Nordic Grid Code

2007
(Nordic collection of rules)
NORDIC GRID CODE (CONTENTS)

CONTENTS

The Nordic Grid Code contains:

Preface 112

Part 1 Introduction to a Common Nordic Grid Code 114

Part 2 Planning Code (with appendices) 113

Part 3 Operational Code (System Operation Agreement) 139

Part 4 Connection Code 154

Part 5 Data Exchange Code (Data Exchange Agreement 178

between the Nordic TSOs)

The present document is the English translation of Nordisk regelsamling 2004 and its updated
parts, which have been written and published in the Swedish language. In case of possible
discrepancies between the English and the Swedish version, the Swedish version shall prevail.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (INTRODUCTION)

INTRODUCTION TO A COMMON NORDIC GRID CODE ............................................. 5

1 INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 5
2 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................... 6
2.1 Nordic cooperation .................................................................................................. 6
2.2 The Nordic electric power system ............................................................................ 8
2.3 The electrical characteristics of the Nordic electric power system ......................... 9
2.4 Transmission system operators (TSOs).................................................................. 10
2.5 The Nordic electricity market................................................................................. 11
2.5.1 Elspot.............................................................................................................. 11
2.5.2 Elbas ............................................................................................................... 11
2.5.3 The regulating power market ......................................................................... 11
3 GENERAL PROVISIONS ..................................................................................................... 11
3.1 Bilateral agreements .............................................................................................. 11
3.2 Confidentiality........................................................................................................ 11
3.3 Deviations from the regulations............................................................................. 12
3.4 Dealing with unclear provisions in the regulations ............................................... 12
3.5 The development of the regulations ....................................................................... 12

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NORDIC GRID CODE (INTRODUCTION)

INTRODUCTION TO A COMMON NORDIC GRID CODE

1 Introduction
The formulation of this common code for the Nordic grid (the Nordic Grid Code) is a step
towards the harmonisation of the rules that govern the various national grid companies. The
purpose of the Nordic Grid Code is to achieve coherent and coordinated Nordic operation and
planning between the companies responsible for operating the transmission systems, in order to
establish the best possible conditions for development of a functioning and effectively
integrated Nordic power market. A further objective is to develop a shared basis for
satisfactory operational reliability and quality of delivery in the coherent Nordic electric power
system.

The Nordic Grid Code concerns the transmission system operators (TSO’s) the operation and
planning of the electric power system and the market actors’ access to the grid. The Code lays
down fundamental common requirements and procedures that govern the operation and
development of the electric power system.

The Nordic Grid Code is made up of:

- General provisions for cooperation
- Planning Code
- Operational Code (System Operation Agreement)
- Connection Code
- Data Exchange Code (Data Exchange Agreement between the Nordic transmission
system operators (TSOs)

The Operational Code and the Data Exchange Code are binding agreements with specific
dispute solutions. The Planning Code and the Connection Code are rules that should be
observed. They correspond to Nordel’s recommendations in these areas.

The Nordic Grid Code governs technical cooperation between the transmission system
operators in the interconnected Nordel countries: Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark.

Ideally, the planning, expansion and operation of all the subsystems would be governed by
identical rules. However, this is not yet the case, partly for historical reasons and partly because
the different subsystems are subject to different legislation and to supervision by different
official bodies. However, an objective is that the Nordic Grid Code should be a starting point
for the harmonisation of national rules, with minimum requirements for technical properties
that influence the operation of the interconnected Nordic electric power system. The Nordic
Grid Code must, however, be subordinate to the national rules in the various Nordic countries,
such as the provisions of legislation, decrees and the conditions imposed by official bodies.

The first edition of the Nordic Grid Code was based on Nordel’s former rules (recom-
mendations), the system operation agreement, the Data Exchange Agreement and national
codes. Therefore the content of the Code still shows traces of being taken from numerous
sources.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (INTRODUCTION)

The new versions of the System Operation Agreement and the Data Exchange Agreement are
reproduced in this edition in their entirety. As a new Nordel recommendation this document
includes the Nordel Connection Code for Wind Turbines. It is included as an own chapter in
the Connection Code. Other parts of the Connection Code have been updated according to the
latest development in the national requirements and rules. Coordination between the Planning
Code and the Operational Code has been improved by developing the formulation of the
criteria scheme in planning to better correspond with the operational states.

The development of the Nordic Grid Code is a project that ought to continue also in the years
ahead. The work on further development of Nordic cooperation to the Nordic electric power
market thus continues.

2 Background

2.1 Nordic cooperation

The expansion of electric power supply in the Nordic countries began at the end of the 19th
century and at the beginning of the 20th. To begin with, small local electrical companies were
set up. Gradually these companies merged in order to become larger regional units. Eventually,
the systems developed to the point where the power grids in the individual Nordic countries
were linked via high-voltage interconnections.

From the outset, the supply of electric power in the Nordic countries was based on different
sources of energy. In Norway and Sweden, hydro-electric power was the main energy source.
Finland used a mix of hydro and thermal power, whilst Denmark’s energy supply was based
almost entirely on thermal power. Companies and official bodies in the Nordic countries soon
realised that there were significant benefits to be gained from collaborating and utilising
whichever energy source was the most advantageous at the time in the various countries.
Furthermore cooperation resulted in improved security of supply.

Already in 1912 the first inter-Nordic interconnection operation agreement was signed.
Sydkraft in Malmö and NESA in Copenhagen agreed that Sydkraft would supply surplus
power from its power plants to Zealand in Denmark. On 15 November 1915 a 25,000 volt AC
cable between Skåne and Zealand was ready to go into service. Cooperation on electric power
between Sweden and Norway began much further north with the opening of the railway
between Kiruna and Narvik in the early 1940s.

In 1929 a 60 kV AC interconnection was built between Jutland and Northern Germany. Over
the years from 1930 to 1960, further opportunities for cooperation were investigated, however,
without result until 1959, when an AC interconnection between Sweden and Finland went into
service. In 1960, new interconnections between Sweden and Norway were completed and a
joint power plant project was implemented on the Linnvass river (Linnvassälven). Five years
later, in 1965, an HVDC cable was laid between Jutland and the west coast of Sweden.
Electrical interconnections to the east were extended in 1961 with an AC transmission line
across the eastern border of Finland to the Soviet Union. In 1976 an HVDC link was installed
between Norway and Jutland; its capacity was increased in 1993. The Fenno-Skan HVDC link
between Sweden and Finland was built in 1989.

The planning and construction of the joint interconnections led to greater contact between the
electricity companies in the Nordic countries, and in 1963, Nordel, a Nordic cooperation
program in the field of electric power supply, was established.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (INTRODUCTION)

During the 1960s, electric power consumption increased considerably in all the Nordic
countries. The opportunities for cooperation, for linking together different kinds of production
resources and for creating shared production reserves also attracted greater attention. The
members of Nordel were seeking benefits from coordinating the expansion and operation of the
grids.

As the rapidly growing electric power system would be connected to relatively weak
transmission links, Nordel had to solve problems of control and stability. The long-term
solution was to make the transmission links stronger. Nordel’s recommendations formed the
basis of the technical regulations for production and grid operations in the Nordic countries.
Admittedly, the recommendations were not formally binding, however, since they were
accepted jointly and unanimously, the rules were complied with by all parties and came to
provide the foundation for any formal regulations required in the individual countries.

A feature of cooperation within Nordel has been a common will to find solutions which create
good preconditions for utilising the technical, environmental and economic advantages that
result from an effective common system. From the outset, the sector and electricity users over
the entire Nordel area has benefited from this basic idea.

In order to increase efficiency in the electrical sector, the Nordic countries chose, starting in
1991 in Norway, to expose electricity production and trading to competition and to separate
these functions from the still regulated natural grid monopoly. Since the 1980s, there has been
a trend towards free competition both in the EU and elsewhere in the world, but the trend has
developed most rapidly in the Nordic countries. Among other things, the world’s first
international electric power exchange, Nord Pool, was launched here in 1996. Factors that
contributed to the rapid development of the open common Nordic electric power market were a
well-functioning electric power system and a good tradition of cooperation, partly within
Nordel.

The changes in the electricity market also changed the preconditions for Nordic cooperation.
Nordel took its first step towards adaptation to the changes in 1993, when, among other things,
the organisation changed its statutes to correspond better to the structure that emerged when the
grid operations of the companies were separated from the rest of their operations. The changes
supposed that both the grid sector and the production sector still should be represented in
Nordel. The importance of continued cooperation between the sectors on technical system
issues, for example, was emphasised.

The starting point for a further change to the statutes in 1998 was that Nordel would be a
cooperation organisation for the transmission system operators in the Nordic countries and
should provide a platform for cooperation. At the same time, market actors with technical
installations of significance for the electric power system would continue to collaborate within
the organisation. Yet another change to the statutes in June 2000 transformed Nordel into an
organisation for the transmission system operators in the Nordic countries, with the stated
objective of creating the conditions for an efficient and harmonised Nordic electricity market,
and of developing that market further. Once a body for cooperation between integrated power
companies, Nordel was now a body for cooperation between transmission system operators.

The number of physical interconnections between the Nordel region and neighbouring
countries is increasing. In 1982, an HVDC link was installed between Finland and the Soviet

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NORDIC GRID CODE (INTRODUCTION)

Union. There are now HVDC links to Germany from both Sweden and Denmark and since
2000 an HVDC cable between Poland and Sweden. The AC interconnections between Western
Denmark and Germany have been expanded continuously. Since 2000, a 450 MW Russian
power plant in St. Petersburg has been connected directly to the Finnish subsystem. The
increasing number of interconnections brings growing need for coordination. In its capacity of
cooperation organisation for transmission system operators, Nordel is a natural forum for
contacts between the Nordic electric power system as a whole and system operators elsewhere.
In addition, as a forum for technical cooperation, Nordel offers a unique opportunity for
utilising the expertise that is also needed in international work.

Nordel operates non-bureaucratically. The posts in the organisation rotate between the Nordic
grid operating companies. The company represented by the chairperson is responsible for the
secretariat and bears the associated costs; this makes it possible for Nordel to have no budget of
its own. Nordel uses no interpreters. The member companies provide human resources; a key
factor in Nordel’s work is the core specialist expertise that the companies make available.

2.2 The Nordic electric power system

In the Nordic countries, production systems differ greatly from one country to another.
Denmark uses conventional thermal power and an increasing proportion of wind power.
Norway has hydropower, whilst Finland and Sweden have a mix of different systems, mostly
hydro and nuclear power.

Today, the Nordic grid comprises the national electric power systems of Denmark, Sweden,
Norway and Finland, as well as several interconnections between the countries which tie the
national grids together into a coherent system. This system constitutes a single area with a
common frequency, with the exception of Western Denmark, which is interconnected with the
grid that falls within the area of the continental cooperation organisation UCTE.

The subsystems in Finland, Norway, Sweden and eastern Denmark are interconnected
synchronously and form what is known as the “synchronised system”. The subsystem in
Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden via HVDC links. Together, the
synchronous system and the Western Denmark subsystem form the interconnected Nordic
electric power system.

The interconnection of the individual subsystems into a common system means increased
security and lower costs. The delivery capacity of the system as a whole is higher than the sum
of the individual delivery capacities of the subsystems. As a result of the expansion of
transmission capacity between the subsystems, the interconnected Nordic electric power
system operates increasingly as a single entity.

The common system reduces the need for reserves and improves the potential for obtaining
help in the event of serious disturbances or in other extreme situations such as years of
exceptional drought or shortage of fuel.

A Nordic grid that works well is the technical prerequisite for a secure Nordic supply of high-
quality electric power, and has been the foundation of a financially and environmentally
efficient power supply.

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2.3 The electrical characteristics of the Nordic electric power system

The following AC voltage levels are used in the Nordic grid (there are also interconnections at
lower voltages across national borders):
• Denmark: 132/150/220/400 kV
• Finland: 110/220/400 kV
• Norway: 300/420 kV (and 132 kV in the north of Norway)
• Sweden: 220/400 kV
Between subsystems there are also HVDC links at 285-400 kV.

These transmission lines interconnect a number of generators:

• Hydro power production is concentrated in Norway and the north of Sweden and
Finland.
• Thermal power production is concentrated in Denmark and the southern parts of
Sweden and Finland.
• Wind power production and decentralised production are concentrated in Denmark.
Particularly in the West of Denmark in, wind power accounts for a large part of total
production.

The reactance of the AC transmission lines determines how strongly the system is coupled.
Long transmission distances and relatively weak coupling between distant generators are
typical features of the Nordel system.

Weak coupling between generators means that on some interconnecting links it is not possible
to utilise the full thermal capacity. According to the Planning Code, it must be possible to
maintain stable operation after the most common types of fault. This applies to transient,
dynamic and static stability for both frequency and voltage conditions, and no consequential
tripping shall take place due to overloading of components.

Because of long transmission distances and high reactances, it is usually insufficient voltage
support and/or insufficient damping that sets limits on transmission between subsystems. With
excessive power transmission, either voltage collapse would occur (voltage stability) or
generators would lose synchronism (angle stability) because of a single fault condition. This
may occur with significantly lower transmitted power than the grid components themselves
could tolerate (thermal capacity).

Another feature of long transmission distances and separate generators is that the ability of
certain interconnections to transmit power depends on the direction of the power flow, and
varies over the year, depending, for instance, on which generators are connected to the grid and
how much power is being transmitted on other parts of the grid. The technical transmission
limit is determined by grid simulations in different operating modes. Naturally there must be a
system safety margin in terms of calculation accuracy. In addition, some of the technical
transmission capacity is reserved for control margin used for system services, for instance. The
remaining part of the capacity is put at the disposal of the electricity market and is known as
the commercial capacity.

The main cross-sections where experience has shown that physical limitations on the Nordic
electricity market may arise are (see the Planning Code):
• Denmark: In Western Denmark there are interconnections to Norway, Sweden and
Germany and two internal cross-sections (A and B), which may limit import from

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Norway, and Sweden. In Eastern Denmark the link between Zealand and Sweden may
impose a limit. Transmission lines in Sweden’s internal cross-sections (cross-section 4
and the west coast cross-section) also have a major impact on capacity there.
• Finland: There is one internal cross-section, P1, and two cross-sections to Sweden,
RAC and RDC. Depending on the operating situation, it is voltage stability, insufficient
damping or thermal limits that limit transmission in these cross-sections.
• Norway: There are five internal cross-sections and the Hasle cross-section to Sweden.
In particular the latter cross-section has proved in practice to be important for
conditions on the Nordic electricity market. In this cross-section, transmission is limited
by voltage and/or angle stability.
• Sweden: There are three important main cross-sections (1, 2 and 4) and the west coast
cross-section. The capacity of the main cross-sections is limited by voltage and/or angle
stability, whilst the west coast cross-section is limited by thermal capacity.

Where the limit is imposed by the stability conditions, it may be possible to boost the
transmission capacity without building new transmission lines. To improve voltage stability,
fast-response reactive power can be installed, for example series capacitors or controllable
shunt capacitors. Controllable grid components, such as controlled series and shunt capacitors
and HVDC links, may be used to improve damping. Another option is to install a system
protection which disconnects some production units or loads after certain types of fault, thus
reducing the power transmitted on critical interconnections.

Since stability issues are highly important for the Nordel network, it is essential for production
units to be able to tolerate different types of fault on that network. Uncontrolled tripping of
generators in the event of grid faults might make the instability even worse. Stability on the
Nordel network can be improved and its transmission capacity can be increased by optimising
the voltage regulators and power system stabilisers of the generators. For these reasons it is
important for Nordel to have a common Connection Code that lays down minimum
requirements for the technical characteristics of production units.

2.4 Transmission system operators (TSOs)

In Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden, transmission system operators (TSOs) have been
appointed, with overall responsibility for ensuring that every subsystem works properly. These
TSOs are Energinet.dk for the Danish subsystem, Fingrid Oyj for the Finnish subsystem,
Statnett SF for the Norwegian subsystem and Affärsverket Svenska Kraftnät for the Swedish
subsystem.

The TSOs in the Nordic countries are required to operate within the framework of the rules laid
down in national and EU law. Some of the higher-level frames are the same for all countries,
however these may be interpreted differently. The frames also change with political
developments.

The first system operation agreement between two Nordic TSOs was made in 1996 between
Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät. This agreement was followed by bilateral system operation
agreements between all TSOs. The first Nordic system operation agreement between all Nordic
TSOs, with the exception of the TSO on Iceland, was made in October 1999.

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2.5 The Nordic electricity market1

The Nordic market is an international market. The electric power system and functions of the
market influence each other. The market structure in Nordel’s neighbouring countries differs
from the structure in the Nordic countries; this, together with the development of their
production and consumption, is also significant for the Nordic electric power system.

There is a physical market and as well a financial market. For the grid, the physical market is
of interest and is outlined below.

2.5.1 Elspot
The Elspot market deals with power contracts for physical delivery daily within 24 hours.
Elspot’s price mechanism is used to regulate the flow of power where there are capacity
limitations in the Norwegian grid and between the individual countries. Therefore Elspot may
be regarded as a combined energy and capacity market.

The price calculation is based on purchase bids and sale bids from all market actors.

2.5.2 Elbas
Elbas is an organised balance market for Sweden, Finland,Eastern Denmark and Germany. The
Elbas market comprises continuous power trading in hourly contracts up to two hours before
physical delivery. The Elbas market complements Elspot and balance management by the
TSOs.

2.5.3 The regulating power market

The TSOs in each area manage the unforeseen balance between production and consumption.
The active actors who can create balance are consumers and producers, who can react quickly
in situations with unexpected power deviation by rapidly adjusting their power take-off or by
feeding in large amounts of power.

3 General provisions

3.1 Bilateral agreements

Where bilateral agreements or similar arrangements are agreed, the rules and principles in the
code must be followed to the greatest possible extent.

3.2 Confidentiality
If the information exchanged between parties has not been published in the country to which
the information relates, the parties undertake to keep the information confidential as far as the
legislation allows in the respective country.

1
For a detailed description of the ways in which the Nordic electric power market works, see
Nord Pool’s website: www.nordpool.com

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3.3 Deviations from the regulations

If a TSO chooses not to follow the recommendations of the Planning Code and the Connection
Code, the other TSOs must, if this is considered possible and necessary, be informed before the
deviation takes place. The System Operation Agreement and the Data Exchange Agreement are
binding agreements between the parties, with specific dispute solutions.

3.4 Dealing with unclear provisions in the regulations

If there is disagreement about the validity, application or interpretation of the rules in this code,
the issue shall be dealt with primarily in the respective Nordel committee. If agreement cannot
be reached, the issue can be referred to Nordel’s board for a ruling. Nordel’s legal advisor
group must always be consulted before an issue is referred in this way.

3.5 The development of the regulations

Nordel’s Planning Committee is responsible, in consultation with Nordel’s Operations
Committee, for the continued work on and further development of the Nordic Grid Code. The
Operations Committee is responsible for the Operational Code in particular.

The Nordic Grid Code must be updated regularly. Updating must take place when necessary,
however the Code must be reviewed at least once a year. Nordel’s legal advisor group must
always be consulted before any decision is taken that involves significant changes to the
Nordic Grid Code.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

The following documents have been included in this chapter:

Document Status
The Nordel Grid Master Plan 2002 (parts of) For information
Prioritized cross sections For information
Nordel’s planning rules 1992 Recommendations (desirable
requirements)
Planning Code 2004 Recommendations
Follow up on the Moberg report Approved in May 2006 by the
Planning Committee and the
Operations Committee
Transmission capacities in the Nordel system – the Approved in 1998 by the
2005 stage, 1999 Planning Committee and the
Operations Committee
Final report of Nordel’s HVDC working group, 1998 For information
and drafted recommendation

The following national documents deal with the planning code:

Document Status

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

PLANNING CODE .................................................................................................................. 16

1 PURPOSE AND TARGET GROUPS ....................................................................................... 16
2 THE WORK OF PLANNING ................................................................................................. 17
3 TRANSMISSION CAPACITY ............................................................................................... 18
3.1 Nominal transmission capacity for direct current ................................................. 18
3.2 Nominal transmission capacity for alternating current......................................... 18
3.3 Overloading of components ................................................................................... 19
4 GRID PLANNING FOR INTERCONNECTIONS BETWEEN THE NORDEL AREA AND OTHER
AREAS ..................................................................................................................................... 19
4.1 Planning new interconnections .............................................................................. 19
5 PLANNING CODE FOR PLANNING THE NORDIC TRANSMISSION SYSTEM ............................ 20
5.1 Principles of the planning code.............................................................................. 21
5.2 Planning criteria .................................................................................................... 22
5.2.1 Structure ......................................................................................................... 22
5.2.2 Prefault operating conditions before the fault ................................................ 22
5.2.3 Columns in the criteria scheme – Prefault conditions.................................... 23
5.2.4 Fault groups.................................................................................................... 23
5.2.5 Permissible consequences .............................................................................. 23
5.2.6 System protection scheme.............................................................................. 24
5.3 Other important aspects of system planning and design........................................ 24
5.3.1 Operational aspects ........................................................................................ 24
5.3.2 Operational characteristics of generation plants ............................................ 25
5.3.3 Instructions ..................................................................................................... 25
5.4 Post fault performance table (Criteria Scheme) .................................................... 26
5.5 Fault groups ........................................................................................................... 27
APPENDIX 1: METHOD, MODELS AND TOOLS FOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING
STUDIES................................................................................................................................... 28
1 METHODOLOGY FOR SYSTEM ENGINEERING STUDIES ...................................................... 28
1.1 Planning information and preconditions ............................................................... 28
1.2 System reliability .................................................................................................... 28
1.3 System engineering analyses.................................................................................. 30
1.4 Technical/economic evaluation and comparison................................................... 30
2 ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM MODELS ....................................... 31
2.1 Electrical engineering system analyses and tools.................................................. 31
2.2 Security of supply for energy and power................................................................ 33
APPENDIX 2: FINAL REPORT OF NORDEL’S HVDC WORKING GROUP FROM
YEAR 1998................................................................................................................................ 34
1 BACKGROUND ................................................................................................................. 34
2 OBJECTIVE ...................................................................................................................... 34
3 RESULTS AND CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 35

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

3.1 Network disturbances............................................................................................. 35

3.2 System disturbances ............................................................................................... 36
4 CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 38

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

PLANNING CODE

All parts of the power system shall be designed so that the electric power consumption will be
met at the lowest cost. This means that the power system shall be planned, built and operated
so that sufficient transmission capacity will be available for utilising the generation capacity
and meeting the needs of the consumers in a way which is economically best. This also
presupposes suitably balanced reliability.

The long-term economic design of the grid means to balance between investments and the cost
of maintenance, operation and supply interruptions, taking into account the environmental
demands and other limitations. Flexible solutions which take into account future uncertainties,
e.g. generation limitations, uncertain load development, technical development, etc., should be
selected. In this evaluation socioeconomics as well as market functioning shall be included.

The Nordic main grid should allow for well-performing joint operation. This demands co-
ordination, both in the planning of the power system and at the operating stage.

1 Purpose and target groups

Nordic planning work shall contribute to coherent and coordinated Nordic planning between
the TSOs. It must secure the infrastructure that gives the best possible preconditions for an
integrated Nordic market that works well and efficiently, both in spot market terms and
regulating-power market terms. This must be done with due regard to the reliability of supply
and the environmental targets of the individual countries.

The Planning Code describes higher-level and common Nordic requirements, frames, processes
and criteria for joint planning. It also specifies the information necessary for planning,
information which grid owners and producers must be obliged to provide to the TSOs.

The purpose is to provide a basis to secure the following by planning:

- cohesion in the Nordic electric power system
- reliability in the Nordic electric power system, including system security and system
adequacy
- a functioning Nordic market
- environmental considerations

The target group is:

- TSOs in the Nordic countries
- Market actors
- Grid owners
- The authorities

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

2 The work of planning

The work of planning is generally constructed around:
- preconditions
- imposed preconditions
- the existing electric power system
- generation system changes
- concrete expansions (investment decisions have been taken)
- forecast expansion
- consumption change
- concrete expansions (investment decisions have been taken)
- forecast expansion
- events analysed under the given preconditions
- acceptable consequences for the given events

The work of Nordic planning includes both the need to extend the grid and the need for system
services. Planning takes place on a higher level and therefore does not include the distribution
networks. It is concerned only with the part of the transmission networks that are important for
the interconnected Nordic electric power system. The method used to analyse present and
necessary grid strengthening measures includes:
- clarification of preconditions, including relevant development scenarios
- system engineering analyses, including power/energy balance analyses and network
analyses
- technical/economic comparison and evaluation. The economic evaluation is based on
socio-economic theories.

This process is illustrated in Figure 1 below. The system engineering analyses (network and
power/energy balance analyses) are done as an interactive process in which the results of the
power/energy balances constitute the “input” to the network analyses and vice versa.

System engineering
analyses

Power/energy
balance analyses

Technical/economical
Preconditions
comparison
(Planning information)
(System development plan)

Network analyses

Figure 1 Sketch of the method for evaluation of the need for measures to reinforce
the grid

Possible investments are evaluated on the basis of costs and benefit values. Socio-economic
principles are used in the benefit evaluation. Important criteria for planning are:

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

1. Production optimisation and energy turnover

2. Less risk of energy rationing
3. Less risk of power shortage
4. Changes in active and reactive losses
5. Trading in regulating power and system services
6. The value of a better-functioning electric power market
7. Sufficient capacity

Examples of methods, models and tools are described in more detail in Appendix 1: Method,
models and tools for system engineering studies.

3 Transmission capacity

3.1 Nominal transmission capacity for direct current

• The nominal transmission capacity is the maximum continuous power that can be allowed
at an ambient temperature that is not exceeded for more than 4 weeks per year and without
affecting the nominal availability.
• The nominal transmission capacity is measured on the AC side of the rectifier.

3.2 Nominal transmission capacity for alternating current

• The transmission capacity is the technical limit for active power that can be continuously
transmitted over a grid section with a starting point in an intact network. The trading
capacity is agreed between the TSOs and is lower, typically by 5-10 %.
• For the calculations, dimensioning transmissions, load situations and generation situations
for the grid shall be selected; according to Nordel’s grid planning rules.
• The transmission capacity is determined on the basis that the grid must withstand the
dimensioning fault (n-1) both on the interconnection and in the connected grids; see
Nordel’s grid planning rules. This applies regardless of limitations due to thermal
conditions, voltage stability, dynamic stability or conditions in the underlying grid.
• The transmission capacity is stated as the highest value achieved during the year. The
number of hours for which the transmission capacity is available shall be stated for each
section.
• The limiting factor must always be stated for the technical limit.
• The transmission capacity is measured on the receiving end.

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3.3 Overloading of components

COMPONENT LOADING ABOVE NOMINAL

Component Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
Overhead "one hour’s" Uses 120 % for 15 Conductor
line current with a temperature min temperature
wind of 1.6 depending on +20oC at 30oC
1)
m/sec area air and wind of
/cables / 150 % with 1 m/sec
cables. In the
future this will
be assessed
individually.
Transformers 130 % 150 % briefly 130 % with 120 % for one
o
0 C air hour.
End-point Does not Nominal value 100 -> 120 % 0
components normally limit for up to 15
the line min
1)
Operational possibility that is not brought into the calculation in the planning phase.
Series capacitors are dimensioned according to the IEC standard.

4 Grid planning for interconnections between the Nordel area and other
areas
With the exception of West Denmark, the Nordel system is operated asynchronously with other
electric power systems. Decisions on the establishment of new interconnections to and from
the Nordel area have been formalised in the form of bilateral agreements. Such
interconnections will nevertheless affect the entire Nordic electric power system, not just the
TSOs that establish the new interconnection. It is therefore important that the planning of such
interconnections is coordinated with the Nordic grid master plan. It is desirable that Nordel
should take part in the planning work in a way that ensures that such expansion can be made
clear to all of Nordel.

4.1 Planning new interconnections2

Appendix 2: Final report of Nordel’s HVDC working group contains an approved overview
report about new HVDC interconnections between Nordel and UCTE. A draft Nordel
recommendation has been written on the basis of this report.
• The control systems for new HVDC interconnections should be adapted so that the risk of
multiple commutation failures in the event of dimensioning fault, is minimised. It is
assumed that the grid will be designed in accordance with the plans presented. There
should be verification by means of simulator tests.

2
Written in the light of draft Nordel recommendation.

15 January 2007 19
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

• Maximum frequency-controlled emergency-power activation in the direction away from

the Nordel system should correspond to the dimensioning outage in the Nordel system. In
direction towards the Nordel system a greater activation can be accepted. Frequency-
controlled step or ramp variation of the power is permitted when the frequency is below
49.5 Hz. The basic rule is that the instantaneous disturbance reserve is divided up equally
between the HVDC interconnections. However, transfer can occur subject to prior
agreement between the owners of the HVDC interconnections.
• Emergency power control (EPC) with the HVDC interconnections should not be
concentrated electrically, due to the risk of tripping several HVDC interconnections
simultaneously.

5 Planning code for planning the Nordic transmission system

The criteria are still deterministic, although probabilistic considerations have been taken into
account. In the criteria, demands are made on disturbance consequences that are acceptable for
various combinations of operating conditions and fault types. In principle, more serious
consequences are acceptable for less common combinations of faults and operating conditions.
This principle is illustrated with the following figure.

Probability
Stress
Operation
condition
Probability

before fault
C
on
se
qu
en
ce
so
ff
Severity

au
lts

Fault
Figure 2. Illustration of the correlation between operation condition (including
probability / stress of the condition), faults (including probability / severity of
the faults) and acceptable consequences of faults.

15 January 2007 20
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

The main structure can be summarised in accordance with the table below.
Pre-fault operational conditions

Grid Spontaneously
Maintenance
intact weakened (n-1)

Common
Only local consequences
fault types
Fault type

Relatively
common Only regional consequences
extreme faults

Other
extreme faults Major breakdown acceptable

The rules are intended for use in the planning of the Nordic main grid. They should also be
able to serve as support in the operation of the grid.

5.1 Principles of the planning code

The rules shall be used for the joint, synchronised Nordic transmission grid. This concerns
principally the main grid, mainly 220-4003 kV, and the interconnecting links between the
various countries. The rules should be used in the planning of the power system. The aim is
that the operation and planning work should be based on the same reliability philosophy, and
that the rules should also be able to serve as a guide at the operating stage. The rules do not
cover local supply reliability and other local conditions in the grid.

In order to safeguard a certain minimum reliability level for the interconnected Nordic power
system, certain minimum demands on reliability for the required transmission capacity have
been defined through the planning rules. The demands have been given concrete form by a
number of criteria, which must be met in grid design. The criteria are based on a balance
between the probability of faults and their consequences, i.e. more serious consequences may
be acceptable for faults with lower probability.

The grid strength defined through the rules is such that it will be possible to maintain the
required transmission level if the grid is intact under varying generation and load situations. If
transmission lines are out of operation, lower capacity will normally be accepted.

The required transmission capacity can be achieved by a number of measures affecting the
construction of primary equipment, system protections and auxiliary systems, as well as
disturbance reserves and other operational measures. In the case of more severe disturbances
than those directly taken into account in the criteria, it is assumed that operational facilities are
available in the power system for restoring operation.

3
In Norway nominal voltage is 420 kV

15 January 2007 21
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

The rules are based on assessments, based on experience, of fault probabilities and availability
of individual items of equipment. Future changes in the reliability of individual items of
equipment or the introduction of new equipment may place special demands on grid design.

5.2 Planning criteria

5.2.1 Structure
Deterministic criteria are used in the planning of the grid. This means that a number of faults
groups have been specified, against which the grid will be tested. The following are defined for
every fault group
- prefault conditions, and
- acceptable post fault consequences

The criteria are summarised in the scheme in Figure 3, and in a list of fault groups, etc. in
accordance with Chapter 5.5. The operating conditions before the fault, the fault types and
consequences of various faults are described below.

5.2.2 Prefault operating conditions before the fault

The grid strength shall be studied for the following grid operating conditions.

Grid intact
All grid components that are of importance for the fault being studied are in operation.
For the grid studies, the dimensioning transmissions, load situations and generation situations
for the grid shall be selected. As an example, for the surrounding grid it shall be possible to
assume the transmission levels that correspond to the agreed capacities (normally in
accordance with the Planning Code). Economically reasonable generation situations shall be
assumed.

Grid not intact, scheduled work

A shunt or series component that is of importance for the studied fault shall be assumed to be
out of operation for maintenance.
The point in time shall be selected on the basis of a suitable operating situation, e.g. with low
transmission. The objective is to take into account in the planning the future need for
maintenance, and to create sufficient flexibility for this purpose.

A shunt component is a component that belongs to fault group FG1, i.e. a generation unit or
reactive shunt component (capacitor, etc.). A series component is a component that belongs to
fault group FG2, i.e. transmission line, series capacitor, busbar, etc.

Grid not intact, unscheduled outage

A shunt or series component that is of importance for the studied fault shall be assumed to be
out of operation due to a spontaneous fault event.

The point in time is assumed to be 15 minutes after the component failure. Generation and
transmission have thus been adapted as far as possible with the disturbance reserves available.
For the studied section of the grid, it is acceptable that the transmission has been reduced,
provided that the needs of the consumers and other special transmission requirements can
simultaneously be met.

15 January 2007 22
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

5.2.3 Columns in the criteria scheme – Prefault conditions

In the criteria scheme (Chapter 5.4), five columns with different operating conditions have
been defined as follows.
PC0 Grid intact
PC1 Grid not intact, scheduled maintenance
PC2 Grid not intact, spontaneous loss of a shunt component
PC3 Grid not intact, spontaneous loss of a series element
and three columns for even more serious conditions, with several components out of operation.
Alternatively, the operating situation is not adapted, i.e. the time is less than 15 minutes after
the initial fault.

5.2.4 Fault groups

The fault types for which the grid is to be tested are classified into five fault groups. The fault
groups have been selected to ensure that the grid will have a certain strength. This will
hopefully also cover other relatively common fault types that have not been specified. The
individual fault types are described in more detail in Section 5.5. Fundamental comments are
given below.

Primary relay protection is assumed to perform in the intended manner, unless a different
function has been defined in the studied fault type.

The faults have been grouped with regard to their probability. Faults in FG1 and FG2 are the
most frequent. Fault group FG3 comprises less probable single faults and special more
common double faults. Fault groups FG4 and FG5 contain rare faults.

Three-phase busbar faults in FG3 shall principally be taken into account for stations, which are
of significance to joint operation between countries.

The following shall apply to the fault combination of a line fault with loss of a thermal power
unit in FG4. An economic assessment shall be made of whether it is justified to implement
such measures in the unit and grid that the fault condition will be equivalent to those in fault
group FG3.

5.2.5 Permissible consequences

Three levels of consequences are defined. The principal demands made are those that are of
significance for the interconnected Nordic power system.

A. Stable operation, local consequences

Only local consequences are acceptable. Apart from the load shedding or tripping of generation
that is necessary for eliminating the fault, limited amounts of loads and generation may be
switched out by means of the system protections. After the fault, operational adaptation of the
transmissions is acceptable.

It shall be possible to maintain stable operation as regards transient, dynamic and static
stability for both frequency and voltage conditions, and no consequential tripping shall take
place due to overloading of components. In addition, it is assumed that the voltages and
frequency after the fault will be satisfactory for the consumers and power plants. Efforts shall
be made to maintain joint operation also after the fault, and planned sectionalisation of the grid
shall not normally be employed as a method for ensuring stability.

15 January 2007 23
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

B. Controlled operation, regional consequences

The consequences shall be limited and further controlled operation shall be maintained for
most of the system.

Controlled forced tripping of generation and load shedding may be carried out. Load shedding
or forced generator tripping shall normally be confined to the region in which the fault has
occurred. Minor grid breakdowns and grid sectionalisation are also acceptable provided that
they are restricted to the region in which the fault has occurred. The term ’region’ denotes parts
of the national grid, which are confined by the main cross-sections in the national grid or by
the interconnecting links (international tielines). In exceptional cases, major national
disturbances may be permissible provided that they do not spread beyond the interconnecting
links. However, subject to agreement, load shedding may be extended to other parts of the
Nordic power system. This applies in particular to the use of system-wide system protections.

C. Instability and breakdown

Instability is acceptable. Grid sectionalisation and extensive breakdowns can take place in the
Nordic system. However, the objective is to create a defined initial situation from which
restoration can take place.

It is assumed that operational possibilities will be available for restoring operation to normal
levels. It is also advisable to investigate at the planning stage whether simple measures can be
applied to restrict the consequences in the event of very rare and difficult faults.

5.2.6 System protection scheme

The term system protection scheme denotes automatic control equipment that disconnects or
otherwise controls generation, load or network components other than the faulty component.
Disconnection may concern both individual components and a large number of components.
The definition of system protection scheme is given in the System Operation Agreement
appendix 1 and requirements for system protection in the System Operation Agreement
appendix 2.

5.3 Other important aspects of system planning and design

5.3.1 Operational aspects

Future operational aspects shall be taken into account in the planning of the grid. Fundamental
principles and criteria for planning and future operation must therefore be founded on the same
basic ideas. The design includes both system design and the performance of individual objects.

The economic dimensioning of the grid means that consideration must be given to costs and
need for flexibility at the operating stage.

It shall be possible to handle shutdowns of one or several system components in a manner,

which is acceptable to operation.

At the operating stage, it shall be possible to distribute the disturbance reserves in an

economical manner. The grid should therefore be designed so that transmission margins are
available or that fault conditions will not lead to loss of necessary reserves.

15 January 2007 24
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

Operating possibilities shall be available for handling major disturbances. This includes
operating routines, equipment and training to enable both abnormal operation and restoration to
normal operation to be handled.

5.3.2 Operational characteristics of generation plants

The units are assumed to have certain operational characteristics. These demands are i.e.
regulated by the Connection Code.

The units shall have such tolerance to variations in voltage and frequency that it will be
possible to handle the most common types of grid fault without the units being tripped or
damaged. The units shall also have such control capability that they will be able to contribute
towards the disturbance tolerance of the grid as active and reactive disturbance reserves.

5.3.3 Instructions
As a supplement to the planning criteria, instructions containing special national demands and
’user instructions’ for the planners shall be drawn up. The instructions shall be prepared for
each country, and shall then be co-ordinated between the countries.

The objective of the planning criteria is to achieve acceptable strength of the interconnected
Nordic power system. Only a few demands are made on the supply security and local
conditions. It is therefore natural to supplement the criteria with national planning
requirements.

The structure of the criteria gives a large number of combinations of operating situations and
faults that must be tested. In practice, only a few of them are dimensioning to the design of
each individual section of the grid. Special comments should be made on these combinations,
and instructions should be given on how calculations should be carried out.

Since several consequence levels have been introduced in the criteria, strict demands are made
on knowledge of the nature of the power system and its behaviour in the event of disturbances.
Experience and calculation methods must therefore be gathered and comments must be made
on them.

