School of Distance Education

INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
(PHL1C01)

STUDY MATERIAL

I SEMESTER
CORE COURSE

MA PHILOSOPHY
(2019 Admission onwards)

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT
SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION
CALICUT UNIVERSITY- P.O
MALAPPURAM- 673635, KERALA

190401

PHL1C01- INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

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SCHOOL OF DISTANCE EDUCATION

UNIVERSITY OF CALICUT

STUDY MATERIAL
FIRST SEMESTER

MA PHILOSOPHY (2019 ADMISSION ONWARDS)

CORE COURSE:

PHL1C01 : INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

Prepared by:

Sri.Ratheesh. D
Assistant Professor on Contract (Philosophy)
School of Distance Education
University of Calicut

Scrutinized by:

Dr. Balamurali.P.B
Assistant Professor
Department of Philosophy
University of Kerala, Kariavattom
Thiruvananthapuram

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Unit I
Carvaka System: Epistemology Perception
Unit II
Jainism; Epistemology Immediate and Mediate- Syadvada
Unit III
Nyaya-Vaisesika- Epistemology
Perception Inference Comparison and Verbal testimony
Unit IV
Purva Mimamsa- Epistemology
Perception Inference Comparison and Verbal testimony
Unit V
Sankara’s Advaita System- Epistemology
Perception, Inference, Scriptural testimony

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M.A PHILOSOPHY
(I SEMESTER)
PHLI C01: INDIAN EPISTEMOLOGY
(Core)
INTRODUCTION
Indian philosophy is the systems of thought and reflection that were developed by the
civilizations of the Indian subcontinent. They include both orthodox (astika) systems, namely, the
Nyaya, Vaisheshika, Samkhya, Yoga, Purva-Mimamsa (or Mimamsa), and Vedanta schools of
philosophy, and heterodox (nastika) systems, such as Carvaka, Buddhism and Jainism. Indian
thought has been concerned with various philosophical problems, significant among which are
the nature of the world (cosmology), the nature of reality (metaphysics), logic, the nature of
knowledge (epistemology), ethics, and the philosophy of religion. Indian epistemology or the
theory of knowledge attempts to provide a rational basis for an intelligible discourse on matters
of common, everyday experience, on the one hand, and in concentrating on the subject of
cognition, it attempts to offer insights into the real, that is, essential, nature of this subject, the
being who cognizes. In this sense, the concern with epistemology in Indian philosophy may be
said to represent a philosophy of being and knowing involving, thereby, the metaphysical concern
implicit in epistemology, where the subject-object distinction in the case of a knowledge of the
subject breaks down.

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UNIT-I
Charvaka System – Epistemology

Introduction
Brhaspati is considered as the traditional founder of the Charvaka system. Charvaka, after
whose name this school is so called, is said to be the chief disciple of Brhaspati. According to
another view, Charvaka is the name of the founder of this school. According to still another view,
the word ‘Charvaka’ is not a proper name, but a common name given to a materialist. Another
synonym of Charvaka is Lokayata which means a commoner. Nastika-Shiromani or an ‘arch-
heretic’ is another name for a materialist. They believed only in perception land in four elements.
Krsnapati Mishra sums up the teachings of this system thus: ‘Lokayata is only Shastra;
perception is the only authority, earth, water, fire and air are the only element; enjoyment is the
only end of human existence; mind is only a product of matter. There is no other world: death
means liberation’. The Sarva-darshana-sangraha gives the following summary of the Charvaka
system: ‘There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in another world; nor do the actions
of the castes, orders etc. produce any real effect. The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic’s
three staves and smearing one’s self with ashes, were made by Natures as the livelihood of those
destitute of knowledge and manliness. If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to the
heaven, why then does not the sacrificer forthwith offer his own father?... if beings in heaven are
gratified by our offering the Sharddha here, then why not gives the food down below to those
who are standing on the house top? While life remains let a man live happily, let him feed on
ghee even though he runs in debt ; when once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever return
here?. All the ceremonies are a means of livelihood for Brahmans. The three authors of Vedas
were buffoons, knaves and demons’.

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Perception
The epistemological doctrine of the Charvaka School is that perception or Pratyaksa is the only means of
valid knowledge. Perceptions are of two types, for Charvaka, external and internal. External perception is
described as that arising from the interaction of five senses and worldly objects, while internal perception is
described by this school as that of inner sense, the mind. Knowledge is the outcome of contact between an
external object and one of the five senses, although further knowledge may be acquired through the process of the
mind operating with the sense knowledge. Ultimately, then, all knowledge is derived from the senses.

Rejection of inference
The validity even of inference is rejected. Inference is said to be a meres leap in the dark. We precede here
from the known to the unknown and there is no certainty in this, though some inferences may turn out to be
accidentally true. A general proposition may be true in perceived cases, but there is no guarantee that it will hold
true even in unperceived cases. Deductive inference is vitiated by the fallacy of petitio principii. It is merely an
argument in a circle since the conclusion is already contained in the major premise the validity of which is not
proved. Inductive inference undertakes to prove the validity of the major premise of deductive inference. But
induction too is uncertain because it proceeds unwarrantedly from the known to the unknown. In order to
distinguish true induction from simple enumeration, it is pointed out that the former, unlike the latter, is based on
a causal relationship which means invariable association or vyäpti. Vyäpti therefore is the nerve of all inference.
But the Chärväka challenges this universal and invariable relationship of concomitance and regards it a mere
guess-work. Perception does not prove this vyäpti. Nor can it be proved by inference, for inference itself is said to
presuppose its validity.

Rejection of testimony
Carvaka rejects the validity of testimony too. Firstly, testimony itself is not a valid means of knowledge
and secondly, if testimony proves vyäpti, inference would become dependent on testimony and then none would
be able to infer anything by himself. Hence inference cannot be regarded as a valid source of knowledge.
Induction is uncertain and deduction is argument in a circle. The Chärväka accepts the validity of perception and
thereby upholds the truth of the means of valid knowledge, though he rejects all other means of knowledge as
invalid.

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The crude Chärväka position has been vehemently criticized by all systems of Indian Philosophy all of
which have maintained the validity of at least perception and inference. To refuse the validity of inference from
the empirical standpoint is to refuse to think and discuss. All thoughts, all discussions, all doctrines, all
affirmations and denials, all proofs and disproofs are made possible by inference. The Chärväka view that
perception is valid and inference is invalid is itself a result of inference. The Chärväka can understand others only
through inference and make others understand him only through inference. Thoughts and ideas, not being material
objects, cannot be perceived; they can only be inferred. Perception itself which is regarded as valid by the
Chärväka is often found untrue. We perceive the earth as flat but it is almost round. We perceive the earth as
static but it is moving round the sun. We perceive the disc of the sun as of a small size, but it is much bigger than
the size of the earth. Such' perceptual knowledge is contradicted by inference. Moreover, pure perception in the
sense of mere sensation cannot be regarded as a means of knowledge unless conception or thought has arranged
into order and has given meaning and significance to the loose threads of sense-data. The Chärväka cannot
support his views without giving reasons which presuppose the validity of inference.

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UNIT– II
Jainism- Epistemology
Introduction
The word Jainism is derived from ‘Jina’ which means ‘conqueror —one who has conquered his passions
and desires. It is applied to the liberated souls who have conquered passions and desires and karmas and obtained
emancipation. The Jainas believe in 24 Tirthankaras or ‘Founders of the Faith through whom their faith has come
down from fabulous antiquity. Of these, the first was Rsabhadeva and the last, Mahâvïra, the great spiritual hero,
whose name was Vardhamâna. Mahâvïra, the last of the prophets, cannot be regarded as the founder of Jainism,
because even before him, Jaina teachings were existent. But Mahâvïra gave a new orientation to that faith and for
all practical purposes, modern Jainism may be rightly regarded as a result of his teachings. He flourished in the
sixth century B.C. and was a contemporary of the Buddha. His predecessor, the 23rd Tirthankara, Pärshvanätha is
also a historical personage who lived in the eighth or ninth century B.C.

