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CHAPTER 1

The Director of Lands Vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 102858, July 28, 1997

FACTS:

Teodoro Abistado, private respondent, filed a petition for original registration of his title over 648 square
meters of land under P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree. The application was docketed as Land
Registration Case (LRC) No. 86 and assigned to Branch 44 of the Regional Trial Court of Mamburao, Occidental
Mindoro. During the pendency of the case, Teodoro Abistado died and was substituted by his children -
Margarita, Marissa, Maribel, Arnold, and Mary Ann, all surnamed Abistado, who were all represented by their
aunt Josefa Abistado, ad litem ( act in which a lawsuit has a representative in behalf of children not capable of
representation.

Land Registration Court dismissed the petition for want of jurisdiction in compliance with the mandatory
provision requiring publication of initial public hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Records show
that applicants failed to comply with P.D. No. 1529 Section 23 (1) requiring publication of notice of initial
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation. Initial public hearing was only published in the Official Gazette.

The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which granted the application and ordered the registration of
title to Teodoro Abistado, since publication in a newspaper of general Circulation is merely procedural, hence
dispensable. The Director of Land, represented by the Solicitor General, elevated this case to the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Director of Land is correct that the publication of Notice of Initial hearing in a Land
Registration Case is mandatory.

HELD:

Yes. Section 23 of P.D. No. 1529 shall be followed requiring a publication once both in the Official Gazette and
newspaper of general circulation. The Land Registration Case is an in Rem proceeding, meaning the applicant
must prove his title over the land against all persons concerned, who might have interest to right in the
property and should effectively be invited in the court to prove why the title should not be granted. Thus.
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Lower Court dismissing the petition for registration of Land Title to
the respondents.

DOCTRINE:

Such provision used the term "shall" which indicated that it is mandatory.
When the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or

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equivocation, there is room only for application.

The People of the Philippines Vs. Mario Mapa Y. Mapulong

The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

Vs.

Mario Mapa Y. Mapulong, Defendant-Appellant.

G.R. No. L-22301, August 20, 1967

FACTS:
Defendant Mapa was caught having in his possession a home-made revolver, caliber .22 without serial
number and with six rounds of ammunition, without any license. Thus, he was charged and convicted with the
crime of illegal possession of firearms by the Court of First Instance of Manila.

According to the defendant, he was a duly appointed secret agent of Honorable Feliciano Leviste, the then
Governor of Batangas, and that he was directed by the latter to proceed to Manila, Pasay and Quezon for a
confidential mission. These statements are corroborated by proper document exhibits.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant's appointment to and holding a position of secret agent to the provincial
governor would constitute a sufficient defense to the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of fire
arms and ammunition.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila. No provision was made
for a secret agent to be exempted from the licensing of firearms. The law is explicit and it specifically stated
that it is unlawful for any person to possess any firearms, detached parts of firearm and ammunition.
However, there are exceptions which a secret agent is still not included. Officers, Soldiers, Sailors or Marines
of AFP, Philippine Constabulary, Guards employed by the Bureau of Prisons, Municipal Police, Provincial
Governors, Lieutenant Governors, Provincial Treasurers, Municipal Treasurers, Municipal Mayor and Guards of
Provincial Prisoners and jails are exempted from this provision when such firearms are in possession for use in
the performance of their official duties.

DOCTRINE:

No Provision is made for secret agent. Thus, he is not exempted. The first and fundamental duty of the court is
to apply the law. Construction and interpretation comes only after it has demonstrated that the application is
impossible or inadequate.

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G.R. No. 179334 April 21, 2015

SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS and DISTRICT ENGINEER CELESTINO R.
CONTRERAS, Petitioners,
vs.
SPOUSES HERACLEO and RAMONA TECSON, Respondents.

FACTS:

In 1940, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) took respondents-movants' subject property
without the benefit of expropriation proceedings for the construction of the MacArthur Highway. In
1994,respondents-movants demanded the payment of the fair market value of the subject parcel of land.
DPWH, offered to pay for the subject land at the rate of Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter.
Unsatisfied with the offer, respondents-movants demanded the return of their property, or the payment of
compensation at the current fair market value, which is 1,500.00 per square meter.

Regional Trial Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA) decided in favor of respondents-movants that the
subject property shall be valued at One Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (₱1,500.00) per square meter, with
interest at six percent (6%) per annum, interest from the time of the filing of the complaint until full payment,
by way of compensation.

Petitioners thus elevated the matter to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari. We, however, did not
agree with both courts and ruled instead that just compensation should be based on the value of the property
at the time of taking in 1940, which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter. 4 In addition, and by way of
compensation, we likewise awarded an interest of six percent (6%) per annum from 1940 until full payment. 5

Aggrieved, respondents-movants hereby move for the reconsideration of said decision and insist that gross
injustice will result if the amount that will be awarded today will be based simply on the value of the property
at the time of the actual taking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the valuation would be based on the corresponding value at the time of the taking or the time
of the filing of the action.

HELD:

Following the jurisprudence like in the case at bar, and constitutionally, "just compensation" is the sum
equivalent to the market value of the property, broadly described as the price fixed by the seller in open
market in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair value of the property as
between the one who receives and the one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the time of the actual taking
by the government. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator. It has been repeatedly stressed by this Court that the true measure is not the

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taker's gain but the owner's loss. The word "just" is used to modify the meaning of the word "compensation"
to convey the idea that the equivalent to be given for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.

Indeed, the State is not obliged to pay premium to the property owner for appropriating the latter's property;
it is only bound to make good the loss sustained by the landowner, with due consideration of the
circumstances availing at the time the property was taken. More, the concept of just compensation does not
imply fairness to the property owner alone. Compensation must also be just to the public, which ultimately
bears the cost of expropriation.

Lastly, from finality of the Court's Resolution on reconsideration until full payment, the total amount due to
respondents-movants shall earn a straight six percent (6%) legal interest, pursuant to Circular No. 799 and the
case of Nacar.

DOCTRINE:

This Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that its first and fundamental duty is the application of the
law according to its express terms, interpretation being called for only when such literal application is
impossible.49 To entertain other formula for computing just compensation, contrary to those established by
law and jurisprudence, would open varying interpretation of economic policies - a matter which this Court has
no competence to take cognizance of.

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The People of the Philippines Vs. Patricio Amigo

The People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee

Vs.

Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot," Accused-Appellant

G.R. No. 116719, January 18, 1996

FACTS:

On December 29, 1989 at around 1:00 Pm, Benito Ng Suy was driving their gray Ford Fiera back home, with his
daughters, Jocelyn Ng Suy and a younger one together with his two year old son. An accidental head on
collision occurred between the Fiera and the Tamaraw being driven by one Virgillio Abogado, with Abogado
was the accused, Patricio Amigo alias "Bebot". The collision caused slight damage to the right bumper of the
Tamaraw.

While Abogado and Benito were having a verbal confrontation, Patricio approached Benito asking the latter to
leave the incident as it was only a minor incident. However, Benito said that Patricio should not interfere,
which made Patricio irritated and caused the latter to stab Benito, rendering the victim into a critical condition
which later caused his death due to a sepsis infection that has already circulated in his body.

Patricio Amigo was charged initially with Frustrated murder, but was modified to the crime of murder to which
he was convicted with a penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. Accused-Appellant claims that the penalty of reclusion
perpetua is too cruel and harch as a penalty and pleads for sympathy.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the penalty imposed upon the accused "Reclusion Perpetua" be modified or reduced by virtue
of Section 19 (1) of Article III of the Constitution which prohibits the imposition of death penalty.

HELD:
No. The Supreme Court hold that Article III, Section 19 (1) does not change the penalty periods prescribed by
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code except only in so far as it prohibits the imposition of death penalty. The
range of the medium and minimum penalties remain the same.

Thus, a person originally subject to death penalty and another who committed the murder without the
attendance of any modifying circumstances will now be both punishable with the same medium period
although the former is conceitedly more guilty than the latter.

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DOCTRINE:

But that is the will of the constitution and the duty of the court is to apply the law, disregarding the sympathy
or pity for an accused. Dura Lex Sed Lex.

CHAPTER 2

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC

G.R. No. 197676 February 4, 2014

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. and CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS'ASSOCIATION, Petitioners,

vs.

PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE and PROFESSIONAL REGULATION

COMMISSION, Respondents.

FACTS:

R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the "Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines" was signed into law by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. The purpose is to professionalize the real estate service sector under a
regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service practitioners in the country.
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because it violates Article VI, Section 26 of the
1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.

After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:

1.Whether or not R.A. No. 9646 is unconstitutional for violating the “one title-one subject" rule
under Article VI, Section 26 of the Philippine Constitution.

RULING:
R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one-title, one-subject rule. The Court laid down that rule that constitutional
provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly construed as to
cripple or impede the power of legislation. The Court has previously ruled that the one-subject requirement
under the Constitution is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject
matter expressed in the title, or as long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and
title. It is also well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the
title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
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the general object which the statute seeks to effect. Indeed, the Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather
than technical construction of the rule "so as not to cripple or impede legislation."

DEL SOCORRO VS. WILSEM

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

FACTS:
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland. They were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines.
According to Norma, Ernst made a promise to provide monthly support to their son. However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, Ernst never gave support to Roderigo. Respondent remarried
again a Filipina and resides again the Philippines particularly in Cebu where the petitioner also resides. Norma
filed a complaint against Ernst for violation of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor
child with petitioner.

ISSUES:

1. Does a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under the Philippine law?
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure
to support his minor child.

RULING:

1. YES. (While it is true that Respondent Ernst is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so. This does not, however,
mean that Ernst is not obliged to support Norma’s son altogether).

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law. In the present case, Ernst hastily concludes that being a national of
the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to support.
While Ernst pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to
support his son, he never proved the same.

DOCTRINE:
In view of respondent’s failure to rove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and
proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with the Philippine Law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
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judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. Applying
the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to support his child
nor penalize the non-compliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the Philippines because
it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
2. YES. The court has jurisdiction over the offense (R.A 9262) because the foreigner is living here in the
Philippines and committed the offense here.

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CHAPTER 3

Socorro Ramirez vs Court of Appeals and Ester S. Garcia

248 SCRA 590
G. R. No. 93833
September 25 1995

FACTS:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the RTC of Quezon City alleging that the
private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to petitioner’s dignity and
personality, “contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.”

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event. The transcript on which the
civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the
confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the RTC of Pasay City for violation of
RA 4200, entitled “An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wiretapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication, and Other Purposes.”

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the
facts charged do not constitute an offense particularly a violation of RA 4200. The trial court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner.

From the trial court’s Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on certiorari with this Court,
which forthwith referred the case to the CA. Respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision
declaring the trial court’s order null and void.

ISSUE:
W/N RA 4200 applies to taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to a conversation.

HELD:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is
clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be
resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would lead to an
injustice.

Section 1 of RA 4200 clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all parties to
any private communication, to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law

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makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other
than or different from those involved in the private communication. The statute’s intent to penalize all
persons unauthorized to make such recording is underscored by the use of qualifier “any.” Consequently, as
respondent CA correctly concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision
of RA 4200.
The unambiguity of the express words of the provision therefore plainly supports the view held by the
respondent court that the provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where
the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

DOCTRINE:
Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.

Legal Maxims: Verba Legis (the statute must be interpreted literally if the language of the statute is plain and
free from ambiguity)

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Re: Letter· of Court of Appeals Justices Vicente S.E. Veloso, Angelita A. Gacutan and Remedios A. Salazar-
Fernando for computation/adjustment of longevity pay

A.M. No. 12-8-07-CA; A.M. No. 12-9-5-SC; A.M. No. 13-02-07-SC

FACTS:
The petitioners are all Justices of the Court of Appeals. Justices Veloso and Fernando claim longevity pay for
services rendered within and outside the Judiciary as part of their compensation package. Justice Gacutan,
who has recently retired, claims deficiency payment of her longevity pay for the services she has rendered
before she joined the Judiciary, thus demanded for re-computation.