15 January 2007 25
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

5.4 Post fault performance table (Criteria Scheme)

Acceptable consequences Pre-Fault Conditions

A Stable operation, local
consequences and limited Alert-state Disturbed Emergency
intervention of system protection
Normal operation
operation operation operation
B Controlled operation, regional
consequences
Planned Spontaneous loss and Exceeded Exceeded Exceeded
C Instability and breakdown Grid intact transfer limits / transfer limits transfer limits
maintenance adapted operation1
insufficient and / or and / or
A/B Consequences in accordance reserves. insufficient insufficient
with B for faults in previously No critical Shunt or Shunt Series
Adapt reserves reserves
weakened area, otherwise A. components series component component
operation by
out of component out of out of
B/C Aim should be to limit the operation out of operation operation
adjusting new Load
consequences according to B but transfer limits shedding
operation
for all faults this cannot be fulfilled and / or effected
1 The operating situation has been adapted
activating
reserves within
during 15 minutes after the fault by using the
means available (disturbance reserves, etc.).
PC0 PC1 PC2 PC3 max. 15 min.

Single fault that does not

affect series components A B/C
FG1
B/C
N-1 faults

Single fault that affects

series components A A A A/B B/C
Fault groups

FG2
Uncommon single faults
and special combinations
of two faults
B
FG3
C
Other combinatios of two
Serious faults

faults caused by the

same event
B B B C
FG4

Other multiple faults

C C
C C C
FG5

Figure 3 Criteria Scheme to be used for grid planning

15 January 2007 26
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE)

5.5 Fault groups

The faults for which the grid is to be tested are classified into five fault groups.

FG1 Common single faults that do not affect (transmission lines or other) series components
Definite loss of
1.1 Generation unit
1.2 Load block with associated transformer
1.3 Shunt component (capacitor, reactor)
1.4 DC pole (connected to adjacent system (e.g. Baltic Cable))

FG2 Common single faults that affect (transmission lines or other) series components
Definite loss, with or without initial single-phase permanent fault
2.1 Transmission line, one circuit
2.2 System transformer
2.3 Busbar
2.4 Other series component (series capacitor, etc.)
2.5 DC pole (Internal Nordic connection)

FG3 Less common single faults and special, more frequent combinations of two
simultaneous faults
Definite loss with initial 2-phase or 3-phase fault
3.1 Transmission line, one circuit (without fast autoreclose)
3.2 Busbar4
3.3 Combination that includes equipment with unknown reliability.

FG4 Other combinations of two simultaneous faults with a common cause

Definite loss with initial 3-phase fault
4.1 Combination of line fault and loss of thermal power unit5
4.2 Double circuit transmission line
4.3 Stuck breaker pole or relay fault in the event of fault clearance
4.4 Two power station units
4.5 Station with sectionalising circuit breakers
4.6 DC bipole link
4.7 Two transmission lines along the same cleared path

FG5 Other multiple faults (two independent simultaneous faults, and three or more
simultaneous faults)
5.1 Two independent simultaneous faults
5.2 Three or more simultaneous faults

4
Considered principally for stations that are of importance to joint operation between countries

5
Measures in the grid and on units assessed economically against grid consequences

15 January 2007 27
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

APPENDIX 1: METHOD, MODELS AND TOOLS FOR SYSTEM

ENGINEERING STUDIES

1 Methodology for system engineering studies

- Studies to evaluate the need to reinforce the grid
- The benefit values of alternative reinforcing measures
- Determining and describing preconditions
- Analysis of the technical properties with alternative solutions
- A technical/economic evaluation and prioritisation of these alternative solutions
- Choice of reinforcing measures

A method for this is shown in Figure 4. The method is described in more detail below.

1.1 Planning information and preconditions

The various preconditions that are fundamental for making analyses of the electric power
system are described in Figure 4. Scenarios and basic assumptions are of particular importance
(alternative developments that are important for the reinforcing need that is to be studied). This
includes preconditions with regard to general load development, special load increases,
production expansion, etc. When establishing models for carrying out the technical analyses it
is important to consider operational situations that are of significance for the evaluation of
limitations, capacity and reinforcing needs.

1.2 System reliability

The long-term planning of the electric power system must ensure the reliability of the system
(security of supply). The international concepts for system reliability cover:
- system security, which covers necessary system services and grid capacity for the
transport of these services.
- system adequacy, which covers sufficient production and grid capacity to meet demand.

The following concepts agree with the international definition of system sufficiency. The term
“energy security” refers to the ability of the electric power system to deliver to consumers the
desired amount of energy with a given quality. The term “power security” refers to the ability
of the electric power system to deliver to consumers the desired amount of power with a given
quality. A common expression for these two concepts is delivery security (or system
sufficiency).

Internationally, security of supply is expressed with the concept of system reliability, where
delivery security/system sufficiency is one part and system security is the other. System
security is the ability of the electric power system to withstand sudden disturbances such as
electrical short circuits or the unexpected disconnection of parts of the system. The concept
includes dynamic conditions.

15 January 2007 28
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

Technical/economic evaluation and comparison

(socio-economic profitability evaluation)
• Qualitative /strategic description/evaluation of the properties and limitations of
alternative grid solutions
• Cost/benefit evaluations of different reinforcement solutions (socio-economic
profitability evaluation)
• Calculated, for example, as costs of using alternative reinforcement solutions in
relation to a reference solution, e.g. the zero alternative/zero solution
• Quantitative/qualitative evaluation of consequences of changed preconditions
(adaptability evaluations)

System engineering analyses

Grid analyses Power balance analyses
(Load Flow/dynamic) (Multi area power market
simulator)

System engineering properties  Power balance properties

(Flow input
• Transmission limitations/ to grid • Duration curves
dimensioning fault analyses • Bottleneck costs
• Transmission capacity • Transmission losses and
(thermal, voltage, costs of losses
dynamic) 
• Transmission loss (Transmission
capacity)





Planning information/assumptions
• Scenarios and basic assumptions (load, production, export/import)
• Reinforcement measures/solutions, operational situations, cross-sections
• Analysis period and analysis stages
• Planning criteria
• Technical assumptions
• Economic assumptions
• Method

Figure 4 Procedure for carrying out a socio-economic profitability evaluation

15 January 2007 29
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

1.3 System engineering analyses

System engineering analyses include grid analyses and power balance analyses:
- Grid analyses include the analysis of transmission limitations and transmission capacity
(thermal, voltage and dynamic) for existing grids and alternative reinforcement
solutions for relevant operational situations and scenarios. Information about energy
flows in the grid, e.g. duration curves from power balance analyses will be important
background regarding the need for transmission capacity in important cross-sections.
The calculations are done with the load flow and dynamic simulation software and a
relevant grid model.
- Power balance analyses include analysis of energy flows under the relevant scenarios.
Among other things, duration curves are calculated for transmission between the
individual joint load areas and bottleneck costs with limitations between these areas.
The calculations are done with the multi-area power market simulator and a relevant
grid model.

Duration curves are calculated without limitation between the relevant network areas, possibly
without limitations between several/all areas.

Bottleneck costs are calculated with one fixed or several relevant capacity levels in the cross-
section concerned, and without or with relevant capacities between the other areas. Relevant
transmission capacities are obtained as a result of the grid analyses.

1.4 Technical/economic evaluation and comparison

Technical/economic comparison will include a summarising evaluation of the grid-related and
power-balance-related properties of different grid reinforcement solutions in different
scenarios.

Benefit value and cost evaluations (socio-economic profitability evaluations) will be important
for evaluating alternative reinforcement measures, but more qualitative and strategic
evaluations of alternative reinforcement solutions will have to be undertaken before a final
decision to implement relevant reinforcement measures is made.

A socio-economic profitability evaluation can be done with various profitability evaluation

methods. A method for calculating the net present value benefit of a reinforcement measure is
described here.

The net present value is calculated as a capitalised and discounted value of all costs during the
analysis period, stated as the benefit in relation to the reference solution (e.g. the zero
solution6). For a measure to be socio-economically profitable, the following requirement must
be met:
Net present value benefit (NNN) > 0

6
The “zero solution” means the existing grid, i.e. with no measures taken to reinforce the grid (concrete
reinforcement measures), or to utilise the grid more (e.g. system protection measures) in relation to existing
grids and operational practice.

15 January 2007 30
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

The net present value benefit is calculated on the basis of technical costs and system costs as
follows:
NNN = ∆I - ∆D - ∆M + ∆F + ∆T - ∆A - ∆S

(∆ means costs, cost/benefit effect of the measure compared with a reference solution, e.g. the
zero solution.)

Cost components included are:

Technical costs
∆I: Investment costs, possibly investment/reinvestment costs, etc. in relation to the
corresponding costs of the reference solution.
∆D: Operating and maintenance costs, i.e. o/m costs due to new measures or in relation to
the corresponding costs of the reference solution.
∆M: Environmental costs compared with the corresponding costs of the reference solution.
Environmental costs are often difficult to quantify, and the environmental consequences
are therefore often only evaluated qualitatively.

System costs
∆F: Bottleneck costs, expressed as reduction (benefit) with respect to the bottleneck costs of
the reference solution.
∆T: Loss costs, expressed as the benefit compared with the costs of transmission losses for
the reference solution.
∆A: Outage costs compared with the corresponding costs of the reference solution.
∆S: System costs compared with the corresponding costs of the reference solution.

Power/energy balance analyses and network analyses are carried out. The area subdivision
used in the analyses is described.

2 Electrical engineering electric power system models

To carry out the analyses, a model of the Nordic electric power system is used which contains
the transmission installations included in the system, e.g. transmission lines, transformers and
generating plant. Underlying networks with corresponding components and connected
consumption are also modelled. Analyses are done for relevant operational situations, i.e. with
a relevant switching configuration in the grid and with correct production and consumption
levels, so that transmissions and voltage levels are correct.

For this purpose the following load cases are created:

- High-load scenario with a five-year horizon.
- High-load scenario with a ten-year horizon.

2.1 Electrical engineering system analyses and tools

The practical analyses for determining, for example, the transmission capacity of the grid, are
carried out by determining dimensioning operational situations and types of fault, limiting
components (thermal) or limiting system properties (voltage collapse, dynamic instability), as
well as loading of the grid until the limiting components are fully loaded or the limiting system
properties are exceeded (voltage collapse, dynamic stability).

15 January 2007 31
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

Utsjoki

Tromsø Alta

7
Ivalo

Narvik

Ofoten Tornehamn
Vajukoski

8 12
Salten
RAC
Petäjäskoski
6 SWEDEN Letsi
Pirttikoski

Keminmaa
Røssåga
Krivoporolsk
Ajaure
Pikkarala Pyhänselkä
(6)
Cross-section
Grundfors no. 1 P1
Tunnsjødal
Linn-
9 Vuolijoki
vasselv

Stornorrfors
Ventusneva FINLAND
Trondheim Storfinnf. Alapitkä

0)
Alajärvi

(22
Järpströmmen Tuovila
5 Nea
(220) Seinäjoki Petäjävesi
Huutokoski
NORWAY
(5)
Sundsvall 13
Toivila

Ulvila Yllikkälä
(132)
Kangasala
Koria Vyborg
Cross-section Olkiluoto
1 no. 2
Rauma
Hikiä
Nurmijärvi Kymi
(4) Hyvinkää
4 DC Lieto Loviisa
Bergen
RDC HELSINKI
Kingisepp
Rjukan Inkoo
Narva
OSLO 10 Enköping

(3) Hasle Borgvik

Stavanger
2 (2)
STOCKHOLM
Important transmission
ESTONIAcross-sections
Tartu
3 Norrköping P1 Finland
(1)
Kristiansand
Skogsäter
Sweden
Cross-section no. 1
Velikor
West Coast cross-section Cross-section no. 2
Göteborg DC
Cross-section no. 4
DC

Nässjö Riga LATVIA

A C
West Coast cross-section
15 DRinghals Oskarshamn
Cross-section Norway 1) Hasle cross-section
no. 4
2) Flesaker cross-section
Tjele
Helsingborg 3) Sørlands cross-section
B 11 4) Hallingdal/Numedal cross-s.
DENMARK Karlshamn 5) Trøndelags cross-section
16 Ignalina
14 Barsebäck
Kruseberg
6) Nordlands cross-section
LITHUANIA
DC

KØBEN-
Denmark A
Kassø
17 HAVN
Zarnowiec B Kaunas Vilnius
DC

Flensburg
Kiel KaliningradGreat Belt
Gdansk
Audorf Ustka Inter-Nordic cross-sections Lida
DC Lubmin
Brunsbüttel
Rostock
Dunowo RACElk
Emden Brokdorf Zydowo
RDC
(11

Bergum Güstrow
0)

Ross
Bialystok
Hamb.IS Pasewalk Norway-Sweden cross-section
)
20

)
0
Öresund
(2

GERMANY Perleberg POLAND (22

HOLLAND

Figure 5 Important transmission cross-sections in the Nordel area shown in relation to

the area division (areas 1 – 17) for which power and energy analyses are made.

15 January 2007 32
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 1

2.2 Security of supply for energy and power

As well as analysing the capacity for transport on the market, it is important to determine
whether there are sufficient resources in the generating plant to maintain security of supply in
the Nordel area. This is done by analysing the probability of energy or power shortage. Where
the energy supply is concerned, the focus is on dry years and extreme dry years for the
hydropower system. Where power is concerned, the focus is on normal winter load and
extreme winter load that occurs once every ten years.

There may be a need to develop a number of security-of-supply criteria, which determine the
Nordel area’s possible degree of self-supply in terms of power and energy.

15 January 2007 33
NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 2

APPENDIX 2: FINAL REPORT OF NORDEL’S HVDC WORKING

GROUP FROM YEAR 1998

1 Background
The near future will see a rapid increase in the number of HVDC connections for transmission
of power between the Nordel and UCTE systems. At present, total transmission capacity is
almost 3000 MW, while current plans are for it to increase to about 5500 MW within the next
few years.

The desire for such increase in the HVDC capacity springs primarily from commercial
interests, powered by the idea within the EU of creating a single energy market, as well as the
scope for joint operation of hydroelectric power generation in Nordel with thermal electricity
production on the Continent. The prospect of an expansion of the existing main network is
hampered by considerable public opposition to overhead lines.

The HVDC connections, having independent owners and representing uncoordinated interests,
are in certain cases expected to draw so much from the Nordel system as to disrupt the stability
of operations. With uncoordinated operation of the connections, there is a risk that a
disturbance in the UCTE system could affect the dimensioning of the Nordel system.

The fast power control properties of the HVDC connections can contribute to improving the
overall frequency quality of the system. Any production outage will affect system frequency.
Depending on the extent of frequency deviations, various forms of emergency power will be
activated. Current practice as regards emergency power in the Nordel system is described in
Nordel’s recommendation “Rekommandasjon for frekvens, tidsavvik, regulerstyrke og
reserve”, August 1996. The HVDC connections are included in both momentary operating
disturbance reserve and in network protection control.

In consideration of the Nordel recommendation the power control properties of the HVDC
connections may be used to improve the frequency quality in Nordel following disturbances of
operation.

Nordel’s HVDC working group has prepared two sub reports: “Sub report 1 prepared by
Nordel’s HVDC working group: Network disturbances” and “Sub report 2 prepared by
Nordel’s HVDC working group: System disturbances”. This final report summarises the results
from the two sub reports.

2 Objective
The objective of the work of the working group has been to illustrate:
- the impact of serious network disturbances on a system with several HVDC
connections, which in electrical terms are close together.
- the importance of rapid power control response from the HVDC connections to
frequency variation generated by disturbances during operation.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 2

The studies have been undertaken for a future scenario, about 2002, assuming HVDC
connections from Norway to both the Netherlands and Germany, as well as from Sweden to
Poland. However, the plan is not for two of the Norwegian connections to be established until
2005.

3 Results and conclusion

The work of the group has resulted in recommendations, partly concerning the need for co-
ordination of restart of HVDC connections following a network disturbance and partly
concerning HVDC power control for frequency reserve.

The work has resulted in two sub reports, which have been considered by Nordel’s System
Committee; “Sub report 1 prepared by Nordel’s HVDC working group: Network
disturbances”, Trapla 1997-10, 04.03.98 and “Sub report 2 prepared by Nordel’s HVDC
working group: System disturbances”, Trapla 1997-42, 04.03.98.

3.1 Network disturbances

As far as network disturbances are concerned, the study focuses on power flow in the direction
from UCTE to Nordel, since this is a “worst case” scenario, corresponding to inverter operation
and low short-circuit power in Nordel. Only dimensioning network disturbances, for example
busbar faults as described in Nordel’s network dimensioning rules (1992 edition), are
examined.

Commutation failure
Practical experience has shown that commutation failures caused by a network disturbance
only occur concurrently on HVDC connections that in electrical terms are close together. For
example, concurrent commutation failures have been seen on Kontek and Baltic Cable caused
by an unsymmetrical network disturbance on Zealand, while other plants in Sweden and
Norway continued operations as usual.

This study concentrates on the risk of repeated commutation failures, i.e. commutation failures
during the restart of HVDC connections after a network disturbance. Only HVDC connections
that are close together in electrical terms fail at the same time, e.g. Kontek, Baltic Cable and
SwePol. This means that even with maximum power transmission to Nordel by all HVDC
connections, the power that is lost immediately cannot exceed the sum of the connections
affected.

There are no dimensioning faults that can cause commutation failure on all connections at the
same time.

Possible action
The HVDC power that can be transmitted to a network area is highly dependent on the local
short-circuit power Sk, e.g.:
- approx. 3000 MW at a short-circuit power of approx. 6 GVA, falling to
- approx. 2000 MW at a short-circuit power of approx. 4.5 GVA.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 2

Increasing the short-circuit power by introducing various more or less expensive network
measures could improve the situation, e.g.:
- increased network capacity,
- more production units in operation (rotating reserve) or
- synchronous condensers.

So far, work has shown that, as an alternative, it is highly advantageous to leave the control
systems of the converter stations to handle the situation, e.g. through:
- gradual ramping-up from minimum power to the ordered level for a single connection
in the affected area, or
- automatic shift-over from power control to current control on a single HVDC
connection immediately after a network disturbance and in the case of commutation
failure upon restart. This function is already available for some HVDC connections.

The expansion of the control systems on future HVDC connections to include such ”soft start”
functionality presents a highly attractive solution, both technically and financially.

With a refined control system design, it will become feasible to increase the number of HVDC
connections to an extent corresponding to the number of connections examined in the present
study, trigging substantial reinforcements in the network.

Damping
Substantial improvements can be achieved in the damping of power oscillations in the network
around known “bottlenecks”, e.g. the Hasle cross-section through Southern Norway and
Central Sweden exploiting the damping function of the HVDC connections in the right way.

However, general guidelines for the setting of the HVDC connections’ damping control
function have not been determined.

3.2 System disturbances

Dimensioning outages and in a few cases outages larger than the dimensioning outage have
been considered. As defined in Nordel’s network dimensioning rules (1996 edition), the
dimensioning outage is 1200 MW.

Focus is primarily on the first few seconds following the disturbance, a time when the
conventional and slower power control of the generators is not particularly effective, but when
the HVDC connections have their strength. Figure 6 shows the typical development in
frequency following a production outage and illustrates the terms ”minimum temporary
frequency” and “stationary frequency”.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 2

50,1

50,0

49,9
Stationary frequency
FREQUENCY (Hz)

49,8

49,7

49,6

49,5

49,4
Minimum temporary frequency

49,3
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90
TIME (s)
Figure 6 Development in frequency in Nordel following production outage

The power systems’ frequency response within the first few seconds of the disturbance is
improved markedly with HVDC emergency power control, reducing the minimum temporary
frequency drop. The fast power control systems of the HVDC connections ensure efficient
HVDC power control before regulation by the power control systems of the turbines.

The working group has identified the requirements that must be made to the power control of
the HVDC connections with account being taken of Nordel’s recommendations.

The following types of frequency-dependent emergency power control systems are

recommended:
- HVDC droop control of up to, e.g., of 1000 MW/Hz in total as a momentary operating
disturbance reserve (frequency control).
- HVDC emergency power in steps or ramps of up to 1200 MW in total as network
protection control (EPC, Emergency Power Control).

Momentary operating disturbance reserve

HVDC frequency control (droop control) is activated in the frequency range between 49.9 and
49.5 Hz.

Network protection control

EPC, that is HVDC emergency power in steps or ramps, is activated when frequency drops
below 49.5 Hz. It is recommended that a combination of frequency control and EPC should be
used when the HVDC connections are used for network control, that is in the range below 49.5
Hz. During EPC, the frequency control should thus remain active. In this way, the ability of the
EPC to quickly restore frequency to the desired level is used, while the frequency control
ensures fast stabilisation of frequency.

Both the power response of the frequency control and the steps of the EPC should be
determined on the basis of the current operating situation of the electricity system and with
account being taken of the HVDC connections actually in operation.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (PLANNING CODE) APPENDIX 2

The frequency response/droop of the HVDC connections within each local area can be set in
relation to the currently phased-in MVA (S) and the load to ensure compliance with the
minimum requirements for frequency control in the area.

The extent of EPC for each area can be set in relation to the current rotating reserve.

In situations where the Nordel HVDC connections are to supply emergency power to the
UCTE system, the control parameters of the HVDC connections must be co-ordinated to
ensure that the supplied emergency power does not exceed the dimensioning production outage
of 1200 MW for Nordel.

In situations where the Nordel HVDC connections are to receive emergency power from the
UCTE system, the control parameters of the HVDC connections do not need to be co-
ordinated, if the recommended combination of static control and stepping-up or ramping-up of
emergency power is used. This control principle ensures effective frequency control while
preventing overcontrol.

4 Conclusion
The working group considers its task to be completed.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

The following documents have been included in this chapter:

Document Status
The System Operation Agreement 2006 Binding agreement

The following national documents deal with the Operational Code:

Document Status

The TSOs in Scandinavia and Finland have entered into a System Operation Agreement. The
System Operation Agreement contains rules for the operation of the interconnected Nordic
electric power system, and is set out in this section. This is translation, the original one is in
Swedish language.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

AGREEMENT (TRANSLATION) REGARDING OPERATION OF THE

INTERCONNECTED NORDIC POWER SYSTEM (SYSTEM OPERATION
AGREEMENT) ........................................................................................................................ 49
§1 THE PARTIES ETC ........................................................................................................ 49
§2 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................. 49
§3 OBJECTIVE .................................................................................................................. 49
§4 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 50
§5 DECISIONS ETC CONCERNING OWN SUBSYSTEMS ......................................................... 50
§6 OPERATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS ......................................................................... 51
§7 OPERATIONAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS FOR THE LINKS BETWEEN THE SUBSYSTEMS .. 51
§8 OPERATIONAL PLANNING ............................................................................................ 53
§9 SYSTEM SERVICES ....................................................................................................... 53
§ 10 MANAGING TRANSMISSION LIMITATIONS BETWEEN THE SUBSYSTEMS ........................ 53
§ 11 MANAGING OPERATIONAL DISTURBANCES .................................................................. 53
§ 12 BALANCE REGULATION ............................................................................................... 54
§ 13 POWER EXCHANGES .................................................................................................... 54
§ 14 SETTLEMENT ............................................................................................................... 55
§ 15 POWER SHORTAGES ..................................................................................................... 55
§ 16 EXCHANGING INFORMATION ....................................................................................... 56
§ 17 LIABILITY .................................................................................................................... 56
§ 18 DISPUTES .................................................................................................................... 56
§ 19 ALTERATIONS AND SUPPLEMENTS ............................................................................... 56
§ 20 TRANSFER ................................................................................................................... 57
§ 21 VALIDITY ETC ............................................................................................................. 57
DEFINITIONS ......................................................................................................................... 59

OPERATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS ....................................................................... 67

1 SYSTEM SECURITY CRITERIA ........................................................................................... 67
2 SYSTEM PROTECTION ...................................................................................................... 67
3 HVDC LINKS .................................................................................................................. 68
4 OPERATIONAL RESERVES ................................................................................................ 69
4.1 Automatic active reserve ........................................................................................ 69
4.1.1 Frequency controlled normal operation reserve............................................. 69
4.1.2 Frequency controlled disturbance reserve...................................................... 69
4.2 Fast active disturbance reserve.............................................................................. 71
4.3 Slow active disturbance reserve............................................................................. 71
4.4 Reactive reserve ..................................................................................................... 71
5 SPECIAL CONDITIONS FOR ENERGINET.DK AS A MEMBER OF UCTE ................................ 72
6 PRINCIPLES FOR DETERMINING THE TRANSMISSION CAPACITY ........................................ 72
6.1 Introduction............................................................................................................ 72

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

6.2 Thermal limitation.................................................................................................. 72

6.3 Voltage collapse ..................................................................................................... 72
6.4 System dynamics..................................................................................................... 73
BALANCE REGULATION STANDARDS .......................................................................... 74
1 BALANCE REGULATION WITHIN THE SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEM .......................................... 74
1.1 Quality standards ................................................................................................... 74
1.2 Momentary area control error ............................................................................... 75
2 BALANCE REGULATION IN WESTERN DENMARK ............................................................. 75
3 REGULATION MEASURES AND PRINCIPLES OF PRICING ..................................................... 75
3.1 Regulation of frequency and balance..................................................................... 75
3.2 Regulation for network reasons ............................................................................. 76
4 PRICING OF BALANCE POWER .......................................................................................... 77
4.1 Balance power between the subsystems within the synchronous system ............... 77
4.2 Balance power between Western Denmark and Sweden ....................................... 77
4.3 Balance power between Western Denmark and Norway ....................................... 77
5 PRICING OF SUPPORTIVE POWER ...................................................................................... 77
5.1 Pricing within the synchronous system .................................................................. 77
5.2 Pricing between Western Denmark and Norway, and Western Denmark and
Sweden................................................................................................................................ 77
5.3 Pricing during operational disturbances on cross-border links............................ 77
6 OPERATIONAL/TRADING RULES BETWEEN THE SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEM AND WESTERN
DENMARK ............................................................................................................................... 78
EXCHANGING INFORMATION ......................................................................................... 79
1 OUTAGE PLANNING ......................................................................................................... 79
2 PRIOR TO THE HOUR OF OPERATION ................................................................................. 79
3 DURING THE HOUR OF OPERATION ................................................................................... 80
4 FOLLOWING THE HOUR OF OPERATION ............................................................................ 81
SYSTEM PROTECTION ....................................................................................................... 82
1 GENERAL ........................................................................................................................ 82
2 SYSTEM PROTECTION ACTIVATED BY FREQUENCY DEVIATIONS....................................... 84
2.1 Frequency controlled regulation of DC installations, Emergency power ............. 84
2.2 Frequency controlled start-up of production ......................................................... 85
2.3 Frequency controlled load shedding...................................................................... 85
2.4 Frequency controlled disconnection of lines ......................................................... 85
3 SYSTEM PROTECTION ACTIVATED BY VOLTAGE DEVIATIONS........................................... 86
3.1 System protection in Sweden cross-section 2......................................................... 86
3.2 System protection in Sweden cross-section 4......................................................... 86
3.3 System protection in southern Norway................................................................... 86
3.4 System protection in Finland.................................................................................. 86

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

4 SYSTEM PROTECTION ACTIVATED BY ONE OR MORE RELAY SIGNALS FROM THE

FACILITIES’ PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT ...................................................................................... 87
4.1 Eastern Denmark: System protection for stability in Eastern Denmark................ 90
4.2 Sweden: System protection with production shedding for limiting overloads on
lines in Sweden ................................................................................................................... 90
4.3 Sweden: System protection in the West Coast cross-section (Kilanda-Horred +
Stenkullen-Strömma) .......................................................................................................... 90
4.4 Sweden: System protection Forsmark .................................................................... 91
4.5 Sweden: System protection Långbjörn................................................................... 91
4.6 Norway: System protection in the Hasle and Flesaker cross-section.................... 91
4.7 Norway: System protection in the Nordland cross-section.................................... 91
4.8 Norway: Local system protection at Kvilldal......................................................... 92
4.9 Norway: Network division in southern Norway..................................................... 92
4.10 Norway: System protection for load shedding ....................................................... 92
4.11 Norway: System protection at Sørlandsnittet (PFK and HVDC control) .............. 92
4.12 Western Denmark: Konti-Skan pole 2.................................................................... 92
4.13 Western Denmark: Konti-Skan pole 1 & 2............................................................. 93
4.14 Western Denmark: Skagerrak pole 3 ..................................................................... 93
4.15 Western Denmark: the German link ...................................................................... 93
4.16 Finland: Frequency regulation (during island operation) with automated systems
on the HVDC Fenno-Skan link........................................................................................... 94
4.17 Finland: Power modulation for Fenno-Skan (Power modulation control) ........... 94
4.18 Finland: Network division in northern Finland to protect the 110 kV network from
overloads ............................................................................................................................ 94
4.19 Finland: System protection for avoiding system oscillations................................. 94
SYSTEM SERVICES .............................................................................................................. 95
1 SURVEY OF SYSTEM SERVICES ......................................................................................... 95
1.1 System services defined in Appendix 2 of the System Operation Agreement ......... 95
1.1.1 Frequency controlled normal operation reserve............................................. 95
1.1.2 Frequency controlled disturbance reserve...................................................... 96
1.1.3 Voltage controlled disturbance reserve .......................................................... 96
1.1.4 Fast active disturbance reserve....................................................................... 97
1.1.5 Slow active disturbance reserve ..................................................................... 97
1.1.6 Reactive reserve ............................................................................................. 98
1.2 System services not defined in Appendix 2 of the System Operation Agreement... 99
1.2.1 Load following ............................................................................................... 99
1.2.2 System protection........................................................................................... 99
1.2.3 Ramping ....................................................................................................... 100
1.2.4 Black starts ................................................................................................... 100
1.2.5 Automatic load shedding.............................................................................. 100
1.2.6 Manual load shedding .................................................................................. 101
1.2.7 Fast active forecast reserve .......................................................................... 101
1.2.8 Fast active counter trading reserve............................................................... 102
1.2.9 Peak load resource........................................................................................ 102

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

2 DESCRIPTION OF ROUTINES FOR TRADING IN SYSTEM SERVICES .................................... 103

2.1 General................................................................................................................. 103
2.2 Trading in frequency controlled normal operation reserve and frequency
controlled disturbance reserve......................................................................................... 103
2.3 Exchanges using other types of reserves.............................................................. 103
JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH SUBSYSTEMS
ON THE AC LINKS .............................................................................................................. 104
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 104
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS OF SWEDEN-NORWAY ............... 104
2.1 Transmission facilities which are owned/held by system operators at both ends 104
2.2 Other transmission facilities ................................................................................ 104
2.3 Other transmission facilities than those under 2.2 .............................................. 104
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 ........................................................... 105
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 105
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management....................... 105
3.3 Switching responsible operator............................................................................ 105
3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety ...................... 105
3.5 Switching schedule ............................................................................................... 105
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 105
3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management ......................................................... 106
3.6.2 Switching schedule....................................................................................... 106
3.6.3 Fault finding ................................................................................................. 106
3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults ................................................................. 106
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 AND 2.2............................................... 106
4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 106
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 107
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 107
4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation ...................... 107
4.5 Voltage regulation................................................................................................ 108
4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Norwegian side................................................... 108
4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side ....................................................... 108
4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation ............................................................. 109
4.6 Outage planning................................................................................................... 109
4.7 Disturbance situation ........................................................................................... 109
JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE FINNISH AND SWEDISH SUBSYSTEMS ON
THE AC LINKS AND FENNO-SKAN ................................................................................ 110
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 110
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS SWEDEN – FINLAND .................. 110
2.1 Transmission facilities which are owned/held by system operators .................... 110
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 ........................................................... 110
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 110
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management....................... 110

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

3.3 Switching responsible operator............................................................................ 111

3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety ...................... 111
3.5 Switching schedule ............................................................................................... 111
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 111
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 ............................................................ 111
4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 111
4.1.1 400 kV AC links........................................................................................... 112
4.1.2 Fenno-Skan................................................................................................... 112
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 112
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 112
4.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of system operation .................... 113
4.5 Voltage regulation................................................................................................ 113
4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side ....................................................... 113
4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Finnish side......................................................... 113
4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation ............................................................. 114
4.6 Outage planning................................................................................................... 114
4.7 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 114
5 DISTRIBUTION OF CAPACITY UTILIZATION BETWEEN FINLAND AND SWEDEN................ 115
5.1 Basic distribution ................................................................................................. 115
5.2 Loss minimization (Fenno-Skan optimization)..................................................... 115
5.3 Loss minimization model...................................................................................... 115
5.4 Distribution of benefit .......................................................................................... 116
5.5 Utilizing the other party’s idle capacity............................................................... 116
5.5.1 Bottlenecks in Fingrid’s network ................................................................. 116
5.5.2 Bottlenecks in SvK’s network...................................................................... 116
5.5.3 Bottlenecks in both parties’ networks .......................................................... 117
5.6 Settlement of loss minimization............................................................................ 117
JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN, FINNISH AND SWEDISH
SUBSYSTEMS IN ARCTIC SCANDINAVIA.................................................................... 118
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 118
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS OF NORWAY-FINLAND .............. 118
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 .............................................................. 118
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 118
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operation management.......................... 118
3.3 Switching responsible operator............................................................................ 118
3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety ...................... 118
3.5 Switching schedule ............................................................................................... 119
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 119
3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management ......................................................... 119
3.6.2 Switching schedule....................................................................................... 119
3.6.3 Fault finding ................................................................................................. 119
3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults ................................................................. 119
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 ............................................................... 119

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 119

4.1.1 From Norway to Finland .............................................................................. 119
4.1.2 From Finland to Norway .............................................................................. 119
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 120
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 120
4.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of system operation .................... 120
4.5 Voltage regulation................................................................................................ 120
4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Norwegian side................................................... 120
4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Finnish side......................................................... 120
4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation ............................................................. 120
4.6 Outage planning................................................................................................... 120
4.7 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 121
5 MISCELLANEOUS ........................................................................................................... 121
5.1 Settlement ............................................................................................................. 121
5.2 Information exchange........................................................................................... 121
JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN AND WESTERN DANISH
SUBSYSTEMS ON THE DC LINKS SKAGERRAK POLES 1, 2 AND 3 ...................... 122
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 122
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS OF NORWAY-WESTERN DENMARK
122
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 .............................................................. 122
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 122
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management....................... 122
3.3 Switching responsible operator............................................................................ 123
3.3.1 Switchings .................................................................................................... 123
3.3.2 Switching responsible operator .................................................................... 123
3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety........................ 123
3.5 Switching schedule ............................................................................................... 123
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 123
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 ............................................................... 124
4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 124
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 124
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 124
4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation ...................... 124
4.4.1 The power flow and distribution between the poles .................................... 125
4.4.2 Regulating the link ....................................................................................... 125
4.5 Outage planning................................................................................................... 125
4.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 125
4.6.1 General ......................................................................................................... 125
4.6.2 Emergency power......................................................................................... 126
4.6.3 System protection......................................................................................... 126
5 MISCELLANEOUS ........................................................................................................... 126
5.1 System services..................................................................................................... 126

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

5.2 Settlement ............................................................................................................. 126

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE WESTERN DANISH AND SWEDISH
SUBSYSTEMS ON THE KONTI-SKAN 1 AND 2 DC LINKS ........................................ 127
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 127
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS OF SWEDEN - WESTERN DENMARK
127
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 .............................................................. 127
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 127
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management....................... 127
3.3 Switching responsible operator............................................................................ 128
3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety........................ 128
3.5 Switching schedule ............................................................................................... 128
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 128
3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management ......................................................... 128
3.6.2 Switching schedule....................................................................................... 128
3.6.3 Fault finding ................................................................................................. 128
3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults ................................................................. 128
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2 ............................................................... 129
4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 129
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 129
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 129
4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation ...................... 130
4.4.1 The power flow and distribution between the poles .................................... 130
4.4.2 Regulating the link ....................................................................................... 130
4.5 Outage planning................................................................................................... 130
4.6 System protection - emergency power.................................................................. 130
4.6.1 General ......................................................................................................... 130
4.6.2 Emergency power......................................................................................... 131
4.6.3 System protection......................................................................................... 131
5 MISCELLANEOUS ........................................................................................................... 131
5.1 System services..................................................................................................... 131
5.1.1 Transmission scope for operation reserves .................................................. 131
JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE EASTERN DANISH AND SWEDISH
SUBSYSTEMS ON THE AC LINKS ACROSS ÖRESUND AND TO BORNHOLM ... 132
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 132
2 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS OF EASTERN DENMARK AND
SWEDEN ................................................................................................................................ 132
2.1 Transmission facilities owned/held by system operators at both ends................. 132
2.2 Other transmission facilities ................................................................................ 133
3 ELECTRICAL SAFETY FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 ........................................................... 133
3.1 General................................................................................................................. 133
3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management....................... 133

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

3.3 Switching responsible operator/Switching leader ............................................... 133

3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety........................ 134
3.5 Operational orders/Switching schedule ............................................................... 134
3.6 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 134
3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management ......................................................... 134
3.6.2 Switching schedule/Operational orders........................................................ 135
3.6.3 Fault finding ................................................................................................. 135
3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults ................................................................. 135
4 SYSTEM OPERATION FOR FACILITIES UNDER 2.1 AND 2.2............................................... 135
4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)............................................................................... 135
4.1.1 Transmission capacity in MW per cable bundle .......................................... 135
4.1.2 Transmission capacity in MW per link ........................................................ 135
4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity ............................................ 136
4.3 Trading capacity (NTC) ....................................................................................... 136
4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation ...................... 136
4.5 Voltage regulation................................................................................................ 136
4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side ....................................................... 136
4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Danish side ......................................................... 137
4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation ............................................................. 137
4.6 Outage planning................................................................................................... 137
4.7 Disturbance management..................................................................................... 138
5 MISCELLANEOUS ........................................................................................................... 138
5.1 Parallel operation 130 kV .................................................................................... 138
5.2 Transmissions to Bornholm.................................................................................. 138
5.3 Co-ordination of fast active disturbance reserve south of cross-section 4 .......... 138
5.4 Counter trading .................................................................................................... 139
JOINT TRIANGULAR OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN, SWEDISH
AND WESTERN DANISH SUBSYSTEMS ........................................................................ 140
1 TRANSMISSION FACILITIES TRIANGULARLY LINKING THE SUBSYSTEMS SWEDEN -
WESTERN DENMARK - NORWAY ........................................................................................... 140
2 PRINCIPLES FOR THE DISTRIBUTION OF EXCHANGE PLANS ON THE LINKS ...................... 140
MANAGING TRANSMISSION LIMITATIONS BETWEEN SUBSYSTEMS.............. 142
1 BACKGROUND ............................................................................................................... 142
2 TRANSMISSION LIMITATIONS DURING THE PLANNING PHASE, PRIOR TO COMPLETED
TRADING ON ELSPOT ............................................................................................................. 142
3 TRANSMISSION LIMITATIONS DURING THE OPERATIONAL PHASE, FOLLOWING COMPLETED
TRADING ON ELSPOT ............................................................................................................. 142
4 STEP BY STEP OF THE TRADING CAPACITY ..................................................................... 143
RULES FOR MANAGING POWER SHORTAGES DURING HIGH CONSUMPTION,
BOTTLENECKS OR DISTURBANCES ............................................................................ 144
1 GENERAL POWER SHORTAGES WITHOUT BOTTLENECKS IN THE NETWORK..................... 145

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NORDIC GRID CODE (OPERATIONAL CODE)

1.1 Maintenance of manual active reserve (15 min).................................................. 145

1.2 Risk of power shortages ....................................................................................... 146
1.3 Power shortages................................................................................................... 146
1.4 Critical power shortages...................................................................................... 146
2 REGIONAL POWER SHORTAGES CAUSED BY BOTTLENECKS OR NETWORK DISTURBANCES
147
3 CONNECTION OF CONSUMPTION FOLLOWING LOAD SHEDDING ...................................... 148
4 PRICING ......................................................................................................................... 148
THE INTERCONNECTED NORDIC POWER SYSTEM’S JOINT OPERATION WITH
OTHER SYSTEMS................................................................................................................ 149
1 WESTERN DENMARK’S JOINT OPERATION WITH THE UCTE SYSTEM ............................. 149
1.1 Western Denmark’s joint operation with Germany ............................................. 149
1.1.1 System operation collaboration with E.ON Netz ......................................... 149
1.1.2 Commercial conditions ................................................................................ 150
1.2 Western Denmark’s joint operation with Flensborg............................................ 150
1.2.1 System operation collaboration with SWG.................................................. 150
1.2.2 Commercial conditions ................................................................................ 151
2 THE SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEM’S JOINT OPERATION WITH THE UCTE SYSTEM ................. 151
2.1 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Germany via the Baltic Cable... 151
2.1.1 System operation collaboration with E.ON Netz ......................................... 151
2.1.2 Commercial conditions ................................................................................ 151
2.2 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Germany via Kontek ................. 151
2.2.1 System operation collaboration with Vattenfall Europe Transmission........ 152
2.2.2 Commercial conditions ................................................................................ 152
2.3 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Poland....................................... 152
2.3.1 System operation collaboration with PSE.................................................... 152
2.3.2 Commercial conditions ................................................................................ 153
3 THE SYNCHRONOUS SYSTEM’S JOINT OPERATION WITH RUSSIA .................................... 153
3.1 System operation collaboration with RAO UES of Russia................................... 153
3.2 Commercial conditions ........................................................................................ 153

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

AGREEMENT (TRANSLATION) REGARDING OPERATION OF THE

INTERCONNECTED NORDIC POWER SYSTEM (SYSTEM
OPERATION AGREEMENT)

§1 The Parties etc

• Energinet.dk (Energinet.dk) corporate registration no. 28 98 06 71
• Fingrid Oyj (Fingrid) Business Identity Code 1072894-3
• Statnett SF (Statnett) corporate registration no. 962 986 633
• Affärsverket svenska kraftnät (Svenska Kraftnät)
corporate registration no. 202100-4284

The terms and concepts occurring in this System Operation Agreement (the Agreement) and its
appendices are defined in Appendix 1.