Immediate and Mediate

The Jainas classify knowledge into immediate (aparoksa) and mediate (paroksa). Immediate knowledge is
further divided into Avadhi, Manahparyäya and Kevala; and mediate knowledge into Mati and Shruta. Perceptual
knowledge which is ordinarily called immediate is admitted to be relatively so by Jainism and therefore included
in mediate and not immediate knowledge. It is included under Mati. Pure perception in the sense of mere
sensation cannot rank the title of knowledge. It must be given meaning and arranged into order by conception or
thought. Perceptual knowledge therefore is regarded as mediate since it presupposes the activity of thought. Mati
includes both perceptual and inferential knowledge. Shruta means knowledge derived from authority. Thus Mati
and Shruta which are the two kinds of mediate knowledge have as their instruments perception, inference and
authority, the three Pramänas admitted by Jainism. Avadhi-jnäna, Manah- paryäya-jnäna and Kevala-jnäna, are
the three kinds of immediate knowledge which may be called extra-ordinary and extra-sensory perceptions.
Avadhi is clairvoyance; Manahparyäya is telepathy; and Kevala is omniscience. Avadhi is direct knowledge of
things even at a distance of space or time. It is called Avadhi or ‘limited’ because it functions within a particular
area and up to a particular time. It cannot go beyond spatial and temporal limits. Manah-paryäya is direct
knowledge of the thoughts of others. This too is limited by spatial and temporal conditions. In both Avadhi and
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Manahparyäya, the soul has direct knowledge unaided by the senses or the mind. Hence they are called
immediate, though limited. Kevala-jnäna is unlimited and absolute knowledge. It can be acquired only by the
liberated souls. It is not limited by space, time or object. Besides these five kinds of right knowledge, we have
three kinds of wrong knowledge—Sarhshaya or doubt, Viparyaya or mistake and Anadhyavasäya or wrong
knowledge through indifference.

Knowledge may again be divided into two kinds, Pramäna or knowledge of a thing as it is, and Naya or
knowledge of a thing in its relation. Naya means a standpoint of thought from which we make a statement about a
thing. All truth is relative to our standpoints. Partial knowledge of one of the innumerable aspects of a thing is
called ‘naya’. Judgment based on this partial knowledge is also included in ‘naya’. There are seven ‘nayas’ of
which the first four are called ‘Artha-naya’ because they relate to objects or meanings, and the last three are
called ‘Shabda-naya because they relate to words. When taken as absolute, a ‘naya’ becomes a fallacy—
‘nayäbhäsa’.

The first is the ‘Naigama-naya’. From this standpoint we look at a thing as having both universal and
particular qualities and we do not distinguish between them. It becomes fallacious when both universals and
particulars are regarded as separately real and absolute, as is done by Nyäya-Vaishesika. The second is the
‘Sangraha-naya’. Here we emphasize the universal qualities and ignore the particulars where they are manifested.
It becomes fallacious when universals alone are treated as absolutely real and particulars are rejected as unreal, as
is done by Sänkhya and Advaita Vedanta. The third is the ‘Vyavahära-naya’ which is the conventional point of
view based on empirical knowledge. Here things are taken as concrete particulars and their specific features are
emphasized. It becomes fallacious when particulars alone are viewed as real and universals are rejected as unreal,
as is done by Materialism and Buddhist realistic pluralism. The fourth is called ‘Rjusütra-naya. Here the real is
identified with the momentary. The particulars are reduced to a series of moments and any given moment is
regarded as real. When this partial truth is mistaken to be the whole truth, it becomes fallacious, as in some
schools of Buddhism. Among the nayas which refer to words, the first is called ‘Shabda-naya’. It means that a
word is necessarily related to the meaning which it signifies. Every word refers either to a thing or quality or
relation or action. The second is ‘Samabhirüda-naya which distinguishes terms according to their roots. For
example, the word ‘Pankaja literally means ‘born of mud’ and signifies any creature or plant bom of mud, but its
meaning has been conventionally restricted to ‘lotus* only. Similarly the word ‘gauh’ means ‘anything which
moves’, but has conventionally become restricted to signify only a ‘cow. The third is called ‘Evambhüta-naya
which is a specialized form of the second. According to it, a name should be applied to an object only when its

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meaning is fulfilled. For example, a cow should be called ‘gauh’ only when it moves and not when it is lying
down.

Each naya or point of view represents only one of the innumerable aspects possessed by a thing from
which we may attempt to know or describe it. When any such partial viewpoint is mistaken for the whole truth,
we have a ‘nayâbhâsa’ or a fallacy. The ‘nayas’ are also distinguished as ‘Dravyarthika or from the point of view
of substance which takes into account the permanent nature and unity of things, and as ‘Paryäyäthika’ or from the
point of view of modes which takes into account the passing modifications and the diversity of things. When a
thing is taken to be either as permanent only or as momentary only, either as one only or as many only, fallacies
arise.

Syadvada
syädväda which is also called Sapta-bhangi-naya is the theory of relativity of knowledge. Sapta-bhangi-
naya means ‘dialectic of the seven steps or ‘the theory of seven-fold judgment. The word ‘syät’ literally means
probable, perhaps, may be. And Syädväda is sometimes translated as the theory of probability or the doctrine of
the may-be. But it is not in the literal sense of probability that the word syät is used here. Probability suggests
scepticism and Jainism is not scepticism. Sometimes the word ‘syät is translated as ‘somehow’. But this too
smacks of agnosticism and Jainism, again, is not agnosticism. The word ‘syät is used here in the sense of the
relative and the correct translation of Syädväda is the theory of Relativity of knowledge. Reality has infinite
aspects which are all relative and we can know only some of these aspects. All our judgments, therefore, are
necessarily relative, conditional and limited. ‘Syät or ‘relatively speaking or ‘Viewed from a particular view-point
which is necessarily related to other view-points must precede all our judgments. Absolute affirmation and
absolute negation both are wrong. All judgments are conditional. This is not a self-contradictory position because
the very nature of reality is indeterminate and infinitely complex and because affirmation and negation both are
not made from the same standpoint. The difficulty of predication is solved by maintaining that the subject and
the predicate are identical from the point of view of substance and different from the point of view of modes.
Hence categorical or absolute predication is ruled out as erroneous. All judgments are double-edged. Affirmation
presupposes negation as much as negation presupposes affirmation. The infinitely complex reality (ananta-
dharmakam vastu) admits of all opposite predicates from different standpoints. It is real as well as unreal
(sadasadätmakam). It is universal as well as particular (vyävrty- anugamätmakam). It is permanent as well as
momentary (nityänitya- svarupam). It is one as well as many (anekamekätmakam). Viewed from the point of

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view of substance, it is real, universal, permanent and one; viewed from the point of view of modes, it is unreal,
particular, momentary and many.The Jainas are fond of quoting the old story of the six blind men and the
elephant. The blind men put their hands on the different parts of the elephant and each tried to describe the whole
animal from the part touched by him. Thus the man who caught the ear said the elephant was like a country-made
fan; the person touching the leg said the elephant was like a pillar; the holder of the trunk said it was like a
python; the feeler of the tail said it was like a rope; the person who touched the side said the animal was like a
wall; and the man who touched the forehead said the elephant was like the breast. And all the six quarreled among
themselves, each one asserting that his description alone was correct. But he who can see the whole elephant can
easily know that each blind man feels only a part of the elephant which he mistakes to be the whole animal.
Almost all philosophical, ideological and religious differences and disputes are mainly due to mistaking a partial
truth for the whole truth. Our judgments represent different aspects of the many-sided reality and can claim only
partial truth. This view makes Jainism catholic, broad-minded and tolerant. It teaches respect for others’ point.
We can know an object in three ways through durniti, naya and pramäna. Mistaking a partial truth for the whole
and the absolute truth is called ‘durniti’ or ‘bad judgment’, e.g., the insistence that an object is absolutely real
(sadeva). A mere statement of a relative truth without calling it either absolute or relative is called ‘naya’ or
‘judgment, e.g., the statement that an object is real (sat). A statement of a partial truth knowing that it is only
partial, relative and conditional and has possibility of being differently interpreted from different points of view is
called ‘pramäna’ or ‘valid judgment. Every naya in order to become pramäna must be qualified by syät. Syät is
said to be the symbol of truth. It is relative and successive knowledge. It removes all contradictions among
different points of view. To reject ‘syät’ is to embrace unwarranted absolutism which is directly contradicted by
experience.

Everything exists from the point of view of its own substance, space, time and form and it does not exist
from the point of view of other’s substance, space, time and form. When we say ‘This table exists’, we cannot
mean that this table exists absolutely and unconditionally. Our knowledge of the table is necessarily relative. The
table has got innumerable characteristics out of which we can know only some. The table exists in itself as an
absolutely real and infinitely complex reality; only our knowledge of it is relative. For us the table must exist in
its own matter as made of wood, in its own form as having a particular shape, length, breadth and height, at a
particular space and at a particular time. It does not exist in other matter, other form and at other space and time.
So a table is both existent and non-existent viewed from different standpoints and there is no contradiction in it.

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The Jaina logic distinguishes seven forms of judgment. Each judgment, being relative, is preceded by the
word ‘syät’. This is Syädväda or Sapta-bhangi-naya. The seven steps are as follows:—

(1) Syädasti: Relatively, a thing is real.

(2) Syännästi: Relatively, a thing is unreal.

(3) Syädasti nästi : Relatively, a thing is both real and unreal.

(4) Syâdavaktavyam : Relatively, a thing is indescribable.

(5) Syädasti cha avaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is real and is indescribable.

(6) Syânnâsti cha avaktavyam: Relatively, a thing is unreal and is indescribable.

(7) Syadasti cha nästi cha avaktavyam : Relatively, a thing is real, unreal and indescribable.