The law under which they claim their longevity pay is provided in B.P. 129, section 42, to wit;
1. The longevity pay is a monthly pay equivalent to 5% of monthly basic pay;
2. Recipients are the Justices and Judges of courts;
3. For each five years of continuous, efficient and meritorious service;
4. The service is to be rendered in the Judiciary;
5. In no case shall the total salary of each Justice or Judge, after his longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of
the Justice or Judge next in rank.

ISSUE:
W/N section 42 of B.P. 129 should be given a liberal interpretation by the Court.

HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that the only service recognized for purposes of longevity pay under the said law is
service in the Judiciary. Hence, their previous positions in the government, specifically both serving as NLRC
Commissioners (Justice Veloso and Justice Gacutan) and serving as COMELEC Commissioner (Justice Fernando)
cannot be credited in the computation of their longevity pay.

DOCTRINE:
Plain Meaning Rule or Verba Legis

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Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMRC) Vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
Imelda Salazar

Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation (GMRC), Petitioner

Vs.
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Imelda Salazar, Respondents
G.R. No. 82511, March 3, 1992

FACTS:
Private Respondent, "Imelda Salazar" was employed as general systems analyst of Globe-Mackay Cable and
Radio Corp. (GMRC) While Delfin Saldivar, her close friend, was employed as technical operations' support
manager in May 1982.

Petitioner GMRC investigated Saldivar's activities due to the reports indicating that the company equipment
and spare parts were in custody of Saldivar. The internal audit report also indicated that Saldivar entered into
a partnership with Richard A. Yambao, owner and manager of Eledon Engineering Services (Elecon), a supplier
often recommended by Saldivar to the petitioner. It also appeared in the course of Maramara's investigation
that Imelda Salazar violated company regulations by involving herself in transactions with conflict of interest
with the company. Evidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between
Yambao and Saldivar, and that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the missing air
conditioner but she failed to inform her employer.

The Company placed Salazar under 1 month preventive suspension, allowing her 30 days within which to
explain her side. However, Salazar instead filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which was
later modified to illegal dismissal.

The Labor arbiter ordered the company to reinstate Salazar to her former and equivalent position and to pay
her full back wages and benefits, plus moral damages. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed
the labor arbiter's decision but limited back wages for only two years and deleted the award of moral
damages.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the action of dismissal would constitute a violation of Art. 279 of the Labor Code, which
protects the security of tenure of an employee.

HELD:
Positive. The Court did not agree on the petitioner's action of suspension and eventual dismissal of Salazar due
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to lack of evidence to show that Salazar was involved with the malicious activities of Saldivar. In the instant
case, petitioner has predicated its dismissal of Salazar on loss of confidence, but derived only from speculative
inferences, which did not pass the Court’s test.

Since there is no evidence to show an authorized or legal dismissal, and GMRC only relied to an internal audit
findings, Salazar, according to the Labor Code, is entitled to reinstatement and full back wages allowed by the
Court.

Art. 279 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides:

Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee
who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other
benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. 6 (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code:

Sec. 2. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular employments, the employer shall not
terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause as provided in the Labor Code or
when authorized by existing laws.

Sec. 3. Reinstatement. — An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages."7 (Emphasis supplied)

DOCTRINE:
The wordings of the Labor Code is clear and unambiguous "An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement and full back wages." Under the principle of Statutory Construction, if a
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation. The plain meaning rule or Verba Legis derived from the maxim "Speech is the index
of intention" should be applied in this case.

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Felicito Basbacio Vs. Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, Franklin Drilon in his capacity as
Secretary of Justice

Felicito Basbacio, Petitioner

Vs.

Office of the Secretary, Department of Justice, Franklin Drilon in his capacity as Secretary of Justice,
Respondent

G.R. No. 109445, November 7, 1994

FACTS:
Felicito Basbacio, with his son in law Wilfredo Balderrama, was convicted of the crime of murder and of two
counts of frustrated murder for the killing of Federico Boyon and the wounding of his wife and son, due to an
apparent land dispute between the Boyon's and the petitioner.

Petitioner appealed the matter and he was acquitted because the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy
between him and his son in law. His mere presence was insufficient to show conspiracy.

Petitioner then filed a claim under RA 7309 section 3(a) which provides for the payment of compensation to
any person who was unjustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subsequently released by virtue of a
judgment of acquittal. However, his claim was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, there
was nevertheless bad blood between him and the Boyons. There was a basis in finding that he was "probably
guilty."

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the provision of RA 7309 Section 3(a) using the term "unjustly accused" applies to the
petitioner?

HELD:
No. Section 3(a) requires that the claimant be unjustly accused, convicted and imprisoned. Though his
conviction was reversed, it is not a proof that his previous conviction was unjust. Section 3(a) does not refer
solely to an unjust conviction as a result of which the accused is unjustly imprisoned, but the accused must
have been also unjustly accused.

There is the presence of "probable guilt" which does not make the petitioner unjustly accused because there
is a reason to believe that he was a part of the crime. The court explained that the term "unjustly convicted or
accused" has something to do with the manner of conviction, that there is malice in the judgment rendered,
that from the start of the prosecution, it must have been wrongful.
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An accusation based on "probable guilt" is not an unjust accusation and unjust judgment, but only an
erroneous one correctable by appeal.

DOCTRINE:

That when the language of the statute is clear it should be given its natural meaning.

JMM Promotions and Management, Inc., Vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Ulpiano L.
Delos Santos

JMM Promotions and Management, Inc., Petitioner

Vs.

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and Ulpiano L. Delos Santos, Respondents.

G.R. No. 109835, November 22, 1993

FACTS:
Petitioner JMM Promotions and Management Inc. appealed to the respondent NLRC with regard to the
decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) on the ground of failure to post the
required appeal bond.

NLRC, in support of the decision, cited Article 223 of the Labor Code, as provided and amended:

Article 223 - In a case of judgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected
only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the
Commission in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

Rule VI, Section 6 of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC as amended reads as follows:

Section 6 - Bond - In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter involves a monetary award, an appeal by the
employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the award.

The Petitioner contended that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in applying these rules to
decisions rendered by POEA. It insists that the appeal bond is not necessary in the case of licensed recruiters
for overseas employment because they are already required under Section 4, Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules
not only to pay a license fee of P30,000.00 but also a cash bond of P100,000.00 and a surety bond of
P50,000.00.

Petitioner also claimed it has placed in escrow the sum of P200,000.00 with PNB in compliance of Section 17,
Rule II, Book II to primarily answer for valid and legal claims of recruited workers as a result of recruitment
violations or money claims.

The office of the Solicitor General sustained the appeal bond requirement but suggested that the rules cited
by NLRC are applicable only to decisions of the Labor Arbiter and not of POEA.

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ISSUE:
Whether or Not petitioner is still required to post an appeal bond even after posting a cash and surety bond of
P150,000.00 and placing an escrow money of P200,000.00 as required by POEA rules to perfect the appeal
from a decision of POEA to NLRC?

HELD:
Yes. POEA rules are clear. In addition to the cash and surety bond, and the escrow money fund, there should
be also an amount equivalent to the monetary award to perfect the appeal. An appeal bond is intended to
further insure payment of the monetary award in favor of the employee if it is eventually affirmed on appeal
to the NLRC.

DOCTRINE:

In legal hermeneutics, caution should be taken that every part thereof be given effect on the theory that it
was enacted as an integrated measure and not as a hodge-podge of conflicting provisions . Ut res magis valeat
quam pereat. Under the petitioner's interpretation, the appeal bond required by Section 6 of the POEA rule
should be disregarded because of the earlier bonds and escrow fund. The Court ruled that it is not a
redundancy, but rather a complement between Section 6, Section 4 and Section 17.

The rule is that a construction that would render a provision inoperative should be avoided; instead,
apparently inconsistent provisions should be reconciled whenever possible as parts of a coordinated and
harmonious whole.

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Danilo Duncano vs Sandiganbayan

GR No. 191894

FACTS:

Duncano was a high ranking public officer being the Regional Director of Bureau of Internal Revenue Region
No. 7 with salary grade 26 as classified under RA 6758. He has failed to disclose in his SALN the financial and
business interests that he and his family are registered owners. Such non-disclosure may damage and
prejudice the public interest.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the jurisdiction to try Duncano of the case filed against him.

HELD:

Yes, Sandiganbayan does not have the jurisdiction to try Duncano. The Sandiganbayan can only have such
when violations of Section 3 (a) and 5 of RA No 3019 are committed by public officials and employees
occupying positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the
Compensation and position Classification Act of 1989 (RA 6758)salary with Salary Grade 27 or higher.

"(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act
No. 6758), specifically including:

"(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

DOCTRINE:

As a cardinal rule in statutory construction, particular words, clauses, and phrases should not be studied as
detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part of the statute must be considered in fixing
the meaning of any of its parts, in order to produce a harmonious whole. UT RES MAGIS VALEAT QUAM
PEREAT.

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Manuel T. De Guia Vs. Commission on Elections

Manuel T. De Guia, in his capacity as councilor of the Municipality of Parañaque, Metro Manila, Petitioner

Vs.

Hon. Commission on Elections, Respondent

G.R. No. 104712, May 6, 1992

FACTS:
On November 18, 1991, Congress passed RA 7166 "An Act providing for Synchronized National and Local
Elections and for Electoral Reforms, Authorizing Appropriations therefor, and for other purposes." On
November 20, 1991, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2313 and the subsequent resolutions in question.

On February 20, 1992, Petitioner De Guia, an incumbent member of the Sangguniang Bayan of the
Municipality of Parañaque filed with COMELEC a motion for clarification of its Resolution No. 2313 inquiring
whether the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro Manila
enumerated therein, which are all single-district municipalities would be elected by district in the May 11,
1992 or in the 1995 regular elections.

COMELEC issued Resolution No. 2379 stating that its purpose in recommending to Congress the
apportionment of Sangguniang Panglungsod and Bayan seats to reduce the number of candidates to be voted
for.

Petitioner De Guia received the copy of the Resolution to mean that the election of elective members of
Sangguniang Bayan, by district of the 13 Municipalities in Metro Manila shall apply in the May 11, 1992
election. Not satisfied, De Guia filed the instant petition for reversal of the position of the respondent.
Petitioner insisted that the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque should fall under category (d) in which they will
still be elected at large until the 1995 elections.

ISSUE:

The issue in this case is the proper interpretation of sec 3 of R.A No. 7166 for May 11, 1992 elections.
Whether or Not the Members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Parañaque and other municipalities of Metro
Manila enumerated therein, would be elected by district in the May 11, 1992 regular elections?

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HELD:
Yes. As stated in Paragraph (c) Section 3, of R.A No. 7166, cities with 2 or more legislative districts (Manila,
Cebu, Davao ) shall continue to be elected by district, as well as the 13 Municipalities of Metro Manila,
including Paranaque, pursuant to sections 2 and 3 of RA No. 6636.

Republic Act No. 6636 November 6, 1987

Section 2. Metro Manila Area. - For purposes of the Local Elections on January 18, 1988, the City of Manila,
Quezon City and the City of Caloocan, City of Pasay and the Municipalities of Makati, Parañaque, Pasig,
Marikina, and Valenzuela, each of which comprises a representative district shall be elected at large by the
qualified voters of the said city or municipality.