§2 Background
The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected, forming the so called synchronous system. The subsystem of Western Denmark
is connected to Norway and Sweden using DC interconnectors. The synchronous system and
the subsystem of Western Denmark jointly constitute the interconnected Nordic power system.

The supervisory authorities of Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden have appointed special
system operators who are comprehensively responsible for the satisfactory operation of each
subsystem. These system operators are Energinet.dk for the Danish subsystem, including
Bornholm, Fingrid for the Finnish subsystem, Statnett for the Norwegian subsystem and
Svenska Kraftnät for the Swedish subsystem. Åland is not covered by this Agreement.

The background to entering into this Agreement is that operation of the interconnected Nordic
power system entails operational collaboration and co-ordination taking place between the
system operators. Effective collaboration between these will provide the technical prerequisites
for trading in power on an open electricity market.
The Agreement and its Appendices regulate the operational collaboration between the Parties.
Several of the Agreement’s provisions are based upon recommendations issued by Nordel.

§3 Objective
The objective of the Agreement is to make use of the advantages arising from the
interconnected operation of the Nordic power system. The Parties shall thus jointly uphold the
interconnected operation of the Nordic power system on a satisfactory level of reliability and
quality.

The Parties shall jointly uphold a supply quality that is appropriate to joint system operation,
e.g. frequency, time deviation, system oscillations etc.

The Parties shall jointly operate the interconnected Nordic power system in a manner which
promotes the efficient utilization of existing resources and power trading on the Nordic
electricity market, as well as on an additional potential international market. The Agreement

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

specifies in detail the commitments that the Parties undertake to honour during their
operational collaboration.

The Parties are agreed that agreements regarding the operation of the interconnected Nordic
power system shall only be entered into between the system operators concerned.

It is the Parties’ intention that, as long as transmission facilities between the subsystems are in
operation, there shall exist an agreement between the Parties regulating their operational
collaboration, rights and commitments vis-à-vis system operation issues

§4 Appendices

The following Appendices are attached to this Agreement.

Appendix Content
1 Definitions
2 Operational security standards
3 Balance regulation standards
4 Exchanging information
5 System protection
6 System services
7.1 Joint operation between Norway - Sweden
7.2 Joint operation between Sweden - Finland
7.3 Joint operation between Norway - Finland - Sweden (Arctic
Scandinavia)
7.4 Joint operation between Norway - Western Denmark
7.5 Joint operation between Sweden - Western Denmark
7.6 Joint operation between Sweden - Eastern Denmark
7.7 Joint triangular operation between the Norwegian, Swedish
and Western Danish subsystems.
8 Management of transmission limitations between
subsystems.
9 Power shortages
10 The Nordel system’s joint operation with other systems

The Appendices constitute an integral part of the Agreement.

In the event of any variance between the contents of the Appendices and what is set forth in
this, the main part of the Agreement, what is set forth in the main part shall take precedence.

§5 Decisions etc concerning own subsystems

The Parties will make their own decisions regarding the principles applicable to the system
security of their own subsystems.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

The Parties agree, however, when taking such decisions, to comply with the intentions and
principles of the Agreement as far as is possible and appropriate.

The Parties are individually responsible for formulating their own agreements concerning
system operation collaboration between their own subsystems and subsystems outside of the
interconnected Nordic power system, with which there are physical transmission links, in such
a way that these do not contravene the intentions of, or prevent compliance with, the
Agreement.

It is the intention of the Parties, as far as is possible within the legal framework provided
(terms and conditions of concessions etc) to co-ordinate the terms and conditions of such
agreements with the provisions of this Agreement.

Each respective Party shall enter into such agreements with companies within its own
subsystem as are necessary to comply with the Agreement.

Unless otherwise agreed, the Parties shall be responsible for ensuring that measures taken
within their own subsystems, which impact upon the operation of the system, shall not burden
the other subsystems.

§6 Operational security standards

The Parties shall, in the day-to-day operation of the system and in their operational
collaboration with other Parties, comply with the standards set forth in Appendices 2 and 3.

§7 Operational terms and conditions for the links between the subsystems

7.1 Transmission facilities

The transmission facilities linking the subsystems are accounted for in the following
Appendices.

Appendix 7.1 Norway - Sweden

Appendix 7.2 Sweden - Finland
Appendix 7.3 Norway - Finland - Sweden (Arctic Scandinavia)
Appendix 7.4 Norway - Western Denmark
Appendix 7.5 Sweden - Western Denmark
Appendix 7.6 Sweden - Eastern Denmark
Appendix 7.7 Norway - Sweden - Western Denmark
(subsystems in triangular operation)

The Parties are responsible, as and when required, for detailed operating instructions being
drawn up for the links listed in the mentioned Appendices within their own subsystems. In
parts where such operating instructions have a bearing upon the joint system operation, they
are to be co-ordinated with the companies and Parties concerned.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

7.2 Transmission capacity

The transmission capacity of the links between the subsystems shall be bilaterally determined
on a routine basis by the Parties concerned. Decisions shall normally be based on the
operational security standards set out in Appendix 2 and on such current technical and
operative factors as are of significance to the transmission capacity. The Parties are
individually responsible for assessing these circumstances within their own subsystems and
will decide on the necessary measures.

The Parties agree to reserve a regulating margin between the transmission and trading
capacities of the links. The regulating margin shall normally have the values specified in
Appendices 7.1 -7.7.

7.3 Special operational terms and conditions

In certain cases, special rules are applied as regards using the transmission capacity of the
links. Detailed terms and conditions, together with the companies concerned, are specified in
the respective Appendices 7.1-7.7.

7.4 Transmission losses

Issues concerning transmission losses are governed by separate agreements – settlement
agreements.

A Party shall not be responsible for transmission losses arising within another Party’s
subsystem in any operational situation, unless otherwise agreed.

The settlement points are specified in Appendices 7.1-7.6.

7.5 Voltage regulation

Voltage regulation in the subsystems shall be conducted in such a way that the operational
security standards specified in 6 § are upheld and in such a way that the reactive flow of power
between the subsystems does not entail operational problems. The Parties’ rights and liabilities
regarding reactive power flows on the AC interconnectors are limited to what corresponds,
calculation-wise, to zero exchange at the national border, based on values measured at the
terminals of the links.

7.6 System protection

System protection can be used to increase the transmission capacity and/or system security
between and within the subsystems. The settings and operational status of system protection
shall be decided upon and monitored by the respective Party. In cases when system protection
has a bearing on two or more subsystems, co-ordination and communication of the operating
status shall take place between the Parties concerned. The requirements relating to system
protection are set out in Appendix 2. The forms of system protection used are set out in
Appendix 5.

7.7 Relay protection and fault analysis

The Parties shall co-ordinate supportive data and plans for setting functional values for the
relay protection of such transmission facilities. Following operational disturbances,
information from registration equipment shall be exchanged between the Parties concerned to
the extent necessary to enable investigation of the course of events.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

§8 Operational planning
The Parties shall, as far as is possible, bilaterally co-ordinate operational outages and other
measures which each and everyone of them has control over and which impact upon the joint
system operation. In the event that operational disturbances and other measures occur during
the operational phase and which have to be carried out at short notice, with no time for co-
ordination, the Parties concerned shall be informed as quickly as possible.

Appendices 7.1- 7.6 contain certain rules regarding the co-ordination of operational outages on
the respective links between the subsystems.

§9 System services
The Parties shall comply with the operational security standards specified in § 6 by ensuring
the availability of system services within their own subsystems. When this is possible, the
Parties can co-ordinate and exchange system services with each other. During the exchange of
such system services, the pricing shall be based on the costs incurred by the respective Party
when obtaining access to and utilizing the system services within its own subsystem.

The Parties shall work towards harmonisation of the terms and conditions in order to gain
access to system services from companies within the respective subsystem.

System services are described in Appendix 6.

§ 10 Managing transmission limitations between the subsystems

The Parties shall be bilaterally responsible for transmissions on the respective links between
the subsystems not exceeding the set transmission capacity. If a limit is exceeded, this shall be
rectified within 15 minutes.

The Parties shall bilaterally co-ordinate terms and conditions and management routines in
order to be able, as and when required, to restrict the commercial players’ utilization of the
links in cases when transmission capacities need to be reduced. The separate terms and
conditions that apply, as and when appropriate, to each respective link are set out in
Appendices 7.1 - 7.7. The Parties shall uphold the commercial players’ planned trading, by
means of counter trading, to the extent set out in Appendix 8.

It is incumbent upon the Parties to manage, within their own subsystems, such transmission
problems that cannot be solved by restricting the commercial players’ utilization of the links.
The Parties are further responsible for implementing the necessary regulation on their own
sides of the links, and for the costs thus arising, unless otherwise agreed between the Parties
concerned.

§ 11 Managing operational disturbances

In the case of all operational disturbances, normal state shall be resumed without undue delay.
The Parties shall assist one another in minimising the consequences of any disturbances that
arise.

In the case of disturbances arising within its own subsystem, the affected Party will be
responsible, at its own expense, for remedial measures. Whenever it is appropriate to carry out

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

remedial measures in another subsystem, the affected Party shall be responsible for the costs of
the agreed measures. For disturbances on a link between the subsystems, the Parties concerned
shall, at their own expense, be responsible for the necessary measures on their own side of the
link, unless otherwise agreed.

In the case of activation of the joint frequency controlled disturbance reserve, compensation
shall normally be rendered via the settlement of balance power.

The Parties shall promptly inform one another of system security risks or disturbances arising.

§ 12 Balance regulation
Each subsystem is responsible for planning itself into balance hour by hour, as well as for
upholding its own balance during the hour of operation.

The Parties shall collaborate towards minimising the cost of balance regulation by utilizing, to
the greatest extent possible, one another’s regulation resources when this is technically and
financially appropriate.

The balance regulation of the Nordic system is divided up into two balance areas. One of
these balance areas is the synchronous system while the other balance area is Western
Denmark.

Energinet.dk manages the balance regulation of the Western Danish area, within its sphere of
responsibility for the UCTE system, and in accordance with an agreement with EON Netz.
Consequently, Energinet.dk has agreements with two balance areas; the UCTE system and the
synchronous system.

The balance regulation of each subsystem within the interconnected Nordic synchronous
power system shall be carried out in accordance with the principles set out in Appendix 3.

The basis of the interconnected Nordic synchronous power system’s balance regulation is that
regulation is carried out in respect of frequency. Regulation work is apportioned in accordance
with the requirement for frequency response and a joint Nordic merit order regulation list. The
entire Nordic power system shall constitute a single market for regulation power. In the event
of bottlenecks, the regulation market can be split up.

The Parties shall pay attention to regulation problems within the hour of operation and
especially at hour changes. Major changes to exchange plans should be managed via
agreements concerning transitions.

§ 13 Power exchanges

13.1 Hourly exchange plans

Parties with adjacent subsystems shall jointly set routines for notifying hourly exchange plans
and trading plans among the subsystems. Whenever transmission capacity is made available
for other purposes than power trading, the relevant plans shall be bilaterally reported to each
player individually. Trading must be reportable as a net trade between each subsystem.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

13.2 Supportive power

Exchanges of supportive power between Parties with adjacent subsystems may be carried out
in order to achieve efficient operation of the system. Such exchanges can come about as and
when required during normal state, during counter trading or during operational disturbances.
Supportive power can be agreed upon in advance, as well as commenced and terminated during
the current hour of operation.

The principles for pricing supportive power are set out in Appendix 3.

13.3 Balance power

Balance power between the subsystems is calculated during settlement as the difference
between the measured exchange of power and the sum of all forms of agreed exchange,
including such exchanges as have been agreed between the Parties.

More detailed rules for managing and pricing balance power are set out in Appendix 3.

§ 14 Settlement
Settlement shall be based on the principles set out in § 12 - 13 for balance regulation and
exchanges of power.

All settlement of exchanges of power between the subsystems shall take place at the settlement
points specified in Appendices 7.1 - 7.6.

The settlement procedure is regulated bilaterally in separate agreements, settlement

agreements, between the Parties concerned.

§ 15 Power shortages
When there is a risk of power shortages, the power trade within the power exchange area shall
be given the opportunity, through price formation, to distribute risks and costs between the
electricity market players. The Parties shall, as far as is possible and reasonable, work towards
upholding such power trading and allocations of production capacity, which they do not
contractually have the right to discontinue.

In the event of anticipated power shortages in one or more subsystems, the Parties shall
collaborate in such a way that the resources available within the interconnected Nordic power
system are utilized in order to minimise the extent of compulsory load shedding.

Acute situations such as general power shortages or power shortages resulting from
operational disturbances on networks, or bottleneck situations when compulsory load
shedding has to be carried out, are to be managed in accordance with Appendix 9.

System security shall be maintained on the level specified in Appendices 2 and 3 so that
dimensioning faults do not lead to extensive follow-on disturbances in the interconnected
Nordic power system.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

§ 16 Exchanging information
Appendix 4 specifies the information that shall be exchanged between the Parties for system
operation requirements.

If the information that the Parties are mutually exchanging has not been made public in the
country the information relates to, the Parties pledge to keep this information confidential, as
far as possible, in accordance with the legislation in force in the respective country.

§ 17 Liability
The Parties will only be liable to one another for damage resulting from gross negligence or
malice aforethought.

None of the Parties will be able to hold any of the other Parties liable for lost revenues,
consequential losses or other indirect losses, unless such damage has been caused by gross
negligence or malice aforethought.

§ 18 Disputes
Should a dispute arise in connection with this Agreement, the Parties shall initially attempt to
resolve their conflict through negotiation. If this does not succeed, the dispute shall, under
Swedish law, conclusively be settled by arbitration in accordance with the Rules of the
Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce. The arbitration procedure shall
take place in Stockholm.

§ 19 Alterations and supplements

Alterations and supplements to this Agreement shall, in order to be legally valid, be drawn up
in writing and signed by all the Parties.

Appendices to this Agreement can be added to on a rolling basis. In doing so, Appendices
which relate to all the Parties shall be updated jointly and approved by all the Parties.
Appendices which deal with individual links shall be updated by the Parties that are affected
by the Appendix in question. Any and all changes to Appendices shall be documented in
writing and communicated to the Parties.

In the event of alterations to Appendices, the Appendices in question shall, by at the latest one
month after the alteration has been made, be revised and sent out to all the Parties. An annual
review of the Agreement shall be carried out in order to deal with any contractual revisions.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

§ 20 Transfer
This Agreement may be transferred to another company which has been appointed as the
system operator of a subsystem by the authorities of a country. Other transfers may not, wholly
or in part, take place without the written consent of the other Parties.

In the event of the transfer of the system responsibility to another company, the Parties will be
responsible for transferring their contractual commitments under this Agreement to the new
system operator.

§ 21 Validity etc
This Agreement will come into force once it has been signed by all the Parties and will remain
in force until further notice. The Agreement, which will apply from xx xx 2006, is conditional
upon each respective Party receiving the necessary Board/Authority approvals.

If a Party deems the terms and conditions of this Agreement to entail unreasonable or
inappropriate consequences, then this Party will be able to request, in writing, from the other
Parties that negotiations be entered into as soon as possible with the aim of bringing about
appropriate changes to the Agreement. Equivalent negotiations can also be entered into if the
pre-conditions for the Agreement change significantly due to altered legislation or a decision
made by an authority, or due to physical changes being made to the interconnected Nordic
power system.

If a Party requests renegotiation, the other Parties will be obligated to actively take part in
such negotiations within one month of receiving such a request.

If renegotiations do not, within six months of the request for renegotiation being made, lead to
agreement being reached as regards such changes to the Agreement that the Party deems
satisfactory, the Party shall have the right to terminate the Agreement. Termination, which
must be in writing, shall occur by at the latest two weeks from the expiration of the
renegotiation deadline. If such termination occurs, the Agreement shall be deemed to have
ceased to be valid in respect of the terminating Party, once a period of six months has elapsed
from the time when the notice of termination was communicated to all the other Parties.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT)

This Agreement replaces the previous agreement dated 1 April 2004.

This Agreement has been drawn up and signed in four (4) identical copies, of which the Parties
have received one copy each.

Fredericia 2006- - Helsinki 2006- -

Energinet.dk Fingrid Oyj

Peder Ø. Andreasen Timo Toivonen

Oslo 2006- - Stockholm 2006- -

Statnett SF Affärsverket Svenska Kraftnät

Odd Håkon Hoelsæter Jan Magnusson

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 1

DEFINITIONS

Terms defined in this Appendix are written in italics in the Agreement and its Appendices.

Most of the terms are Nordic and are not used in Continental Europe. Individual general terms
correspond to terms used within UCTE. Terms concerning the capacity of the links between
the subsystems are comparable to the corresponding terms within ETSO.

The active reserve is divided into automatic active reserve and manual active reserve.

Adjustment state is a transition from alert state to normal state, characterised in that
consumption, production and transmissions in the network are adjusted so that the network can
manage a (new) dimensioning fault. The adjustment takes place in 15 minutes from a fault
which has involved the disconnection of components. See also operational states.

Alert state is an operational state which entails that all consumption is being met and that the
frequency, voltage or transmissions are within acceptable limits. The reserve requirements are
not fulfilled and faults in network components or in production components will lead to
disturbed state or emergency state. Also see operational states.

Annual consumption is the sum of electricity production and net imports in a subsystem.
Electricity production is the net production in a power plant, i.e. exclusive of the power plant’s
own consumption of electricity for electricity production.

An area is a part of the power system within a subsystem; an area can potentially comprise an
entire subsystem. An area is bordered by transmission cross-sections in the national subsystems
or by cross-border links.

Area prices are Elspot prices within an Elspot area.

The automatic active reserve is the active reserve which is automatically activated during the
momentary operating situation. It is divided into frequency controlled normal operation
reserve, frequency controlled disturbance reserve and voltage controlled disturbance reserve.

Balance areas are areas of the power system where there is continuous regulation in order to
maintain the frequency and a physical balance in relation to adjacent areas. In the Nordic area,
the synchronous system and Western Denmark are separate balance areas.

Balance power is the difference between the planned and measured transmissions between the
subsystems.

Balance regulation is regulation in order to maintain the frequency and time deviation in
accordance with the set quality requirements. Regulation is also carried out for network
reasons.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 1

A bottleneck is a capacity limitation on the transmission network. On the Elspot market,

attention is paid to bottlenecks between the Elspot areas. During operational planning and
monitoring and control, attention is paid to all physical bottlenecks.

Counter trading is the purchasing of upward regulation and the sale of downward regulation,
on each side of a bottleneck, which the system operators carry out in order to maintain or
increase the trading capacity of Elspot trading between two Elspot areas, or in order to
eliminate a bottleneck during the day of operation.

Critical power shortage occurs during the hour of operation when consumption has to be
reduced/disconnected without commercial agreements about this.

A cross-border link is a link between two subsystems including connecting line feeders on
both sides of the link. For HVDC links, only the DC facility at stations on both sides of the link
is included in the cross-border link.

The day of operation is the calendar day around the momentary operational situation.

A deficit area is a subsystem whose balance is negative, i.e. that power is physically flowing
into the subsystem physically measured on the cross-border links between the Parties.

Dimensioning faults are faults which entail the loss of individual major components
(production units, lines, transformers, bus bars, consumption etc.) and entail the greatest impact
upon the power system from all fault events that have been taken into account.

Disturbed state is an operational state which entails that all consumption is being met, but that
the frequency, voltage or transmissions are not within acceptable limits and that normal state
cannot be achieved in 15 minutes. Also see operational states.

Elbas trading is power trading in Elbas at Nord Pool Spot. Elbas trading can occur in
Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark prior to and during the day of operation after Elspot
trading has finished.

Elspot areas are the areas of the Elspot market which the interconnected Nordic power system
is divided into in order to deal with potential capacity limitations (bottlenecks) on the
transmission network. Potential bottlenecks give rise to different Elspot prices in Elspot areas.
In Finland, Sweden, Western Denmark and Eastern Denmark, the Elspot areas correspond to
the subsystems.
In Norway, there are several Elspot areas within the subsystem.

Elspot prices are prices in Elspot trading within an Elspot area.

Elspot trading is power trading on the spot market of Nord Pool Spot. Elspot trading can
occur prior to the day of operation in all subsystems.

Emergency power is power regulation on HVDC links activated by automatic systems on both
sides of the respective HVDC link.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 1

Emergency state is an operational state entailing that compulsory load shedding has been
applied and that production shedding and network divisions may occur. Also see operational
states.

ETSO (European Transmission System Operators) is an organisation for system operators in

Europe.

An exchange plan is a plan for the total agreed active power to be exchanged hour by hour
between two subsystems. This can be a plan for a whole calendar day or a number of hours
(energy plan) and, whenever supportive power occurs during a part of the hour, also a
momentary plan during the hour (power plan).

The fast active counter trading reserve is the manual active reserve for carrying out counter
trading.

The fast active disturbance reserve is the manual reserve available within 15 minutes in the
event of the loss of an individual principal component (production unit, line, transformer, bus
bar etc.). Restores the frequency controlled disturbance reserve.

The fast active forecast reserve is the manual active reserve for regulation of forecasting
errors for consumption and production.

Faults are events which occur in the power system and lead to a reduced capacity or loss of a
line, bus bar, transformer, production units or consumption. A fault causes an operational
disturbance in the power system.

The frequency controlled disturbance reserve is the momentarily available active power
available for frequency regulation in the range of 49.9 – 49.5 Hz and which is activated
automatically by the system frequency. Previously called the momentary disturbance reserve.

The frequency controlled normal operation reserve is the momentarily available active
power available for frequency regulation in the range of 49.9 – 50.1 Hz and which is activated
automatically by the system frequency. Previously called the frequency regulation reserve.

The frequency response is the change ability in production dependent on the frequency of the
network (MW/Hz).

The interconnected Nordic power system is the interconnected subsystems of Finland,

Norway, Sweden, Western Denmark and Eastern Denmark for which the Nordic system
operators have joint system responsibility.

Load following entails players with major production changes reporting their production plans
with a time resolution of less than 1 hour.

Load shedding is the automatic or manual disconnection of consumption.

The manual active reserve is the active reserve which is activated manually during the
momentary operational situation. This is divided into the fast active forecast reserve, the fast
active disturbance reserve, the fast active counter trading reserve and the slow active
disturbance reserve.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 1

Manual emergency power is power regulation on the HVDC links which is activated
manually.

A momentary area control error is the disparity (in MW) between the sum of the measured
power and the sum of the agreed exchange plan on the links between the subsystems plus
frequency correction, which is the subsystem’s momentary frequency response multiplied by
the deviation in the frequency away from 50 Hz. Also called the momentary imbalance.

N-1 criteria are a way of expressing a level of system security entailing that a power system
can withstand the loss of an individual principal component (production unit, line, transformer,
bus bar, consumption etc.). Correspondingly, n-2 entails two individual principal components
being lost.

Network collapse is an operational state that entails that all loads in one or more areas are shed
and that production shedding and network divisions can occur. Also see operational states.

Normal state is an operational state entailing that all consumption requirements are being met,
that frequency, voltage and transmission lie within their limits and that reserve requirements
are being met. The power system is prepared to deal with dimensioning faults. Also see
operational states.

An operational disturbance is a disturbance to the power system. This can be the loss of a
line, a bus bar, a transformer, a production unit or consumption.

An operational instruction is an instruction given to the control rooms of the system

operators concerning how they are to behave in an operational situation.

Operational monitoring and control is the monitoring and control of the operation of the
power system carried out by the control rooms.

The operational phase is the time from the momentary operational situation and the rest of the
day of operation when trade on the Elspot market has already been determined.

Operational planning is the system operators’ planning of the operation of the power system.

The operational reserve is the reserve that the system operators have access to during the day
of operation. It is divided into the active reserve and the reactive reserve.

Operational security standards are criteria which the system operators use when conducting
operational planning in order to uphold the reliable operation of the power system.

The operational states are normal state, alert state, disturbed state, emergency state and
network collapse. See also adjustment state and restoration. These were earlier referred to as
the power system’s operational states. See Figure 1.

Outage planning is the planning done by each individual system operator, as well as between
the system operators, of the necessary outages affecting transmission capacities between the
subsystems.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 1

A Party is one of the system operators entering into this Agreement regarding operation of the
interconnected Nordic power system. The Parties are Energinet.dk, Fingrid, Statnett and
Svenska Kraftnät.

The peak load resource is an active reserve which normally has a long readiness time. In the
event of anticipated peak loads, the readiness time is reduced so that the peak load resource
can be used prior to the day of operation on the Elspot market or during the day of operation
on the regulation market.

The planning phase is the time until which bids submitted for the next calendar day’s Elspot
trading on the power exchange can no longer be changed.

A Player is a physical or legal persona active on the physical electricity market in the form of
bilateral trading with other players, Elspot trading, Elbas trading or trading on other existing
marketplaces.

The power operation manager is the person who has obtained, from the holder, the task of
being responsible for managing the electrical facility.

The power operation responsibility boundary is the boundary of a well-defined area in the
transmission facilities between two power operation managers.

Power shortage occurs during the hour of operation when a subsystem is no longer capable of
maintaining the demand for a manual active reserve which can be activated within 15 minutes.

A price area is an Elspot area which, due to bottlenecks towards another Elspot area, has been
given an Elspot price of its own.

Production shedding means the automatic or manual disconnection of a production facility.

Ramping means restricting changes in Elspot trading on one or more cross-border links
individually and together from one hour to the next.

Ramp regulation means regulation of power based upon a specified ramp in order to even out
the transition between two power levels, normally on HVDC cables at the changes of the hour.

The reactive reserve is the reactive power which is activated either automatically or manually
during the momentary operational situation.

Redundancy is more than one independent opportunity for a piece of equipment to carry out a
desired function.

Regulating bids are bids for upward or downward regulation at a specified output power at a
specified price.

Regulating power is activated regulating bids, upward and downward regulations at power
plants as well as the upward and downward regulation of consumption which producers or
consumers offer in exchange for compensation. The system operators activate these bids
during the momentary operational situation to maintain the balance/frequency within the
balance areas and to deal with bottlenecks on the transmission network.

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Regulation areas are the areas which the regulation market for the interconnected Nordic
power system is divided into in order to manage possible capacity limitations (bottlenecks) on
the transmission network. Potential bottlenecks will entail different regulation prices in the
regulation areas. In Sweden, Finland, Western Denmark and Eastern Denmark, regulation
areas normally correspond to the subsystems. In Norway, there are several regulation areas
within the subsystem.

The regulation list is the list of regulation bids in ascending and descending order sorted by
the price for one hour.

The regulation margin, also called TRM (Transmission Reliability Margin), is the gap
between the transmission capacity and the trading capacity. It constitutes the scope for the
momentary regulation variations as a result of frequency regulation around the planned hourly
value for transmission.

The regulation market is the market for regulating power.

The regulation price is the price resulting from implemented regulations during the hour of
operation for a regulation area. Also called the RK price.

Regulation steps are steps in the regulation list.

Restoration is a transition between different operational states characterized by the network

being restored, production being regulated upwards, and frequency, voltage and transmission
being brought within acceptable limits. Consumption is connected at a pace which the network
and production resources can take. Also see operational states.

A risk of power shortage occurs when forecasts show that a subsystem is no longer capable of
maintaining the demand for a manual active reserve which can be activated within 15 minutes,
for the planning period.

Scaling means restricting changes in the trading capacity (NTC) between two Elspot areas
from one hour to the next.

Serious operational disturbances are operational disturbances entailing greater

consequences than activation of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve.

Settlement points are reference points for financial settlement between the subsystems based
on direct measurement.

The slow active disturbance reserve is the active power available after 15 minutes.

Special regulation is the activation of regulating power in order to deal with bottlenecks on
the transmission network.

A subsystem is the power system for which a system operator is responsible. A system
operator can be responsible for several subsystems.

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Subsystem balance is calculated as the sum of the measured physical transmissions on the
cross-border links between the subsystems. Thus, there is a deficit if this sum shows that power
is flowing into a subsystem and a surplus if power is flowing out of a subsystem. (Exchanges
on cross-border links like Finland-Russia, the SwePol Link, the Baltic Cable, Kontek and
Western Denmark-Germany are not to be included in the calculation.)

Supportive power is power that adjacent system operators can exchange reciprocally as an
element of the regulation of balance in the respective subsystems. Exchanges are made
specifying the power, price, link and time to the exact minute of the start and finish of the
exchange. Supportive power is settled as the hourly average value.

A surplus area is a subsystem whose balance is positive, i.e. that power is physically flowing
out of the subsystem measured physically on the cross-border links between the subsystems.

The synchronous system is the synchronously interconnected power system consisting of the
subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark. Western Denmark is
synchronously interconnected with the UCTE system.

The system operator has the system responsibility for a defined subsystem.

The system price is an estimated price for the entire Elspot market. The system price is
estimated as if there are no capacity limitations on the transmission network between the
Elspot areas.

System protection is composed of automatic system protection equipment for the power
system. System protection can, for instance, be used to limit the impact of faults by shedding
production in order to compensate for the defective component and so that overloads do not
arise. System protection can also be used to increase the capacity of the transmission network
without simultaneously increasing the risk of diminishing the system security. System
protection requires a level of reliability in line with primary protection. Previously called
network protection.

The system responsibility is the responsibility for co-ordinating the utilization of electrical
facilities in the jointly operated power system, or a part of this, in order that the desired system
security and network quality may be attained during operational service.

System security is the power system’s ability to withstand incidents such as the loss of lines,
bus bars, transformers, production units or consumption.

System services is a generic term for services that system operators need for the technical
operation of the power system. The availability of system services is agreed upon by the system
operator and the other companies within the respective country. System services can be
arranged into different forms of system protection and operational reserves for active and
reactive power.

Time deviation is the difference between a synchronous clock driven by the frequency of a
power system and planetary time.

The trading capacity, also called NTC (Net Transfer Capacity), is capacity made available to
Elspot trading between the Elspot areas and the highest permitted sum of the players’ planned

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trading on an hourly basis. The trading capacity is calculated as the transmission capacity less
the regulating margin.

The trading plan is the sum of the players’ electricity trading between the Elspot areas
(Elspot, Elbas, hourly trading).

The transmission capacity, also called TTC (Total Transfer Capacity), is the maximum
transmission of active power in accordance with the system security criteria which is permitted
in transmission cross-sections between the subsystems/areas or individual installations.

A transmission cross-section is a cross-section on the transmission network between the

subsystems or between areas within a subsystem. Also referred to solely as cross-sections.

Transmission facilities are individual installations (lines, bus bars, transformers, cables,
breakers, isolators etc) which form the transmission network. This includes protective,
monitoring and control equipment.

A transmission network is the interconnected network containing the transmission facilities.

UCTE (Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity) is an association of system

operators in continental Europe.

The voltage controlled disturbance reserve is the momentarily available active power used
for operational disturbances and which is activated automatically by the network voltage.
Often established as system protection.

Normal
operation
Serious disturbance (>>dim. fault)

Dimensioning fault (n-1) (New) Reserves activated / transmission

limits maintained / adjusted in 15 min
Restoration

Alert operation
Max. 15 minutes

Insufficient reserves after 15 min Load shedding

Transmission limits exceeded has taken place
15 min

Additional fault
Disturbed Emergency
operation operation
Restoration

Figure 1 Operational states (network collapse is not specified in the figure).

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OPERATIONAL SECURITY STANDARDS

1 System security criteria

The following criteria for system security are to be applied in those respects that are of
significance as regards enabling operation of the power system to be upheld with the
subsystems interconnected with each other.

The criteria for system security shall be based on the n-1 criterion. This is an expression of a
level of system security entailing that a power system is assumed to be intact apart from the
loss of individual principal components (production units, lines, transformers, bus bars,
consumption etc.). For faults having the largest impact on the power system, the term
dimensioning faults is used.

It is not normally the same type of fault that is dimensioning during frequency disturbances as
during disturbances to the transmission system. The loss of the power system’s largest
production unit is normally dimensioning as regards determining the frequency controlled
disturbance reserve.

The definition of serious operational disturbances is operational disturbances having a greater

impact than activation of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve.

The definition of normal state is an operational state entailing that all consumption is being
met, that the frequency, voltage and transmission lie within normal limits and that the reserve
requirements have been met. The power system has been prepared in order to deal with
dimensioning faults.

For the interconnected Nordic power system, the above entails that:
• a dimensioning fault on a subsystem must not bring about serious operational
disturbances in other subsystems. This places demands on the frequency controlled
disturbance reserve and the transmission capacity within and between the subsystems
• if the power system is not in normal state following an operational disturbance, the
power system must have been restored, within 15 minutes, to normal state. This places
demands on the available fast active disturbance reserve. If there are exceptions from
the time requirement, or if there is a departure from the above definition of
dimensioning faults, then there must be consultation between the system operators
concerned.

2 System protection
System protection is used to limit the consequences of faults over and above the disconnection
of defective components. System protection can have as its purpose to increase the system
security, the transmission capacity, or a combination of these. For system protection that is
used to increase the transmission capacity, the following requirements have been set:
• An analysis must be implemented which shows the consequences for the power system in
the event of a correct, unwanted and missing function hereby taking the interaction with
other system protection schemes into account.

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• In the event of a correct or unwanted function, serious operational disturbances will not be
accepted in other subsystems.
• If the above consequence analysis shows that a missing function can entail serious
operational disturbances for other subsystems, the following technical requirements shall
apply to the system protection function:

- Redundant telecommunications shall exist in cases where system protection

is dependent on telecommunications
Redundant telecommunications means that communications between the
stations concerned shall be entirely duplicated. If the auxiliary power feed for
one of the communications systems fails, then the other must not be affected.
In practice, this means that batteries, telecom terminals, converters and
communication paths must be duplicated. Communication paths may not, on
any section, share connections, leads, opto cables or similar. They must take
geographically separated routes.
Multiplexed links can be used but communications shall use separated
multiplexes that are not fed by the same battery. Having separate fuses on the
same battery does not constitute full redundancy.

- There must be real time monitoring of telecommunications

- There must be a redundant and independent ”triggering function”

A redundant triggering function, if this relates to breakers, means that the
breaker has two trip magnets. Breaker fault protection shall be used to
safeguard breaker operation if the ordinary breakers are not functioning
correctly

- The control facility and telecommunications standard shall be on the same

acceptable reliability level as the one applicable to primary relay protection

• If a consequence analysis shows that a missing function will not entail serious operational
disturbances for other subsystems, the relevant subsystem’s system operator will decide
which requirements apply to the system protection function.
• If a consequence analysis shows that a correct, unwanted or missing function can lead to
more extensive consequences than dimensioning faults, system protection must be accepted
separately between the parties.

3 HVDC links
HVDC links shall be regarded as production facilities.
The system operators for the individual HVDC links are only responsible for restoring the
operation to normal state in their own subsystems after the loss of the HVDC link or after
emergency power regulation has been activated.

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4 Operational reserves

4.1 Automatic active reserve

The automatic active reserve is divided up into the frequency controlled normal operation
reserve, the frequency controlled disturbance reserve and the voltage controlled disturbance
reserve.

4.1.1 Frequency controlled normal operation reserve

The frequency controlled normal operation reserve shall be at least 600 MW at 50.0 Hz for the
synchronous system. It shall be completely activated at f = 49.9/50.1 Hz (∆f = +- 0.1 Hz).
In the event of a rapid change of frequency to 49.9/50.1 Hz, the reserve shall be regulated
upwards/downwards within 2-3 minutes. The frequency controlled normal operation reserve is
distributed between the subsystems of the synchronous system in accordance with the annual
consumption (total consumption exclusive of power plant’s own consumption) during the
previous year.

The factual distribution of the frequency-controlled normal operation reserve between the
subsystems shall be revised each year before 1 March on the basis of annual consumption in
the previous year and rounded to the closest ten. Annual consumption shall be given in TWh
with an accuracy of one decimal.

