GENDER SENSITIVITY AND LAWS ON WOMEN AND CHILDREN

ATTY. IRMA MARI-CASTRO

LAWS PROTECTING WOMEN

GROUP 1 REPORT

Topic Reporter Page

No.
Republic Act 9262 (Anti-Violence Against Jared Mark Lagahit 3
Women and their Children Act of 2004):
Coverage and Punishable Acts

Protection Orders (BPO, TPO, PPO) Kevin Quirante 5

Jesus Garcia vs Drilon (Validity of VAWC) Keren Kezia Camalon 7

Remedies of Victims of Abuse – Pavlow vs Eurylyn Celestial 10

Mendenilla, 2017

People vs Genosa, GR No. 135981, 15 Oryza April Rendon 11

January 2004 (Decided prior to the effectivity
of RA 9262 – Re: Battered Woman Syndrome)
Go-Tan vs Tan, GR No. 1628652, 30 Jared Mark Lagahit 12
September 2008 – RA 9262 does not preclude
the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC
Dinampling vs People, on Requisites of Joemarie Gochuico 14
Psychological Violence

AAA vs BBB, 2018 (Territoriality, Continuing Kevin Quirante 15

Crime, Marital Infidelity is Psychological
Violence)
***reiterated in XXX vs People, 1 March 2023 Abigail Pia 17

Araza vs People, GR No. 247429, 8 Sheena Ecilla 18

September 2020

Acharon vs People, GR No. 224946, 9 Gerard Paul Cusi 19

November 2021 (En Banc) – Redefined the
requisites in sustaining conviction for violation of 5e
(Economic Abuse) and 5i (Psychological Abuse, if
means is the withdrawal of financial support)

Randy Michael Knuton vs Hon. Elisa Yves Dreyfus 21

Sarmiento-Flores and Rosalina Knutson, GR
No. 239215 (Abusive mothers can be
offenders under VAWC Law, fathers can file a
case on behalf of the abused children)

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Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of
2004, aims to address the violence committed against women and children in keeping with
the fundamental freedoms guaranteed under the Constitution and the Provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the convention on the Elimination of all
forms of discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC) and other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a party.

Under Section 3 of said Act, the following terms are defined:

Violence against women and their children refers to any act or series of acts committed by
any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a women with whom
the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child,
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such act, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes the following:

A. Physical violence refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm

B. Sexual violence refers to acts which is sexual in nature committed against a

woman or her child, this includes:
a. Rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her
child as sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks,
physically attacking the sexual parts of the victim’s body, forcing her/hm to
watch obscene publication or forcing the woman or her child to do indecent
acts and/or make films thereof, forcing the wife and mistress to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the abuser;
b. Acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or
other harm or coercion;
c. Prostituting the woman or child.

C. Psychological Violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause

mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes causing the victim to witness the
physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which the victim
belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or to witness injury to pets.

D. Economic abuse refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes:
a. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, business, occupation, except in cases on valid,
serious and moral grounds;
b. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to
use and enjoyment of the conjugal property;
c. Destroying household property;
d. Controlling the victims’ own money or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.

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 E. Battery refers to acts of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or child resulting
to physical and psychological distress
F. Stalking refers to an intentional act committed by a person who, knowingly and
without lawful justification follows the woman or her child or places the woman or her
child under surveillance directly or indirectly or a combination of both.

Other terms to remember are the following:

Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and
behavioral symptoms found in women living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse. Section 26 of this Act recognizes Battered Woman Syndrome as a valid
defense, noting that women suffering from such do not incur any criminal and civil liability
notwithstanding the absence of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense
under the Revised Penal Code.

Safe place or shelter refers to any home or institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Welfare and Development or by any other agency accredited by the DSWD
for the purposes of this Act.

Children refers to those below eighteen years of age or older but are incapable of taking
care of themselves as defined under Republic Act No. 7610.

Under Section 5 of the Act, the crime of violence against women and their children is
committed through the following:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or
her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child.
This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect
of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually depriving the woman or her child of custody to
her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity or controlling the victim's own mon4ey or properties, or solely
controlling the conjugal or common money, or properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for the purpose of
controlling her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child to engage in any sexual
activity which does not constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical harm, or
through intimidation directed against the woman or her child or her/his immediate
family;

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 (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or
her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to
animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the
woman or her child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and
emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children
of access to the woman's child/children.

Section 7 talks about the venue for filing, and the Regional Trial Court designated as the
Family Court shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children. In the absence of such court, the case shall be filed with the
Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the option of
the compliant.

Section 35 enumerates the rights of the victims – “In addition to their rights under existing
laws, the victims of violence against women and their children shall have the following
rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any
public legal assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the DSWD and LGUs'
(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and support as provided for under the Family Code;
and
(e) To be informed of their rights and the services available to them including their right to
apply for a protection order.

Section 44 mandates the confidential treatment of all records pertaining to cases of violence
against women and their children, including those in barangay and all public offices shall
respect the right to privacy of the victim.

Section 47 states the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code and other applicable
laws to RA 9262.

