VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 189 *FIRST DIVISION.

Court of Appeals, Special First Division, composed of JJ. Reyes, LB Gaviola.

**

Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals Jr and De Castro.

No. L-40502. November 29, 1976. * 190
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE and HONORABLE SEVERO A. 190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
MALVAR, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Laguna, Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
Branch VI, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF is of such nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant
APPEALS, PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B
** factor, x x x In other words, “resides,” should be viewed or
GARCIA, respondents. understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
No. L-42670. November 29, 1976. *
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode.
It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat.
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE
Same; Same; Evidence; Death certificate is admissible to prove
ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance
the residence of the deceased at the time of his death.—A death
of Rizal, Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the
GARCIA, respondents. time of his death.
Settlement of estate; Venue; Jurisdiction; Section 1, Rule 73 of Same; Same; Court’s discretion to choose the special
the Rules of Court prescribing the court where a decedent’s estate administration should be bused on reason, equity, and justice.—
shall be nettled, which in at the place of his residence or where the Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator does
estate is located, relates to venue and not jurisdiction.—The not tie in the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the
aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 specifically the clause “so far as it judge to become partial, or Lo make his personal likes arid dislikes
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location prevail over, or his passions, to rule, his judgment. Exercise of that
of the estate,” is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and legal
Rule indicates: “Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue principle.
and Processes.” It could not have been intended to define the Same; Same; Special administrator; The rules applicable in the
jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is choice of a regular administrator should be applied in the
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural appointment of special administrator for a decedent’s estate.—There
matters. Procedure is one thing, jurisdiction over the subject matter is no reason why the same fundamental and legal principles
is another, x x x A fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken
settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of into account in the appointment of a special administrator. Nothing
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over is wrong for the judge to consider the order of preference in the
the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special
Same; Same: Same; The term “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 on administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all others
settlement of a decedent’s estate refers to his actual residence as in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the estate
distinguished from his legal residence or domicile.—We lay down the of the decedent. Under the law, the widow would have the right of
doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi termini“actual succession over a portion CM the exclusive property of the decedent,
residence” as distinguished from “legal residence or domicile.” This besides her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she
term “resides,” like the terms “residing” and “residence” is elastic would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the
and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. The good or bad
statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the
statutes and rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court naked ownership of a property.
_______________
 Same; Same; Venue; Supreme Court may decree, under its A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia
supervisory authority over courts, that venue was transferred from on May 8, 1973, contending that the order appointing Virginia
one trial court to another.—Under these circumstances and the G. Fule as special administratrix was issued without
doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court under jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of
its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly decree
administration has been served upon all persons interested in
that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
the estate; there has been no delay or cause for delay in the
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice
and proceedings for the appointment of a regular administrator as
191 the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be
VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 191 preferred in the appointment of a special administratrix; and,
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of the estate of Amado G. Garcia.
Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be appointed
PETITIONS for review the decision of the Court of Appeals. special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule,
and as regular administratrix after due hearing.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court. While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution
Francisco Carreon for petitioners. before the Court, Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents. motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix
alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the motion
MARTIN, J.: for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was
obtained through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what 192
the word “resides” in Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules 192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
of Court, referring to the situs of the settlement of the estate Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the misrepresentations; that Virginia G. Fule has adverse interest
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be against the estate; and that she has shown herself unsuitable
reviewed. as administratrix and as officer of the court.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for
First Instance of Laguna, at Calamba, presided over by Judge letters of administration filed by Virginia G. Fule with the
Severe A. Malvar, a petition for letters of administration, Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was published on
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, “that on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly
April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of publication of general circulation in Southern Luzon.
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a
real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and “Supplemental Petition for the Appointment of Regular
in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Administrator ‘ filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On allegation that during the lifetime of the deceased Amado G.
even date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional Delegate for the First
District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at
Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss
Garcia and Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; the petition, because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over
(3) the allegation that Carolina Carpio, who was simply listed the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2)
as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse of venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a
Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her party in interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the
preferential right to the administration of the estate in favor deceased Amado G. Garcia.
of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G, Fule be appointed On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a
as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental motion to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
supplemental petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia G. Fule
the reason, among others, that it attempts to confer admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded
jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which sister of Pablo G. Alcaide, an illegitimate son of Andrea
the court was not possessed at the beginning because the Alcaide, with whom the deceased Amado G. Garcia has no
original petition was deficient. relation.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opporsition to Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on
the original and supplemental petitions for letters of November 14, 1973, one, to enjoin the special administratrix
administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack from taking possession of properties in the hands of third
of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, persons which have not been determined as belonging to
and disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special Amado G. Garcia; another, to remove the special
administratrix. administratrix for acting outside her authority and against the
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of the
20, 1973, praying for authority to take possession of properties minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of
of the decedent allegedly in the hands of third persons as well cause of action, jurisdiction, and improper venue.
as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia omnibus motion of Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss
opposed the motion, calling attention to the limitation made filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the motion to dismiss,
by Judge Malvar on the power of the special administratrix, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special
viz., “to making an inventory of the personal and real administratrix are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of
properties making up the estate of the deceased “ the Rules of Court, subject only to the previous qualification
1