Each subsystem shall have at least 2/3 of the frequency-controlled normal operation reserve in
its own system in the event of splitting up and island operation.

For 2006, the following distribution applies:

Annual consumption Frequency controlled

2005 normal operation
(TWh) reserve
(MW)
Eastern Denmark 14.4 23
Finland 84.9 137
Norway 125.9 203
Sweden 147.3 237
Synchronous system 372.5 600

4.1.2 Frequency controlled disturbance reserve

There shall be a frequency controlled disturbance reserve of such magnitude and composition
that dimensioning faults will not entail a frequency of less than 49.5 Hz in the synchronous
system.

Taking into account the frequency-dependence of consumption, the above requirements entail
that the combined frequency controlled disturbance reserve shall amount to an output power
equal to the dimensioning faults less 200 MW. The overall frequency controlled disturbance
reserve must be able to be used until the fast active disturbance reserve has been activated.

Upward regulation of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve must not give rise to other
problems in the power system. When setting the transmission capacity, localization of the

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frequency controlled disturbance reserve must be taken into account. Each subsystem shall
have at least 2/3 of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve within its own system in the
event of splitting up and island operation.

The frequency controlled disturbance reserve shall be activated at 49.9 Hz and be completely
activated at 49.5 Hz. It must increase as good as linearly throughout the frequency range of
49.9-49.5 Hz.

The major part of both the frequency controlled disturbance reserve and the frequency
controlled normal operation reserve will be achieved via automatic frequency regulation for
production facilities. To meet the above requirements, the objective for each respective system
operator must be to place demands on turbine regulator settings, e.g. in the form of demands
regarding regulating time constants. There should also be the possibility of monitoring and
checking.

Agreed automatic load shedding, e.g. industrial, district heating and electric boiler
consumption in the event of frequency drops to 49.5 Hz can be counted as part of the frequency
controlled disturbance reserve. The following requirements are applicable, however:
Load shedding can be used as frequency controlled disturbance reserve in the frequency
range of 49.9 Hz to 49.5 Hz, when load shedding meets the same technical requirements set
below for generators.

In the event of a frequency drop to 49.5 Hz caused by a momentary loss of production:

• 50 % of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve in each subsystem shall be
regulated upwards within 5 seconds
• 100 % of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve shall be regulated upwards
within 30 seconds.

Distribution of the requirement for the frequency controlled disturbance reserve between the
subsystems of the interconnected Nordic power system shall be carried out in proportion to the
dimensioning fault within the respective subsystem. Distribution of the requirement shall be
updated once a week or more often if necessary.

The following example shows how distribution of the requirement for the frequency controlled
disturbance reserve is achieved:

Dimensionin Frequency Frequency

g faults controlled controlled
(MW) disturbance res. disturbance res.
(MW) (%)
Denmark 580 153 15.0
Finland 865 228 22.4
Norway 1,200 317 31.0
Sweden 1,220 322 31.6
Total 1,020 100

Energinet.dk’s requirement of the frequency controlled disturbance reserve is distributed

between Eastern and Western Denmark as follows:
- Western Denmark 75 MW (7.4%)

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- Eastern Denmark 78 MW (7.6%)

Energinet.dk accepts this requirement as long as E.ON Netz and UCTE accept the emergency
power setting on the HVDC Skagerrak and Konti-Skan links and as long as this entails no
financial consequences for Energinet.dk. Energinet.dk will not reserve trading capacity in order
to be able to deliver the reserve.

Energinet.dk’s AC joint operation of Western Denmark within the UCTE system entails that
Energinet.dk is required to maintain the frequency and frequency controlled disturbance
reserve in accordance with UCTE rules. This is described in section 5 ”Special conditions for
Energinet.dk as a member of UCTE”.

4.2 Fast active disturbance reserve

The fast active disturbance reserve shall exist in order to restore the frequency controlled
normal operation reserve and the frequency controlled disturbance reserve when these
reserves have been used or lost, and in order to restore transmissions within applicable limits
following disturbances.

The fast active disturbance reserve shall be available within 15 minutes.

The fast active disturbance reserve shall exist and be localized to the extent that the system can
be restored to normal state following faults.

The size of the fast active disturbance reserve is determined by the individual subsystem’s
assessment of local requirements. Bottlenecks on the network, dimensioning faults and similar
are included when assessing this.

The system operators have secured, through agreement or ownership, a fast active disturbance
reserve. This reserve consists of gas turbines, thermal power, hydropower and load shedding.
In round figures, Fingrid has 1,000 MW, Svenska Kraftnät 1,200 MW, Energinet.dk 600 MW
in Eastern Denmark (where 300 MW is slow active disturbance reserve which, on special
occasions, can be made fast), Energinet.dk 620 MW in Western Denmark, and Statnett 1,600
MW.

Whenever required, a subsystem can hold a certain amount of fast active disturbance reserve
for another subsystem, if there is idle transmission capacity for this purpose. The keeping of
such reserves is to be agreed upon between the concerned subsystems’ system operators upon
each occasion, and all system operators shall be informed of this.

4.3 Slow active disturbance reserve

The slow active disturbance reserve is active power available after 15 minutes.

4.4 Reactive reserve

Within each subsystem, there must be a reserve of reactive power which is constituted in such a
way with regard to size, regulation capability and localization that dimensioning faults will not
entail a system collapse.

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5 Special conditions for Energinet.dk as a member of UCTE

N-1 security
The n-1 criterion also applies to the UCTE area. If n-1 security is maintained with the help of
adjacent systems (e.g. using system protection), this shall be approved by the adjacent system
owners.

Primary regulation
For the entire UCTE, a frequency response of 18,000 MW/Hz is required. The dimensioning
production loss is 3,000 MW. The different countries’ share of the primary regulation reserve
is distributed in proportion to the individual countries’ production capacities. Energinet.dk
shall thus, during 2006, be able to deliver 32 MW as frequency controlled disturbance reserve
in Western Denmark. This frequency controlled disturbance reserve shall be fully activated in
the event of a momentary frequency change of ± 200 mHz.

Secondary reserve
Generally within UCTE, it is applicable that the delivery of secondary reserve shall be
commenced 30 seconds after an imbalance has arisen between production and consumption
and shall be fully regulated out after 15 minutes. There must be sufficient reserve to safeguard
each area’s own balance following a loss of production.

6 Principles for determining the transmission capacity

6.1 Introduction
The various system operators’ ability to transmit power shall be calculated for each state of
operation. This applies both to transmissions within each subsystem and to exchanges between
subsystems. Most frequently, this is achieved by means of a transmission cross-section being
defined, and static and dynamic simulations determine how much power can be transmitted in
any direction through the cross-section before thermal overloads, voltage collapse and/or
instability arise following a dimensioning fault (for the cross-section) being added. In the
cross-section, an arbitrary number of lines on different levels of voltage can be included.

The result of the calculations will be the maximum technical limitation for transmission. For
the operational phase, this limit must be reduced as regards the calculatory inaccuracy and
normal variations due to frequency controlled normal operation regulation.

6.2 Thermal limitation

In cases when thermal limitations on lines and/or equipment restrict the transmission capacity
through a transmission cross-section, the maximum transmission capability through a cross-
section, or for single lines following a simple fault, can be set at a given percentage over the
nominal limit in cases when the cross-section/line can be relieved within 15 minutes.

6.3 Voltage collapse

It is neither of interest nor possible to specify exactly at which voltage a voltage collapse
occurs as this will vary with the state of operation and access to active and reactive
synchronized production at the onset of the fault. Some events that low voltage can lead to are:
• Consumers being affected at a voltage of 0.5-0.7 p.u. (contactors open)

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• Risk of overloading equipment at 0.8 p.u.

• Risk of production being shed due to low voltage on auxiliary power equipment (0.85
p.u.)
• Reactive resources being exhausted, i.e. generators are at their current limits for rotors
and stators. Can appear at a voltage of 0.85-0.9 p.u.

Neither is it possible to specify a global value for the calculatory inaccuracy. This is different
for each system operator and transmission cross-section and primarily depends on the quality
of data, representation of the underlying systems and the calculation technique used. The
margin for primary voltage regulation is set by each system operator for internal cross-sections
and bilaterally between the system operators for cross-sections between systems.

6.4 System dynamics

Dynamic simulation of a power system before, during and after a fault provides, as a typical
result, how the different production facilities’ generators oscillate against each other. These
oscillations can either be attenuated after a while or accelerated. Today there is no accepted
norm for how quickly the oscillations must be attenuated in order for the system to be assumed
to be stable; rather this is a matter of judgement. In the same way as above, the calculated
technical limit is reduced using a calculatory inaccuracy margin.

A fault scenario is to be simulated over a period so lengthy that all conceivable oscillation
frequencies can be detected and that these are well attenuated.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 3

BALANCE REGULATION STANDARDS

The work of balance regulation shall be conducted in such a way that regulations take place in
the subsystem with the lowest regulation cost. Parties carrying out regulation shall be
compensated for their costs.

1 Balance regulation within the synchronous system

Balance regulation within the synchronous system shall be conducted in such a way that the
below specified quality standards regarding frequency and time deviation are integrated.
Requirements regarding frequency response and frequency controlled reserves (see appendix 2)
shall be maintained. Furthermore, balance regulation shall be conducted in such a way that the
transmission capacity is not exceeded.

Sweden and Norway represent approx. 75% of the annual consumption of the synchronous
system. The Parties agree that Svenska Kraftnät and Statnett will thus have the task of
maintaining the frequency and time deviation within the set limits. Fingrid and Energinet.dk
will normally only balance-regulate after contacting Svenska Kraftnät. Energinet.dk West will
exchange supportive power with the synchronous system after contacting Statnett.

The distribution of work between Svenska Kraftnät and Statnett is regulated bilaterally and
communicated to all the Parties.

1.1 Quality standards

Frequency
The requirement of the highest permissible variation in the frequency during normal state is
between 49.90 and 50.10 Hz. The goal is to maintain 50.00 Hz.

In certain operational situations it may be necessary to deviate from the normal activation
sequence and go over to regulating bids on the regulating list in order to maintain the
frequency.

Time deviation
The time deviation is used as a tool for ensuring that the average value of the frequency is
50.00 Hz.

The time deviation ∆T shall be held within the time range of - 30 to + 30 seconds. At ∆T = 15
seconds, Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät shall contact each other in order to plan further action.

The frequency target has a higher priority than the time deviation and the costs of frequency
regulation.

The time deviation shall be corrected during quiet periods with high frequency response and
with a moderate frequency deviation.

Joint operational planning

There shall active communications between Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät before each hour of
operation and day of operation in order to jointly draw up a suitable strategy and to plan future

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action so that the above goals are achieved. Both parties are responsible for maintaining
sufficiently active communications.

Information on planned and taken action in order to achieve the above goals shall be delivered
to Fingrid and Energinet.dk.

1.2 Momentary area control error

Momentary area control errors are calculated for each subsystem and used as an instrument for
measuring the subsystem’s momentary imbalance. Momentary area control errors are not
normally used as regulation criteria.

Area control errors (I) are calculated in accordance with the following formula:

I = Pmom - Pplan + ∆f x R
Pmom = the momentary reading on the links between the subsystems
Pplan = the exchange plan including supportive power between the subsystems
∆f = frequency deviation
R = momentary frequency response

2 Balance regulation in Western Denmark

Balance regulation in Western Denmark shall take place so that the requirements concerning
Western Denmark as a “control block” in UCTE are met on the cross-border links between
Germany and Jutland.

3 Regulation measures and principles of pricing

A joint list of regulation bids is compiled, in the order of price, containing bids from both the
synchronous system and Western Denmark. During the hour of operation, regulation is initially
carried out for network reasons and then, if necessary, to maintain the frequency in the
synchronous system or the balance in Western Denmark. Regulation carried out for network
reasons need only be in one direction.

Power exchange between the subsystems in the synchronous system primarily takes place in the
form of balance power. Balance power can be exchanged as long as this does not cause
unacceptable conditions for the adjacent areas. Power exchange between the synchronous
system and Western Denmark primarily takes place in the form of supportive power.

3.1 Regulation of frequency and balance

For the regulation of the frequency of the synchronous system and the balance in Western
Denmark, the bids on the joint regulation list are used in the order of price, with the exception
of bids confined behind a bottleneck. The activated bids are marked as balance regulations and
are included when calculating the regulation price and regulation volume.

For each hour, the regulation price is determined in all Elspot areas. The regulation price is
set at the margin price of activated bids in the joint regulation list. When bottlenecks do not
arise during the hour of operation, the prices will be equal. The available capacity during the
hour of operation can be utilised even there is a bottleneck in Elspot so that a joint regulation
price is obtained. If there has been no regulation, the regulation price is set as the area price in
Elspot.

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When a bottleneck arises during the hour of operation between Elspot areas which entails that
a bid in an area cannot be activated, the relevant area will obtain a regulation price of its own.
This regulation price will be decided by the last bid activated in the joint regulation list prior
to the bottleneck arising.

There is a bottleneck between the Elspot areas when it is not “possible” to carry out balance
regulation on the basis of a joint regulation list without deviating from the normal price order
of the list. The reason for this not being “possible” can be for example levels of transmission
that are too high on the cross-border link itself or on other lines/transmission cross-sections or
operational/trading rules which entail that it is not permitted to activate bids in the joint
regulation list.

If the transmission between Elspot areas is greater than the trading plan and this creates
bottleneck problems for other Elspot areas, the area(s) which caused this will regulate against
the balance. The area(s) therefore obtain(s) its/their own regulation price(s). This will be
decided by balance regulations within the area or within several adjacent areas that are
affecting the bottleneck in the same way.

During bidirectional regulation for an hour in the synchronous system, the net regulated energy
will decide whether the regulation price will be the upward or downward regulation price. If
no regulation has taken place or if the net volumes upwards and downwards are equal, the price
will be set at the Elspot price. Regulation behind a bottleneck will only affect the net volume if
the bottleneck has arisen through activated balance regulations. This also applies to Western
Denmark.

Bottlenecks to/from an Elspot area which are caused by imbalances within an Elspot area are
dealt with as balance regulation and give rise to a divided regulation market. Bottlenecks
caused by a reduced transmission capacity to/from an Elspot area, after Elspot pricing, are
managed using counter trading and special regulations.

A prerequisite for the system operator in the synchronous system to be able to set his own
regulation price is that the trading plan is exceeded. In the opposite case, counter trading
could be necessary between the system operators.

3.2 Regulation for network reasons

Regulations carried out for network reasons shall not, in the basic case, affect the regulation
price calculation, but they are carried out as special regulations.

For regulations for network reasons in internal cross-sections in an Elspot area, bids are used
in the subsystems which rectify the network problem. When choosing a regulation object,
attention must be paid to both the price and the effectiveness of the regulation.

For regulations carried out for network reasons on the border between Elspot areas, the
cheapest bids are normally used in the subsystems which rectify the network problem. When
such regulation is caused by an imbalance vis-à-vis the trading plan between Elspot areas, the
regulation price will be affected in the subnetwork where the regulation was carried out.

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4 Pricing of balance power

4.1 Balance power between the subsystems within the synchronous system
Balance power between two subsystems is priced at the average of the regulation prices in
these subsystems.

4.2 Balance power between Western Denmark and Sweden

Swedish regulation prices apply to the pricing of balance power between Western Denmark
and Sweden in accordance with the dual price model applied internally within Sweden.

4.3 Balance power between Western Denmark and Norway

Norwegian regulation prices apply to the pricing of balance power between Western Denmark
and Norway.

5 Pricing of supportive power

5.1 Pricing within the synchronous system

When there is a need to exchange supportive power between two Parties, the price will be set
at the regulating Party’s cost, and conclusively set after the hour of operation. The price of
supportive power shall not normally affect the pricing of balance power between the
subsystems.

5.2 Pricing between Western Denmark and Norway, and Western

Denmark and Sweden

The following applies to supportive power for balance regulation between the synchronous
system and Western Denmark:

When the balance in the synchronous system and Western Denmark is regulated in the same
direction, the price of supportive power is set to that regulation price – if they are different –
which is closest to the system price in Elspot. The same rule applies when there is no
regulation in any of the areas.

When the balance in the synchronous system and Western Denmark is regulated in different
directions, the price of supportive power is set to the system price in Elspot.

In the event of bottleneck situations, it may be appropriate to carry out triangular supportive
power exchanges between Sweden, Norway and Western Denmark. This will not affect the
individual subsystem’s balance and the price of the exchange will be set at 0 SEK. Supportive
power for balance regulation has priority over triangular transit.

5.3 Pricing during operational disturbances on cross-border links

The price of supportive power during counter trading which is due to an operational
disturbance on the cross-border link itself will be the average of the area prices in Elspot in
the adjacent systems.

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6 Operational/trading rules between the synchronous system and Western

Denmark

Exchange of supportive power for balance regulation between the synchronous system and
Western Denmark is carried out in accordance with a set model based on the below principles.

Energinet.dk West sends plans in advance for each operating hour for exchange between the
synchronous system and Western Denmark. The plans are given per 15 minutes and they are
drawn up on the basis of forecasts for imbalance in Western Denmark, current bids in the joint
regulation list and other information exchange between Statnett and Energinet.dk West.

Statnett and Energinet.dk West are jointly responsible for the plan concerning the coming hour
being acceptable with respect to regulation in both systems at the latest 15 minutes before the
hour shift.

After this, the plan can be altered during the hour of operation in accordance with the rules
below.

Supportive power is exchanged between the synchronous system and Western Denmark in one
direction only during each hour. The volume can increase or decrease during the hour of
operation, but not more often than every 15 minutes.

After a decrease in the supportive power volume, the volume cannot increase again during the
same hour. However, this does not apply to hour shifts if the agreed exchange during the
coming hour is higher than the current volume.

Exchange of supportive power takes place in accordance with a power plan at 5 minutes’
discontinuation. In the activation of supportive power during the hour of operation, a change in
the power plan shall normally be carried out in a maximum of 15 minutes.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 4

EXCHANGING INFORMATION

The purpose of this Appendix is to describe the information which shall routinely be
exchanged between the concerned Parties to an extent which is significant for the collaboration
between the Parties in respect of system operation and balance management.

The technical description (network model, network data etc.) of the power system is governed
by other agreements.

Information to be provided to the players on the electricity market is governed by the system
operators’ agreement vis-à-vis Nord Pool Spot.

1 Outage planning
Plans for outages having impact on the transmission capacity between the subsystems or which
are in some other way significant for system security or the electricity market shall be
exchanged and co-ordinated between the Parties concerned. Plans shall be advised for up to
one year forward in time. Alterations to plans shall be advised as soon as possible.

The impact of such outages on the transmission capacities between the subsystems shall also
be exchanged. Preliminary values shall be exchanged as early on as possible. Final values shall
be exchanged immediately following approval of the capacities.

Outages having impact on the transmission capacity between the subsystems shall be entered in
the joint Nordic outage planning system NOPS (Nordic Outage Planning System).

2 Prior to the hour of operation

Information which is to be routinely exchanged between the Parties prior to the hour of
operation:
• Plans for the transmission capacities and trading capacities on the links between the
subsystems on an hourly basis
• Current limitations within the subsystems
• Forecast of available frequency controlled normal operation reserve, frequency
controlled disturbance reserve and fast active disturbance reserve
• Forecast of dimensioning faults
• Changes to the network configuration of significance to the subsystems’ system security
and the impact of these changes
• Changes to settings of regulation equipment and automatic systems
• Hourly exchange plans and trading plans between the subsystems
• Hourly exchange plans for non-Nordic links
• Hourly plans or forecasts regarding the overall production and consumption. Quarter-
hourly plans for production shall be exchanged to the extent these are available.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 4

• Plans for counter trading between the subsystems

• Regulation bids.

The joint Nordic information system NOIS (Nordic Operational Information System) shall be
used for the exchange of information which is necessary in balance regulation (regulation bids,
production plans and HVDC plans, consumption forecasts etc.).

3 During the hour of operation

Information which must routinely be available to the Parties during the hour of operation:
• Ongoing outages
• Authorization-dependent transmission capacity and parameters of significance in this
regard (e.g. system protection)
• Counter trading/special regulation and other corresponding measures concerning the
other Parties
• An account of events and disturbances of a major character, together with implemented
measures
• Volume and duration of requested load shedding in the event of power shortages.

Measured values and status indications to be exchanged between the Parties during the hour of
operation:
• Transmission of reactive and active power on the individual links, plus the sum of the
active power between the subsystems
• Transmission of reactive and active power on the individual links, plus the sum of the
active power to systems outside the Nordic power system provided that the
counterparty approves of this
• Active power in critical transmission cross-sections within the subsystems
• Activated regulations and current prices for regulating imbalances upwards and
downwards
• Area control errors
• Surpluses/deficits as defined in Appendix 9
• Overall production and consumption
• Production at power plants that are critical to the interconnected Nordic power system’s
operational situation
• Frequency response and available frequency controlled normal operation reserve,
frequency controlled disturbance reserve and fast active disturbance reserve. If
measured values are not available, forecasts shall be exchanged.
• Measurements that are needed for monitoring the stability of the power system.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 4

4 Following the hour of operation

Information which must routinely be exchanged between the Parties following the hour of
operation:
• Activated upward and/or downward regulation volume and regulation prices
• Reconciliation of previous calendar day’s exchanges, frequency response, deals, prices
etc, in accordance with the settlement routines
• Measured values on the links between the subsystems in accordance with other relevant
agreements
• An account of events and disturbances, together with implemented and planned
measures, to be rendered as soon as possible.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

SYSTEM PROTECTION

1 General
Automatic system protection is used to limit the impact of faults by means of measures over
and above disconnecting the defective component. System protection can be used to increase
the system security, the transmission capacity, or a combination of these. For system protection
which is used to increase the transmission capacity, requirements have been set. These are
specified in Appendix 2 of the System Operation Agreement.

Automatic system protection uses two different principles of operation. One of these is system
protection that is activated via measurements of the system state, e.g. the voltage at a critical
point or the system frequency. The other is system protection that is activated by predetermined
events, e.g. one or more relay signals from the facilities’ protective equipment.

Automatic system protection limits the consequences of operational disturbances in one or

more of the following ways:
• regulation of DC facilities, emergency power
• production shedding or downward regulation of production
• load shedding and, in some cases, reactive shunts
• start-up of production
• network switchings.

Automatic system protection is adapted to the combined operational reserves of the

interconnected Nordic power system. Frequency controlled functions are shown in Figure 1. A
detailed description of the Figure can be found in the Nordel report ”Rekommandasjon for
frekvens, tidsavvik, regulerstyrke og reserve” from August 1996. Minor frequency deviations
are dealt with by the frequency controlled disturbance reserve on generators. Major frequency
deviations start up regulation at the DC facilities. At lower frequencies, automatic load
shedding starts up.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

Frequency controlled actions in the NORDEL-system

f Hz Power plants are

disconnected

52
Emergency power actions
on the HVDC-links

Manual down
51 regulation

50 Frequency control
Frequency controlled disturbance
reserve is activated
- frequency control of active generation Emergency
- disconnection of eventual pumping aggregates power actions
- emergency power actions on the HVDC-links on the HVDC-links
- start of gas turbines
49 - switching into active generation and
loading of synchronised hydro generator sets

Load shedding
48 Network splitting

47 Large thermal
power plants are
disconnected

Figure 1 Frequency controlled actions in the Nordel-system

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2 System protection activated by frequency deviations

Frequency controlled system protection activated by a deviating frequency:
• regulation of DC facilities, emergency power
• production shedding or downward regulation of production, PFK
• start-up of production
• load shedding, AFK
• network switchings.
A low frequency during operational disturbances is traditionally dealt with using frequency
controlled disturbance reserve.
Frequency controlled disturbance reserve is dimensioned to maintain the frequency within
permissible limits in the event of operational disturbances. If this is not successful and the
frequency continues to drop, load shedding, for instance, might curb the frequency drop. The
increased use of frequency controlled regulation of DC installations, emergency power, is in
order to prevent major frequency drops.

A high frequency is traditionally dealt with using the downward regulation of production or, in
extreme situations, using load shedding. In this case too, there will be an increased use of the
frequency controlled regulation of DC installations.

2.1 Frequency controlled regulation of DC installations, Emergency power

The maximum impact of regulation of DC installations during frequency drops can be seen in
Figure 2. As illustrated by the Figure, all DC installations between the synchronous system and
other AC systems contribute frequency controlled emergency power. It should be pointed out,
however, that if a DC installation is performing a full import to an area with a low frequency, it
will not be able to contribute emergency power.

Maximum frequency controlled emergency power

52,00

51,50

51,00
KS1+KS2
Frequency (Hz)

50,50 BALTIC
KONTEK
50,00
SWEPOL
49,50 Skagerrak

49,00
Vyborg

48,50

48,00
-2000 -1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000
Emergency power import (MW)

Figure 2 Maximum frequency controlled emergency power

The Vyborg DC link is disconnected at a frequency in Finland of > 52 Hz for 0.5 sec.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

2.2 Frequency controlled start-up of production

Automatic frequency controlled start-up of production is carried out in order to increase the
number of production units in the power system during operational disturbances.

Hz Denmark Norway Sweden Finland

East West
49.8 25 MW GT
49.7-49.5 520 MW GT in three 180 MW GT,
stages of 0.1 Hz 15 sec
49.5
Schedule 1

2.3 Frequency controlled load shedding

If a frequency drop cannot be curbed by the regulation of DC installations and the frequency
continues to drop, automatic load shedding will occur. This will take place in accordance with
Schedule 2:

Denmark East 10 % of consump. f<48.5 Hz momentary, f<48.7 Hz 20 sec.

10 % of consump. f<48.3 Hz momentary, f<48.5 Hz 20 sec.
10 % of consump. f<48.1 Hz momentary, f<48.3 Hz 20 sec.
10 % of consump. f<47.9 Hz momentary, f<48.1 Hz 20 sec.
10 % of consump. f<47.7 Hz momentary, f<47.9 Hz 20 sec.
West 15 % of consump. f<48.7
25 % of consump. f<47.7
Norway 7,000 MW* in stages from 49.0 Hz to 47.0 Hz
Sweden South of cross- electrical boilers and heat pumps
section 2 P ≥ 35 MW. f< 49.4 for 0.15 sec
35>P ≥ 25 MW. f< 49.3 for 0.15 sec
25>P ≥ 15 MW. f< 49.2 for 0.15 sec
15>P ≥ 5 MW. f< 49.1 for 0.15 sec
30 % of consump in 5 stages
stage 1. f< 48.8 for 0.15 sec
stage 2. f< 48.6 for 0.15 sec
stage 3. f< 48.4 for 0.15 sec
stage 4. f< 48.2 for 0.15 sec. f<48.6 for 15 sec
stage 5. f< 48.0 for 0.15 sec. f>48.4 for 20 sec
Finland 10 % of consump. f<48.5 Hz 0.15 sec. f<48.7 Hz 20 sec
10 % of consump. f<48.3 Hz 0.15 sec. f<48.5 Hz 20 sec
Schedule 2

* For Norway, this refers to peak loads.

2.4 Frequency controlled disconnection of lines

Denmark East Disconnection of the Swedish link at f<47.0 Hz for 0.5 sec or f<47.5 for 9 sec
West -
Norway -
Sweden -
Finland Disconnection of Vyborg DC link at a frequency in Finland of >52 Hz for 0.5
sec
Disconnection of northern AC links to Sweden at a frequency of > 50.7 for 2 sec
if imports from Sweden are > 900 MW and the voltage on the 400 kV network
is < 380 kV.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

3 System protection activated by voltage deviations

In Sweden, there are two important types of system protection which are controlled by voltage.
Both types of system protection regulate down exports to the continent on HVDC links in the
event of a risk of voltage collapse or overloads on important lines.

3.1 System protection in Sweden cross-section 2

The System protection that is to relieve cross-section 2 during operational disturbances
measures the voltage at 4 stations north of cross-section 2; Storfinnforsen, Kilforsen,
Stornorrfors, and Hjälta. When the voltage has been lower than 390 kV for 2 seconds, a signal
will be sent to the system protection. If the voltage has been low in at least two of the stations,
the system protection will send a signal to Fenno-Skan (emergency power 400 MW) and Konti-
Skan 2 (emergency power 100 MW).

3.2 System protection in Sweden cross-section 4

The System protection will regulate down the transmissions on three DC links to the continent
when the voltage in southern Sweden falls below 390 kV. In doing so, cross-section 4 will be
relieved immediately in the event of an operational disturbance. When system protection is in
operation, a higher level of transmission will be allowed in cross-section 4 (2/3 of the
emergency power intervention). The increased capacity in cross-section 4 may only be used
when consumption south of cross-section 4 is less than 4,500 MW.

System protection obtains measured values from 6 substations: Breared, Hallsberg, Hjälta,
Kilanda, Tenhult and Sege. When system protection is in operation, a higher level of
transmission will be allowed in cross-section 4. The increase will accrue on the respective
overseas interconnector, Baltic Cable, the SwePol link and Öresund connection.

The criterion for the activation signal of system protection is that the voltage in one of these six
points goes under 390 kV for 4 seconds. Upon activation, there will be a power change of 200
MW northbound for Baltic Cable (BC emergency power control entry 3), 250 MW northbound
for Kontek, and 300 MW northbound for the SwePol Link (SwePol emergency power control
entry 4). For the SwePol Link to become activated, it is also necessary that the voltage at
Stärnö is lower than 415 kV.

3.3 System protection in southern Norway

In Norway, there is system protection, which is voltage-controlled. The Skagerrak cables have
emergency power regulation which is controlled by local voltage measurements at
Kristiansand. A low voltage of 275 and 270 kV will provide 200+200 MW of relief.

3.4 System protection in Finland

In Finland, there is system protection which is controlled by voltage and the transmission
between Sweden and Finland at the critical transmission cross-section in Finland (north -
south). The system protection uses emergency power regulation with automated systems on the
HVDC Fenno-Skan link. The system protection provides a power change of 200 or 400 MW to
Finland.

The four types of system protection are shown in Figure 3.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

Low voltage and

high transmission
North->South in
Finland
n
Low voltage in
-S ka
cross-section 2 no
F en

Low voltage
in Kristiansand
Sk
age
rra

kan
k

ntiS
Ko Low voltage in
cross-section 4

Sw
eP
o l
Kontek
Baltic

Figure 3 Control of HVDC-links on low voltage

4 System protection activated by one or more relay signals from the

facilities’ protective equipment

System protection activated by relay signals is often more complicated and the protection often
controls facilities a long way from the relays. Figure 4 shows an overview of system protection
for production shedding and/or control of the HVDC links. Figure 5 shows an overview of
system protection for load shedding and/or network division.

The Figures are followed by a description of the system protection.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

PSH in case of
line disconnection
PSH Nordlands ~ ~~
cross-section

~ ~
SWEDEN ~ ~

PSH for cross-section 1

FINLAND
PSH in case of
overload
~
~
PSH for cross-section 2
NORWAY

PSH for system

PSH Hasle and oscillations
Flesaker cross-section ~
~
PSH, overload
Sørlandet
~ ~

~
Control of Skagerrak
overload in Sørlandet
Skagerrak, line
disconnection in Kontiskan, West-
Energinet or over- Coast cross-section
load in Germany Kontiskan, local
West-Denmark
DENMARK
~
PSH for West-
Coast cross-section

Figure 4 System Protection based on Production Shedding (PSH) or Control of HVDC-

links

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

110 MW on line
disconnection

Network division
Network division on overload
on overload

Network division on
line disconnection
SWEDEN Network division on
import, high frequency
or low voltage

150 or 400 MW on
line disconnection FINLAND

NORWAY
Network division
on high frequency

220 MW on line Network division on

disconnection line disconnection

DENMARK

Network division
on low frequency

Figure 5 System Protection based on Load Shedding or Network Division

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

4.1 Eastern Denmark: System protection for stability in Eastern Denmark

Disconnection of gas turbines and downward regulation of the steam turbine at unit 2 of the
Avedøre plant upon activation of certain breakers on the 400 kV network in Zealand. This
system protection is only activated during operational situations when critical 400 kV network
components are disconnected or during high export volumes towards Sweden.

4.2 Sweden: System protection with production shedding for limiting

overloads on lines in Sweden
Shedding of hydropower production in northern Sweden via remotely-transmitted signals from
activated protection functions. Extent of approx. 1,600 MW of installed power. Upon
disconnection of lines in cross-section 1, there is a risk that other lines will become overloaded.
The system protection will disconnect production so that the lines will be relieved. The signals
originate from Grundfors, Betåsen, and Hjälta and are sent to stations northwards. The setting
of the automated equipment is adapted to the state of operation.
The system protection also includes a link with Norway so that the loss of a link between
Porjus and Ofoten will lead to load shedding in northern Norway.

4.3 Sweden: System protection in the West Coast cross-section (Kilanda-

Horred + Stenkullen-Strömma)
During imports from Germany, Zealand and Jutland and a high level of production at Ringhals,
simultaneous to exports towards Norway, there is a risk of overloads on the remaining line in
the event of a long-term fault on one of the lines.
The system protection will work as follows:
- In the event of losing Kilanda-Horred and transmission of more than 500 MW northbound on
the line, this will result in a power change of 300 MW on Konti-Skan 2 towards Western
Denmark.
- In the event of losing Stenkullen-Strömma and transmissions of more than 500 MW
northbound on the line, this will result in a power change of 300 MW on Konti-Skan 2 towards
Western Denmark.
These system protections do not provide increased capacity, rather they increase the system
security.

During exports to Jutland, there is a risk that the regional network around Gothenburg will be
overloaded in the event of a long–term fault on the Strömma-Lindome line. The system
protection will function as follows:
In the event of losing Strömma-Lindome, Konti-Skan 2 will be regulated down to 0 if there are
exports on the link.

Extended system protection:

This protection disconnects ”production” in Zealand through production shedding. This will
reduce the imports from Zealand which will relieve the West Coast cross-section and provide
increased system security. The activation of ”production” in Zealand by the system protection
will be taken, following agreement between the Parties concerned, into and out of operation on
the basis of the operational situation.

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4.4 Sweden: System protection Forsmark

In the event of a stoppage on either of the lines Forsmark-Odensala (FL4) or Tuna-Hagby, the
transformer at Tuna risks becoming overloaded if a fault arises on the remaining line.
The system protection will go into operation in the event of a stoppage on one of the mentioned
lines. The system protection will regulate down the production at Forsmark to unload the
transformer.
The system protection will work as follows:
- In the event of losing Forsmark-Odensala (FL4) or Tuna-Hagby, G12 will be regulated down
if Forsmark G11, G12 and G21 or G22 are in operation, and:
- in the event of losing Forsmark-Odensala (FL4) or Tuna-Hagby, G22 will be regulated down
if Forsmark G21, G22 and G11 or G12 are in operation.

4.5 Sweden: System protection Långbjörn

Production at Ångermanälven is fed out via transformations at Långbjörn and Betåsen. In the
event of losing a transformation, there is a risk that the other will become overloaded. The
system protection at Långbjörn will disconnect the Långbjörn-Korsselbränna-Stalon line with
its connected production when the link between Kilforsen and Långbjörn is broken (400 kV
line Kilforsen-Långbjörn + transformer T1 at Långbjörn).

4.6 Norway: System protection in the Hasle and Flesaker cross-section

During high export levels from southern Norway to Sweden, there is a risk that the loss of a
line can bring about overload, voltage or stability problems. In the event of critical losses, the
system protection must relieve the cross-sections by means of automatic production shedding
at Kvilldal, Sima, Aurland, Tonstad, Tokke and/or Vinje. The maximum permissible
production shedding is 1,200 MW and activation will occur as a result of the following events:
Loss of Hasle-Borgvik, Tegneby-Hasle, Rød-Hasle, Hasle-Halden, Halden-Skogssäter,
Kvilldal-Sylling and Sylling-Tegneby. During these events, the system protection has
redundancy when measuring high power levels on Hasle-Borgvik, Hasle-Halden, 300 kV
Tegneby-Hasle, 300 kV Flesaker-Tegneby and 300 kV Flesaker-Sylling. The system
protection’s setting will depend on the operational situation.

4.7 Norway: System protection in the Nordland cross-section

In the event of a large power surplus in northern and central Norway, there is a risk of network
collapse in the event of losing critical lines. The system protection must rapidly relieve the
cross-section by means of automatic production shedding or through network division so that
the surplus area is separated from the rest of the synchronous system. The largest permissible
production shedding is 1,200 MW.
The system protection will be activated by the following events:
- The loss of Ofoten-Ritsem, Ritsem-Vietas, Vietas-Porjus, Ofoten-Kobbelv or Svartisen-
N.Røssåga.
- High levels of current on 300 kV Tunnsjødal-Verdal, 300 kV Tunnsjødal-Namsos or 300 kV
Nea-Järpströmmen.
The system protection’s setting will depend on the operational situation and can result in
production shedding at Vietas, Ritsem, Kobbelv and/or Svartisen. Loss of the lines Ofoten-

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

Ritsem-Vietas-Porjus might also lead to network division south of Kobbelv. The system
protection is also described under point 4.2.

4.8 Norway: Local system protection at Kvilldal

Automatic load shedding at Kvilldal when the loss of a line entails high levels of transmission
westbound (towards Saurdal).

4.9 Norway: Network division in southern Norway

Automated systems that establish separate operation for the southern Norway area during
simultaneous stoppages on both the links between southern Norway and Sweden.

4.10 Norway: System protection for load shedding

System protection which disconnects up to 220 MW of industrial load in the event of the loss
of one or both 300 kV lines in the Sauda cross-section which supplies Bergen and important
industrial centres in Vestlandet.
System protection which disconnects 150 MW or 400 MW of industrial load in the event of the
loss of one or two 300 kV lines adjacent to Møre or in the event of loss of lines which entails a
low voltage or overload on the Nea-Järpströmmen line. The network supplies general
consumption and important industrial centres in Nord-Vestlandet.
System protection which disconnects up to 110 MW of industrial load in the event of losing the
420 kV lines north of Ofoten. The system protection will prevent overloads in the parallel 132
kV network which might otherwise lead to a collapse in the most northerly part of Norway.

4.11 Norway: System protection at Sørlandsnittet (PFK and HVDC control)

During abundant exports from Southern Norway to Denmark and with simultaneous low local
production, there is a risk of loss of a line, which can lead to overload or voltage problems.
During a critical loss of a line, the system protection will relieve the cross-section through
automatic downward regulation of the Skagerrak HVDC line. The system protection measures
overload on the 300 kV lines at 4 stations. The system protection regulates 400 MW of exports
down on Pole 3 during 1 sec.

During abundant imports to Southern Norway from Denmark and with simultaneous high local
production, there is a risk of loss of a line, which can lead to overload or voltage problems.
During a critical loss of a line, the system protection will relieve the cross-section through
automatic downward regulation of the Skagerrak HVDC line or PFK at Tonstad. The system
protection measures overload on the 300 kV lines at 3 stations. The system protection regulates
300 MW of imports down on Pole 3 during 1 sec and/or regulates production down at the
Tonstad power plant (4 x 160 MW available).

