People of the Philippines v.
XXX
G.R. No. 22578, November 26, 2020
Ponente: Hernando, J.
Digested by: Maica Carmel Shirl O. Dizon
Topic: Rape; Criminal Law.
Facts:
An appeal challenging the CA Decision affirming in toto the Joint decision of the RTC
which found XXX guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape. The victim,
AAA, later executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay ng Pag-uurong ng Habla. AAA narrated
that she was molested by XXX, the live-in-partner of her mother BBB. The 2 nd time, BBB
caught XXX on top of AAA, then AAA revealed to her mother that he also sexually
molested her the previous month.
The RTC acquitted XXX of the charge of attempted Rape but convicted him of one
count of Rape.
The CA pointed out that recantation of testimonies are frowned upon by the court as
they are generally unreliable in character.
Issue:
Whether or not the prosecution has proven the guilt of XXX beyond reasonable doubt
for the crime of Rape.
Ruling:
Yes, XXX is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape.
The gravamen of crime of Rape is carnal knowledge of a woman against her will. The
following elements must be proven beyond reasonable doubt for the conviction of the
accused in the crime of Rape:
(1) The accused had carnal knowledge of the victim;
(2) The act was accomplished: (a) through the use of force or intimidation; (b) when
the victim deprived of reason or otherwise; or (c) when the victim is twelve (12)
years or is demented.
The foregoing elements are all present.
The victim testified that XXX had sexual intercourse with her, against her will, while
pointing a bladed weapon at her neck. The victim’s detailed and straightforward
testimony was likewise corroborated by the medical findings.
It is settled in the rule that while medical examination of the victim is not indispensable
in the prosecution of a rape case and no law required a medical examination conducted
and the medical certificate issued are veritable corroborative pieces of evidence, which
strongly bolster the victim’s testimony.
As a rule, courts view unfavorably affidavits of desistance or a recantation of a victim’s
testimony, especially in rape cases, since they can easily be obtained for monetary
consideration through intimidation.
Here, five years had passed from the time she testified against him to the time she
recanted her testimony. This long passage of time renders suspend her execution of the
affidavit. Thus, the prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt, that indeed
accused-appellant is guilty of the crime of Rape. The designation of the crime
committed by accused-appellant, however, must be corrected.
XXX is liable for one count of Rape under Art. 266 Par. 1(a) of the RPC. Article 266-B of
the RPC provides that “whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.”
In view of XXX’s use of bladed weapon in the commission of the crime, he should suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua under Article 266-B of the RPC since such use of the
bladed weapon was alleged in the Information and sufficiently proven during trial.
The CA and trial court correctly disregarded the qualifying circumstance of XXX’s
relationship to the victim as her mother’s live-in partner since this circumstance was not
alleged in the Information, although it was proven during trial.
The rule is that in order for an accused to be convicted of qualified rape, the information
must allege that the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of rape, and
that the accused is the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, or relative by
consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or common-law spouse of the
victim’s parent.
The appeal is dismissed.
John Paul Kiener v. Atty. Ricardo Amores
A.C. No. 9417, November 18, 2020
Ponente: Hernando, J.
Digested by: Maica Carmel Shirl O. Dizon
Topic: Notarial Practice; Jurat; Legal Ethics
Facts:
John Paul was the accused in a criminal case pending before the Municipal Trial Court.
Atty. Amores was the private prosecutor on behalf of the private complainant. He was
also a commissioned notary public at that time. Irene, the corporate secretary of the
private complainant, executed a Secretary’s Certificate which was notarized by Atty.
Amores.
John Paul claims that the Secretary’s Certificate was defective and improperly
notarized. He alleges that Atty. Amores failed to indicate the serial number of his
notarial commission and that Irene’s signature appears to have been printed or scanned
into the document. He asserts that because of the use of a printed signature, Irene
could not have been physically present before Atty. Amores when the document was
signed and notarized. Atty. Amores claims that it is a common practice for the signatory
to sign only one copy and to reproduce the originally signed copy to the desired number
of copies before notarization.