Section 3. Other Cities. - The provision of any law to the contrary notwithstanding the City of Cebu, City of
Davao, and any other city with more than one representative district, shall be elected at large by the qualified
voters of the said cities

Paragraph (d) Section 3 of RA 7166 refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang Panglungsod which are
single district cities and Sangguniang Bayan for Municipalities outside Metro Manila, which will remain to be
elected at large in the May 11, 1992 election in accordance with existing laws (RA 6636, RA 7166, COMELEC
Resolution 2313 and 2379). Paragraph (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of the statute and to
follow the interpretation of the petitioner would make the act of the statute in singling out the single district
provinces as useless or meaningless.

Section 3 (d), R.A No. 7166 provides; for purposes of the regular elections on May 11, 1992, elective members
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod and Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected at large in accordance with existing
laws. However, beginning with the regular elections in 1995, they shall be elected by district.

DOCTRINE:

The key to open the door to what the legislature intended in the language of a statute is its purpose or reason
which induced it to enact the statute. Statutes should be construed in light of the object to be achieved. A
Construction should be rejected that gives the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish
its purpose for which it is enacted.

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Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas Vs. Court of Appeals

Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas, Petitioners

Vs.

Hon. Court of Appeals and Hon. Raymundo Seva, Judge of Branch 38 of the Regional Trial Court of Camarines
Norte and William Guerra, Respondents

G.R. No. 78687, January 31, 1989

FACTS:
Florencia H. De Enciso and Miguel Enciso owned a property which was formerly covered by Original Certificate
Title (OCT) No. P-1248, issued by virtue of Free Patent Application No. 192765. The Original Certificate of Title
was inscribed in the registration book for the province of Camarines Norte on December 10, 1961.

On February 28, 1970, the patentees, the Enciso spouses, by an Absolute Deed of Sale, sold the property in
favor of the petitioners, the spouses, Elena Salenillas and Bernardino Salenillas for a consideration of P900.
Petitioner Elena is a daughter of the Encisos.

Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-8104 of the Register of Deeds of Camarines Norte was issued in the name of
the Salenillas, cancelling the OCT in the name of the Enciso.

On June 30, 1971, the petitioners mortgaged the property with the Rural Bank of Daet, Inc. the petitioner was
able to pay the loan for the amount of P1000. Later on, December 4, 1975, the petitioners mortgaged the
property in PNB as a security for the loan of P2500.

However, petitioners failed to pay the loan. Extrajudicial Foreclosure of the mortgage was instituted by PNB
and the property was sold at a public auction. Private respondent William Guerra emerged as the highest
bidder.

On August 17, 1983, PNB filed with RTC of Camarines Norte at Daet. A motion for writ of attachment in favor
of the private respondent. However, petitioners refused to vacate the land and instead offered to repurchase
the property by virtue of Section 119 of the Public Land Act.

Trial Court issued an alias writ of attachment. The petitioners moved for a motion of consideration but were
denied.
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The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals. The respondent Trial Court Judge, according to petitioner,
acted with grave abuse of discretion. Court of Appeals dismissed the case for lack of merit. According to Court
of Appeals, the transfer of property from the parent to the child for a nominal sum was not the conveyance
contemplated by the law.

On the other side, the private respondent states that the sale of the contested property by the patentees to
the petitioners disqualified the latter from being the legal heirs vis-à-vis the said property. Thus, the
petitioners had lost their right granted to heirs under the provisions of section 119 of the Public Land Act.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the petitioners have the right to repurchase the contested property under Section 119 of the
Public Land Act.
HELD:
Yes. The Petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under "Section 119 of the Public Land Act. Every
conveyance of land acquired under the free patent of homestead provisions, when proper, shall be subject to
repurchase by the applicant, his widow, or legal heirs within a period of 5 years from the date of the
conveyance."

It is clear that only three types of persons are bestowed the right to repurchase that is the applicant, his
widow and legal heirs. Elena Salenillas is a legal heir of the Enciso being their daughter.

DOCTRINE:
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction made by respondent contravenes
the very purpose of the act. Between two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of
the law shall prevail.

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B/GEN. JOSE COMENDADOR, ET AL. vs. B/GEN. RENATO S. DE VILLA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 96948, August 2, 1991

FACTS:
Petitioners are officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and were charged with violations of Articles of
War in relation with their alleged participation in a failed coup d'etat. The charges against them are violations
of Articles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96 (Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a Gentleman) and AW 94
(Various Crimes) in relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code (Murder).

A Pretrial investigation was constituted before being referred to the General Court Martial (GCM). The
petitioners were, given several, opportunities to present their side in the pretrial investigation, however, PTI
panel resolved to recommend that the charges be referred to the GCM, due to failure of the petitioners to
submit their counter affidavits.

The PTI panel was justified in referring the charges to GCM No. 14 without waiting for the petitioners to
submit their defense. Failure of pretrial investigation does not deprive a General Court Martial of jurisdiction,
because a PTI is only directory, not mandatory.

In the GCM No. 14 on May 15, 1990 hearing, Petitioners manifested that they were exercising their rights to
raise peremptory challenges against the President and members of the General Court Martial No. 14. They
invoked Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 for this purpose. GCM No. 14 ruled, however, that peremptory
challenges had been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

Petitioners seek certiorari against its ruling denying them the right to peremptory right/challenge as granted
by Article 18 of the Articles of War.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the right to peremptory challenge provided by Article 18 of Com. Act No. 408 (Articles of War)
has been discontinued under P.D. No. 39.

HELD:
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No. The petitioners have a peremptory right. When the martial law ended, General Order No. 8 was revoked
and military tribunals were dissolved. Thus, the reason for the existence of P.D. No. 39 ceased automatically.
When the reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases. Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex.

President Marcos issued General Order No. 8, to empower the Chief of Staff or the AFP to create military
tribunals for the cases of military personnel. P.D. No. 39 was issued to implement G.O. No. 8. This decree
disallowed Peremptory challenge.

When President Marcos issued Proc. No. 2045 proclaiming the termination of the martial law, G.O. No. 8 also
ended and military tribunals were dissolved upon final determination of pending cases. With this, P.D. No. 39
ceased automatically.

DOCTRINE:

Applying the basic canon of Statutory Construction that when the reason of the law ceases, the law itself
ceases, the Supreme Court held that the withdrawal of the right to peremptory challenge became ineffective
again, and now the petitioners can exercise the right to Peremptory Challenge.

Cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex

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Lydia O. Chua Vs. The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration

Lydia O. Chua, Petitioner

Vs.

The Civil Service Commission, The National Irrigation Administration, Respondents

G.R. No. 88979, February 7, 1992

FACTS:

Republic Act 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization. Section 2 (Coverage) of R.A. 6683 provides who are qualified to avail the
benefits under the law which includes all regular, temporary, casual and emergency employees who have
rendered two consecutive years of government service as of the date of separation with the exception of
uniformed personnel of (Armed Forced of the Philippines) AFP and (Philippine Constabulary Integrated
National Police) PC/INP.

Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the Early Retirement Law, filed
an application to the Respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA), which was denied since petitioner is
a co-terminus employee.

She appealed with respondent Civil Service Commission (CSC) but which was also denied because contractual
employees are excluded from the coverage. The date of the petitioner's separation from the service is co-
terminus with the NIA project which is contractual nature.

Chua then elevated the issue to the Supreme Court by way of Special Civil action for certiorari insisting that
she is entitled to the benefits under R.A. 6683.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not petitioner's status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the coverage of R.A. 6683.

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HELD:

No. There is no substantial between a co-terminus employee and a contractual, casual, emergency employee
which are all tenurial employees with no fixed term, non career and temporary. The Early Retirement Law
would violated equal protection clause if a group or class of employees would be denied with benefits that are
received by a class of equal or similar footing.

DOCTRINE:

The doctrine of necessary implications should be applied. The doctrine states that what is implied in a statute
is as much as that which is expressed. Every statute is understood, by implication, to contain all such
provisions as may be necessary to effectuate its object and purpose.

REQUISITES OF NECESSARY IMPLICATIONS:

1. That the implication must be so strong in its probability

2. That the implications do not contradict the expressed intent of the statute

GENERAL RULE: the expressed intent must prevail over the intent reached by implication. If the intent is
expressed, there is nothing that can be implied. Nothing further is needed to reveal the legislative intent.

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G.R. No. L-37251 August 31, 1981

CITY OF MANILA and CITY TREASURER, petitioners-appellants,

vs.
JUDGE AMADOR E. GOMEZ of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ESSO PHILIPPINES,
INC., respondents-appellees.

FACTS:
This case is about the legality of the additional one-half percent (½%) realty tax imposed by the City of Manila.

Section 64 of the Revised Charter of Manila, Republic Act No. 409, which took effect on June 18, 1949, fixes
the annual realty tax at one and one-half percent (1-½ %).

On the other hand, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, Republic Act No. 5447, which took effect on
January 1, 1969, imposed "an annual additional tax of one per centum on the assessed value of real property
in addition to the real property tax regularly levied thereon under existing laws" but "the total real property
tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centrum.

That maximum limit gave the municipal board of Manila the Idea of fixing the realty tax at three percent. So,
by means of Ordinance No. 7125, approved by the city mayor on December 26, 1971 and effective beginning
the third quarter of 1972, the board imposed an additional one-half percent realty tax. The ordinance reads:

SECTION 1. An additional annual realty tax of one-half percent (1/2%), or in short a total of three percent (3%)
realty tax (1-½% pursuant to the Revised Charter of Manila; 1% per Republic Act No. 5447; and ½% per this
Ordinance) on the assessed value ... is hereby levied and imposed.

Esso Philippines, Inc. contended that the additional one-half percent tax is void because it is not authorized by
the city charter nor by any law (Civil Case No. 88827). After hearing, the trial court declared the tax ordinance
void and ordered the city treasurer of Manila to refund to Esso the said tax. The City of Manila and its
treasurer appealed to this Court under Republic Act No. 5440 (which superseded Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court).

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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

ISSUE:
The only issue is the validity of the tax ordinance or the legality of the additional one-half percent realty tax.

HELD:
As repeatedly observed, section 4 of the Special Education Fund Law, as confirmed by the Real Property Tax
Code, in prescribing a total realty tax of three percent impliedly authorizes the augmentation by one-half
percent of the pre-existing one and one- half percent realty tax.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is reversed and set aside. The complaint of Esso Philippines, Inc.
for recovery of the realty tax paid under protest is dismissed. No costs.

DOCTRINE:
We hold that the doctrine of implications in statutory construction sustains the City of Manila's contention
that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision in section 4 of the Special
Education Fund Law that "the total real property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum.

The doctrine of implications means that "that which is plainly implied in the language of a statute is as much a
part of it as that which is expressed"

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People of the Philippines Vs. Guillermo Manantan

People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-appellant

Vs.

Guillermo Manantan, Defendant-appellee

G.R. No. 14129, July 31, 1962

FACTS:

Defendant Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of section 54 of the Revised Election Code in the
Province of Pangasinan.

Section 54. Active intervention of public officers and employees. - No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or
assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city,
municipal or rural police force, and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid in any candidate, or
exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to
preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.

Defendant contends that the provision excludes justice of peace and as such, he is excluded from this
prohibition.

The defense moved to dismiss the information on the ground that as justice of peace, the defendant is not
one of the officers enumerated in section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The lower court denied the motion
to dismiss, holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of section 54. A second motion was filed by the
defense counsel who in cited in support the decision of the Court of Appeals in People vs. Macaraig, where a
justice of peace is excluded from the prohibition of sec. 54. The lower court dismissed the information against
the accused upon authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the Justice of Peace is included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code.

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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner argues that when section 54 of the Revised Election Code omitted the words "Justice of Peace"
from the Revised Administrative Code provision from which it was taken and thus making the intention of the
legislature in the omission; however, petitioner's contention is without merit. The word judge in the former
provision was qualified by the phrase "of First instance" the term judge in section 54 is not modified or
qualified making it more broader and generic to comprehend all kinds of judges.

