Architecture and the Problem of Space and Time

Dr. Wagih Fawzi Youssef

Abstract
Architecture is about creating a place through physical design of buildings situated in
space and in time. There is a dominant trend in the literature focusing on the relational
aspects of space as well as of time. In that sense, Space and time are only relational
attributes and not ontological categories in themselves. This essay argues, in line with
Kant, that space and time are a priori notions, fundamental to a holistic understanding of
situating buildings in spatio-temporal fields. The notion of place, as conceptualized by
Aristotle, becomes an encompassing and meaningful totality.

Introduction
Space appeared in Greek philosophy. The Pythagoreans asserted the existence of a void
and that it extended into the heavens out of the limitless breath, since it is this void that
delimits the separation between things next to each other. Its prime seat being in
numbers, since it is this void that delimits their nature. Spatial vacancies were necessary
to guarantee the directness of individual numbers in the Pythagorean geometrization of
number. Space here has not yet any physical implications apart from serving as the
limiting agent between different bodies. The concept of space is still confounded with
that of matter. The Pythagoreans identified air with void. Lucretius reveals that if space
were not infinite, all matter would have sunk in the course of past eternity in a mass to
the bottom of space and nothing would exist anymore.

Plato identifies the world of physical bodies with the world of geometric forms. A
physical body is merely a part of space limited by geometric surfaces containing nothing
but empty space. With Plato, physics becomes geometry as with the Pythagoreans it
became arithmetic, stereo-metric similarity becomes the ordering principle in the
formation of macroscopic bodies.

The parts of space, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common
boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time but space, also, is a continuous
quantity, for its parts have a common boundary. Space here is conceived as the sum total
of all places occupied by bodies; and place, conversely is conceived as that part of space
whose limits coincide with the limits of the occupying body.

The dilemma of time as past, present, and future has been explored by many
philosophers. The momentous present presents the most difficulty as part of it recedes in
the past and part advances from the future (see annex for a more lengthy argument on this

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dilemma). Measuring time of motion of a moving person also presents a similar dilemma
and a brief argument is presented in the annex.

Time is duration set out by measures, the next thing natural for the mind to do is, to get
some measure of this common duration, whereby it might judge of its different lengths,
and consider the distinct order wherein several things exist; without which a great part of
our knowledge would be confused, and a great part of history be rendered very useless.
This consideration of duration, as set out by certain periods, and marked by certain
measures or epochs, is that which most properly call time.

What then, are space and time? Are they real existence? Are they only determination or
relations of things, yet such as would belong to things even if they were not intuited? Or
are space and time such that they belong only to the form of intuition, and therefore to the
subjective constitution of our mind, apart from which they could not be ascribed to
anything whatsoever? In order to obtain light upon these questions, let us first give an
exposition of the concept of space. By exposition I mean the clear, though not
necessarily exhaustive, representation of that which belongs to a concept. The exposition
is metaphysical when it contains that which exhibits the concept as given a priori.

Space & Architecture

The nature of a building, considered in general, does not consist in its being a thing that
has hardness or weight or color, but simply in its being a thing that has extension in
length, breadth and depth, and we should say that there is space there. All that happens
here is change of shape that has many gaps between their masses. Whatever they maybe
that fills the gaps, that some new body that comes and fills them up, although we do not
perceive this body by any of our senses. We may consider the entire nature of the
building as a new body comes to occupy the space and determines the space and without
color, heaviness, coldness and heat and all other such qualities except its extension in
length, breadth; and depth. Now this is just what is implied in the idea of space; not
merely of a space occupied by bodies, but even of a so-called vacuum.

There is, however a conceptual difference. When a block is removed from the space or
place where it is, we think of its extension as being likewise removed, for we are then
regarding the extension as something individual and inseparable from the block. But if
the building is still, it has the same shape and size and keeps the same position relatively
to the external bodies that determines the space.

The terms place and space do not signify something different from the building that it is
said to be in a place. They merely mean its size, shape and position relative to other
buildings. The term ‘empty’ means not a place or space where there is no object at all,
but simply a place where there is no object such as we think there ought to be. Since a

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cup is made to hold water. It is called empty when it is only full of air; for we ordinary
consider only such things as our senses attain to.

Space denotes an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing
together. Space is something absolutely uniform, and without the things placed in it; one
point of space does not absolutely differ in respects whatever from another point of
space. But space without things, has nothing whereby it may be distinguished; and
indeed not anything actual.

Place is nothing else but a relative position of anything. We can have no idea of the place
of the universe though we can know all the parts of it. The idea therefore of place we
have is formed by the same means that we get the idea of space. The parts of pure space
are inseparable one from the other, so that the continuity cannot be separated. According
to Aristotle, Place is an accident, having real existence and that the place of a thing is no
part of or factor of the thing itself, but that which embraces it.