The Investigating Commissioner recommended the revocation of Atty. Amores’s
appointment as Notary Public and his disqualification for a period of two years. He
found that Atty. Amores failed to ascertain the genuineness of Irene’s signature when
he notarized the document and that there was no evidence to show that Irene was
physically present. However, the IBP-Board of Governors reversed and set aside the
Investigating Commissioner’s report and recommendation in which dismiss the
administrative case.
Issue:
Whether or not Atty. Amores is administratively liable for violating the Rules on Notarial
Practice when he notarized a document without the presence of the signatory and failed
to indicate his commission number in the notarial certificate.
Ruling:
Yes, Atty. Amores should be held administratively liable.
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless routinary act, but one invested with
substantive public interest. It converts a private document into a public document,
making it admissible in evidence without further proof of its authenticity. It is for this
reason that a notary public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the
performance of his notarial duties; otherwise, the public’s confidence in the integrity of a
notarized document would be undermined.
Atty. Amores performed a jurat when he notarized the Secretary’s Certificate with Irene
signing as the Corporate Secretary. A Jurat refers to an act in which an individual on a
single occasion: (1) Appears in person before the notary public and presents an
instrument or document; (2) Is a personally known to the notary public or identified by
the notary public through competence evidence of identify as defined by these Rules;
(3) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and 4) takes an oath
or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document. The Rules
prohibit the notary public from performing a notarial act if the signatory is not in his/her
presence at the time of the notarization.
Atty. Amores failed to observe the requirement of physical presence when he notarized
the Secretary’s Certificate. Atty. Amores did not present any proof that Irene was indeed
physically in his presence upon the signing and notarization of the document. Thus, Atty
Amores violated the Rules on Notarial Practice.
He also failed to adhere to Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which
requires every lawyer to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote
respect for the law and legal processes, and Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code, which
prohibits a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest immoral and deceitful
conduct.
Atty. Amores is guilty of violation the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
Pascual Purisima, Jr. et al. v. Macaria Purisima et al.,
G.R. No. 200484, November 18, 2020
Ponente: Hernando, J.
Digested by: Maica Carmel Shirl O. Dizon
Topic: Statue of Frauds; Sales; Reconveyance; Torrens Title; Civil Law
Facts:
On November 8, 1999, herein respondents filed a complaint for reconveyance,
cancellation and quieting of title against their late brother's heirs, Purisima, Jr.,
Leonardo Purisima, Eufrata Purisima and Estelita Daguio, herein petitioners.
Respondents alleged that their brother, Pascual Purisima Sr., owned Lot located in
Cagumitan, Tuao, Cagayan.
However, sometime in 1960, Pascual Sr. sold portions of the aforesaid property to
respondents to answer for his medical bills. At the time of the sale, the whole land was
not yet titled but it was surveyed for a patent application under Purisima Sr.'s name by
the Land Management Bureau. Banking on mutual trust, the survey as well as the sale
was not recorded by the parties. Since the 1960s and prior to the death of Purisima Sr.,
respondents had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the apportioned
properties. They had been paying realty taxes thereon and had their own tenants tilling
their respective portions of land.
On September 19, 1978, petitioners, as heirs of Pascual Sr., executed an Extrajudicial
Settlement of Estate of Deceased, Pascual Purisima and Sale over the unregistered
property of their father which included the sale of the properties apportioned to the
respondents.
On December 16, 1991 Purisima Jr. was granted a Free Patent under the name of
"Heirs of Pascual Sr." The free patent covered the whole of lot, including the portions
that were already sold to the respondents. The Free Patent was later on registered with
the Registry of Deeds of Tuao, Cagayan and Original Certificate of Title was issued in
favor of the "Heirs of Pascual Purisima Sr. rep. by Pascual Purisima Jr."