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PROTECTION ORDERS (BPO, TPO, PPO)

Nature of Protection Orders. In the Philippines, a "restraining order," in the context of

domestic relationships, usually refers to a protection order under the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act (RA 9262). This law protects women and children from
violence within an intimate or familial setting.

Kind of Protection Orders:

1. Barangay Protection Order (BPO)- refers to the protection order issued by the
Punong Barangay, or in his absence the Barangay Kagawad, ordering the
perpetrator to desist from committing acts of violence against the family or household
members particularly women and their children.

2. Temporary Protection Order (TPO)- refers to the protection order issued by the court
on the filing of the application and after ex parte determination of its need. It may
also be issued in the course of a hearing, motu proprio or upon motion.

3. Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to the protection order issued by the court
after notice and hearing.

Who may file Protection Orders?

1. The offended party;

2. Parents or guardians of the offended party;
3. Ascendants, descendants, or collateral relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity;
4. Officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of local government units
(LGUs);
5. Police officers, preferably those in charge of women and children’s desks;
6. Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
7. Lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider of the petitioner; or
8. At least two (2) concerned responsible citizens of the city or municipality where the
violence against women and their children occurred and who has personal
knowledge of the offense committed (Sec. 9, R.A. 9262)

Where to file Protection Orders?

Except for BPO, Application for a protection may be filed with the appropriate Regional Trial
Court/Family Court or Municipal Court where the petitioner resides in case of Temporary
Protection Order (TPO) and Permanent Protection Order (PPO), respectively.

Enforceability of Protection Orders:

All TPOs and PPOs issued under RA 9262 shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines
and a violation thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Php 5,000.00 to Php
50,000.00 and/or imprisonment of 6 months.,

Legal Representation of Petitioners

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 a. Public Attorney’s Office (PAO)- if the petitioner lacks economic means to hire a
counsel de parte.

b. Counsel de Parte- if the applicant can afford to hire its services, upon determination
of PAO.

Duty of Court, Re: Application for Protection Order:

Failure to act on an application for protection oder within the reglimentary period without
justifiable cause shall render the official or judge administratively liable.

BPO
refers to the protection order issued by the barangay ordering the perpetrator/ respondent to
desist from committing the following acts:
(a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
(b) threatening to cause the woman or her child physical harm (Sec. 13, IRR of R.A.
9262)

Where to file BPO?

Where to file?

In the barangay where the victim-survivor/ petitioner resides or is located (Sec. 15,
IRR of R.A. 9262)

Note: The place of residence or location of the victim-survivor/ petitioner may include the
place where the victim-survivor temporarily resides or where she sought refuge/sanctuary to
escape from and avoid continuing violence from the respondent.

1. The application for a BPO shall be in writing, signed by the victim-survivor/petitioner,

and in a language understood by her/him. It shall be attested before the Punong
Barangay who has jurisdiction over the application.

2. The Punong Barangay or Kagawad must issue the BPO on the same day of
application, immediately upon the conclusion of the ex parte proceedings (meaning:
without notice and hearing to the respondent).

3. The BPO shall state the:

a) last known address of the respondent;
b) date and time of issuance; and
c) the protective remedies prayed for by the victim-survivor/petitioner.

4. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or

Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same to the respondent, or
direct any barangay official to effect its personal service. The BPOs shall be effective
for fifteen (15) days.

Temporary Protection Order- As defined under Republic Act (RA) 9262, also known as the
Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act, victims of violence can be granted a

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protection order to shield them from more harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life,
and let them independently regain control over their life.

Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the protection order issued by the court on
the date of filing of the application after ex parte determination that such order should be
issued.

A court may grant in a TPO any, some, or all of the reliefs mentioned in RA 9262 and shall
be effective for thirty (30) days.

The court shall schedule a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the date of the
expiration of the TPO.

The court shall order the immediate personal service of the TPO on the respondent by the
court sheriff who may obtain the assistance of law enforcement agents for the service.

Permanent Protection Order (PPO) - refers to the protection order issued by the court after
notice and hearing. The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order on the basis of
the lapse of time between the act of violence and the filing of the application

If the respondent appears without counsel during hearing on the PPO, the court shall
appoint a lawyer and proceed with the hearing.

Ex parte presentation of evidence by applicant- in case failure to appear of the respondent

during hearing. Court will then render judgement on the basis of the evidence presented by
the applicant.

The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the hearing on the merits of the issuance of
a PPO in one (1) day. If unable to conduct in 1 day and the TPO is due to expire, the court
shall continously extend or renew the TPO for a period of 30 days at each particular time
until final judgment is issued.

Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the respondent, the Court must determine
whether ot not the PPO shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO shall be granted as
long as there is no clear showing that the act form which the order might arise did not exist.

Jesus Garcia vs. Drilon, GR No. 179267

Petitioner: Jesus C. Garcia (Husband of Rosalie Jaype-Garcia)

Private respondent: Rosalie Jaype-Garcia and in behalf her minor children:

Facts: Rosalie is married to Garcia and they have 3 children. Rosalie filed a petition before
the RTC for the issuance of a TPO (Temporary Protection Order) against Garcia, pursuant
to RA 9262, claiming that she was a victim of physical abuse. Rosalie described Garcia as
dominant, controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. Garcia
had an affair with another woman.

