CASE COMMENT

Case: Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 739

Citation:

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India & Anr., AIR 2003 SC 739; (2003) 2 SCC 45

Facts of the Case:

The case centres around the question of whether lawyers have the right to go on strike and the
consequences of such strikes on the administration of justice.

The case’s origins lie in the experiences of Ex-Captain Harish Uppal, a retired army officer
who faced allegations of embezzlement during his posting in Bangladesh in 1972. He was
court-martialled, arrested, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment, leading to his
dismissal from his post. Despite filing review applications in court, his case faced significant
delays and misplacement of documents due to a strike by a group of advocates.

Harish Uppal’s frustration with the strike-induced delays led him to file a writ petition in the
Supreme Court of India, asserting that strikes by lawyers were unlawful. This case raises
fundamental questions about the rights and responsibilities of lawyers, the impact of strikes
on the judicial system, and the need to strike a balance between safeguarding lawyers’
interests and ensuring the efficient functioning of the legal system.

Issues of the Case:

1. Issue of Law:
o Whether lawyers have the right to strike or boycott court proceedings.
o Whether such actions by lawyers infringe on the right of litigants to access
justice.
o
2. Issue of Fact:
o The extent and impact of lawyer strikes on the functioning of courts and the
delivery of justice.

Arguments Advanced:

1. Petitioner’s Arguments:
o Lawyers have a duty to their clients, the courts, and society to maintain the
smooth functioning of the judicial system.
o Strikes by lawyers cause unnecessary delays in the administration of justice,
infringe upon the right of litigants to a fair and speedy trial, and amount to a
violation of Article 21 (Right to Life) of the Constitution, as it denies access to
timely justice.
 oStrikes or boycotts by lawyers are not recognized under any law and have no
legal sanction. Therefore, they must be declared illegal.
2. Respondents’ Arguments (Bar Associations and Lawyers):
o Lawyers, like any other group, have the right to peaceful protest under Articles
19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of speech
and expression and the right to assemble peacefully.
o Boycotting court proceedings is a method of highlighting issues affecting
lawyers or the legal profession and should be recognized as a legitimate form
of protest.
o Strikes by lawyers do not significantly harm the functioning of the courts as
they are generally infrequent and called only in exceptional circumstances.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that lawyers do not have the right to go on strike or boycott
courts, and such actions are illegal. The Court emphasized that lawyers, as officers of the
court, have a duty towards the courts and the litigants, and must ensure the continuous
functioning of the judicial system.

The Court observed that while lawyers have the right to express their grievances and protest,
they cannot do so by disrupting the functioning of the courts. Strikes by lawyers lead to a
denial of justice to the common man, which is against public interest.

Ratio of the Case:

1. The right to strike is not a fundamental right for lawyers under the Indian
Constitution.
2. Lawyers, being officers of the court, cannot strike or boycott judicial proceedings, as
it affects the functioning of the courts and denies justice to litigants.
3. Strikes by lawyers violate the constitutional right of litigants to speedy and fair trials,
as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution.
4. Lawyers may protest in other forms, such as by representing their grievances to the
appropriate authorities, but they cannot disrupt court proceedings.

Comments on the Decision:

The decision in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India is a significant ruling aimed at
curbing the frequent disruption of court proceedings due to strikes by lawyers. The Supreme
Court rightly emphasized the duty of lawyers towards their clients and the judiciary,
affirming that they must prioritize the larger interest of justice over their personal or
professional grievances.
While the judgment restricts the right of lawyers to strike, it does not completely curtail their
freedom of expression. The Court acknowledged that lawyers have legitimate grievances but
provided alternative methods to address those concerns without boycotting court proceedings.

This judgment strikes a balance between the rights of lawyers and the fundamental rights of
litigants, ensuring that justice is not denied due to delays caused by strikes. By declaring
strikes illegal, the Court upheld the sanctity of the judicial process and reaffirmed the
judiciary’s role in providing timely justice.

Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and Anr.

INTRODUCTION

The case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and another, decided on 17th December
2002 by the Supreme Court of India, holds significant importance in the legal landscape of
India. This case revolves around the contentious issue of whether lawyers have the right to go
on strike and the impact of such strikes on the administration of justice. The case sheds light
on the delicate balance between the rights of lawyers to express their grievances and the
fundamental right of litigants to access a speedy trial.