Respondents filed a case before the RTC to remove the cloud on their title over the
apportioned lots and for their ownership to be not disturbed. The petitioners countered
that there was no sale that transpired at any given time. The amounts given by the
respondents were due to the fact that their father was sick. Admittedly, while they all
signed the Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased, Pascual Purisima, Sr. and
Sale, they did not understand its import and were convinced by the respondents, their
aunts, that the document was merely an evidence of their indebtedness. They did not
appear before a notary public in the execution thereof nor were they given a copy of the
said document.
The RTC dismissed the complaint of respondents and ruled that even if there were a
sale that transpired, it was not enforceable since it was not embodied in a written
document.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and ruled that reconveyance was proper. The CA
held that the 1978 Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased, Pascual Purisima, Sr.
and
Sale confirmed that the apportioned properties were sold to the respondents and the
signatures of the petitioners therein clearly signified their conformity to the sale. Also,
the Statute of Frauds, which requires a written instrument for the enforceability of
certain contracts, applies only to executory contracts, not to consummated contracts.
Issue:
Whether or not the 1960 oral sale was already fully consummated as evidence by the
1978 Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Sale.
Ruling:
Yes, the 1960 oral sale was already fully consummated as evidence by the 1978
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate and Sale.
The SC held that the CA was correct in not applying the Statute of Frauds in the case at
bar. The Statute of Frauds affects merely the enforceability of the contract.
In the early case of Iñigo v. Estate of Adriana Maloto, this Court elucidated on when the
Statute of Frauds vis-a-vis a contract of sale would be inapplicable:
By Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, a verbal contract for the sale of real property is
unenforceable, unless ratified. For such contract offends the Statute of Frauds. But long
accepted and well settled is the rule that the Statute of Frauds is applicable only to
executory contracts - not to contracts either totally or partially performed. It matters not
that neither the receipt for the consideration nor the sale itself was in writing. Because
"oral evidence of the alleged consummated sale of the land" is not forbidden by the
Statute of Frauds and may not be excluded in court.
The 1960 oral sale was already fully consummated as evidenced by the 1978
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of Deceased, Pascual Purisima, & and Sale which
was undisputed and acknowledged by the petitioners themselves, and as established
by the pieces of evidence presented by the respondents such as the testimonies of their
tenants and other documentary evidence. There can be no escaping the fact that the
sale between the respondents and Purisima Sr. was consummated and that the Statute
of Frauds has no application in the case. Verily, a contract of sale, whether oral or
written, is classified as a consensual contract, which means that the sale is perfected by
mere consent and no particular form is required for its validity. The 1960 oral sale thus
stands and all its consequences under the law are thus binding to the parties and their
successors-in interest.
Pursuant to Article 1458 of the Civil Code which defines a contract of sale, the transfer
of the properties to respondents arising from the 1960 sale by Purisima Sr. of the
apportioned properties effectively vested ownership to the respondents from that time.
Inasmuch as there was no dispute as to the fact that the apportioned properties were in
the possession of the respondents, the CA correctly ordered its reconveyance to the
respondents, notwithstanding the subsequent issuance of the OCT in favor of the
petitioners. While the certificate of title in favor of defendants-appellees is indefeasible,
unassailable, and binding against the whole world, including government itself, it does
not create or vest title. It merely confirms or records the title already existing and vested.
It cannot be used to protect a usurper from the true owner, nor can it be used as shield
for the commission of fraud; neither does it permit one to enrich himself at the expense
of others.
The prescriptive period for the reconveyance of registered property is ten years,
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. However, the ten-year
prescriptive period for an action for reconveyance is not applicable where the
complainant is in possession of the land to be reconveyed and the registered owner
was never in possession of the disputed property. In such a case, the action for
reconveyance filed by the complainant who is in possession of the disputed property
would be an action to quiet title which is imprescriptible.
Hence, the petition for review on certiorari filed by petitioners is denied, and the CA
decision granting the action for reconveyance in favor of respondents is affirmed.