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The RTC found a reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against
Rosalie and her children. The RTC issued TPO effect for 30 days.

Garcia filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO and allow
him to visit his children. Rosalie, on the other hand, claimed although Garcia deprived them
of financial support, failed to faithfully comply with the TPO, and committed new acts of
harassment against her and their children. She then filed another application for TPO.

The RTC issued a TPO, effective for 30 days, this was extended for another 10 days, and
gave petitioner another 5 days to show case why the TPO should not be renewed,
extended, or modified. Garcia no longer submitted the required document. Garcia filed
before the CA a petition for prohibition. With prayer for injunction and TRO, challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due process and the equal protection
clauses. The CA dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional
issue in his pleadings before the RTC, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same.
Hence, this petition.

Issues:
1. W/N Ra 9262 violates the guaranty of equal protection of laws, hence,
unconstitutional.
2. W/N RA 9262 is violative of the due process clause, hence, unconstitutional.

Held:
1. No. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of laws. Equal
protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The equal protection of the
laws clause of the Constitution allows classification.

Requirements for a valid classification:

1. The classification should be based on substantial distinctions
2. It must be germane to the purpose of the law.
3. It must not be limited to existing conditions only
4. It must apply equally to each member of the class.

I. SUBSTANTIAL DISTINCTIONS:

A. The unequal power relationship between women and men:

History and societal norms reveal that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
women. The family patriarch was accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control.

B. Women are the usual and more likely than men to be victims of violence
“There may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to
the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace to the health of the community.”

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C. Gender bias and prejudice against women.
Senator Loi Estrada (Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723): Whenever violence
occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the latter is
hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This lack of response
or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence.”

As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused on
women does not discriminate against men.

II. THE CLASSIFICATION IS GERMANE TO THE PURPOSE OF LAW

RA 9262, SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that the State values the
dignity of women and children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its members particularly women and children,
from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.

III. THE CLASSIFICATION IS NOT LIMITED TO EXISTING CONDITIONS ONLY

The application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of
women and their children are threatened by violence and abuse.

IV. THE CLASSIFICATION APPLIES EQUALLY TO ALL MEMBERS.

R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse.
Section 3 defines VAWC as:
Any act or a series of acts which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, committed by any person
against a woman who is his:
 wife
 former wife,
 against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
 with whom he has a common child,
 against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode.

The Supreme Court have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest.
As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral
word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships.

RA 9262 IS NOT VIOLATIVE OF THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

The court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing
when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

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The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
process. It should be recalled Garcia after the TPO was extended, he chose not to file the
required comment arguing that it would just be an "exercise in futility”. Having failed to do
so, petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law.

Pavlow v. Mendenilla, G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017

Maria Sheila filed a criminal complaint before the prosecutor against her husband, Pavlow,
for slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The charges, however, were dismissed by the
prosecutor for failure to substantiate allegations. Mendenilla, Maria Sheila’s mother, applied
for a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) under the Anti-VAWC Law before the RTC in favor
of the latter who is allegedly being physically abused by Pavlow. The Court granted the TPO
in favor of Maria Sheila and summons were sent to Pavlow. Pavlow was out of the country
at the time of the service of the summons, thus, substituted service of summons through his
employee, Tolentino, was made by the sheriff.

a. Can Mendenilla apply for the TPO?

Yes, Mendenilla can apply for the TPO. The mother of a victim of acts of violence against
women and their children is expressly given personality to file a petition for the issuance of a
protection order by Section 9(b) of the Anti-VAWC Law. However, the right of a mother and
of other persons mentioned in Section 9 to file such a petition is suspended when the victim
has filed a petition for herself. Nevertheless, in this case, respondent Mendenilla filed her
petition after her daughter's complaint-affidavit had already been dismissed.

b. Will Maria Sheila’s prior filing of a criminal complaint with the prosecutor preclude
Mendenilla’s subsequent application of a protection order?

No. The 2nd paragraph of Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC reads: The filing of a petition
for protection order by the offended party suspends the right of all other authorized parties
to file similar petitions. A petition filed by the offended party after the filing of a similar
petition by an authorized party shall not be dismissed but shall be consolidated with the
petition filed earlier.
The word used by Section 8 is "suspend." To suspend is to momentarily, temporarily, or
provisionally hold in abeyance. It is not to perpetually negate, absolutely cancel, or
otherwise obliterate. The right of persons other than the victim to file a petition for the
issuance of a protection order therefore persists; albeit, they may not exercise such right for
as long as the petition filed by the victim subsists.

Mendenilla's petition for the issuance of a protection order was filed after the prosecutor had
already dismissed Maria Sheila's complaint under the Anti-VAWC Law. Thus, even if Maria
Sheila's Complaint came with a petition for the issuance of a protection order and even as
Section 8 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC stipulates the suspension of other people's right to file
petitions for the issuance of a protection order, this suspension is rendered inefficacious by
the remission of Maria Sheila's prior petition. Stated otherwise, there was no longer a prior
petition to compel a suspension.

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c. Were summons properly served upon Pavlow?