Space: an a priori intuition

Space is not an empirical concept which has been derived from outer experiences. For in
order that certain sensations be referred to something outside us, and similarly in order
that we may be able to represent them as outside and alongside one another, and
accordingly as not only different but as in different places, the representation of space
must be presupposed. The representation of space cannot, therefore, be empirically
obtained from the relations of outer appearance. On the contrary, this outer experience is
itself possible at all only through that representation.

Space is a necessary a priori representation, which underlies all outer intuitions. We can
never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think of it as
empty of objects. It must be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearance,
and not as a determination dependent upon them. It is an a priori representation which
necessarily underlies outer experiences.

Space is not a discursive or, as we say, general concept of relations of things in general,
but a pure intuition. For, in the first place, we can represent to ourselves only one space,
and if we speak of diverse spaces, we mean thereby only parts of one and the same
unique space.

Space is represented as an infinite given of magnitudes. Now every concept must be

thought of as a representation which is contained in an infinite number of different
possible representations, and which therefore contains these under itself, but no concept,
as such, can be thought as containing an infinite number of representations within itself.
It is in this latter way, however that space is thought, for all the parts of space coexist as
infinitum. Consequently, the original representation of space is a priori intuition, not a
concept.

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Time: an a priori intuition
Time is a necessary representation that underlies all intuitions. We cannot, in respect of
appearances in general, remove time itself, though we can quite well think of time as void
of appearances. Time is therefore given a priori. In it alone is actuality of appearances
possible at all. Appearances may, one and all, vanish; but time cannot itself be removed.

Time has only one dimension; different times are not simultaneous but successive. These
principles cannot be derived from experience, for experience would give neither strict
universality nor apodictic certainty. These principles are valid as rules under which alone
experiences are possible, and they instruct us in regard to the experiences, not by means
of them.

Time is not something which exists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective
determination, and it does not, therefore, remain when abstraction is made of all
subjective conditions of its intuition. Were it self-subsistent, it would be something
which would be actual and yet not an actual object. Were it a determination or order
inhering in things themselves, it could not precede the objects as their condition, and be
known and intuited a priori by means of synthetic propositions. But this last is quite
possible if time is nothing but the subjective condition under which alone intuition can
take place in us. For that being so, this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to
the objects, and therefore a priori.

Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of
our inner state. It cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it has to do neither
with shape nor position, but with the relation of representations in our inner state. And
just because this inner intuition yields no shape, we endeavor to make up for this want by
analogies.

Time is an a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. It is the immediate condition

of inner appearances of our souls, and thereby the mediate condition of outer
appearances. All objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in time relations.

Time is a purely subjective condition of our human intuition which is always sensible,
that is, so far as we are affected by objects, and in itself, apart from the subject, is
nothing. Nevertheless, in respect of all appearances, and therefore of all things which can
enter into our experience, it is necessarily objective. We cannot say that all things are in
time, because in this concept of things in general, we are abstracting from every other of
their intuitions and therefore from that condition under which alone objects can be
represented as being in time. If however, the condition be added to the concept, and we
say that all things are appearances, that is, as objects of sensible intuition are in time, then
the proposition has legitimate objective validity and universality a priori.

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Time and space, taken together, are the pure forms of all sensible intuition, and so are
what make a priori synthetic propositions possible. But these a priori sources of
knowledge, being merely conditions of our sensibility, just by this very fact determine
their own limits, namely, that they apply to objects only in so far as objects are viewed as
appearances, and do not present things as they are themselves. This is the sole field of
their validity; should we pass beyond it, no objective use can be made of them. This
ideality of space and time leaves, however, the certainty of empirical knowledge
unaffected, for we are equally sure of it whether this forms necessarily inherent in things
in themselves or only in our intuition of them. Those, on the other hand, who maintain
the absolute reality of space and time whether as subsistent or only as inherent, must
come into conflict with the principles of experience itself.

Time itself does not change, but only something which is in time. The concept of time
thus presupposes the perception of something existing and of the succession of its
determinations; that is to say, it presupposes experience.

Conclusion
Time is not something which exists of itself, or which inheres in things as an objective
determination, and it does not, remain when abstraction is made of all subjective
conditions of its intuition. Where self-subsistent, it would be something which would be
actual and yet not an actual object. Where it a determination or order inhering in things
themselves, it could not precede the object as their condition, and be known and intuited
a priori by means of synthetic propositions. But this last is quite possible if time is
nothing but the subjective condition under which alone intuition can take place in us. For
that being so, this form of inner intuition can be represented prior to the objects, and
therefore a priori.

Time is nothing but the form of inner sense, that is, of the intuition of ourselves and of
our inner state. It cannot be a determination of outer appearances it has to do neither with
shape nor position, but with the relation of representations of our inner state. And just
because this inner intuition, yields no shape, we endeavor to make up for this want by
analogies. We represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, in which the
manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only, and we reason from the properties of
this line to all the properties of time, with this one exception, that while the parts of the
line are simultaneous the parts of time are always successive. From this fact also, that all
the relations of time allow of being expressed in an outer intuition, it is evident that the
representation is itself intuition.

