Whether the CA gravely erred in dismissing petitioners' petition based on mere

technicalities.

Petitioners mainly argue that technicalities should not be given preference but
must yield to substantial justice; and that deficiency in the observance of the rules
should not be given undue importance.

Prefatorily, petitioners cite Section 6, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that the Rules of Court shall be liberally construed in order to promote
their objective of securing a just, speedy, and inexpensive disposition of every
action and proceeding. Referring to the case of Case v. Jugo, (77 Phil. 523 (1946))
petitioners alleged that there are four instances where non-observance of the
rules may be excused, to wit: (1) those cases in which public policy is not involved;
(2) those which arose from an honest mistake in good faith or unforeseen
circumstances or accident; (3) those which do not prejudice the adverse party;
and (4) those which do not deprive the courts of their authority.

While they conceded that certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal,
petitioners claim that there have been many exceptions that could have applied
to their case.

First, relying in Ruiz, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,( 292-A Phil. 622 (1993)) petitioners
maintain that even if appeal should have been a proper remedy against an
oppressive and arbitrary decision of a lower court, the aggrieved party may avail
of the special civil action for certiorari when appeal would not be a speedy or
adequate remedy. They added that the Court can legally entertain the special civil
action for certiorari considering the broader and primordial interests of justice
which compel an occasional departure from the general rule that the
extraordinary writ of certiorari cannot substitute for a lost appeal. Relatedly,
petitioners invoke the foregoing exception alleging that the orders of the trial
court amounted to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.

Second, petitioners cite the case of Del Pozo v. Judge Penaco, (249 Phil. 534
(1988). ) wherein the Court held that in order to prevent a miscarriage of justice
and correct a very serious error, "very special circumstances" of the case can
make a necessary suspension of the principle that a special civil action for
certiorari is proper only if "there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law." Petitioners submit that the unique
circumstances of what happened in their case should be taken into consideration
in the interest of substantial justice.

relaxation in the faithful observance of the rules should only be for persuasive
reasons and only in meritorious cases, which they claim as wanting in this case.

they averred that there is no satisfactory or compelling reason that warrants the
relaxation of the rules in favor of the petitioners. They added that petitioners'
plea for the application of the principles of substantial justice in their favor
deserves scant consideration.

Moreover, in its Comment,39 the DPWH, through the OSG, noted that petitioners'
arguments are nothing but a citation of various jurisprudence on liberal
interpretation of procedural rules and instances when their nonobservance was
excused. According to the OSG, the instant case does not establish a pure legal
question and involves factual issues that are beyond the pale of an appeal by
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The OSG pointed out that the
instant petition only addresses ancillary issues, i.e., the failure to comply with the
technical requirements and formalities, but not the weightier reason for the
denial of their remedies, which was belated filing. Lastly, the OSG claims that the
RTC's dismissal of the complaint, which is the root of the present controversy, can
no longer be disturbed since petitioners failed to raise this as an issue to this
instant case.

In their Consolidated Reply,41 petitioners reiterate that due to "unique

petitioners further argued that ….

It is settled that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court is proper only when there is neither an appeal, nor plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The remedies of appeal and
certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive such that where an
appeal is available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground is grave abuse of
discretion. To reiterate, certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. It is not
allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment to the proper forum,
especially if one's own negligence or error in one's choice of remedy occasioned
such loss or lapse.46

In Villalon v. Lirio,47 the Court held that "even if, in the greater interest of
substantial justice, certiorari may be availed of, it must be shown that the [lower
court] acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. The court must have exercised its powers in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, so patent and gross as to
amount to an evasion or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act in
contemplation of law." (Id. at 481, citing Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court
of Appeals, 531 Phil. 620, 630-631 (2006).)

Admittedly, there are instances where the extraordinary remedy of certiorari may
be resorted to despite the availability of an appeal.( Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corp., ). These are: (a) when
public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the
broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void;
or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial
authority. (Chua v. Santos, 483 Phil. 392, 402 (2004). )

In this case, the Court finds that none of the exceptions is present in this case.
Aside from generally asserting that "unique circumstances" happened to their
case, petitioners were not able to substantiate their allegation of the RTC's
violations of the rules.

In support of their submission that they can exceptionally avail of a petition for
certiorari, petitioners cite the cases of Ruiz, Jr. and Del Pozo.

Petitioners' reliance to these cases are mistaken.

