The preliminary report of interrogation, of the 36 survivors from SCHARNHORST is

referred for information.

2. It is emphasised that this report has been prepared solely from the evidence of the
prisoners whose quality was not high and whose memories of the engagement were very
confused; it should therefore be treated with reserve.
3. A separate copy is circulating, to ACNS(W) and ACNS(A) on entry and Staff
Departments. Another copy is circulating in N.I.D. and copies have been sent to F.O.(S)
and Commander in Chief, Home Fleet.
for DIRECTOR OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCE
16.1.1944
NID.1/PW
It is suggested that some of the lessons which may be taken from SCHARNHORST's
experience are:-
(1) On first going to sea after embarking a new Admiral and staff a flagship is apt
to suffer from lack of intimate understanding between Admiral and Captain.
(2) Although, most heavy ships have an organisation for getting the crews of A.A.
guns under cover during a surface action in which there is no apparent chance of them
taking part, it is a great risk to put it into force because it cannot be cancelled
easily. It is generally better for them to lie down at their guns.
(3) It is not clear whether SCHARNHORST was fitted with Radar for the main armament
but evidently she was not for the secondary armament which “could not fire at shadows”.
(4) In the encounter last year between a German force and Russian convoy escort, the
importance was of all round Radar search being maintained after action was joined to
prevent surprise by another force. It appears that SCHARNHORST was not warned by Radar
of DUKE OF YORK'S approach.
(5) DUKE OF YORK opened fire after illuminating the SCHARNHORST with starshell. The
5.25 inch starshell has a long range and gives considerable advantage to the K.G.V.
class over ships with shorter starshell range.
Parts IV and V read as though the men had been primed with stories making light
of past mishaps.
Bombing at La Pallice
Channel dash
An internal explosion
Spitzbergen raid
and Operation Source are covered.
R K Dickson [?]
for Director of Plans
24th January, 1944
HSW/MGD
The enclosed report from C. In C. Home Fleet contains information obtained from
Prisoners of War from SCHARNHORST sunk on December 26th, 1943.
2. It must be emphasised that the information is not confirmed.
3. Another copy is being circulated to Staff Departments And A.C.N.S. (A) and
1
(W).

1
A second copy has the alternate paragraph 3: “Another copy is being circulated to D.O.D.(H), D. of P., A.C.N.S.(H), V.C.N.S., 1st Sea
Lord and 1st Lord.” That copy has a handwritten annotation: “Noted. No mention is made of any torpedo attack by Jamaica. The
presumption is that the ship had sunk before Jamaica arrived.” Signature, A de Salis [?] D.T.M. 17.1.44.

1
COPY ENCLOSURE No. 2 in H.F.1415/17
at 1st January, 1944.
INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM PRISONERS OF WAR EX SCHARNHORST
The following information was vouchsafed by prisoners during conversation:-
“Ship carried an Admiral - Rear Admiral Bey, who had Joined shortly before the
operation.
The Captain - Kapitan Zur See Hintz - previously Captain of the HIPPER had joined
recently and was taking the ship to sea for her first operation under his
command.
The ship carried 3 aircraft and was fitted with triple torpedo-tubes either side
amidships. She did not fire torpedoes during the action. 40 Midshipmen were
carried onboard.
The ship’s company were warned on leaving harbour that they were likely to
encounter two or three enemy cruisers screening the convoy. The general
impression among the prisoners appeared to be that either they would destroy the
convoy or would themselves be sunk and several of them did not expect to return.
SCHARNHORST was accompanied by five destroyers, which were sent on ahead early on
the 26th to contact and shadow the convoy. They had just reported contact by
firing Verey’s lights or a similar light signal when SCHARNHORST was engaged by
enemy gunfire and shortly afterwards hit in the crow's nest. She sustained
several casualties and retired intending to return to the convoy. No further
contact was made with the destroyers and prisoners were curious to know what had
happened to them. The general impression seemed to be that the destroyers were
returning to the scene of action when H.M. destroyers were picking up prisoners
and caused our ships to retire with so few survivors.
It appears that the ship – if she did detect DUKE OF YORK by radar before the
latter opened fire - was unaware that she was a battleship and did not expect to
encounter one. SCHARNHORST’s radar does not seem to have been very effective as
even after DUKE OF YORK had opened fire they had difficulty in identifying her on
the scan because of the number of small echoes round her.
Matrosenobergefreiter Helmut Boekhoff, who was stationed in the crow’s nest in
direct communication with the bridge by head-set, was kept informed of the radar
situation. He appreciated, as did two other prisoners that our radar must have
been considerably superior.
A hit was scored about 1800 by DUKE OF YORK in the region of ‘Y’ turret (“Caesar”
Turm), - Matrose Gerhardt Lobin was under the impression that about this time a
hit had been obtained in the region of the screws as he felt the stern of the
ship thrust upwards and thereafter noticed on his speed indicator a reduction
from 29 to 22 knots. During this first action there was also a hit right for’ard.
which carried away an anchor and one on the bridge which caused a fire. There
were many near-misses, mostly astern and many splashes were observed in the
ship’s wake and a considerable amount of shrapnel was in the air. A hit was
observed on DUKE OF YORK’s mast. As H.M. destroyers went in to attack with
torpedoes SCHARNHORST picked up seven echoes by radar, which she at first thought
were her own destroyers.
During the second engagement SCHARNHORST was hit repeatedly causing extensive
fires and casualties, but prisoners seemed to be of the opinion that no salvoes
penetrated lower than two decks, and that the armour belt was not pierced by
shell-fire.