Yes. Section 1 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly states that while it governs petitions for
the issuance of protection orders under the Anti-VAWC Law, "the Rules of Court shall apply
suppletorily." In the silence of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, service of summons – the means
established by the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure for informing defendants and/or
respondents of the filing of adverse actions, and for the acquisition of jurisdiction over their
persons – remains efficacious.

Petitioner, though an American citizen, was admittedly a resident of the Philippines when
the sheriff attempted to personally serve summons on him. On the date of service, however,
he was not in the Philippines. It was this circumstance which, according to the Sheriff's
Report, impelled substituted service of summons through Pavlow’s employee.

Rule 14, Section 7 of the Rules of Court stipulates that substituted service may be resorted
to "if, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be personally served within a reasonable
time."
The exigencies of this case reveal a backdrop of justifiable causes and how, by the
convenience of Pavlow's temporary absence, immediate personal service was rendered
impossible. These exigencies justified substituted service of summons upon Pavlow during
his temporary absence through Tolentino, a person of suitable age and discretion, who also
resided at petitioner's own residence. Jurisdiction over the petitioner's person was then
validly acquired, and the dismissal of Mendenilla's petition on this score was correctly held
by the trial judge to be unwarranted.

PEOPLE V. GENOSA
GR NO. 135981

FACTS:
Marivic Genosa, was married to the victim Ben Genosa. At the first stage of their marriage
Marivic and Ben lived happily together however after some time, the couple would quarrel
often and their fights would become violent. Ben, a habitual drinker, treated Marvic violently
to the point that he would slap her, pin her down on the bed or beat her. These incidents
would happen often, when it does, Marivoc would run to her parents. She tried to leave her
husband but the latter would always ask for reconciliation.
Consequently, Marivic Genosa, the appellant, on November 15, 1995, attacked and
wounded his husband which ultimately led to his death. According to the appellant, she did
not provoke her husband when she got home that night and it was her husband who began
the provocation. The appellant said she was frightened that her husband would hurt her and
she wanted to make sure she would deliver her baby safely.
The appellant testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband at least
five times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would reconcile. The appellant
said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive towards her that night was because
he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, Lulu Rubillos. The appellant, after being
interviewed by specialist, has been shown to be suffering from Battered Woman Syndrome.
The appellant with a plea of self-defense admitted the killing of her husband. She was found
guilty of the crime of parricide, with the aggravating circumstance of treachery, for the
husband was attacked while asleep.

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ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not appellant can validly invoke the Battered Woman Syndrome as
constituting self-defense;
2.) Whether or not treachery attended the killing.

RULING:
1. For the first issue, the SC held that the defense failed to establish all the elements of
self-defense arising from battered woman syndrome, to wit: (a) Each of the phases of the
cycle of violence must be proven to have characterized at least two battering episodes
between the appellant and her intimated partner; (b) The final acute battering episode
preceding the killing of the batterer must have produced in the battered person’s mind an
actual fear of an imminent harm from her batterer and an honest belief that she needed to
use force in order to save her life, and;

(c) At the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable not
necessarily immediate and actual – grave harm to the accused based on the
history of violence perpetuated by the former against the latter.
2. The Court ruled that when a killing is preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance, because the deceased may be said to
have been forewarned and to have anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in
order to appreciate alevosia, the method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have
been consciously and deliberately chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the
unlawful act without risk from any defense that might be put up by the party attacked. Here,
there is no showing that appellant intentionally chose a specific means of successfully
attacking her husband without any risk to herself from any retaliatory act that he might
make. It appears that the thought of using the gun occurred to her only at about the same
moment when she decided to kill her batterer-spouse. Thus, in the absence of any
convincing proof that she consciously and deliberately employed the method by which she
committed the crime in order to ensure its execution, the Court resolved the doubt in her
favor.

Go-Tan vs Tan, GR No. 135981, 15 January 2004

FACTS:
On 18 April 1999, petitioner Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan and respondent Steven L. Tan were
married.

On 12 January 2005, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Protective Order against Steven and her parents-in-law, spouses Perfecto C. Tan and
Juanita L. Tan before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents,
were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5
of Republic Act No. 9262.

On 25 January 2005, the RTC issued an Order granting the petitioner’s prayer for TPO.

On 7 January 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance
of Permanent Protect Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition contending that the

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RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since parents-in-law of the petitioner are not
covered by RA No. 9262.

On 28 February 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition arguing that respondents

were covered by RA No. 9262 under the liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting
the protection and safety of victims of violence.

On 7 March 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case on the ground that
parents-in-law were not covered as respondents under RA 9262.
On 16 March 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that
the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of
substantial justice and due process.

On 8 April 2005, respondents filed their Comment arguing that petitioner’s liberal
construction unduly broadened the provisions of RA 9262 since the relationship between
the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of RA
9262.

On 11 July 2005, RTC issued a Resolution dying petitioner’s Verified Motion for
Reconsideration, reasoning that to include respondents under coverage of RA 9262 would
be a strained interpretation of the law.

Petitioner contends that RA 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of
Section 47 of RA 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised
Penal Code and the provision on Conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletority
applied to RA 9262.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Article 8 of the Revised Penal Court can be applied suppletorily applied to
RA 9262.

