Naval War College Review

Volume 55
Article 18
Number 4 Autumn

2002

Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy

W. H. Dalton

Mark M. Lowenthal

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Recommended Citation
Dalton, W. H. and Lowenthal, Mark M. (2002) "Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy," Naval War College Review: Vol. 55 : No. 4 ,
Article 18.
Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/nwc-review/vol55/iss4/18

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 Dalton and Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy BOOK REVIEWS 119

targeted by antisubmarine warfare make numerous allusions to the Soviet

forces. American naval strategists of this desire to adhere to international agree-
era can take satisfaction in having cor- ments, and to American perfidy as forcing
rectly postulated that the central purpose the Soviets to build all of this weaponry.
of the entire Soviet navy was to support There is sadness in the discussion of the
the submerged missile forces, particu- demise of the Russian strategic program,
larly the Deltas and their successors near brought about by the dire economic sit-
the Soviet coasts. uation facing Russia and the loss of So-
The authors dispassionately and authori- viet republics as newly independent
tatively document the eventual decay of states, and with them the Soviet test
the Soviet land-based and sea-based stra- ranges.
tegic nuclear edifice. Perhaps this is why Nonetheless, this book should not be
the FSB has declared the book a work of read for its political message. It is a well
espionage. In fact, one of its authors, referenced storehouse of knowledge on
Igor Sutyagin, was arrested and held on Soviet strategic systems, useful to re-
charges related to his research for the searchers and historians alike. Against its
book. Yet it is cold comfort even for an own standards, it is a remarkable
American reader to note the degenera- accomplishment.
tion of the Russian early-warning satel-
TOM FEDYSZYN
lite system or the pollution hazard Naval War College
caused by the way in which the nuclear
submarine fleet was deactivated.
The table on nuclear testing provides a
keen insight into the mindset of the So-
viet decision-making elite, as well as the Lowenthal, Mark M. Intelligence: From Secrets to
efficacy of focused, centralized planning. Policy. Washington, D.C.: CQ Quarterly, 1999.
264pp. $28.95
The sheer size of the program and its
reckless disregard for the environment Mark Lowenthal’s professed intent in
persuasively show the political power of writing this book was to fulfill the need
the Soviet nuclear-industrial complex. for an introductory text for students of
The hundred pages devoted to this pro- intelligence. He is well qualified to do so,
gram make clear its importance. Of par- having devoted more than twenty years
ticular note, the Soviets conducted 135 in the executive and legislative branches
nuclear explosions for industrial or of government as an intelligence official
other “peaceful” purposes. In fact, the and as an adjunct professor in graduate
Lazurit explosion of 1974 moved enough programs at Columbia and George
earth to form a dam. Washington Universities. (He is now the
The authors offer no apologies for the vice chairman of the National Intelli-
huge building programs or for the Soviet gence Council for Evaluation.) The re-
Union’s unabashed desire to prevail in sulting work is much more than an
the Cold War arms race. While the book introductory textbook; it is a trove of
is not overtly political, one senses that valuable information and insights rang-
the authors believe the governmental ing from the basic concepts and defini-
pronouncements justifying the building tions of intelligence to a thorough
or destruction of each weapon. They examination of the intelligence process.

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 120
Naval War College Review, Vol. 55 [2002], No. 4, Art. 18
NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW

Thus not only is this an excellent text- key provisions of the National Security
book on the basics of intelligence and Act of 1947, Executive Order 12333, and
ideal for a course in Intelligence 101, but the Senate resolution that established the
it is also an interesting and informative Senate Select Committee on Intelligence;
examination of intelligence and na- all these are helpful for ready reference.
tional security disciplines, one that Lowenthal provides an interesting and
would be of interest and value to na- valuable examination of the “syndromes”
tional security “old-timers.” that sometimes affect the analyst, result-
This book addresses the fundamental is- ing in a faulty analysis and product.
sue of what “intelligence” is and what it Most interesting is the “mirror-imaging”
is not, and it offers a detailed examina- syndrome, in which the analyst errone-
tion of the processes involved in the ously presumes that other states will act
practice of intelligence—collection disci- in the same way as the United States
plines, analysis, counterintelligence, co- would—Pearl Harbor is a classic exam-
vert action, the role of the policy maker, ple. Throughout the book, Lowenthal
oversight and accountability, and the emphasizes the importance of the role of
ethical and moral issues generated by the policy maker and the fact that the
intelligence practice. Lowenthal provides purpose of intelligence is to support the
an abbreviated but enlightening history policy makers who run the government.
of the development of the U.S. intelli- He also notes the converse responsibility
gence community, as well as a summary of policy makers to provide clear and
of significant historical intelligence de- unambiguous requirements to the intel-
velopments since the creation of the Co- ligence community.
ordinator of Information and the Office In his chapter on covert action,
of Strategic Services during World War Lowenthal characterizes these activities
II. There is not only a helpful examina- as “something between the states of
tion of the structure of the U.S. intelli- peace and war.” That may not be entirely
gence community (with the obligatory accurate, since covert action may consist
wiring diagrams) but also an interesting entirely of nonforcible measures. Never-
description of the relationships between theless, his description of the covert-
and among the players in the commu- action process and his examination of
nity, including the important stake- the ethical issues that are raised in con-
holders in the budgetary process. nection with it are right on the mark.
Throughout the book, Lowenthal has in- However, one would have liked a bit
serted sidebars containing brief descrip- more discussion on what does not consti-
tions and vignettes summarizing the tute covert action. For example, section
more detailed material in the text; these 503(e)(2) of the National Security Act of
add a certain panache to the work. He 1947 exempts “traditional military activ-
also discusses historical examples of in- ities” from the definition of covert ac-
telligence successes and failures, to illus- tion, while in the Senate Report on the
trate the various concepts and insights 1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, the
he has mentioned. At the end of each Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
chapter Lowenthal lists “key terms” went to some length to describe those
unique to the profession, as well as addi- activities, including “almost every use of
tional readings. He has also included the uniformed military forces . . . whether or

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 Dalton and Lowenthal: Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy BOOK REVIEWS 121

not the U.S. sponsorship of such activi- the North Korean–Soviet Union
ties is apparent or later to be acknowl- relationship.
edged publicly.” More along these lines Lerner asserts that the intelligence col-
would perhaps reveal that policy makers lection effort, code-named Operation
have quite a bit more flexibility in re- CLICKBEETLE, was the idea of the Na-
sponding to overseas events and that tional Security Agency and that it had
covert action is not the only option be- been patterned after the efforts of the
tween inaction and the overt use of Soviet Union’s intelligence-collection
force. But this is a mere quibble. ships (AGIs) off the coast of the United
In sum, Lowenthal has written an out- States. Deciding that the Navy should be
standing primer on intelligence, the in- the operational commander for this stra-
telligence process, and the intelligence tegic tasking, the National Security
community. Agency turned the program over to it.
Converting tired, old, and slow cargo
W. H. DALTON
Department of Defense ships into intelligence collection plat-
Associate Deputy General Counsel, Intelligence forms with insufficient money, inade-
quate self-defense, little more than fresh
coats of paint, minimal training, and in-
adequate safeguards for the sensitive in-
telligence equipment on board, the Navy
Lerner, Mitchell B., The Pueblo Incident: A Spy mismanaged the effort from the outset.
Ship and the Failure of American Foreign Policy. The maladies that befell the USS Liberty
Lawrence: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2002. 320pp. in 1967 off the coast of Israel were re-
$34.95
peated in the preparation and tasking of
Finally, an author has done a hard- Pueblo just seven months later off the
hitting analysis of the USS Pueblo inci- Korean Peninsula.
dent of January 1968. Mitchell B. Lerner, The USS Pueblo had been tasked to collect
an assistant professor of history at Ohio signals intelligence in the Sea of Japan us-
State University, does not exonerate the ing the “cover” of conducting hydro-
commanding officer of the Pueblo, Com- graphic research. The operation had been
mander Lloyd M. Bucher, for giving up deemed to be of minimal risk, based on
the ship and crew, and the intelligence it the analogy of the Soviet AGIs. Lerner
had gathered. However, of all those who contends that whenever an AGI violated
may have been culpable, Commander territorial waters, the U.S. Navy would
Bucher emerges a hero and is no longer turn it around with an admonishment
the scapegoat his superiors made him and no more. Would not the North Ko-
out to be. Exhaustive research, including reans do the same? Herein rested the
access to new information released from Navy’s greatest miscalculation. The Ko-
the Lyndon Johnson White House files, reans were not the puppets of the Soviet
leads Lerner to place blame evenly on the Union or its foreign policy executors.
shoulders of the Navy chain of command, Lerner goes to great lengths to take the
the intelligence community, and Johnson’s reader inside the mind of Kim Il Sung
foreign policy advisors, due to their mis- and his vision of communism and the
understanding and underestimation of greater glory of the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea.

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