From the point of view of one’s own substance, everything is, while from the point of view of other’s
substance, everything is not. As we have just remarked that we can know a thing in relation to its own matter,
form, space and time as a positive reality, while in relation to other’s matter, form, space and time it becomes a
negative entity. When we affirm the two different stand-points successively we get the third judgment—a thing is
both real and unreal (of course in two different senses). If we affirm or deny both existence and non-existence
simultaneously to anything, if we assert or negate the two different aspects of being and non-being together, the
thing baffles all description. It becomes indescribable, i.e., either both real and unreal simultaneously or neither
real nor unreal. This is the fourth judgment. The remaining three are the combinations of the fourth with the first,
second and third respectively.

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UNIT- III
Nyaya-Vaishesika - Epistemology
Introduction
The Vaishesika system is next to Sähkhya in origin and is of greater antiquity than the Nyäya. It may be prior
to and is certainly not later than Buddhism and Jainism. The word is derived from ‘Vishesa’ which means
particularity or distinguishing feature or distinction. The Vaishesika philosophy, therefore, is pluralistic realism
which emphasizes that diversity is the soul of the universe. The category of Vishesa or particularity is dealt with
at length in this system, and is regarded as the essence of things.

The founder of this system is Kanada who is also known as Kanabhuk, Ulüka, and Kâshyapa. This system
is also called after him as Kanada or Aulüka darshana. He was called Kanada because he used to live as an ascetic
on the grains picked up from the fields. Kana (in addition to meaning ‘grain’) also means a particle or a particular
and the word Kanada suggests one who lives on the philosophy of particularity— vishesa. Prashastapâda has
written his classical Padärthadharmasahgraha which is called a Bhäsya or Commentary on the Vaishesikasütra of
Kanada, but is really a very valuable independent treatise. It has been commented upon by Udayana and
Shridhara. The Vaishesika was, later on, fused together with the Nyäya which accepted the ontology of the former
and developed it in the light of its epistemology. Thus Shiväditya, Laugäksi Bhaskara, Vishvanätha and
Annambhatta treat of the two systems together.

The sage Gotama is the founder of Nyäya School. He is also known as Gautama and as Aksapada. Nyäya
means argumentation and suggests that the system is predominantly intellectual, analytic, logical and
epistemological. It is also called Tarkashästra or the science of reasoning; Pramänashästra or the science of logic
and epistemology; Hetuvidyä or the science of causes; Vädavidyä or the science of debate; and Ânvïksikï or the
science of critical study.

Nyäya is a system of atomistic pluralism and logical realism. It is allied to the Vaishesika system which is
regarded as ‘Samänatantra’ or similar philosophy. Vaishesika develops metaphysics and ontology; Nyäya
develops logic and epistemology. Both agree in viewing the earthly life as full of suffering, as bondage of the soul

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and in regarding liberation which is absolute cessation of suffering as the supreme end of life. Both agree that
bondage is due to ignorance of reality and that liberation is due to right knowledge of reality. Vaishesika takes up
the exposition of reality and Nyäya takes up the exposition of right knowledge of reality. Nyäya mostly accepts
the Vaishesika metaphysics. But there are some important points of difference between them which may be noted.
Firstly, while the Vaishesika recognizes seven categories and classifies all reals under them, the Nyäya recognizes
sixteen categories and includes all the seven categories of the Vaishesika in one of them called Prameya or the
Knowable, the second in the sixteen. The first category is Pramäna or the valid means of knowledge. This clearly
brings out the predominantly logical and epistemological character of the Nyäya system. Secondly, while the
Vaishesika recognizes only two Pramänas—perception and inference and reduces comparison and verbal
authority to inference, the Nyäya recognizes all the four as separate—perception, inference, comparison and
verbal authority.

Perception
Knowledge (jnäna) or cognition (buddhi) is defined as apprehension (upalabdhi) or consciousness
(anubhava). Nyäya, being realistic, believes that knowledge reveals both the subject and the object which are
quite distinct from itself. All knowledge is a revelation or manifestation of objects (arthaprakäsho buddhih). Just
as a lamp manifests physical things placed before it, so knowledge reveals all objects which come before it.
Knowledge may be valid or invalid. Valid knowledge (pramä) is defined as the right apprehension of an object
(yathärthänu- bhavah). It is the manifestation of an object as it is. Nyäya maintains the theory of correspondence.
Knowledge, in order to be valid, must correspond to reality. Valid knowledge is produced by the four valid means
of knowledge—perception, inference, comparison and testimony. Invalid knowledge includes memory (smrti),
doubt (samshaya), error (viparyaya) and hypothetical reasoning (tarka). Memory is not valid because it is not
presentative cognition but a representative one. The object remembered is not directly presented to the soul, but
only indirectly recalled. Doubt is uncertainty in cognition. Error is misapprehension as it does not correspond to
the real object. Hypothetical reasoning is no real knowledge. It is arguing like this—‘if there were no fire, there
cannot be smoke’. When you see a rope as a rope you have right knowledge. If you are uncertain whether it is a
rope or a snake, you have doubt. If you recall the rope you have seen, you have memory. If you mistake the rope
for a snake, you have error.

Knowledge is produced in the soul when it comes into contact with the not-soul. It is an adventitious
property of the soul which is generated in it by the object. If the generating conditions are sound, knowledge is

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valid; if they are defective, knowledge is invalid. A man of sound vision sees a conch white, while a man
suffering from jaundice secs it yellow. Correspondence with the object is the nature of truth. If knowledge
corresponds to its object, it is valid; if it does not, it is invalid. Valid knowledge corresponds to its object
(yathärtha and avisamvädi) and leads to successful activity (pravrttisämarthya). Invalid knowledge does not
correspond to its object and leads to failure and disappointment (pravrttivisamväda). Fire must bum and cook and
shed light. If it does not, it is no fire. Knowledge intrinsically is only a manifestation of objects. The question of
its validity or invalidity is a subsequent question and depends upon its correspondence with its object. Truth and
falsity are extrinsic characteristics of knowledge. They are apprehended by a subsequent knowledge. They arise
and are apprehended only when knowledge has already arisen. They are neither intrinsic nor self-evident. Validity
and invalidity of knowledge arise (utpattau paratah prämänyam) after knowledge has arisen, and they are known
(jnaptau paratah prämänyam) after knowledge has arisen and they have also arisen. Correspondence is the
content and successful activity is the test of truth. The Nyäya theory of knowledge, therefore, is realistic and
pragmatic; realistic as regards the nature and pragmatic as regards the test of truth.

Perception, inference, comparison or analogy and verbal testimony are the four kinds of valid knowledge.
Let us consider them one by one. Gotama defines perception as ‘non-erroneous cognition which is produced by
the intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects, which is not associated with a name and which is well-
defined. This definition of perception excludes divine and yogic perception which is not generated by the
intercourse of the sense-organs with the objects. Hence Vishvanätha has defined perception as ‘direct or
immediate cognition which is not derived through the instrumentality of any other cognition. This definition
includes ordinary as well as extra-ordinary perception and excludes inference, comparison and testimony.
Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the sense-
organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the manas,
the manas with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The contact of the sense-organs with the
objects is not possible unless the manas first comes into contact with the sense-organs, and the contact of the
manas with the sense-organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas. Hence sense-object
contact necessarily presupposes the manas-sense contact and the self-manas contact. The sense-organs are
derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are manifested by
them. Perception is a kind of knowledge and is the attribute of the self. Ordinary perception presupposes the
sense-organs, the objects, the manas and the self and their mutual contacts. The self comes into contact with the
manas, the manas with the sense-organs and the sense-organs with the objects. The contact of the sense-organs
with the objects is not possible unless the manas first comes into contact with the sense-organs, and the contact of

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the manas with the sense-organs is not possible unless the self comes into contact with the manas. Hence sense-
object contact necessarily presupposes the manas-sense contact and the self-manas contact. The sense-organs are
derived from the elements whose specific qualities of smell, taste, colour, touch and sound are manifested by
them. The manas is the mediator between the self and the sense-organs. The external object through the senses
and the manas makes an impression on the self. The theory, therefore, is realistic.