RULING:
The Court ruled in favor of the petitioner. Under Section 47 of RA 9262 expressly provides
for the suppletory application of the RPC.

Article 10 of the RPC provides that this Code (the RPC) shall be supplementary to such
laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary.

Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in supplementary
capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as RA 9262, in which the special law
is silent on a particular matter.

Section 5 of RA 9262 provides that crimes of violence against women and their children is
committed through any of the following acts:
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another,
that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child;

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(3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child
against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of
the woman or her child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;

Section 4 of RA 9262 calls for the liberal construction of the law to promote the protection
and safety of victims of violence against women and their children.

Thus, contrary to the RTC’s pronouncement, the maxim “expression unios est exclusion
alterius” (the expression of one thing excludes the other) finds no application here. Said
maxim is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction.

G.R. No. 19952 June 22, 2015

RICKY DINAMPLANG vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

NATURE OF THE CASE:

The accused caused psychological violence against his pregnant wife who by repeated
verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad and insulting utterances directed
against the victim and a feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger and the other
incident, during her pregnancy by boxing the victim on the head, kicking her at the back and
removing her pants and panty thereby resulted to a miscarriage on the part of the victim.
The accused denied the charges against him and assailed the CA’s decision in disregarding
the supposedly exculpatory nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony. Allegedly,
the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was unsure if the abortion was a result of the
mauling that the victim suffered or could have been caused by an infection or other factors.
The Court resolved to deny the claim of the accused for lack of merit. Hence, the accused
was convicted for violation of Section 5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No.
9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004

FACTS:
Dinamplang, the petitioner, was charged of two criminal information for violating RA 9262 for
inflicting psychological violence upon AAA whom he had an on-going relationship for five
years with two common children. Dinamplang evicted AAA including their children in their
home, accusing her of using the place as whore house wherein she “brought her partners”.
Another incident of physical abuse happened after several days where Dinamplang shouted
and punched AAA at her left ear, which subsequently bled and caused her miscarriage.
Dinamplang visited AAA but showed no remorse over his acts. Dinamplang pleaded not
guilty to both charges. RTC found Dinamplang guilty of both charges. The Court of Appeals
affirmed with modification on the penalty due to the application of Indeterminate Sentence
Law. Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is guilty of violation of RA No. 9262

RULING:

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Yes. There is no reason to doubt the veracity and truthfulness of the victim’s evidence. In
particular, AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which gave rise to the charges
was clear, categorical and straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence. The elements
have been proven and duly established. It is undisputed that the victim is a woman, in a
five-year ongoing relationship with Dinamplang and had two common children. Neither the
physical injuries suffered by the victim nor the actual physical violence done by the
perpetrator are necessary to prove the essential elements of the crime as defined in Section
5(i) of RA 9262. In this instance, the physical violence was means of causing mental or
emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it led to actual bodily injury, the physical
violence translates to psychological violence since its main effect was on the victim's mental
or emotional well-being. For his crime, pregnancy of AAA is one of aggravating
circumstances which increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be alleged and proven
with competent evidence for the penalty to be properly imposed.

AAA,Petitioner, V. BBB, Respondent

G.R. No. 212448. January 11, 2018

Applicable Doctrine/ Principle: Continuing Offense in relation to RA 9262; Psychological

Violence vs. Marital Infidelity

Facts:

AAA and BBB married in 2006, with two children born during their union. While BBB worked
as a chef in Singapore, his official address remained in Quezon City, where AAA and the
children lived until 2010 when they moved to Pasig City. AAA alleged that BBB provided
minimal financial support, leading her to work extra hours. She accused him of
mistreatment, abandonment, and violent acts, culminating in a 2011 altercation in a
Singapore hotel.

BBB faced charges for causing AAA mental anguish, but he evaded arrest despite a
warrant. The case was archived due to jurisdictional issues in Singapore. In 2013, a motion
to revive the case was granted, asserting lack of jurisdiction.

AAA's motion for reconsideration was denied, prompting a direct appeal to the Supreme
Court. She argued that emotional anguish is integral to the offense, impacting her
anywhere, not just in Singapore. BBB claimed the motion to quash equated to an acquittal,
only civil aspects could be appealed, and the petition was belated and should involve the
Office of the Solicitor General.

Issue: WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC HAS JURISDICTION OVER PSYCHOLOGICAL

ABUSE UNDER R.A. 9262 WHEN COMMITTED THROUGH MARITAL INFIDELITY AND
THE ALLEGED LILLICIT RELATIONSHIP TOOK PLACE OUTSIDE THE PHILIPPINES

Ruling:

First, the Supreme Court define the following terms:

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SECTION 3. Psychological violence refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to cause
mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
abuse and marital infidelity.

Psychological violence is an element of violation of Section 5(i) just like the mental or
emotional anguish caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the means employed by
the perpetrator, while mental or emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish psychological violence as an element of the
crime, it is necessary to show proof of commission of any of the acts enumerated in Section
5 or similar such acts. And to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary to
present the testimony of the victim as such experiences are personal to this party.

Marital infidelity as cited in the law is only one of the various acts by which psychological
violence may be committed.

