CHAPTER FOUR
PROFESSIONAL I
PHILOSOPHY
The trend, negativeto ethno-philosophy,.. isthe
professional
It is a critical, sometimes technical approach. Most of approach
it
African philosophy should not be confused with urges that
African
ethnography. Philosophy it 1s contended, is an argument, not areligion or
recitator
of myths and tabo0s.
ETHNOPHILOSOPHY AND PROFESSIONAL
4.1
PHILOSOPHY
nthe preceedingchapter, an analysis of views ofsome of
those
scholars who argued thatthere exist African
philosophy was
made. However, in the current debate the existence
and
-nature ofAfricanphilosophy, these scholars are referred to
ethnophilosophers. This is because what they qualify as
African
philosophy, is strictly speaking, not philosophy. The methodoloy
they use resembles that kind which is ordinarily used in cultura
anthropology (ethnology)in order to get to the underlying and basic
principles of reality and behaviour of theAfrican, which they then
describe in philosophical language. The end-product is therefore a
conjunction of the ethnological method and philosophical language.
hence in short ethno-philosophy. As Paulin Hountondji puts it, they
are "ethnological works with philosophical pretensions, or »2
more
simply, ifImay coin theword, a work of ethnophilosophy.
At thisjuncture, a cautionary remark ought to be made. Those
scholars and thinkers who are termed as being ethnophilosophers
are so referred to essentially because of their stand regarding the
nature of African philosophy. It has nothing todo with their mentl
Horton,
and rational capabilities. Hence Placide Tempels, Robin
Alexis Kagamé, John Mbiti, amongstothers, are ethnophilosophers
the subject of African
for the simple reason that they approach
philosophy from an ethnological angle. It does not mean nor even
thoughts are any less
imply that their thinking capacities and
are thinkers of higa
philosophical. Indeed, some ethnophilosophers
philosophical calibre.
African
Philosophy
The ethnophilosophers use
the term
sense and hence 'philosophy in the
ideological "whatevercomes out from
can be their views
as 'pphilosophy' philosophy only inthe
term. Today therefore, some philosophers; 'debased' sense ofthe
argue forthe extinction,in usage of the
word
they claim,it has outlived its time... and 'ethnophilosophy'because
is simply a
schemes of conduct and schemes constitution ofboth
of thought
(not a
The philosophy).
scholars who areagainst the
ethnophilosophical
mainly professionally trained approach to
African philosophy, are
and they assert that African philosophers
philosophy should be seen
arafessional and academic angle. It should be from the
he engrained with individual and should
argument and criticiSm since at
"philosophy as a theoretical any rate
discipline is devoted to
complicated argument. detailed and
Peter Bodunrin summarises
it as follows:
Philosophy is a conscious
creation. One cannot be
philosophy in the said to have a
strict sense of the word
reflected on one's beliefs. until one has consciously
Some notable
representative of the
African philosophy professional approach
are Kwasi Wiredu,
Oruka, and Peter Paulin Hountondji, H. Odera
Bodunrin. Though they
concur that African
philosophy should be critical,
discursive, and independent,
hold interesting (and they
sometimes incompatible) views
question boils down toits when the
exactnature.
It isuseful to
mention that representatives of
approach are often referred the professional
to as professional
just as in the caseof philosophers. This,
ethnophilosophers, has nothing to do
individual rational with their
capacities. It does not mean
that they are more
philosophical than the
hold the position ethnophilosophers. It simply means
that whatever thatthey
the African philosophy is,it
critena of professional must satisty
critical philosophy, that is, it must
2 independent
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY:
REALITY
reflection."
involve
MYTH AND
In his
pioneering book in professional
African African
philosophy,
from Philosophy:
Benin, Paulin
Myth and Reality, the
illustrious philosopher
Hountondji's "assessment of ethnophilosophy is
Professional Philosophy 75
much nmore severe and uncompromising in itsapproach. Indeed, in
ts comprehensiveness this assessment amounts,in fact, to what one
might call a 'critigue of ethnophilosophical reason', caught at the
very roots of its conceptual foundation"
Pauln doesnot bother himself with the question of
Hountondji
whether Afican philosophy exists or not, that is, he does not ask
whether itisa myth or reality. He grants its existence, that is, that it
is a reality. However, at the same time, Hountondji's efforts are
channclled towards explaining why Some scholars
(ethnophilosophers) conceived African philosophy:
as an urnthinking.spontaneous,collective system of thought, common to
allAfricans or at least to all members severally, past, present and future,
of such-and-such an African ethnic group.