The Naiyäyika maintains two stages in perception. The first is called indeterminate or nirvikalpa and the
second, determinate or savikalpa. They are not two different kinds of perception, but only the earlier and the later
stages in the same complex process of perception. These two stages arc recognized by Gotama in his definition of
perception quoted above. Perception is ‘unassociated with a name’ (avyapadeshya) which means ‘indeterminate’,
and it is ‘well-defined’ (vyavasayatmaka) which means ‘determinate’. All perception is determinate, but it is
necessarily preceded by an earlier stage when it is indeterminate. Nvâva recoenizes the fundamental fact about
knowledge which is said to be the distinct contribution of Kant to western philosophy that knowledge involves
both sensation and conception. ‘Percepts without concepts are blind and concepts without percepts are empty.’
Perception is a complex process of experience involving both sensation and conception. All perception we have is
determinate because it is perceptual knowledge or perceptual judgment. Sensation is the material and conception
is the form of knowledge. Bare sensation or simple apprehension is nirvikalpa perception; perceptual judgment or
relational apprehension is savikalpa perception. Nyäya avoids the fallacy of the psychical staircase theory that we
have first sense-experience, then conception and then judgment. Perception is a complex presentative-
representative process in which we cannot really separate direct awareness from relational judgment.
Indeterminate perception forms the material out of which determinate perception is shaped, but they can be
distinguished only in thought and not divided in reality. Nirvikalpa perception is the immediate apprehension, the
bare awareness, the direct sense-experience which is undifferentiated and non-relational and is free from
assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. The consciousness of the ‘that is not yet determined by the
consciousness of the ‘what’. But as the ‘that cannot be really known as separated from the ‘what’, the ‘substance
cannot be known apart from its ‘qualities’, we immediately come to savikalpa perception where the mere
awareness of the ‘that’ and the ‘what’ and their ‘inherence’ as something undifferentiated, unrelated, dumb and
inarticulate, is transformed into differentiated, relational, conceptual and articulate knowledge involving
assimilation, discrimination, analysis and synthesis. For example, when we go, from broad daylight, into a dark
cinema hall to see a matinée show, we first do not see the seats or the audience clearly, but have only a dim
sensation of the objects present there which gradually reveal themselves to us ; the dim sense-experience of the
objects in the hall is indeterminate perception while the clear perception of them is determinate perception. The

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mere apprehension of some object as something, as the ‘that’, is indeterminate perception, while the clear
perception of it together with its attributes is determinate perception. We see in dusk a straight something lying on
the road and find out by going near it that it is a rope. We see a white moving object at a distance and when it
comes near we see it is a white cow. The earlier stage is indeterminate and the later one determinate perception.
We are in a hurry to go somewhere and want to finish our bath before starting. We do not know whether the water
was cold and the bath refreshing, though we did feel the coolness of water and the refreshing character of bath.
We feel water and we feel its coolness but we do not relate the two. Indeterminate perception presents the bare
object without any characterization. In determinate perception we relate the substance with its attributes. The
feeling of indeterminate perception is psychological, but its knowledge is logical. As bare awareness, as mere
apprehension, we sense indeterminate perception, we feel it, but the moment we try to know it even as ‘bare
awareness* it has passed into conception and has become determinate. Hence all our perception being a cognition
is determinate and is a perceptual judgment. We can separate indeterminate from determinate perception only in
thought and not in reality. Hence, though we feel indeterminate perception as a psychological state of sense-
experience, its knowledge even as indeterminate perception is a result of logical deduction. We do feel it directly
but only as an awareness, not as a cognition. Mere apprehension, being infra-relational, cannot be cognized. As
cognition it is inferred afterwards when conception has transformed mere sensation into a perceptual judgment.

Vätsyäyana says that if an object is perceived with its name we have determinate perception; if it is
perceived without its name, we have indeterminate perception. Jayanta Bhatta says that indeterminate perception
apprehends substance, qualities and actions and universal as separate and indistinct something and is devoid of
any association with a name, while determinate perception apprehends all these together with a name. Gangesha
Upädhyäya defines indeterminate perception as the non-relational apprehension of an object devoid of all
association of name, genus, differentia etc. Annam Bhatta defines it as the immediate apprehension of an object
as well as of its qualities, but without the knowledge of the relation between them. The substance and the
qualities, the ‘that’ and the ‘what are felt separately and it is not apprehended that those qualities inhere in that
substance or that the 'what characterizes the ‘that. Indeterminate perception is ‘mere acquaintance which William
James calls ‘raw un-verbalized experience’, while determinate perception is relational apprehension.

Perception, again, may be ordinary (laukika) or extraordinary (alau- kika). When the sense-organs come
into contact with the objects present to them in the usual way, we have Laukika perception. And if the contact of
the sense-organs with the objects is in an unusual way, i.e., if the objects are not ordinarily present to the senses
but are conveyed to them through an extraordinary medium, we have Alaukika perception. Ordinary perception is

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of two kinds—internal (mänasa) and external (bähya). In internal perception, the mind (manas) which is the
internal organ comes into contact with the psychical states and processes like cognition, affection, conation,
desire, pain, pleasure, aversion etc. External perception takes place when the five external organs of sense come
into contact with the external objects. It is of five kinds—visual, auditory, tactual, gustatory and olfactory,
brought about by the sense- organs of sight, sound, touch, taste and smell respectively when they come into
contact with the external objects. The external sense-organs are composed of material elements of earth, water,
fire, air, and ether and therefore each senses the particular quality of its element. Thus the sense-organ of smell is
composed of the atoms of earth and perceives smell which is the specific quality of earth and so on.

Extra-ordinary perception is of three kinds—sämänyalaksana, jnänalaksana and yogaja. Sämänyalaksana

perception is the perception of the universals. According to Nyäya, the universal are a distinct class of reals. They
inhere in the particulars which belong to different classes on account of the different universals inhering in them.
An individual belongs to a particular class because the universal of that class inheres in it. Thus a cow becomes a
cow because it has the universal cowness inhering in it. Ordinarily we perceive only the particulars and not the
universals. We perceive particular cows but we do not perceive a ‘universal cow. Hence the Nyäya maintains that
the universals are perceived extraordinarily. Whenever we perceive a particular cow we first perceive the
‘universal cowness’ inhering in it. The second kind of extraordinary perception is called jnänalaksana perception.
It is the ‘complicated’ perception through association. Sometimes different sensations become associated and
form one integrated perception. Here an object is not directly presented to a sense-organ, but is revived in
memory through the past cognition of it and is perceived through representation. For example, I look at a
blooming rose from a distance and say ‘I see a fragrant rose’. But how can fragrance be seen} It can only be
smelt. Fragrance can be perceived by the sense-organ of smell and not by the sense-organ of vision which can
perceive only colour. Here the visual perception of the rose revives in memory the idea of fragrance by
association, which was perceived in the past through the nose. The perception of the fragrant rose through the eye,
therefore, is called jnänalaksana perception or perception revived in memory through the cognition (jnäna) of the
object in the past. Other examples of it are: ‘the piece of sandalwood looks fragrant’, ‘ice looks cold’, ‘stone
looks hard’, ‘tea looks hot’, etc. etc. The theory of illusion accepted by Nyäya called ‘Anyathäkhyäti is based on
this kind of perception. When we mistake a rope for a snake» the idea of snake perceived in the past is imported
in memory through this extraordinary jnänalaksana perception and is confused with the object (i.e., rope) which
is directly presented to the sense-organ. When shell is mistaken for silver the idea of silver perceived in the past in
a shop (äpanastha) (or anywhere else) is revived in memory through jnanalaksaiia perception and is confused
with the object (i.e., shell) which is directly presented to the sense-organ. The past impression represents the

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object to our mind. Error is due to a wrong synthesis of the presented and the represented objects. The represented
object is confused with the presented one. The word ‘anyathä’ means ‘elsewise and ‘elsewhere and both these
senses are brought out in an erroneous perception. The presented object is perceived elsewise and the represented
object exists elsewhere. The shell and the silver, the rope and the snake are both separately real; only their
synthesis is unreal. The shell and the rope are directly presented as the ‘this (when we say: ‘this is silver or ‘this is
a snake), while the silver and the snake exist elsewhere and are revived in memory through jnänalaksana
perception. The third kind of extraordinary perception is called yogaja perception. This is the intuitive and
immediate perception of all objects, past, present and future, possessed by the Yogins through the power of
meditation. It is like the Kevalajnäna of the Jainas, the Bodhi of the Buddhists, the Kaivalya of the Särtkhya-
Yoga and the Aparoksänubhüti of the Vedäntins. It is intuitive, supra-sensuous and supra-relational.

