OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Runway Overrun
Protection and Warning
The Airbus answer to prevent runway excursion during landing
Presented by
Sourya KAHLOUL / Sr Flight Operations Engineer
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Page 2
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Contents
1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
2 How does the ROPS work?
3 Installation & certification
Page 3
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Contents
1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
2 How does the ROPS work?
3 Installation & certification
Page 4
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
Non-Stabilized
IATA Safety Report 2010 a pproaches
Breakdown per Accident Category
Derotation
Long Flare /Long
t l ow a ltitude
ift a
Wind sh
23% Runway Excursion Conta
minat
ed Runw
ays
Late selection of re
versers
u al br aking
Ma n
Late
Follow SOP No runway excursions
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
Proactive
Airport Operational
on-board
infrastructures technology procedures
2009‐2012
2009‐2012 1998
1998
Flight Safety
Foundation : Creation
Recommended ICAO of Approach & Landing
Runway End Safety Accident Reduction
Area (RESA) (ALAR) Toolkit
2010
2010
Takeoff & Landing
Performance
Assessment (TALPA)
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Contents
1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
2 How does the ROPS work?
3 Installation & certification
Page 7
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
ROPS Principle
HELPS
CREW DECISION MAKING
WARNS
THE CREW IF RUNWAY TOO SHORT
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OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
ROPS Principle
V app
Lateral
Position
Landing
Configuration
Algorithm assuming :
-Operational Braking,
-Reversers : Ground Speed
IDLE on dry
MAX on wet
-15% margin…. Wind
Landing Distance computation on DRY & WET runways
Comparison with the runway length
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OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
ROPS Principle
9 Wind and /or Low visibility
9 AP engaged or not
9 Overweight Landing
9 With aircraft landing configuration
9 Contaminated runways not taken into
account
PFD: Visual ROPS alerts
LOUDSPEAKERS: Audio ROPS alerts
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
ROPS Principle
ROPS = ROW + ROP
Transition Point: Autobrake activation or
Ground Spoilers extension
ROPS automatically
armed at 500 ft
ROW ROP
Runway end Overrun Warning Runway end Overrun Protection
GO-AROUND STOP
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OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
How does ROW work?
Before the Transition point
Transition Point
PFD Audio Pilot Action
(Below 500 ft) (Below 200 ft) (Below 500 ft)
Go-Around Decision
If Runway Condition
None
is not DRY
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
How does ROW work?
Before the Transition point
Transition Point
PFD Audio Pilot Action
(Below 500 ft) (Below 200 ft) (Below 500 ft)
Go-Around
Decision
"RWY TOO SHORT !"
Whatever Runway
Condition
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
How does ROP work?
After the transition point
Transition Point
PFD Audio Pilot Action
“BRAKE…MAX BRAKING…MAX
BRAKING”
- If Max Braking applied and Max
Reverse not selected, Max Braking
"MAX REVERSE" Max Reverse
"KEEP MAX REVERSE"
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
ROPS failures
Failure INOP SYS STATUS Consequences
ROW & ROP lost
System failure ROW & ROP
affecting the available & do not
landing distance take into account
the failure
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Contents
1 Reducing runway excursion: a safety priority
2 How does the ROPS work?
3 Installation & certification
Page 16
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
How to install ROPS - Certification
• ROPS retrofit
• Implementation through software change + one additional wiring
• Retrofit within one night stop
• Certification target dates:
• A320 family: 2nd quarter of 2013
• A330 & A340 family: 3rd quarter of 2013
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
Conclusion
Should become a ‘standard’
Recognised by Insurances &
Risk Management Community in the Aviation Industry
SAFETY ENHANCEMENT:
PREVENTS RUNWAY EXCURSION
RISK AT LANDING
SOP remains the primary means to
prevent runway excursion at landing
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document. This document and all information contained herein is the sole property of AIRBUS S.A.S. No intellectual property rights are granted by the
delivery of this document or the disclosure of its content. This document shall not be reproduced or disclosed to a third party without the express written consent of AIRBUS S.A.S. This document and its content shall not be
used for any purpose other than that for which it is supplied. The statements made herein do not constitute an offer. They are based on the mentioned assumptions and are expressed in good faith. Where the supporting
grounds for these statements are not shown, AIRBUS S.A.S. will be pleased to explain the basis thereof.
AIRBUS, its logo, A300, A310, A318, A319, A320, A321, A330, A340, A350, A380, A400M are registered trademarks.
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
SA prerequisites
Modified Systems Role for ROPS
TAWS landing runway detection, A/C position computation, landing runway characteristics computation
EGPWS P/N 965‐1676‐006
FAC ROPS availability monitoring, “distance‐to‐stop” computation, detection of the risk of runway
B621 overrun, ROPS alerts request and ROPS installed software pin program
FMGC ROPS messages and aural alerts management upon FAC request, “ROPS lost” signal management
S6C13, H2C13, S6I12, H2I12
DMC display of messages on PFD, transmission of the FMGC messages requests to DFDR
EIS1 V701 or EIS2 S10
FWC emission of aural warnings, display on ECAM of “ROW/ROP LOST” message, ROW/ROP INOP SYS
H2‐F6 message, transmission of “All reverses INOP” information to DMC and HUD, transmission of the
reverse inoperative on engines 1 or 4 information to the FMGEC.
SDAC transmission of braking data (pedals position) to FWC
H2‐E3
DFDR OPTIONAL for retrofit
FS1 recording of messages and aural alerts requests received from DMC
HUD OPTIONAL
L5 (TBD) display of messages (consistent with PFD)
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© AIRBUS S.A.S. All rights reserved. Confidential and proprietary document.
OLM 2012 - Overrun Protection and Warning
LR prerequisites
Modified Systems Role for ROPS
TAWS landing runway detection, A/C position computation, landing runway characteristics
EGPWS P/N 965‐1676‐006 computation
FMGC ROPS availability monitoring, “distance‐to‐stop” computation, detection of the risk of
HJ2 for A330 PW/RR, G2 for A330 GE, K3 runway overrun, ROPS messages and alerts request, “ROPS lost” signal management and
for A3456 and F1 for A340 CFM ROPS installed software pin program
DMC display of messages on PFD, transmission of “A/Brake armed” information to FMGC via
EIS1 V513X for A330‐200/300 discrete signal, transmission of the FMGC messages requests to DFDR
EIS1 V112X for A340‐200/300
EIS2 Std L8‐1 for all LR
FWC emission of aural alerts, display on ECAM of “ROW/ROP lost” message, transmission of
T5‐0 for A330 and A3456 “Reverses INOP” information to DMC
L13‐0 for A3423
SDAC transmission of braking data (Auto Brakes modes, pedals position) to FWC and/or DMC
C10‐0 and/or HUD
DFDR OPTIONAL for retrofit
FL1 recording of messages and aural alerts requests received from DMC
HUD OPTIONAL
L5 (TBC) display of messages (consistent with PFD)
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