193 made by the court that the administration of the properties

VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 193 subject of
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals _______________
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued 1 “Sec. 2. Powers and duties of special administrator.—Such special
an order, received by Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, administrator shall take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights,
denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia to reconsider the credits, and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or
order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administrator afterwards appointed, and for that purpose may commence and
maintain suits as administrator. He may sell only such perishable and other
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of
property as the court orders sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to
May 18, 1973. pay any debts of the deceased unless so ordered by the court.”
 194 second, holding that the power allowed the special
194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED administratrix enables her to conduct and submit an
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals inventory of the assets of the estate.
the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the reconsideration of the foregoing orders of November 28, 1973
latter; and that the special administratrix had already been and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or failed to
authorized in a previous order of August 20, 1973 to take rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of
custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title action) of Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d)
and personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar 195
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 195
Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa appointment, qualification and removal of special
B. Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix
qualifying words like “married to Amado Garcia” does not of checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba
appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first
order of July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motion to questioned order denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motion for
reconsider the appointment of Virginia G. Fule and admitting reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19, 1974, Judge
the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G. Fule to Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one,
allege in her original petition for letters of administration in directing Ramon Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters
the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., to furnish Virginia
was cured. Judge Malvar further held that Preciosa B. Garcia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to
her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special deliver to her the corresponding amount due the estate;
and regular administratrix of the estate. another, directing Preciosa B, Garcia to deliver to Virginia G.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
December 27, 1973 to clarify or reconsider the foregoing order and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court
of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court order limiting the all certificates of title in his possession in the name of Preciosa
authority of the special administratrix to the making of an B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word “single” or
inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of “married to Amado Garcia.”
her motion to dismiss the petitions for lack of cause of action, During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp.
and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B. Garcia. Resolution Proc. 27-C) before Judge Malvar. Virginia G. Fule presented
2