Inference
The second kind of knowledge is anumä or inferential or relational and its means is called anumäna or
inference. It is defined as that cognition which presupposes some other cognition. It is mediate and indirect and
arises through a ‘mark, the ‘middle term (linga or hetu) which is invariably connected with the ‘major term
(sädhya). It is knowledge (mäna) which arises after (anu) other knowledge. Invariable concomitance (vyâpti or
avinäbhävaniyama) is the nerve of inference. The presence of the middle term in the minor term is called
paksadharmatä. The invariable association of the middle term with the major term is called vyâpti. The
knowledge of paksadharmata as qualified by vyâpti is called parämarsha. And inference is defined as knowledge
arising through parämarsha, i.e., the knowledge of the presence of the major in the minor through the middle
which resides in the minor (paksa- dharmatä) and is invariably associated with the major (vyäpti). Like the
Aristotelian syllogism, the Indian inference has three terms. The major, the minor and the middle are here called
sädhya, paksa and linga or hetu respectively. We know that smoke is invariably associated with fire (vyäpti) and
if we see smoke in a hill we conclude that there must be fire in that hill. Hill is the minor term; fire is the major
term; smoke is the middle term. From the presence of smoke in the hill as qualified by the knowledge that
wherever there is smoke there is fire, we proceed to infer the presence of fire in the hill. This is inference. Indian
logic does^not separate Reduction from induction. Inference_is a complex process involving both. Indian logic
also rejects the verbalist view of logic. It studies thought as such and not the forms of thought alone. The formal
and the material logic are blended here. Verbal form forms no integral part of the inference. This becomes clear
from the division of inference into svärtha (for oneself) and parärtha (for others). In the former we do not require
the formal statement of the different members of inference. It is a psychological process. The latter, the parärtha
which is a syllogism, has to be presented in language and this has to be done only to convince others. There are
five members in the Nyäya syllogism. The first is called Pratijnä or proposition. It is the logical statement which
is to be proved. The second is Hetu or ‘reason which states the reason for the establishment of the proposition.
The third is called Udäharana which gives the universal concomitance together with an example. The fourth is
Upanaya or the application of the universal concomitance to the present case. And the fifth is Nigamana or

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conclusion drawn from the preceding propositions. These five propositions of the Indian syllogism are called
‘members or avayavas. The following is a typical Nyäya syllogism:

(1) This hill has fire (pratijnä).

(2) Because it has smoke (hetu).

(3) Whatever has smoke has fire, e.g., an oven (udäharana).

(4) This hill has smoke which is invariably associated with fire (upanaya).

(5) Therefore this hill has fire (nigamana).

If we compare it with the Aristotelian syllogism which has only three propositions, we will find that this
Nyäya syllogism corresponds to the Barbara (AAA) mood of the First Figure which is the strongest mood of the
strongest figure. Though the Nyäya syllogism has five and the Aristotelian has three propositions, the terms in
both are only three— the sädhya or the major, the paksa or the minor and the hetu or the middle. Out of the five
propositions, two appear redundant and we may easily leave out either the first two or the last two which are
essentially the same. The first coincides with the fifth and the second with the fourth. If we omit the last two the
first three propositions correspond with the conclusion, the minor premise and the major premise respectively. Or,
if we omit the first two, the last three propositions correspond to the major premise, the minor premise and the
conclusion of the Aristotelian syllogism. Hence if we leave out the first two members of the Nyäya syllogism
which are contained in the last two, we find that it resembles the Aristotelian syllogism in the First Figure:

(1) All things which have smoke have fire (Major premise).

(2) This hill has smoke (Minor premise).

(3) Therefore this hill has fire (Conclusion).

And the typical Aristotelian syllogism may be stated in the Nyäya form thus:

(1) Socrates is mortal (pratijnä).

(2) Because he is a man (hetu).

(3) Whoever is a man is a mortal, e.g., Pythagoras (udäharana).

(4) Socrates is a man who is invariably a mortal (upanaya).

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(5) Therefore Socrates is mortal (nigamana).

But there are certain real differences between the Nyäya and the Aristotelian syllogism apart from the
nominal difference between the numbers of the propositions in each. The Aristotelian syllogism is only deductive
and formal, while the Nyäya syllogism is deductive-inductive and formal-material. The Nyäya rightly regards
deduction and induction as inseparably related, as two aspects of the same process—the truth now realized in
western logic. Inference, according to Nyäya, is neither from the universal to the particular nor from the particular
to the universal, but from the particular to the particular through the universal. The example is a special feature of
the Nyäya syllogism and illustrates the truth that the universal major premise is the result of a real induction based
on the law of causation and that induction and deduction cannot be really separated. Again, while in the
Aristotelian syllogism the major and the minor terms stand apart in the premises though they are connected by the
middle term with each other, in the Nyäya syllogism all the three terms stand synthesized in the Upanaya. Again,
while the Aristotelian syllogism is verbalistic, the Nyäya recognizes the fact that verbal form is not the essence of
inference and is required only to convince others. There are also certain fundamental differences between the two
views and the view of Nyäya is accepted as better by the modern western logicians also. The view that vyäpti, the
nerve of inference, was introduced by the Buddhist logician Dinnäga who was influenced by Greek thought is
also wrong. Vyäpti was recognized much before Dinnäga, nor did he ‘borrow his doctrine from Greece. It is more
reasonable to explain the similarities between the two as due to a parallel development of thought. Indian logic
has been a natural growth.

There are five characteristics of the middle term:

(1) It must be present in the minor term (paksadharmatâ); e.g., smoke must be present in the hill.

(2) It must be present in all positive instances in which the major term is present; e.g., smoke must be present in
the kitchen where fire exists (sapaksasattva).

(3) It must be absent in all negative instances in which the major term is absent; e.g., smoke must be absent in the
lake in which fire does not exist (vipaksäsattva).

(4) It must be non-incompatible with the minor term; e.g., it must not prove the coolness of fire (abädhita).

(5) It must be qualified by the absence of counteracting reasons which lead to a contradictory conclusion; e.g.,
‘the fact of being caused’ should not be used to prove the ‘eternality of sound (aviruddha).

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Inference is generally regarded as of two kinds—Svärtha and Parärtha which we have already discussed.
Gotama speaks of three kinds of inference—pûrvavat, shesavat and sämänyatodrsta. The first two are based on
causation and the last one on mere coexistence. A cause is the invariable and unconditional antecedent of an
effect and an effect is the invariable and unconditional consequent of a cause. When we infer the unperceived
effect from a perceived cause we have pûrvavat inference, e.g., when we infer future rain from dark clouds in the
sky. When we infer the unperceived cause from a perceived effect we have shesavat inference, e.g., when we
infer past rain from the swift muddy flooded water of a river. When inference is based not on causation but on
uniformity of co-existence, it is called sämänyatodrsta, e.g., when we infer cloven hoofs of an animal by its
horns. According to another interpretation, a pûrvavat inference is based on previous experience of universal
concomitance between two things, a shesavat inference is parishesa or inference by elimination, and a
sämänyatodrsta is inference by analogy.

Another classification of inference gives us the kevalänvayi, kevalavy- atireki and anvayavyatireki
inferences. It is based on the nature of vyäpti and on the different methods of establishing it. The methods of
induction by which universal causal relationship is established may be anvaya, vyatireka or both. The first
corresponds to Mill's Method of Agreement, the second to his Method of Difference, and the third to his Joint
Method of Agreement and Difference or the Method of Double Agreement. We have kevalänvayi inference when
the middle term is always positively related to the major term. The terms agree only in presence, there being no
negative instance of their agreement in absence, e.g.,

All knowable objects are nameable;

The pot is a knowable object;

The pot is nameable.

We have kevalavyatireki inference when the middle term is the differentium of the minor term and is always
negatively related to the major term. The terms agree only in absence, there being no positive instance of their
agreement in presence, e.g.,

What is not different-from-other-elements has no smell;

The earth has smell;

The earth is different-from-other-elements.

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We have anvayavyatireki inference when the middle term is both positively and negatively related to the major
term. The vyäpti between the middle and the major is in respect of both presence and absence. There is Double
Agreement between the terms—they agree in presence in the positive instances and they also agree in absence in
the negative instances; e.g.,

All things which have smoke have fire;

This hill has smoke;

.’. This hill has fire; and

No non-fiery things have smoke;

This hill has smoke;. This hill is not non-fiery; i.e., This hill has fire.

In Indian logic a fallacy is called hetvâbhasa. It means that the middle term appears to be a reason but is
not a valid reason. All fallacies are material fallacies. We have mentioned the five characteristics of a valid
middle term. When these are violated, we have fallacies. Five kinds of fallacies are recognized:

(i) Asiddha or Sädhyasama: This is the fallacy of the unproved middle. The middle term must be present in the
minor term (paksadharmatä). If it is not, it is unproved. It is of three kinds—

(a) äshrayäsiddha : The minor term is the locus of the middle term. If the minor term is unreal, the middle term
cannot be present in it; e.g., ‘the sky-lotus is fragrant, because it is a lotus, like the lotus of a lake’.

(b) svarüpäsiddha : Here the minor term is not unreal. But the middle term cannot by its very nature be present in
the minor term; e.g., ‘sound is a quality, because it is visible’. Here visibility cannot belong to sound which is
audible.

(c) vyäpyatväsiddha : Here vyâpti is conditional (sopädhika). We cannot say, e.g., 'wherever there is fire there is
smoke’. Fire smokes only when it is associated with wet fuel. A red-hot iron ball or clear fire does not smoke.
Hence 'association with wet fuel is a condition necessary to the aforesaid vyâpti. Being conditioned, the middle
term becomes fallacious if we say: ‘The hill has smoke because it has fire’.

(2) Savyabhichära or Anaikäntika: This is the fallacy of the irregular middle. It is of three kinds :

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(a) Sädharana: Here the middle term is too wide. It is present in both the sapaksa (positive) and the vipaksa
(negative) instances and violates the rule that the middle should not be present in the negative instances (vipak-
säsattva); e.g., 'the hill has fire because it is knowable’. Here ‘knowable is present in fiery as well as non-fiery
objects.