DOCTRINE: The rule of Casus omissus has no applicability to the case at bar for the maxim only applies and
operates if and when the omission has been clearly established.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc., ET AL Vs. Hon. Herminio C. Mariano, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal Manuel Aquial, Maria Aquial, Spouses Jose M. Cordova and Saturnina C. Cordova

G.R. No. L-33140, October 23, 1978

FACTS:
Respondents Aquial were claiming ownership of a parcel of land located in Quezon City having an area of 383
hectares. They are alleging that the land to which they claim was acquired by their father by means of Spanish
Title, has been fraudulently and erroneously included in O.C.T. No. 735. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that O.C.T. No.
735 and the titles derived be declared void due to certain irregularities in the Land Registration proceedings.

J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of jurisdiction, improper venue,
prescription, laches and prior judgment. However, the lower court issued an order requiring parties to
produce in court the certificate of title and the production in court of the plan of the land covered by O.C.T.
No. 735, allegedly for determining the ownership of the land. Defendants filed the instant civil actions of
certiorari and prohibition.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not O.C.T. No. 735 is valid.

HELD:
Yes. O.C.T. No. 735 is valid. The validity of O.C.T. No. 735 was already decided by the Supreme Court in the
previous cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason, and Pili vs. Tuason. The rulings in these cases was
also applied in other cases involving the validity of O.C.T. No. 735.

DOCTRINE:

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Considering the principle of "Stare Decisis" or "Follow Past Precedents and do not disturb what has been
settled", the court ruled that respondents cannot maintain their action without eroding the long settled
holding of the Courts that O.C.T. No. 735 is valid and no longer open to attack.

CHAPTER 4

G.R. No. 201043

Republic of the Philippines represented by the Armed forces of the Philippines finance Center vs Daisy
Yahon

FACTS:

Sgt Yahon was married to respondent. A TPO has been issued against Sgt Yahon to protect the respondent
from further abuses. In the TPO, Sgt Yahon was ordered to provide reasonable financial spousal support to the
respondent. In his failure to appear before the court with a counsel and with an answer to the charges against
him, the court has granted PPO for the respondent against Sgt Yahon. It was also reiterated that Sgt Yahon
should provide for the financial spousal support to his wife from his retirement benefits.

However, the Armed Forces of the Philippines Finance Center contended that half of the retirement benefits
of Sgt Yahon cannot be given to the respondent as it is from a military institution. Thus, on May 27, 2009, filed
a petition for certiorari before the CA praying for the nullification of the aforesaid orders and decision insofar
as it directs the AFPFC to automatically deduct from S/Sgt. Yahon’s retirement and pension benefits and
directly give the same to respondent as spousal support.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon be subject to the ruling of the court to provide for the
financial spousal support of respondent.

HELD:

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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

Retirement benefits of Sgt Yahon are subject to the financial spousal support of respondent. As a rule in
statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish. As section 8 (g) of
RA No. 9262 used the general term 'employer', thus applies to all employers, whether private or government,
therefore, it includes in its coverage the military institution, which is the employer of Sgt Yahon.

DOCTRINE:

As a rule in statutory construction, when the law does not distinguish, the court should not distinguish.

Juanito C. Pilar Vs. Commission on Elections

JUANITO C. PILAR, Petitioner,

Vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondent.

G.R. No. 115245, July 11, 1995

FACTS:

Juanito C. Pilar filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the province of Isabela. However, three days later. He withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result,
respondent Commission imposed a fine of ₱ 10,000.00 for failure to file his statement of contributions and
expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidate must have entered the
political contest, and should have either won or lost.

Section 14 of R.A. No. 7166 provides that:

Statement of Contributions and Expenditures. Effect of Failure to file statement. Every candidate and
treasurer of the political party shall within 30 days after the day of the election, file in duplicate with the
officers of the commission, the full, true and itemized statement of all contributions and expenditures in
connection with the election.

Resolution No. 2348 was promulgated to implement such provision.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not petitioner is required to file his statement of Contributions and Expenditures despite his
withdrawal of candidacy.
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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

HELD:

Yes. Section 14 of R.A. 7166 states that "Every candidate" has the obligation to file his statement of
contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate
pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "Every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to
a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to those who withdrew his candidacy.

Also, Section 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to all candidates who filed their certificate of
candidacy.

DOCTRINE:

If the law makes no distinction, neither should the Court.

People of the Philippines Vs. Hon. Judge Antonio C. Evangelista and Guildo Tugonon

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

Vs.

Hon. Judge ANTONIO C. EVANGELISTA, as presiding judge of Branch XXI, 10th Judicial Region, RTC of Misamis
Oriental, Cagayan De Oro City and Guildo S. Tugonon, Respondents.

G.R. No. 110898, February 20, 1996

FACTS:

Private respondent Guildo Tugonon was charged and convicted of frustrated homicide. He filed a petition for
probation. However, the chief probation and parole officer recommended denial of private respondent's
application for probation on the ground that appealing the sentence of the trial, he had already waived his
right to make his application for probation.

The Regional Trial Court set aside the probation's officer’s recommendation and thus granted private
respondent's application for probation.

ISSUE:

Whether or Not the RTC committed grave abuse of its discretion by granting private respondent's application
for probation despite filed by the private respondent.

HELD:

Yes. Private respondent filed his application for probation on December 28, 1992 after P.D. No. 1990 had
taken effect. It is thus covered by the prohibition that "no application for probation shall be entertained or
granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction" and that "the filing of the

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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal.” Having appealed from the judgment of the trial
court and applied for probation after the court of appeals had affirmed his conviction, private respondent was
clearly precluded from the benefits of probation.

Private respondent argues, however, that a distinction should be drawn between meritorious appeals (like his
appeal notwithstanding the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction) and unmeritorious appeals. But the
law does not make any distinction and so neither should the court. In fact, if an appeal is truly meritorious the
accused would be set free and not only given probation.

Petition granted, judgment granting probation set aside.

DOCTRINE:

When the law does not make any exception, courts may not, except something unless compelling reasons
exist to justify it. The law makes no distinction between meritorious and unmeritorious appeals so neither
should the court.

Cecilio S. De Villa Vs. Court of Appeals

CECILIO S. DE VILLA, Petitioner,

Vs.

The Honorable Court of Appeals, People of the Philippines, Hon. Job B. Madayag and Roberto Z. Lorayes,
Respondents.

G.R. No. 87416, April 8, 1991

FACTS:

On October 5, 1987, Petitioner Cecilio S. De Villa was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of NCR
(Makati, Branch 145) with violation of BP. 22 (Bouncing Check Law) when the accused unlawfully and
feloniously draw and issue a check to Roberto Z. Lorayes to apply on account or for value a depositors trust
company check No. 3371 antedated March 31, 1987 with an amount of $ 2,500.00 or equivalent to PHP
50,000.00. The check was issued at the time the accused had no sufficient funds. At the time of presentment,
the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds and despite the receipt of notice of such dishonor, said
accused failed to pay the respondent, Lorayes, the amount of the check or to make arrangement for the
payment of the check within 5 banking days after the receipt of the (Check) Notice.

Petitioner moved to dismiss the case due to the following grounds: That the respondent court has no
jurisdiction over the offense and that no offense was committed since the check was payable in dollars, hence,
obligation was null and void. Motion to dismiss was denied.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied by the respondent court due to lack of merit. Under
Bouncing Check Law (BP. 22), foreign checks provided they are drawn and issued in the Philippines, though
payable outside thereof are within the coverage of the law.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the court of appeals, which was however denied by the court of
appeals. Hence, Petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court to reverse and set aside the decision of
the Court of Appeals.
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STAT CON CASE DIGEST (CHAPTER 1-5)_PREPARED BY JAYSON PANAGA

ISSUE:

W/N a Foreign Check drawn against a foreign account is covered by BP. 22.

HELD:

Yes. The check was executed and delivered by the petitioner to private respondent in Metro Manila (Makati).

The Bouncing Checks Law does not distinguish the currency to which the violation extended and thus, foreign
check is covered by the law. The records of the Batasan Vol. III also showed that the lawmaker's intention is to
apply the law to whatever currency.The Petition is dismissed by the court for lack of merit.

DOCTRINE: Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish.

Colgate - Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Vs. Hon. Pedro M. Gimenez

Colgate - Palmolive Philippines, Inc., Petitioner

Vs.

Honorable Pedro M. Gimenez as Auditor General and Ismael Mathay as Auditor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines, Respondents.

G.R. No. L-14787, January 28, 1901

FACTS:
The Petitioner Colgate - Palmolive, Inc. is a corporation duly organized and existing under the Philippine law
for the manufacture of toilet preparations and household remedies. The company imported various materials
such as Irish moss extracts, sodium benzoate, sodium saccharinate, precipitated calcium and dicalcium
phosphate, for use as stabilizers and flavoring of the dental cream they manufacture. For every importation of
these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Bank 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used
for the payment of the cost, transportation and other incidental charges, in accordance with R.A. 601
(Exchange Tax Law).

On March 14, 1956, Petitioner filed with the Central Bank 3 applications for refund of the 17% special excise
tax in the total amount of ₱ 113,343.99, based on section 2 of R.A. 601 which provides that foreign exchange
used for the payment of cost, transportation and incidental charges to the importation of stabilizers and
flavors shall be refunded to any importer upon satisfactory proof of actual importations.

OIC of the Exchange Tax Administration of Central Bank advised the petitioner that they can claim for refund
the amount of ₱ 23,958.13 of the total sum of ₱ 113,343.99, representing the 17% special excise tax on
foreign exchange used to import of stabilizer and flavors. However, the auditor of the Central Bank refused to
pass in audit its claim for refund.

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The Petitioner appealed to the Auditor General but the latter affirmed the ruling of the auditor of the Central
Bank on the same ground that the term “stabilizer and flavors” in sec. 2 of Exchange Tax Law refers only to
food products.

Petitioner elevated the issue to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE:
Whether or Not the Foreign Exchange used by the petitioner for the importation of Dental Cream Stabilizers
and Flavors is exempt from the 17% special excise tax imposed by the Exchange Tax Law, so as to entitle it to a
refund.

HELD:
Yes. The Court ruled in favor of the Petitioner Company.
Section 2 of the Exchange Tax Law provides: The Tax collected under the preceding section on the foreign
exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and/or charges incident to importation into the
Philippines of rice, flour, canned milk, cattle and beef, canned fish, soya beans, butter, fat, chocolate, malt
syrup, tapioca, stabilizers and flavors, vitamin concentrate, fertilizers poultry feed, textbooks, reference books,
and supplementary readers approved by the Board on Textbooks and/or established public/private
educational institutions; newsprint imported by paper, book cloth, chip board imported for the printing of
supplementary readers (approved by the Board of Textbooks) ..., anesthetics, antibiotics, vitamins, hormones,
X-rays films, Laboratory Reagents, biological, dental supplies and pharmaceutical drugs necessary for
compounding medicines: medical and hospital supplies listed in the appendix to this act, in quantities to be
certified by the Director of Hospitals as actually needed by the hospitals, and such other drugs and medicines
as may be certified by the Secretary of Health from time to time to promote and protect the health of the
people of the Philippines shall be refunded to any importer making application therefor, upon satisfactory
proof of actual importation under the rules and regulations to be promulgated pursuant to sec. 7 thereof.

The ruling of the Auditor General is wrong because he applied the principle of statutory construction of
“ejusdem generis” incorrectly because the general terms “stabilizer and flavors” mentioned in the provision
among others do not belong to the same kind or class. The rule should be used if all the items in the
enumeration pertain only to one specific class. In the instant case, the more correct view is “Ubi llex not
distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos,” or ‘where the law does not distinguish, neither do we distinguish”.
Since the law does not distinguish between “stabilizer and flavors” for food preparation and those used in the
manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream, we are not authorized to make any distinction and must construe
the words in their general sense. Therefore, the law must be seen in its entirety. The rule of construction that
general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by a particular recital does not require the rejection of
general terms entirely.