FACTS OF THE CASE

The case centres around the question of whether lawyers have the right to go on strike and the
consequences of such strikes on the administration of justice.

The case’s origins lie in the experiences of Ex-Captain Harish Uppal, a retired army officer
who faced allegations of embezzlement during his posting in Bangladesh in 1972. He was
court-martialled, arrested, and subsequently sentenced to imprisonment, leading to his
dismissal from his post. Despite filing review applications in court, his case faced significant
delays and misplacement of documents due to a strike by a group of advocates.

Harish Uppal’s frustration with the strike-induced delays led him to file a writ petition in the
Supreme Court of India, asserting that strikes by lawyers were unlawful. This case raises
fundamental questions about the rights and responsibilities of lawyers, the impact of strikes
on the judicial system, and the need to strike a balance between safeguarding lawyers’
interests and ensuring the efficient functioning of the legal system.
ISSUES

1. Whether lawyers have a fundamental right to strike under Article 19(c) of the
Indian Constitution and if so, what are the limitations on this right?
2. Whether the strikes by lawyers are lawful or unlawful, considering their
impact on the administration of justice and the rights of clients.
3. Whether the ban imposed on strikes by lawyers is justified, and if so, what
measures should be taken to balance the interests of lawyers while
safeguarding the functioning of the legal system.
4. What constitutes “rare of rarest cases” in which lawyers may call for strikes,
as mentioned in the Supreme Court’s judgment?
5. How to ensure that the right to speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the
Indian Constitution is not violated due to frequent protests and strikes by
lawyers.

CONTENTIONS

In the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal (Petitioner) vs. Union of India and another
(Respondent), the main arguments presented by each side can be summarized as follows:

Petitioner (Harish Uppal):

1. Lawyers’ Strike as Unlawful: The Petitioner, Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal, argued

that lawyers’ strikes were unlawful and should be declared as such by the
court. He contended that strikes by lawyers disrupted the administration of
justice, delayed court proceedings, and put the interests of clients at risk. He
highlighted that the strikes by lawyers had led to the misplacement of
important documents, causing substantial delays in his legal case.
2. Lawyers’ Duty to the Court: The petitioner emphasized that lawyers held a
special position as officers of the court and had a duty to ensure the smooth
functioning of the judicial system. Strikes were seen as interfering with this
duty and compromising the integrity of the legal profession.
Respondent (Union of India and another):

1. Right to Freedom of Association: The respondents contended that the right to

strike was a fundamental corollary of the right to freedom of association, as
guaranteed by Article 19© of the Constitution. They argued that lawyers, like
any other group with common interests, should be able to come together and
demand their rights.

JUDGEMENT

The Court’s Ruling and Reasoning:

In the case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal vs. Union of India and another, the Supreme Court of
India delivered a significant ruling on the legality of strikes by lawyers. The court
unequivocally declared that lawyers do not have the right to go on strike or call for the
boycott of court proceedings, not even on a symbolic strike. The reasoning behind this ruling
was rooted in several key arguments.

Firstly, the court emphasized the unique position that lawyers hold as officers of the court.
Lawyers are considered officers of the court and have a duty to ensure the smooth
functioning of the judicial system. Strikes disrupt court proceedings, interfere with the
administration of justice, and put the interests of clients at risk. Therefore, the court found
that strikes by lawyers are incompatible with their role as officers of the court.

Secondly, the court recognized the adverse effects of lawyer strikes on the justice system.
Strikes lead to delays in the trial of cases, resulting in the pendency of cases and the violation
of the fundamental right to a speedy trial guaranteed by Article 21 of the Indian Constitution.
This disruption in the functioning of the judiciary was seen as a grave concern.

The court also highlighted the need for lawyers to express their grievances through
alternative means, such as giving press explanations, conducting TV interviews, wearing
armbands, organizing peaceful protests, or engaging with the media. These methods were
deemed acceptable forms of protest that did not interfere with the court’s operations.

In summary, the Supreme Court’s judgment in this case ruled that strikes by lawyers are
unlawful and illicit. Lawyers must ensure the proper functioning of the judicial system and
cannot resort to strikes as a means of protest. Only in the most extreme and rare
circumstances, where the integrity and functioning of the courts are at stake, may lawyers
consider alternative forms of protest. This landmark judgment aimed to balance the interests
of the legal profession with the efficient administration of justice.