(è) Asädhärana: Here the middle term is too narrow. It is present only in the paksa and neither in the sapaksa nor
in the vipaksa. It violates the rule that the middle term should be present in the sapaksa (sapaksasattva); e.g.,
‘sound is eternal, because it is audible. Here audibility belongs to sound only and is present nowhere else.

(c) Anupasarhhäri : Here the middle term is non-exclusive. The minor term is all-inclusive and leaves nothing by
way of sapaksa or vipaksa; e.g., 'all things are noneternal, because they are knowable.

(3) Satpratipakça : Here the middle term is contradicted by another middle term. The reason is counter-balanced
by another reason. And both are of equal force; e.g., ‘sound is eternal, because it is audible and ‘sound is non-
eternal, because it is produced. Here ‘audible is counter-balanced by ‘produced’ and both are of equal force.

(4) Bâdhita: It is the non-inferentially contradicted middle. Here the middle term is contradicted by some other
pramäna and not by inference. It cannot prove the major term which is disproved by another stronger source of
valid knowledge; e.g., ‘fire is cold, because it is a substance. Here the middle term ‘substance becomes
contradicted because its major term ‘coldness is directly contradicted by perception.

(5) Viruddha: It is the contradictory middle. The middle term, instead of being pervaded by the presence of the
major term, is pervaded by the absence of the major term. Instead of proving the existence of the major term in
the minor term, it proves its non-existence therein; e.g., 'sound is eternal, because it is produced. Here ‘produced,
instead of proving the eternality of sound, proves its non-eternality. Here the middle term itself disproves the
original proposition and proves its contradictory, while in the savyabhichära the middle term only fails to prove
the conclusion, and in the satpratipaksa the middle term is inferentially contradicted by another middle term both
of which are of equal force, and in the bâdhita the middle term is non-inferentially contradicted and the major is
disproved by a stronger pramäna other than inference.

Comparison
The third kind of valid cognition is Upamiti and its means is called Upamâna. It is knowledge derived
from comparison and roughly corresponds to analogy. It has been defined as the knowledge of the relation
between a word and its denotation. It is produced by the knowledge of resemblance or similarity. For example, a
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man who has never seen a gavaya or a wild cow and does not know what it is, is told by a person that a wild cow
is an animal like a cow, subsequently comes across a wild cow in a forest and recognizes it as the wild cow, then
his knowledge is due to upamâna. He has heard the word ‘gavaya and has been told that it is like a cow and now
he himself sees the object denoted by the word ‘gavaya and recognizes it to be so. Hence upamâna is just the
knowledge of the relation between a name and the object denoted by that name. It is produced by the knowledge
of similarity because a man recognizes a wild cow as a‘gavaya when he perceives its similarity to the cow and
remembers the description that ‘a gavaya is an animal like a cow.

The Buddhists reduce Upamäna to perception and testimony. The Sänkhya and the Vaishesika reduce it to
inference. The Jainas reduce it to recognition or pratyabhijnä. The Mimâmsakas recognize it as a separate source
of knowledge, but their account of it is different from that of Nyäya, which will be considered in the chapter on
Mimämsä.

Verbal Testimony
The fourth kind of valid knowledge is Shabda or Agama or authoritative verbal testimony. Its means is
also called Shabda. It is defined as the statement of a trustworthy person (äptaväkya) and consists in
understanding its meaning. A sentence is defined as a collection of words and a word is defined as that which is
potent to convey its meaning. The power in a word to convey its meaning comes, according to ancient Nyäya,
from God, and according to later Nyäya, from long established convention. Testimony is always personal. It is
based on the words of a trustworthy person, human or divine. Testimony is of two kinds— Vaidika and secular
(laukika). The Vaidika testimony is perfect and infallible because the Vedas are spoken by God; secular
testimony, being the words of human beings who are liable to error, is not infallible. Only the words of
trustworthy persons who always speak the truth are valid; others are not. A word is a potent symbol which
signifies an object and a sentence is a collection of words. But a sentence in order to be intelligible must conform
to certain conditions. These conditions are four—äkänksä, yogyatä, sannidhi and tätparya. The first is mutual
implication or expectancy. The words of a sentence are interrelated and stand in need of one another in order to
express a complete sense. A mere aggregate of unrelated words will not make a logical sentence. It will be sheer
nonsense, e.g., ‘cow horse man elephant. The second condition is that the words should possess fitness to convey
the sense and should not contradict the meaning. ‘Water the plants with fire is a contradictory sentence. The third
condition is the close proximity of the words to one another. The words must be spoken in quick succession
without long intervals. If the words ‘bring, ‘a, and ‘cow are uttered at long intervals they would not make a

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logical sentence. The fourth condition is the intention of the speaker if the words are ambiguous. For example, the
word ‘saindhava’ means ‘salt as well as a ‘horse. Now, if a man who is taking his food asks another to bring
‘saindhava, the latter should not bring a horse.

The Nyäya admits only these four pramänas. Arthäpatti or implication is reduced to inference. For
example, when we say: ‘Fat Devadatta does not eat during day’, the implication is that he must be eating during
night otherwise how can he be fat? Mïmâmsâ grants the status of an independent pramäna to implication. But
Nyäya reduces it to inference thus:

All fat persons who do not eat during day, eat during night;

Devadatta is a fat person who does not eat during day;

Devadatta is a fat person who eats during night.

Abhâva or non-existence which also is regarded as a separate pramäna by Bhâtta Mïmâmsâ is reduced
here either to perception or to inference. Abhâva is non-existence of a thing and the same sense-organ which
perceives a thing, perceives its non-existence also. If the thing is imperceptible and can only be inferred, then, its
non-existence too may be equally inferred.

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UNIT – IV
Purva Mimamsa- Epistemology
INTRODUCTION
The word 'Mïmâmsâ' literally means 'revered thought' and was originally applied to the interpretation of
the Vedic rituals which commanded highest reverence. The word is now used in the sense of any critical
investigation. The school of Mïmâmsâ justifies both these meanings by giving us rules according to which the
commandments of the Veda are to be interpreted and by giving a philosophical justification for the Vedic
ritualism. Just as Sânkhya and Yoga, Vaishesika and Nyäya are regarded as allied systems, similarly Mïmâmsâ
and Vedanta are also treated as allied systems of thought. Both are based on and both try to interpret the Veda.
The earlier portion of the Veda, i.e., the Mantra and the Brähmana portion, is called Karmakända, while the later
portion, i.e., the Upanisads is called Jnänakända, because the former deals with action, with the rituals and the
sacrifices, while the latter deals with the knowledge of reality. Mimämsä deals with the earlier portion of the
Veda and is therefore called Pürva-Mïmâmsâ and also Karma-Mïmâmsâ, while Vedäntä deals with the later
portion of the Veda and is therefore called Uttara-Mïmâmsâ and also Jnâna- Mîmâmsâ. The former deals with
Dharma and the latter with Brahma and therefore the former is also called Dharma-Mimämsä, while the latter is
also called Brahma-Mïmâmsâ. There has been a long line of pre-Shankarite teachers of Vedanta of whom
Mandana Mishra seems to be the last, who have regarded Mïmâmsâ and Vedânta as forming a single system and
who have advocated the combination of action and knowledge, known as Karma-Jnâna-samuchchaya-vâda.
According to them, the sütras, beginning with the first sütra of Jaimini and ending with the last sütra of
Bâdarâyana, form one compact shästra. These teachers held that Karma (action) and Upâsanâ (meditation) were
absolutely essential to hasten the dawn of true knowledge. Even the great Shankarächärya who treated action and
knowledge as being absolutely opposed like darkness and light and who relegated Karma to the sphere of Avidyä,
had to admit that Karma and Upâsanâ do purify the soul, though they are not the direct cause of liberation and
that therefore the study of Pörva Mimämsä, though not essential for the study of Vedanta, was a good means for
the purification of the soul. In this connection it is also important to remember that it is the great Mimämsaka
Kumärila Bhatta himself who may be rightly regarded as the link between the Purva and the Uttara Mimämsä.

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Ramanuja and Bhäskara believe that the Pörva and Uttara Mimämsäs together form one science and the study of
the former is necessary before undertaking the study of the latter. Madhva and Vallabha, though they make
devotion to God as a necessary prerequisite for the study of Vedanta, yet believe that Vedanta is a continuation of
Mimämsä.