Decision revered.

DOCTRINE:

“Ubi llex not distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos,” or ‘where the law does not distinguish, neither the court
distinguish”

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RP vs Eutropio Migrinio and Troadio Tecson

GR No. 89483, August 30, 1990

FACTS:
Acting on information received which indicated the acquisition of wealth beyond his lawful income, the
Philippine Anti-Graft Board required private respondent Lt. Col. Tecson to submit his explanation or comment,
together with supporting evidence thereto. Private respondent was unable to provide supporting evidence
because they were allegedly in the custody of his bookkeeper who has gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was
created by the PCGG to "investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP personnel, both
retired and in active service." Private respondent mainly argues that he is not one of the subordinates
contemplated in Executive Orders No. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A are acts of his alone while being the Finance Officer of
the Philippine Constabulary and not connected with being a crony, business associate or subordinate. Hence,
the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate him.

ISSUE:
W/N private respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board, an agency of the PCGG, for
violation of RA 3019 and 1379

HELD:
Undoubtedly, the alleged unlawful accumulation of wealth was done during the administration of President
Marcos. However, applying the rule in statutory construction, the term "subordinate" as used in EO 1 and 2
would refer to one who enjoys close association or relation with former President Marcos and/or his wife,
similar to the immediate family member, relative and close associate in E.O. No. 1 and the close relative,
business associate, dummy, agent or nominee in EO 2. Note.

The PCGG is enjoined from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent in I.S. No.
37 without prejudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecuting agency.

DOCTRINE:

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Ejusdem Generis – General words followed by an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular
and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as
applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.

PP vs Hon. Vicente Echavez, Jr. et al.

GR Nos. L-47757-61, January 28, 1990

FACTS:
The record shows that on October 25, 1977, Fiscal Abundio R. Ella filed with the lower court separate
informations against 16 persons charging them with squatting which is penalized by Presidential Decree No.
772 which provides that “any person who with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of
the absence or tolerance of the landowner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of another
against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes, shall be punished by imprisonment xxx”.

The lower court dismissed the informations and later denied the motion for reconsideration by the Fiscal.
Applying the doctrine of “ejusdem generis” that the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a grazing land.

From the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this court under Republic Act no. 5440.

ISSUE:

W/N PD 772, which penalizes squatting and similar acts applies to agricultural lands.

HELD:

No. PD 772 does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that “it was intended to apply to
squatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in squatter areas made by well-to-
do individuals.”

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But the Supreme Court disagreed with the lower court’s usage of the maxim Ejusdem Generis because the
intent of the decree is unmistakeable. It stated that the “rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool for statutory
construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.”

DOCTRINE:

Rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is
uncertain. Under this doctrine, where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and
specific words of the same class or where the later follow former, the general word or phrase is to be
construed to include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or
class as those specifically mentioned.

Alta Vista Golf and Country Club vs City of Cebu

G.R. No. 180235

FACTS:

Petitioner is a non-stock and non-profit corporation operating a gold curse in Cebu City. The golf course has
been operated in the city of Cebu for 5 years already. The local government has promulgated a law for
imposing tax on amusement places in their jurisdiction. Section 42 of the said Tax Ordinance provides,

“There shall be paid to the Office of the City Treasurer xxx, an amusement tax xxx, gold courses and polo
grounds at the rate of twenty percent (20%), xxx”.

The petitioner reasoned that under the LGC, amusement tax can only be imposed on operators of theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, or places where one seeks to entertain himself by seeing or viewing a show or
performance.

ISSUE:

W/N the City of Cebu can validly impose amusement tax to the act of playing golf, or is a golf course to be
considered an amusement place.

HELD:

Golf course cannot be considered as an amusement place and is therefore not subject to amusement tax.
According to Section 140 of the Local Government Code on amusement tax, the province may levy an
amusement tax to be collected from the proprietors, lessees, or operators of theaters, cinemas, concert halls,
circuses, boxing stadia, and other places of amusement.

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Furthermore, section 131 (c) of the Local Government Code defines “amusement places” as “include theaters,
cinemas, concert halls, circuses and other places of amusement where one seeks admission to entertain
oneself or viewing the show or performance.”

In applying the principle of ejusdem generis, a golf course is not similar to that of the expressly provided
amusement places as it cannot be considered as an amusement place in itself. An amusement place is defined
as a place where people enter to witness a show or a performance.

Petition granted.

DOCTRINE:

Ejusdem generis, where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words of
the same class or where the latter follows the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include, or to be restricted to persons, things or cases akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as
those specifically mentioned.

MUNICIPALITY OF NUEVA ERA, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor,CAROLINE ARZADON-
GARVIDA vs. MUNICIPALITY OF MARCOS, ILOCOS NORTE, represented by its Municipal Mayor, SALVADOR
PILLOS, and the COURT OF APPEALS

Case No.: G.R. No. 169435

FACTS:

The Municipality of Nueva Era was created by virtue of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 66 dated September
30, 1916.

The Municipality of Marcos, on the other hand, was created on June 22, 1963 pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 3753 entitled "An Act Creating the Municipality of Marcos in the Province of Ilocos Norte."

However, on March 8, 1993, the Municipality of Marcsos claimed a part of Nueva Era, when its Sangguniang
Bayan passed Resolution No. 93-015, entitled, “Resolution claiming an area which is an original part of Nueva
Era, but separated due to the creation of Marcos Town in the Province of Ilocos Norte.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the eastern boundary of Marcos extends over and covers a portion of Nueva Era.

HELD:

Only the barrios (now barangays) of Dingras from which Marcos obtained its territory are named in R.A. No.
3753. To wit:

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SECTION 1. The barrios of Capariaan, Biding, Escoda, Culao, Alabaan, Ragas and Agunit in the Municipality of
Dingras, Province of Ilocos Norte, are hereby separated from the said municipality and constituted into a new
and separate municipality to be known as the Municipality of Marcos.”

Since only the barangays of Dingras are enumerated as Marcos' source of territory, Nueva Era's territory is,
therefore, excluded. The Court cannot accept the contentions of Marcos. Only Dingras is specifically named by
law as source territory of Marcos. Hence, the said description of boundaries of Marcos is descriptive only of
the listed barangays of Dingras as a compact and contiguous territory.

Moreover, since the barangays of Nueva Era were not mentioned in the enumeration of barangays out of
which the territory of Marcos shall be set, their omission must be held to have been done intentionally. This
conclusion finds support in the rule of casus omissus pro omisso habendus est, which states that a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally

DOCTRINE:

Under the maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, the mention of one thing implies the exclusion of
another thing not mentioned. If a statute enumerates the things upon which it is to operate, everything else
must necessarily and by implication be excluded from its operation and effect.

Dra. Brigida Buenaseda vs Secretary Juan Flavier

GR No. 106719, September 21, 1993

FACTS:
The private respondents filed an administrative complaint with the Ombudsman against the petitioners for
violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the
preventive suspension of the petitioner, who were employees of the national center for mental health. The
respondents argue that the preventive suspension laid by the Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is
contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of the 1987 Constitution, while petitioner contends that the
Ombudsman can only recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive suspension
of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted by his office.

ISSUE:
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government officials working in other offices
other than that of the Ombudsman pending the investigation of administrative complaints.

HELD:
RA 6770 Section 24, provides; Preventive Suspension. - The Ombudsman or his Deputy may preventively
suspend any officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation xxx.

Art. 9, section 13 of the 1987 Constitution, furtherly, provides that the Ombudsman is expressly authorized to
recommend to the appropriate official the discipline or prosecution of any erring public officials or employees,
office or agency or instrumentality thereof. In order to make an intelligent determination whether to
recommend such actions, the Ombudsman has to conduct such investigation in an expeditious and efficient
manner, he may need to suspend the respondent.
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Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or
preventive suspension. Art 9, section 13 (3), provides; Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action
against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.

DOCTRINE:
Under the rule of Noscitur a sociis, the word "suspension" should be given the same sense as the other words
with which it is associated. Where a particular word is equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct
construction may be made specific by considering the company of terms in which it is found or with which it is
associated.

Manolo Fule vs. Honorable Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 79094

FACTS:

Manolo Fule has been accused and convicted of the Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg 22 (The Bouncing Checks
Law) by the RTC of Lucena City on the basis of the Stipulation of Facts entered into between the prosecution
and the defense during the pre-trial conference.

It appears that the stipulation of facts was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. However,
petitioner waived his right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a memorandum confirming the
stipulation of facts.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals upheld the stipulation of facts and affirmed the judgment of conviction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the court has erred in its ruling.

HELD:

Yes, the court has erred in its ruling. According to Sec 4 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, pre-trial
agreements must be signed. It provides that no agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial
conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his

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counsel. Therefore, the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by
the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence.

Judgment is revered and ordered to reopen the case for further reception of evidence.

DOCTRINE:

Use of negative words; negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the
affirmative are merely directory. The use of the term 'shall' further emphasizes its mandatory character and
means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced.

Purita Bersabal v. Hon. Judge Serafin Salvador

G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978)

FACTS:

For failure of the petitioner to file her memorandum on time as required by the Court of First Instance of
Caloocan City pursuant to the R.A No. 6031, her appeal was dismissed.

ISSUE:

W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit on time the mentioned memorandum would empower the CFI
to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.

HELD:

R.A 6031, section 1 (2) provides that the Courts of First Instance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis
of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts: Provided, that the parties may
submit memoranda and/or brief with oral argument if so requested xxx.

In the instant case, after the expiration of such period of submission of memoranda as requested, can the
respondent Judge only act on the case by deciding it on the merits, but not by dismissing the appeal of the
petitioner.

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The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an Appellant to submit his
memorandum. The law provides that “Courts… shall decide… cases on the basis of the evidence and records
transmitted from the city… courts: Provided… parties may submit memoranda… if so requested…” It cannot be
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional. Being optional on the part of the
parties, the latter may choose to waive submission of the memoranda.

As a general rule, the word "may" when used in a statute is permissive only and operates to confer discretion;
while the word "shall" is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. The implication is
that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and
records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and/or brief with oral argument duly
submitted and/or made on request.

DOCTRINE:

The use of the word “may” clearly shows it is directory in nature and not mandatory.

Office of the Ombudsman vs. Mercedita De Sahagun, Manuela T. Waquiz and Raidis J. Bassig

G.R. No. 167982, August 13, 2008

FACTS:

The issues in the present case are settled by precedents. But to shed some light, here are some notable facts;

In an Order5 dated March 10, 2003, that there was substantial evidence to hold respondents administratively
liable since the contracts awarded to Brand Asia, Ltd. failed to go through the required procedure for public
bidding under Executive Order No. 301

On June 24, 2003, Ombudsman Marcelo issued an Order7 partially granting the motion for reconsideration.
Respondents and Ferrer were found guilty of the lesser offense of simple misconduct and suspended for six
months without pay. Rustia's suspension was reduced to three months.

Dissatisfied, respondents filed a Petition for Review 8 with the CA assailing the Orders dated March 10, 2003
and June 24, 2003 of the Ombudsman.

On April 28, 2005, the CA rendered a Decision 9 setting aside the Orders dated March 10, 2003 and June 24,
2003 of the Ombudsman. The CA held that respondents may no longer be prosecuted since the complaint was
filed more than seven years after the imputed acts were committed which was beyond the one year period
provided for by Section 20 (5) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6770, otherwise known as "The Ombudsman Act of
1989".

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Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE:

W/N Section 20 (5) of R.A. No. 6770 prohibits administrative investigations in cases filed more than one year
after commission.

HELD:

The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.

Well-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses by their very
nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. In disciplining public officers and employees,
the object sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service
and the preservation of the public’s faith and confidence in our government.