In other words, besides Hountondji's concern for explaining what
he at
Affican philosophy is, (that is, in the strict theoretical sense),
the same time attempts to account for why African philosophy is
this having the
paraded merely as a collectivethought system, with
strict sense), but
implication that it does not exist in reality (in the
that this is so because words
that it is a myth. Hountondji explains
as they pass from the
change their meanings miraculously as soon to the word
Western to the African context. This is what happens
to designate
"philosophy" when it is applied to Africa. It is supposed
evokes in its Western context but
no longer the specific discipline it spontaneous,perhaps
merely a collective world-view, an implicit,
to which all Africans are
even unconscious system of beliefs
supposed to adhere.
double standards: the term
This means that there are
it
is equivocal. When it is prefixed with 'African'
"philosophy" prefixed with "Western'.
means something different from when it is it means that African
This is an undesirable state of affairs,
for
philosophy, with the
philosophy is distinct from Western
not critical thinkers. To Hountondji
implication that Africans are
exists African philosophy even
that is a false proposition. There 10
when the word is used in the 'Western terminology'.
critics of
Hountondji has been one of most uncompromising
out that Tempels' work was
He points
Tempels' Bantu Philosophy. the
not addressed to Africans but to Europeans, particularly
76 African Philosophy
colonials and the missionaries. In thisrespect the seventh and last
chapter bears an eloquent title: "Bantu philosophy and our mission
to civilise". Africans are portrayed as objects to be analysed and
understood, they are not to be involved in the discourse:
a
Africans are,...excluded from the discussion, and Bantu philosophy is
Europeans. The black man
mere pretext for learned disquisitions among
a topIc, a
Continues to be the very opposite of an interlocutor: he remains
VoIceless face under private investigation, an object to be defined and not
the subjectof a possible discourse.
were
Tempels' African successors, such as Kagamé and Mbiti,
address
also prisoners of the same mentality. They 'chose' to
themselves primarily to a European public. The African
It has not
ethnophilosopher's discourse is not intended for Africans.
if their
been produced for their benefit. “So it is no surprise, then, »12
literature,... is much better known outside
than inside Africa."
Hountondji then proceeds on to argue that the usage
of the
ideological and vulgar sense of philosophy
should be destroyed.
With this done, the destruction of African philosophy as a myth will
inevitably follow. Therefrom the discourse on African
philosophy
should exclusively remain theoretical. Secondly, African
philosophers must reorient their discourse.
They must write firstand
foremost for an African public, no longer a non-African
public.
With this there would be no need to write about Luba ontology,
Dogon metaphysics etc., simply because such themes do
not interest
Western craving
their countrymen but were aimed at satisfying the
for exoticism.
to be widely informed
As for the African public, what it wants most is
about what is going on elsewhere, about current scientific problems
in
the first place, but also
other countries and continents,out of curiosity in
in order to confront those problems with its
own preoccupations, to
steep them in the
reformulate them freely in its own
13
terms and thusto
melting-potof African science.
of
What has been explicated so far constitute essential features
Hountondji's description of African philosophy. In its exact
according to Hountondji is a
definitive form,African philosophy
set of texts, specifically the set
of texts written by Africans and
by their authors themselves.
"l4 This
as philosophical
described beelow is as famous as itis controversial.
will be shown
definition as
has three basic features, and these
The definition are:
of texts. Second,
Afican philosophy consists that thefirst,that
the texts
Third, that the are (be) texts
written by Aficans. are
philosophicalby the authors themselves. described as
Thesethree features will beanalysed
the first. Hountondji underscored
to be African philosophy, it must be
for
written.
For,
Hountondji, writing is a pre-requisite for philosophy in
.
the fact that for a beginning
thought or with
view
according to
general and
hence Afican philosophy in particular.
may be,
About this s
controversial and strange as it Hoountondji does feature,
his words and in this regard he will be quoted at length. Heasserts
that:
There may.have been African philosophers without
without an
is strìctly African
philosophy, although the converse,.. impossible.