2
 Prisoners appeared to agree that SCHARNHORST was hit by eight torpedoes in all -
of the first hits one was in a boiler room and two hit aft causing extensive
flooding as her water-tight doors were not closed. After five hits however she
was still making good 22 knots and the Captain broadcast that they would get away
with it. (“Wir Schaffen es”) 3 minutes after the last 3 torpedo hits, which
struck in quick succession, SCHARNHORST sank by heeling over to starboard. They
were all of the opinion that without the torpedo hits; the ship could not have
been sunk. Much admiration was expressed for the destroyers who pressed home
their attack, firing their guns all the time, with great bravery in face of
concentrated fire from SCHARNHORST’s total armament.
Several of the prisoners were struck by the small number of W/T, compartments
etc., in DUKE OF YORK compared with SCHARNHORST and were of the opinion that this
ship could not have stood up to as many torpedo hits. Matrose Gunter Lorke states
he saw a submarine on the surface on the port side towards the end of the action.
Other items of interest which came up in conversation were that of the three
midget submarines which penetrated to Kaafjord in September; one damaged TIRPITZ
the other two were bombed and destroyed, but several survivors including one
officer of Lieutenant Commander’s rank were taken on board TIRPITZ. As far as the
prisoners knew, she had been patched up and was ready for sea again. SCHARNHORST
was in company at the time but proceeded to Langfjord when the attack began.
2. It is emphasized that the above information was obtained during friendly
conversation with the prisoners, the only direct questions asked being in accordance
with C.B.3074, paragraph 42.

(Sgd) W STEVENSON
LIEUTENANT, R.N.V.R.
ACTING INTERPRETER, GERMAN.

3
 PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE INTERROGATION OF SURVIVORS FROM THE
GERMAN BATTLESHIP “SCHARNHORST”; SUNK BY UNITS OF THE HOME
FLEET OFF THE NORTH CAPE AT 1940 ON 26th DECEMBER, 1943.
================================================================
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS.
The German battleship “SCHARNHORST”, under the command of Captain HINTZE, and
flying the flag of Rear Admiral Erich BEY, Admiral Commanding Destroyers, was sunk by
units of the Home Fleet off the North Cape at 1940 on 26th December, 1943.
“SCHARNHORST” had left her anchorage at Langfjord at 1900 the previous day,
accompanied by three destroyers, with the intention of attacking an Allied convoy bound
for Russia. Two attempts to close the convoy were made on 26th December at about 0930
and 1200, but both were beaten off by H.M. Ships “NORFOLK”, “BELFAST” and “SHEFFIELD”.
At some time between 0700 and 0800 on 26th December, “SCHARNHORST” seems to have
detached her destroyer screen to shadow and if possible attack the convoy. No sighting
report has been received concerning these destroyers, and their whereabouts during the
whole of the action remains a mystery.
“SCHARNHORST” retired to the south after the second engagement, shadowed by the
three British cruisers, which had been joined before the second action by H.M.
Destroyers “MUSKETEER”, “MATCHLESS”, “OPPORTUNE” and “VIRAGO”.
At 1630, “SCHARNHORST” was brought to action by H.M.S. “DUKE OF YORK”, which had
been coming up from the south-west in company with H.M. Cruiser “JAMAICA”, H.M.
Destroyers “SAVAGE”, “SCORPION” and “SAUMAREZ” and H.Nor.M. Destroyer "STORD".
After a ??? hit by D of Y a determined torpedo attack by the “S” class destroyers
at 1850 further slowed down the “SCHARNHORST” (just when it appeared likely that her
superior speed would enable her to escape,) and she was sunk at 1940 after sustaining
heavy gunfire from H.M.S. “DUKE OF YORK” and as a result of a second torpedo attack in
which H.M. Ships “BELFAST”, “JAMAICA”, “MATCHLESS”, “MUSKETEER”, “OPPORTUNE” and
“VIRAGO” took part. H.M.S. “SCORPION” picked up 30 survivors and H.M.S. “MATCHLESS”
six.
Contrary to expectations, the survivors, all of whom were ratings, presented a
front of tough, courteous security-consciousness, and evidence of high morale, which,
combined with their meagre and limited knowledge, has provided interrogators with a
difficult problem.

It was unfortunate that, owing to the time which elapsed between capture and
arrival in the interrogation centre, and owing to the transfer from the destroyers to
‘Duke of York’, prisoners apparently received sufficient information on the action from
the British point of view to colour their own version and to make the extraction of an
accurate parallel account rather more difficult.

The fact that all but four of the survivors were below decks or under cover
during practically the whole of the action has proved a major drawback. Most of the
remainder were unable to distinguish between the explosion of the torpedoes, the impact
of the heavy shells and the firing of their own heavy armament. To many of them, the
order to prepare to abandon ship came as a surprise, as they had no idea that
“SCHARNHORST” had been damaged to that extent.

Almost to a man, the survivors ascribe the sinking to the effect of the torpedo
attacks, and contend that their ship would never have been sunk by gunfire alone. None
of them can provide a coherent narrative of the sequence of events after the first
torpedo attack by the “S” Class destroyers, but it seems to be the general concensus
[sic] of opinion that the destroyers would never have got near enough to attack if it
had not been for dissension amongst the “SCHARNHORST” officers and muddled and inept
handling of the secondary armament.

4
 The crews of the 4.1” HA/LA guns apparently received the order to take cover when
the action with H.M.S. “DUKE OF YORK” began, and this order was never rescinded.
Survivors contend that if these guns had been brought to bear on the destroyers, the
vital torpedo attack could never have been made.

Both Captain HINTZE and Rear-Admiral BEY are said to have shot themselves on the
bridge after giving the order to abandon ship. No officer above the rank of Lieutenant-
Commander was seen in the water by survivors.