of her motions to substitute and remove the special the death certificate of Amado G. Garcia showing that his
administratrix was likewise prayed for. residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate part, Preciosa B, Garcia presented the residence certificate of
orders, the first, denying Preciosa B. Garcia’s motions to the decedent for 1973 showing that three months before his
substitute and remove the special administratrix, and the death his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia G. Fule also
testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, the same intestate estate of Amado G. Garcia. On February
Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge
Laguna. Vicente G. Ericta granted the motion and appointed Preciosa
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. B. Garcia as special administratrix upon a bond of P30,000.00.
Garcia commenced a special action for certiorari and/or Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court of For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B, Garcia
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to informed Judge Ericta of the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C
annul the proceedings before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. before Judge Malvar of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, or, in the and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of
alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, Appeals on January 80, 1975. She manifested, however, her
viz., one dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for willingness to withdraw Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision
reconsideration of the order denying their motion to dismiss of the Court of Appeals annulling the proceedings before the
the criminal and supplemental petitions on the issue, among Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have
others, of not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for
_______________ reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of
2 July 2, 1973, July 26, 1973, August 9, 1973, July 17, 1974, July 25, 1974,
at 270-391, Rollo of No. L-40502. the proceedings before his court until Preciosa B. Garcia
196 inform the court of the final outcome of the case pending before
196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B.
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals Garcia filed on December 11, 1975, an “Urgent Petition for
jurisdiction, and the three others, ail dated July 19, 1974, Authority to Pay Estate Obligations.”
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a “Special
administratrix, Virginia G. Fule, and to the court. Appearance to Question Venue and Jurisdiction” reiterating
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered the grounds stated in the previous special appearance of
judgment annulling the proceedings before Judge Severo A. March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the
Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Court of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for
197
Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 197
1975, Virginia G. Fule forthwith elevated the matter to Us on Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed as G.R. No. L- reconsideration had been appealed to this Court; that the
40502. parties had already filed their respective briefs, and that the
However, even before Virginia G, Fule could receive the case is still pending before the Court.
decision of the Court of Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Paño, who
already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for letters of succeeded Judge Ericta, issued an order granting Preciosa B.
administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Garcia’s “Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate
Quezon City Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over Obligations” in that the payments were for the benefit of the
estate and that there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of 18 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
the proceedings in Sp, Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
Instance of Laguna. creditor, or otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia intestate and his last residence within the country are
on January 12, 1976. foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in the
On February 4, 1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was
No. L-42670, a petition for certiorari with temporary not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left
restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. Q- no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court
19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Patio from further to grant letters of administration.3

acting in the case. A restraining order was issued on February The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75,
9, 1976. We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the Section 1), specifically the clause “so far as it depends on the
petition for certiorari in G.R. No. L-42670for the reasons and place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of the
considerations hereinafter stated. estate,” is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court Rule indicates: “Settlement of Estate of Deceased
provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the Philippines at Persons, Venue and Processes.” It could not have been
4

the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure
estate nettled; in the Court, of First Instance in the province in dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The
inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First Instance of power or authority of the court over the subject matter “existed
any province in which he had estate. The court first taking and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.” That
cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall power or authority is not altered or changed by procedure,
exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. The which simply directs the manner in which the power or
jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it depends on the authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases
place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his though that if the power is not exercised conformably with the
estate, shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in provisions of the procedural law, purely, the court attempting
an appeal from that court, in the original case, or when the to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally. However,
want of jurisdiction appears on the record.” With particular this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject
regard to letters of administration, Section 2,’ Rule 79 of the matter. Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose
Revised Rules of Court demands that the petition therefor jurisdiction over the person or that the judgment may thereby
should affirmatively show the existence of jurisdiction to make be rendered defective for lack of something essential to sustain
the appointment sought, and should allege all the necessary it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at
facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the once raises a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with
decedent, the existence, and situs if need be, of assets, the jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter. In plain
intestacy, where this is relied upon, and the right of the person words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to the
who seeks administration, as next of kin, parties.5

198
 The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts the same meaning as the term “inhabitant.” In other words,
8

of First Instance jurisdiction over all probate cases “resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense,
independently of the place of residence of the deceased. meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
in the country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular
the sense, the term means merely residence, that is, personal
_______________ residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
9

requires bodily presence as an inhabitantin a given place,

3 Diez v. Serra, 51 Phil. 286 (1927).
4 See Malig v. Bush, L-22761, May 31, 1969, 28 SCRA 453-454. while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also
5 Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 530-32 (1911). an intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of
10

199 time of residence is required though; however, the residence

VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 199 must be
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals _______________
venue or the place where each case shall be brought. A 6 In re Kaw Singco. Sy Oa v. Co Ho, 74 Phil. 241-242 (1943); Rodriguez v.

fortiori, the place of residence of the deceased in settlement of Borja, L-21993, June 21, 1966, 17 SCRA 442.
estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of 7 McGrath v. Stevenson, 77 P 2d 608; In re Jones, 19 A 2d 280.

administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction 8 See 92 C.J.S. 813-14; See also Cuenco v. Court of Appeals, L-24742,

October 26, 1973, 53 SCRA 377.