Thousands of
Socrateses could have never given birth to Greek philosophy,
So thousands however
talented they might have been in dialectics. of
without written works could never have given birth to philosophers
an Afican
philosophy. Socrates was able to enterthe theoretical history of Greece
because his disciples or fellow citizens took the time and trouble tow
down his thoughts, to discuss, sometime to criticize and often to distor
them. Similarly,we Africans can probably today recover philosophical
fragments from our oral litrature, but we must bear in mind that so far 2:
authentic philosophy goes, everything begins at the precise moment of
transcription,when the memory can rid itselfof cumbersome knowledre
now entrusted to papyrus and so free itself for the critical activity which
is thebeginning ofphilosophy, in the only acceptable sense of the word 1s
This Hountondjian view, to say the least, places too much value
on literacy in as far as the definition and conceptualisation of
philosophy goes. It is undoubtedly true that literacy plays an
important and indeed a focal role in the development and
propagation of philosophy, but it is certainly not a necessary
requirement. For athought or view to qualify as philosophy, it is not
necessary that it be put in black and white. In other words, it is not
part ofthe definition ofphilosophy that a thought be written. Today,
for example, we are able to read and philosophise over Plato's
philosophy, thanks to the art of writing. However, the crucial point
is that even ifPlato's thoughts hadnot been put down in writing, this
would nothave made his thoughts non-philosophical or any less
philosophical. Though of course, proving that Plato
philosopher (in that his thoughts were philosophical) would be
78 African
Philosophy
under the circumstances, But then that
difficult altogether, a problemn of proof would be another
problem but not of
of philosophy. The only nccessary
requirement and necessary condition
critical,
evaluative coherent thought
becngaged in by is that
period! Hountondji's individual
thinkers: over-cmphasis on writing
for philosophy is therefore not as a
condition very appropriate.
condition for Writing
proving the existence
is a sufficient of a philosophy,
is definitely not a necessary
condition.
but it
Wiredu in
his paper “African
Kwasi Philosophical
a similar
view. He postulates that
similar Tradition"
expresses African traditional
spite of belonging tot the oral tradition is
thought in philosophical
and as a result
andlogically acute ..conceptual absurdities in the
Critigue of Pure Keason...would be promptly laughed outof court
among any group of abstraction inclined Akan clders 16
heless, Wiredu observes that the
lack of writing is a definite
bandicap in the preservation and enhancement of a philosonhical
»17
tradition
Two other professional African philosophers, Peter O.Bodunrin
andH. Odera Oruka, both concur with the view that
writing is not a
preconditionfor philosophy, though the latter thinks thatthe former
waters down this point. Bodunrin asserts that:
Writing helps us to pin ideas down and to crystallise them in our minds. It
makes the ideas of one day available for later use. It is by its means that
the thoughts of one age are made available to succeeding
generations
with least distortion... Surely, writing is not aprereqisite for
philosophy
but I do doubt whether philosophy can progress
adequately without
writing. Had others not written down the sayings of Socrates,the pre
socratics and Buddha, we would not regard them as philosophers for
their thoughts would have been lost in themythological world of
proverbs and pithy sayings."(Emphasis ours)
Odera Oruka on his part argues
that;
To existasa philosopher it is not necessary that one's thought must
progress or be available to the future generation. Sufficient for the
CXIstence of a philosopher, is thatone's contemporaries recognise one s
philosophical ability and practice. How many of the contcmporary
African
philosophers will have theirideas known beyond their death?
Many of us shall
have our works buried unrecognised within the mvad
of the
many kinds of literature that are being produced in the ticld Yet
the fact
would not in itself deny the pont that authors of such orks
Professional Philosophy
79
existed as philosophers. Lack of
knowledge about one's or a peoples's
philosophy isnot aproof of the
non-existence of such a philosophy."
Hountondji should be told (or is it
reminded?), that he is
recognised as an African of great intellectual
ability and acumen,
not so much because he has put
down his thoughts on paper, but
essentially because his thoughts are
recognised as such. The fact that
he has written someofhis thoughts is
incidental to the philosophical
aspects ofhis thought.
Hountondji's second feature cf the definition of African
philosophy, is that the texts be writt en
by Africans. By this
Hountondji means that African philosophy rust be defined
in terms
of the geographical origins of the authors, and not the contents of
what they write. In this regard he asserts that:
The Africanness of our philosophy will not necessarily reside in its
themes but willdepend above all on the geographical origin of those who
produce it and their intellectual coming together. The best European
Africanistsremain Europeans, even (and above all) if they inventa Bantu
philosophy', whereas the African philosophers who think in terms of
Plato or Marx and confidently take over the theoretical heritage of
Western philosophy, assimilating and transcending it, are producing
authenticAfrican work.0
And at, a later page heargues thatAfrican philosophy inchudes all
the researches into Western philosophy carried out by Africans.