Contrary to the interpretation of the RTC, what R.A. No. 9262 criminalizes is not the marital
infidelity per se but the psychological violence causing mental or emotional suffering on the
wife. Otherwise stated, it is the violence inflicted under the said circumstances that the law
seeks to outlaw.

In the issue whether RTC has jurisdiction over psychological abuse under r.a. 9262 when
committed through marital infidelity and the alleged lillicit relationship took place outside the
philippines, the Supreme Court ruled:

In criminal cases, venue is jurisdictional. Thus, in Treñas v. People,the Court explained that:

The place where the crime was committed determines not only the venue of the action but
is an essential element of jurisdiction. It is a fundamental rule that for jurisdiction to be
acquired by courts in criminal cases, the offense should have been committed or any one of
its essential ingredients should have taken place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court.

What may be gleaned from Section 7 of R.A. No. 9262 is that the law contemplates that
acts of violence against women and their children may manifest as transitory or continuing
crimes; meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime's essential and material acts have been
committed maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was in
part committed.

It is necessary, for Philippine courts to have jurisdiction when the abusive conduct or act of
violence under Section 5(i) of R.A. No. 9262 in relation to Section 3(a), Paragraph (C) was
committed outside Philippine territory, that the victim be a resident of the place where the
complaint is filed in view of the anguish suffered being a material element of the offense. In
the present scenario, the offended wife and children of respondent husband are residents of

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Pasig City since March of 2010. Hence, the RTC of Pasig City may exercise jurisdiction over
the case.

XXX VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR. NO 250219, MARCH 1, 2023

Facts of the Case:

Petitioner was charged with violating the VAWC Law for depriving AAA and her minor child,
BBB, of financial support and abandoning them totally , causing psychological and
emotional anguish.

According to the prosecution, Petitioner and AAA were married in 2006 and out of their
union , a daughter was born. However, due to financial difficulties , AAA decided to look for
a job abroad to help sustain their family. AAA left for Singapore in 2008

In May 2015, AAA learned that petitioner was in a romantic relationship with another
woman, CCC, AAA also discovered that CCC was pregnant with petitioner’s child.

Upon learning that petitioner and CCC has started to cohabit, AAA sought to help and
assistance of the Department of Social Welfare and Development in getting her daughter,
BBB from her mother-in-law.

Contrary to AAA’s accusations, XXX argues that it was he who had custody and who
primarily took care of their child since AAA left the country and work in Singapore.

Petitioner initially denied knowing CCC, but subsequently clarified that they went to the
same secondary school, but had not seen CCC in a long time. When asked in he was
providing support to BBB, he replied that since October 2015 when the child was taken from
him, he stopped giving support because AAA does not allow BBB to be near him nor show
her to him.

Both the RTC and CA found XXX guilty of inflicting psychological violence against AAA and
BBB through emotional and psychological abandonment..

Issue:
Whether petitioner XXX is guilty of violating the Section 5 (i) of the VAWC Law.

Ruling:
YES.
The elements of a violation of Section 5(I) of RA 9262 otherwise known as the VAWC Law
are as follows:

1. The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children.

2. The woman is either the wife or former wife the offender; or a woman with
whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or is a woman
with whom such offender has a common child. As for the woman’s child or
children, they may be legitimate or illegitimate within or without the family
abode;

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 3. The offender causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish;
and
4. The anguish is caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated
verbal and emotional abuse, denial of financial support or custody of minor
children or access to the children or similar to such acts or omissions.

JAIME ARAZA y JARUPAY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 247429, 08 September 2020, FIRST DIVISION

FACTS:

AAA and Jaime Araza were married in 1989. She had no marital issues with Araza until he
went to Zamboanga City for their networking business. One day, she received a text
message that her husband is having an affair with their best friend. After confirming such
fact, she instituted a complaint for Concubinage. The case was subsequently amicably
settled after Araza and his mistress committed themselves never to see each other again.

Thereafter, Araza again lived with AAA. However, Araza left AAA without saying a word. An
investigation revealed that Araza left to live with his mistress. As a matter of fact, three
children were born out of their cohabitation. The truth caused AAA emotional and
psychological suffering. At present, she is taking anti-depressant and sleeping pills to cope.

These events led to the filing of an Information against Araza for violation of Section 5 (i) of
Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
Both the RTC and the CA found Araza guilty of violating Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262.

ISSUE:
Did Araza commit psychological violence upon his wife AAA by committing marital infidelity.

HELD:
Yes. Psychological violence is an indispensable element of violation of Section 5 (i) of R.A.
No. 9262. Equally essential is the element of emotional anguish and mental suffering, which
are personal to the complainant. Psychological violence is the means employed by the
perpetrator, while emotional anguish or mental suffering are the effects caused to or the
damage sustained by the offended party.

The law does not require proof that the victim became psychologically ill due to the
psychological violence done by her abuser. Rather, the law only requires emotional anguish
and mental suffering to be proven. To establish emotional anguish or mental suffering,
jurisprudence only requires that the testimony of the victim to be presented in court, as such
experiences are personal to this party.