LEGAL REASONING

The legal reasoning used by the Supreme Court in arriving at its decision was based on
several key principles, constitutional provisions, and precedents:

 Role of Lawyers as Officers of the Court: The court emphasized that lawyers
hold a unique position as officers of the court. This principle recognizes that
lawyers must assist the court in the dispensation of justice and ensure the
smooth functioning of the judicial system. Strikes were seen as a breach of this
duty.
 Right to a Speedy Trial: The court invoked Article 21 of the Indian
Constitution, which guarantees the right to a speedy trial. Lawyer strikes, by
causing delays in court proceedings, were found to violate this fundamental
right.
 Freedom of Association: While the Constitution grants the freedom of
association under Article 19c, the court noted that this right is not absolute and
can be subject to reasonable restrictions. The court determined that the
restriction on lawyer strikes was reasonable, considering the unique role of
lawyers as officers of the court.
  Past Precedents: The court referred to previous judgments that had upheld the
prohibition on lawyer strikes. These precedents established a legal framework
for the court’s decision.
In conclusion, the Supreme Court’s decision was grounded in the principles of upholding the
integrity of the judiciary, ensuring a speedy trial, and balancing the right to association with
the smooth functioning of the legal system. It relied on constitutional provisions and past
legal precedents to support its ruling against lawyer strikes.

IMPACT OR PRECEDENT

The case of Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal v. Union of India and another, decided on 17th December
2002, holds significant implications in legal jurisprudence. It established a crucial precedent
regarding lawyers’ rights to strike in India. The Supreme Court’s ruling in this case has a
lasting impact on future legal decisions and the legal profession in India.

The case set a precedent by firmly declaring that lawyers do not have a right to go on strike,
call for boycotts of court, or engage in any form of disruptive protest that interferes with the
functioning of the judiciary. The Court’s reasoning was based on the notion that lawyers, as
officers of the court, have a unique role and responsibility to ensure the smooth operation of
the legal system. Strikes by lawyers were seen as detrimental to the administration of justice,
leading to delays in the trial of cases and an increase in case pendency.

This precedent was established in Ex-Capt. Harish Uppal’s case has been relied upon in
subsequent legal decisions to curb the practice of lawyers going on strike. It reinforces the
idea that while lawyers have the right to express their grievances, these expressions must not
disrupt the fundamental duty of the judiciary to provide timely justice.

CONCLUSION

Key takeaways from the case include:

 Lawyers in India do not have an inherent or constitutional right to strike or

boycott court proceedings. Such actions are considered unlawful and
detrimental to the administration of justice.
 Lawyers are considered officers of the court and have a duty to ensure the
smooth functioning of the legal system, which includes appearing in court and
representing their clients without interruptions caused by strikes.
 The case highlights the importance of balancing the interests of lawyers with
the needs of the legal system. While lawyers’ grievances should be heard and
addressed, they must not compromise the right of clients to timely justice.
 The judgment underscores the significance of alternative methods for lawyers
to express their concerns, such as press releases, TV interviews, peaceful
protests outside court premises, and engaging with the media.
 In the broader legal context, this case serves as a reference point for
addressing the responsibilities and limitations of lawyers in their professional
conduct. It emphasizes the fundamental duty of the legal profession to serve
the interests of justice and the public, while also acknowledging the need to
 protect lawyers’ rights and interests through appropriate channels and
mechanisms, such as grievance redressal committees
REFERENCE(S):

1. https://www.legalserviceindia.com/
2. https://www.indiankanoon.org/
3. Advocates Strike: An Unprofessional Conduct
 Shrishti Dutta, Mani Shankar Choudhary
 Issue 3 Int’l JL Mgmt. & Human. 4, 3836, 2021
4. Advocate’s Right to Strike with the Analysis of the Case: Ex-Capt. Harish
Uppal V. Union of India
 Aditya Gupta
 Indian Journal of Integrated Research in Law 2 (1), 389-395, 2022

CASE: D SAIBAB VS BAR COUNCIL OF INDIA AIR 2003 SC 2502

Citation:

D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India & Ors., AIR 2003 SC 2502; (2003) 6 SCC 186

Facts of the Case:

 This is a case that involves a complaint with the cornerstones of professional

misconduct against an advocate D. Saibaba (Petitioner), made by his wife, Smt.
D. Anuradha (Respondent 1). It was alleged that despite being a duly enrolled
advocate, the Petitioner was running a telephone booth allotted to him in the
handicapped person's quota. However, hearing the Petitioner's response the
State Bar Council, directed the complaint to be dropped out.

