Article 14: Equality before law.

That State shall not deny to any person—

(i) Equality before the law
(ii) The equal protection of laws, within the territory of India.
Both the terms (Equality before the law and equal protection of laws) means equal justice.

Right to Equality is available to every person (i.e, legal or natural, citizens or foreigners).

Equality before the law.—The term 'equality before law' means that all persons are equal before
law. There should not be any discrimination on the basis of caste, religion, gender, race or birth
place. Equality before law is a concept devised by Prof. Dicey, termed as the Rule of Law in
England. Rule of Law means that law is supreme and every person, whatever be his rank or
condition, is subject to jurisdiction of ordinary courts. The Constitution is the supreme law of the
land and all laws passed by the Parliament (Legislature) must be consistent with the provisions
of the Constitution.

Equal protection of law.-The guarantee of equal protection of law is available to any person; the
protection of Article 14 extends to citizens and non-citizens and to natural persons as well as
legal persons.
Both Equality before law and Equal protection of law aim to establish the equality of status and
opportunity as embodied in the Preamble of the Constitution.

Article 14: The Doctrine of Reasonable Classification

Article 14 provides that the State can treat different persons differently if circumstances justify
such treatment. This is called the Doctrine of Reasonable Classification which says that
protective discrimination is also a fact of equality.

Article 14 forbids class legislation but it does not forbid reasonable classification. Article 14
applies where equals are treated differently without any reasonable basis, but if equals and
unequals are treated differently, Article 14 does not apply. Class legislation is that which makes
an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of persons arbitrarily
selected from a large number of persons.

In State of West Bengal v Anwar Ali Sarkar, S R Das J propounded the nexus test:
In order to pass the test, two conditions must be fulfilled, namely, (1) that the classification must
be founded on an intelligible differentia which distinguishes those that are grouped together from
others and (2) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be
achieved by the Act. The differentia which is the basis of the classification and the object of the
Act are distinct things and what is necessary is that there must be a nexus between them.
Subba Rao J, after setting out the nexus test propounded in RK Dalmia v SR Tendolkar case,
observed thus:
Though a law ex facie appears to treat all that fall within a class alike, if in effect it operates
unevenly on persons or property similarly situated, it may be said that the law offends the
equality clause. It will then be the duty of the court to scrutinise the effect of the law carefully to
ascertain its real impact on the persons or property similarly situated. Conversely, a law may
treat persons who appear to be similarly situated differently; but on investigation they may be
found not to be similarly situated. To state it differently, it is not the phraseology of a statute that
governs the situation but the effect of the law that is decisive.66

This added refinement to the test now meant that it was possible to invalidate the law under the
Article 14 test not only from the standpoint of classification and the object of the law (as evolved
by Bose J in Bidi Supply Co) but also by examining the effect of the operation of the law on the
fundamental right.

Express application of what Justice Bhagwati called “the double test“ is clear from the following
passage: There is, thus, a valid basis of differentiation between occupiers of Municipal premises
and those of other premises, and there is a rational relation and nexus between the basis of the
classification and the object of the legislation. (Maganlal Chhagganlal (P) Ltd v Municipal
Corporation Of Greater Bombay, 1974)

The Supreme Court has however warned against over-emphasis on classification. The court has
explained that ‘the doctrine of classification is only a subsidiary rule evolved by the courts to
give practical content to the doctrine of equality, over-emphasis on the doctrine of classification
or anxious or sustained attempt to discover some basis for classification may gradually and
imperceptibly erode the profound potency of the glorious content of equity enshrined in Article
14 of the Constitution. The over-emphasis on classification would inevitably result in
substitution of the doctrine of classification for the doctrine of equality… Lest, the classification
would deny equality to the larger segments of the society’ (L.I.C. of India v Consumer
Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995)

The Doctrine of Arbitrariness

E.P. Royappa v. State of Tamil Nadu

The Supreme court has drifted from the traditional concept of equality which was based on
reasonable classification and has laid down a new concept of equality. Bhagwati J., delivering
the judgement on behalf of himself, Chandrachud and Krishna Iyer, JJ. propounded the new
concept of equality in the following words- "Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects
and dimensions, and it cannot be 'cribbed, cabined and confined' within traditional and
doctrinaire limits.
From a positivistic point of view, equality is antithesis to arbitrariness. In fact, equality and
arbitrariness are sworn enemies; one belongs to the rule of law in a republic while the other, to
the whim of an obsolete monarch. Where an act is arbitrary, it is implicit in it that it is unequal
both according to political logic and constitutional law and is therefore violative of Article 14".

In Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, Bhagwati, J., again quoted with approval the new
concept of equality propounded by him in the E.P. Royappa case. He said: -
"Equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and dimensions, and it cannot be imprisoned
within traditional and doctrinaire limits. Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness in State action and
ensures fairness and equality of treatment. The principle of reasonableness, which legally as well
as philosophy, is an essential element of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervades Article 14 like a
brooding omnipresence.

It is now firmly established that Article 14 strikes at arbitrary state action, both administrative
and legislative. There has been a significant shift towards equating arbitrary or unreasonableness
as the yardstick by which administrative as well as legislative actions are to be judged. A basic
and obvious test to be applied in cases where administrative action is attacked as arbitrary is to
see whether there is any discernible principle emerging from the impugned action and if so, does
it really satisfy the test of reasonableness. It is now considered that non-compliance with the
rules of natural justice amounts to arbitrariness violating Article 14.