Time is the formal a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. Space as the pure
form of all outer intuition, is so far limited; it serves as the a priori condition only of outer
appearances. But since all representations, whether they have for their objects outer
things or not, belong, in themselves, as determination of the mind, to our inner state; and

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since this inner state stands under the formal condition of inner intuition, and so belong to
time, time is an a priori condition of all appearances whatsoever. It is the immediate
condition of inner experiences of our souls, and thereby the mediate condition of outer
experiences. Just as we can say a priori that all outer appearances are in space, and are
determined a priori in conformity with the relation of space, we can also say from the
principle of inner sense that all appearances, whatsoever, that is all objects of the senses,
are in time, and necessarily stand in time relations.

What we are maintaining is therefore, the empirical reality of time, that is, its objective
validity in respect of all objects which allow the ever being given to our senses. And
since our intuition is always sensible, no object can ever be given to us in experience
which does not conform to the condition of time. On the other hand, we deny to time all
claim to absolute reality, that is to say, we deny that it belongs to things absolutely, as
their condition; or property, independently of any preference to the form of our sensible
intuition; properties that belong to things in themselves can never be given to us through
the senses. This then, is what constitutes the transcendental ideality of time. What we
mean by this phrase is that if we abstract from the subject conditions of sensible intuition,
time is nothing and cannot be ascribed to the objects in themselves in the way either of
subsistence or of inherence. This ideality, like that of space, must not however, be
illustrated by false analogies with sensation, because it is then assumed that the
appearance, in which the sensible predicates inhere, itself has objective reality. In the
case of time, such objective realities falls entirely away, save in so far as it is merely
empirical, that is, save in so far as we regard the object itself merely as appearance.

Annex
The problem of time
If nothing passed away there would be no past time, and if nothing were still coming,
there would be no future time; and if there were nothing at all, there would be no present
time. But then how is it that there are two times: past and future, when even the past is
now no longer and the future is now not yet. But if the present were always present, and
did pass into past time, it obviously would not be time but eternity. If, then, time present,
if it be time, comes to existence only because it passes into time past, how can we say
that even this is, since the cause of its being is that it will cease to be? Thus can we not
truly say that time is only as it tends toward nonbeing? And yet we speak of a long time
and a short time; but never speak this way except of time past and future. We call a
hundred years ago, for example, a long time past. In like manner, we should call a
hundred years hence a long time to come. But we call ten days ago, a short time past;
and ten days hence a short time to come. But in what sense is something long or short
that is nonexistent? For the past, is not now, and the future is not yet. Therefore, let us
not say, “it is long”; instead, let us say of the past, “it was long” and of the future, “it will

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be long”. And yet for that long time past; was it long when it was already past, or when it
was still present? For it might have been long when there was a period that could be
long, but when it was past, it no longer was. In that case, that which was not at all could
not be long. Let us not say “time past was long” for we shall not discover what it was
that was long because, since it is past, it no longer exists. Rather, let us say that “time
present was long because when it was present it was long”. For then it had not yet passed
on so as not to be, and therefore, it still in a state that could be called long. But after it
passed, it ceased to be long simply because it ceased to be.

Let us see whether present time can be long, for it has been given you to feel and measure
the periods of time. Is a hundred years when present a long time? But, first, see whether
a hundred years can be present at once? For if the first year in the century, is current.
Then it is present time, and the other ninety and nine, are still future. Therefore, they are
not yet. But, then if the second year is current, one year is already past, the second
present, and all rest are futures. And thus, if we fix on any middle year of this century as
present, those before it are past, those after it are futures. Therefore a hundred years
cannot be present all at once.

Let us see then, whether the year that is now current can be present. For if its first month
is current then the rest are futures; if the second, the first is already past, and the
remainders are not yet. Therefore the current year is not present all at once. And if it is
not present as a whole, then the year is not present. For it takes twelve months to make
the year, from which each individual month which is current is itself present one at a
time, but the rest either past or future.

Thus it comes out that time present, which we found was the only time that could be
called “long” has been cut down to the space of scarcely a single day. But let us examine
even that, for one day is never present as a whole. For it is made up of twenty four hours,
divided between night and day. The first of these hours has the rest of them as future,
and the last of them has the rest as past; but any of those between has those that preceded
it as past and those that succeed it as future. And that one hour itself passes away in
fleeting fractions. The part of it that has fled is past, what remains is still future. If any
fraction of time be conceived that cannot be now divided even into the most minute
momentary point, this alone is what we may call time present. But this flies so rapidly
from future to past that it cannot be extended by any delay. For, if it is extended, it is the
divided into past and future. But the present has no extension whatever.