5
 II. DETAILS OF “SCHARNHORST”
(i) Building Yard: Kriegsmarinewerft, Wilhelmshaven.
(ii) Tonnage: No survivor has yet mentioned any tonnage above the
declared standard tonnage of 26,000 tons.
(iii) Length: 236 m. (774 feet).
(iv) Beam: 30.5 m. (100 feet).
(v) Speed: Speed gauges were calibrated up to 28 knots, but
survivors state that a maximum speed of 33 knots could
be attained.
(vi) Complement Normally 1,903 officers and men. An additional 50 men
and 40 cadets joined the ship shortly before the last
sortie. The men were to replace ratings who were due to
go on leave.
(vii) Armament: Nine 280 mm. (11") guns in triple turrets, two forward
and one aft.
Eight 150 mm. (5.9") guns in twin turrets, one turret
on each side on deck abreast the bridge, and one turret
on each side on deck abreast the after director
platform.
Four 150 mm. (5.9") guns in single mountings, two on
each side on deck amidships.
Sixteen 105 mm. (4.1") HA/LA guns in twin mountings,
three mountings on each side on the midships platform,
one mounting on the centre line on the platform forward
of the bridge and one mounting on the centre line on
the after director platform.
Eighteen 37 mm. (1.46") A.A. guns in twin mountings:
four mountings on the after director platform; two on
the platform forward of the bridge, one on each side on
deck abreast “B” 11" turret, and one on the platform
below the Admiral's bridge.
Six 20 mm. (0.79") quadruple A.A. guns and twelve
single 20 mm. guns in positions yet to be ascertained.
Two triple torpedo tubes, one on each side on deck.
The possibility of tri-axial mountings is being
investigated. At present it seems as if only the
director sights were stabilized.
(viii) Aircraft: Three Arado aircraft carried; two in a hangar abaft the
funnel, and one on the catapult.
These were manned by G.A.F. personnel.
(ix) Lay-out: The only notable alterations to the N.I.D. plan dated
April, 1940, were as follows:
The aircraft catapult on the after 11" turret and the
after crane had been removed.
The space between the mast and the funnel was occupied
by the large hangar for the Arado aircraft.
The bow had been lengthened by 8 m. (26.24 feet).2
The ship was divided into 21 compartments by watertight
transverse bulkheads, numbered from aft.
The six decks were called, from top to bottom:

2
The extended ‘Atlantic bow’ was installed after sea trials in early 1939 revealed a dangerous tendency to ship excessive water, and was
complete by November 1939 (Wikipedia).

6
 Batteriedeck (Battery deck)
Zwischendeck (Tween deck)
Panzer deck (Armoured deck)
Oberes Plattformdeck (Upper platform deck)
Munitionsdeck (Magazine deck)
Unteres Plattformdeck (Lower platform deck).
(x) Armour: No details of the armour are yet to hand. One prisoner
has stated that the armour was designed as protection
against 380 mm. (15") shell[s.]
(xi) Engines There were three boiler roans and three turbine rooms.
The engines were almost identical to those of the
“TIRPITZ”, but no details are yet to hand.
Maximum turbine revolutions were said to be 3,000 -
4,000 r.p.m.
(xii) Searchlights: Five searchlights were carried, one above the Admiral’s
bridge, one on each side of the funnel and one on each
side on the after director platform.
(xiii) Pinnaces: Five pinnaces were carried on the midships platform
round the funnel. Three of them had 35 H.P. Deutz
engines.

7
 III LAST SORTIE AND SINKING OF "SCHARNHORST".
The ship's company in “SCHARNHORST” had spent a cheerful and relaxed Christmas
Day at their anchorage in Langfjord and were looking forward to another day of
slackened discipline on 26th December. A large quantity of Christmas comforts had
arrived and most of them had already opened their parcels of extra cigarettes and
sweets. Captain's rounds had been an informal affair, with more attention paid to
the comfort and well-being of the crew than to the usual insistence on neatness and
efficiency. If the Commanding Officer considered that any man had less than the
usual share of cigarettes he gave instructions for an additional issue to make up
the deficiency.
Disillusionment came at 1300 when the ship’s loud-speakers blared the order to
prepare for sea at three hours’ notice. The order was repeated at 1500 and at 1700
the order came “Prepare to weigh”. From then until 1900 there was a pause and during
this period Rear-Admiral Bey, Admiral Commanding Destroyers, came on board with his
staff of 30. He was taking the place of Rear-Admiral Kummetz, who was on leave at
the time.
At 1900 they weighed anchor and proceeded down Langfjord in company with three
destroyers, Z 28, Z 31 and Z 34. The starboard watch was at action stations and the
guns’ crews were called on to the quarterdeck, where they were told that
“SCHARNHORST” was putting to sea to attack an Allied convoy of about 20 ships,
escorted by three cruisers and destroyers
The port watch then proceeded to clean ship and remove a large number of sacks
of potatoes which were encumbering the gangways. They had been taken on board before
Christmas and had not been dealt with over the holiday.
At midnight the port watch went to action stations and at 0400 they got two
hours sleep. At 0600 they had breakfast and at 0700 went to action stations where
they were joined by the starboard watch at 0800. Both watches remained at action
stations until the ship was sunk.
Between 0700 and 0800 the three destroyers parted company, apparently with
orders to contact and shadow the convoy. They seem to have taken no part in any of
the subsequent actions and their whereabouts during the day remain a complete
mystery.
(N.I.D. Note: At 0400 the dispositions of British forces in the Bear Island
area were as follows:
Convoy JW 55B was in position 73˚ 31’ N., 18˚ 54’ E., steering 070° at 8
knots. Nineteen merchant ships escorted by H.M. Ships “ONSLOW”, “ONSLAUGHT”,
“HAIDA”, “IROQUOIS”, “ORWELL”, “HURON”, “SCOURGE”, “IMPULSIVE” and “GLEANER” and the
following ships belonging to the Western Approaches Command: “WHITEHALL”,
“WRESTLER”, “HONEYSUCKLE” and “OXLIP”. This escort had also been reinforced by the
following four destroyers detached from Convoy R.A. 55A: “MUSKETEER”, “OPPORTUNE”,
“VIRAGO” and “MATCHLESS”.)
(Convoy R.A. 55A was in approximate position 74˚ 42’ N., 05˚ 27’ E., steering
267˚ at 8 knots. Twenty-two merchant ships escorted by H.M. Ships “MILNE”, “METEOR”,
“ASHANTI”, “ATHABASKAN” and “SEAGULL”, with the following ships from Western
Approaches Command: “BEAGLE”, “WESTCOTT”, “DIANELLA”, “POPPY” and “ACANTHUS”.)
(Force I was in approximate position 73˚ 52’ N., 27˚ 12’ E., steering 235˚ at
18 knots and consisted of H.M. Ships “BELFAST”, “NORFOLK” and “SHEFFIELD”.)
(Force 2 was in position 71˚ 07’ N., 10˚ 48’ E., steering 080˚ at 24 knots and
consisted of H.M. Ships “DUKE OF YORK”, “JAMAICA”, “SAVAGE”, “SAUMAREZ” and
“SCORPION” and H.Nor.M.S. “STORD”)
(As J.W. 55B had been consistently shadowed and reported by aircraft and U-
boats throughout its passage, it was appreciated that “SCHARNHORST”, which had been