over the subject matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And 9 See 77 C.J.S. 286.

it is upon this reason that the Revised Rules of Court properly 10 Kemp v. Kemp, 16 NYS 2d 34.

considers the province where the estate of a deceased person 200

shall be settled as “venue.” 6 200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
2, But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
“resides” mean? Does it refer to the actual residence or more than temporary. 11

domicile of the decedent at the time of his death? We lay down 3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and
the doctrinal rule that the term “resides” connotes ex vi Preciosa B. Garcia on the residence of the deceased Amado G.
termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal Garcia at the time of his death. In her original petition for
residence or domicile.” This term “resides,” like the terms letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
“residing” and “residence,” is elastic and should be interpreted Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated “(t)hat on
in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of
which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
7
Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of Manila, leaving
rules—Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and
such nature—residence rather than domicile is the significant in other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
factor. Even where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it Court.” Preciosa B. Garcia assailed the petition for failure to
is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper laying of
technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or
terms “residence” and “domicile” but as generally used in residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as
statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey “property owner of Calamba, Laguna,” he also resides in
Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur. On the laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to
death certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before improper venue is subject to waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the
the Calamba court and in other papers, the last residence of Revised Rules of Court states: “When improper venue is not
Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived.” In the
Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended case before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in
petition, Virginia G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. asking to substitute Virginia G. Fule as special
Garcia’s “last place of residence was at Calamba, Laguna.” administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily waive
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court
deceased Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere
Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A practical resort to alternative remedy to assert her rights as
death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the
decedent at the time of his death. As it is, the death certificate
12 Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last
of Amado G. Garcia, which was presented in evidence by residence of the decedent.
Virginia G. Fule herself and also by Preciosa B. Garcia, shows 4. Preciosa B. Garcia’s challenge to Virginia G. Fule’s
that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel Avenue, appointment as special administratrix is another issue of
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to the
deceased’s residence certificate for 1973 obtained three appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides
months before his death; the Marketing Agreement and Power that “(w)hen there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning over the of administration by any cause including an appeal from the
administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint
Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the a special administrator to take possession and charge of the
Deed of Donation dated January 8, 1973, transferring part of estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay
his interest in are decided and executors or administrators
_______________ appointed. Formerly, the appointment of a special
13

administrator was only proper when the allowance or

See 92 C.J.S. 816.
11

See Rules of Court, Francisco, Vol V-B, 1970 Ed., at 32; Manzanero v.
12
disallowance of a will is under appeal. The new Rules,
Bongon, 67 Phil. 602 (1939). however, broadened the basis for appointment and such
201 appointment is now allowed when there is delay in granting
VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 201 letters testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g.,
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals parties cannot agree among themselves. Nevertheless,
14

certain parcels of land in Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. _______________

Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels of land in 13 A special administrator is a representative of decedent, appointed by the

Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. probate court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general
Garcia’s last place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, administrator is appointed. (Jones v. Minnesota Transfer R. Co., 121 NW 606,
the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia cited in Jacinto, Special Proceedings, 1965 ed., at 106.
14 See Proceedings of the Institute on the Revised Rules of Court, UP Law
C. Fule’s petition for letters of administration was improperly
Center, 1963, at 99.
 202 16 Ozaeta v. Pecson, 93 Phil. 415-20 (1953).
202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 17 Roxas v. Pecson. 92 Phil. 410 (1948).
18 Idem, at 411.

Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals 19 Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: An illegitimate child has no right

the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not lies in to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father
the probate court. That, however, is no authority for the judge
15 or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from
the illegitimate child.”
to become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes 20 Fernandez v. Maravilla, L-18799, March 31, 1964, 10 SCRA 597.