Where therefore, is that time which we may call “long”? Is it future? Actually we do not
say of the future “It is long”, for it has not yet come to be, so as to be long. Instead we
say, “It will be long”. When will it be? For since it is future it will not be long, for what
may be long is not yet. It will be long only when it passes from the future which is not as

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yet, and will have begun to be present, so there can be something that may be long. But
in that case, time present cries that it cannot be “long”.

We do perceive intervals of time and we compare them with each other and we say that
some are longer and others are shorter. We even measure how longer or shorter this time
maybe than that time. And we say that this time is twice as long, or three times as long,
while this other time is only just as long as that other. But we measure the passage of
time when we measure the intervals of perception. But who can measure times past
which now are no longer, or times future which are not yet, unless someone will dare to
say that what does not exist can be measured! Therefore, while time is passing, it can be
perceived and measured, but when it is past it cannot, since it is not.

The motion of a person

Nobody is moved but in time, for when a person is moving we measure by time how long
he was moving from the time when he began to be moving until he stopped. And if we
do not see when he began to move, and if he continued to move so that we could not see
when he stopped, we could not measure the movement, except from the time when we
began to see him until we stopped. But if we look at him for a long time, we could affirm
only that the time is long but not how long it maybe. This is because when we say how
long we are speaking comparatively as: This is long as that or this is twice as long as that;
or other similar ratios. But if we were able to observe the point in space where and from
which the person who moved, comes and the point to which he moved, or if we can
observe his body moving, we can say how long the movement of his body took or the
movement of his body from this place to that. Since the motion of a body is one thing,
and the norm by which we measure how long it takes is another thing, we cannot see
which of these two is to be called time. For, although his body sometimes moves and
sometimes stands still, we measure not only his motion but also his rest as well; and both
by time. Thus, we say he stood still as long as he is moving or any other ratio which our
measuring has either determined or imagined, either roughly or precisely, according to
our custom. Therefore, time is not the motion of a body, and that very long is not long
except when measured by the duration of time. How then do we know this, when we do
not know what time is? Or, is it possible that we do not know how can we express what
we do know?

We measure the motion of a body by time, but the time itself we do not measure. But,
could we measure the motion of a body and how long it takes, and how long it is in
motion from this place to that unless we could measure the time in which it is moving.

How then, do we measure this time itself? Do we measure a longer time by a shorter
time as we measure a length? Thus, we can say that the length of a long syllable is
measured by the length of a short syllable and thus say the long syllable is double. In that
way we would measure space rather than time.

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But no certain measure of time is obtained this way, since it is possible that if a shorter
verse is pronounced slowly, it may take up more time than a longer one if it is
pronounced hurriedly. From this it appears that the time is nothing other than
extendedness, but extendedness of what we do not know. The extendedness may be of
the mind itself. For what is it we measure when we say this time is longer than that or
this twice as long as that. We know that we measure time but not measuring the future,
for it is not yet; and we are not measuring the present because it is extended by no length,
and we are not measuring the past because it is no longer is. What is it therefore, that we
are measuring? We measure times, and those which are not yet, nor those which no
longer are, nor those which are stretched out by some delay, nor those which have no
limit. Therefore, we measure neither times future nor times past, nor times present, nor
times passing by; and yet we do measure times. In fact we measure something in our
memory which remains fixed. We measure the periods of time. We measure as time
present the impression that things make on us as they pass by and what remains after they
have passed by. We do not measure the things themselves which have passed by and left
impression on us. This is what we measure. When, we measure periods of time. Either,
then, these are the periods of time or else we do not measure time at all.

What are we doing when we measure silence, and say that this silence has lasted as long
as that voice lasts? Do we not project our thoughts to the measure of a sound, as if it
were then sounding, so that we can say something concerning the intervals of silence in a
given span of time? For, even when both the voice and the tongue are still, we review in
thought, poems and verses of various kinds of various measures of motions, and we
specify their time spans, how long this is in relation to that, just as we were speaking
them loud. What is already finished has already sounded and will go on sounding. Thus
it passes on until the present intention carries the future over into the past. But how is the
future diminished when it is not yet exists? Or how does the past, which exists no longer,
increase, unless it is that in the mind in which all this happens there are three functions?
For the mind expects, it attends, and it remembers so that what it expects passes into what
it remembers by way what it attends to. Who denies that future things do not exist as
yet? But still there is already in the mind the expectation of things still futures. And who
denies that past things now exist no longer? Still there is in the mind the memory of
things past. Who denies that time present has no length, since it passes away in a
moment? Yet our attention has continuity and it is through this that what is present may
proceed to become absent. Therefore, future time, which is nonexistent, is not long; but a
long future is a long expectation of the future. Nor is time past, which is now no longer,
long; a long past is a long memory of the past.

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