8
 reported as being at sea at 0339 would make for this convoy rather than for R.A. 55A
which was apparently undetected. At 0628 the course of Convoy J.W. 55B was altered
to 045˚ and Force I was ordered to close the convoy for mutual protection.)
At about 0900 three “Shadows” were reported ahead and almost immediately fire
was opened by “SCHARNHORST” with main and secondary armament on what were soon
identified as three heavy cruisers. The action lasted about ten minutes before the
“SCHARNHORST” turned away.
During this period either the crow’s nest or the bridge port director received
a hit. The crow’s nest was damaged and one officer and one rating severely injured.
It is also possible that another shell hit the forecastle without causing any
damage.
(N.I.D. Note: At 0921, with the cruisers on a line of bearing 160, “SHEFFIELD”
reported the enemy in sight at 13000 yards, bearing 222. Three minutes later
“BELFAST” opened fire with starshell. “NORFOLK” had to drop back to clear
“BELFAST’s” range, but by 0925 all Force I were engaging the enemy. At O929 cruisers
altered course to 265. “NORFOLK” claimed a hit with her second or third salvo).
(The enemy turned to the southward and the range opened rapidly. Force I
altered round to 105 at 0936 and back to 170 ten minutes later, but by then the
range had opened to 24000 yards and the enemy was steering 150 at 30 knots.)
(At 0955 Force I altered to a similar course and almost at once the energy
altered round to the north-east, apparently trying to work round to the northward of
the convoy. “SCHARNHORST” had a 4-6 knot superiority in speed and Force I finally
altered round to 325 at 1014 in order to get between “SCHARNHORST” and the convoy.
Five minutes later contact with the enemy was lost at 32000 yards when he was
steering north-east at about 28 knots. Force I retired on the convoy and was joined
at 1024 by H.M. Ships “MUSKETEER”, “MATCHLESS”, “OPPORTUNE” and “VIRAGO”.)
Shortly after the first engagement with the convoy escort a signal was
received in “SCHARNHORST” from Admiral Doenitz which is variously reported by
survivors as: “I rely on your fighting spirit. You must attack the convoy even if
heavy units are behind it”.3 Another version, or perhaps another signal, read
“Attack and destroy the convoy to alleviate your comrades struggling on the Eastern
Front”. The signals were read over the loud-speaker system.
At about 1215, “SCHARNHORST” was again in contact with the British cruisers. A
hit was claimed on one cruiser and survivors stated that one shell hit “SCHARNH0RST”
on the port side between the after twin 105mm. and the after main turret without
exploding.4 The British cruisers’ fire was described as unpleasantly accurate, with
a large number of shell bursts within 50 yards of the ship, filling the air with
fragments.
(N.I.D. Note; At 1200 Force I was in position 74˚ 11’ N., 22˚ 18’ E., steering
045˚ at 18 knots. Four minutes later “BELFAST” obtained a Radar contact at 29000
yards. “SCHARNHORST” was estimated to be steering 240 at about 20 knots. Action was
joined at ranges from 4½ to 8 miles, during which the enemy’s speed increased from
20 to 28 knots and his course altered round from west to south.)
(At 1233 “NORFOLK” was hit aft. ‘X’ turret was put out of action and ‘X’
magazine flooded. One officer and six ratings were killed and five ratings seriously
wounded. About the same time a salvo fell close to “SHEFFIELD” and several pieces of
shell “up to football size” came inboard. By 1241 the enemy was steering 110 at 28
knots and Force I checked fire and continued to shadow the “SCHARNHORST”.)
After this second engagement with the British cruisers, the “SCHARNHORST”
seems to have given up all idea of attacking the convoy and relative calm settled
3
Interesting. Raeder was normally very protective of his capital ships but by this time had been replaced by Dönitz, a U-Boat man who
needed to prove to Hitler that his surface fleet was good for something..
4
Underlined by hand.