***

In Ruiz, Jr., the Court found that an appeal would have been neither speedy nor
adequate for the plaintiffs and the cross-claimants had not been given a chance to
prove their causes of action, hence, there was no evidence in the records upon
which to anchor a judgment by the appellate court in their favor.
Meanwhile, in Del Pozo, there was a finding that in the proceedings during the
trial, petitioners therein were denied of due process. Consequently, the Court
found very special circumstances that warranted necessary suspension of rules to
prevent miscarriage of justice and correct a very serious error the actuality of
which was conceded by virtually all the parties.

Evidently, the factual milieu of the foregoing cases and the standpoint in which
the filing of a petition for certiorari, despite availability of an appeal was allowed,
differ with that of this case.

Relaxation of the procedural rules unwarranted.

As to the procedural aspect, the CA dismissed the petition based also in the
following defects: (1) failure to pay required docket fees and other lawful fees; (2)
violation of Section 11, Rule 13 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure; (3)
inconsistencies on Explanation and Proof of Service; (4) violation of Section 2(c),
Rule VIII of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice; and (5) prayer for extension of 15
days to file a petition for certiorari not in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence.51

Relatedly, petitioners argue that mere technicalities should not be given

It is settled that the acceptance of a petition for certiorari, as well as the grant of
due course thereto is, in general, addressed to the sound discretion of the court.
It must be stressed that certiorari, being an extraordinary remedy, the party who
seeks to avail of the same must strictly observe the rules laid down by the law and
non-observance thereof may not be brushed aside as mere technicality.53

While there have been exceptional instances where the Court has set aside
procedural defects to rectify patent injustice related to the liberal interpretation
of the rules, the Court finds such reason lacking in this case.

All told, the Court dismisses the instant petition after finding that the challenged
Resolutions failed to illustrate a reversible error and grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the CA. With the core
issues in this case resolved, the Court sees no more reason to discuss petitioners'
marginal arguments belatedly raised in their Reply.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed May 30, 2016 and September
20, 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals, Cebu City in CA-G.R. SP No. 09623-
UDK are AFFIRMED.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

SO ORDERED.

Leonen, (Chairperson), Hernando, Inting, and J. Lopez, JJ.,

Endnotes:
* Also referred to as "Asuncion Cabarrubias-Aquilla" in some parts of the rollo.

** Also referred to as "Lucia Villamor" in some parts of the rollo.

*** Also referred to as "Joseph Wennie dela Rosa" in the Petition.

**** Also referred to as "Roberto Jurado" in some parts of the rollo.

1Rollo, pp. 12-28.

2 Id. at 31-38; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, with
Associate Justices Pablito A. Perez and Gabriel T. Robeniol, concurring.

3 Id. at 41-48; penned by Associate Justice Pamela Ann Abella Maxino, with
Associate Justices Marilyn B. Lagura-Yap and Gabriel T. Robeniol, concurring.

4 Also referred to as CA-G.R. CEB SP No. 09623 UDK in the Notices of Resolution
and in the Petition.

5Rollo, pp. 155-161; penned by Presiding Judge Ma. Lynna P. Adviento.

6 Id. at 15.
7 Id. at 142.

8 Id.

9 Id. at 142-145.

10 363 Phil. 393 (1999).

11 Id. at 399, citing Travel Wide Associated Sales (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
276 Phil. 219, 224 (1991).

12Rollo, p. 72.

13 Id. at 155.

14 Id. at 17.

15 Id. at 158.

16 Id.

17 Id.
18 Id.

19 Supra note 5.

20Rollo, p. 159.

21 Id. at 161.

22 Id. at 19.

23 Id.

24 Id.

25 Supra note 2.

26Rollo, pp. 33-34.

27 Id. at 35-36.

28 Id. at 36.
29 Supra note 3.

30Rollo, p. 23.

31 77 Phil. 523 (1946).

32Rollo, p. 21.

33 Id.

34 292-A Phil. 622 (1993).

35 249 Phil. 534 (1988).

36Rollo, pp. 54-61.

37 Id. at 71-75.

38 Id. at 115-122.

39 Id. at 132-139.
40 Id. at 63-65.

41 Id. at 175-186.

42 497 Phil. 269 (2005).

43Rollo, p. 179.

44 Id. at 181.

45Abadilla, Jr. v. Spouses Obrero, 775 Phil. 419, 424-425 (2015).

46Miranda v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 213502, February 18, 2019.

47 765 Phil. 474 (2015).

48 Id. at 481, citing Cathay Pacific Steel Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 531 Phil.
620, 630-631 (2006).

49 Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Jancom Environmental Corp.,

51Rollo, pp. 35-36.

52 Id. at 23.

53Garcia, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 570 Phil. 188, 193 (2008).cralawredlibrary