This broadening of the horizon implies no contradiction: just as the
writings of Western anthropologistson African societies belong to
Western literature, so the philosophicalwritings of Africans on he
history of Western thought are an integral part of African philosophical
literature. So, obviously, African philosophical works concerning
should also
problems that are not specially related to African experience
be included. In this sense, the articles by the Ghanaian J.E. Wiredu on
of are an integral
Kant, on material implication and the concept truth,
of the concept of freedom
part ofAfrican philosophy, as are the analyses
or the notion of free will by the Kenyan Henry Odera
or the Nigerian
D.E. ldoniboye.
On this issue both Hountondji and Bodunrin share the same
just like Hountondji, argues that African
score. Bodunrin,
philosophy is,
the area of logic,
...the philosophy done by Africans whether it be in
the works be set
metaphysics or history of philosophy.It is desirable that
they be so.
some African context; but it is not necessary
that
in
African Philosophy
80
Tempels'
The Hountondjian and Bodunrinian position excludes
belonging to African philosophy,
Bantu Philosophy as a work to
precisely because Tempels
was not an African. Hountondji refers
of African philosophy. Iher
the work as a notorious forerunner born
include the works ofthe Ashanti
position would however
scholar Anton-Wilhelm Amo. Amo largely grew
up, studied and
the firsthalf of the eighteenth
taught in German universities during
related to the
century. The fact that Amo's works are not specifically
African experience would not be relevant.
Someprofessional African philosophers do not find Hountondji's
View palatable. They do notsee any rational basis as to why African
philosophy should be restricted to the Africans, The Malawian
scholar N.D. Kaphagawani, for example, contends that:
The works of some non-African philosophers working or who worked at
some point in time, in Africa should... qualify as Afican professional
philosophy. For example, Francis Gillies (1980) and Gordon Hunnings
(1972, i9i5),*
Kaphagawani's response to Hountondji has some merit. There
cannot be any solid justification to the position that African
philosophy is or can be a product of indigenous Africans only.
foreigner who has lived in Africa for quite some time,
A
may
some interest in problems that arise from his or her develop African
experience and milieu, and consequently may
write a philosophical
treatise which can rightly be termed
African.
From what has been stated
immediately above, the analyses of
Julius Nyerere's thoughts
by D.A. Masolo (SomeAspects
Philosophy Today) and by G. A. ofAfrican
Bennaars (TheEducation of Man)
are both works in
African philosophy.
simplistic togrant thatMasolo's work would be erroneously
It
but disqualify belongs to African philosophy
Bennaars', on the grounds
African descent, whereas that Bennaars is
Masolo is. On the same not of
obnoxious to un-African note it would be
Barry Hallen's numerous
philosophy on the basis of works in African
his ancestry. Still
should be noted that with the same breath,
Tempels' Bantu it
strong anthropological Philosophy, were it not
undercurrent, for its
African philosophy. The would pass as a
fact that work in
immediately relevant tothe Tempels was a
question of whether Belgian is not
African philosophy or not. In his work
other words, belongs to
the fact that
Tenmpels was
Professional Philosophy
81
a Belgian is not what
should
disqualify his
disqualification should be work,the
given to Odera looked for elsewhere.
Oruka's cautionary yardstick for
remark that: Credit
can
We have no good nowbe
ground to think that
unique to the Africans. African
Neitherr is
West. African Western philosophy needs
philosophy should be to be
sense in which it philosophy
defined in a unique to
does not mean
of a philosophy of this that only Africans simple sense,i.e.,the
kind26 are and in a
can be capable
Up to this juncture
raises aproblem Hountondji's
on the "African" definition ofAfrican Philosonhy
philosophy". The dimension of the term
a philosophical problem could be phrased as 'Arican
piece ofwork follows: Whatmakes
African?
(1)Is itthefact
that the author
subject matter? Or: is an African,
irespective ofthe
(2) Is itthat
the subject
(orissue) within'or matter must
address itself to a
immediately problem
irespective of whether relevant to Africa,
the author is an African
According to or not?