9
down on board. Several survivors described how they had taken advantage of the lull
to doze off and the sudden sounding of the alarm signal shortly after 1600 caught
most of them by surprise.
The report of “Schweres Mündungsfeuer” (Heavy gun flashes) from a completely
new direction and the sight of a column of water from a near miss ahead caused a
rude awakening, but it is not clear at what time the ship’s company learnt that they
were in combat with a British heavy unit, and they seem to have been under the
impression for some time that they only had to deal with cruisers.
Several survivors contend that the 20mm. guns went into action and shot down a
number of starshells at this and later stages of the action.
(N.I.D. Note: Force 2, which had been receiving continuous reports of
“SCHARNHORST’s” course and speed from Force I made Radar contact with the enemy at
1617 at a range of 45500 yards, bearing 020. At 1637 the destroyers were ordered to
take up the most advantageous position for torpedo firing, having been formed in
sub-divisions on either bow after H.M.S. “DUKE OF YORK” obtained the Radar contact.)
(At 1632 the range was 29700 yards and the enemy appeared to be zig-zagging on
a mean course of 160. At 1642 the enemy seemed to alter slightly to port. At 1650
“DUKE OF YORK” illuminated the enemy with starshell and opened fire with her main
armament.)
A shell from one of the first salvoes of this new opponent struck the
“SCHARNHORST” in the starboard tween deck of compartment 13 about two feet above the
waterline, making a breach about half a yard in diameter, Another hit shortly after
1700 put ‘A’ turret out of action.
A garbled account from some survivors indicates that charges in ‘A’ magazine
started to burn and that a certain proportion of charges in ‘B’ magazine were also
rendered useless. The fire was got under control without serious damage ensuing, but
‘A’ turret took no further part in the action.
When the action with “DUKE OF YORK” commenced, the order came through from the
bridge “Flak in Deckung” (Anti-aircraft guns’ crews take cover) which meant that
only a skeleton crew remained at the 105mm. guns to take messages and the remainder
took cover. The full scope of this order has yet to be ascertained, as it seems that
one or two of the 105mm. mountings certainly took part in the action towards the
end, although in local firing only and probably as the result of individual initia-
tive.
The handling of the secondary armament seems to have been inept and muddled.
Survivors describe fierce arguments between the first and second gunnery officers,
Korvettenkapitaen Brodenbreuker and Kapitaenleutnant Wieting. At one point Wieting
ordered the 150mm. port mountings to load starshells and the order was
countermanded, the crews being ordered to unload and reload with armour-piercing
shells.
(N.I.D. Note: “SCHARNHORST” turned east almost immediately after the first
salvoes from “DUKE OP YORK” had the range steadily opened owing to her superior
speed. About 1820 “SCHARNHORST” ceased firing when the range was just over 20000
yards and the “DUKE OF YORK” ceased at 1824 when the range had opened to 21400
yards.)
No chronological account of the ensuing action has been, or is likely to be
obtained from survivors. The first torpedo attack seems to have over-awed them by
its determination and results, blotting out any clear remembrance of other events
from their minds.
It was “about 1830” when “Shadows” were reported on either beam of the
“SCHARNHORST”. One officer is said to have asked for clearer identification “as he

10
could not fire on shadows” However, as more than one survivor plaintively remarked,
“the shadows were tangible enough to fire torpedoes at us”.
The crew seems to have been aghast at the relentless attack carried out by
what turned out to be four destroyers. Coming in to about 1800 yards or less, they
fired full salvoes of torpedoes. The hydrophones gave due warning of the attack and
“SCHARNHORST” took violent avoiding action, but there were too many torpedoes coming
from too many angles and at least three hits were scored.
During this attack, the 105mm. Guns’ crews seem to have remained under cover,
a fact which has caused much bitter comment amongst survivors. They contend that if
they had received the order to fire, the destroyers would never have been able to
break through the barrage and come near enough to fire their torpedoes accurately.
One of the torpedo hits seems to have put one of the boilers out of action and
one shaft apparently stopped. It picked up again for about ten minutes, shortly
before the “SCHARNHORST” sank and then stopped once more. The speed dropped to about
22 knots and does not seem to have risen above this figure again.
Another torpedo hit apparently pierced Compartment 3 aft and flooded
compartments 1, 2 and 3. The watertight doors had to be closed on the 25 men inside.
(N.I.D. Note: The Force 2 destroyers had been slowly gaining on “SCHARNHORST”
and at 1840 were at 10000 yards, closing rapidly, two on either beam. “SCHARNHORST”
had opened fire on them at about 1830. Soon afterwards, the destroyers themselves
opened fire at about 7000 yards and at 1850 the enemy, illuminated by starshell, was
seen to alter course to the southwards, placing “SAVAGE” and “SAUMAREZ” in an
excellent position on her starboard bow and “SCORPION” and “STORD” a little to the
southward on her port bow. The two sub-divisions turned in at once and attacked from
both sides, closing the range in both cases to 1800 yards before firing.)
At 1915, the report over over the loud-speakers, “heavy unit astern is
overhauling us”, and from this point on only fragmentary accounts can be obtained
from survivors of the course of the action.
(N.I.D. Note: During the destroyer attacks, Force 2 closed the enemy rapidly
and as the destroyers withdrew to the east “DUKE OF YORK” and “JAMAICA” re-engaged
at 1901 at a range of 10400 yards, the enemy by then having altered course to the
southward. Hits were immediately scored, the enemy continuing to fire at the
retiring destroyers.)
(After five minutes, when the “SCHARNHORST” had been repeatedly hit, and fires
and flashes from exploding ammuntion [sic] were flaring up, she shifted her
secondary armament fire to “DUKE OF YORK” at a range of 8000 yards. During this
second engagement, she apparently engaged Force 2 sporadically with only part of her
main armament)
The majority of the prisoners were stationed under cover or below decks and
were apparently unable to distinguish between the explosion of the torpedo hits, the
impact of heavy shells and the detonation of their own heavy guns.
However, the following hits are known to have been scored, although their
order is unknown:
1. On the forward port 150 mm. twin turret, putting the gun and the
ammunition hoist out of action.
2. On the aircraft hangar, destroying both planes and causing a fierce fire,
which was apparently put out in about ten minutes.
3. On the forward 105 mm. mounting on the starboard side.
4. On the starboard side near the funnel.
5. In the tween deck on the port side in Compartment 10.
6. In the battery deck on the port side in Compartment 9.