4.12 Western Denmark: Konti-Skan pole 2

The system protection on Konti-Skan 2 will be activated at a load of over 80 % of the 400 kV
transformer at the Nordjylland plant (NVV3+NNV5) (see point 1 in Figure 6). Transmissions
on pole 2 will be reduced until the load is once again under 80 % of the transformer (30 MW
per sec.).

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

The system protection is used to increase the import capacity from Sweden (load flow).

SBA3

DYB3
NVV5
1 ~
BDK3 I>

>> Konti Skan 2

3
HVO3 >> Konti Skan 1
NVT3

NVV3 VHA3
2
I>

ÅBØ3

ADL3 FER5
Figure 6 System Protection on Konti-Skan

4.13 Western Denmark: Konti-Skan pole 1 & 2

To safeguard the 150 kV link Ålborg Øst (ÅBØ3) – the Nordjylland plant (NVV3) from
dangerous overloads, there is an overload protector at the Ålborg Øst (ÅBØ3) station which
disconnects the T-branch (NVT3) - Ålborg Øst (ÅBØ3) during loads of over 150 % for 2-5
minutes. Additionally, the 150 kV line Ådalen (ADL3) - Ålborg Øst (ÅBØ3) is disconnected if
the overload exceeds 174 %.

The system protection is used to increase the import capacity from Sweden (load flow).

4.14 Western Denmark: Skagerrak pole 3

In the event of a disconnection of the 400 kV line Tjele – Askaer and the 400 kV line Askaer -
Revsing - Kassö, imports are reduced from Skagerrak pole 3 to 50 MW.

The system protection is not used to increase the import capacity from Norway, only to protect
the HVDC station.

4.15 Western Denmark: the German link

In the event of loads on the links to Germany in excess of 120 % for more than 15 seconds, the
remote control system will automatically commence downward regulation of the HVDC links.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 5

Regulation will be terminated when transmissions are normal again or when maximum
regulation has been reached. The function allows a maximum of 200 MW on Skagerrak poles
1, 2 and 3 as well as 150 MW on each of the Konti-Skan poles.

4.16 Finland: Frequency regulation (during island operation) with

automated systems on the HVDC Fenno-Skan link
The system protection can be used when the northern AC network between Rauma and
Dannebo is broken. This can control the frequency of the potential island network in Finland.

4.17 Finland: Power modulation for Fenno-Skan (Power modulation

control)
The system protection can be used to attenuate large power oscillations between the countries.
Uses the frequency difference between Sweden and Finland as a signal and modulates the
power ± 100 MW.

4.18 Finland: Network division in northern Finland to protect the 110 kV

network from overloads
The system protection sections the line Vajukoski-Meltaus 110kV when the power on the line
is over 100 MW for 0.2 seconds.

4.19 Finland: System protection for avoiding system oscillations

The system protection is used to increase the capacity in the north towards Sweden. In certain
fault scenarios, with large transmission levels, there is a risk of system oscillations. System
protection relieves transmissions by means of production shedding in southern Finland.
Production shedding is activated by means of remotely-transmitted signals from activated
protection functions. Extent approx. 900 MW. The system protection is activated automatically
depending on the operational situation. The Power System Centre in Helsinki can put system
protection into/out of operation using the remote control system, depending on the
transmission situation.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 6

SYSTEM SERVICES

System services is a generic term for services that the system operators need for the technical operation
of the power system. The availability of system services is agreed upon between the system operator
and the other companies within the respective subsystem.

1 Survey of system services

1.1 System services defined in Appendix 2 of the System Operation

Agreement

1.1.1 Frequency controlled normal operation reserve

Activated automatically within a ± 0.1 Hz deviation and shall be regulated out within 2-3 minutes. The
joint requirement for the synchronous system is 600 MW. This means a joint requirement for frequency
response in the synchronous system of 6,000 MW/Hz.
This service can be exchanged to a certain degree. Each subsystem shall have at least 2/3 of the
frequency controlled normal operation reserve within its own system in the event of splitting up and
island operation. A major exchange of the service between the subsystems can require a greater need for
regulating margin (the difference between the transmission and trading capacities). Elspot exchanges
and joint Nordic balance regulation take priority over the exchange of automatic active reserve. Thus,
the exchange of this service is agreed after the Elspot has closed.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Droop control at thermal power plants. Yes
East
Energinet.dk No requirement regarding frequency controlled normal operation
West reserve from UCTE.
Fingrid Measured droop control at hydropower and thermal power plants. Yes
DC link towards Russia.
Yes
Statnett % turbine opening/Hz in hydropower. Yes
Svenska % turbine opening/Hz in hydropower. Yes
Kraftnät

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1.1.2 Frequency controlled disturbance reserve

Activated automatically at 49.9 Hz and fully activated at 49.5 Hz. At least 50 % shall be regulated out
within 5 sec and 100 % within 30 sec. Joint requirement for the interconnected Nordic power system is
approx 1,000 MW, depending on the relevant dimensioning fault.

The service is closely linked to frequency controlled normal operation reserve, and the principle of
exchange is the same.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Disconnection of district heating. Yes
East Turbine opening at thermal power plants.
Droop control from thermal power plants.
HVDC interventions.
Energinet.dk Condensate stoppage at thermal power plants. No (only
West Droop control (modified gliding pressure) at thermal power plants. exchanged
between
Energinet.dk
West and UCTE)
Fingrid Droop control at hydropower and thermal power plants. Yes
Sheddable load. Yes
Statnett % turbine opening/Hz in hydropower. Yes
HVDC interventions, in stages depending on freq
Svenska % turbine opening/Hz in hydropower. Yes
Kraftnät HVDC interventions, in stages depending on freq. Automatic start-up
of gas turbines, in stages depending on freq. Some with 5 sec start-up
delay.

1.1.3 Voltage controlled disturbance reserve

This service becomes relevant when low voltage activates emergency power on HVDC links out from
the synchronous system. The service is applicable to exchanges.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Not used.
East
Energinet.dk Not used.
West
Fingrid Not used.
Statnett Emergency power Skagerrak. Yes
Svenska Automatic export restriction on DC links south of cross-section 4 in Yes
Kraftnät Sweden. SwePol Link, Baltic Cable and Kontek (Zealand).

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 6

1.1.4 Fast active disturbance reserve

This service restores frequency controlled disturbance reserve and shall be activated within 15 minutes.
This service can be exchanged between the subsystems of the joint Nordic regulation market or as
supportive power. However, in the event of power shortages, Appendix 9 comes into force.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Contract with producer. Yes
East Gas turbines, upward regulation of rolling reserve, fast-start thermal
power plants.
Energinet.dk Contract with producer, bids can be made via regulation market. Yes
West
Fingrid Gas turbines. Yes
Sheddable load. Yes
Russian DC link. Yes
Statnett Contracted regulating power: Options market for regulating power Yes
(production and consumption).
Voluntary bids on regulation market. Yes
Svenska Requirement for producers to report to SvK, gas turbines and Yes
Kraftnät hydropower.

1.1.5 Slow active disturbance reserve

Requirements for each system operator to comply with will depend on national legislation. Activation is
slower than 15 minutes. The service is not yet relevant to exchanges between the subsystems. However,
in the event of power shortages, Appendix 9 comes into force.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Thermal power plants with a start-up time of up to 4 hours and
East rearrangement of production types at thermal power plants.
Energinet.dk There are no plants with a start-up time of < 4 hours.
West
Fingrid Power available after 15 minutes, market is responsible. No
Statnett Not used
Svenska Most frequently replaced by a surplus of fast active disturbance No
Kraftnät reserve.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 6

1.1.6 Reactive reserve

Reactive reserve is of a local nature. Consequently, it cannot be exchanged between the subsystems.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Over/under magnetization of production plants. No
East Synchronous condenser operation in one generator.
Connection/disconnection of capacitor batteries and reactors.
Energinet.dk Over/under magnetization of central production plants. No
West Change of Mvar production at power plants.
Synchronous condensers at Tjele and Vester Hassing.
Connection/disconnection of capacitors.
Connection/disconnection of reactors.
Fingrid Over/under magnetization of production plants. No
Synchronous condenser operation at certain hydropower plants. No
Connection/disconnection of power lines.
Connection/disconnection of capacitor batteries and reactor. No
No
Statnett Over/under magnetization of production plants. No
Connection/disconnection of power lines.
Connection/disconnection of capacitor batteries.
Static phase compensation (SVC plants).
Svenska Over/under magnetization of production plants. No
Kraftnät Connection/disconnection of power lines.
Connection/disconnection of capacitor batteries, reactors.
Static phase compensation (SVC plants).
¹) Payment for production of reactive power in generators outside certain limits for tanφ.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 6

1.2 System services not defined in Appendix 2 of the System Operation

Agreement

1.2.1 Load following

Load following entails that players with major production changes report production plans with a
resolution of 15 minutes. Load following with a quarter-hourly resolution improves the quality of the
frequency of the synchronous system. This service can be exchanged between the subsystems.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Not used.
East
Energinet.dk Production balance centres with variable production deliver running Partly, 5 min and
West schedules with a resolution of 5 min. 15 min. plans are
sent to other
TSOs
Fingrid Hour shift regulation. Yes¹
Balance centres inform Fingrid about hours containing more than 100
MW of changes in their balance.
Statnett Players with major production changes make their production plans
using a quarter-hourly resolution. Yes¹

Statnett can move planned production changes for all players by up to

15 minutes. Yes¹
Svenska Players report production plans with a quarter-hourly resolution to Yes¹
Kraftnät SvK. SvK has the right to move production by at least a quarter of an
hour.
¹) Quarter hourly regulation improves the quality of the frequency throughout the synchronous system.

1.2.2 System protection

The service is exchanged to some degree today. It is imaginable that the Nordic power system will
become more integrated in the future. Then, events in one subsystem will be able to activate system
protection in another subsystem.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Automatic downward regulation and/or disconnection of power plants No
East and/or KONTEK, automatic upward regulation of KONTEK.
Specified in App. 5.
Energinet.dk Emergency power on Kontiskan and Skagerrak. Yes
West Downward regulation of Kontiskan in the event of an overload on
transformers.
Downward regulation of Skagerrak 3 upon the loss of some 400 kV
lines (downward regulation in respect of voltage quality).
Fingrid Automatic production shedding. No
Network division. Specified in App 5.
Statnett Automatic disconnection of power plants and smelting works. Yes
Emergency power on Skagerrak.
Yes
Svenska Automatic downward regulation of SwePol link, Baltic Cable and Yes
Kraftnät Kontek.

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1.2.3 Ramping
Ramping entails a system operator designating a facility for complete or partial regulation in step with
the HVDC links, when it is being regulated on an HVDC link out from the synchronous system. This is
a system service for improving the quality of the frequency and for allowing major load changes on the
HVDC links. This service can be exchanged between the subsystems.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Not used.
East
Energinet.dk Not used.
West
Fingrid Not used.
Statnett Not used.
Svenska Not used.
Kraftnät

1.2.4 Black starts

This service is of a local nature. Consequently, it cannot be exchanged between the subsystems.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Diesel generator and/or gas turbines. No
East
Energinet.dk 2 gas turbines. No
West
Fingrid Some hydropower plants and gas turbines. No
Statnett Some selected hydropower plants. No
Svenska Some selected hydropower plants. No
Kraftnät

1.2.5 Automatic load shedding

This service is relevant during major operational disturbances. The subsystems will then hardly be
interconnected and the service will not be relevant to exchanges.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Frequency controlled load shedding and disconnection of links No
East between Sweden and Zealand. Specified in App. 5.
Energinet.dk Load shedding. Link with Germany is not disconnected. Load No
West shedding between 48.7 Hz and 47.7 Hz.
Fingrid Automatic load shedding between 48.7 Hz – 48.3 Hz. No
Statnett Automatic load shedding between 49.0 Hz – 47.0 Hz. No
Svenska Automatic load shedding between 48.8Hz – 48.0 Hz. No
Kraftnät

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1.2.6 Manual load shedding

This service is used during major operational disturbances and power shortages and cannot be
exchanged between the subsystems. This is regulated by Appendix 9.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk The load can be shed to eliminate non-approved transmissions on the No
East network, for managing power shortages, during island operation and
when automatic shedding has not been sufficient.
Energinet.dk The load can be shed to eliminate non-approved transmissions on the No
West network, for managing power shortages, during island operation and
when automatic shedding has not been sufficient.
Fingrid Sheddable load used as fast active disturbance reserve, can also be No
used during power shortages when only 600 MW of fast active
disturbance reserve remains in the synchronous system.
Statnett Used during power shortages when only 600 MW of fast active No¹
disturbance reserve remains in the synchronous system.
Svenska Used during power shortages when only 600 MW of fast active No
Kraftnät disturbance reserve remains in the synchronous system.
¹) No particular compensation is paid to the players. However, when the service is activated, Statnett will obtain
the CENS (Compensation for Energy Not Supplied) liability, entailing a reduction of the revenue limit.

1.2.7 Fast active forecast reserve

This service restores the frequency controlled normal operation reserve. Using this, deviations in
consumption and/or production forecasts are adjusted. Requirements for each system operator to
comply with will depend on national legislation. Activation time is 10-15 min.
The service is exchanged between the subsystems in the joint Nordic regulation market as voluntary or
contracted regulation power, but in the event of power shortages, Appendix 9 will come into force.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Contract with producers regarding bids (as bids in the regulation Yes
East market).
Energinet.dk Contract with producers regarding minimum bids (as bids in the Yes
West regulation market).
Voluntary bids in the regulation market. Yes
Fingrid Voluntary bids in the regulation market. Yes
Statnett Contracted regulation power: Options market for regulation power Yes
(production and consumption).

Voluntary bids in the regulation market. Yes

Svenska Voluntary bids in the balance regulation (secondary regulation). Yes
Kraftnät

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1.2.8 Fast active counter trading reserve

Requirements for each system operator to comply with will depend on national legislation. The service
can be exchanged between the subsystems during the operational phase.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Particular purchases from producers.
East
Energinet.dk Particular purchases from producers and bids in the regulation market Yes
West can be used.
Fingrid Voluntary bids in the regulation market can be used. Yes
Statnett Contracted regulation power: Options market for regulation power Yes
(production and consumption).

Voluntary bids in the regulation power market. Yes

Svenska Voluntary bids in the balance regulation (secondary regulation). Yes
Kraftnät

1.2.9 Peak load resource

Requirements for each system operator to comply with will depend on national legislation.
By peak load resource is meant active reserve which is not normally used. For anticipated peak load
periods, the preparedness time is reduced so that the capacity, as and when needed, can be used. The
service can be exchanged between the subsystems in the joint Nordic regulation market. However, in
the event of power shortages, Appendix 9 will come into force.

TSO Generation of system service Exchange

between
subsystems
Energinet.dk Not used.
East
Energinet.dk Not used.
West
Fingrid Not used.
Statnett Not used.
Svenska Being procured.
Kraftnät

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2 Description of routines for trading in system services

2.1 General
Trading in system services shall not be an obstacle to either Elspot trading or balance regulation.

2.2 Trading in frequency controlled normal operation reserve and

frequency controlled disturbance reserve
Trading in frequency response can be simultaneously trading in frequency controlled normal operation
reserve and frequency controlled disturbance reserve depending on how the individual services are
acquired in the separate subsystems.

During conversion between the frequency response, frequency controlled normal operation reserve and
frequency controlled disturbance reserve, the following conversion table is to be used, unless otherwise
agreed:

Frequency response Frequency controlled normal operation Frequency controlled disturbance

reserve reserve
10 MW 1 MW 1.5 MW

System operators can inform each other on a daily basis after the Elspot has closed regarding surpluses
of frequency response that can be offered to the other system operators.

System operators that have a need to purchase can contact the relevant system operator to obtain
information on prices and volumes.

When the total purchasing requirement is larger than the supply, distribution shall take place on the
basis of the basic requirement for the frequency controlled normal operation reserve.

Trading is carried out bilaterally between system operators.

If trading involves transit transmission through a subsystem, the system operator in whose network the
transit transmission will take place shall be informed before making the agreement.

In the event of selling to several system operators, all will pay the same price, the marginal price.

2.3 Exchanges using other types of reserves

Services linked to the joint Nordic regulation market are described in Appendix 3.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN AND SWEDISH

SUBSYSTEMS ON THE AC LINKS

1 Background

The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden using
DC links. This Appendix describes the operation of the AC links between the subsystems of
Sweden and Norway.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems of Sweden-Norway

2.1 Transmission facilities which are owned/held by system operators at

both ends

Facility Voltage kV Settlement point Misc.

Ofoten-Ritsem 400 Ritsem

N.Rössåga-Gejmån-Ajaure 220 Gejmån, Ajaure
Nea-Järpströmmen 300 Nea
Hasle-Borgvik 400 Hasle Incl. in Hasle
cross-section
Halden-Skogssäter 400 Halden Incl. in Hasle
cross-section

2.2 Other transmission facilities

Sildvik-Tornehamn 130 Tornehamn Vattenfall

owner on
Swedish side

2.3 Other transmission facilities than those under 2.2

Eidskog-Charlottenberg 130 Charlottenberg Fortum
owner on
Swedish side

This transmission facility is not included in the grid on the Swedish side. The trading capacity
of the link is submitted to Nord Pool by Statnett on the Norwegian side and by Fortum on the
Swedish side.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2.1

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities
EN 50 110 which governs the organisation and working methods. In addition to the standard,
there are national regulations and special instructions which entail certain mutual differences
between the system operators as regards dealing with operational issues from an electrical
safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management

Responsible for the electrical operation of the facility on the Swedish side is Svenska Kraftnät,
while on the Norwegian side it is Statnett. The power operation responsibility boundaries for
electrical operation for facilities under 2.1 lie at the national border between Sweden and
Norway.

3.3 Switching responsible operator

For each of the cross-border links, there is a specific switching agreement between the parties.

Line Norway Sweden

Ofoten-Ritsem Regional Centre at Alta Operations Centre at
Sollefteå (DCSO)
N.Rössåga- Regional Centre at Operations Centre at
Gejmån-Ajaure Sunndalsöra Sollefteå (DCSO)
Nea- Regional Centre at Operations Centre at
Järpströmmen Sunndalsöra Sollefteå (DCSO)
Hasle-Borgvik Regional Centre in Oslo Operations Centre at
Råcksta (DCRÅ)
Halden- Regional Centre in Oslo Operations Centre at
Skogssäter Råcksta (DCRÅ)

3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

Same Parties as under 3.3.

3.5 Switching schedule

Switchings on the links are carried out in accordance with a switching schedule drawn up by
Svenska Kraftnät. Statnett’s Regional Centres acknowledge reception.

3.6 Disturbance management

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management

During operational disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall as soon
as possible restore the link to normal state.

3.6.2 Switching schedule

In the event of faults needing switchings which will affect the cross-border link, Statnett and
Svenska Kraftnät are to be informed before any switchings are made. In the case of switchings
on the Swedish grid, switching schedules are to be drawn up by Svenska Kraftnät.

3.6.3 Fault finding

Initial fault finding will be carried out differently from case to case. Generally speaking, the
respective facility owner will be responsible for fault finding in consultation with the switching
responsible operator.

3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults

Once the fault has been localized, the respective facility owner will attend to clearing the fault.

4 System operation for facilities under 2.1 and 2.2

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

The transmission capacity of the links is as follows, in MW.
Line -20 °C -10°C 0°C 10°C 20°C 30°C Total to Total to
Sweden Norway
Sildvik – 120 120 120 120 120 100 Approx 900- Approx 700-
Tornehamn 1,300 1,100
(to Sweden)
Sildvik – 70 70 70 70 70 70
Tornehamn
(from Sweden)
Ofoten – Ritsem 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,350 1,170 880
N.Rössåga - 536 496 451 398 334 250
Gejmån –Ajaure
Nea -
Järpströmmen 730 690 650 610 550 500
Hasle -Borgvik 2,100 2,000 1,900 1,780 1,650 1,510 See below See below
Halden – 3,070 2,900 2,700 2,490 2,260 2,000
Skogssäter

The transmission capacity is limited by defined transmission cross-sections, stability

conditions or similar. The transmission capacity thus varies in accordance with how it is
distributed between the links.

- To Norway in the Hasle cross-section: The transmission capacity is dependent on the

temperature as follows (at temperatures below 0ºC, the transmission capacity is
restricted by voltage in Sweden):

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

Temperature [°C] -20 -10 0 10 20 30

Capacity [MW] 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,150 2,050 1,900

- To Sweden in the Hasle cross-section: The transmission capacity is 1,600 MW without

production shedding. For every 100 MW of production, production shedding increases
the transmission capacity by 50 MW. The maximum production shedding is 1,200 MW,
corresponding to 2,200 MW of capacity.

The transmission capacity will be reduced due to a high Oslo load, in accordance with the
following table:

Oslo load [MW] 3,200 3,300 3,400 3,500 3,600 3,700 3,800 3,900 4,000 4,100
Capacity [MW] 2,200 2,175 2,090 2,000 1,900 1,785 1,700 1,600 1,450 1,250

Oslo load [MW] 4,200 4,300 4,400 4,500 4,600 4,700 4,800 4,900 5,000
Capacity [MW] 1,050 850 650 500 350 200 100 50 0

4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The transmission capacity between Norway and Sweden shall be jointly determined on a daily
basis by the Parties.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

When determining the trading capacity of the links, the transmission capacity shall be reduced
by the regulating margin.
The regulating margin of the Hasle cross-section is normally 150 MW. The total regulating
margin of the other links is normally 50 MW.
If a country can guarantee counter trading and the existence of a sufficient fast active
disturbance reserve, then the trading capacity may be increased.
For the trading capacity, a weekly forecast is established for the coming week. The forecast is
sent to Nord Pool by at the latest the Tuesday of the week before.

4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation

Operation monitoring of capacities and transmission cross-sections, which can affect
exchanges, are conducted in accordance with the below:

Line Norway Sweden

Sildvik-Tornehamn National Centre in Oslo Vattenfall Norrnät’s
Operations Centre at Luleå
Ofoten-Ritsem National Centre in Oslo SvK’s Grid Supervisor at
Network Control at
Råcksta
N.Rössåga- National Centre in Oslo SvK’s Grid Supervisor at
Gejmån-Ajaure Network Control at
Råcksta
Nea-Järpströmmen National Centre in Oslo SvK’s Grid Supervisor at
Network Control at
Råcksta

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

Hasle-Borgvik National Centre in Oslo SvK’s Operations Centre

at Råcksta
Halden-Skogssäter National Centre in Oslo SvK’s Grid Supervisor at
Network Control at
Råcksta

4.5 Voltage regulation

The basic principle for voltage regulation is governed by item 7 point 7.5 in the agreement.

4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Norwegian side

Voltage is monitored by the National Centre in Oslo and Regional Centres in Alta, Sunndalsöra
and Oslo. If the Regional Centres do not have sufficient resources to maintain the voltage
within the given limits, the National Centre will be contacted.

The following voltage levels are applied:

Substation Min Normal operation range Max
voltage kV kV voltage kV
Ofoten 400 400-415 425
Nedre Rössåga 235 240-250 250
Nea 285 285-300 306
Hasle 380 410-415 430
Halden 380 410-415 430

4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side

The Operations Centre in Sollefteå (DCSO) is responsible for voltage regulation in the
northern parts of the grid, and the Operations Centre in Råcksta (DCRÅ) is responsible for
voltage regulation in the southern parts of the grid. If the Operations Centres do not have
sufficient resources to maintain the voltage within the given limits, SvK's Operations Centre
shall be contacted.
The following voltage levels are applied:
Substation Min Normal operation range Max
voltage kV kV voltage kV
Ritsem 395 400-415 420
Ajaure 230 245-255 260
Järpströmmen 280 285-295 305
Borgvik 395 400-415 420
Skogssäter 395 400-415 420

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.1

4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation

In normal operation, the goal is the higher voltage within the normal operation range. In
conjunction with operational disturbances and switching, the respective operations centres in
Sweden and Norway can agree on action to maintain the voltage within the given intervals.

4.6 Outage planning

Svenska Kraftnät shall plan the following in consultation with Statnett:

- Outages or other measures on the Swedish network impacting upon the transmission
capacity of the links between Sweden and Norway.
- Outages on one of the 400 kV lines between Porjus and Ritsem.
- Outages on the 400 kV line between Midskog and Järpströmmen or the 400/300 kV
transformer at Järpströmmen.
- Outages on one of the 220 kV lines between Grundfors and Gejmån or the 400/220 kV
transformer at Grundfors.
- Outages causing a major reduction of the transmission capacity in cross-sections 1 or 2,
or the West Coast cross-section in Sweden.
- Control facility works at Skogssäter, Borgvik, Porjus, Ritsem and Vietas.

Statnett shall plan the following in consultation with Svenska Kraftnät:

- Outages or other measures on the Norwegian network impacting upon the transmission
capacity of the links between Sweden and Norway.
- Outages entailing that, on the Norwegian network, there is no link between Ofoten and
Rössåga.
- Outages entailing that, on the Norwegian network, there is no link between Rössåga and
Nea.
- Outages entailing that, on the Norwegian network, there is no link between Nea and
Hasle.

4.7 Disturbance situation

The term disturbance situation means that the transmission capacities have been exceeded due
to, for instance, long-term line faults or the loss of production. If the transmission capacities
are not exceeded during the faults, the situation will be deemed to be normal.

In the event of operational disturbances, measures in accordance with the issued instructions
shall, as soon as possible, restore the link to normal state.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.2

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE FINNISH AND SWEDISH

SUBSYSTEMS ON THE AC LINKS AND FENNO-SKAN

1 Background

The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden using
DC links. This Appendix describes the operation of the AC links and the Fenno-Skan DC link.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems Sweden – Finland

2.1 Transmission facilities which are owned/held by system operators

Facility Voltage level Settlement point:

Petäjäskoski - Letsi 400 kV AC Letsi 400 kV
Keminmaa - Svartbyn 400 kV AC Svartbyn 400 kV
Fenno-Skan 400 kV DC Dannebo 400 kV

Ossauskoski – Kalix*) 220 kV AC Kalix 220 kV

*) SvK and Fingrid own the line, Vattenfall Norrnät and Fingrid are
responsible for its electrical operation.
The transmissions depend on consumption in the Kalix region. The transmissions are taken
into account when determining the trading capacity between Finland and Sweden.

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2.1

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities
EN 50 110 which governs the organisation and working methods. In addition to the standard,
there are national regulations and special instructions which entail certain mutual differences
between the system operators as regards dealing with operational issues from an electrical
safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management

The responsibility for electrical operation for the transmission facilities is held in Finland by
Fingrid. In Sweden, SvK holds the responsibility for electrical operation.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.2

The power operation responsibility boundary concerning the 400 kV links lies at the border
between Finland and Sweden. The power operation responsibility boundary regarding Fenno-
Skan lies at the cable connection point in the terminal at Rihtniemi, Finland.

3.3 Switching responsible operator

Facility Swedish side Finnish side
Petäjäskoski – Letsi Operations Centre at Sollefteå (DCSO) Tavastehus Network
Centre
Keminmaa - Svartbyn Operations Centre at Sollefteå (DCSO) Tavastehus Network
Centre
Fenno-Skan Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ) Tavastehus Network
Centre

3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

Operations monitoring and control in Finland are carried out from:
− Tavastehus Network Centre as regards the AC links and Fenno-Skan.
Operations monitoring and control in Sweden are carried out from:
− The Operations Centre at Sollefteå (DCSO) as regards the 400 kV AC links.
− The Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ) as regards Fenno-Skan.

3.5 Switching schedule

Switchings on the links are carried out in accordance with a switching schedule drawn up by
Svenska Kraftnät.

3.6 Disturbance management

When a cross-border link is taken out of operation, the control rooms will contact each other
immediately.
As and when required, the switching responsible operators issue the necessary switching
schedules in order to carry out fault finding and clearance.
The switching responsible operators conduct fault finding in consultation.
Clearance of remaining faults is organised by the switching responsible operators in
consultation.
For Fenno-Skan, the Preparedness plan for fault clearance is used.

4 System operation for facilities under 2.1

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

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4.1.1 400 kV AC links

The transmission capacity to Finland is dependent upon the temperature in northern Sweden
and Finland, as follows:
Temperature °C < 20 > 20
Capacity 1,650 MW 1,600 MW

The transmission capacity to Sweden is limited because of dynamic reasons as follows:

Cross-section 1 Max. transmission to Sweden
3,000 MW 1,200 MW
3,100 MW 1,100 MW
3,300 MW 1,000 MW

The transmission capacity of only one 400 kV link in the north is a maximum of:
Planned outage in the other Disturbance in the other link
link
To Finland 700 MW 500 MW
From Finland 400 MW 400 MW

4.1.2 Fenno-Skan
The transmission capacity of Fenno-Skan is transiently max. 600 MW. The transmission
capacity of Fenno-Skan is temperature-dependent, the normal value being 550 MW. As the
trading capacity, a temperature-dependent value is used continuously, normally 550 MW.

4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The transmission capacity between the subsystems is set on a daily basis in consultation
between the System Operation Centre in Helsinki and SvK’s Grid Supervisor at Network
Control at Råcksta.

Both parties shall inform the other party in good time before the day of operation of the
transmission capacity on Fenno-Skan and on the northern links. The minimum values will be
the transmission capacity.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

When determining the trading capacity of the AC links, the transmission capacity is reduced
by a regulation margin of 100 MW. Consumption in the Kalix region is taken into account
when determining the trading capacity between Finland and Sweden. The trading capacity of
Fenno-Skan is equal to its transmission capacity, normally 550 MW. For the trading capacity,

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a weekly forecast is set for the coming week. The forecast is sent to Nord Pool by at the latest
the Tuesday of the week before.

4.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of system operation

Operations monitoring and control in Finland are carried out from:
− The System Operation Centre in Helsinki as regards AC links and Fenno-Skan.
Operations monitoring and control in Sweden are carried out from:
− SvK’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta concerning 400 kV AC links and
Fenno-Skan.
Regulation of Fenno-Skan is carried out on an alternating basis per half calendar year: the first
half by Svenska Kraftnät’s Operations Centre at Råcksta and the second half by the System
Operation Centre in Helsinki.

4.5 Voltage regulation

The basic principle for voltage regulation is governed by item 7 point 7.5 in the agreement.

4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side

The Operations Centre in Sollefteå (DCSO) is responsible for voltage regulation in the
northern parts of the grid.
The following voltage levels are applied:

Substation Min Normal operation Max

voltage kV range kV voltage kV

Letsi 395 400-410 415

Svartbyn 395 400-415 420

The minimum voltage is a voltage which the power system can withstand with a certain margin
against a voltage collapse. The maximum voltage is the design voltage of the equipment. The
target value for voltage lies within the normal operation range.

4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Finnish side

For voltage regulation, there are reactors on the tertiary windings of transformers and
capacitors in the 110 kV system.
At Keminmaa, the capacitor is connected for reactive power on the 110 kV side of
transformers. The reactors are connected by means of automation for 400 kV voltages. The
automation has three windows of +/- 4 kV and it can be adjusted upwards and downwards from
the System Operation Centre.
At Petäjäskoski, the reactors are connected manually.
The following voltage levels are applied:

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Substation Min Normal operation Max

voltage kV range kV voltage kV

Petäjäskoski 380 400-417 420

Keminmaa 380 399-417 420

4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation

Problems can arise on the Svartbyn - Keminmaa line if the Swedish side does not pay attention
to the Finnish voltage regulation principle. There can be consequential impacts between reactor
connections at Svartbyn and corresponding connections at Keminmaa on account of the size of
the reactor at Svartbyn, 150 Mvar. The voltage at Svartbyn shall be held within 406 - 414 kV.
If problems occur, the relevant parties shall contact each other.

4.6 Outage planning

The Parties shall plan, in consultation with each other, outages on the links and on their own
networks when such outages will impact upon the transmission capacities of the links.
Planned outages on Fenno-Skan are to be co-ordinated with the other HVDC links of the Nordic
area.

4.7 Disturbance management

The term disturbance situation means that the transmission capacity has been exceeded due to, for
instance, long-term line faults or the loss of production. If the transmission capacity has not been
exceeded during the faults, the situation will be deemed normal.
When a cross-border link is disconnected, the control rooms will immediately contact each other
and jointly reduce the transmission level to permissible values.
During hours when a disturbance situation is in force, loss minimization is not employed. This
means that no compensation for loss minimization benefit will be paid out. The Parties will only
pay for non-notified balance power.
During disturbance situations, both Parties have the right to regulate Fenno-Skan to support their
networks. Fenno-Skan can be used as much as possible facility-wise and to an extent not entailing
any difficulties in the other Party’s network.
During a disturbance situation, the Parties shall immediately contact each other and agree that it is
a disturbance situation. In conjunction with this, it must also be agreed how much Fenno-Skan is
to be regulated and who will regulate. If the situation is very serious and the situation in the other
Party’s network can be assumed to be normal, then Fenno-Skan can be regulated by the Party
affected by the disturbance without any previous contact. Such unilateral regulation may not,
however, exceed 300 MW counted from the current setting.
If Fenno-Skan’s emergency power regulation has been activated, this will also be deemed to be a
disturbance situation. If the emergency power intervention entails counter trading requirements

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for a Party not being affected by a disturbance, then Fenno-Skan shall be regulated within 15
minutes to such a value that the counter trading requirement ceases.

5 Distribution of capacity utilization between Finland and Sweden

The distribution of capacity utilization on the cross-border links is governed by a separate
agreement between Fingrid and Svenska Kraftnät. The main principles are as follows:
The transmission capacity of the cross-border links is defined for the AC links in the north and for
Fenno-Skan. The transmission capacity shall be determined continuously by the parties in
accordance with the relevant technical conditions of the System Operation Agreement. The
trading capacity is determined by calculating the transmission capacity minus determined
regulating margin.

5.1 Basic distribution

Basic distribution is used as a starting point for the distribution of electricity transmissions
between northern and southern links. Basic distribution is determined by the proportion between
the determined trading capacity, at any one given time, of the AC links and Fenno-Skan 1. Basic
distribution shall be used if neither loss minimization nor the use of the other Party’s idle capacity
is relevant.
Basic distribution is applied as follows:
− For each hour, the planned cross-border power trade is totalled.
− The power trade is distributed between the northern AC links and Fenno-Skan in accordance
with the above basic distribution.
− Elbas and supportive power trading across the border are not handled in basic distribution.
If either Party needs to limit the AC links or Fenno-Skan due to internal limitations, e.g. cross-
sections 1, 2 or P1, the above trading capacity will nevertheless be used for the AC link and
Fenno-Skan when calculating basic distribution.

5.2 Loss minimization (Fenno-Skan optimization)

In the event of loss minimization, Fenno-Skan will be regulated in such a way that the
transmission losses on the Finnish and Swedish grids are minimized. The benefits thus gained
are to be divided equally between Fingrid and SvK through financial reimbursement twice a
year.

5.3 Loss minimization model

The model for loss minimization is based upon SvK and Fingrid calculating their network losses
as a function of the transmissions on Fenno-Skan. The curves are calculated using the current
operating situation and the constant net trade. The curves are sent to the other company and added
in order to obtain the minimum point giving a reference value for Fenno-Skan.

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The price of energy used in loss minimization shall be area price Sweden in Nord Pool Spot’s
Elspot market. The Parties shall specify the prices in SEK. As of the beginning of 2006, the prices
shall be specified in EUR.

5.4 Distribution of benefit

The overall benefit to the system during a period of one hour is defined as the positive difference
between the calculated overall loss overheads during basic distribution and during the real
reference value. Normally, the minimum point is used as the reference value.
The overall benefit shall be distributed in accordance with the 50/50 principle; both Parties shall
have equal benefit of loss minimization. The distribution of benefit will be as follows: firstly the
overall benefit is calculated as set out above. Following this, Fingrid’s benefit is calculated as the
difference between its loss overheads during basic distribution and during the real reference value.
SvK’s benefit is calculated the same way. Subsequently, either of the Parties compensates the
other Party to the extent that SvK’s benefit increased/decreased by the compensation is the same
as Fingrid’s benefit increased/decreased by the compensation.

5.5 Utilizing the other party’s idle capacity

Both countries have pledged to internally counter trade in the event of transmission limitations on
their own networks during normal state, this applies during the operational phase. Parties
experiencing problems on their networks due to loss minimization have the right to change, free
of charge, the power distribution within the range [basic distribution, optimum]. If there are,
nevertheless, bottlenecks in one of the networks, the System Operation Centre in Helsinki and
SvK’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta shall agree upon the redistribution as
follows.

5.5.1 Bottlenecks in Fingrid’s network

If there are bottlenecks in Fingrid’s network and there is idle capacity in SvK’s network, the
System Operation Centre in Helsinki and SvK’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta
shall agree upon the utilization of SvK’s network in order to relieve Fingrid’s transmissions. The
agreement must feature the following points:
− new reference values for the northern links and Fenno-Skan
− the transit amount=the volume outside the range [basic distribution, optimum].
Afterwards, Fingrid shall compensate SvK for utilizing SvK’s capacity. This compensation
will be calculated as the product of the transit price and the transit sum. The transit price is,
until further notice, set at SEK 30/MWh unless otherwise agreed between the parties. The
transit price shall, however, be adjusted by the parties for each commencing period of two (2)
calendar years.

5.5.2 Bottlenecks in SvK’s network

If there are bottlenecks in SvK’s network and there is idle capacity in Fingrid’s network, the
System Operation Centre in Helsinki and SvK’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta

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shall agree upon the utilization of Fingrid’s network in order to relieve SvK’s transmissions. The
agreement must feature the following points:
− new reference values for the northern links and Fenno-Skan
− the transit amount=the volume outside the range [basic distribution, optimum].
Afterwards, SvK shall compensate Fingrid for utilizing Fingrid’s capacity. This compensation
will be calculated as the product of the transit price and the transit amount. The transit price is,
until further notice, set at SEK 30/MWh unless otherwise agreed between the parties. The
transit price shall, however, be adjusted by the parties for each commencing period of two (2)
calendar years.

5.5.3 Bottlenecks in both parties’ networks

If both parties are experiencing bottleneck situations simultaneously, the net trade shall be
distributed between the links as in basic distribution. But if the counter trading overheads in the
parties’ networks differ greatly and the control rooms agree upon cost distribution, another type of
power distribution can be used.