Hountondji, it is the
However, one should fact that the author
notethat is African.
serve very Hountondji's
an African appropriately in defining an response would only
philosophy. It isthe African philosopher, but not
disjunctive affirmative answer to the second
question above
that would
philosophy. According serve well in defining African
to the
disjunctive (affirmative)
question, African answer of the seco
Africans, and
similarly philosophy is not
not a peculiarity of
West. An Western
African philosophy is 1S not a
monopoly of the
philosophy (asthey philosopher could be an
commonly are)and, expert in Western
expert
Western and, at the
atthe other end lof the scale,
in Africanphilosopher could
these pair ofphilosophy. There meaningfully and pproductively engage
is about
are combinations. Hencenothing mutually exchusive
African Kwasi Wiredu and Odera Oruka
Free philosophers but
Will", their articles
Western respectively, are on "Immanuel Kant"and
and Barryphilosophy. scholarly Cxercises of finesse in
Hallen,for Similarly,
are Francis Gillies, Gordon Hunnings
well-grounded in example, are non-African who
African philosophers
Hountondji's third philosophy.
philosophy, feature
82 African Philosophy
authors themsclves, is
enigmatic, mystical and prima facie
arroneous, and can beshown to contradict
some ofhis views. In the
inst chapter of his book,
African Philosophy: Myth and Reality,
Hountondji spends a great dealof
time and intellectual cnergy trying
10 showand prove that Tempels'
and Alexis Kagamé's works do not
belong to Afncan philosophy
precisely because they are not
nhilosophical." The intellectual force
and rigorous analysis by
Hountondji in showing the
non-philosophical nature of Tempels'
and Kagamé's works impliesthat he
such. Another individual could very
(Hountondji) believes that a
work isnot simply philosophical because the
author describes it
well act as a referee in
:
determining whether some author's work is
philosophical or not. As
far as the works of Tempcls and
Kagamé areconcerned, Hountondji
assigns himself this role. This is an inconsistency in
Hountondji's
thesis.As an example,according to Hountondji:
..Kagamé's work is so exceptionally interesting precisely because of
his extraordinary knowledge of the traditions, language and oral
literature of Rwanda. But the point is that this
literature - at least as it is
presented by Kagamé - is not philosophical.""
Thishas an implication that, as far as Hountondji is concerned,
Kagamé's work is nota text in African philosophy because it is not
philosophical, regardless of whether Kagamé describes it as being
so or not. Infact, in his book Hountondji enunciates what he thinks
are the universal characteristics of philosophy. Kagamé's work,
according to Hountondji, does not qualify as African philosophy
because it does not meet these requirements. It is therefore not clear
what Hountondji intended by emphasising on this feature of his
definition.
However, to be intellectually honest and morally fair to
worth noting that in the latter chapters of
Hountondji,it is his book,
he interestingly modifies his view regarding the question of the
definition of African philosophy. He dropsthe third feature of the
definition and describes African philosophy ..n
a new sense, as a
literature produced by Africans and dealing with philosophical
problems".310 He asks the question of whether philosophy resides in
the world-view described or in the description itself. His answer is
tnat it must be that it resides in the latter, the description of that
"even if this is, in fact, a self-deluding invention that hides
Professional Philosophy 83
behind its own products, l With this view Hountondji restores
ethnophilosophy and sees its literature as philosophical literature,
With this new definition, Hountondji now asserts that "Kagamés
work is an integral part of African philosophical
literature... but a
work like Bantu Philosophy does not belong to
African philosophy,
Since its author is not African,"2
However, despite the problems involved, Hountondji'sdefinition
of Afican philosophy entails a cardinal element of absolute
conviction: that African philosophy is (or should be) critical and
individual. For anypiece of literatureto pass as
philosophy in the
strict (theoretical) sense, it must involve
rigorous, sustained and
independent thought.
4.3 PHILOSOPHY AND AN AFRICAN CULTURE
In his book Philosophy and an African Culture, the
prolific
Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu, just like his
counterpart
Paulin Hountondji, stresses the distinction between African
philosophy as folk thought preserved in oral tradition on one hand,
and African philosophy as critical, individual reflection, using
modern logical and conceptual techniques on the other. Hefurther
emphasises the importance of not using the term “African
philosophy" only in the first sense, i.e., only as traditional folk
thought. This according to him, was the mistake of the
ethnophilosophers. However, Wiredu's critique of ethnophilosophy,
unlike Hountondji's, is sympathetic. He does not reject the use of
African philoscphy as folk thought preserved in orál tradition, he
believes that some aspects of it are good and should be translated
into contemporary African experience.
At the outset of his book, Wiredu argues that traditionalAfrican
culture and hence traditional African
philosophy is intuitive,
essentially unanalytic, and unscientific. Léopold $. Senghor an
acclaimed poet essayist, philosopher and political activist is well
known to have asserted the same position and has been criticised
repeatedly for pointing this out.On the bare fact of this attitude of
mind, Wiredu concurs with Senghor. Though Wiredu thinks that
Senghor tended to exaggerate the role of emotion in the thinking of