11
 7. On the forward starboard 150 mm. turret, immediately prior to final
torpedo attack.
8. The starboard after single 150 mm. gun.
9. On one quadruple 20 mm. mounting on the starboard side which flew through
the air and crashed on the deck.
‘B’ turret also seems to have been hit and one survivor gave a graphic account
of how the ventilating system failed and the whole turret filled with choking smoke
every time the breeches were opened. This, combined with the motion o£ the ship in
heavy weather rendered nearly every man in the turret violently seasick and their
only alleviation came when the ship zig-zagged, blocking the turret’s line on the
target. They were then able to cease fire and obtain a short respite to clear the
air. This turret ceased firing some minutes before the “SCHARNHORST” sank.
‘Y’ turret continued firing practically to the end and used up nearly all the
ammunition in ‘Y’ magazine, after firing over 60 full salvoes.
One survivor described how most of the guns’ crews on the port side seemed to
be dead shortly before the last torpedo attack was made and the deck was littered
with dead bodies being washed overboard.
Although survivors insist that no shells penetrated the armoured deck, a large
number penetrated the decks above it and exploded on contact with the armour,
causing frightful havoc. Compartments were described as full of mangled bodies and
swilling with sea water.
Just before this last torpedo attack, Captain Hintze came to the microphone
himself and said, “I shake you all by the hand for the last time. I have sent this
signal to the Fuehrer: ‘We shall fight to the last shell’. “SCHARNHORST” onwards”.
Shortly afterwards a further announcement stated that the Commander had taken over
the ship. Survivors state that Captain Hintze and Admiral Bey shot themselves on the
bridge.
A few minutes before the end, the order came through to carry out the first
part of “Manoeuvre ‘V’”, which consisted of shutting certain watertight doors to
ensure that the ship sank more slowly and enable more members of the crew to make
their escape.
When the second torpedo attack came, resistance was practically at an end.
Most survivors have no idea what type of ship fired the fatal torpedoes, although
one prisoner described how he had seen a destroyer firing a salvo of three, all of
which hit.
There was a pause, while the “SCHARNHORST” took on a list to starboard and the
order was given to prepare to abandon ship., and carry out the second part of
“Manoeuvre ‘V’”, which required the destruction of secret files and equipment. Then
one more torpedo explosion on the starboard side, the seventh or eighth,
“SCHARNHORST” heeled over and sank almost immediately. The watch of one of the
survivors stopped at 1940 and he thinks he jumped into the water at this moment.
Abandon ship drill seems to have been most rudimentary, None of the survivors
seems to have had an abandon ship station. Lifebelts were not worn and were only put
on at the last moement [sic] if they could be found. One survivor described how two
or three of the cadets attempted to jump into the water from the bridge but
misjudged the list and crashed to the deck.
Survivors state that “SCHARNHORST” was designed to withstand, theoretically,
fourteen torpedo hits without being sunk. They ascribe the loss of the ship to the
fact that nearly all the hits were on the starboard side. They insist also that
“SCHARNHORST” was sunk by torpedoes and that “DUKE OF YORK” would never have
succeeded in sinking her by gunfire alone.

12
 (N.I.D. Note: At 1920 “JAMAICA” and “BELFAST” were told to finish off the
enemy with torpedoes. “BELFAST” closed first to 6600 yards, firing three torpedoes
to starboard at 1926 and claiming one hit. She then altered round to fire her port
tubes, but owing to the melee of ships and fire round the target, sheered off to the
southward to await a more favourable opportunity.)
(“JAMAICA” followed “BELFAST” in and at 1935 fired three torpedoes at a range
of 6000 yards, no hits being claimed. The whole of the target area was obscured by
dense smoke when “JAMAICA” on the starboard of the enemy turned in and delivered her
second torpedo attack at about 1939 at 5500 yards. She claimed two possible hits.)
(While “JAMAICA” was attacking on “SCHARNHORST’s” starboard side, “MUSKETEER”,
“MATCHLESS”, “OPPORTUNE” and “VIRAGO” who had been slowly gaining bearing on the
enemy to the northward turned in to attack in two sub-divisions on the port side.
Between 1932 and 1934 all destroyers except “MATCHLESS” fired torpedoes and claimed
hits. “MATCHLESS”, when about to fire, was struck by an unusually large wave. She
hauled round to attack again, but before she could do so “SCHARNHORST” had sunk.)
(“BELFAST” also again approached to fire her remaining torpedoes, illuminating
the area by starshell, but by this time “SCHARNHORST” had sunk.)
(“BELFAST”, “NORFOLK” and several destroyers then searched the area until
2040, “SCORPION” picked up 30 survivors and “MATCHLESS” six.)