5.6 Settlement of loss minimization

The compensation of loss minimisation takes place twice a year, at the beginning of January and
at the beginning of July, if the parties do not agree upon another procedure. Fingrid makes out the
invoice if the parties do not agree otherwise.
The compensation of the use of the other party’s idle capacity also takes place twice a year at the
same time with loss minimisation compensation.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.3

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN, FINNISH AND

SWEDISH SUBSYSTEMS IN ARCTIC SCANDINAVIA

1 Background
The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is linked to Norway and Sweden using DC
links. This Appendix governs the special circumstances resulting from no separate trade being
conducted via the Ivalo-Varangerbotn link. The capacity will instead be included in the trading
scope for Nord Pool’s Elspot market between Norway-Sweden and Sweden-Finland.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems of Norway-Finland

Transmission facilities owned/held at both ends by system operators:

Facility Voltage kV Settlement point

Ivalo-Varangerbotn 220 kV AC Varangerbotn

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities
EN 50 110 which governs the organisation and working methods. In addition to the standard,
there are national regulations and special instructions which entail certain mutual differences
between the system operators as regards dealing with operational issues from an electrical
safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operation management

Responsible for the electrical operation on the Norwegian side is Statnett, while on the Finnish
side it is Fingrid. The power operation responsibility boundary lies at the border between
Finland and Norway.

3.3 Switching responsible operator

Line Norway Finland
Ivalo-Varangerbotn Regional Centre at Alta Tavastehus Network Centre

3.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

In accordance with 3.3.

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3.5 Switching schedule

Switchings on the links are carried out in accordance with a switching schedule drawn up by
the Party with the outage requirement. The Party drawing up the switching schedule is also the
switching responsible operator.

3.6 Disturbance management

3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management

During operational disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as

soon as possible, restore the link to normal state.

3.6.2 Switching schedule

Same as under 3.5.

3.6.3 Fault finding

Initial fault finding is conducted differently from case to case. Generally speaking, the
respective facility owner will be responsible for fault finding.

3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults

Once the fault has been localized, the respective facility owner will attend to clearing the fault.

4 System operation for facilities under 2

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

4.1.1 From Norway to Finland

The transmission capacity varies between 50 and 130 MW depending on where the sectioning
point in Norway is located and the transmission situation in Finland.

4.1.2 From Finland to Norway

The transmission capacity is 100 MW from Finland to Norway.

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4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The exchange of supportive power is agreed upon on each separate occasion between Statnett
and Svenska Kraftnät and between Fingrid and Svenska Kraftnät.

Statnett manages the transmissions on the cross-border link by redistributing production and
sectioning in Norway so that the transmission capacity is not exceeded. Fingrid confirms the
daily transmission capacity.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

The trading capacity is included in the trading scope of Nord Pool’s Elspot market between
Norway - Sweden and between Sweden - Finland.

4.4 Operations monitoring and control in respect of system operation

In Finland, operations monitoring is carried out from the System Operation Centre in Helsinki.
Control is carried out from the Tavastehus Network Centre following permission from the
System Operation Centre.
In Norway, operations monitoring and control are carried out from the Regional Centre at Alta
following permission from the National Centre in Oslo.

4.5 Voltage regulation

The basic principle for voltage regulation is governed by item 7 point 7.5 in the agreement.

4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Norwegian side

At Varangerbotn, the target voltage level is 220 kV in normal operation, but the voltage can
range between 205 and 235 kV.

4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Finnish side

The normal operation range of voltage is 230 – 243 kV, but the voltage can range between 215
and 245 kV. At Utsjoki, there is a stationary reactor of 20 MVA.

4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation

The link is long and sensitive to voltage variations. The voltage is monitored in co-operation
between the relevant control centres.

4.6 Outage planning

Outage planning and maintenance are co-ordinated in conjunction with Fingrid’s System
Operation Centre in Helsinki/Uleåborg Regional Centre and Statnett’s National Centre in
Oslo/Operation Centre at Alta.

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4.7 Disturbance management

The term disturbance situation means that the transmission capacities have been exceeded due
to, for instance, long-term line faults or the loss of production. If the transmission capacities
have not been exceeded during the faults, the situation will be deemed normal.

In the event of disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as quickly
as possible, restore the link to normal state.

5 Miscellaneous

5.1 Settlement
Settlement of power exchanges between Norway and Finland shall be carried out in accordance
wit the following principles:
− Power exchanges via the Ivalo - Varangerbotn line shall, for Statnett’s part, be included in
the total exchanges between Statnett and Svenska Kraftnät.
− Power exchanges via the Ivalo - Varangerbotn line shall, for Fingrid’s part, be included in
the total exchanges between Fingrid and Svenska Kraftnät.
Settlement is carried out in accordance with separate bilateral agreements between Statnett and
Svenska Kraftnät, and between Fingrid and Svenska Kraftnät.

5.2 Information exchange

Statnett is responsible for Fingrid and Svenska Kraftnät obtaining calendar day forecasts for
transmissions on the Ivalo – Varangerbotn line.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.4

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN AND WESTERN

DANISH SUBSYSTEMS ON THE DC LINKS SKAGERRAK POLES 1, 2
AND 3

1 Background
The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden using
DC links. This Appendix describes the operation of the DC links between Norway and Western
Denmark.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems of Norway-Western

Denmark

Facility Voltage kV Settlement point

Kristiansand-Tjele
SK1, SK2 250 kV DC Kristiansand 300 kV DC

SK3 350 kV DC Kristiansand 300 kV DC

Together, SK1, SK2 and SK3 make up the Skagerrak link.

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities
EN 50 110 which governs the organisation and working methods. In addition to the standard,
there are national regulations and special instructions which entail certain mutual differences
between the system operators as regards dealing with operational issues from an electrical
safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management

The responsibility for electrical operation of the transmission facilities is held in Western
Denmark by Energinet.dk and in Norway by Statnett. The responsibility for electrical operation
is regulated by the operation agreements between Energinet.dk and Statnett.

The power operation responsibility boundaries for the links lie on the Danish side of the
submarine cable at Bulbjerg in Jutland.

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3.3 Switching responsible operator

3.3.1 Switchings
In the event of outages on the HVDC links, there shall be an exchange of written confirmation,
before a work authorization can be despatched, between Statnett’s Regional Centre in Oslo and
Energinet.dk’s control room at Tjele stating that the HVDC isolators are open and the line is
terminal grounded and blocked against connection.

3.3.2 Switching responsible operator

On the Danish side, the authorization to switch in respect of the switching and switching off of
the converter stations is given by Energinet.dk’s control room at Skærbæk, while authorization
for all switchings and work authorizations on the HVDC side of the facilities is given by the
local operational management at Tjele.

On the Norwegian side, Statnett’s Regional Centre in Oslo gives the switching authorization,
and issues work authorizations on the Norwegian side.

Switchings at the AC facilities are normally carried out from Energinet.dk’s control room at
Skærbæk and from Statnett’s Regional Centre in Oslo. Switchings at the HVDC facilities, once
these have been disconnected from the AC network, are carried out from Kristiansand and
Tjele.

3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

Operation monitoring and control in Western Denmark is carried out from:
- Energinet.dk’s control rooms at Skærbæk or Tjele.

Operation monitoring and control in Norway is carried out from:

- Statnett’s Regional Centre in Oslo.
- The three poles can be operated individually.

3.5 Switching schedule

Prior to planned outages on the HVDC links, written confirmation shall be exchanged between
Statnett’s Regional Centre in Oslo and Energinet.dk’s control room at Tjele. Outage planning
for the links will be carried out in accordance with 4.5.

3.6 Disturbance management

Faults entailing the disconnection of links are managed via consultation in accordance with
internal instructions. For fault localization and clearance, there is a special preparedness plan
for submarine cables.

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4 System operation for facilities under 2

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

The transmission capacity of the links is dependent on the temperature of the air, cable runway
and earth.

SK1, SK2: Techn. min 10 MW/pole Nominal (500 + 40) MW

SK3: Techn. min 13 MW Nominal 500 MW

4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The transmission capacity between Western Denmark and Norway shall be jointly determined
on a routine basis by the Parties. In the case of intact connecting networks, the transmission
capacity will be determined by the thermal capacity of the facilities’ components. The thermal
overload capability allowed by monitoring equipment shall be capable of being used as and
when required in accordance with special instructions. For any limitations to the connecting
AC networks, Energinet.dk’s control room at Skærbæk is responsible for supportive data on
the Western Danish side and Statnett for the equivalent on the Norwegian side.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

The normal trading capacity in ”bipolar operation”:
950 MW from Western Denmark to Norway
1,000 MW from Norway to Western Denmark
The above applies when Kristiansand is the exchange point (50 MW of losses).

The following calendar day’s trading capacity is decided each day. Similarly, a weekly
forecast is established for the coming week’s trading capacity. The forecast is submitted to
Nord Pool Spot by at the latest the Tuesday of the week before. The trading capacity can be
limited by line work, production in the connection area, overhauls etc.
Both Parties inform the other Party in good time prior to the relevant calendar day about the
transmission capacity seen from each respective side. The values that are the lowest will form
the basis for determining the trading capacity.

4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation

Operation monitoring and control in Western Denmark is carried out from:
- Energinet.dk’s control room at Skærbæk.

Operation monitoring and control in Norway is carried out from:

- Statnett’s National Centre in Oslo.
The three poles can be operated individually.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.4

4.4.1 The power flow and distribution between the poles

The distribution of the power flow between the poles shall be determined on a routine basis by
the Parties taking into account the minimum electrode currents, loss minimization or other
technical circumstances in the poles or on the transmission networks on each respective side.

To minimize losses and electrode currents, the following shall be aimed at during resulting
exchanges:

≥ 75 MW for > 2 hours, the power is distributed at 42 % on SK1, 2 and 58 % on SK3.

Also applies during ”monopole operation”.

< 75 MW, SK3 is used alone.

During special operational circumstances, other types of operation can be agreed upon.

4.4.2 Regulating the link

Regulation of the Skagerrak link in accordance with agreed exchange plans will be carried out,
until further notice, from the Danish side. Energinet.dk’s control room at Skærbæk is
responsible for its own balance regulation towards Norway. Regulation is carried out, in
principle, in accordance with a power plan using ramping transitions between different power
levels.
The plans are issued as power plans in whole MW for each 5 min value. The link is regulated
in accordance with this power linearly from power value to power value.
The power plan is determined in accordance with the energy and power plan agreements
forming the basis for utilizing the Skagerrak link.
Planned power regulation during the operational phase is set at max. 30 MW/min.

4.5 Outage planning

Outages on the links and on own networks which affect the transmission capacity shall be
planned in consultation between the Parties.

Planning and maintenance are co-ordinated between the respective operational managements.

Overhaul planning is co-ordinated with the other HVDC links in the Nordic area.

4.6 Disturbance management

4.6.1 General
The Skagerrak link is of great importance to Norway and Denmark, thus outages due to
disturbances generally entail major economic losses. In the event of operational disturbances,
measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as soon as possible, restore the link to
normal state.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.4

Automated operational disturbance systems are installed at Kristiansand and Tjele which begin
to function during disturbances on the Norwegian or Jutland networks.

4.6.2 Emergency power

Emergency power consists of regulating measures which are initiated manually (manual
emergency power) or automatically by means of a control signal being transmitted to the
converter stations using telecoms.

Both sides have the right to initiate manual emergency power in the event of unforeseen losses
of production, network disturbances or other operational disturbances.

Manual emergency power without previous notice may be activated within 100 MW and 100
MWh/calendar day. Prior to activation over and above this, notification and approval shall
occur between Energinet.dk’s control room at Skærbæk and Statnett’s National Centre in Oslo.

4.6.3 System protection

At the DC facilities, system protection is constituted by emergency power settings at the
converter stations. Activation criteria can be locally measured frequency and voltage or via
telecoms based on the supplied signal. In the event of activation, any ongoing normal
regulation will be interrupted. Activation over and above the agreed limits and regulation back
to plan may not occur until the counterparty has approved this. (See further in Appendix 5 –
System protection).

Energinet.dk and Statnett can additionally enter into agreements regarding other types of
system services.

5 Miscellaneous

5.1 System services

For the automatic or manual activation of operation reserves, the available transmission
capacity can be used.

The regulation margin is maintained following the agreement between the Parties taking into
account the exchange of system services. The Parties have the right to utilize idle transmission
capacity for the transmission of system services. Configuration values, power limits etc are
agreed upon bilaterally.

5.2 Settlement
Energinet.dk manages balance settlement.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.5

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE WESTERN DANISH AND

SWEDISH SUBSYSTEMS ON THE KONTI-SKAN 1 AND 2 DC LINKS

1 Background
The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden using
DC links. This Appendix describes the DC links between Sweden and Western Denmark.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems of Sweden - Western

Denmark

Facility Voltage kV
KS1
Lindome - Vester Hassing 285 kV DC

KS2
Lindome - Vester Hassing 285 kV DC

Together, KS1 and KS2 make up the Konti-Skan link.

Settlement presently takes place on the AC side at Vester Hassing.

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities -
EN 50 110 - which governs the organisation and working methods. In addition to the standard,
there are national regulations and special instructions which entail certain mutual differences
between the system operators as regards dealing with operational issues from an electrical
safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management

The responsibility for electrical operation of the transmission facilities is held in Western
Denmark by Energinet.dk and in Sweden by Svenska Kraftnät. The responsibility for electrical
operation is regulated by facility agreements between Energinet.dk and Svenska Kraftnät.

The power operation responsibility boundary between Svenska Kraftnät and Energinet.dk lies
at Läsö Öst, at the transition between the submarine and shore-end cables.

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3.3 Switching responsible operator

During work between Lindome and XL1-F at Läsö Öst or Lindome and XL2-F at Läsö Öst, the
Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ) shall be the power operation manager for the entire link
up to Vester Hassing.

During work on the Danish parts of the link, Energinet.dk’s control room at Vester Hassing is
the power operation manager for the entire link up to Lindome.

3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

Operation monitoring and control is carried out from Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at
Skærbæk or Vester Hassing and the Operation Centres at Råcksta (DCRÅ).

- Normally, bipolar operation is applied to Konti-Skan 1 and 2 but each of them can also be
operated in monopolar mode.

3.5 Switching schedule

Switchings on the links are carried out in accordance with switching schedules drawn up by
Svenska Kraftnät. Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at Skærbæk acknowledges receipt.

3.6 Disturbance management

3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management

During operational disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as
soon as possible, restore the link to normal state.

3.6.2 Switching schedule

In the event of faults requiring switchings impacting upon the cross-border link, Energinet.dk’s
Operations Centre at Skærbæk and Svenska Kraftnät are informed prior to any switchings
being made. In the event of switchings on the Swedish grid, a switching schedule will be
drawn up by Svenska Kraftnät.

3.6.3 Fault finding

Initial fault finding will be carried out differently from case to case. Generally speaking, the
respective facility owner will be responsible for fault finding. For fault finding, a special
preparedness plan for submarine cables has been drawn up.

3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults

Once the fault has been localized, the respective facility owner will attend to clearing the fault.
For fault clearance, a special preparedness plan for submarine cables has been drawn up.

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4 System operation for facilities under 2

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

The transmission capacity of the link is dependent on the temperature of the air and the earth.

In bipolar operation, the nominal capacity is 740 MW, and in monopolar operation (KS1
or KS2), the capacity is 370 MW.

Technical minimum capacity of KS1: 12 MW; KS2: 9 MW.

4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The transmission capacity between Jutland and Sweden shall be set on a routine basis by the
Parties. In the case of intact connecting networks, the transmission capacity is determined by
the thermal capacity of the facilities’ components. The thermal overload capability allowed by
monitoring equipment shall be capable of being used as and when required in accordance with
special instructions. Technical data for the facilities’ transmission capacities is reported in the
current facility agreement between Energinet.dk and Svenska Kraftnät.

For any limitations in the connecting AC networks, Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at

Skærbæk is responsible for supportive data on the Western Danish side and Svenska Kraftnät
for the same on the Swedish side.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

The normal trading capacity after the modernisation of the 400 kV line Nordjyllandsværket -
Vester Hassing, scheduled to be commissioned in 2007, is:

740 MW from Western Denmark  Sweden

680 MW from Sweden  Western Denmark

Until then, the normal trading capacity is:

500 MW from Western Denmark  Sweden

620 MW from Sweden  Western Denmark

The above applies when Vester Hassing is the exchange point (30 MW of losses).

The following calendar day’s trading capacity is set every day. Similarly, a weekly forecast is
established for the coming week’s trading capacity. The forecast is submitted to Nord Pool by
at the latest the Tuesday of the week before. The trading capacity can be limited by line work,
production in the connection area, overhauls etc.
Both Parties inform the other Party in good time prior to the relevant calendar day regarding
the transmission capacity seen from the respective sides. The values that are the lowest will be
the trading capacity.

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4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation

Operation monitoring and control is carried out from Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at
Skærbæk and Svenska Kraftnät’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta.

4.4.1 The power flow and distribution between the poles

Konti-Skan 1 and 2 are normally operated in bipolar mode.
During disturbances and maintenance on one pole, monopolar operation is applied.

4.4.2 Regulating the link

Regulation of the Konti-Skan links in accordance with agreed exchange plans will be carried
out, until further notice, from the Danish side. Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at Skærbæk is
responsible for its own balance regulation towards Sweden.

Regulation takes place, in principle, in accordance with a power plan using ramping transitions
between different power levels. The plans are issued as power plans in whole MW for each 5
min of plan value. The links are regulated in accordance with this power linearly from power
value to power value.

The power plan is determined in accordance with the energy and power plan agreements which
form the basis for utilizing the Konti-Skan link.

4.5 Outage planning

The Parties shall, in consultation, plan outages on the link itself and on their own networks
when these outages impact upon the transmission capacity of the link.

Operational planning and maintenance are co-ordinated between Svenska Kraftnät’s

Operational Department and Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at Skærbæk.

Overhaul planning is co-ordinated with the other HVDC links in the Nordic area.

4.6 System protection - emergency power

4.6.1 General
The Konti-Skan link is of major importance to Sweden and Denmark and outages due to
disturbances thus generally entail major economic losses. In the event of operational
disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as soon as possible, restore
the link to normal state.

Automated operational disturbance systems are installed at Lindomen and Vester Hassing
which can begin to function during operational disturbances on the Swedish or Jutland
networks.

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4.6.2 Emergency power

Emergency power is regulating measures which are initiated manually (manual emergency
power) or automatically by means of a control signal being transmitted to the converter stations
by means of telecommunications.

On the Western Danish side, Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at Skærbæk has the right to
initiate manual emergency power in the event of disturbances to the power balance or
transmission network.

On the Swedish side, Svenska Kraftnät has the right to initiate manual emergency power in the
event of disturbances to the power balance or transmission network. Svenska Kraftnät can give
Vattenfall Regionnät AB the right to initiate the operational reserve during disturbances on the
regional network in western Sweden.

Manual emergency power of less than 100 MW and 100 MWh/calendar day may be activated
without previous notification. Prior to activation over and above this, notification and approval
shall occur between the control room staff of Energinet.dk’s Operations Centre at Skærbæk
and Svenska Kraftnät’s Grid Supervisor at Network Control at Råcksta.

4.6.3 System protection

At the DC facilities, system protection is installed in the form of an emergency power function.
Activation criteria for emergency power can be locally-measured frequency and voltage or via
telecommunications on the basis of a supplied signal. In the event of activation, any ongoing
normal regulation will be interrupted. Activation over and above the agreed limits and
regulation back to plan may not occur until the counterparty has approved this. (See further in
Appendix 5 – System protection).

5 Miscellaneous

5.1 System services

5.1.1 Transmission scope for operation reserves

Available transmission capacity can be used for the automatic or manual activation of
operational reserves.

The regulation margin is maintained following the agreement between the Parties taking into
account the exchange of system services. The Parties have the right to utilize idle transmission
capacity for the transmission of system services. Configuration values, power limits etc. are
agreed upon bilaterally.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.6

JOINT OPERATION BETWEEN THE EASTERN DANISH AND

SWEDISH SUBSYSTEMS ON THE AC LINKS ACROSS ÖRESUND AND
TO BORNHOLM

1 Background

The subsystems of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Eastern Denmark are synchronously
interconnected. The subsystem of Western Denmark is connected to Norway and Sweden using
DC links. This Appendix describes the operation of the AC links across Öresund and to
Bornholm.

2 Transmission facilities linking the subsystems of Eastern Denmark and

Sweden

2.1 Transmission facilities owned/held by system operators at both ends

Facility Voltage level Settlement point

Hovegaard - Söderåsen (FL25) 400 kV Söderåsen

Gørløse - Söderåsen (FL23) 400 kV Gørløse

The ownership structure of the facilities is set out in ”Anlægsaftalen for 400 kV
forbindelserna” between Svenska Kraftnät and Elkraft Transmission (merged with
Energinet.dk as of 1 January 2005), dated 12 December 2001.

Svenska Kraftnät owns three single phase 400 kV cables included in FL23, cables K4001,
K4002 and K4003, between Kristinelund and Ellekilde Hage, including the corresponding
share belonging to the oil equipment at Kristinelund and Ellekilde Hage. The ownership
boundary between wholly-owned Danish and Swedish facilities is constituted by the splicing
points between the land lines and submarine cables on the Danish side. The cable joints belong
to the Swedish-owned facilities.

A single phase 400 kV cable K4004 between Kristinelund and Ellekilde Hage, including the
corresponding share belonging to oil equipment at Kristinelund and Ellekilde Hage, is owned
to 50 % by Svenska Kraftnät and to 50 % by Energinet.dk. The boundary between K4004 and
surrounding facilities is composed of the splicing points between the land lines and submarine
cables on both the Danish and Swedish sides. The cable joints are part of K4004.

Energinet.dk owns three single phase 400 kV cables which are included in FL25, cables
K4005, K4006 and K4007, between the Swedish shore and Ellekilde Hage, with associated oil
equipment at Kristinelund and Skibstrupgaard. The ownership boundary between the Danish
and Swedish-owned facilities is constituted by the splicing points between the submarine

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cables and land lines on the Swedish side. The cable joints belong to the Danish-owned
facilities.

2.2 Other transmission facilities

Facility Voltage level Settlement point

Teglstrupgaard 1 - Mörarp 130 kV Mörarp

Teglstrupgaard 2 - Mörarp 130 kV Teglstrupgaard

Hasle, Bornholm - Borrby 60 kV Borrby

The ownership structure of the 130 kV links is set out in ”Anlægsaftalen for 132 kV
forbindelserna” between Sydkraft and Elkraft Transmission (merged with Energinet.dk as of 1
January 2005), dated 13 May 2002.

The ownership structure of the 60 kV facility is set out in ”Anlægsaftale for 60 kV

forbindelsen” between Sydkraft and Østkraft.

3 Electrical safety for facilities under 2.1

3.1 General
The common ground for the electrical safety work of the system operator companies within
Nordel is constituted by the European standard for managing electrical high-voltage facilities -
EN 50 110 - which governs the organisation and working methods.
In addition to the standard, there are national regulations and special instructions which entail
certain mutual differences between the system operators as regards dealing with operational
issues from an electrical safety point of view.

3.2 Responsibility for electrical operation/Operational management

Responsibility for electrical operation of the 400 kV Öresund links on the Swedish side is held
by Svenska Kraftnät, and operational management on the Danish side is carried out by
Energinet.dk.
The power operation responsibility boundaries for electrical operation/operational
management are the same as the ownership boundaries, see under 2.1.

The power operation manager of K4004 is Svenska Kraftnät.

3.3 Switching responsible operator/Switching leader

The power operation manager for the 400 kV Öresund links on the Swedish side is Svenska
Kraftnät’s Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ), and the switching leader on the Danish side
is Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup.

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Switchings on the links take place after agreement between Svenska Kraftnät’s Operations
Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ) and Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup.

The party which initiates a planned outage is the switching responsible operator/switching
leader for the switchings and other operational measures carried out (leading switching leader)
if not otherwise agreed upon.

In the event of faults which require switchings that have an impact on the 400 kV Öresund
links, that party whose facility suffers from the fault is the switching responsible
operator/switching leader for the switchings and other operational measures carried out
(leading switching leader).

If the fault cannot be located, the switchings shall take place on the basis of mutual
consultation.

If a party needs switchings by the other party because of electrical safety reasons, the other
party shall carry out such switchings without delay.

3.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of electrical safety

Operation monitoring and control of the 400 kV Öresund links is managed on the Danish side
by Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup and on the Swedish side by Svenska Kraftnät’s
Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ).

Both parties’ switching responsible operators/switching leaders have access to status

indications and electronic measured values via remote control from each others’ facilities and
from those stations where the 400 kV Öresund links are connected to the respective parties’
grids.

3.5 Operational orders/Switching schedule

Switchings on the links are carried out in accordance with operational orders drawn up by
Svenska Kraftnät’s Outage Planning at Råcksta. Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup
shall acknowledge the receipt of order.

The parties shall exchange switching confirmations in accordance with the operational
orders/switching schedule before the work begins and after the work is complete.

3.6 Disturbance management

3.6.1 Cross-border link trips – management

In the event of operational disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as
soon as possible, restore the link to normal state.

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3.6.2 Switching schedule/Operational orders

In the event of faults requiring switchings which have an impact on the 400 kV Öresund links,
Energinet.dk’s Control Room at Ballerup and Svenska Kraftnät’s Operations Centre at Råcksta
(DCRÅ) are informed prior to any switchings are made.
For switchings in the Swedish grid, a switching schedule/operational order is drawn up by
Svenska Kraftnät’s Operations Centre at Råcksta (DCRÅ).
For switchings in the Danish grid, a switching programme is drawn up by Energinet.dk’s
Control Room at Ballerup.

3.6.3 Fault finding

Initial fault finding is carried out differently from case to case. Generally, it is the respective
facility owner who is responsible for fault finding. A special preparedness plan has been drawn
up for fault finding and repair for submarine cables.

3.6.4 Fault clearance, remaining faults

Once the fault has been localized, the respective facility owner will look after fault clearance.
For fault clearance, a special preparedness plan for submarine cables has been drawn up.

4 System operation for facilities under 2.1 and 2.2

4.1 Transmission capacity (TTC)

4.1.1 Transmission capacity in MW per cable bundle

Line 5 °C 15-20 °C 30 °C
Hovegaard – Söderåsen 830 830 830
Gørløse – Söderåsen 830 830 830
Teglstrupgaard 1 – Mörarp 182 182 154
Teglstrupgaard 2 – Mörarp 173 173 157
Hasle, Bornholm - Borrby, 51 51 51

4.1.2 Transmission capacity in MW per link

− To Eastern Denmark

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Link Capacity
Öresund (Zealand) 1,350
Bornholm 51

− To Sweden (thermal limitation)

Link Capacity
Öresund (Zealand) 1,750
Bornholm 51

The transmission capacities of the links are technically dependent and can be affected by the
current operational situation in Zealand.

4.2 Routines for determining the transmission capacity

The transmission capacity between Eastern Denmark and Sweden shall be set on a daily basis
by the Parties.

4.3 Trading capacity (NTC)

Determination of the capacity is based on the combined transmission capacity of the 400, 130,
and 60 kV transmission facilities. When determining the trading capacity of the links, the
applicable regulation margin of 50 MW is taken into account. A weekly forecast for the
trading capacity shall be established for the coming week.
If a country can guarantee counter trading and the existence of sufficient fast active
disturbance reserve, the trading capacity may be increased.

4.4 Operation monitoring and control in respect of system operation

Operation monitoring of borders and transmission cross-sections, which can affect exchanges,
is managed on the Danish side by Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup and on the
Swedish side by Svenska Kraftnät’s Network Control Centre at Råcksta (SvK-vhi).

4.5 Voltage regulation

The basic principle for voltage regulation is governed by item 7 point 7.5 in the agreement.

4.5.1 Voltage regulation on the Swedish side

The Operations Centre in Råcksta (DCRÅ) is responsible for voltage regulation in the southern
parts of the grid.
The following voltage levels are applied:

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Substation Min Normal operation Max

voltage kV range kV voltage kV

Söderåsen 395 400-410 420

4.5.2 Voltage regulation on the Danish side

The Control Centre at Ballerup is responsible for voltage control in Zealand.
The following voltage levels are applied:

Substation Min Normal operation Max

voltage kV range kV voltage kV

Hovegaard 380 390-410 420

Gørløse 380 390-410 420

Teglstrupgaard 1 130 130-137 137

Teglstrupgaard 2 130 130-137 137

4.5.3 Co-ordination of voltage regulation

Mvar contribution from the cables is distributed between Svenska Kraftnät and Energinet.dk in
the same proportion as their ownership.
At a voltage of 400 kV, the facilities FL23 and FL 25 each will generate 150 – 170 Mvar. The
reactors at Hovegaard and Söderåsen compensate this generation by 110 Mvar per line.
The 400 kV voltage at Hovegaard and Söderåsen shall be regulated so that the given Mvar
distribution is achieved as well as possible. Minor deviations in the region of 25 Mvar are
accepted in normal operation. Short-term deviations from this Mvar range can occur for
example in conjunction with the connection of capacitor batteries or reactors. There can be
deviations in the Mvar distribution in conjunction with disturbances.

4.6 Outage planning

The Parties shall, in consultation, plan outages on the links and on their own networks if the
transmission capacity of the links is affected.
Operational planning and maintenance are co-ordinated in consultation between Energinet.dk’s
Operational Planning at Ballerup and Svenska Kraftnät’s Outage Planning at Råcksta.
Operational planning and maintenance which affects the entire Nordic system shall, whenever
possible, be co-ordinated in consultation with all system operators.

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4.7 Disturbance management

The term disturbance situation means that the transmission capacity has been exceeded due to, for
instance, long-term line faults or losses of production. If the transmission capacities are not
exceeded during the faults, the situation will be deemed normal.
In the event of operational disturbances, measures in accordance with issued instructions shall, as
soon as possible, restore the link to normal state.

5 Miscellaneous

5.1 Parallel operation 130 kV

Power transmitted via the 130 kV network does not entail any liability to render payment or
any other reimbursement of expenses from Svenska Kraftnät or Energinet.dk.

5.2 Transmissions to Bornholm

As regards balance, Bornholm is managed as a part of the Eastern Danish subsystem.
Energinet.dk shall be responsible for the production resources on Bornholm being capable of
being utilized for general system operation requirements in the same way as the production
resources in the rest of Eastern Denmark.

5.3 Co-ordination of fast active disturbance reserve south of cross-section 4

Svenska Kraftnät and Energinet.dk shall ensure that there is sufficient fast active disturbance
reserve to cope with dimensioning faults based upon each subsystem’s responsibility for its
own reserves. Svenska Kraftnät and Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup shall exchange
information regarding how much fast active disturbance reserve there is which can restore the
operational situation to normal state following a fault.

During normal state, Svenska Kraftnät and Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup co-
ordinate the fast active disturbance reserve in Southern Sweden and Eastern Denmark in
accordance with the following distribution rules:

(Dimensioning fault) x (own fault) / (own fault + counterparty fault)

Dimensioning fault = largest fault in area south of cross-section 4

Own fault = largest fault in own area south of cross-section 4

Counterparty fault = largest fault in counterparty’s area south of cross-section 4

In Sweden, south of cross-section 4, the largest fault is typically the result of:
• Network part of cross-section 4
• Baltic Cable
• SwePol Link.

In Eastern Denmark, the largest fault is typically the result of:

• Unit at the Avedøre or Asnæs plants
• KONTEK.

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5.4 Counter trading

Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Ballerup can agree with Svenska Kraftnät on counter trade in
Sweden to increase the trading capacity between Sweden and Eastern Denmark. Energinet.dk
shall in this context compensate all of Svenska Kraftnät’s costs in respect of this counter
trading.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 7.7

JOINT TRIANGULAR OPERATION BETWEEN THE NORWEGIAN,

SWEDISH AND WESTERN DANISH SUBSYSTEMS

1 Transmission facilities triangularly linking the subsystems

Sweden - Western Denmark - Norway

Facility Voltage kV Other

Hasle-Borgvik 400 kV AC Included in Hasle cross-section
Halden-Skogssäter 400 kV AC Included in Hasle cross-section
Stenkullen-V Hassing 250 kV DC Konti-Skan 1
Lindome-V Hassing 285 kV DC Konti-Skan 2
Kristiansand-Tjele 1 and 2 250 kV DC Skagerrak 1 and 2
Kristiansand-Tjele 3 350 kV DC Skagerrak 3

2 Principles for the distribution of exchange plans on the links

Nord Pool utilizes the trading capacity which the system operators have set in order to try to
avoid price differences between the Elspot areas.

Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Skærbæk sets a trading capacity to and from the Elspot area
in Western Denmark which can entail a limitation of the trading capacity between the Elspot
areas Western Denmark - Norway and Western Denmark - Sweden. Distribution between the
cables takes place on a pro rata basis, depending on the DC links’ trading capacities. In the
event of a price difference between the areas, the trading capacity will be redistributed so that
it is increased from a low-price area to a high-price area within the framework of the overall
trading capacity.

Svenska Kraftnät, Energinet.dk and Statnett agree that trading plans between Western
Denmark and the rest of the Nordic subsystem will not be changed more than 600 MW from
one hour to the next (this applies to the overall net regulation between Western Denmark and
Sweden/Norway as well as per single link).

The planned ramping rate on Konti-Skan and the Skagerrak link is a maximum of 30 MW/min.

Based on hourly plans from Nord Pool Spot, Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Skærbæk draws
up preliminary power plans on the DC links towards Sweden and Norway with ramping
transitions between the different power levels, taking into account the ramping rate and
minimising network losses in the triangular link. Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Skærbæk is
responsible for the plans meeting the stipulated requirements.

The UCTE system has a requirement that the entire regulation must be completed within +/- 5
minutes at hour shifts.

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Transits through Western Denmark entail that power plans and regulations for the DC links
reflect the UCTE requirement.

These power plans can later be re-planned as a result of exchanges of supportive power, either
bilaterally between two of the relevant system operators or between all three system operators.

The exchange of equal volumes of supportive power between all three system operators in a
triangle (triangular trading) is used to relieve heavily loaded links on the network, to obtain
scope for regulating the frequency and to minimise the need for counter trading. All three
system operators can take the initiative as regards supportive power trading via the relevant
DC links or the Hasle cross-section. Statnett has a co-ordinating function. Triangular trading
requires the approval of all three Parties.

Energinet.dk’s Control Centre at Skærbæk is responsible for drawing up new power plans for
the DC links in accordance with the stipulated requirements and for informing the other system
operators.

All Parties shall be informed about the potential transmission capacity of all three links as
regards the allocation of balance power and supportive power.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 8

MANAGING TRANSMISSION LIMITATIONS BETWEEN

SUBSYSTEMS

1 Background

All trading capacity (NTC) shall be put at the disposal of the electricity market.
System operators may need, for reasons of system security or the state of affairs in their own or
adjacent networks, to limit the transmission capacity of the links between the subsystems.

For the transmission capacity of the cross-border links between Elspot areas, the same
prioritization rules are to be applied by all system operators in the subsystems. See table below.

Priority Sweden Finland Norway Eastern Western

Denmark Denmark
1 Elspot X X X X X
2 Elbas X X X
3 Balance power/ X X X X X
Supportive
power

Supportive power agreed in advance between the system operators, with reference to start-ups
of thermal power or similar, has a higher priority than balance power.

2 Transmission limitations during the planning phase, prior to completed

trading on Elspot

2.1 Elspot is used to balance transmission limitations between the subsystems during the
planning phase. The involved Parties reach agreement on a daily basis regarding the
trading capacity for exchanges between the subsystems.

2.2 In the event of limited-duration reduced transmission capacity between the subsystems,
the system operators will be able to agree to use counter trading.

2.3 In the event of transmission limitations within an Elspot area, it will be the respective
system operator’s responsibility to manage the limitation by using counter trading or
by limiting the trading capacity.

3 Transmission limitations during the operational phase, following

completed trading on Elspot

3.1 During the operational phase, reduced transmission capacity between the subsystems,
as a consequence of an operational disturbance, is managed by means of counter
trading. There is no limitation of the players’ planned power trading on Elspot. Counter
trading takes place during the remainder of the current period when trade on Elspot has

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been fixed.

For Elbas trading, the trading capacity is reduced but prearranged trading will be
counter traded for the remainder of the current Elspot period.

3.2 In the event of an operational disturbance in a Party’s subsystem, the responsible Party
will bear the full technical, financial and operative liability for eliminating the effects of
the incident in its own subsystem and minimising the effects in other sybsystems.

3.3 In the event of an operational disturbance on the cross-border links themselves, the
system operators on both sides of the link will bear the technical, financial and
operative liability for eliminating the effects of the incident on their own subsystems.

If the agreed trading exceeds the reduced trading capacity between subsystems,
supportive power is exchanged between the parties concerned. The volume of
supportive power in counter trading as a result of an operational disturbance on the
cross-border link itself is normally the difference between the agreed trading capacity
and current trading capacity.

3.4 Acute situations, such as during a general power shortage or during power shortages
resulting from operational disturbances in networks or during bottleneck situations,
when compulsory load shedding has to occur, are managed in accordance with
Appendix 9.

4 Step by step of the trading capacity

During major changes to the transmission capacity between two Elspot areas, this can entail
major changes in power flows from one hour to the next. These major changes can be difficult
to manage regulation-wise. Thus, restrictions are placed on changes to trading capacities,
MWh/h, from one hour to the next. This change may be a maximum of 600 MWh/h, unless
otherwise agreed.

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NORDIC GRID CODE (SYSTEM OPERATION AGREEMENT) APPENDIX 9

RULES FOR MANAGING POWER SHORTAGES DURING HIGH

CONSUMPTION, BOTTLENECKS OR DISTURBANCES

Introduction
These rules describe how the system operators of the interconnected Nordic power system shall
jointly manage possible power shortages. This shall be carried out with a level of system
security which is as high as possible.

Extracts from Appendix 1 Definitions:

A subsystem is the power system for which a system operator is responsible. A system
operator can be responsible for several subsystems.

Subsystem balance is calculated as the sum of measured physical transmissions on the cross-
border links between the subsystems. Thus, there is a deficit if this sum shows that power is
flowing into a subsystem and a surplus if power is flowing out of a subsystem. (Exchanges on
cross-border links like Finland-Russia, Norway-Russia, the SwePol Link, Baltic Cable, Kontek
and Western Denmark-Germany are not to be included in the calculation.)

A risk of power shortage defines the state when forecasts show that a subsystem is no longer
capable of maintaining the demand for a manual active reserve, which can be activated within
15 minutes, for the planning period.

Power shortage occurs during the hour of operation when a subsystem is no longer capable of
maintaining the demand for a manual active reserve which can be activated within 15 minutes.

Critical power shortage occurs during the hour of operation when consumption has to be
reduced/disconnected without commercial agreements about this.

Prerequisites
- Each subsystem is responsible for its own balance and for the requirements for
automatic and manual reserves being fulfilled.

- All regulation resources shall exist as regulation bids on the joint Nordic regulation
list. This concerns both market-based bids and manual active reserve (15 min).

- System operators inform each other on a continuous basis.

- A subsystem with a physical surplus does not need to carry out load shedding to the
benefit of subsystems with a deficit.

- The need for manual active reserve (15 min) in each subsystem shall normally be
equal to or greater than the dimensioning faults in each subsystem.