Legitimate expectations
Fairness in State action is an essential concomitant of Article 14. One of the methods by which
the courts exercise control over administrative action is through the doctrine of legitimate
expectation. We must clarify, at the outset, that this doctrine is confined to the sphere of
administrative action alone and has no place when it comes to the legislative process.
Legitimate expectation could either be procedural or substantive.

The procedural legitimate expectation relates to a representation of the authorities that a hearing
or other appropriate procedure will be afforded before the decision is made.
A substantive legitimate expectation arises if a representation is made that a benefit of a
substantive nature will be granted or if the person is already in receipt of the benefit that it will
be continued and not be substantially varied, then the same could be enforced.

There are a number of arguments for and against the principle of legitimate expectations.
Proponents in favor argue that it promotes fairness in public administration and enhances the
trust and reliance in the Government and its agencies thereby enhancing the rule of law. Those
opposing the principle argue that it imposes fetters on the power of the Government to alter its
policy in the interests of the public.
In Food Corp of India v Kamdhenu Cattle Feed Industries, J S Verma J (as the learned Chief
Justice then was) reiterated that respecting legitimate expectation was a part of good
administration adding that the principle afforded a means to control exercise of public power by
judicial review. Three important principles were then laid down by the court:

● Mere reasonable or legitimate expectation of a citizen, in such a situation, may not by

itself be a distinct enforceable right, but failure to consider and give due weight to it may
render the decision arbitrary;
● Every legitimate expectation is a relevant factor requiring due consideration in a fair
decision-making process. Whether the expectation of the claimant is reasonable or
legitimate in the context is a question of fact in each case. The expectation must
nonetheless be legitimate. An ultra vires representation cannot bind. This is the law in
India as well as in the UK.130
● Whenever the question arises, it is to be determined not according to the claimant’s
perception but in larger public interest wherein other more important considerations may
outweigh what would otherwise have been the legitimate expectation of the claimant. A
bona fide decision of the public authority reached in this manner would satisfy the
requirement of non-arbitrariness and withstand judicial scrutiny.
Article 15

Article 15(1) specifically bars the state from discriminating against any citizen of India on
grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex, place of birth, or any of them.
Article 15(2) prohibits subjection of a citizen to any disability, liability, restriction or condition
on grounds only of religion, race, caste, sex or place of birth with regard to—

​ (a) access to shops, public restaurants, hotels and places of entertainment, or,
​ (b) the use of wells, tanks, bathing ghats, roads and places of public resort maintained
wholly or partly out of state funds or dedicated to the use of general public.

Under Article 15(3), the state is not prevented from making any special provision for women and
children.

Article 15(4) or Article 29(2) does not prevent the state from making any special provisions for
the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the
Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes.

Article 15(5) added by the Constitution (93rd Amendment) Act, 2005 provides that under Article
15 or Article 19(1)(g) the State is not prevented from making any special provisions for the
advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens or for the Scheduled
Castes and the Scheduled Tribes in so far as such special provisions relate to their admission to
educational institutions including private educational institutions other than the minority
educational institutions referred to in Article 30(1).2

Article 15(6), which has been inserted by the Constitution (103rd Amendment) Act, 2019
enables the state to make special provisions for the economically weaker sections of citizens
(EWS), other than those mentioned in Articles 15(4) and 15(5). Article 15(6)(b) limits EWS
reservation in educational institutions, other than those specified in Article 30(1), to a maximum
of 10 seats in each category.

Provisions contained in Articles 15 and 16 are merely enabling provisions. No citizen of India
can claim reservation as a matter of right and accordingly no writ of mandamus can be issued
directing the State to provide reservation.

Article 15(1) is an extension of Article 14. Article 15(1) expresses a particular application of the
general principle of equality embodied in Article 14.
Just as the principle of classification applies to Article 14 so it does to Article 15(1) as well. The
combined effect of Articles 14 and 15 is not that the state cannot pass unequal laws, but if it does
pass unequal laws, the inequality must be based on some reasonable ground (Article 14), and
that, due to Article 15(1), religion, race, caste, sex, or place of birth alone is not, and cannot be, a
reasonable ground for discrimination
Under Article 15(4), the State can make special provisions for certain sections of the society as
stated above. But for any section of population not falling under Article 15(4), special provisions
can be made if there is reasonable classification.
The word “discrimination” in Article 15(1) involves an element of unfavourable bias. The use of
the word “only” in the Articles 15(1) and 15(2) connotes that what is discountenanced is
discrimination purely and solely on account of any of the grounds mentioned. A discrimination
based on any of these grounds and also on other grounds is not hit by Articles 15(1) and 15(2)
though it may be hit by Article 14.
Further, to adjudge the validity of an Act under these Articles, a distinction is to be drawn
between the object underlying the impugned Act and the mode and manner adopted therein to
achieve that object. The object underlying the Act may be good or laudable but its validity has to
be judged by the method of its operation and its effect on the fundamental right involved. The
crucial question to ask therefore is whether the operation of the impugned Act results in a
prohibition only on any of the grounds mentioned in Articles 15(1) and 15(2). It is the effect of
the impugned Act that is to be considered and if its effect is to discriminate on any of the
prohibited grounds, it is bad.
Article 15 is a facet of Article 14. Like Article 14, Article 15(1) also covers the entire range of
state activities. But, in a way, the scope of Article 15 is narrower than that of Article 14 in
several respects.
One, while Article 14 is general in nature in the sense that it applies both to citizens as well as
non-citizens, Article 15(1) covers only the Indian citizens, and does not apply to non-citizens. No
non-citizen can claim any right under Article 15, though he can do so under Article 14.
Two, while Article 14 permits any reasonable classification on the basis of any rational criterion,
under Article 15(1), certain grounds mentioned therein can never form the basis of classification.