13
 IV. PREVIOUS HISTORY OF “SCHARNHORST”.
No survivor has yet referred to activities prior to the winter of 1940/41, nor
is any account yet to hand of the action during which ”RAWALPINDI” was sunk or of
“SCHARNHORST”’s commerce-raiding activities in the Atlantic during 1940.
The diary of her movements subsequent to her arrival in Brest in February,
1941, is roughly as follows:
Feb. 1941 - Feb. 1942 : In Brest and La Pallice.
Feb. 1942 : The Channel dash with “GNEISENAU” and “PRINZ
EUGEN”.
Feb. – March 1942 : In dock at Kiel.
March 1942 – Feb. 1943 : In the Baltic, chiefly at Gdynia.
8th March 1943 : Arrived in Narvik.
18th March 1943 : Arrived in Langfjord.
April 1943 : One patrol to Bear Island.
Sept. 1943 : Spitzbergen raid with "TIRPITZ”.

Air attacks in Brest and La Pallice:

Survivors told one story of a ruse which was employed by the Germans in Brest
to divert the attention of British bombers.
It seems that two old merchant ships were welded together and had their beam
artifically [sic] widened with baulks of timber. Anti-aircraft guns were mounted on
deck, and the superstructure built up in a tolerable imitation of the “SCHARNHORST”.
Whenever the air-raid alarm was wounded, this hulk was towed up and down in
the harbour with its anti-aircraft guns firing furiously to provide verisimilitude.
The hulk was damaged on various occasions, and apparently suffered more from
inclement weather than from air attacks. The upper decks were always being patched
up and repaired.
During these aircraft attacks, “SCHARNHORST” only opened fire in case of
absolute necessity, and it seems to have suffered hardly any damage, although on one
occasion a huge boulder was hurled on board from the dockside. On another occasion
the torpedo store was hit by a bomb and blew up with an enormous explosion.
Particular attention was paid during these raids to any sign of Fifth Column
activity round the harbour and the “ADMIRAL HIPPER” had orders to fire on any lights
being shown from houses with her 37 mm. and 20 mm. guns.
While exercising at sea from La Pallice at some time during the summer of
1941,“SCHARNHORST” was attacked by aircraft, and a stick of five large bombs fell
just to starboard. Two of these apparently hit and tore an enormous hole in
Compartment 9 through which “SCARNHORST” shipped 1,000 tons of water. In spite of a
considerable list, she managed to make 27 knots on the way back to La Pallice.
The Channel Dash.
Survivors’ chief recollections of the Channel dash with “GNEISENAU” and “PRINZ
EUGEN” in February 1942 were the tremendous blind barrage put up against the
attacking “Swordfish” aircraft, and the hitting of two mines.
None of the “Swordfish” torpedoes apparently scored a hit, but the mine
explosions seem to have caused considerable perturbation.
The mines apparently exploded under Compartments 15 and 6, and “SCHARNHORST”
came to a dead stop. The crew started looking round for their life-jackets, firmly
convinced that the end had come.

14
 The destroyer, Z.29 (Captain BEY, later Rear-Admiral BEY, who went down with
the “SCHARNHORST”) came alongside and took off Admiral CILIAX and his staff. They
later had to transfer to another destroyer when Z.29 was damaged by a shell hit.
The remainder of the force had proceeded ahead, but the “SCHARNHORST” ship’s
company soon came to their senses and, finding that their ship was practically
undamaged, proceeded at 28 knots and caught up the rest of the force again.
Activities in the Baltic.
“SCHARNHORST” was apparently in dock in Kiel for two months after the Channel
dash, and during this time received slight damage during one air raid.
Accounts of the ensuing twelve months in the Baltic are fragmentary and
consist chiefly of minor disasters. During the year she rammed a U-boat (this was
probably U.523, which has since been sunk), lost one of her aircraft, fouled one of
her screws with a buoy, and ran aground off Hela.
Explosion on board in Langfjord.
An account, which has yet be confirmed and amplified, has been given by one
survivor, of an explosion which occurred on board “SCHARNHORST” about May 1943.
It seems that stores of some kind were being taken on board when there was a
violent explosion in the tween deck in the vicinity of “Y” turret. An immediate
panic ensued, and “Y” magazine was flooded as a precautionary measure.
Seventeen men were killed, and this survivor says that the scene below decks
was indescribable, the compartment in question being nothing but a mass of severed
pipes, decapitated heads and odd limbs.
Sabotage was suspected and all the officers sallied forth with revolvers to
carry out a general hue and cry in the neighbourhood, Next-of-kin of the dead men
were informed that the men had fallen in action with the enemy.
The Spitzbergen Raid.
This raid, carried out in September, 1943, with the “TIRPITZ” and nine
destroyers, was apparently regarded as a picnic from start to finish. Each of the
destroyers had a landing party of about 100 soldiers on board.
The force approached Spitzbergen flying the British flag, and intercepted a
signal from the Spitzbergen W/T station stating that British warships were entering
harbour. During the action the reply was intercepted, stating that the message had
not been understood and asking for a repeat.5
Before opening fire the German flag was hoisted and the “SCHARNHORST” entered
the harbour preceded by six destroyers. The other three destroyers stayed outside
the harbour with “TIRPITZ”.
The destroyers and “SCHARNHORST” with her secondary armament fired at
everything within sight, paying particular attention to the W/T station and the
Meteorological station, and the guns seem to have got in some useful target
practice. However, Z.33, one of Germany’s newest destroyers, received a hit on the
forward twin 150 mm. turret, and had subsequently to be taken in tow.