 The wife, aggrieved by the said decision, filed yet another complaint making
almost identical averments. The appellant provided a detailed reply submitting
that this complaint was malicious in nature, originating from a disgruntled wife
who had even lodged a criminal complaint to harass the appellant. While
defending himself, he stated that he was a handicapped person, and under the
levying onus of family's responsibilities and stringent financial conditions he had
applied for an STD booth under the handicapped person's quota and was
allowed to him.

Issues of the Case:

1. Issue of Law:
o Whether Rule 7 of the Bar Council of India Rules, which mandates a 15-day
limitation period for challenging Bar Council elections, is valid and
reasonable.
 o Whether the BCI's decision to strike Saibaba's name off the roll of advocates
was justified.
o Whether the BCI followed the prescribed procedure in initiating and
conducting the disciplinary proceedings.
o Whether the BCI's decision was proportionate to the alleged misconduct.
2. Issue of Fact:
o Whether D. Saibaba was aware of the election results within the 15-day
limitation period, and whether he had been given a fair opportunity to file an
election petition.

Arguments Advanced:

1. Petitioner’s Arguments (D. Saibaba):

o The 15-day limitation period prescribed under Rule 7 is too short and
unreasonable, as it does not provide sufficient time for advocates to become
aware of the election results and gather relevant information to challenge the
election.
o A limitation period that starts running from the date of declaration of the
results is arbitrary, as the petitioner did not have knowledge of the results
within that time.
o The right to challenge an election is a fundamental legal right, and this rule
unfairly restricts that right.
2. Respondents’ Arguments (Bar Council of India):
o The limitation period of 15 days is necessary to ensure that election disputes
are resolved quickly and do not hamper the functioning of the Bar Council.
o Allowing a longer period for filing election petitions could result in
unnecessary delays and uncertainty in the functioning of the Bar Council.
o The rules are framed in accordance with statutory authority and should not be
interfered with unless shown to be unreasonable or unconstitutional.

Decision of the Court:

The Supreme Court held that the 15-day limitation period prescribed under Rule 7 of the
Bar Council of India Rules is valid. However, the Court also clarified that the limitation
period would begin from the date the petitioner had knowledge of the election results,
and not necessarily from the date of declaration of the results.

The Court emphasized that while limitation periods are important for ensuring prompt
resolution of disputes, they must be applied in a manner that is fair and does not unduly
restrict the rights of individuals to seek legal recourse. In this case, the Court found that
Saibaba was not aware of the election results within the stipulated 15 days and, therefore, his
petition should not have been dismissed as time-barred.

Ratio of the Case:

1. The 15-day limitation period prescribed under Rule 7 of the Bar Council of India
Rules is valid and reasonable, but it should be interpreted to begin from the date when
the petitioner becomes aware of the election results.
2. A limitation period should be applied in a manner that does not unfairly restrict an
individual’s right to challenge an election or seek legal recourse.
 3. The knowledge of the election results is crucial for determining when the limitation
period begins, and a strict interpretation starting from the date of declaration may not
be just in all cases.

Comments on the Decision:

The Supreme Court's decision in D. Saibaba v. Bar Council of India strikes a balance
between the need for prompt resolution of election disputes and the protection of an
individual’s right to seek legal remedies. By holding that the limitation period starts from the
date the petitioner gains knowledge of the results, the Court has ensured that individuals are
not unfairly penalized due to lack of timely information.

This ruling emphasizes the importance of fairness in applying procedural laws, particularly
those involving limitation periods. It acknowledges the practical difficulties that litigants may
face in obtaining information and preparing legal challenges, and it provides a safeguard to
ensure that legitimate grievances are not dismissed on technical grounds.