The Supreme Court delivered a landmark judgment in NALSA v UOI25 recognized that
discrimination against transgenders violated Article 15(1). The court drew on the ideal of
personal autonomy to hold that any discrimination based on gender identity violated Article
15(1). Writ petitions were, thereafter, filed and the correctness of the decision in Suresh Kumar
Kaushal, supra, was referred to a Constitution Bench in Navtej Singh Johar v UOI.
Indu Malhotra J concurred with the view of Chandrachud J observing that the word “Sex” would
take within its fold “sexual orientation”. The learned judge expressly invoked the ideal of
personal autonomy to as in instrument to identify and eliminate discrimination under Article 15.
The wheel had come a full circle. The decision of the Delhi High Court in Naz Foundation had
been resurrected like the Sphinx.

Article 15(2), mentioned above, contains a prohibition of a general nature and is not confined to
the state only. On the basis of this provision, it has been held that if a section of the public puts
forward a claim for an exclusive use of a public well, it must establish that the well was
dedicated to the exclusive use of that particular section of the public and not to the use of the
general public. A custom to that effect cannot be held to be reasonable, or in accordance with
enlightened modern notions of utility of public wells because of the force of Article 15.
Article 15(2) is an expression of the notion of horizontal application of rights. In other words, it
even prohibits discrimination of one citizen by another in matters of access to public spaces. In
Naz Foundation, it was held that discrimination on the ground of sexual orientation is
impermissible between citizens on the horizontal application of the right enshrined under Article
15. Thus, where the practice of religion is interfered with by non-state actors, Article 15(2)
would spring into action.

According to Article 15(3), the state is not prevented from making any “special provision” for
women and children.
Articles 15(1) and 15(2) prevent the state from making any discriminatory law on the ground of
gender alone. The Constitution is thus characterised by gender equality. The Constitution insists
on equality of status and it negates gender bias. Nevertheless, by virtue of Article 15(3), the state
is permitted, despite Article 15(1), to make any special provision for women, thus carving out a
permissible departure from the rigours of Article 15(1). Articles 15 and 16 do not prohibit special
treatment of women.
The provision for maintenance under section 125(3) CrPC have been enacted as a measure of
social justice to provide recourse to dependent wives and children for their financial support, so
as to prevent them from falling into destitution and vagrancy. The constitutional purpose served
by the enactment of the POCSO Act, and the Juvenile Justice Act have been traced to Article 15.
The constitutional mandate is infringed only where the females would have received same
treatment with males but for their sex. In English law “but-for-sex” test has been developed to
mean that no less favourable treatment is to be given to women on gender-based criterion which
would favour the opposite sex and women will not be deliberately selected for less favourable
treatment because of their sex. The Constitution does not prohibit the employer to consider sex in
making the employment decisions where this is done pursuant to a properly or legally charted
affirmative action plan.84
Article 15(3) recognises the fact that the women in India have been socially and economically
handicapped for centuries and, as a result thereof, they cannot fully participate in the
socio-economic activities of the nation on a footing of equality. The purpose of Article 15(3) is
to eliminate this socio-economic backwardness of women and to empower them in such a
manner as to bring about effective equality between men and women. The object of Article 15(3)
is to strengthen and improve the status of women. Article 15(3) thus relieves the state from the
bondage of Article 15(1) and enables it to make special provisions to accord socio-economic
equality to women.85
The scope of Article 15(3) is wide enough to cover the entire range of state activity including
that of employment. Article 15(3) is a special provision in the nature of a proviso qualifying the
general guarantees contained in Articles 14, 15(1), 15(2), 16(1) and 16(2).86
A doubt has been raised whether Article 15(3) saves any provision concerning women, or saves
only such a provision as is in their favour.87 The better view would appear to be that while the
state can make laws containing special provisions for women and children, it should not
discriminate against them on the basis of their gender only. This appears to be the cumulative
effect of Articles 15(1) and 15(3). Although there can be no discrimination in general on the
basis of sex, the Constitution itself provides for special provisions being made for women and
children by virtue of Article 15(3). Reading Articles 15(3) and 15(1) together, it seems to be
clear that while the state may discriminate in favour of women against men, it may not
discriminate in favour of men against women. However, only such provisions can be made in
favour of women under Article 15(3) as are reasonable and which do not altogether obliterate or
render illusory the constitutional guarantee mentioned in Article 15(2).

Where a female employee’s grievance was the writing of a sensuous letter expressing love to her,
admiring her qualities and beauty, and extending unsolicited help, it was held that the female
employee’s grievance ought to have been looked into according to the directions given in
Vishaka Case.