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- When power shortages or critical power shortages exist, the manual active reserve
(15 min) is reduced to less than the normal level.
The manual active reserve (15 min), however, must not fall short of 600 MW, in
total, in the synchronous system.

- The physical transmission capacities of the network shall be maintained and a

frequency which does not drop below 50.0 Hz shall be aimed at.

- Each system operator formulates instructions which comply with this set of rules.
The content of the instructions is co-ordinated between the system operators.

1 General power shortages without bottlenecks in the network

1.1 Maintenance of manual active reserve (15 min)

- When a subsystem in normal balance regulation is approaching the limit of

keeping the manual active reserve (15 min) in its own subsystem for its
dimensioning faults, the control centres of the other system operators shall be
informed. This shall also be done even if there is a surplus in the subsystem. This
information shall be delivered by e-mail and by telephone as early as possible.

- The system operators concerned assess whether the manual active reserve (15 min)
in their own subsystem can also be used for upward regulation purposes in normal
balance regulation. This means that the subsystem will not have sufficient own
reserves to cover the need for manual active reserve (15 min).

- If further upward regulation is needed, the parties shall ascertain whether there are
available market-based upward regulation bids in the neighbouring systems to
cover the subsystem’s deficit of manual active reserve (15 min). “Available” means
that resources can be activated for this purpose and that there is sufficient
transmission capacity.

- If there are available market-based upward regulation bids, the parties can agree on
maintaining part of the need for manual active reserve (15 min) in another
subsystem. In this case, upward regulation can take place in price order in the joint
Nordic regulation list.

- In further upward regulation in price order, the subsystem can maintain parts of its
manual active reserve (15 min) continuously. The system operator of the
subsystem shall specify the volume and composition of this reserve on the basis of
the current operational situation.

- If there are not available market-based upward regulation bids in the neighbouring
systems to cover the subsystem’s deficit of manual active reserve (15 min), a
power shortage generally takes place in accordance with item 1.3.

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1.2 Risk of power shortages

- The system operator shall inform the other Parties as quickly as possible. The
measures in question will be taken in order to avoid an unacceptable reduction of
the system security.

- Whenever required, the market players shall be informed via UMM as soon as
possible. The information shall also be delivered directly from the system operators
to the other Parties.

- At least 600 MW of the most expensive manual active reserve (15 min) in the
regulation list will be earmarked for each hour. Unavailable regulation bids will be
marked on the joint regulation list. When there is a potential risk of bottlenecks
arising, the reserve is to be distributed in consultation between the Parties.

- The starting of slow active disturbance reserve and peak load reserve will be
assessed. The other system operators will be informed on plans to start the reserve.
The costs of starting the reserve in order to keep it in readiness are considered as
special regulation.

1.3 Power shortages

- When a subsystem is no longer capable of meeting the requirement for manual

active reserve (15 min) and there are not sufficient available market-based
regulation bids in the neighbouring systems, the other system operators are to be
informed as quickly as possible

- Prearranged trading between players is fixed and cannot be changed.

- Svenska Kraftnät and/or Fingrid can demand that cross-border trading on Elbas
between Sweden and Finland ceases, and Svenska Kraftnät and/or Energinet.dk can
demand that cross-border trading on Elbas between Sweden and Eastern Denmark
ceases.

- When there is a requirement for upward regulation, bids on the regulation list are to
be used in the order of price unless the regulating power will lead to bottlenecks in
the transmission network or will be unavailable for other reasons. Market-based
bids are used before fast active disturbance reserve. The earmarked manual active
reserve will not, however, be activated until all of the remaining regulation list has
been activated. When unexpected bottlenecks arise, the earmarked reserve can be
redistributed.

1.4 Critical power shortages

- When a critical power shortage is approaching, preparations for manual load

shedding (15 min) will be ordered in the deficit areas. The Parties will agree on the
subsystem(s) where the load shedding will take place and where in the subsystem(s)

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the load shedding will take place. The consequences for load shift must be assessed.

- If no network problems arise, bids in the regulation list will be used until only 600
MW of manual active reserve (15 min) remains in the synchronous system. The
activation of regulation bids shall take place in price order, and if frequency
regulation so requires, all market-based bids shall be activated before the fast
disturbance reserve.

- When only 600 MW of manual active reserve (15 min) remains in the synchronous
system, it will be activated and retained as increased frequency controlled normal
operation reserve. The activated reserve of at least 600 MW will be redistributed
among rapidly regulating hydropower production in consultation between the
Parties. The most expensive available upward regulation bid in hydropower
production shall be deactivated. Bids with a low volume can be skipped in order to
facilitate their handling. If there are no upward regulation bids, the downward
regulations will be activated in price order. SvK and Statnett are responsible for and
co-ordinate this.

- At the same time, load shedding will be ordered without a commercial agreement.
The expected activation time for load shedding has to be weighed into the decision.
Load shedding occurs in the subsystem with the greatest physical deficit in its
balance. Shedding occurs in stages until the requirement for 600 MW of manual
active reserve (15 min) in the synchronous system is met. When load shedding has
taken place until two or more subsystems have an equally large deficit, load
shedding is distributed thereafter between these subsystems. Attention must be paid
to the practical handling; load shedding in stages of 200 – 300 MW at a time is
considered a suitable level.

- When assessing a subsystem’s balance, the manual active reserve (15 min) that is
not activated must be taken into account. A subsystem with a physical deficit which
can regulate itself into balance does not need to implement load shedding.

- The system operator that carries out load shedding shall inform the market and the
other system operators of critical power shortage.

2 Regional power shortages caused by bottlenecks or network disturbances

- The relevant subsystem is responsible for measures as long as regulation resources

are available.

- If time allows, preparations for manual load shedding (15 min) will be ordered in
the deficit areas.

- If a bottleneck arises within a subsystem towards a area with a deficit and all
available bids in the merit order regulation list that are without sufficient manual
active reserve (15 min) within the area are activated, then load shedding will be
ordered outside the merit order regulation list. Load shedding will be carried out in
the subsystem with the greatest physical deficit in its balance and which remedies

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the bottleneck.

- When assessing a subsystem’s balance, the manual active reserve (15 min) which is
not activated must be taken into account. A subsystem with a physical deficit which
can regulate itself into balance does not need to implement load shedding.

- If there are stable consumption conditions, the need for manual active reserve (15
min) within the deficit area will be less than if consumption had been rising.
However, manual active reserve (15 min) must not fall short of 600 MW in the
synchronous system.

3 Connection of consumption following load shedding

- When the power balance within the deficit area improves, consumption will be
reconnected in small steps. The potential for increased consumption as a
consequence of shedding must be taken into account.

4 Pricing

The pricing of supportive power and balance power shall be set in accordance with normal
principles. Normally, no supportive power shall be agreed upon, instead the power will be
exchanged as balance power. In the event of price disputes, the setting of prices shall take
place afterwards. The correction of irregularities in the pricing can be achieved by means of
subsequently reaching agreement about supportive power.

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THE INTERCONNECTED NORDIC POWER SYSTEM’S JOINT

OPERATION WITH OTHER SYSTEMS

1 Western Denmark’s joint operation with the UCTE system

1.1 Western Denmark’s joint operation with Germany

Since the middle of the 1960’s, Western Denmark has been parallel-connected with the
German high-voltage network and has thus been a part of the synchronous continental UCTE
system. Energinet.dk has been a part of E.ON Netz’ balance area, thus meeting the formal
UCTE requirements. Irrespective of this, Energinet.dk shall comply with all the requirements
set by UCTE. Effective 25 October 2001, Energinet.dk is formally an associated member of
UCTE.

Energinet.dk’s relationship with E.ON Netz is such that it does not have a formal system
operation agreement with E.ON Netz, but there is a draft which is being processed.

In Germany, there is a ”Grid Code” for the collaboration conditions relating to the technical
system operation between the German system operators.

1.1.1 System operation collaboration with E.ON Netz

Energinet.dk is connected to E.ON Netz via the following links:

- 220 kV Kassø – Flensborg, settlement point Kassø
- 220 kV Ensted – Flensborg, settlement point Ensted
- 2 st 400 kV Kassø – Audorf, settlement point Kassø.

The transmission capacity is normally 1,200 MW in both directions. Taking into account faults
at major production facilities, the transmission capacity northbound is 800 MW, in relation to
planning.

Energinet.dk and E.ON Netz are discussing a system operation agreement. Irrespective of this
agreement, Energinet.dk must comply with the following UCTE requirements:

- Contribute to the combined momentary reserve of the synchronous continental

system. The proportion is determined by the dimensioning faults, and the
requirement in relation to the system operator’s production in his own area. See
Appendix 2 section 5

- The network-regulating function on the Danish-German border

- Each area inside UCTE must be able to manage its own balance

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- Trading plans are specified in quarter-hourly and hourly energy

- The energy plan is converted to a power plan. To include the energy as per the
trading plan, regulation is commenced between five minutes before and five
minutes after an hour shift

- The load shedding is co-ordinated.

The ramping requirement for exchanges with E.ON Netz has a direct impact on transiting
between the synchronous system and the continent. This means that the five-minute
requirement is directly transferred to the transiting, when changes are made in the same
direction during hour shifts.

1.1.2 Commercial conditions

The transmission capacity across the Danish-German border is utilized for commercial
purposes in accordance with the following principles; a detailed description can be found on
the Energinet.dk and E.ON Netz websites.

- Annually and monthly, some of the transmission capacity in each direction is

offered at auction. The winners of the auction obtain the right to submit bilateral
trading plans via the Danish-German border on the morning prior to the day of
operation. These plans are binding. Unutilized capacity is lost.

- Every day, the remaining part of the transmission capacity in each direction is
offered at auction. The winners of the auction obtain the right to submit bilateral
trading plans via the Danish-German border on the day before the day of operation.
Utilization of the capacity is not compulsory.

There are formal requirements for the traders to comply with in order to be able to take part in
the auction.

1.2 Western Denmark’s joint operation with Flensborg

Since the beginning of the 1920’s, Stadtwerke Flensborg (SWF) has conducted AC
collaboration across the Danish-German border. This collaboration has, with time, become
more and more intensive, and a 150 kV link between Flensborg and Ensted is now established.

Energinet.dk and SWF have entered into an agreement which regulates the system operation
and market conditions.

1.2.1 System operation collaboration with SWG

Stadtwerke Flensborg is connected to Energinet.dk via the following links:

- 150 kV Ensted – Flensborg, settlement point Ensted
- 60 kV links between Kruså and Flensborg.

The transmission capacity is normally 150 MW in both directions.

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SWF has the opportunity to carry out exchanges with Slesvig via the 60kV network.
Exchanges are regulated via a transverse voltage transformer.

1.2.2 Commercial conditions

SWF has a limited-duration prioritized transmission for utilizing the capacity of the network
between Energinet.dk and SWF, i.e. on the 150 kV link between Flensborg and the Ensted
station.

In SWF’s area, there are no other market players than SWF as a producer. When other players
emerge, and there are capacity limitations, an auction system will be introduced which will
correspond to that which applies between Energinet.dk and E.ON Netz today.

2 The synchronous system’s joint operation with the UCTE system

2.1 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Germany via the Baltic
Cable

The Baltic Cable is an HVDC link between Sweden and Germany. The link goes between
Trelleborg on the Swedish side and Lübeck on the German side. Baltic Cable AB owns the
cable link. Co-owners are E.ON Sverige and Statkraft Europa.

The capacity is 600 MW.

2.1.1 System operation collaboration with E.ON Netz

There is no system operation agreement. The system services that exist have been produced
vis-à-vis E.ON Sverige. The link is equipped with an emergency power function. There is also
a system protection function, which provides a greater transmission capacity in southern
Sweden.

2.1.2 Commercial conditions

The link is used today for Elspot trading. The utilization fees are regulated by means of a tariff.
Idle capacity permitting, there are opportunities for Svenska Kraftnät to do supportive power
deals via E.ON Sverige.

2.2 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Germany via Kontek

Kontek is an HVDC link between Eastern Denmark and Germany.

The link goes between Bjaeverskov on the Danish side and Bentwisch on the German side.
Energinet.dk is the owner of the facilities in Denmark and the cable link across to the German
coast. Vattenfall Europe Transmission is the owner of the facilities in Germany. The link is
connected to the 400 kV network in Zealand and Germany. The transmission capacity is 600
MW.

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2.2.1 System operation collaboration with Vattenfall Europe Transmission

The combined suite of agreements (entered into between the former VEAG and the former
ELKRAFT) contains rules for system operation as well as allocation. As yet, there is no
separate system operation agreement.
There is an agreement regarding a system protection function, which could yield a higher
transmission capability in southern Sweden.

2.2.2 Commercial conditions

The link’s transmission capacity is utilized as follows:

Southbound:
550 MW is made available to Nord Pool Spot for Elspot trading until the middle of 2006.
50 MW is utilized for the frequency controlled disturbance reserve.

Northbound:
550 MW is made available to Nord Pool Spot for Elspot trading until the middle of 2006.
50 MW is utilized for the frequency controlled disturbance reserve.

Settlement point: Bentwisch.

2.3 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Poland

SwePol Link is an HVDC link between Sweden and Poland. The link goes between Karlshamn
on the Swedish side and Slupsk on the Polish side. SwePol Link AB owns the cable link. The
owners are:

Svenska Kraftnät
Vattenfall AB
Polish Power Grid Company (PPGC)

The capacity is 600 MW.

The system operator on the Polish side is Polskie Sieci Elektroenergetyczne (PSE).

2.3.1 System operation collaboration with PSE

The system operation collaboration is regulated by a system operation agreement. This

agreement regulates, for instance:
- Technical limitations
- Outage co-ordination
- Emergency power functions
- Exchanges of trading plans.

The link is regulated half-yearly from the respective system operator.

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2.3.2 Commercial conditions

SwePol Link AB is a transmission company that sells transmission capacity on the link.
The utilization fees are regulated by means of a tariff. Today, the bulk of the link’s capacity is
being utilized via a long-term agreement. A minor part of the capacity remains unutilized. Idle
capacity permitting, there are opportunities for the respective system operator to do supportive
power deals.

3 The synchronous system’s joint operation with Russia

Electricity imports from Russia began in 1960. There was a significant increase in imports at
the beginning of the 1980’s, when the HVDC stations at Viborg and the double 400 kV lines
were commissioned. The third 400 kV line went into commercial operation at the beginning of
2003.

3.1 System operation collaboration with RAO UES of Russia

The Finnish grid is connected with Russia via three 400 kV lines from Viborg (Russia) to
Yllikkälä and Kymi (both Finland). The technical transmission capacity is 1,400 MW.
Transmissions take place via the HVDC stations at Viborg and from a 450 MW gas-fired
power plant which is in isolated operation, i.e. synchronised with the synchronous system. In
addition to this, there are two 110 kV links owned by private regional network companies.

Fingrid and RAO UES of Russia signed a system operation agreement on 6 February 2003,
which regulates operational and technical relations between the power systems. Nordel’s
recommendations and requirements have been taken into account.

3.2 Commercial conditions

For technical and commercial reasons, trading via the link only occurs from Russia to Finland.
The trading capacity is 1,300 MW.

The transmission service is based upon a firm fixed-period transmission. The minimum period
for a transmission reservation is one year while the longest is three years. The smallest volume
for individual players is 50 MW.

The daily hourly transmission programme is agreed upon on a daily basis and imports are
managed as a firm delivery in the balance settlement. Fingrid carries the balance responsibility
for the delivery.

Fingrid and RAO UES of Russia have agreed that the link and the HVDC stations at Viborg
may also be used for technical requirements. 100 MW has been reserved for this purpose. The
link is used for frequency regulation and can also be used for fast active disturbance reserve.

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The following documents have been included in this chapter:

Document Status
Nordel’s connection requirements to be met by Recommendations
thermal production plants (Operational performance
specifications for thermal power units larger than 100
MW and Operational performance specifications for
thermal power units smaller than 100 MW), 1995
Dimensioning practice in the Nordic countries, Descriptive
Nordel’s system committee, 1998
Nordel Connection Code Wind Turbines, November Recommendations
2006, Edited by the ad-hoc group Jan Havsager
Energinet.dk, Inge Vognild Statnett, Matti Lahtinen
Fingrid, Erik Thunberg Svenska Kraftnät and Fredrik
Norlund Svenska Kraftnät

The following national documents deal with the Connection Code:

Document Status
Electrical quality: The working group has attempted Varying: Guidelines (Sweden,
to bring together the regulations of the different Finland, Norway)
countries. Not complete.
Production: The working group has attempted to
upgrade Nordel’s recommendation for thermal power
plants to apply to all types of power plant, on the
basis of national regulations:
Sweden: Technical design of power plants regarding Binding regulation (according
reliability (SvKFS 2005:2 Affärsverket svenska to delegation in law)
kraftnäts föreskrifter och almänna råd om
driftsäkerhetsteknisk utformning av
produktionsanläggningar)
Norway: Regulations for hydro power Guidelines
Finland: General Connection Terms of Fingrid Oyj’s Binding requirements and
Grid, Specifications for the Operational Performance recommendations
of Power Plants, Power Quality in Fingrid’s 110 kV
grid

Denmark: Binding requirements

Technical Regulations of Thermal Power Station
Units of 1,5 MW or above (July 2006)
Technical Regulations of Thermal Power Station
Units below 1,5 MW (work in progress)
Requirements to be met by wind power installations
connected above 100 kV (December 2004)
Rules for regulation units (work in progress)
Upgrading not complete.

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CONNECTION CODE.......................................................................................................... 157

1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 157
2 CONNECTION TO THE GRID ............................................................................................ 157
2.1 Electrical quality (in systems of 110 kV and above) ............................................ 157
2.1.1 Frequency..................................................................................................... 157
2.1.2 Voltages and slow voltage variations........................................................... 157
2.1.3 Rapid voltage variations............................................................................... 158
2.1.4 Voltage dips.................................................................................................. 158
2.1.5 Outages......................................................................................................... 158
2.1.6 Overvoltages................................................................................................. 158
2.1.7 Voltage imbalance........................................................................................ 159
2.1.8 Voltage harmonics........................................................................................ 159
2.1.9 Voltages with intermediate harmonics......................................................... 159
2.2 HVDC ................................................................................................................... 160
2.3 Connecting grids .................................................................................................. 160
2.3.1 Take-out and surplus of reactive power ....................................................... 160
3 PRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 161
3.1 Terms.................................................................................................................... 161
3.1.1 Types of production plant ............................................................................ 161
3.1.2 Other terms................................................................................................... 161
3.2 General requirements to be met by thermal power and hydropower .................. 162
3.2.1 Automatic frequency control........................................................................ 162
3.2.2 Turbine regulator, set point .......................................................................... 162
3.2.3 Tolerance to frequency variations ................................................................ 162
3.2.4 Tolerance to voltage variations .................................................................... 163
3.2.5 Generator and voltage regulator characteristics ........................................... 166
3.2.6 Verification................................................................................................... 167
3.3 Operational performance specifications for thermal power units > 100 MW..... 168
3.3.1 Operational characteristics ........................................................................... 168
3.3.2 Power control equipment characteristics...................................................... 168
3.3.3 Power response capability during normal operation of the power system... 169
3.3.4 Power response capability during power system disturbances .................... 170
3.3.5 House load operation.................................................................................... 171
3.4 Specifications for thermal power units < 100 MW .............................................. 171
3.5 Special requirements for hydropower .................................................................. 172
NORDEL CONNECTION CODE WIND TURBINES...................................................... 173
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 173
2 DEFINITIONS.................................................................................................................. 173
3 SCOPE OF THE CONNECTION CODE ................................................................................. 173
4 ACTIVE POWER CONTROL .............................................................................................. 173
5 REACTIVE POWER CAPACITY ......................................................................................... 174
6 REACTIVE POWER CONTROL .......................................................................................... 174
7 DIMENSIONING VOLTAGE AND FREQUENCY ................................................................... 175

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8 OPERATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS DURING GRID DISTURBANCES ................................... 176

9 START AND STOP ........................................................................................................... 177
10 REMOTE CONTROL AND MEASUREMENTS .................................................................. 177
11 TEST REQUIREMENTS................................................................................................. 177

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CONNECTION CODE

1 Introduction
The purpose is to lay down certain basic rules for connection to the transmission system on
non-discriminating terms. There are national requirements which shall be taken into account in
the first place.

The connection conditions specify requirements for minimum technical requirements to ensure
security of operation in the Nordic electric power system. The connection conditions lay down
the lowest technical requirements that a plant must satisfy to have access to the grid, and the
lowest technical requirements to be met by a plant that may be important to the operational
reliability of the Nordic electric power system. The respective TSOs lay down national
requirements. They should be based on minimum requirements laid down in this Connection
Code, but may be stricter.

The Connection Code applies to new installations or to the reconstruction of existing

installations. Existing installations must retain the properties they had when they were
connected to the grid.

2 Connection to the grid

2.1 Electrical quality (in systems of 110 kV and above)

This section has been written with national requirements in mind.

2.1.1 Frequency
The nominal frequency is 50 Hz. Under normal operating conditions (synchronous operation of
the Nordic grid) the frequency will typically remain within the range 49.9 to 50.1 Hz.
However, larger frequency deviations may occur during operational disturbances. See Section
4.1.2 of the System Operation Agreement, appendix 2.

2.1.2 Voltages and slow voltage variations

The nominal voltages between the phases (UN) and the corresponding minimum insulation
levels for the equipment (the insulation levels are normally lower for power lines) are shown in
the table below:

Nominal Used for Highest Withstand Withstand 50 Hz, 1 min

voltage transmission in operating voltage for voltage for withstand
or rated voltage on lightning switching voltage
voltage equipment surge (LIWL) surge (SIWL)
110 Finland 123 550 - 230
132 Denmark, Norway 145 1) 650 - 275
150 Denmark 170 750 - 325
220 Denmark, Finland, 245 950 - 395
Sweden
300 Norway 300 1050 850 -
400 Denmark, Finland, 420 1425 1050 -
Norway, Sweden 1350 (DEN West)

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1)
Isolation level. Highest operating voltage is 138 kV according to thermal dimensioning of
transformer core, 105% of rated voltage due to induction.

The lowest operating voltages at each voltage level are highly dependent on the local
conditions. The lowest values are reached during operational disturbances and are usually not
lower than 90 % of the nominal voltage.

2.1.3 Rapid voltage variations

During normal operating conditions, a rapid voltage variation does not typically exceed 5 % of
the nominal voltage.

A rapid voltage variation due to a single regulation or switching action must not generally
exceed 3 % of the nominal voltage. However, the value must be lower if the action is
constantly repeated, e.g. several times a day (the exact requirement depends on the local
conditions).

Comment: A rapid voltage variation that causes a voltage, which falls below 90 % of the pre-
existing voltage, is regarded as a voltage dip.

Rapid periodic voltage variations are known as flicker and the severity of these must be
measured with special instruments. The aim is to keep the measured value for short-term
flicker (Pst) below 1.0 and the measured value for long-term flicker (Plt) below 0.8. The limit
values apply to 95 % of all measured values during a period of one week. Permitted flicker due
to only one connecting party is usually lower than these values but is highly dependent on local
conditions.

2.1.4 Voltage dips

A voltage reduction with duration of 10 ms to 1 minute and a voltage drop of more than 10 %
of the existing value is known as a voltage dip. There are no standard requirements for the
severity or extent of voltage dips since they are highly dependent on the grid structure, weather
conditions, etc. Most voltage dips are caused by earthing faults. Whether or not such voltage
dips are transferred to lower voltages depends on which earthing methods are used and on the
transformer connections. The voltage dips may often become deeper and may also spread to
larger parts of the grid if faults occur in more than one phase, but this is relatively rare. The
duration of a voltage dip is highly dependent on the type of fault concerned and on which relay
protection methods are used locally.

2.1.5 Outages
At outages, the voltage at the customer’s connection point is below 1 % of the nominal voltage.
Outages can be divided into planned outages (customers are informed beforehand) and outages
due to operational disturbances. The negative effects of outages differ greatly between the two
cases. There are no standards with defined limit values for outages.

2.1.6 Overvoltages
Temporary overvoltages
Earth faults are the most common cause of temporary overvoltages. During the fault, the
voltage in normal phases rises. The voltage may rise up to 1.8 times the rated voltage,
depending on the earthing method used in the grid. In practice, however, the voltage is usually
kept to a lower level.

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Switching and lightning overvoltages

Switching-in of shunt capacitors and auto-reclosure of lines are the most common causes of
switching overvoltages. During switching of a capacitor, the voltages between phase and earth
may, depending on the earthing method used, reach values up to 1.8 times the peak value of the
phase voltage (1.8 p.u.). Switching of lines, especially rapid automatic reclosure of lines, may
cause high over voltages, up to 3 p.u. However, the probability of such high values is low.
Overvoltages on the overhead lines of the grid due to atmospheric phenomena are largely
limited by the dielectric strength of the lines and the overvoltage protection of the transformer
stations. Because of these factors, it may largely be assumed that the over voltages will be
limited to a level of 5-6 p.u.

2.1.7 Voltage imbalance

Depending on local conditions, the average measured values for 10 minutes for the phase
component of a three-phase system with negative sequence must be below 1-2 % of the phase
component with positive sequence for 95 % of the time over a measuring period of one week.
In Sweden and Norway a limit value of 1 % is used. 2 % is used on the Finnish 110 kV grid.

2.1.8 Voltage harmonics

The figures in Table 1 must not be exceeded for voltages with harmonics. This means that
99 % of the average values for a period of 10 minutes over a measuring period of one week
must be below the limit values. NOTE: The limit values differ between the countries.

PLANNING LEVELS FOR HARMONIC VOLTAGES

As a percentage of the nominal voltage
Odd Odd Even
Multiples other than 3 Multiples of 3
n F N S n F N S n F N S
% % % % % % % % %
5 3.0 2.0 2.5 3 3.0 2.0 2.0 2 1.0 1.5 1.0
7 2.5 2.0 2.5 9 1.5 1.0 1.0 4 0.7 1.0 1.0
11 1.7 1.5 1.5 15 0.5 0.3 0.6 6 0.5 0.5 0.5
13 1.7 1.5 1.5 21 0.5 0.2 0.4 8 0.3 0.2 0.5
17 1.5 1.0 1.0 >21 0.3 0.2 0.4 10 0.2 0.4
19 1.5 1.0 1.0 12 0.2 0.4
23 0.8 0.7 0.7 >12 0.2 0.2
25 0.8 0.7 0.7
>25 0.5 0.2+ 0.2+
0.5* 0.5*
25/n 25/n
Total harmonic distortion (THD) for the voltage < 3% (F and N), < 4% (S)
Table 1 (F = Finland, N = Norway, S = Sweden)

2.1.9 Voltages with intermediate harmonics

Voltages that contain intermediate harmonics are usually far lower than voltages with full
harmonics. So far, there are no standards that lay down limit values for systems above 110 kV,
but 0.2 % (of the nominal voltage) is used in Norway and 0.5 % in Sweden. Voltages and
intermediate harmonics are generated by arc furnaces, welding equipment and fast frequency
converters.

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2.2 HVDC1
• Every new HVDC link should be designed so that it has no negative effect on existing
equipment connected to the grid. Examples of negative effects are SSR (sub-synchronous
resonance), rapid voltage variations, harmonic voltages and interference with
telecommunications. In addition, the link should not have a negative effect on system
operation. Examples of possible system operation problems are insufficient ability to
tolerate voltage dips or exaggerated input/output of reactive power. A bipolar link should
also be designed so that the risk of losing both poles for the same reason is as low as
possible.
• It should be possible within the frequency range 49.9-49.5 Hz for the HVDC inter-
connections to have frequency-dependent regulation with droop. Frequency-controlled step
or ramp variation of the power is not permitted in this frequency range when it is used in
droop regulation.
• Any other regulation of emergency power must be based on the conditions that apply at the
site. The question also concerns the affected TSOs.
• The owners of new HVDC interconnections are to notify the Operations Committee of the
setting parameters for the regulating energy, ramps and emergency power in relation to
existing HVDC links according to agreements with the TSOs in Nordel.

2.3 Connecting grids

The connection must be set up in such a way that the quality of the Nordic electric power
system is not affected.

2.3.1 Take-out and surplus of reactive power

TAKE-OUT AND SURPLUS OF REACTIVE POWER

Subject Denmark Finland Iceland Norway Sweden
Tapping from Balance per Balance per PF (cos φ) = There must be Balance per
the grid voltage level. voltage level. 0.90 at 132 - no transport of voltage level.
MVAr Transport is 220 kV. MVAr, which Not measured.
transport is minimised PF (cos φ) = has a negative
minimised. with the aid of 0.85 < 132 effect on the
a "window" kV. voltage.
(tan φ = 0.04- + "fine" 1)
0.16). MW
loss is
minimised.
Reactive Reactors etc. ~ Reactors etc. ~ Reactors etc. ~
surplus intact grid intact grid Grid intact
after 50 % with three in
load shedding reserve
2)
1) From 1998, the limits are changed to 0.95 and 0.9 respectively.
2) The eastern part synchronous to the Nordel grid. The western part has own rules
corresponding to the demands from the synchronous UCTE grid.

1
Written in the light of draft for Nordel recommendation.

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3 Production

3.1 Terms

3.1.1 Types of production plant

Definitions:
Gas turbine unit Production plant powered by air and combustion gases to generate
electric power. One generator with one or more gas turbines. There
are two types: jet and industrial.
Combined plant Steam turbines and gas turbines that use the same fuel cycle, in
which exhaust heat from gas turbines is used to produce steam for
steam turbines.
Condensing power plant One or more thermal power units in the same production plant,
which produce only electricity.
Combined heating and One or more thermal power units in the same production
power (CHP) plant plant, powered by fossil and/or bio fuel and which combine the
production of electricity and heat, which is used for district heating
or for an industrial process.
Nuclear power plant One or more thermal power units in the same production plant,
which produce only electricity and which are powered by nuclear
fission in a reactor. There are two types: the pressurised water
reactor (PWR) and the boiling water reactor (BWR).
Hydropower unit Turbine and generator coupled together and powered by water.
Hydropower station One or more hydropower units in the same production plant.
Wind power unit Turbine and generator coupled together and powered by wind.
Wind power farm One or more wind power units with a common connection to the
power grid.
Thermal power unit Production plant powered by uranium, fossil and/or bio fuels to
generate electric power. Turbine and generator coupled together,
powered by steam from a boiler or a reactor.
Thermal power block One or more thermal power units powered from a common boiler
or reactor. Combined heating and power plants are included in
thermal power blocks.

3.1.2 Other terms

Definitions:
House load operation Operation of a unit with its own auxiliary machinery as its only
load, when the unit is disconnected from the external power grid.
Rated field voltage The field voltage of a generator at rated load and nominal
operating voltage.
Rated load Simultaneous nominal active and reactive production.
Nominal active power Nominal design power for electricity production.
Nominal operating voltage The operating voltage of the connecting grid, which is used as a
design precondition when planning the unit.
Nominal generator voltage The design voltage of the generator.
p.u. “Per unit”: a term which states the size relative to a nominal value
which must have been defined in each individual case.

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Frequency response The ratio between power change and frequency deviation when
automatic frequency control is used.
Droop The inverse of frequency response, i.e. the ratio between frequency
deviation and power change.
Synchronous generator A generator whose rotation speed follows the frequency of the
connecting grid.

3.2 General requirements to be met by thermal power and hydropower

Requirements:
• Thermal power plants (Norway, Sweden and Denmark > 100 MW,
Finland > 50 MW)
• Hydro power plants (Norway > 10 MW, Sweden and Finland > 50 MW)

The national requirements may be stricter than the requirements stated below.

3.2.1 Automatic frequency control

The production plants must be capable of automatically contributing to frequency regulation of
the electric power system with a frequency response in the range 0.25-1 p.u. power/Hz, which
corresponds to a droop of 8-2 %, at a frequency variation of 50 ± 0.1 Hz. The locally measured
grid frequency or the rotation speed of the plant is used as a control signal.

3.2.2 Turbine regulator, set point

The unit controller shall have an adjustable frequency set point in the range from 49,9 Hz to
50,1 Hz. The set point resolution shall be 0,05 Hz or better. For large thermal power plants an
adjustable frequency dead band of the unit controller within the setting range of 0-50 mHz is
acceptable.

3.2.3 Tolerance to frequency variations

Frequency Range 49 Hz to 51 Hz
It shall be possible to operate the unit continuously at full output power within the grid voltage
range of 90- 105% of the normal voltage, and at any frequency between 49 and 51 Hz. A
maximum operating time of 10 hours/year and duration of 30 minutes maximum per case can
be assumed within the frequency range of 50.3-51 Hz. At a frequency above 50.3 Hz a small
power reduction is accepted, if stable operation at full power can be re-established when the
frequency again drops below this value. See Figure 1.

Frequency Range 49 Hz to 47.5 Hz

It shall be possible to operate the unit under disturbance conditions for 30 min within the grid
voltage range of 95-105 % of the normal voltage, at any frequency down to 47.5 Hz. The
output power may then be reduced by 0 % at 49 Hz and a maximum of 15 % at 47.5 Hz, and
by a value found by linear interpolation at frequencies between these two limits. Efforts should
be made to lower this reduction in output power, if this can be achieved without high additional
costs.

Transitory Frequency Variations 51 Hz to 52 Hz

It shall be possible to operate the unit for 5 sec during transitory conditions of the network in
connection with exceptional disturbances within the grid voltage range of 95-105 % of normal
voltage at any frequency between 51 and 52 Hz. During such transients the power may be

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reduced, if stable operation at full power can be re-established when the frequency again drops
below 50.3 Hz.

Frequency Range 51 Hz to 53 Hz
On a separate electrical network it shall be possible to operate the unit at strongly reduced
output power within the grid voltage range of 95-105 % of normal voltage, at any frequency
between 51 and 53 Hz for 3 min.

Frequency Below 47.5 Hz

The unit may be tripped from the network at frequencies below 47.5 Hz. The unit shall then be
capable of changing over to house load operation. However, this should not take place
instantaneously, the time delay being determined by the design limits of the unit and so that
reliable changeover to house load operation will be obtained.

Frequency Gradients
The control system shall be designed so that the unit will not trip because of the transient
frequency gradients occurring in case of short-circuit on the high voltage network to which the
unit is connected.

3.2.4 Tolerance to voltage variations

Grid Voltage Range 90 % to 105 % of Normal Voltage
It shall be possible to operate the unit continuously at full load within the frequency range of
49-51 Hz and at a grid voltage between 90 and 105 % of normal voltage. At a frequency above
50.3 Hz, a small power reduction is accepted, if stable operation at full power can be re-
established when the frequency again drops below this value. A maximum operating time of 10
hours/year and a duration of 30 minutes maximum per case can be assumed within the
frequency range of 50.3-51 Hz. (Same requirements as in Section 3.2.3 (Frequency range 49
Hz to 51 Hz). See Figure 1.

U [%]

110

105

100
47,0 48,0 49,0 50,0 51,0 52,0 53,0 54,0 55,0
f [Hz]

95

90

85

Figure 1 Performance requirements for power production in relation to frequency and voltage

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Grid Voltage Range 85 % to 90 % of Normal Voltage

It shall be possible to operate the unit for 1 hour within the frequency range of 49.7-50.3 Hz at
a grid voltage between 85 and 90% of the normal voltage, and an output power reduction of up
to 10 % of full output may then be acceptable.

Grid Voltage Range 105 % to 110 % of Normal Voltage

It shall be possible to operate the unit for 1 hour at a frequency within the range of 49.7-50.3
Hz and at a grid voltage between 105 and 110 % of normal voltage. A small output power
reduction may then be acceptable (approximately 10%).

Consequences of Nearby Grid Faults

a) Ability to Withstand Mechanical Stresses Due to Line Side Faults
Thermal power units shall be designed so that the turbine generator set can withstand the
mechanical stresses associated with any kind of single-, two- and three-phase earth or short
circuit fault occurring on the grid on the high voltage side of the step-up transformer. The fault
can be assumed to be cleared within 0.25 sec. Neither damage nor need for immediate stoppage
for study of the possible consequences are allowed.

b) Line Side Faults of Clearing Time up to 0.25 Sec

The unit shall be designed so that it remains connected to the grid and continues its operation
after isolation of line side fault within 0.25 sec.

Thermal power plants > 100 MW in Denmark East (synchronous to the Nordel grid) shall
fulfill the above demands. Thermal power plants > 100 MW in Denmark West (synchronous to
the UCTE grid) shall fulfill UCTE demands. (Clearing time 0.15 Sec and the demands are to
the line side of the generator transformer.) For smaller thermal power plants and wind power
plants the demands are weaker see detailed specifications. (Chapter 6 of TF 3.2.3 will be
changed at next revision.)

c) Deep Voltage Transient

The units shall be designed so that they can withstand the following line side voltage variation
resulting from faults in the grid, without disconnection from the grid:
- step reduction to 0 % of the line side voltage lasting for 0.25 sec,
- followed by linear increase from 25 % to 90 % in 0.5 sec,
- followed by constant line side voltage 90 %.
Consequently, only a small power reduction can be accepted.

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1,2

1,1

1,0

0,9

0,8

0,7
U [%]

0,6

0,5

0,4

0,3

0,2

0,1

0,0
-0,3 -0,2 -0,1 0,0 0,1 0,2 0,3 0,4 0,5 0,6 0,7 0,8 0,9 1,0 1,1 1,2

t [s]
Figure 2 Deep voltage transient in line side voltage caused by a network fault

It shall be noted that the design criteria for the voltage protection may deviate, as the unit must
manage several kinds of other faults that may occur in the generators/power grid.

Large Voltage Disturbances

The unit may be disconnected from the power system, if larger voltage variations or longer
durations than those for which the unit has been designed occur, and shall, in each case, be
disconnected if the unit falls out-of-step.

The unit and its auxiliary power system shall be designed for such voltage variations that a safe
changeover to house load operation can take place after disconnection from the network.

Reactive Power Output at Low Voltages

Thermal power units shall be equipped with such excitation systems and shall be designed for
such a power factor that the generator will be capable of providing a reactive power output of
about the same magnitude as the rated active power output for 10 sec, in conjunction with
network disturbances and at a generator busbar voltage of 70 % of the rated generator voltage.

Reactive Power Capability

The thermal power units shall be able to generate and to consume reactive power in adequate
amounts within their capabilities for the voltage control of the power system. At normal grid
voltage the generators shall be designed to operate within the limits of reactive power output
and input defined by the capability diagrams of the generators or by stable reactive droop.

At grid voltages higher than the normal voltage the under-excited capability of the generators
shall be fully available according to the capability diagram or static stable reactive droop,
whichever is more limiting.