In Melchor v. Gironella,14 the Court held that the period stated in Section 20(5) of R.A. No. 6770 does not
refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the Ombudsman on whether it would
investigate a particular administrative offense. The use of the word "may" in the provision is construed as
permissive and operating to confer discretion.

Applying Section 20(5), therefore, it is discretionary upon the Ombudsman whether or not to conduct an
investigation on a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission
complained of.

Furthermore, Section 4 (a), RA 6770 provides that upon receipt of the complaint, the same shall be evaluated
to determine whether the same may be dismissed outright for any grounds stated under Section 20 of
Republic Act No. 6770, provided, however, that the dismissal thereof is not mandatory and shall be
discretionary on the part of the Ombudsman or the Deputy Ombudsman concerned.

The declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word "may" is directory, the
negative phrase "may not" is mandatory in tenor; that a directory word, when qualified by the word "not,"
becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in character, is not plausible. It is not supported by
jurisprudence on statutory construction.

Thus, the CA committed a reversible error in holding that the case had already prescribed and that
the Ombudsman does not have the power to penalize erring government officials and employees.

DOCTRINE:

The use of the word “may” clearly shows it is directory in nature and not mandatory. The use of the word
"may" clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. When used in a
statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretion; while the word "shall" is imperative, operating
to impose a duty which may be enforced.

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Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (South) vs Court of Appeals

GR No. 117188, August 7, 1997

FACTS:

The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association (North Association) was registered with private respondent
Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation as the sole homeowners’ organization in the said subdivision but it
did not file its corporate by-laws. Years later, it was discovered that there were two organizations within the
subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of North
Association that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as
required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of the South Association, herein petitioner.
The North Association complained and got a favorable result from respondent HIGC declaring the registration
of petitioner association (the South Association) cancelled and respondent CA subsequently affirmed the said
decision. Hence, petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.

Issue: W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation
results in its automatic dissolution.

Held:

The pertinent provision of the Corporation Code that is the focal point of controversy in this case states:

Sec. 46. Adoption of by-laws. –

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(1) Every corporation formed under this Code, must within one (1) month after receipt of official notice of
the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the Securities and Exchange Commission, adopt a
code of by-laws for its government not inconsistent with this Code. xxx
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, by-laws may be adopted and filed prior to
incorporation; in such case, such by-laws shall be approved and signed by all the incorporators and
submitted to the Securities and Exchange Commission, together with the articles of incorporation.

No. The legislature’s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its failure to pass its by-laws. The
use of the word “must” in the first paragraph rather suggests that it’s mere directory and not mandatory.
Because, note should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows filing of the by-laws even prior
to the incorporation. This provision in the same section of the code rules out mandatory compliance with the
requirement of filing the by-laws within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its
certificate of incorporation by the SEC.

It necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within the period does not imply the demise of the
corporation. By-laws may be necessary for the government of the corporation but these are subordinate to
the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statues. There are in fact cases
where by-laws are unnecessary to corporate existence or to valid exercise of corporate powers.

Thus, in the absence of a charter or statutory provisions to the contrary, by-laws are not necessary either to
the existence of a corporation or to the valid exercise of the powers conferred upon it. And, even when where
the governing statute in express terms confers upon the corporation the power to adopt by-laws, the failure
to exercise the power will be ascribed to mere a non-action which will not render void any acts of the
corporation which would otherwise be valid.

DOCTRINE:

The word “must” in a statute is not always imperative but it may be consistent with an exercise of discretion.
The language of the statute should be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in
using the word “must” or “shall”.

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ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. v. NLRC

G.R. No. 172409 February 4, 2008

ROOS INDUSTRIAL CONSTRUCTION, INC. and OSCAR TOCMO, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION and JOSE MARTILLOS, respondents.

FACTS:

A complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims was filed against Roos before the NLRC. Jose Martillos
alledged that he had been hired as a driver-mechanic in 1988 but was not made to sign any employment
contract by Roos. Roos contended that Martillos had been hired on several occasions as a project employee
and that his employment was coterminous with the duration of the projects.

The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Martillos finding that he had acquired the status of a regular employee as
he was hired as a driver with little interruption from one project to another, a task which is necessary to the
usual trade of his employer.

The Labor Arbiter ordered Roos to pay Martillos the aggregate sum of P224,647.17 representing backwages,
separation pay, salary differential, holiday pay, service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay.

Roos filed an appeal, however, instead of posting the required cash or surety bond within the reglementary
period, Roos filed a motion for extension of time to submit/post surety bond.

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The 2nd Division of the NLRC dismissed Roos’ appeal for lack of jurisdiction stating that the bond is an
indispensable requisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal
within the reglementary perion and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and jurisdictional.

Roos elevated the dismissal to the CA but the resolution of the NLRC was affirmed. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

W/N the motion for extension of time to file cash or surety bond before the NLRC toll the reglementary period
to appeal.

HELD:
NO. The Court denies the petition. The Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the
Labor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond
within ten (10) days from such decision.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioners.

Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but jurisdictional

Art. 223. Appeal. Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to
the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or
orders. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds:

a. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter;

b. If the decision, order or award was secured through fraud or coercion, including graft and corruption;

c. If made purely on questions of law; and

d. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury
to the appellant. xxx

Rule VI of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC implements this Article with its Sections 1, 3, 5, 6 and 7
providing pertinently as follows:

Section. 1. Periods of Appeal. - Decisions, awards, or orders of the Labor Arbiter and the POEA Administrator
shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter or of the Administrator, and in case
of a decision of the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing Officer within five (5) calendar days from
receipt of such decisions, awards or orders . . .

Section 3. Requisites for Perfection of Appeal. '(a) The appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as
provided in Sec. 1 of this Rule; shall be under oath with proof of payment of the required appeal fee and the
posting of a cash or surety bond as provided in Sec. 5 of this Rule; shall be accompanied by memorandum of
appeal which shall state the grounds relied upon and the arguments in support thereof; the relief prayed for;
and a statement of the date when the appellant received the appealed decision, order or award and proof of
service on the other party of such appeal.

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A mere notice of appeal without complying with the other requisite aforestated shall not stop the running of
the period for perfecting an appeal.

Section 5. Appeal Fee. 'The appellant shall pay an appeal fee of One hundred ( P100.00) pesos to the Regional
Arbitration Branch, Regional Office, or to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration and the official
receipt of such payment shall be attached to the records of the case.

Section 6. Bond. 'In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter, the Regional Director or his duly authorized Hearing
Officer involves a monetary award, an appeal by the employer shall be perfected only upon the posting of a
cash or surety bond, which shall be in effect until final disposition of the case, issued by a reputable bonding
company duly accredited by the Commission or the Supreme Court in an amount equivalent to the monetary
award, exclusive of damages and attorney's fees..

DOCTRINE:

The word “only” makes it perfectly clear that the LAWMAKERS intended the posting of a cash or surety bond
by the employer to be exclusive means by which an employer’s appeal may be considered completed.

The word “only” means exclusive

ADDITIONAL NOTES:

1. “And” means conjunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter I to be
added to or taken along with the first (Black Law’s Dictionary). It denotes a joinder or union and not
meant to separate.
2. “Or” is a disjunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a choice of one among two or
more things, or between different or unlike things.
3. “In other words”, “to wit”, or “that is to say” are used to clarify what has already been said, and in
such cases.
4. “And/or” means “either and or”. It also means that the effect shall be given to both the conjunctive
‘and’ and the disjunctive ‘or’. Furthermore, that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as
one or the other will best effectuate the purpose intended by the legislature as gathered from the
whole statute. Therefore, it is ordinarily held that the intention of the legislature in using the terms
are to be used interchangeably.
5. The term “shall” may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the
entire provision in which it is found, its object and the consequences that would follow from
construing it one way or the other.

For example, Article 213 (2) of the Family Code and the last paragraph of section 6, rule 99, Revised Rules of
Court, the use of the word “shall” connotes a mandatory character.

(2) No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother, unless the court finds compelling
reasons to order otherwise.

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The second paragraph of Article 213 of the Family Code should not be read as prohibiting separated couples
from agreeing to a custody arrangement, other than sole maternal custody, for their child of tender age. The
statutory preference for the mother’s custody comes into play only when courts are compelled to resolve
custody fights between separated parents. Where the parents settle the matter out of court by mutual
agreement, the statutory preference reserved to the mother should not apply.

A reading of the entire text of Article 213 shows that the second paragraph applies only to custody disputes
that have reached the courtroom.

It is unmistakable that the legislative policy is to vest the separated mother with physical custody of the child
under seven years old, in cases where the courts are called upon to designate a parent for the exercise of
parental authority. The second sentence of the first paragraph and the second paragraph itself merely qualify
the general rule expressed in the first sentence that "parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
designated by the Court," in case of parental separation.

In choosing the parent who will exercise parental authority, the court must take into account all relevant
considerations. One of these is the child’s age, as the court is directed to give due regard to the child’s choice,
if the child is more than seven years of age. If the child, however, is below seven years of age, the court cannot
separate the child from the mother, except for compelling reasons. This is the import of the entire provision.

6. Computation of time – (Art. 13, New Civil Code)

 Year – 365 days
 Month – 30 days
 Week – seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins
 Day – twenty four hours,
 Night – from sunset to sunrise
 If months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they
respectively have
 In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included (Art. 13, New Civil
Code).
 Prescription of crime under art 90 of the Revised Penal Code, the term month shall be understood as a
30-day month and not a calendar month.

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PNB vs Court of Appeals 222 Scra 134, May 17, 1993

FACTS:

To secure payments of his loan, private respondent mortgages two lots to petitioner bank. For failure to pay
the obligation, petitioner bank extra judicially foreclosed the mortgaged property and won the highest bidder
at the auction sale. Then, a final deed of sale was registered in the Registry of Property in favor of the
Petitioner bank and later sold the said lots to a third party. The notices of sale of private respondent’s
foreclosed properties were published on March 28, April 11 and April 12, 1969 issues of a newspaper “Daily
Record.” The date March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday, while the dates April 11 and 12 fall on a Friday and a
Saturday respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be “published
once a week for at least three consecutive weeks.”

ISSUE:

W/N the petitioner bank complied with the requirements of weekly publication of notice of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgages.

HELD:

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No. it must be conceded that Article 13 of the NCC is completely silent as to the definition of what is a week.
In Concepcion vs Zandueta, the term “week” was interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven
consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins. The petitioner bank failed to
comply with the legal requirement of publication. Auction sale of petitioner bank is void and of no legal effect.

Petition for certiorari dismissed.

DOCTRINE:

A week means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.

ALU-TUCP vs. NLRC and NSC

[G.R. No. 109902. August 02, 1994]

FACTS:

Petitioners, as employees of private respondent National Steel Corporation (NSC), filed separate complaints
for unfair labor practice, regularization and monetary benefits with the NLRC, Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch
XII, Iligan City. The complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioners
“regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such [project] activity
exists,” but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining
agreement. It also ordered payment of salary differentials.

The NLRC in its questioned resolutions modified the Labor Arbiter’s decision. It affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s
holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific
undertaking — the Five Years Expansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time
of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. The
NLRC, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enjoyed by regular employees for lack
of legal and factual basis.

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The law on the matter is Article 280 of the Labor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are “regular”
employees of NSC because: (i) their jobs are “necessary, desirable and work-related to private respondent’s
main business, steel-making”; and (ii) they have rendered service for six (6) or more years to private
respondent NSC.

ISSUE:

Whether or not petitioners are considered “permanent employees” as opposed to being only “project
employees” of NSC.

HELD:

NO. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. NLRC Resolutions affirmed.

Petitioners are not considered “permanent employees”. However, contrary to petitioners’ apprehensions, the
designation of named employees as “project employees” and their assignment to a specific project are
effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable
requirements of labor laws.