Protective Discrimination
In Anuj Garg v Hotel Assn of India,104 the constitutional validity of section 30 of the Punjab
Excise Act, 1914 was assailed as it prohibited employment of “any man under the age of 25
years” or “any woman” in any part of such premises in which liquor or intoxicating drug is
consumed by the public. The reason proffered was that women would be as vulnerable without
State protection. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Delhi High Court striking down
the provision as it ended up victimising women in the name of protection. The court observed
that instead of prohibiting women employment in the bars altogether the State should focus on
factoring in ways through which unequal consequences of sex differences could be eliminated. It
reiterated that it was the State’s duty to ensure circumstances of safety which inspire confidence
in women to discharge the duty freely in accordance to the requirements of the profession they
choose to follow.

In State of Maharashtra v Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn,105 the Supreme Court struck down
a provision of the Bombay Police Act which banned performance of bar dancers in eating houses
or permit rooms or beer bars.

In Hotel Priya v State of Maharashtra,107 the Supreme Court annulled an order of the
Commissioner of Police, Bombay which had imposed a restriction of four women singers/artists
and four male singers/artists to remain present on the stage in an Orchestra Bar. The reason
proffered by the State was that these bars exploited women by making them perform obscene
dances with customers, and that such regulations were necessary for the safety of women.

In Yusuf Abdul Aziz,108 the constitutional validity of section 497 IPC was upheld on the ground
that it was covered by Article 15(3) which was a provision meant to protect women. However, in
Joseph Shine v Union of India109 the court invalidated section 497 IPC holding that the
provision exempted a woman from being punished as an abettor. Underlying this exemption was
the notion that a woman is the victim of being seduced into a sexual relationship with a person
who is not her husband. In assuming that the woman has no sexual agency, the exemption seeks
to be justified on the ground of being a provision that is beneficial to women and protected under
Article 15(3) of the Constitution. The court held that this was contrary to the remedy which
Article 15(3) sought to embody. It concluded by observing that Article 15(3) does not protect a
statutory provision that entrenches patriarchal notions in the garb of protecting women

Article 15(4):
The first amendment to the Constitution added this article. This article was added by our Indian
Constitution's constituent assembly, which authored it. This article gives the state the authority to
establish specific arrangements for:
Backward classes of citizens
Schedule class
Schedule tribes
The case State of Madras vs. C. Dorairajan 5 is a historic decision that resulted in the addition of
Article 15(4) to the Indian constitution. This is India's first important court decision dealing with
reservations. The Madras high court issued a ruling that reserved seats in government positions
and higher education institutions based on caste.

According to the Supreme Court, reservation under article 15(4) is purely based on Caste. It
further said that article 15(4) does not contain any reservations based on the phrases backward
and more backward classes, nor does it give any classification based on the same terms.

Article 15(5): The state is empowered under this article to enact provisions that aid in the
upliftment of socially and educationally backward communities, such as Scheduled Castes and
Scheduled Tribes. Under this article, the state has the authority to impose laws that apply to all
educational institutes, whether state-aided or not, regardless of the minority educational institutes
mentioned in Article 30(1).

Article 15(5), which solely serves as a "enabling section," was added to the 93rd amending act.
In the case "Ashoka Kumar Thakur vs Union of India"8, this was determined. In addition, the
court declared in the case "T.M.A. Pai Foundation"9 that under Art 19(1)(g) of the Indian
Constitution, an individual has the freedom to create and govern any private educational
institution. As a result, the court explicitly stated that art 15(5) does not infringe art 19(1)

While all the above discussed mutually deal with Art 15, the court have always upheld both Art
15(4) and Art 15(5) are valid and both of them are not contradicting to each other.

Mandal Case:
The concept of a creamy layer was used in this case. In the case Indira Sawhney vs Union of
India, the idea of a Creamy Layer was established. 10. The Supreme Court ruled that OBCs will
be given a 27 percent preference in government positions. In this situation, it was also indicated
that the reserve would only be offered for the first phases of appointments and not for the
subsequent promotion process.

The total amount of reservations must not surpass 50%. (Because 22.5 percent is already set up
for SCs and STs.) Following the Indira Sawhney case, numerous state governments and other
governing bodies have voted in favour of the Mandal Report, deeming it genuine. This case was
brought up under Article 16(4) of the Constitution.

Balaji v State of Mysore

In Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963), it was held that where the persons in whose favour a
discrimination is made as to belonging to the backward classes under clause 4 of Article 15, the
discrimination will be void if it is solely based on caste consideration and not on economic or
social backwardness. In Balaji v. State of Mysore (1963), the Mysore Government issued an
order and decided to provide 68% reservation for students belonging to backward classes for
their admissions in medical and engineering colleges. The government left only 32% of
reservations for students getting admission on merit. Because of this reservation, students with
higher marks than those in the reserved category failed to obtain a seat. In the opinion of the
Court, the categorisation of backward and even more backward classes was not justified under
Article 15(4). In order to be considered ‘backward’, both socially and educationally backward
can be included. Clause (4) of Article 15 does not talk about caste but class. Additionally, the
Court stated that reserving 68% of seats in medical and engineering schools would constitute
constitutional fraud, as Clause (4) of Article 15 prohibits exclusive provisions for backward
classes. Therefore, reservations could not exceed 50%. In M.R. Balaji v. State of Mysore it was
held that caste cannot be the sole or even predominant factor to ascertain the backwardness of a
class.