Marital infidelity, which is a form of psychological violence, is the proximate cause of AAP’s
emotional anguish and mental suffering, to the point that even her health condition was
adversely affected.

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The prosecution was able to prove the case of AAA. While Araza denied that he committed
marital infidelity against AAA, he would later on admit that that he left his wife AAA to live
with his mistress, and that he was fully aware that AAA suffered emotionally and
psychologically because of his decision.

- PETITION DENIED
Jaime Araza was sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months and one
(1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum; ordered to pay a fine of P100,000.00 and moral damages of
P25,000.0 and directed to undergo a mandatory psychological counselling or psychiatric
treatment.

G.R. No. 224946. November 09, 2021

Christian Pantonial ACHARON, Petitioner
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents

FACTS

AAA and Christian have been sweethearts for six (6) years before they got married.Only six
(6) days after their wedding, Christian left to work at Pizza Hut, Brunei as delivery rider.
As placement fee, they borrowed the amount of P85,000.00 with 3% monthly interest from
their godmother, Emelina So. She and Christian agreed that the latter would send money in
the amount of Php9,633.00 per month in payment of their loan. Christian was able to send
money in the total amount of Php71,500.00, leaving a balance of 13,500.00 before ceasing
to send any further. AAA felt so embarrassed to So and pleaded her not to file a complaint
to the barangay.

While in Brunei, Christian maintained a paramour in the person of Melete Domalaon.The

womanizing activity of Christian extremely hurt her feelings and caused her depression.
This drove AAA to file a case against Christian with the RTC of Valenzuela City
RTC Ruled that Christian is Guilty beyond reasonable doubt. On appeal, Court of appeals
affirms the conviction stating that the refusal to give financial support constitutes violence
against women under Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262 and Christian's failure to provide financial
support constitutes economic abuse.

ISSUE

Whether CA erred in finding Christian guilty of causing psychological or emotional anguish

when he failed to: (1) financially support AAA; (2) keep the communication lines open with
the latter.

RULING:

YES, C.A. erred.

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As to the issue with the failure to keep the communication lines open, It was not alleged in
the information. The Constitution mandates that the accused must be informed of the nature
and cause of accusation against him.

As to the issue whether Christian is indeed guilty of violating R.A. 9262 by denying financial
support to AAA, the Supreme Court held “Mere failure or an inability to provide financial
support is not punishable by R.A. 9262”
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
…
…
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman's child/children.
The SC held that the elements to prove a violation of Section 5(i) include: (1) The offended
party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2) The woman is either the wife or former
wife of the offender, or is a woman with whom the offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such offender has a common child; (3) The offender
causes on the woman and/or child mental or emotional anguish; and (4) The anguish is
caused through acts of public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or access to the children or similar
such acts or omissions.

To be convicted under Section 5(i), the evidence must establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused intended to cause the victim mental or emotional anguish, or public ridicule
or humiliation through the denial of - not the mere failure or inability to provide - financial
support, which thereby resulted into psychological violence.

As the prosecution failed to establish the willful refusal to provide financial support, then
Christian cannot be held guilty of violating Section 5(i) of R.A. 9262.

As for SECTION 5(e): Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage
in conduct which the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct
which the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or
restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of
force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed
against the woman or child. This shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support;

The elements include: (1) The offended party is a woman and/or her child or children; (2)
The woman is either the wife or former wife of the offender,…; (3) The offender either (a)
deprived or (b) threatened to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or (c) deliberately provided the woman's children insufficient financial
support; (4) The offender committed any or all of the acts under the third element for the
purpose of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct.

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The Court holds that Christian is also not guilty of violating Section 5(e) of R.A. 9262 due to
the absence of the third and fourth elements. There is no proof that he deliberately refused
to give support in order to control the behavior or actions of AAA.

In order to be liable under the penal provisions of R.A. 9262, therefore, it is necessary to
allege and prove the existence of the facts that qualify the act of denial or deprivation of
financial support from one in which mere civil liability may arise to one where a person may
be criminally liable.

The Petition was Granted. Christian Acharon was ACQUITTED.

Randy Michael Knutson

vs
Hon. Elisa Sarmiento-Flores and Rosalina Knutson,
[ G.R. No. 239215. July 12, 2022]

Case Synopsis
May a FATHER apply for custody and protection orders against a MOTHER who allegedly
committed violence against their own child /children?
Whether Abusive mothers can be offenders under VAWC Law

Petitioner:
• Randy Michael Knutson –Rosalina’s Spouse, Rhuby’s Father
• Rhuby Sibal Knutson- daughter of Spouses Knutson

Private respondent:
• Rosalina Sibal Knutson- mother of Rhuby, spouse of Randy

Facts

In 2005, Randy Michael Knutson (Randy), met Rosalina Sibal Knutson (Rosalina) in
Singapore. They got married and had a daughter named Rhuby Sibal Knutson (Rhuby).
In 2011, the family lived in the Philippines. However, Randy and Rosalina became
estranged after he discovered her extra-marital affairs. Anyhow, Randy supported Rosalina
and Rhuby.
Rosalina became addicted to casinos, leaving Rhuby under the care of strangers and
incurring large debts from casino financiers. She sold their family's house, lot, and vehicles,
rented an apartment, and got a boyfriend. Randy advised her to be discreet in her illicit
affairs to protect Rhuby.