On the claim that petitioners’ service to NSC of more than six (6) years should qualify them as “regular
employees”, the Supreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. The simple fact that the
employment of petitioners as project employees had gone beyond one (1) year, does not detract from, or
legally dissolve, their status as “project employees”. The second paragraph of Article 280 of the Labor Code,
quoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one (1) year, shall be considered a
regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to project employees.

Article 280. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable
in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for a specific
project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the
employment is for the duration of the season.

(2) An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and his
employment shall continue while such activity exists.

DOCTRINE:

Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the stature, the office of which is either to except something from the
enacting clause, or to qualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of
misinterpretation of its extent.

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The familiar grammatical rule is that proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding
part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other sections thereof, unless the clear legislative
intent is to restrict or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding the proviso but also earlier provisions
of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

CHAPTER 5

Aris Phil Inc. vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.

G.R. No. 90501, August 5, 1991

FACTS:

In 1988, private respondent, who were employees of petitioner requested for grievance conference
concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous. As none was
arranged, lodged a protest against their employer for hazardous and detrimental working conditions.
Because of this protest they were dismissed on the ground of violation of company rules and regulations.

These dismissed employees then filed an action for illegal dismissal against their employer. The labor
arbiter ruled in their favor ordering reinstatement. After promulgation of judgment respondent file a
motion for execution based on the provision of Sec 12 of Republic Act 6715 or Art. 223 of the Labor Code
which provide for immediate execution of award of reinstatement by the Labor Arbiter. This provision is
assailed by the petitioner for its alleged unconstitutionality.

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ISSUE:

Whether or not Sec 12 of Republic Act 6715 and sections 2 and 17 of NLRC interim Rules on Appeal
under RA 6715, Amending the Labor Code are unconstitutional.

Section 12. Article 223 of the same Code is amended to read as follows:

"Article 223. Appeal xxx

(3) In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar
as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The
employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior
to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The
posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.

NLRC INTERIM RULES ON APPEALS UNDER R. A. 6715, AMENDING THE LABOR CODE

SECTION 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. - Insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the
decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be executory
even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely be
reinstated in the payroll.

SECTION 17. Transitory Provision. - Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of
these Interim Rules must conform with the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the
Commission.

HELD:

The Court finds the petition lack of merit.

As explained, the provision is in the exercise of the police power of State. Given that the employer has power
to discharge its employee, the State, however, in ensuring the protection and preservation of employment
and livelihood as it is considered a property of a person as embodied by the Constitution, may exercise such
power. The execution pending appeal is designed to stop the threat on the survival of the dismissed
employee and his family.

Article XIII on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution provides that the State is mandated to
afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment
and equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization,
collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in
accordance with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy
and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote
the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary
modes in settling disputes.

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The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely
baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional. With the foregoing there is it can be seen that the provision
haven’t breach the Constitution.

DOCTRINE: PRESUMPTION OF CONSTITUTIONALITY

Laws are presumed constitutional to support its nullification it must be a clear and unequivocal breach, not
a doubtful and argumentative implication. A law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the
Constitution is clear and beyond reasonable doubt. As put by Justice Malcolm, “to doubt is to sustain”.

Hon. Alfredo Lim vs. Hon. Felipe G. Paquing and Associated Development Corporation

G.R. No. 115044 January 27 1995

Teofisto Guingona Jr. And Dominador Cepeda Jr. Vs. Hon. Vetino Reyes and Associated Developmeny
Corporation

G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995

FACTS:

Among the legislative powers of the Municipal Board as provided by the Charters of Manila is to tax, license,
permit and regulate amount others the game of jai-alai.

However Executive Order No. 392, vest the authority to Games and Amusements Board (GAB) in regulating
this jai-alai. Subsequently Congress enacted RA. 954 prohibiting certain activities which includes jai-alai.

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However, the Municipal Board of Manila pass an ordinance authorizing the Mayor to allow and permit the
Associated Development Corporation to establish and maintain and operate a jai-alai in the City of Manila.

Years after Pres Marcos promulgated Presidential Decree 771 revoking all powers and authority to the local
government in granting franchise to certain activities which include jai-alai.

But in a few months the president issued again another presidential decree, which is Presidential Decree 810
which allow the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation to operate jai-alai (basque pelota) in greater
Manila.

But then Pres. Aquino issued Executive Order 169 expressly repealing Presidential Decree 810 which revoke
and cancel the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation.

However, on May 1998, the Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a jai-alai. To which
the government through GAB opposed invoking Presidential Decree 771. ADC question the constitutionality of
Presidential Decree 771 saying that it is violative of equal protection clause and non-impairment clause.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree 771 is unconstitutional for violation of equal protection clause and non-
impairment clause of the 1987 Constitution.

There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises
issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal
protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by
the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in
the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these
issues as early as 1975, almost twenty (20) years ago.

Requisites of Equal Protection clause:

1. It must be based on substantial distinction

2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law
3. It must not be limited existing conditions only
4. It must apply to all members of the same class

On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be
remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a
mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit
through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police
power for the public welfare. (RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450))

Non-impairment clause
The non-impairment clause is contained in Section 10, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that no
law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

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The non-impairment clause is limited in application to laws that derogate from prior acts or contracts by
enlarging, abridging or in any manner changing the intention of the parties. There is impairment if a
subsequent law changes the terms of a contract between the parties, imposes new conditions, dispenses with
those agreed upon or withdraws remedies for the enforcement of the rights of the parties.

The non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the State. Property rights and contractual rights
are not absolute

DOCTRINE:
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the Court.
The petitioners’ argument must fail because there is nothing on record that shows Presidential Decree 771
being repealed, altered, and amended by any subsequent law or presidential decrees. The contention of the
petitioner that in one case in the Court of First Instance, the Presidential Decree has been declared
unconstitutional must fail, for it is only the Supreme Court, sitting en banc, can declare a law
unconstitutional.

Jovencio Lim and Teresita Lim vs. The People of the Philippines, The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 217, The City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Wilson Cham

G.R. No. 149276, September 27, 2002

Facts:

Petitioner is assailing constitutionality Presidential Decree 818 which amended Art 315 of the Revised Penal
Code by increasing the penalties for estafa by means of bouncing checks is being challenged in this petition
for certiorari, for being violative of due process clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel,
degrading or inhuman punishment of the 1987 Constitution.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, follow.
In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank
check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated
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January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having
been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of
petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check.
When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent
filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses
with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818. On
February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and
recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an
information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
against petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574.
On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an "Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest" which was
denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners' motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial
court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the
trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large.
On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates
the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment.
In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant
to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide
involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Decree 818 is unconstitutional in violation of provisions about due process
clause, the right to bail, and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment of the 1987
Constitution.

Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any
person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
xxx
Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x
x.

HELD:

With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners
claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the
Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due
process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. [5] PD 818 was
published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975.

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Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose,
namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country's commercial and economic
growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD
818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is
immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed
by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we
conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution.

With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE: The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.

When the law is questioned, presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. The burden of proving otherwise is
in the person who questions it. The breach must be clear and unequivocal not doubtful and argumentative.
The petitioner failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat such presumption.

Salvacion vs Central Bank of the Philippines Case Digest

G.R. No. 94723; August 21, 1997

FACTS:
Bartelli, an American tourist, detained and raped Salvacion. Salvacion was rescued and Bartelli was arrested.
The policemen recovered from Bartelli several dollar checks and a dollar account in China Bank. Bartelli
however escaped from prison. In the civil case filed against Bartelli, the trial court awarded Salvacion moral,
exemplary and attorney’s fees.

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Petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Bank. But China Bank refused arguing
that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme
Court.

ISSUE/S:
W/N sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 and sec. 8 of RA 6426 as amended by PD 1246 , AKA “Foreign
Currency Deposit Act’, be made applicable to a foreign transient.

Section 113. Exemption from attachment - foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any
administrative body whatsoever.

Section 8. Secrecy of foreign currency deposits. – All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as
amended by PD No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under PD No. 1034, are hereby
declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of
the depositor, in no instance shall foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any
person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative, or any other
entity whether public or private; Provided, however, That said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from
attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or
any administrative body whatsoever. (As amended by PD No. 1035, and further amended by PD No. 1246,
prom. Nov. 21, 1977.)

HELD:
NO. The provisions of Section 133 of CB Circular No. 960 are hereby held to be inapplicable to this case
because of its peculiar circumstances. If we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No.
960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative
body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice
would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Bartelli.

Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides
that “in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body
intended right and justice to prevail.” Hence, Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of
execution issued in the civil case and to release to petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as
would satisfy the judgment.

Moreover, the SC ruled that economic basis for the enactment of RA No. 6426 is not anymore present; and
even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable
and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted but the law failed to anticipate the
iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

Furthermore, the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give the latter protection. However,
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the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged because
such depositor stays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank
only for a short time. Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the
protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment
or other court processes.

It would be unthinkable, that the questioned sec. 113 of Central Bank Circular 960 would be used as a device
by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing and in doing so, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent.

DOCTRINE:

In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended
right and justice to prevail.

Carlos Alonzo and Casimira Alonzo vs. Intermediate Appellate Court and Tecla Padua G.R. No. L-
72873, May 28, 1987

FACTS:

Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land from their deceased parents.
Two- fifths of the said land was sold to herein petitioner: In 1963, Celestino Padua (his brother), transferred
his undivided share by way of absolute sale, while Eustaquia Padua (his sister) in 1964, sold hers in an
instrument denominated “Con Pacto de Retro Sale”.
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By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied the area and enclosed the same with a fence.
Sometime in 1975, petitioner’s son, Eduardo built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area his
parents have bought with the latter’s consent.

In 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the co-heirs sought to redeem the area he sold, but his complaint was
dismissed for he is an American citizen.

In 1977, a complaint was then filed by another co-heir, Tecla Padua invoking the same right as Mariano. The
complaint was dismissed by the trial court on the ground that the right has prescribed, saying that the
protest must be filed 30 days from the notice of sales. Although there is no written notice, the trial court say
the actual knowledge or notice may suffice.

The respondent court, Intermediate Appellate Court, reversed the order saying that written notice although
in whatever form must be strictly complied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not actual knowledge will be sufficient in compliance with the 30 day notice rule in the sale of
land.

HELD:

The 30-day period of redemptions begins when the first complaint for redemption was filed where the other co-
heirs were actually informed of the sale, but thereafter expired.

The Court sustained the lower court’s order. Saying that it is unacceptable to allow the pretense posed by
the respondent in having no knowledge of the said sale. Allowing their strict contention of written notice
would enable the law to be device for injustice. It is evident what the legislature want in enacting such
provision is to provide redemptioners due notice. The court is satisfied, the parties being brother and sisters,
were actually informed and written notice is immaterial, that such actual notice is sufficient. Petition
granted.

DOCTRINE:
A law should not be interpreted so as to cause an injustice.

ALELI C. ALMADOVAR, GENERAL MANAGER ISAWAD, ISABELA CITY, BASILAN PROVINCE, PETITIONER, VS.
CHAIRPERSON MA. GRACIA M. PULIDO-TAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, G.R. No. 213330

FACTS:

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This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Revised Rules of Court seeking to reverse and set aside the
December 29, 2011 Decision of the Commission on Audit (COA) and the April 4, 2014 Resolution 2 of the COA
En Bane which affirmed the October 28, 2010 Decision of the COA Regional Office (COA Regional
Office) regarding Notices of Disallowances (NDs).

The COA Regional Office explained that the compensation of the GMs of local water districts (LWDs) was still
subject to the provisions of RA No. 6758, or the Salary Standardization law (SSL). Thus, it found that the
increase in petitioner’s salary was improper as it ran afoul with the provisions of RA No. 6758.