Chitralekha v State of Mysore

The Government of Mysore by an order defined backward classes and directed that 30 per cent
of the seats in professional and technical colleges and institutions shall be reserved for them and
18 per cent to the Schedule castes and Scheduled Tribes. It was laid down that classification of
socially and educationally backward classes should be made on the basis of economic condition
and occupation. In R. Chitralekha v. State of Mysore, the government of Mysore laid down two
parameters for classification- economic conditions and occupation leaving out caste altogether.
The Court upheld this classification making caste not necessary criteria to determine
backwardness.

Article 15(6):
This article gives the government the authority to establish specific provisions for the
advancement of "economically weaker groups" of society, including reservations in educational
institutions. In 2019, the 103rd amendment was added to the Constitution. In addition, 10% of
the reservation must be set aside for EWS, according to the article. This ten percent of
reservations is independent of any current reservation ceilings.

Pradeep Jain v UOI

The Constitution identifies only one domicile, i.e., domicile in India. Art. 5 of the Constitution is
very clear at this take and it only talks about one domicile, namely, “domicile in the territory of
India.. “There is only one legal system which prevails in INDIA. Legal system in India doesn’t
vary from state to state. The court said was consequently of the view that as far as admissions to
post-graduate courses, like M.S., M.D. and the like are concerned, it would be highly desired not
to provide for any reservation based on a requirement of residence in the same state . Preference
may be given for admission to the post-graduate course in the same medical colleges or
university but such reservation should not exceed 50 per cent of the total number of All India
seats available for admission to the post- graduate course. But, even in regard, to admissions to
the post-graduate course, we would direct that so far as super specialities such as neuro- surgery
and cardiology are concerned, there should be no reservation at all even on the basis of
institutional preference and admissions should be granted purely on merit on all India basis.
While ‘residence’ may be the basis of reservation, according to the Supreme Court in Pradeep
Jain v. Union of India, it may be tested on the touch stone of Art. 14. Accordingly, the Court has
condemned as unconstitutional and void under Art. 14 "wholesale reservation" on the basis, of
the ‘domicile’ or ‘residence’ requirement within the State, 27 or on the basis of ‘institutional’
preference for students passing the qualifying examination for admission so as to exclude all
students not satisfying the requirement regardless of merit. In Pradeep Jain, the Supreme Court
expressed great reluctance in accepting any reservation for admissions to post graduate courses
where ordinarily merit should prevail. The case dealt with reservation of seats for the residents of
the State or the students of the same University for admission to the medical colleges. The Court
said in the instant case, that considerations for admission to the post-graduate courses such as
M.D. and the like for reservation based residence requirements within the State or institutional
preference were different from those for admission to the M.B.B.S. course. The Court
emphatically stated that excellence cannot be allowed to be compromised by any other
considerations because that would be detrimental to national interests.
Preeti Srivastava v State of MP
There cannot be a wide disparity between minimum Qualifying marks for reserved category and
general candidates at postgraduate level. The Supreme Court has rendered a momentous decision
in Dr. Preeti Sagar Srivastva v. State of Madhya Pradesh. The factual context in which this case
arose was as follows: For admission to post-graduate degree/diploma courses in medicine,
candidates were required to appear at an entrance examination. The State Government fixed a
cut-off percentage of 45% marks in this examination for admission of the general category
students while no cut off percentage of marks was fixed for SC/ST candidates. This meant that
there was no minimum qualifying marks in the entrance examination prescribed for the reserved
category candidates for admission to the postgraduate medical courses. This was challenged and
the Supreme Court quashed the same in Dr. Sadhna Devi v. State of Uttar Pradesh , with the
remark that if this was done, merit would be sacrificed altogether. The Court has also ruled in
Preeti Sagar that at the level of superspecialization, there cannot be any special provision as it is
contrary to national interest. Merit alone can be the basis of selection. This means that no
reservation can be made in the super-speciality courses in favour of the reserved classes because
any dilution of merit at this stage would adversely affect the national goal of having the best
possible candidates at the highest levels of professional and educational training. "Opportunities
for such training are few and it is in the national interest that these are made available to those
who can profit from them, viz; the best brains in the country, irrespective of the class to which
they belong."

State of MP v Nivedita Jain

For example, in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Nivedita Jain , an order issued by the M.P.
Government dispensing with the requirement of obtaining any minimum qualifying marks in the
pre-medical entrance examination for admission to the M.B.B.S. course for SC/ST candidates
has been held valid. The order was passed because of the paucity of qualified SC/ST candidates.
The factual context in which the order was passed was as follows: The State reserved 15% seats
each for SC and ST candidates for admission to the M.B.B.S. course. This meant 108 seats each
for the two groups out of a total of 720 seats. When the result of the Pre-Medical entrance
examination was published, only 18 SC candidates and 2 ST candidates qualified. In view of the
large unfilled quota of SC/ST candidates, the State completely relaxed the condition relating to
the minimum qualifying marks for these two categories. Upholding the relaxation, the Court
argued that the relaxation in the admission qualification would not effect any relaxation in the
standard of medical education or curriculum of studies in medical colleges for those candidates
after their admission to the college, and the standard of examination and the curriculum would
remain the same for all students
Article 16: Equality of opportunity in matters of public employment
Article 16 of Indian Constitution
Right to Equality is one of the basic fundamental rights that the Indian Constitution gives to all
of its residents is the right to equality. The equality of opportunity in areas of public employment
is covered under Article 16 of Indian Constitution. The definition of the phrase “equal
opportunity” varies, and there is no universal agreement on its exact meaning. A broad
interpretation of this provision is provided by the Indian Constitution. Principles of Equal
Employment Opportunity (EEO) are applicable to:

● Getting a job
● The working environment
● Relationship dynamics at work
● The process of assessing performance and
● The potential for career advancement and training
Equal opportunity in matters of appointment to State functions is what Article 16 promises.
According to his or her credentials and capabilities, every citizen should be eligible for
employment or appointment to any office under the State, according to the concept of equality of
opportunity, as the Supreme court in its judgement of State of JK vs KNVT Kholo 1974 held.