Purva Mïmamsâ regards the Veda as eternal and authorless and of infallible authority. It is essentially a book of
ritual dealing with commandments prescribing injunctions or prohibitions. Greatest importance is attached to the
Brähmana portion of the Veda to which both the Mantras and the Upanisads are subordinated. The aim of the
Mîmâmsâ is to supply the principles according to which the Vedic texts are to be interpreted and to provide
philosophical justification for the views contained therein. The work of finding the principles for the right
interpretation of the Vedic texts was undertaken by the Brähmanas themselves and mainly by the Shrauta-sutras.
Mimämsä continues this work. But had it done only that, it would have been, at best, only a commentary on the
Vedic ritual. The main thing which entitles it to the rank of a philosophical system is its keen desire to provide
philosophical justification for the Vedic views and to replace the earlier ideal of the attainment of heaven (svarga)
by the ideal of obtaining liberation (apavarga). It undertakes a thorough investigation into the nature and validity
of knowledge and into the various means which produce valid knowledge and also into other metaphysical
problems. Curious though it may seem, the Mimämsä has been much influenced by the Nyäya- Vaishesika
school, many important doctrines of which it has either borrowed or rejected.

The earliest work of this system is the Mimämsä-sutra of Jaimini which begins with an inquiry into the
nature of Dharma. It is the biggest of all the philosophical sutras and discusses about one thousand topics.
Shabarasvämin has written his great commentary on this work and his commentary has been explained by
Prabhäkara and Kumärila Bhatta who differ from each other in certain important respects and form the two
principle schools of Mîmâmsâ named after them. Prabhäkara’s commentary Brhati has been commented upon by
Shälikanätha who has also written another treatise Prakarana-panchikä. Kumärila’s huge work is divided into
three parts—Shlokavärtika, Tantravärtika and Tuptïkâ, the first of which has been commented upon by
Pärthasärathi Mishra who has also written his Shâstradipikâ. Tradition makes Prabhäkara a pupil of Kumärila
who nicknamed him as 'Guru on account of his great intellectual powers. But some scholars like Dr. Gangänätha
Jha believe that the Prabhäkara school is older and seems to be nearer the spirit of the original Mïmâmsâ.

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Perception
Both Prabhäkara and Kumârila regard knowledge itself as pramäna or means of knowledge. Jaimini
admits three pramänas—perception, inference and testimony. Prabhäkara adds two more—comparison and
implication. Kumârila further adds non-apprehension. Let us consider these one by one. Both Prabhäkara and
Kumârila recognize two kinds of knowledge— immediate and mediate. Perception is regarded as immediate
knowledge by both and both admit two stages in perception—indeterminate and determinate. Prabhäkara defines
perception as direct apprehension (sâksât pratîtih pratyaksam). Kumârila defines it as direct knowledge produced
by the proper contact of the sense-organs with the presented objects, which is free from defects. Mîmâmsâ
broadly agrees with Nyäya in its view of perception. The self comes into contact with the mind (manas); the mind
comes into contact with the sense-organ; and the sense-organ Comes into contact with the external object. We
have already dealt with the account of perception in the Nyäya system and need not repeat it here. We may only
note the main differences between the Nyäya and the Mîmâmsâ account of perception. The Mîmârhsaka regards
the auditory organ as proceeding from space (dik) while the Naiyäyika regards it as proceeding from ether
(äkäsha). Again, according to Nyäya, the indeterminate perception is a stage inferred afterwards as a hypothesis
to account for the determinate perception. All perception is determinate and indeterminate perception serves no
fruitful purpose; it is inferred as a necessary earlier stage in the complex process of perception. But the
Mimämsaka regards it as part of normal experience.

It is the vague, indefinite and primitive stage of perception, the awareness of the ‘that without its relation
to the ‘what, which gains clarity and definiteness afterwards when it becomes determinate. But like the
determinate perception, indeterminate perception also serves a fruitful purpose. It is the basis of activity for
children and animals and even adults whose mental growth is imperfect. Even normal adults act upon it when
they are in a hurry and confusion. In determinate perception, the self apprehends the pure object (shuddha vastu)
and though the genuine and the specific characters are given in it, their relation to the object is not perceived. It is
the bare awareness (älochana- mätra) which is non-relational and therefore indeterminate.

Inference
Anumāṇa means inference. It is described as reaching a new conclusion and truth from one or more
observations and previous truths by applying reason. Observing smoke and inferring fire is an example
of Anumana. All schools of Indian Philosophy except Charvaka accept this is a valid and useful means to
knowledge. The method of inference is explained as consisting of three

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parts: pratijna (hypothesis), hetu (reason),and drshtanta (examples). The hypothesis must further be broken down
into two parts, state the ancient Indian scholars: sadhya (that idea which needs to proven or disproven)
and paksha (the object on which the sadhya is predicated). The inference is conditionally true
if sapaksha (positive examples as evidence) are present, and if vipaksha (negative examples as counter-evidence)
are absent. For rigor, the Indian philosophies also state further epistemic steps. For example, they
demand Vyapti - the requirement that the hetu (reason) must necessarily and separately account for the inference
in "all" cases, in both sapaksha and vipaksha. A conditionally proven hypothesis is called
a nigamana (conclusion).

Comparison
The Mimämsä view of comparison or Upamäna differs from the Nyäya view. According to Nyäya,
comparison is the knowledge of the relation between a word and the object denoted by that word (samjnä-
samjnisambandhajnäna). It is the knowledge of similarity of an unknown object like a wild cow with a known
object like a cow. The knowledge is like this—‘the perceived wild cow is like the remembered cow (gosadrsho
gavayah). The Mimämsaka refutes this account of comparison. He points out that the knowledge of the relation
between a word and the object denoted by that word is derived by verbal authority (e.g., by the words of the
person who tells that a wild cow is similar to a cow) and not by comparison. It is known through the recollection
of what was learnt from the verbal authority of the person. And the knowledge of the wild cow itself is due to
perception and not comparison. Hence comparison, according to Mimämsä, apprehends the similarity of the
remembered cow to the perceived wild cow. This knowledge is like this: ‘the remembered cow is like the
perceived wild cow (gavayasadrshi gauh). It is the cow as possessing similarity with the wild cow that is known
by comparison. A person need not be told by anybody that a wild cow is similar to a cow. Any person who has
seen a cow and happens to see a wild cow himself remembers the cow as similar to the wild cow he is perceiving.
This knowledge of similarity is comparison. It is distinguished from inference because the vyäpti or the invariable
concomitance is not needed here.

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Verbal Testimony
Shabda-pramana has got the greatest importance in Mîmâmsâ. Testimony is verbal authority. It is the
knowledge of supra-sensible objects which is produced by the comprehension of the meanings of words.
Kumärila divides testimony into personal (pauruseya) and impersonal (apauruseya). The former is the testimony
of the trustworthy persons (äptaväkya). The latter is the testimony of the Veda (Vedavâkya). It is valid in itself. It
has intrinsic validity. But the former is not valid in itself. Its validity is inferred from the trustworthy character of
the person. It may be vitiated by doubt and error and may be contradicted afterwards. The Veda is eternal and
authorless. It is not the work of any person, human or divine. The sages are only the ‘seers not the authors of the
Veda. The Veda is not composed or spoken even by God. The Veda deals with Dharma and the objects denoted
by it cannot be known by perception, inference, comparison or any other means of valid knowledge. Hence the
Vedic injunctions can never be contradicted by any subsequent knowledge. And there can be no internal
contradictions in the Veda itself. Hence the Vedic testimony is valid in itself. Prabhâkara admits only Vedic
testimony as real testimony and reduces human testimony to inference because its validity is inferred from the
trustworthy character of the person. Again, testimony may give us knowledge of the existent objects (siddhârtha
vâkya) or may command us to do something (vidhäyaka väkya). Kumärila admits the distinction between
existential and injunctive propositions and limits the scope of the Veda to the latter ( abhihitänvayaväda). The
Veda deals with injunctions. Prohibitions are injunctions in disguise. The Veda commands us to do certain things
and to refrain from doing certain things. It deals with the supra-sensible dharma or duty. If we follow the Vedic
commands we incur merit and if we do not, we incur demerit. Action, therefore, is the final import of the Veda.
The Veda is broadly divided into Vidhi- väda or injunctions and Arthaväda or explanations. The existential or the
assertive propositions of the Veda are merely explanatory passages which explain the injunctions of the Veda
which are its final import. Prabhäkara takes a strictly pragmatic view of all knowledge. Knowledge leads to
successful activity. Action is the only import of knowledge. He, therefore, refuses to accept that knowledge deals
with existent things. All propositions must be injunctive. All knowledge, whether Vedic or secular, points to
activity. The so-called assertive or explanatory propositions in the Veda are authoritative only when they help
persons to perform their duties (anvitäbhidhänaväda).