At the same time, the decision upholds the validity of the Bar Council of India’s rules,
recognizing the need for expeditious handling of election-related disputes to maintain the
effective functioning of the Bar Councils. The judgment strikes a reasonable balance between
procedural efficiency and substantive justice, ensuring that neither is sacrificed at the expense
of the other.
CASE: In Re Arundhati Roy
Citation:
In Re: Arundhati Roy, (2002) 3 SCC 343
FACTS:
An organisation namely, NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN filed a petition
under Article 32 of the constitution of India, being writ petition no:319 of
1994 in this court. The petitioner was a movement or andolan, whose
leaders and members were concerned about the alleged adverse
environmental impact of the construction of the SARDAR SAROVAR
RESERVOIR DAM in Gujarat and the far reaching and tragic consequences
of the displacement of hundreds of thousands of people from their
ancestral homes that would result from the submerging of vast extents of
land, to make the reservoir. During the pendency of the writ petition this
court passed various orders. By one of the orders the court permitted to
increase the height of the dam to RL85 metres which was resented to and
protest by the writ petitioners and others including the respondent herein.
Respondent Arundhati Roy, who is not a party to the writ proceedings,
published an article entitled “The Greater Common Good” which was
published in the OUTLOOK magazine and in some portion of a book
written by her. two judges of this court forming the three-judge bench felt
that the comments made by her were, prima facie, a judicial process and
institution cannot be permitted to be scandalised or subjected to
contumacious violation in such a blatant manner, as had been done by
her. The action of the respondent had caused the court much anguish and
when the court expressed its displeasure on the action of the respondent
in making distorted writings or way leaders of the petitioner, Ms Medha
Patkar and one Dharmadhikari despite giving assurance to the Court
acted in breach of the injunction, the court observed: “We are unhappy at
the way the leaders of NBA and Ms Arundhati Roy have attempted to
undermine the dignity of the Court. We expected better behaviour from
them.” Showing its magnanimity, the court declared “After giving this
matter our thoughtful consideration and keeping in view the importance
of the issue of resettlement and rehabilitation of PAFs, which we have
been monitoring for the last five years, we are not inclined to initiate
proceedings against the petitioner, its leaders, or Ms Arundhati Roy. We
are of the opinion, in the larger interest of the issues pending before us,
that we need not pursue the matter any further. We, however, hope that
what we have said above would hereafter desist from acting in a manner
which has the tendency to interfere with the due administration of justice
which violates the injunctions issued by this court from time to time.”
Respondent merely a writer without any study regarding working of
judiciary, in such circumstances respondent held guilty of criminal
contempt of Supreme Court by scandalising its authority with mala fide
intention punishable under s.12 of contempt of courts act. Constitution of
India, Art.129 and 125.
Issues:
1. Whether the given set of circumstances warrants for a condition
wherein the respondent is show caused and contempt proceedings
be initiated against her.
2. The action on the part of Arundhati Roy in relation to Narmada
Bachao Andolan also the Article written by her in various magazines
namely OUTLOOK EXPRESS where she expressed her views and
critiqued the judgement given by the honourable Supreme Court. In
addition to this she also demonstrated before Supreme Court of
India and was because of this accused for contempt proceedings.

Arguments Advanced:
 1. For the Petitioner (Contempt Accusers):
o Roy’s statements were a direct attack on the judiciary and its role
in ensuring justice.
o Her remarks had the effect of undermining public confidence in the
judiciary and interfering with the administration of justice.
o The comments fell under the ambit of "criminal contempt" as
defined by Section 2(c) of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.
2. For the Respondent (Arundhati Roy):
o Roy argued that her comments were an exercise of her right to
freedom of speech and expression, as guaranteed by Article 19(1)
(a) of the Constitution.
o She contended that criticism of the judiciary should not
automatically be construed as contempt, especially when made in
good faith and in the public interest.
o The statements were not intended to interfere with the
administration of justice but to highlight the plight of the people
affected by the dam project.

ARGUMENTS:

1. Arundhati Roy claims relief on grounds that in P.N. DUDA V. P. SHIV

SHANKAR this court had held that administration of justice and
judges are open to public criticism and public scrutiny. Judges have
their accountability to the society and their accountability must be
judged by the conscience and oath to their office i.e. to defend and
uphold the Constitution and the laws without fear and favour. Thus,
the judges must do, in the light given to them to determine, what is
right. Any criticism about the judicial system or the judges which
hampers the administration of justice or which erodes the faith in
the objective approach of the judges and brings administration of
justice to ridicule must be prevented. The contempt of court
proceedings arises out of that attempt. Judgments can be criticized.
Motives of the judges need not be attributed. It brings the
administration of justice into disrepute. Faith in the administration of
justice is one of the pillars on which democratic institution functions
and sustains. In the free market place of ideas criticism about the
judicial system or judges should be welcome so long as such
criticism does not impair or hamper the administration of justice.
This is how the courts should exercise the powers vested in term
and judges to punish a person for an alleged contempt by taking
notice of the contempt Suo motu or at the behest of the litigant or a
lawyer. In the case the speech of the Law Minister in a seminar
organised by the Bar Council and the offending portions therein
were held not contemptuous and punishable under the act. In a
democracy judges and courts alike are, therefore, subject to
criticism and if reasonable argument or criticism in respectful
language and tempered with moderation is offered against any
 judicial act as contrary to law or public good, no court would treat
criticism as a contempt of court.”
2. The respondent has not claimed to be possessing any special
knowledge of law and the working of the institution of judiciary. She
has only claimed to be a writer of repute. She has submitted that
“as an ordinary citizen I cannot and could not have expected to
make a distinction between the Registry and the court.” It is also
not denied that the respondent was directly or indirectly associated
with the NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN and was, therefore,
interested in the result of the litigation. She has not claimed to have
made any study regarding the working of this court or judiciary in
the country and claims to have made the offending imputations in
her proclaimed right of freedom of speech and expressions as a
writer. The benefit to which Mr.P. Shiv Shankar, under the
circumstances, was held entitled is, therefore not available to the
respondent in the present proceedings.
3. The Constitution of India has guaranteed freedom of speech and
expression to every citizen as a fundamental right. While
guaranteeing such freedom, it has also provided under Article 129
that the Supreme Court shall be a court of record and shall have all
the powers of such a court including the power to punish for
contempt of itself. similar power has been conferred on the High
Courts of the States under Article 215. Under the Constitution, there
is no separate guarantee of the freedom of the press and it is the
same freedom of expression, which is conferred on all citizens under
Article 19(1). Any expression of opinion would, therefore, be not
immune from the liability for exceeding the limits, either under the
law of defamation or contempt of court or the other constitutional
limitations under article 19(2). If a citizen, therefore, in the garb of
exercising right of free expression under Article 19(1), tries to
scandalise the court or undermines the dignity of the court, then the
court would be entitled to exercise power under Article 129 or
Article 215. In relation to a pending proceeding before the court,
while showing cause to the notices issued, when is stated that the
court displays a disturbing willingness to issue notice on an absurd,
despicable, entirely unsubstantiated petition, it amounts to a
destructive attack on the reputation and the credibility of the
institution and it undermines the public confidence in the judiciary
as a whole and by no stretch of imagination, can be held to be a fair
criticism of the court’s proceedings. When a scurrilous attack is
made in relation to a pending proceeding and the notice states that
the issuance of notice to show cause was intended to silence
criticism and muzzle dissent, to harass and intimidate those who
disagree with it, is a direct attack on the institution itself, rather
than the conduct of an individual judge.

DECISION OF THE COURT:

 While convicting the respondent for the contempt of the Court, she is
sentenced to simple imprisonment for one day and to pay a fine of Rs.2000.
In case of default in the payment of fine, the respondent shall undergo simple
imprisonment of three months.

Ratio Decidendi (Legal Reasoning):

 The court emphasized that while the right to freedom of speech and expression is
fundamental, it is subject to reasonable restrictions, including contempt of court.
 The court held that the judiciary should be open to criticism, but such criticism should
be fair and not intended to undermine the integrity or authority of the court.
 It was also noted that Roy's remarks went beyond fair criticism and amounted to a
scurrilous attack on the judiciary, which warranted punishment to maintain public
confidence in the justice system.

Comment on the Decision:

 The In re Arundhati Roy case remains a significant ruling on the balance between the
freedom of speech and the dignity of the judiciary. While the decision reaffirmed that
the judiciary cannot be above criticism, it also highlighted the thin line between
permissible criticism and contempt of court. The case raised important questions
about the scope of free speech, particularly when it comes to criticism of institutions
of power.
 The decision has been criticized by some for being overly harsh and for curbing Roy’s
right to free expression, especially considering that her remarks were made in the
context of a larger social cause. However, from the judiciary's perspective, it was
necessary to protect the institution from unwarranted attacks that could erode public
trust in the judicial process.
 This case thus underscores the tension between individual rights and the need to
maintain the authority of the judiciary in a constitutional democracy like India.