Article 16(1)
All citizens must have an equal chance to be hired or appointed to employment within the State,
according to this clause. Only positions held on behalf of the state, such as employment or office,
are subject to the limitation. i.e., the person in a position of power inside the state.

In light of this, the provision does not restrict the state from setting the appropriate standards for
hiring into government positions, and the authority is free to set any further appointment
requirements that would be beneficial in maintaining adequate discipline among the servants.

Consequently, the following are covered by the guarantee in clause (1): (a) initial appointments,
(b) promotions, (c) termination of employment, and (d) issues pertaining to the wage, periodic
increments, leave, gratuity, pension, age of superannuation, etc. The equal pay for equal effort
principle is also covered in clause 16(1).

The experience of reservation in practice, as correctly noted by Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer,
demonstrated in M Thomas v State of Kerala, 1976, that the benefits were largely taken by the
top creamy layer of the backward classes or classes, keeping the weakest among the weak and
leaving the fortunate layers to consume the entire cake. significantly lessened by the passage of
time, greater educational standards, and more work options.
Article 16(2)
No citizen will be excluded from or subject to discrimination in connection with any
employment or office under the State solely on the basis of religion, race, caste, sex, descent,
place of birth, or domicile, or any combination of these factors. The phrase “any occupation or
office under the State” makes it clear that only public employment is covered by Article 16(2).
means test to test the economic backwardness
In K.C. Vasanth Kumar v. State of Karnataka 1985, the Supreme Court ruled that the mean test
should be the basis for any reservations made in favour of underprivileged groups (backward
classes). It has also been suggested that the reservation policy be revisited approximately every
five years to determine whether a class has advanced to the point where reservations are
unnecessary. Its name ought to be removed from the group of backward classes.

In Indira Sawhney & Ors. v. Union of India, 1993, the Supreme Court
Upheld the introduction of distinct reservations for other underprivileged groups in positions
with the national government.
Ordered to deny access to reservation services to the Creamy layer and other underprivileged
classes.
Restrict reservations to the 50% maximum as per order.
Ruled against the validity of special reservations for forward castes who are economically
disadvantaged.

Article 16(3)
For specific jobs or appointments in a state, union territory, local authority, or other authority,
Parliament may stipulate residency requirements.

Hence, the parliament made a law Public Employment (Residence Requirements) Act, 1957, in
which residence was made necessary for public employees in states like Andhra Pradesh,
Manipur, Tripura, and Himachal Pradesh. At, present no such provision for any state stays except
Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

Supreme Court under M R Balaji v Mysore case 1963, put a 50% restriction on a reservation in
nearly all states, with the exception of Tamil Nadu (69%, under the 9th schedule), and Rajasthan
(68% quota, including 14% for advanced castes, post-Gujjar violence 2008). In 1980, Tamil
Nadu went over the boundary.

Article 16(4)
The state may, if it so wishes, provide precedence for appointments or employment to any
member of the underprivileged class in society.
Article 16(4A) provides for the reservation of seats in matters of ‘promotion’ with consequential
seniority for Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes.
Article 16(4B) provides for carrying over of unfilled vacancies reserved for SC/ST to subsequent
years, which is simply referred to as the “carry forward rule”.

Carry forward rule

The Supreme Court considered the scope of Article 16(4) in T. Devadasan v. Union of India
(1964). In this case, the constitutional validity of the “carry forward rule” which was framed by
the government to regulate the appointment of people from the backward classes where state
services were involved, was at issue. This rule states that in case a sufficient number of
candidates belonging to the SCs and STs classes were not available for appointment to the
reserved quota, then the vacancies that remained unfilled would be treated as unreserved and
would be filled by the fresh available candidates; however, a corresponding number of posts
would be reserved in the next year for SCs and STs in addition to their reserved quota for the
next year. The result was to carry forward the unutilised balance and unfilled vacancies in the
second and third years at one time. In actuality, 68 percent of the vacancies were reserved for
SCs and STs. The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by a 4:1 majority, had struck down the carry forward
rule, declaring it unconstitutional on the ground that the power vested in government under
Article 16(4) cannot be exercised in order to deny reasonable equality of opportunity pertaining
to matters of public employment for members of classes other than backward classes. The Court
said that recruitment must be considered each year, and the reservation for backward
communities each year should not be excessive enough to create a monopoly or interfere unduly
with other communities’ legitimate claims. Accordingly, the Court held that the reservation
ought to be less than 50 percent, but how much less than half would depend upon the prevailing
circumstances in each case.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India, overruled Devadasan v. Union
of India on the point and held the “carry forward rule” valid as long as it did not, in a particular
year, exceed 50 percent of vacancies. The 50% limit can only be exceeded in extraordinary
situations prevailing in a State, i.e., far-flung states such as Nagaland, etc.