prevail over, or his passions to rule, his judgment. Exercise of 203

that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice and VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 203
legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
and legal principles governing the choice of a regular court does not determine who are entitled to share in the
administrator should not ‘be taken into account in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the
appointment of a special administrator. Nothing is wrong for
16
administration. The issue of heirship is one to be determined
the judge to consider the order of preference in the in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on
appointment of a regular administrator in appointing a special the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be
administrator. After all, the consideration that overrides all the basis of distribution, The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia
21

others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee is with sufficient reason. In a Donation Inter Vivos executed
in the estate of the decedent. Under the law, the widow would
17
by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8, 1973 in favor
have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married
property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal to Preciosa B. Garcia. In his certificate of candidacy for the
22

partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not office of Delegate to the Constitutional Convention for the
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly First District of Laguna filed on September 1, 1970, he wrote
than any other next of kin. The good or bad administration of therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. Faced 23

a property may affect rather the fruits than the naked with these documents and the presumption that a man and a
ownership of a property. 18
woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa entered into a lawful contract of marriage, Preciosa B. Garcia
B. Garcia as the widow of the late Amado G. Garcia. With can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the
equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that Virginia G. Fule late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrivionio. 24

has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she 5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down
is a mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any in Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, this Court under its
25

successional rights. On this point, We rule that Preciosa B.

19
supervisory authority over all inferior courts may properly
Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of special decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by
administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of and transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of
such appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only justice and avoidance of needless delay that the Quezon City
until a regular administrator is appointed, the appointing
20
court’s exercise of jurisdiction over the settlement of the estate
_______________
of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment of
15 J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. De Guzman, 99 Phil. 281 (1956); Hon. Alcasid special administratrix over the latter’s estate be approved and
v. Samson, 102 Phil. 736 (1957). authorized and the Court of First Instance of Laguna be
disauthorized from continuing with the case and instead be not prosper and should be dismissed where the same property
required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First and the same claim are pending adjudication in a separate
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceeding for the settlement of the testate estate for the
proceedings. deceased. (Macias vs. Uy Kim, 45 SCRA 251).
_______________ The service of notice on individual heirs, legatees and
devisees involves mere procedural convenience and not
21 Ngo The Hua v. Chung Kiat Hua, L-17091, September 30, 1968, 9 SCRA
113. jurisdictional requisite. (Abut vs. Abut, 45 SCRA 326).
22 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 219, Annex “SS” to Petition for Certiorari The court with whom the petition is first filed, must also
and/or Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction by Preciosa B. Garcia in CA- first take cognizance of the settlement of the estate in order to
G.R. No. 03221-SP.
23 Vide, Rollo of No. L-40502, at 268; Annex 5 to Answer filed by Virginia G.
exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
Fule to petition of Preciosa B. Garcia in C.A.-G.R. No. 03221-SP. (Cuenco vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 360).
24 See Perido vs. Perido, L-28248, March 12, 1975, Makalintal, An action to terminate co-ownership belongs to the regular
C.J., ponente, First Division, 63 SCRA 97. courts and not to the probate court after the will of the
25 53 SCRA 381.
deceased predecessor-in-interest of the parties had been
203
204
probated, closed and terminated. (Arce vs. Sundiam,70 SCRA
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED 44).
Where a complaint states two causes of action, one for
Garcia Fule vs. Court of Appeals
breach of contract to pay a sum of money and the other a tort
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Paño of
or criminal act of coercion, the fact that in both cases the relief
December 17, 1975, granting the “Urgent Petition for
sought is payment of money, does not bar dismissal of the first
Authority to Pay Estate Obligations” filed by Preciosa B.
cause of action as a money claim to be prosecuted before the
Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-
proper Court of First Instance that will take cognizance of the
42670, and ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to 205
her as special administratrix the sum of P48,874.70 for VOL. 74, NOVEMBER 29, 1976 205
payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld. People vs. Lopez
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner
settlement proceedings of the estate of the defendant who died
Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R. No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L-
before he had completed the formal presentation of his
42670 are hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.
evidence in support of his counterclaim. (Dy vs. Enage, 70
SO ORDERED.
SCRA 96).
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concep
cion Jr., JJ., concur. ——o0o——
Aquino, J., and Concepcion, J., were designated to sit
in the First Division. © Copyright 2017 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
Muñoz Palma, J., did not take part.
Petitions denied.
Notes.—The action for the annulment of the sale and the
recovery of property allegedly inherited from the deceased will