The antecedent of the case is as follows:

Aleli Almador (petitioner) is the General Manager of Isabela Water District (ISAWAD), which is a government
owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).

The COA found as improper the increase in petitioner’s salary on the ground that it runs afoul of the Salary
Standardization Law (SSL), RA 6758. Petitioner maintained that her salary was exempt from the SSL as Section
23 of RA No. 9286, a later law, empowered the board of directors of LWDs to fix the salary of its GM, thereby
impliedly repealing RA No. 6758.

ISSUE:

W/N petitioner’s salary increase was proper.

HELD:

The increase in the salary of the petitioner was correctly disallowed because it contravened the provision of
the SSL. The said law applies to all Government positions, including those in GOCCs, without qualification,
unless otherwise provided in their own charter.

Section 23 of PD 198, as amended did not expressly exempt GM of water utilities from SSL. The same, clearly
provides that the water utility’s board of directors has the power to define the duties and fix the
compensation of a GM. However, the compensation fixed must be in accordance with the position
classification system under the SSL.

The Court, notes that RA No. 9286 did not expressly repeal the SSL, nor impliedly, because repeal by
implication is not favored by law and is only resorted to in case of irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy
between the new law and the old law.

Similar to Mendoza’s, the LWDs are subject to the provisions of the SSL.

The December 29, 2011 decision of the COA is affirmed.

DOCTRINE:

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Presumption against implied repeals. Well settled is the rule that repeals of laws by implication is not favored
and that courts must generally assume their congruent application. The two laws must be absolutely
incompatible or inconsistent, irreconcilable, and repugnant with each other. For the legislature is presumed to
know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statues.

Antonio Mecano vs. Commission on Audit

G.R. No. 103982, December 11, 1992

Facts:

Petitioner, a Director II in the NBI was hospitalized for cholecystitis, a service connected illness. He now
claims with the COA reimbursement for his hospitalization for the illness under Sec. 699 of Revised
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Administrative Code. However the COA denied his claim saying that the provision where the petitioner’s
claim is based is already not enforce it being not restated or reenacted by the provision of Administrative
Code of 1987, which respondent treats as a repeal to the Revised Administrative Code.

Respondent assails the repealing clause of said law. However time and again that in order for one to be an
express repeal the particular provision must be specifically indicated in the repealing clause. The nature of
the repealing clause mentioned is of a general repealing provision, it is a clause which predicates that under
the condition that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts.

Issue:

Whether or not the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 operates to repeal the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917.

Held:

In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of
the legislature to supplant the old code with the new code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause
of the new code.

Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions), of the administrative Code of 1987 provides,

“All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.”

In the case at bar, herein the repealing clause fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be
repealed, but it just an example of general repealing provision. The failure to add the specific law to be
repealed indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and
repugnancy exist. This situation falls within the ambit of an implied repeal.

Comparing the two codes, the later code does not cover the whole subject of the former, there are several
matters not included therein. And lastly, a well settled rule in statutory construction that repeal by implication
is not favored. For the legislature in enacting laws is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and
not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statues.

Petition granted and respondent was ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits.

DOCTRINE:

Repeals of statute by implication not favored.

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Danilo Paras vs. Commission on Elections

G.R. No. 123169, November 4, 1996

FACTS:

Petitioner an incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula Cabanatuan won during the last regular election of 1994.
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However, a petition for recall was filed by the registered voters of his barangay. The COMELEC acting on the
petition set the signing of the petition. 29.30% sign the petition, above the 25% requirement provided by
law.

An opposition was filed by the petitioner saying that the recall was not proper. Citing Sec. 74 of Republic Act
7160 which states that no recall shall take place within 1 year from the date of the official’s assumption of
office or one year immediately preceding a regular local election. The petitioner saying that an SK election, is
considered as regular local election, is going to happen in a span of four months, therefore recall is improper.

The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:

Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall
election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence.

(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to
office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Sangguniang Kabataan Election can be considered a regular local election.

HELD:
The court did not rule in favor of the petitioner.

if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed
within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall
election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code.

Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of
the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7)
months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary
restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is
hereby made permanent.

DOCTRINE:
Presumption against ineffectiveness. It is a rule in statutory construction that it is presumed that the
legislature intended to enact an operative and effective law, and did not include a vain provision in the
enactment of the statute.

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Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. and The Court of Tax Appeals

G.R. Nos. 28502-03 April 18, 1989

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FACTS:

ESSO, herein respondent overpaid income tax sometime in 1959, it was accordingly granted by the
Commissioner as tax credit in 1964. However in 1960, he was found to have been short of payment. In 1964
he was ordered to pay the sum of short payment. He paid the sum under protest saying that the sum of his
excessive tax paid on 1959 should be subtracted from his payment for 1960.

ESSO then asked for refund but was denied by the Internal Revenue Commissioner. On appeal to the Court
of Tax Appeals, the court ordered payment to ESSO its refund claim (39,787.94) as overpaid interest. Hence,
this appeal by the Commissioner.

The facts are simple enough and are quite quickly recounted. ESSO overpaid its 1959 income tax by
P221,033.00. It was accordingly granted a tax credit in this amount by the Comissioner on August 5,1964.
However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. So, on July 10,
1964, the Commissioner wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest
thereon for the period from April 18,1961 to April 18,1964. On August 10, 1964, ESSO paid under protest the
amount alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the
computation of interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed that it should not have
been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount
of P146,961.00—representing the difference between said deficiency, P367,994.00, and ESSOs earlier
overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a tax credit). ESSO thus asked for a refund.

The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals.
As aforestated. that Court ordered payment to ESSO of its "refund-claim x x in the amount of P39,787.94 as
overpaid interest. Hence, this appeal by the Commissioner. The CTA justified its award of the refund as
follows:

... In the letter of August 5, 1964, .. (the Commissioner) admitted that .. ESSO had overpaid its
1959 income tax by P221,033.00. Accordingly .. (the Commissioner) granted to .. ESSO a tax
credit of P221,033.00. In short, the said sum of P221,033.00 of ESSO's money was in the
Government's hands at the latest on July 15, 1960 when it ESSO paid in full its second
installment of income tax for 1959. On July 10, 1964 .. (the Commissioner) claimed that for
1960, .. ESSO underpaid its income tax by P367,994.00. However, instead of deducting from
P367,994.00 the tax credit of P221,033.00 which .. (the Commissioner) had already admitted
was due .. ESSO .. (the Commissioner) still insists in collecting the interest on the full amount
of P367,994.00 for the period April 18, 1961 to April 18,1964 when the Government had
already in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 of .. ESSOs money even before the latter's income
tax for 1960 was due and payable. If the imposition of interest does not amount to a penalty
but merely a just compensation to the State for the delay in paying the tax, and for the
concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should be in the Government's hand
(Castro v. Collector, G.R. No. L-1274, Dec. 28, 1962), the collection of the interest on the full
amount of P367,994.00 without deducting first the tax credit of P221,033.00, which has long
been in the hands of the Government, becomes erroneous, illegal and arbitrary.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not the Commission Internal Revenue should refund the excess payment made by ESSO Standard
Eastern Inc.

Section 51 of the Tax Code pertinently reading as follows:

(c) Definition of deficiency. As used in this Chapter in respect of tax imposed by this Title, the
term 'deficiency' means:

(1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this Title exceeds the amount shown as the tax by
the taxpayer upon his return; but the amount so shown on the return shall first be increased
by the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, and
decreased by the amount previously abated credited, returned, or otherwise in respect of such
tax;

xxx xxx xxx

(d) Interest on deficiency. — Interest upon the amount determined as deficiency shall be
assessed at the same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of
six per centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax (or, if the tax is
paid in installments, from the date prescribed for the payment of the first xxx

HELD:

The Court upheld that the respondent must be granted its claim.

The Commissioner having been in fact acknowledging the mistake in which the respondent paid excess tax,
(the Government) had the obligation to return the same to ESSO. The contention of the petitioner that the
acknowledgment was made 4 years after the payment negates actuality. The court held that, obligation to
return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made and not from the time that the
payee (BIR or the Government) admits the obligation to reimburse.

The respondent should not be legally or logically considered a debtor of the government and whatever
obligation ESSO may incur should be reduced to the sum which the government holds as obligation to ESSO.

(The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as July 15, 1960, the Government
already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and
received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably
belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the
erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts from its actuality.
The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from
the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an
amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee's confession of the mistake or recognition
of the obligation to reimburse. In other words, since the amount of P221,033.00 belonging to ESSO was
already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the latter had no right whatever to the
amount and indeed was bound to return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logically possible for ESSO
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thereafter to be considered a debtor of the Government in that amount of P221,033.00; and whatever other
obligation ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to be reduced by that sum,
in respect of which no interest could be charged.)

DOCTRINE:
Presumption against absurdity.
Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or
unreasonable consequences. A literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd
results.

Cesario Ursua vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 112170, April 10, 1996

FACTS:

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Atty. Palmones, lawyer for the petitioner wrote a letter the Office of the Ombudsman to be able to be
furnished with a copy of complaint against petitioner. He asked the petitioner to bring this letter to the
Ombudsman because said lawyer’s messenger is running some other errands. Petitioner comply, however he
asked said messenger what to do as he was afraid to go to that office because he is one of the respondents
in the case. The messenger told him that he could just sign his name, Oscar Perez, to avoid being recognized.
And so the petitioner did as told. He obtain the requested complaint from Ms. Loida Kahulugan. But before
leaving the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance. However, this acquaintance was also known to
Loida which enable her to find that the one he gave the complaint was not Oscar Perez himself.

Petitioner was accordingly charged and was found guilty by the trial court in violation of Sec 1 of CA No. 142 as
amended by RA 6085. He appealed to the Court of Appeals but it affirmed the decision of the lower court.
Hence this petition

ISSUE:

Whether or not the use of a different name belonging to another in isolated transaction falls within the
prohibition of Commonwealth Act 142, AKA “Anti-alias law”or AN ACT TO REGULATE THE USE OF ALIASES.

Section 1 as last updated by RA 6085 (1969)

Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in
athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name
different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with
which he was baptized for the first time, or, in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of
immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court

Section 2 as last updated by RA 6085 (1969)

Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided
to obtain judicial authority for a change of name, and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial
authority for more than one alias. xxx The judicial authority for the use of alias the Christian name and the
alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or
names other, than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil
registry.

Section 3 as last updated by RA 6085 (1969)

No person having been baptized with a name different from that with which he was registered at birth in the
local civil registry, or in case of an alien, registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry, or any person
who obtained judicial authority to use an alias, or who uses a pseudonym, shall represent himself in any public
or private transaction or shall sign or execute any public or private document without stating or affixing his
real or original name and all names or aliases or pseudonym he is or may have been authorized to use
HELD:

The objective of the provision mentioned is to curb the common practice among Chinese of adopting
scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. An alias is

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name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business
transaction in addition to his real name registered at birth. Hence the use of fictitious name or a different
name by another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name is addition to his name does not fall within the prohibition contained in the said provision.

In addition to that a rule in statutory construction is there is a valid presumption that undesirable
consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is
fairly susceptible is favored, which will avid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and
injurious consequences. The case being an undesirable consequence and interpretation of the law must be
reversed.

Judgment reversed and set aside, petitioner acquitted.

DOCTRINE:

Presumption against undesirable consequences

ADDITIONAL DOCTRINE:

Presumption against violation of International Law – this presumption is in conformity with the declaration of
principles and state policies in our Constitution. Art 2, secs 1 and 2, which reads:

Section 1. The Philippines is a democratic and republican State. Sovereignty resides in the people and all
government authority emanates from them.

Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted
principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality,
justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.

For instance,

The Vienna Convention on Road signs and signals which was ratified by the Philippine Government in PD 207.

The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relation in 1961.

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