Later, Randy discovered that Rosalina maltreated her own mother in Rhuby's presence.
Rosalina also hurt Rhuby by pulling her hair, slapping her face and knocking her head.
One time, Rosalina pointed a knife at Rhuby and threatened to kill her. Rosalina even texted
Randy about her plan to kill Rhuby and commit suicide.

Randy reported the matter to the police station but the authorities explained that they cannot
assist him in domestic issues.

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Later, Rosalina sent Randy naked pictures, threatening that he won’t see her body again.
Neighbors complained about noisy parties and pot sessions, leading to lease termination
after marijuana plants were confiscated.

Randy, on behalf of minor Rhuby, filed against Rosalina a petition under RA No. 9262 for
the issuance of a TPO and PPO before the RTC Taguig Branch 69.

Randy averred that Rosalina placed Rhuby in a harmful environment deleterious to her
physical, emotional, moral, and psychological development.

The RTC dismissed the petition explaining that protection and custody orders in RA No.
9262 cannot be issued against a mother who allegedly abused her own child.
The RTC ratiocinated that the child's mother cannot be considered as an offender under the
law. Moreover, the remedies are not available to the father because he is not a "woman
victim of violence."

The RTC cited the ruling in Ocampo v. Arcaya-Chua (Ocampo) that a protection order
cannot be issued in favor of a husband against his wife.

“Notably, the offender under [RA No.] 9262 is any person who is the husband, former
husband, those who had sexual or dating relationship with the woman or with whom she
has a common child. On the other hand, the offended party may be the wife, former wife, a
woman who has or had sexual or dating relationship, or with whom the man has a common
child or HER child.”

Moreover, a protection order is defined under Section 8 of [RA No.] 9262, to quote:
"SECTION 8. Protection Orders. — A protection order is an order issued under this act for
the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against a woman or her child specified in
Section 5 of this Act and granting other necessary relief. The relief granted under a
protection order should serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from further harm,
minimizing any disruption in the victim's daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability
of the victim to independently regain control over her life.

"SECTION 28. Custody of children. — The woman victim of violence shall he entitled to the
custody and support of her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old [or] older but
with mental or physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother, with right to
support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise.["]

Randy moved for a reconsideration and argued that RA No. 9262 used the term "any
person" which is not limited to male offenders. The law must be liberally construed to
promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children

The RTC denied the motion and clarified that RA No. 9262 does not apply to cases where a
mother committed violence against her child. They argued that the term "children" should
not be isolated from "women" as the law uses conjunctions.

As such, the children being protected refer to those under the care of the woman victim of
violence.

Page 22 of 24
It is thus clear that the foregoing provision does not apply to a situation where it was the
mother herself who had committed violent and abusive acts against her own child.
Obviously, the victim being referred to in said definition is the woman subjected to acts of
violence by her offender. As it is, children being protected under [RA No.] 9262 refer to the
biological children and other children under the care of the woman/victim. Thus, the court
maintains its position that a child's mother is not included as one of the offenders under [RA
No.] 9262.

Issue

May a FATHER apply for custody and protection orders against a MOTHER who allegedly
committed violence against their own child /children?
Whether abusive mothers can be offenders under VAWC Law?

Ruling

Yes, RA No. 9262 allows the father of the offended party to apply for protection and custody
orders.

In Garcia v. Drilon the Court pointed out that the Congress excluded men as victims under
RA No. 9262. The legislative intent is to limit the protection against violence to women and
children only. The classification rests on substantial distinctions because women and
children are vulnerable victims of abuse compared to men.

Section 9 (b) of RA No. 9262 explicitly allows "parents or guardians of the offended party" to
file a petition for protection orders.

The statute categorically used the word "parents" which pertains to the father and the
mother of the woman or child victim. Absolute Sentencia Expositore Non Indiget. The law
speaks in clear language and no explanation is required.

There is no occasion for the Court to interpret but only to apply the law when it is not
ambiguous. Similarly, the statute did not qualify on who between the parents of the victim
may apply for protection orders.

Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus.

When the law does not distinguish, the courts must not distinguish.

Randy filed a petition on behalf of their minor daughter Rhuby, seeking protection and
temporary custody. The RTC did not evaluate whether the mother could be divested of
custody over the child, and ignored evidence that the father is not a victim of violence and
cannot apply for protection and custody orders. The petition is primarily for the child's
protection.

Differently stated, the fact that a social legislation affords special protection to a particular
sector does not automatically suggest that its members are excluded from violating such
law. This is not the first time that social legislations in the Philippines with penal character
used the phrase "any person" to describe who may be offenders.

Page 23 of 24
Logically, a mother who maltreated her child resulting in physical, sexual, or psychological
violence defined and penalized under RA No. 9262 is not absolved from criminal liability
notwithstanding that the measure is intended to protect both women and their children.

In this case, however, the RTC dismissed Randy's petition for protection orders on behalf of
his minor daughter on the ground that the mother cannot be considered as an offender
under the law. To restate, the policy of RA No. 9262 is to guarantee full respect for human
rights.

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