Catch-up rule and consequential seniority

Following the constitutional recognition of reservation in promotion, the reserved category
candidates who were promoted ahead of their general class counterparts became their seniors due
to their earlier promotion. The Hon’ble Supreme Court addressed this anomaly by introducing
the concept of a catch-up rule in two cases: Union of India v. Virpal Singh (1995) and Ajit Singh
v. State of Punjab (1996). According to this rule, the senior general category candidates who
were promoted after SC/ST candidates would regain their seniority over general category
candidates who were promoted earlier.
Consequential seniority allows reserved category candidates to maintain seniority over general
category peers. In other words, it is open to the State to provide that the candidate promoted
earlier by way of the reservation rule shall not be entitled to seniority over his senior in the
general category and that as and when a general candidate who was senior to him is promoted, he
will regain his seniority over the reserved candidate notwithstanding that he is promoted
subsequently to the reserved candidate.

The concepts of catch-up rule and consequential seniority are not constitutional requirements;
neither are they implied in Article 16 clauses (1) and (4), nor are they constitutional limitations.
Obliteration of these rules does not change the equality code indicated by Articles 14, 15, and 16
of the Constitution. Clause (1) of Article 16 cannot prevent the state from taking cognizance of
the compelling interests of backward classes in society. Clause (4) of Article 16 refers to
affirmative actions by way of reservation, under which the government is free to provide
reservation if it is satisfied on the basis of quantifiable data that backward classes are
inadequately represented in the service. Therefore, in every case where the States decide to
provide reservation, there must be two circumstances, namely, “backwardness” and “inadequacy
of representation.” These limitations have not been removed by the impugned amendments. If
the States fail to apply these tests, the reservation would be invalid. These amendments do not
alter the structure of Articles 14, 15 and 16 (Equality Code). The parameters mentioned in
Article 16 (4) are retained. These amendments do not change the identity of the Constitution.

Article 16 of Constitution Mandal Commission

In accordance with Article 340 of the Constitution, the Morarji Desai Government created the
Second Backward Classes Commission in 1979 to look into the social and educational
circumstances of the underprivileged classes and provide recommendations for their
improvement. Because Bindeshwari Prasad Mandal served as its chairman, the commission is
also known as the Mandal Commission.

The Mandal commission recommended the reservation of 27% of government jobs for the Other
Backward Classes (OBCs) so that the total reservation for all ((SCs, STs and OBCs) amounts to
50%. After 10 years of making these recommendations, V.P. Singh Government declared a
reservation of 27% of government jobs for the OBCs in 1990.

Article 16 of Constitution Indra Sawhney Case

Indra Sawhney case popularly known as the Mandal case, the scope and extent of Article 16(4),
which provides for the reservation of jobs in favour of backward classes, have been examined
thoroughly by the Supreme Court. Though the Court has rejected the additional reservation of
10% for poorer sections of higher castes, it upheld the constitutional validity of 27% reservation
for the OBCs under certain conditions.
It also rules on promotion under article 14 that reservation should be confined to initial
appointments only and no reservation in promotions.

In the case of Rajeev Kumar v. Union of India (2016), it was held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court
that the no reservation rule in promotions, as laid down in the Indra Sawhney case, has no
applicability to citizens with disabilities.

The 77th Amendment Act, 1995

The Parliament enacted the Constitution 77th Amendment Act, 1995, in order to bypass the
Court’s ruling on the point of no reservation in promotions in government service.

This Amendment added a new Clause (4-A) to Article 16 of the Constitution, which states that
the State has the authority to make provisions for reservations in matters of promotion in favour
of SCs and STs if the State believes they are underrepresented in State services.

Therefore, with the intent of reservation in matters concerning the promotion of SCs and STs,
Clause (4) was inserted in Article 16 of the Constitution by the 77th Amendment. Clause (4)
states that “nothing in Article 16 of the Indian Constitution shall prevent the State from enacting
any provision for reservation in matters concerning promotion in favour of the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes in any state or Government related job”. Thus, the reservation in
promotion in government jobs will continue in favour of SCs & STs even after the verdict of the
Indra Sawhney case if the government wants to do so.

The 81st Amendment Act, 2000

The Supreme Court ruled in Indra Sawhney v. Union of India that the 50% limit would apply to
both current and backlog vacancies. The eighty-first amendment added a new clause (4-B) in
Article 16 after Clause (4-A), removing the 50% ceiling on reservation for SCs/STs and OBCs in
backlog vacancies that could not be filled in previous years due to a lack of qualified candidates.
According to Art. 16, clause (4-B), vacancies that could not be filled in previous years are treated
as a separate class of vacancies and will be filled in any succeeding years and are not considered
together with the vacancies of the year or years, even if they exceed the 50% limit.

