worked out, no fine is payable and
when no fine is payable, the obligation can't be requested by depending on the
arrangements of Section 125(2). Such a consequence has not emerged in the current case
since the litigant (assessee) had not practiced this alternative.
 7) The Hon'ble Bombay High Court put aside the request for the Tribunal on the premise
that under Section 125(2) of the Act, the obligation payable on the seized merchandise
must be paid on the inconvenience of a fine rather than reallocation and it is unimportant
whether such alternative is practiced or not.

Judgment-

The Hon'ble Court held that:-

1. Section -124 commands issuance of the show cause notice before passing any request
and mulls over two activities: first identifying with the reallocation of the merchandise
and second, about the burden of punishment. Appropriately, this activity doesn't manage
the installment of customs obligation by any stretch of the imagination.

2. At the point when such a demonstration of the burden of obligation request was not
pondered in the show cause notice, which even in any case wasn't possible while practicing
the forces under Section 124 of the Act, in the last request, there couldn't have been any
heading to pay the obligation.

3. Section- 125(2) would not have any significant bearing for a situation where the
choice to pay fine rather than appropriation isn't practiced by the merchant. Trigger
point is the activity of a positive choice to pay the fine and reclaim the appropriated
products. Just when this possibility is met, the obligation gets payable.

4. The specification contained in the arbitration request was just unexpected, which
possibly would have emerged uniquely on practicing the alternative by the merchant to
pay fine rather than appropriation and to recover the products. At the point when the
Department decided to make a move under Section 124, it ought to be alive of the
circumstance that the notification may not practice the choice and in such case,
obligation.

In like manner, we permit the intrigue and put aside the request passed by the High
Court. We clarify that it would in any case be available to the Department to make a
suitable autonomous move against the appealing party for an installment of import
obligation, if it is still inside a time of constraint.