Testimony is verbal cognition and is derived from the meanings of words which compose sentences. To
uphold the eternality and the authorlessness of the Veda, the Mimämsaka puts forward the theory that words and
meanings as well as their relation are all natural and eternal. A word (shabda) is made of two or more letters
(varna) and is a mere aggregate of the letters and not a whole (avayavi), though the letters must occur in a

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particular order. A varna is regarded as an articulated sound. It is eternal (nitya), omnipresent (sarva-gata) and
integral (niravayava). It is different from its sound (dhvani) if it is spoken and also different from its symbolic
form (rupa) if it is written. The sound and the form are merely its accidental features which reveal it. A varna is
eternal and immutable, while its dhvani and rüpa are momentary and changing. If many varnas are spoken, they
are manifested through a temporal series of utterances; if they are written, they are manifested through a spatial
series of written symbols. The sound and the symbol are only the vehicles of the manifestation of the eternal
varna. When a varna is pronounced or written in ten different ways, there are not ten different varnas, but only
ten different manifestations of the same varna. Therefore a word which is an aggregate of two or more eternal
varnas is itself eternal. A word does not signify the particular things which come into existence and pass away,
but the eternal universals underlying these particulars. Hence the meanings or the objects denoted by words, being
universals, are eternal and unchanging. And the relation between a word and its meaning also, being natural,
necessary, inseparable and internal, is eternal and unchanging. This relation is not conventional. It is due neither
to God's will nor to convention as the old and the modern schools of Nyäya respectively believe. It is natural and
eternal. Language is not a creation of the human or even the divine mind. Philology is a natural science. The
conventional element in language is secondary (sahakäri) and helps the manifestation of the eternal words and
their meanings, just as light helps the manifestation of sight. The Naiyäyika also believes in the authority of the
Veda, but he regards the Veda as the work of God and so challenges the eternality and authorlessness of the Veda.
According to him, words are not eternal and language is due to the divine will or to convention. The Mïmâmsaka
refutes this view and points out that only the sounds and the symbols are created and destroyed, while the real
words are eternal. Words are manifested through human efforts. The sounds and the symbols are the vehicles of
the manifestation of the eternal words.

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UNIT-V
Sankara’s Advaita System-Epistemology
INTRODUCTION
Shankara’s epistemology, his followers in general accepted the point of view of the Mimamsa of
Kumarila’s school. Like Kumarila, they accepted six ways of knowing: perception, inference, verbal testimony,
comparison, nonperception, and postulation. In general, cognitions are regarded as modifications of the inner
sense in which the pure spirit is reflected or as the pure spirit limited by respective mental modifications. The
truth of cognitions is regarded as intrinsic to them, and a knowable fact is accepted as true so long as it is not
rejected as false. In perception a sort of identity is achieved between the form of the object and the form of the
inner sense; in fact, the inner sense is said to assume the form of the object. In their theory of inference, the Nyaya
five-membered syllogism is rejected in favor of a three-membered one. Furthermore, the sort of inference
admitted by the Nyaya, in which the major term is universally present, is rejected because nothing save Brahman
has this property according to the system.

The quintessence of Advaita philosophy is given out by Shankara in his famous line: Brahma satyam
jaganmithya jivobrahmaiva naparah – Brahman is real, the world is unreal and the individual self is non-different
from Brahman. Let us begin with the mechanism of knowing; which involves a knower (pramata), means of
knowing (pramana) and object of knowledge (prameya) that give rise to valid knowledge (prama). The means of
knowledge, according to Advaita, are six and they are perception (pratyaksa), inference (anumana), comparison
(upamana), postulation (arthapatti), nonapprehension (anupalabdhi) and testimony (shabda). A pramana is
defined as that which gives rise to the knowledge of an entity which is hitherto unknown or concealed by avidya
and which is not sublated subsequently. In this sense, shabda alone is considered to be a pramana which gives
rise to Brahman-knowledge and all other pramana deal with the material world. The other means of knowledge
cannot reveal Brahman since Brahman is not an object of knowledge.

Perception
According to Advaita, in the perception of an external object, the mind goes out through the sense organ,
say the ‘eyes’ and reaches the place of the object, say a ‘pot’ and assumes the shape of the pot which modifies
into the thought ‘pot’. This modification is known as vrtti. The pervasion of vrtti removes the veil of ignorance
(vrttivyapti) and the pervasion of reflected consciousness illumines the object (phalavyapti), which is expressed
as ‘This is a pot’. The capacity of the mind to illumine an object is because of the reflection of Consciousness
(Brahman) in the mind. The knowledge of experiences like happiness, sorrow etc. that occur in the mind without

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the aid of sense organs is known by the ‘witness consciousness.’ There is a mental modification internally that is
expressed as ‘I am happy’ etc. The knowledge of self or Brahman cannot be gained by perceptual cognition since
Brahman can never be objectified. When we say, words reveal Brahman, vrttivyapti alone functions and not
phalavyapti, since Brahman is self-evident luminous being, hence the knowledge of Brahman is known as
svarupajnana or knowledge of nature of self as opposed to vrtti-jnana or empirical knowledge.

Inference
Inference is the means of inferential knowledge. Inferential knowledge is produced by the knowledge of
invariable concomitance (vyapti). The latent impression of the invariable concomitance is the intermediate
operation (vyapara). The inferential knowledge that ‘the hill has fire’ arises when one sees the smoke (hetu) in a
hill (paksha), which arouses the latent impression of the invariable concomitance ‘where there is smoke there is
fire’, and by this application one gains the inferential knowledge that the hill has fire (sadhya). Brahman cannot
be known by inference because of absence of hetu to determine Brahman. According to Advaita, the falsity of the
world can be shown through inference by the following syllogism:

Scriptural Testimony
The verbal testimony is defined as that ‘sentence in which the relation among the meaning of words, that
is the object of its intention, is not contradicted by any other means of valid knowledge’. According to Advaita,
the purport of the scriptures is Attributless Brahman (Nirguna Brahman) which is known by scrutinizing the
intention of scriptures based on six indicatory marks, they are, Introduction-Conclusion (upakrama-upasamhara),
Repetition (abhyasa), Uniqueness (apurvata), Result (phala), Eulogy (arthavada) and Logical presentation
(upapatti). A word can reveal its meaning in the primary sense and in cases where primary sense is unfitting, they
are known by their secondary sense. Deriving the meaning of a word through its secondary implication is of three
kinds, namely, Exclusive (jahallakshana), Inclusive (ajahallakshana) and Exclusive-Inclusive
(jahalajahallakshana). The identity statements (mahavakya), according to Advaita, reveals the identity meaning
by the application of exclusive-inclusive implication.

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Knowledge and action

Shankara repeatedly asserts that the Absolute can be realized through knowledge and knowledge alone;
karma and upäsanä are subsidiary. They may help us in urging us to know Reality and they may prepare us for
that knowledge by purifying our mind (sattvashuddhi), but ultimately it is knowledge alone which, by destroying
ignorance, the root-cause of this world, can enable us to be one with the Absolute. The opposition of knowledge
and action stands firm like a mountain. They are contradictory (viparite) and are poles apart. Those who talk of
combining knowledge with action, says Shankara, have perhaps not read the Brhadäranyaka nor are they aware
of the glaring contradiction repeatedly pointed out by the Shruti and the Smrti. Knowledge and action are opposed
like light and darkness. Actions are prescribed for those who are still in ignorance and not for those who are
enlightened. Knowledge only removes ignorance and then Reality shines forth by itself. A liberated sage,
however, performs actions without any attachment and works for the uplift of humanity. Shankara’s own life
bears ample witness to this fact.

Knowledge and liberation

Ultimate Reality (päramärthikam vastu) can neither be asserted nor denied by knowledge. Knowledge
does nothing else except removing ignorance. Shästra only generates right knowledge (jnäpakam). It does
nothing else (na kârakam).

Knowledge of Brahman, which leads to eternal bliss, does not depend on the performance of any act, for
Brahman is already an accomplished fact. Religious acts which lead to prosperity depend on human performance.
Religious texts enjoin injunctions or prohibitions. Knowledge merely instructs. Knowledge of Brahman
culminates in immediate experience and is already an accomplished fact. Action, whether secular or Vedic, can be
done, miss-done or left undone. Injunctions, prohibitions, options, rules and exceptions depend on our thinking.
But knowledge leaves no option to us for its being this or that or for its existence or non-existence. It is not in our
hands to make, unmake, or change knowledge. Our thinking cannot make a pillar a man. Knowledge of Brahman,
- therefore, depends on Brahman itself. It is always of the same nature because it depends on the existent
thing.True knowledge is produced by Pramänas and conforms to its objects. It can neither be produced by
hundreds of injunctions nor can it be destroyed by hundreds of prohibitions. Knowledge is not mental activity,
because it depends not on mind but on the existent fact. There is also no succession in knowledge. Once it dawns,
it dawns forever and at once removes all ignorance and consequently all bondage. Liberation, therefore, means
removal of ignorance by knowledge. That blessed person who has realized Reality is liberated here and now. The
Shruti says: ‘just as a slough cast off by a snake lies on an ant-hill, similarly does this body lie.’ This is
Jivanmuki. Final release (Videhamukti) is obtained after the death of the body. The Shrudi says ‘the only delay for
him is the death of the body’. Just as a potter’s wheel goes on revolving for some time even after the push is

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withdrawn, similarly the body may continue to exist even after knowledge has dawned, though all attachment
with the body is cut off. Like an arrow shot from the bow, the body continues to reap the fruits and it expires; but
no new actions are accumulated.

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