5
This sentence sidelined by hand in green, with the query “In cipher?”

15
 V. MIDGET SUBMARINE ATTACK ON “TIRPITZ” IN KAAFJORD.
Although most of the “SCHARNHORST” survivors professed abysmal ignorance of the
attack by British midget submarines on the “TIRPITZ” in Kaafjord on 22nd September,
1943, one survivor had actually been on board at the time, and provided most of the
following information.
At about 0900, a small submarine was sighted on the surface on “TIRPITZ”’s port
beam. There was an immediate alarm and hand grenades were thrown. The submarine dived
at once and was either abandoned by the crew under water, or came to the surface and
was abandoned, sinking immediately. Four survivors were seen in the water.
They were hauled aboard the “TIRPITZ” and seem to have shown a desire to wander
over to the starboard side “and kept looking at their watches”. The "SCHARNHORST”
prisoner says they were husky fellows, wearing leather jackets with no visible signs of
rank. He thought three were British and one Norwegian.
After they had been on board a minute or two there was a loud explosion, and the
“TIRPITZ” heaved about five feet out of the water before settling down again. The four
survivors “looked surprised and shook their heads” as if in disappointment, and were
taken below, where they were given hot coffee and schnapps and were apparently
questioned by English-speaking officers on Admiral KUMMETZ’ staff.
“TIRPITZ” apparently sustained two hits, one forward and one aft. There was a
water entry aft, and an escape of oil forward, and part of the generating plant was put
out of action. The “SCHARNHORST” survivor expressed the opinion that the “TIRPITZ”
would have to return to Germany for extensive repairs.
The explosions caused great commotion in the Fjord, with much patrol boat
activity and firing of depth charges. Two further confirmed sinkings of midget
submarines were reported, one just outside the inner A/S net off the north bank of
Kaafjord and one opposite the small river Smornes.
The “SCHARNHORST” prisoner understood that the submarines had followed a
freighter through the nets, and states that every time a vessel comes through now, a
few depth charges are dropped astern of it in case of trouble.
Ever since the attack, “SCHARNHORST”, which was lying behind an island at the
entrance to Langfjord when the attack took place, and “TIRPITZ”, have an anti-submarine
patrol of two boats circling them clockwise and anti-clockwise during the night. 42 men
are employed as look-outs, and the hydrophones are constantly manned

16
 {ATTACHMENT TO 2nd Copy}
It appears that SCHARNHORST’s warning radar was either inefficient or had been
damaged during the cruiser action as it is clear that the encounter with DUKE OF YORK
was unexpected.
2. The bearing discrimination of the Gunnery Radar seems to have been of a poor
order, since difficulty was apparently experienced in distinguishing DUKE OP YORK’s
echo from surrounding echoes of her escort.
3. It is noted that a large proportion of the near misses are reported as astern
during the 1st phase when DUKE OF YORK was engaging in blind fire. As SCHARNHORST was
retiring on a zig-zag course these may have been caused by line errors, or by range
errors - depending on the actual course of SCHARNHORST at the time they were observed.
4. It is noted in this report that prisoners were under the impression that
neither the armoured deck nor the side armour were pierced.
5. There seems little doubt that the armoured deck was not pierced.
6. The armoured deck was apparently at the same level as in BISMARCK and it seems
likely that the side armour would be arranged in a similar manner to that illustrated
in C.B.04039 Add. No. 2 for BISMARCK.
7. In view of the considerable number of bursts on or near the armoured deck
referred to in other interrogation reports, and of the small angle of descent at the
ranges in use, it seems possible that the vertical armour was, in fact, penetrated.

C.M.P. 146 DIRECTOR OF GUNNERY & ANTI-AIRCRAFT WARFARE

H.A.K. January, 1944

17
 {MINUTE ATTACHED TO 2ND COPY}
REGISTER No. N.I.D. 0311/44
Minute Sheet No. 1
WRITE ONLY IN THIS COLUMN
1. Concur with D.G.D. paras. 1 and 2. From information at present available on
types of sets likely to have been fitted in Scharnhorst poor discrimination in
range and bearing, as compared with Type 273QR and to a lesser degree with
Type 284, would be in accordance with expectations.
2. That German ratings should have realised their own Radar inferiority merely
from the course of the action is remarkable.
3. D.R.E. will comment in greater detail when C. In C. H.F’s full report is
received by him.

P S ???les
DIRECTOR OF RADIO EQUIPMENT
28TH February 1944

{Handwritten}

The description in para. 1.8 of the hit aft, followed by the reduction in indicated speed from 29 to
22 knots is interesting. Had it not been for this lucky hit the SCHARNHORST could very probably
have got away.

2. The Captain’s broadcast to the effect that he expected to get clear away was previously reported
as having been made before the ship had been hit by any torpedoes – a much more probable
statement.

?? Salter [?]
for DTSS [?]
10.iii.44

Noted.
2. Detailed comment on the technical aspects of this engagement cannot be made
until the results of the full interrogation of prisoners are available but the
following remarks are considered justified by the information in the enclosure.
3. The action was fought almost entirely at ranges below 20,000 yards. There
was therefore a small chance of the 3¼” armour dech of SCHARNHORST being
defeated.
The combination of range and inclination was favourable to the 13” lower
belt until the closing stages of the action.
D.G.D’s remarks in paras. 4 – 7 are concurred in.
4. Re paras. 1.8 and 1.10 of enclosure, C.in C’s report (M.01881/44) makes it
clear that there was an appreciable reduction in speed prior to the first torpedo
attack, presumably the result of DUKE OF YORK’s gun-fire. C.in C. assessed the
number of hits in the first torpedo attack as four and this is stated to have
“almost stopped” SCHARNHORST.

18
5. The remarks as to watertight subdivision are not considered reliable from
what is known of SCHARNHORST’s construction (N.I.D.04443/43). It is presumed that
survivors saw little of DUKE OF YORK.
6. D.N.C. would be interested in any other results of the interrogations.
?? Shepheard [?]
DNC
12 MAR 1944

Noted.
H C Hogger [?]
for ENGINEER-IN-CHIEF.
March, 1944.

19