Manila Electric Company. v. AAA Cryogenics Philippines, Inc.,
G.R. No. 20742, November 18, 2020
Ponente: Hernando, J.
Digested by: Maica Carmel Shirl O. Dizon
Topic: Damages; Attorney’s Fees; Civil Law
Facts:
A Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the rulings of the CA which affirmed the
Joint Decision of the RTC in an action for injunction and damages by AAA, and a
complaint for collection of sum of money by MERALCO.
AAA’s Plant Supervisor reported the fluctuations and interruptions in the electrical
power supplied by MERALCO. As a result, AAA suffered losses in the amount of P21
million. MERALCO could not remedy the situation, except to advise AAA to install power
conditioning equipment. AAA stopped paying its electrical bills until its total
accountabilities reached P13.6 million. Thus, MERALCO disconnected and terminated
its service contract with AAA.
AAA filed an action for Injunction and Damages against Meralco seeking to collect the
amount of P21 million representing its losses due to power fluctuations and
interruptions. On the other hand, Meralco filed an action against AAA for Collection of
Sum of Money to collect the sum of P13.6 million representing the latter's unpaid
electric bill. The two cases were consolidated since they arose from a single contract
and the same set of facts.
The RTC found Meralco liable for actual damages arising from its failure to deliver
constant energy supply to AAA. It relied on the Log Sheet Readings of AAA's computers
and Meralco's expert witness Cañita, who affirmed the capability of AAA's computers to
accurately record the power fluctuations and interruptions. The RTC also held AAA
liable for its unpaid electricity bills amounting to P10.45M. It further ordered the parties'
respective liabilities to be offset.
The CA affirmed the RTC. Meralco appealed to the SC.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not the power fluctuations and interruptions occurred and were
caused by MERALCO.
(2) Whether or not MERALCO is liable for exemplary damages.
(3) Whether or not MERALCO is entitled to attorney’s fees.
Ruling:
(1) Yes, the power fluctuations and interruptions occurred and were caused by
MERALCO.
The occurrence of the power fluctuations and interruptions is well-supported by
evidence. Despite the occurrence of the power fluctuations and interruptions in
the electricity delivered by Meralco, however, AAA was unable to prove with a
reasonable degree of certainty the amount of actual damages it suffered. To
establish the amount of actual damages it suffered, AAA offered in evidence two
documents: (1) Summary of Production Losses due to Fluctuation; and (2)
Comparative Presentation of Production under Normal Power Supply, Production
when there is Power Fluctuation.
However, the basis and source of these documents were never presented in
court, and neither were they testified to by any witness of AAA. Therefore, AAA
cannot be allowed to recover the amount of P21M without running afoul of the
well-established doctrine that the amount of actual damages must be proved with
a reasonable degree of certainty. The calculation of temperate damages is
usually left to the sound discretion of the courts. We observe the limit that in
giving recompense, the amount must be reasonable, bearing in mind that the
same should be more than nominal, but less than compensatory.
The Court finds three-fourths of AAA's claim, or P15.8 million, to be in order.
(2) Yes, the power fluctuations and interruptions occurred and were caused by
MERALCO. The same was properly awarded by the CA.
The records show that despite MERALCO’s repeated assurance of better electric
supply, and despite knowledge of the serious production losses by AAA due to
the power fluctuations and interruptions, it still failed to provide any remedy, in
wanton disregard of its contractual obligation energy "at reasonably constant
potential and frequency”. Further, a public utility vested with vital public interest,
Meralco should be reminded of its "obligation to discharge its functions with
utmost care and diligence.”
(3) No, MERALCO is not entitled to attorney’s fees.
The award of attorney’s fees in an exception rather than the general rule. This,
there must be compelling legal reason to bring the case within the exceptions
provided under Article 2208 of the Civil Code to justify the award. Further, there
is no compelling reason is present in the case.