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The countries’ MVAr requirements for the power plants

MVAr requirements for new building 1) Operating voltage
range
Production Consumption
Danish thermal tg ϕ = 0.4 at 420 kV tg ϕ = - 0.2 at 400 kV 380 - 420 kV
power
Swedish thermal 1/3 at U>90% Ugen 3) 0 3) 395 - 420 kV
power
Finnish thermal cos ϕ = 0.9 at cos ϕ = 0.95 at 380 - 420 kV
power 360…420 kV 2) 400…420 kV 2)
Swedish hydro 1/3 at U>90% Ugen 3) -1/6 3) 395 - 420 kV
power
Finnish hydro power cos ϕ = 0.9 at cos ϕ = 0.95 at 380 - 420 kV
360…420 kV 2) 400…420 kV 2)
Norwegian hydro cos ϕ = 0.86 2) cos ϕ = 0.95 2) 390 - 420 kV
power
Icelandic hydro
power

1) The countries combine the MVAr requirements and associated voltages at the generator
terminals and busbar in different ways.
2) Power factor (cos ϕ) is measured at the generator terminals.
3) MVAr measured at the busbar and Ugen as nominal generator voltage transformed to
busbar side of transformer.

The information above illustrates how the MVAr requirements affect the most costly
component (the generator). Any supplementary requirements that the MVAr requirements
should be met at set voltages for the busbar affect the systems properties of the power plants
and the design of the plant, but have only a marginal effect on the price of the plant, provided
that this is specified during the project phase. This may, for instance, apply to the ratio of the
machine transformer and the winding connections for the internal consumption transformer.
The actual operating point is determined depending on the actual operating situation in the
transmission network.

3.2.5 Generator and voltage regulator characteristics

Generators
The generator reactance shall be as low as technically and economically possible in order to
support the stable droop and reactive power control.

Each generator shall be capable of operating on the rated active power continuously at power
factor down to at least 0.95 under-excited, and 0.9 over-excited. This shall be possible in
connection with voltage and frequency conditions as described in Tolerance to voltage
variations (90-105 % of normal voltage). At under-excited conditions normal grid voltage is
applied instead of 90 % voltage.

Voltage Control
The preferred dynamic characteristics for steady state are defined in a measurable way as
follows:

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The 10 % step response of generator voltage is recorded in no-load conditions, disconnected

from the grid. The set value of the voltage is changed by plus and minus stepwise changes
causing change of generator terminal voltage from 95 to 105 %, and from 105 to 95 %. In both
cases the step response of the generator terminal voltage shall be as follows:
- response is non-oscillating,
- rise time from 0 to 90 % of the change is 0.2-0.3 s in case of static exciter, or in case of
brush less exciter: 0.2-0.5 s at a step upwards, 0.2-0.8 s at a step downwards,
- overshoot is less than 15 % of the change.

PSS, Power System Stabiliser

PSS shall be included in each generator. The PSS shall be tuned to improve the damping of the
oscillations of generator and power system, especially the damping of low frequency (0.2-1.0
Hz) inter-area oscillations.

Additional Voltage Control Equipment

Current limiters (for generator rotor and stator) shall have invert time characteristics to utilise
the generator over current capability to a good extent for various network conditions.

Voltage Control Priority

The normal way of operation is automatic control of generator voltage with the effects of
reactive current droop. In case of needs for different type control, like control according to
power factor or reactive output, these additional controls shall affect at lower priority than the
regulation of voltage.

Island Operation
In case of very serious (and exceptional) disturbances, where the power system is separated
into smaller grids, the units shall also initially be capable of performing the above-mentioned
power changes (upwards or downwards), and then achieving stable operation and normal
power control capability according to Section 3.3.3.

3.2.6 Verification
To the largest possible extent the specifications should be verified by full-scale test. This test
should be made by the owner at commissioning and upon request from the TSO. Recordings of
data from actual operation should be reviewed regularly in order to prove compliance with the
specification.

Verification during Commissioning

This verification shall include:
- Full output power
- Minimum load
- Overload capacity
- Starting time
- Load following
- Power response rate including range
- Power step change
- Deep voltage transients by short circuit (if possible)
- Changeover to house load operation
- House load operation for 1 h
- Step response of generator voltage
- PSS test

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3.3 Operational performance specifications for thermal power units > 100
MW

3.3.1 Operational characteristics

Minimum Output
The minimum output power shall be as low as possible. As a practical guideline, the minimum
output power should be 40 % of full output power in coal-fired units, 20 % of full output power
in oil-fired units, and 20 % of full output power in nuclear units.

Overload Capacity
Fossil-fired units should be prepared for overload capacities only to the extent that it is
intrinsically available. For a steam turbine unit this could be the bypassing of high-pressure
preheaters.

The overload capacities should only be utilised to a certain limit only, because of reductions in
the efficiency and/or the lifetime of the unit.

The unit including auxiliary equipment should be designed to utilise these overload capacities
up to 2 h/day and up to 500 h/year. No overload capacity is specified for nuclear power units.

Starting Time
For all types of thermal power units, the starting time shall be defined according to planned
utilisation. In addition, the following guidelines shall apply to gas turbines for emergency and
peak load generation, from rolling-up to full output power:
- gas turbines of jet engine type 3 to 3.5 minutes
- industrial gas turbines 10 to 15 minutes.

House Load Operation

House load operation is the unit operating with its own auxiliary supply as the only load.

3.3.2 Power control equipment characteristics

Operational Modes
The change of output power of a thermal power unit at the rates and within the ranges
specified, during normal control and during disturbances control, is normally activated as
follows:
- By manual operation
- By the unit controller

The unit controller shall have an adjustable frequency set point in the range from 49.9 Hz to
50.1 Hz. The set point resolution shall be 50 mHz or better.

The droop set point shall be adjustable in the range from 2 % to 8 %. The normal operation is
generally with setting in the range from 4 % to 6 %.

An adjustable frequency dead band of the unit controller within the setting range of
0-50 mHz is acceptable. It shall be possible to disengage this dead band.

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Power Step Change Limiter

The units shall be equipped with adjustable devices for limiting the magnitude and rate of the
power change, so that it will be possible to set these set points at any values from zero up to the
maximum specified, both for normal conditions and for disturbance conditions.

Power Control - Normal Operation and Disturbances

The required power output during normal operation is the manually preset power output,
modified by a frequency-sensing unit controller (or turbine governor) and this power output
shall meet the specifications in Section 3.3.3( Power response capability during normal
operation of the power system).

The need for disturbance control shall be governed by frequency-sensing equipment (e.g.
consisting of a frequency relay set at a certain value below normal frequency). The power
output shall meet the specification in 3.3.4 (Power response capability during power system
disturbances) when the unit is operated under these conditions.

3.3.3 Power response capability during normal operation of the power system
Load Following
All condensing units shall be designed so that they can be used for daily and weekly load
following during certain periods of the year, using the rates of load change specified in the
following.

The units shall also be designed so that, if necessary, they can participate in following the
occasionally varying loads that cause frequency variations on the interconnected power system.
This implies that the units shall be capable of accommodating power changes without intervals
by plus or minus 2 % of full output within periods of 30 sec. The units shall be capable of
performing these changes within the ranges specified. Power changes for nuclear units may be
agreed with the grid operator to be less than plus or minus 2 %.

Power Response Rate and Range - Oil and Gas

Oil-fired and gas-fired units shall be designed for a power response rate of at least 8 % of full
power per minute. The above power response rate of change shall be applicable to any range of
30 % between 40 % and 100 % of full power according to the load schedule. The power
response rate may be limited to the maximum power response rate permissible for the turbines
or the steam boilers in the range below 40 % and above 90 %.

Power Response Rate and Range - Coal

Coal-fired units shall be designed for a power response rate of at least plus or minus 4 % of full
power per minute. The above power response rate of change shall be applicable to any range of
30 % between 40 % and 100 % of full power according to the load schedule. This range may
be restricted to 20 % in certain cases. The power response rate may be limited to the maximum
power response rate permissible for the turbines or the steam boilers in the range below 60 %
and above 90 %.

Power Response Rate and Range - PWR Nuclear

PWR nuclear power units shall be designed for a power response rate of at least plus or minus
5 % of full power per minute within the output range of 60 % to 100 % of full power. At
outputs below 60 %, the power response rate may be limited to the maximum power response
rate permissible for the turbines.

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Power Response Rate and Range - BWR Nuclear

BWR nuclear power units shall be designed for a power response rate per minute of at least
plus or minus 10 % of the initial output value. This shall be maintained throughout all the
output range within which the power can be controlled by the speed of the main circulation
pumps. This output range shall be at least 30 % of the initial output power. In the remainder of
the power range between minimum load and full load, the power response rate shall be at least
1 % of full power per minute.

Comment on requirements for nuclear power units: The power response rates of the units
equipped with standard versions of light water reactors are usually sufficient. However, it
should be noted that the power response rate is subject to some restrictions at the present time,
due to the current design of fuel elements. It is expected that these problems will be solved, and
the units should therefore be designed to conform to the recommended power response rates.
However, in order to limit the stresses imposed, the power changes during normal daily and
weekly load following should be carried out gradually over a period of about two hours.

3.3.4 Power response capability during power system disturbances

Instantaneous Power Response
The demand from the power system is that the instantaneous power response shall be available
within 30 sec after a sudden frequency drop to 49.5 Hz. Half of that power response shall be
available within 5 sec after the frequency drop.

Power Step Change - Fossil Fuel

Fossil-filed thermal units shall be designed with an operating mode allowing an instantaneous
step change in output power of at least 5 % of full output within the range of 50-90 % when
requested. Half of that power shall be available within 5 sec after the frequency drop. Units
without or with only one reheater shall be designed in such a manner that this power step will
be accommodated within 30 sec. If a unit includes more than one reheater, a further delay
corresponding to the time constants of such additional reheaters is acceptable.

Power Step Change - Nuclear

PWR nuclear power units to which the power change signal is applied directly to adjust the
turbine control valve shall be designed so that a power step of 10 % of full power can be
accommodated within 30 % of the power range. BWR nuclear power units operating on
pressure control shall be designed so that, within the range of pump control, they will be
capable of accommodating a power change of 10 % of the initial value within 30 sec.

Subsequent Power Response Rate

After the power step changes specified above, thermal power units shall also be capable of
accommodating a load change at the rates specified in 3.3.3 (Power response capability during
normal operation of the power system). However, the total change in load may then be limited
to the values also specified in 3.3.3.

Spinning Disturbance Reserve

All units of the condensing type shall be made so that they at times can be used as spinning
disturbance reserves and then perform the above mentioned power variations, if serious
disturbances occur on the grid.

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3.3.5 House load operation

Design Characteristics
All power units shall be designed to change over safely to house load operation from
conditions as specified in 3.2.3 (Frequency range 51 Hz to 53 Hz and Frequency below 47.5
Hz), and in 3.2.4 (Large voltage disturbances).

Operating Time
Thermal power units shall be designed so that they can operate in house load operation for at
least 1 h. Nuclear power units shall be capable of operating in house load operation for a
duration determined by the nuclear safety conditions.

3.4 Specifications for thermal power units < 100 MW

Below 100 MW and above 25MW
Minimum output: All the small power stations shall fulfil the regulation given in 3.3.1
irrespective of the type of primary fuel.
Overload capacity: Efforts should be made to observe this regulation, but observance is not
demanded.
Starting time: Regulation given in 3.3.1 shall be fulfilled.
Operational modes and Power step change limiter: Regulation given in 3.3.2 shall be fulfilled.
Power control - normal operation and disturbances: Is not required to observe according to the
abovementioned considerations.
Load following and Power response rate and range: Regulation given in 3.3.3 shall be
fulfilled.
Instantaneous power response and Power step change for fossil fuel: Regulation given in 3.3.4
shall be fulfilled.
Power step change for nuclear, subsequent power response rate, Spinning disturbance reserve
and Island operation: Are not relevant to small power stations.
Tolerance to frequency variations: A voltage profile as shown in Figure 2, in the transmission
network or in the regional distribution network should not cause tripping of power
stations.
Deviations of frequency and voltage within the hatched area on Figure 1 should not
cause tripping of power stations. A reduction of the active production by up to 20 % is
acceptable. The power stations should be able to tolerate frequencies up to 53 Hz.
Tolerance to voltage variations: Is not required to observe according to the above mentioned
considerations. A quick start-up after tripping is desirable but is not demanded
generally. Regarding the starting times the following directions can be given:
After release 30 min
After an outage time of 10 h 90 min
After an outage time of 30 to 50 h 120 min
As for unmanned plants another 120 minutes may pass before the personnel can arrive
at the power station. It should be possible to start up and fully load gas turbine plants
within 30 minutes even after a long outage time. It should be mentioned that the power
that is at disposal after 15 minutes in the national systems can be calculated as part of
the fast reserve.
Generator and voltage regulator characteristics, House load operation and Verification: Are
not required

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Below 25 MW
To these plants it applies that the requirements that it is reasonable to demand complied with
depend on the mode of operation, manning and type of fuel.

Plants in the range 1 MW-25 MW

Minimum output: All the power stations shall fufill the regulation given in 3.3.1 irrespective of
the type of fuel.
Overload capacity: Efforts should be made to observe this regulation, but observance is not
demanded.
Starting time: Regulation given in 3.3.1 shall be fulfilled..
Operational modes and Power step change limiter: Regulation given in 3.3.2 shall be fulfilled.
for power plants in the range 10-25 MW (In case of solid fuel fired plants observance
may be difficult. No demands on plants in the range 1-10 MW.)
Power control - normal operation and disturbances: Is not required observed.
Load following and Power response rate and range: Regulation given in 3.3.3 shall be
fulfilled. for power plants in the range 10-25 MW. (No demands on plants in the range
1-10 MW)
Instantaneous power response and Power step change for fossil fuel: Regulation given in 3.3.4
shall be fulfilled.
Power step change for nuclear, subsequent power response rate, Spinning disturbance reserve
and Island operation: Are not relevant to small power stations.
Tolerance to frequency variations: A voltage profile as shown in Figure 2, in the transmission
network or in the regional distribution network should not be allowed to cause tripping
of power stations.
Deviations of frequency and voltage within the hatched area on Figure 1 should not be allowed
to cause tripping of power stations. A reduction of the active production by up to 20 %
is acceptable. For solid fuel fired plants of the 2nd category it may be difficult to
comply with the requirement in the range from 47.5-49 Hz. The power stations should
be able to tolerate frequencies up to 53 Hz.
Tolerance to voltage variations: Is not required observed. But a quick start-up after tripping is
desirable. Gas turbine plants should be able to start automatically with the alternative of
remote operation when the voltage is stable after a network fault causing tripping of the
plant. For solid fuel fired plants of the 2nd category no requirements are made.
Generator and voltage regulator characteristics, House load operation and Verification: Are
not required.

Plants < 1 MW
Local conditioned requirements are usually made. However, the power stations should be
capable for short periods of time of tolerating frequencies in the range from 47.5 Hz to 53 Hz.

3.5 Special requirements for hydropower

National rules apply to hydropower plants that are not covered by the Connection Code. In
Norway there are national requirements for hydro power plants. In Finland General
requirements to be met by thermal power and hydropower are used.

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NORDEL CONNECTION CODE WIND TURBINES

1 Introduction
The Nordic Connection Code for wind turbines is a part of the Nordic Grid Code. The Nordic
Grid Code shall provide the common framework for the TSO’s (Transmission System
Operator) and the actors, who are operating facilities connected to the Nordic electricity
system.

The Nordic Connection Code outlines the minimum technical requirements that new wind
turbines together with their supplemental installations have to fulfil at the connection point to
the transmission network in order to provide for adequate safe operation and reliability of the
interconnected Nordic Power System. The Nordic TSO’s may publish connection codes for the
electricity system within their responsibility having additional requirements.

It must also be emphasized, that all capabilities will not be exploited in all wind turbines at all
times. Connection codes shall provide the capabilities and characteristics of system
components are available when ever needed for safe and reliable system operation. The
exploitation of the different system components and their capabilities is regulated by system
operation codes.

2 Definitions
Connection point: Point in the transmission network, to which the wind turbine or wind
plant is to be connected. This point is defined by the TSO.

Wind turbine: Complete system to transform wind energy into electricity and to transmit the
electricity to the connection point.

Wind plant1 : More than one wind turbine connected to the same connection point, possible
sharing connection cable/line and other equipment.

All other definitions are according to IEC standard.

3 Scope of the connection code

The requirements must be met by all wind plants connected to the Nordic Power system2.
All requirements are to be met at the connection point.

4 Active power control

It must be possible to control the active power production from the wind plant. The following
control functions must be available

1
Wind Plant is a synonym to the commonly used Wind Farm.

2
The TSO decides in each case whether wind plants smaller than 100 MW has to fulfil all requirements or they
may be released to some extent according to the related impact to the interconnected Nordic system operation
and security.

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• An adjustable upper limit to the active power production from the wind plant shall be
available whenever the wind plant is in operation. The upper limit shall control that the
active power production, measured as a 10 minute average value, does not exceed a
specified level and the limit shall be adjustable by remote signals. It must be possible to set
the limit to any value with an accuracy of ±5%, in the range from 20% to 100% of the wind
plant rated power.
• Ramping control of active power production must be possible. It must be possible to limit
the ramping speed of active power production from the wind turbine in upwards direction
(increased production due to increased wind speed or due to changed maximum power
output limit) to 10% of rated power per minute. There is no requirement to down ramping
due to fast wind speed decays, but it must be possible to limit the down ramping speed to
10% of rated power per minute, when the maximum power output limit is reduced by a
control action.
• Fast down regulation. It must be possible to regulate the active power from the wind
turbine down from 100% to 20% of rated power in less than 5 seconds. This functionality
is required for system protection schemes. Some system protection schemes implemented
for stability purposes require the active power to be restored within short time after down
regulation. For that reason disconnection of a number of wind turbines within a wind plant
cannot be used to fulfil this requirement3 .
• Frequency control. Automatic control of the wind turbine active production as a function
of the system frequency must be possible. The control function must be proportional to
frequency deviations and must be provided with a dead-band. The detailed settings will be
provided by the TSO.

5 Reactive power capacity

The wind plant must have adequate reactive capacity4 to be able to be operated with zero
reactive exchange with the network measured at the connection point, when the voltage and the
frequency are within normal operation limits. See area A in figure 1, chapter 7.

6 Reactive power control

The reactive output of the wind plant must be controllable in one of the two following control
modes according to TSO specifications:
1 . The wind plant shall be able to control the reactive exchange with the system. The control
shall operate automatically and on a continuous basis. The wind plant shall be able to
maintain acceptable small5 exchange of reactive power at all active power production
levels.

3
In a system having a limited number of wind turbines this is not a vital problem. But wind turbines are designed
to stay in operation for 20 years or more, and the international trend is, that wind turbines in some periods will
produce an increasing part of the total power production. It will eventual be a problem if not addressed in
proper time.

4
The reactive capability need not to be installed inside each wind turbine, but may be installed in one or more
separate devices connected to the system at the same connection point as the wind turbines.

5
The TSO defines the acceptable limit according to local system conditions

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2 . The wind plant must be able to automatically control its reactive power output as a
function of the voltage in the connection point with the purpose of controlling the voltage.

The detailed settings of the reactive power control system will be provided by the responsible
TSO

7 Dimensioning voltage and frequency

The system operating conditions that the wind plant must be able to meet are outlined in the
following figure:

Grid Frequency [Hz]

53,0
F

51,0

50,3
E
49,7
D A C
49,0
B

47,5
Grid Voltage [p.u.]

0,85 0,90 0,95 1,05 1,10

Figure 1. Performance requirements in relation to voltage and frequency. The reference for
p.u.value shall be defined by TSO.

When the voltages and frequencies are within the rectangular areas shown in the figure, the
following requirements applies:
A: Normal continuously operation. No reduction in active or reactive capability is allowed due
to system voltage and frequency.
B: Uninterrupted operation in minimum 30 minutes shall be possible. The active output is
allowed decreased as a linear function of the frequency from zero reduction at 49.0 Hz to 15%
reduction at 47.5 Hz.
C: Uninterrupted operation in minimum 60 minutes shall be possible. The active output may be
reduced 10%.
D: Uninterrupted operation in minimum 60 minutes shall be possible. The active output may be
reduced 10%.

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E: Uninterrupted operation in minimum 30 minutes shall be possible. The possible active

output is allowed to be slightly reduced. (The total duration of these operating conditions is
normally not more than 10 hours per year).
F: Uninterrupted operation in minimum 3 minutes shall be possible. The active output may be
reduced to any level, but the turbines must stay connected to the system.

8 Operational characteristics during grid disturbances

The wind plant must be able to continue operation during and after disturbances in the
transmission network. This requirement applies under the following conditions:
• The wind plant and the wind turbines in the wind plant must be able to stay connected to
the system and to maintain operation during and after dimensioning faults in the common
Nordic transmission system. In each area, the TSO defines which parts of his system are
included in the Nordic transmission system. (It is normally defined by voltage level and
depends on parallel operation with the highest voltage levels. It is always above 100 kV)
• The wind plant may disconnect from the system, if the voltage in the connection point
during or after a system disturbance do fall below the levels shown in the following figure
26.
The fault duration, where the voltage in the connection point may be zero, is 250 milliseconds.
The voltage at the wind turbine generator terminals will be higher due to transformer and
network impedance.
Grid voltage [p.u.]

1,1
1,0
0,9
0,8
0,7
0,6
0,5
0,4
0,3
0,25
0,2
0,1 Time [sec.]
0,0
0,00 0,25 0,50 0,75 1,00 1,25 1,50 1,75
Figure 2. Voltage dip profile due to fault in the high voltage connection point which the wind
plant must tolerate without disconnecting from the grid. The 1 p.u. value is the voltage before
the disturbance.

6
The rise-time of the voltage is highly dependent on the local system characteristics, i.e. short circuit capacity.
The TSO may decide to use a different curve in his own area to ensure adequate system security.

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9 Start and stop

It is recommended, that the wind plant is designed so that the wind turbines within the wind
plant does not stop simultaneously due to high wind speeds.

10 Remote control and measurements

Wind plants must be controllable from remote locations by telecommunication. Control
functions and operational measurements must be made available to the TSO on request.

The TSO in each area specifies the required measurements and other necessary information to
be transmitted from the wind plant.

11 Test requirements
Prior to the installation of a wind turbine or a wind plant, a specific test programme must be
agreed with the TSO in the area. The test programme shall be the documentation of the
capability of the wind turbine or wind plant to meet the requirements in this connection code.

As a part of the test programme, a simulation model of the wind turbine or wind plant must
be provided to the TSO. The model shall be provided in a format given by the TSO, and the
model shall show the characteristics of the wind turbine or wind plant in both static
simulations (load flow) and dynamic simulations (time simulations). The model shall be used
in feasibility studies prior to the installation of the wind turbine or wind plant and the
commissioning tests for the wind turbine or the wind plant shall include a verification of the
model.

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The following documents have been included in this chapter:

Document Status
Data exchange agreement between the Nordic Binding agreement
transmission system operators (TSOs) 2006

The following national documents deal with the Data Code:

Document Status

____________________________________________________________________________

The TSOs in the Nordic countries have entered into a data exchange agreement, Data exchange
agreement between the Nordic TSOs. The data exchange agreement contains a basis and data
for a grid model and joint operation model, which was drawn up jointly by the TSOs. The
agreement is reproduced in this section.

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DATA EXCHANGE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NORDIC TRANSMISSION

SYSTEM OPERATORS (TSOS).......................................................................................... 180
1 INTRODUCTION .............................................................................................................. 180
2 PARTIES......................................................................................................................... 180
3 SCOPE............................................................................................................................ 180
4 RULES OF CONFIDENTIALITY ......................................................................................... 181
5 INTERNAL USE AND USE WITHIN NORDEL ...................................................................... 181
6 USE OF CONSULTANTS ................................................................................................... 181
7 EQUIVALENTS ............................................................................................................... 182
8 ANONYMISED COMPLETE MODEL .................................................................................. 182
9 TRANSFER AND RENEGOTIATION OF AGREEMENT .......................................................... 182
10 THE AGREEMENT IS ACCESSIBLE TO MARKET ACTORS ............................................... 182
11 BREACH .................................................................................................................... 182
12 VALIDITY PERIOD AND NOTICE OF TERMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT ...................... 183
13 FILING OF THE AGREEMENT ....................................................................................... 183
SCOPE OF DATA FOR THE COMPLETE NORDIC GRID MODEL .......................... 184

SCOPE OF DATA FOR THE MULTI AREA POWER MARKET SIMULATOR ....... 185

DRAFT AGREEMENT – POWER SYSTEM DATA – USE OF CONSULTANT

ASSISTANCE......................................................................................................................... 187

PROCEDURE FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THE NORDEL DATA SET
.................................................................................................................................................. 188

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DATA EXCHANGE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE NORDIC

TRANSMISSION SYSTEM OPERATORS (TSOS)

Framework for the exchange, use and distribution of power system data

1 Introduction
The liberalisation of the energy sector in Europe has made it necessary to re-evaluate a number
of old co-operative relationships. However, operational reliability for an individual country is
still dependent on the reliability of the composite system.

The primary purpose of formalised Nordic co-operation in the field of power system data is to
create the best possible basis for system analyses of the interconnected Nordic power system
for dealing with balance and capacity problems and for secure exploitation of the advantages of
interconnected systems, as well as to achieve
savings in terms of time and resources.

A further important aim is to control the distribution of the models that are used to analyse the
Nordic power system, i.e. the complete Nordic grid model and the multi area power market
simulator.

Certain data are subject to preparedness-related restrictions in the individual countries or are of
commercial interest. Data concerning production plants should be considered commercial, and
must therefore be treated as confidential; for further information see § 4.

This document sets out the framework that shall control future activity, primarily the exchange,
use and distribution of power system data for and in the form of the grid model and the multi
area power market simulator, as well as access to analysis results.

2 Parties
The parties to the agreement are the Nordic TSOs, Energinet.dk (cvr no 28980671, Denmark).,
Fingrid Oyj (Business ID 1072894-3, Finland), Statnett SF (NO 962 986 633 MVA, Norway),
Affärsverket svenska kraftnät (Org. no.: 202100-4284, Sweden) and Landsnet (Registration no.
580804-2410, Iceland).

It is a precondition that the parties take part in the co-operation by virtue of their function as
TSOs. The Planning Committee of Nordel administers the agreements.

3 Scope
The data exchange agreement applies to the basis of and data for the grid model and multi area
power market simulator established jointly between the TSOs in Nordel.

Grid model
The term grid model refers to the power system data that are needed in order to carry out load
flow and dynamic studies on all or parts of the Nordic power system including the non-
synchronised power system on Jutland. If the need arises, data for an equivalent of the
complete Nordic grid model and fault current studies can be included in the work of the
working group.

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The scope of the term “complete Nordic grid model” is specified in Appendix 1.

Multi area power market simulator

The term multi area power market simulator refers to the power system data needed to calculate the
power and energy balances of the entire Nordic power system, including assessment of the plants’
expected operation in the market.

The scope of the term “complete Nordic multi area power market simulator” is specified in Appendix 2.

Procedure
The procedure for the use and maintenance of the Nordel dataset is described in Appendix 4.

The procedure can be altered by unanimous decision of the Planning Committee.

4 Rules of confidentiality
If the data that the parties exchange with each other has not been published in the country to
which it refers, the parties are obliged to treat the data confidentially as far as possible in
accordance with the legislation in force in the respective country.

5 Internal use and use within Nordel

The grid model and the multi area power market simulator may be freely used for studies by
the parties to the agreements or for studies that exclusively involve the parties to the
agreements, either bilaterally or with several parties involved.

All results from internal use of the models are regarded as the property of the parties
participating in the study. In the case of analyses whose results are of significance for another
party to the agreement, that party will be kept regularly informed.

The grid model and the multi area power market simulator may be freely used in Nordel’s
studies.

6 Use of consultants
In cases where one of the parties to this agreement uses a consultant for advice on a study or to
carry it out, and the consultant represents a party to this agreement in his name, the grid model
or the multi area power market simulator or the anonymised model may be passed to the
consultant subject to his signature to the agreement that governs the relationship, confirming
that the consultant will treat the information in strict confidence, and will obey the same rules
of confidentiality as apply to the relationship between the parties for the particular data in the
country where this data was produced; see Appendix 3.

The consultancy agreement is entered into solely by the parties of that assignment. Results and
background material are the property of the client (the party/ies). The other parties of this data
exchange agreement are to be informed of such consultant agreements. The information is
governed by the procedure in Appendix 4.

Agreements for consultant assistance may only be entered into with consultants who are
accepted by the parties to this agreement. The consultant’s name and a presentation of the
consultant must be sent to the other parties for approval within two weeks. Accepted
consultants can only use the models for studies carried out for one or more of the parties of this
data exchange agreement.

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Agreements with consultants must state that they do not obtain rights of use or ownership of
results produced with the aid of data in accordance with this agreement; see Appendix 3.

7 Equivalents
Equivalents of the Nordic power system can be supplied to and used by third parties for their
studies. In such cases, studies may be done by a third party. The complete grid model or the
complete multi area power market simulator may be used by the parties to the agreement to
create such equivalents.

An equivalent is a simplified version of the complete Nordic models (see Appendix 1 and
Appendix 2). The aim is that the characteristics of the equivalent at the connection points
should be the same as those of the complete model (in terms of load distribution, impedances
and dynamic response, for example). It must not be possible to identify in the equivalent the
internal relationships in the model.

8 Anonymised complete model

An anonymised complete model of the Nordic power system can be supplied to and used by
third parties for their studies. In such cases, studies may be done by a third party. An
anonymised complete model is a special case of an equivalent. An anonymised complete model
may only be supplied after specific processing and consensus in the Planning Committee (see
Appendix 3).

Results of studies (see definition in Appendix 3) are to be given to all parties in accordance
with procedure.

9 Transfer and renegotiation of agreement

If restructuring takes place in one of the countries involved in the collaboration, agreements
and information concerning this matter may be transferred to the organisation that is given
responsibility for the system in the country in question.

If one of the above-mentioned parties wishes to renegotiate the agreement, this process must
start not later than six months from the request to do so. Once entered into, an agreement
remains valid until a new agreement comes into force.

10 The agreement is accessible to market actors

To create confidence that the TSOs are fulfilling their obligations, this agreement will be made
accessible to the market actors, who are required to supply data. This can be done, for example,
by placing the agreements on Nordel’s website, and by the parties to the agreement placing
links to Nordel’s website on their own websites.

11 Breach
In so far as a party is in breach of the provisions of the agreement, that party is obliged, within
one month of being required to do so in writing by the other parties to the agreement, to cease
using data, and the agreement is thereafter terminated as regards the party in breach. During
that month, no data may be copied or distributed.

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12 Validity period and notice of termination of the agreement

By signing of this agreement the previous data exchange agreement of 27. June 2002 will
expire.

The agreement is valid until further notice and ceases after unanimous agreement between the
parties. Three months’ notice of termination of the agreement may be given in writing by one
of the parties to the agreement, with the effect that the party who gave notice withdraws from
the agreement. The party giving notice undertakes to cease using all data, models and
information about the systems of the other parties to the agreement that, through the agreement,
is in the possession of that party within one week of notice to terminate the agreement.

After notice of termination of the agreement has been given, no data may be copied or
otherwise transferred or distributed.

13 Filing of the agreement

The agreement is drawn up in one copy, which is filed by the active secretariat of Nordel. Each
party must be provided with a duplicate of the agreement.

Helsinki 7.th. March 2006

<signature> <signature>

Statnett, Øivind Rue Svenska Kraftnät, Bo Krantz

<signature> <signature>

Fingrid Oyj, Pertti Kuronen Fingrid Oyj, Jussi Jyrinsalo

<signature> <signature>

Energinet.dk, Peter Jørgensen Landsnet, Eymundur Sigurdsson,

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SCOPE OF DATA FOR THE COMPLETE NORDIC GRID MODEL

The Nordic grid model is data for the Nordic power system formatted on the format of the
analysis software used in the model in accordance with the procedure, but the term also applies
to the same data formatted for the
format of other analysis softwares.

The term “power system data” comprises:

• All information stated in the definition of the data format of the analysis software used for
studies with synchronous (positive-sequence), inverse (negative-sequence) and zero (zero-
sequence) system data for 400 kV to 70 kV, possibly including equivalents for the
connection of production and compensation installations at a lower voltage level and for
the dynamic studies below:

 Data for existing and future production, transmission and compensation

installations including dynamic models.

 Recorded or forecast data for active and reactive consumption in different operating
situations, for instance high load and low load.

 Production data for existing and future production plants in different operating
situations.

 Information about operational connection in different operating situations.

• Models and utility softwares developed and/or owned by the parties to the agreement and
used in the studies

• Map material and drawing data that describe, or are used to describe, the geographical or
electrical characteristics of the power system

• Written and electronic background material for creating and documenting the grid model

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SCOPE OF DATA FOR THE MULTI AREA POWER MARKET

SIMULATOR
The Nordic multi area power market simulator comprises data for analysis of the power
balance, e.g. the power and energy balance for the Nordic power system. There are three main
types of data:

Production data:
Production data is stated for the different types of production plant. These types may, for
example, be subdivided into
• Hydro power
• Thermal power - condensing
• Thermal power withdrawal
• Thermal power, back-pressure – district heating
• Thermal power, back-pressure – industry
• Wind power

In addition, the plants are distributed geographically in accordance with the subdivisions in the
transmission models; see below.

Technical data includes:

• Efficiencies
• Capacities
• Fuel type
• Availability
• Environmental conditions
• In addition, for wind power the energy conditions are stated in the form of time series
suitable broken down by time; see below.
• For hydro power, the reservoir volume, draw-down limitations, and for certain analyses
the relevant wind conditions, should be stated.

Financial data includes:

• Operating and maintenance costs

Further data: may include reserves (instantaneous, rapid), etc.

Consumption data:
• Annual consumption for electric power and for heating, when connected to a CHP plant
• Distribution of the consumption over the year – broken down by time, for example
weeks and within the week into 3 to 8 load sections
• Additional material describing the maximum load situation
• Geographically distributed in accordance with the breakdowns in the grid models; see
below

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Grid and transmission data:

Transmission data is maintained on two levels of detail:

• For basic energy balances: here a DC approximation is needed, with the Nordel area
subdivided into a modest number of areas with transmission between them. Data
comprises transmission capacities, losses, availability, grid tariffs.

• For further assessments, e.g. to be able to assess the plausibility of the subdivision in
the DC approximation, there must be a more detailed description. Subdivision into
areas and design of the grid model must be coordinated with the Nordel Grid Group.

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DRAFT AGREEMENT – POWER SYSTEM DATA – USE OF

CONSULTANT ASSISTANCE
Agreement on the handling of power system data from TSO(s) to consultancy companies for
use in the study “Study”
The consultancy company is referred to below as the recipient.

The transfer of power system data is subject to the following provisions:

1. All power system data received must be treated as confidential information, and the
recipient must sign a declaration of confidentiality which contains, among others, the same
clause as in § 4 of the agreement.
2. All power system data supplied by TSOs may only be used for the above-mentioned study.
3. When the recipient has completed the above-mentioned study, the received power system
data must be deleted from the media on which it was stored (paper, magnetic tape, hard
disk, backup etc). This must be confirmed not later than two months after completion of the
study. Power system data must not be stored on media, where backup routines make the
said deletion impossible.
4. The recipient will appoint one person who is responsible for the received information /
power system data and who will ensure that the content of this agreement is respected and
complied with.
5. Individuals at the recipient’s company who are given access to the supplied power system
data in order to carry out the study must be informed of the content of this agreement.
6. The recipient shall ensure that their computer and network security is sufficient (i.e.
conforms to the de facto standard of the sector).
7. Parties to the agreement may approach the software supplier about software-related and
model-related questions and in connection with this attach a data model. In this context, the
software supplier has the status of a consultant. If the answer is of general interest, the
parties to the agreement must be informed.
8. Results and background material from the study are the property of the client.
9. The content and scope of the term “power system data” are defined in Appendix 1.
10. The parties to the data exchange agreement between the TSOs are entitled to information
about the content and results of the abovementioned study.

Sections 1 to 10 of this appendix apply to studies carried out with the complete model (see
Appendices 1 and 2) and with the anonymised model (see § 8 of the agreement). Sections 2
and 4 to 10 apply to studies carried out with an equivalent (see § 7 of the agreement).

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PROCEDURE FOR THE MAINTENANCE AND USE OF THE NORDEL

DATA SET
This appendix described the procedure for the maintenance and use of the grid model and multi
area power market simulator at the date of signing of the agreement.

A distinction is made between operational studies and planning studies.

Operational studies are carried out by the parties when necessary.

At the start of a planning study, if the result concerns more than two parties, the parties to the
agreement are informed of the aims and timetable of the study not later than the first meeting
of the Planning Committee of Nordel. The results of such a jointly carried-out planning study
will be given to all parties to the agreement.

The chairman of the Planning Committee or the Operations Committee (as appropriate) must
stress to any new members of the committees that everyone who is given access to the data
must be aware of the content of the data exchange agreement.

Use of consultants
Each TSO chooses its own consultants.

The Nordic TSOs agree only to use consultants whose strategic interests are beyond question.

Any doubts must be raised with the TSO concerned before the data set is handed over.

Grid model data set

The grid model data set includes a data set for expansion planning to be used by, among others,
the Grid Group, and a data set for operational planning, to be used by, among others, the
Analysis Group of the Operations Committee.

Data sets must be established and supplied in the format for the latest version of a jointly
chosen analysis software. At the signing of the agreement this is the analysis software PSS/E
version 30 (from the company Siemens PTI).

A company is responsible for the functionality and updating of the Nordic dynamic grid model
for a period of three years. The grid model must be a model for performing load-flow and
dynamic analyses for the Nordic interconnected-operation power system. Since the major part
of the model, namely the dynamic data, is common to operations and planning, the model is
common to the Grid Group and the Analysis Group.

Svenska Kraftnät is responsible from 2005 to 2007 inclusive.

The parties to the data exchange agreement undertake to provide the best possible basis
available for the work on the common grid model.

In addition to the necessary data it includes resources for making the multiarea power market
simulator work and reflect the physical situation and to ensure that the content of the model is
documented both technically and clearly.

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Any revision of the grid model and the preconditions for a new model will be decided on by the Grid
Group. The need for revision or for the creation of a new model is normally assessed yearly. In
addition, all the parties to the agreement must provide information about important changes that may be
significant for the multi area power market simulator, as quickly as possible.

Multi area power market simulator data set

The members of the Balance Group must regularly gather and maintain data on production
systems, transmission systems and electricity consumption in the respective country, for the
work of the group.

Data sets must be established and supplied in the format for the latest version of a jointly
chosen analysis software. At the signing of the agreement this is the analysis softwares
“Samkjøringsmodel” (multi area power market simulator) (from SINTEF of Norway) and
“Samlastmodel” (multi area power market simulator) (from Powel of Norway).

Updating and filing procedure

The procedure is updated as necessary in accordance with § 3 of the agreement, and is
approved by unanimous decision of the Planning Committee.

The chairman of the Planning Committee is responsible for ensuring that the currently valid
procedure is filed at the Nordel secretariat.

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