The 85th Amendment Act, 2001

The Amendment changed the words “in matters of promotion to any class” in Clause 4-A to “in
matters of promotion, with consequential seniority, to any class.” This Amendment aimed to
extend the benefit of reservation in favour of the SC/ST in matters of promotion with
consequential seniority, effective from April 1995, when the 77th Amendment to the
Constitution was enacted.
The Hon’ble Supreme Court unanimously held in M. Nagaraj v. Union of India AIR 2007 SC 71
that the provisions under Article 16(4A) and 16(4B) flow from Article 16(4), which do not alter
the basic structure of Article 16(4) and are valid. It also stated that the insertion of Clauses (4A)
and (4B) into Article 16 does not change Article 16(4) of the Constitution. It was stated that the
aforementioned amendments to the Indian Constitution providing for reservations are enabling
provisions that do not change the structure of Article 16. (4). They aid in the retention of the
controlling factors, namely backwardness and inadequacy of representation, allowing the State to
provide for reservation while keeping the overall efficiency of the State administration in mind
under Article 335. These amendments apply only to SCs and STs and do not repeal constitutional
requirements such as the 50% ceiling limit (quantitative limitation), sub-classification of OBCs,
SCs, and STs, and the concept of creamy layer (qualitative exclusion).

In Jarnail Singh v. Lachhmi Narain Gupta (2018), the Hon’ble Supreme Court, by a larger bench
of 7 judges, struck down its backwardness criterion, held in the Nagaraj case, however,
introduced the principle of creamy layer exclusion. It was held that the creamy layer exclusion
shall extend to SCs/STs, however, the state cannot grant reservations in the promotion to SC/ST
individuals who are members of their community’s creamy layer.

Article 16(5)
A law can provide that the incumbent of an office related to a religious or denominational
institution or a member of its governing body should belong to the particular religion or
denomination.

In simple words, a temple can make a rule that the priests must belong to the Hindu religion only
or a mosque can ensure that the Imam must be someone who follows Islam. And these rules
made by such institutions won’t be considered against Art. 16.

It is clear from this that Article 16(5) is a type of exception that prioritises Article 26 “Freedom
to manage religion matters” over Article 16 “Equality of opportunity in the matter of public
employment.”

Article 16(6)
A reserve of up to 10% of appointments or positions for any economically underprivileged
groups of citizens may be made by the state. This additional reservation of up to 10% would be
made in addition to the current one. The state would periodically notify the economically
disadvantaged areas for this purpose based on family income and other economic disadvantage
indicators.
Article 17: Abolition of Untouchability

Article 17: The Indian Constitution abolished the practice of untouchability in 1950. Article 17
provides that enforcement of any disability arising out of untouchability is a punishable offence
in accordance with law. By enacting this Article, the government of independent India acted
earnestly to abolish the scourge of caste discrimination. In order to strengthen the constitutional
provision in Article 17, the Parliament enacted the Protection of Civil Rights Act, 1955 (formerly
known as the Untouchability Offences Act).
This act penalises manifestations of untouchability in any form which include enforcing religious
and social disabilities.
As per the Act, the offender shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term not less than one
month and not more than six months. To expand the ambit of Article 17, the Scheduled Castes
and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, has also been enacted.

In State of Karnataka v. Appa Balu Ingale, AIR 1993 SC 1126, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
held that it is proved beyond doubt that the complainants were stopped from taking water from
the well as they were untouchables. It was further held that neither the Constitution nor the Act
defined untouchability.
The reasons are obvious. It is not capable of practical definition. It encompasses acts/practices
committed against Dalits in diverse forms. The practice of untouchability in any form is,
therefore, a crime against the Constitution. The abolition of untouchability is the arch of the
Constitution to make its Preamble meaningful and to integrate the Dalits in the national
mainstream.

In Sabarimala Temple case, on 28 September, 2018 Writ Petition (Civil) SC 373 of 2006, the
Hon'ble Supreme Court has struck down a rule that disallowed girls and women in 10-50 age
group from entering the Sabarimala Temple in Kerala. The then Chief Justice Deepak Misra who
headed the Constitution bench, in a 4-1 verdict said that the temple rule violated their right to
equality and their right to worship.
It was further held that prejudice against women based on options of impurity and pollution
associated with menstruation is a symbol of exclusion. The social exclusion of women based on
menstrual status is a form of untouchability which is an anathema to the constitutional values.
Article 18: Abolition of title

Article 18 contains four clauses:—

Clause I.-Prohibits the conferment of titles (military and academic distinctions are exempted
from the prohibitions).
Clause II.-Prohibits a citizen of India from accepting any title from a foreign State.
Clause III.-Provides that a non-citizen who holds any office of profit or trust under the State shall
not accept, without the consent of the President, any title from any foreign State.
Clause IV.-Provides that no person-citizen or non-citizen holding any office of profit or trust
under the State shall, without the consent of the President, accept any present or emoluments or
office of any kind from or under any foreign State.

Thus, under Article 18, from not only is the Stare, prevented from conferring titles on any
person, but the Indian citizens are also forbidden to accept any title from a foreign State without
the consent of the President of India.
The prohibition applies not only to the acceptance of any title but also to that of any present,
emolument or office of any kind from any foreign State by any person holding an office of profit
or trust under the State.

In Balaji Raghavan v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 770, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held
that the awards-Bharat Ratna, Padma Vibhushan, Padma Bhushan and other National Awards,
should not amount to title within the meaning of Article 18(1) and they should not be used as
suffixes and prefixes. If this is done, the defaulter shall forfeit, the national award conferred on
him or her, by following the procedure laid down in regulation 10 of each of the four
notifications clearing the National Awards.