Unit 5 Notes
Unit 5 Notes
VIRTUAL THREATS:
• Some threats to virtualized systems are general in nature, as they are inherent threats to
all computerized systems (such as denial-of-service, or DoS, attacks).
• Many VM vulnerabilities stem from the fact that a vulnerability in one VM system can be exploited
to attack other VM systems or the host systems, as multiple virtual machines share the same
physical hardware.
• Virtualization is the technology that allows multiple virtual machines (VMs) to run on a
single physical server, and virtualization systems manage and coordinate these VMs.
Some attacks against virtual machine, or VM, environments are variations of common threats such as denial
of service. Others are still largely theoretical but likely approaching as buzz and means increase. Keep an eye
on these critical weaknesses:
VM sprawl: VMs are easy to deploy, and many organizations view them as hardware-like tools that don’t
merit formal policies.This has led to VM sprawl, which is the unplanned proliferation of VMs.Attackers can
take advantage of poorly monitored resources.More deployments also mean more failure points, so sprawl
can cause problems even if no malice is involved.
Hyperjacking: Hyperjacking takes control of the hypervisor to gain access to the VMs and their data. It is
typically launched against type 2 hypervisors that run over a host OS although type 1 attacks are theoretically
possible. In reality, hyperjackings are rare due to the difficulty of directly accessing hypervisors.However,
hyperjacking is considered a real-world threat, and administrators should take the offensive and plan for it.
VM escape:A guest OS escapes from its VM encapsulation to interact directly with the hypervisor.This
gives the attacker access to all VMs and, if guest privileges are high enough, the host machine as well.
Although few if any instances are known, experts consider VM escape to be the most serious threat to VM
security.
Denial of service(DOS):These attacks exploit many hypervisor platforms and range from flooding a
network with traffic to sophisticated leveraging of a host’s own resources.The availability of botnets
continues to make it easier for attackers to carry out campaigns against specific servers and applications with
the goal of derailing the target’s online services.
Incorrect VM isolation:To remain secure and correctly share resources,VMs must be isolated from each
other.Poor control over VM deployments can lead to isolation breaches in which VMs
communicate.Attackers can exploit this virtual drawbridge to gain access to multiple guests and possibly the
host.
Unsecured VM migration:This occurs when a VM is migrated to a new host, and security policies and
configuration are not updated to reflect the change.Potentially, the host and other guests could become more
vulnerable.Attackers have an advantage in that administrators are likely unaware of having introduced
weaknesses and will not be on alert.
Host and guest vulnerabilities:Host and guest interactions can magnify system vulnerabilities at several
points.Their operating systems, particularly Windows, are likely to have multiple weaknesses.Like other
systems, they are subject to vulnerabilities in email, Web browsing, and network protocols.However, virtual
linkages and the co-hosting of different data sets make a serious attack on a virtual environment particularly
damaging.
Management Server Attacks: These can be considered part of external attacks. Attackers might attempt to
compromise the management server to gain unauthorized access to virtual machines and manipulate
resources. This can be categorized as an external attack.
VM Jumping: VM jumping is a form of lateral movement and is an example of an insider attack. It
typically involves an attacker with access to one VM moving to another VM within the same virtualized
environment. This is an example of an insider attack.
Hypervisor Attacks: Hypervisor attacks are critical, as they target the core of the virtualization
infrastructure. These can be categorized as external attacks because they aim to compromise the hypervisor
from outside.
VM Attacks: VM attacks refer to security concerns and vulnerabilities specific to individual virtual
machines. These can include unauthorized access to VMs, data manipulation, and more. Depending on the
context, they can be both insider and external attacks.
VM Migration Attacks: VM migration attacks can be considered a subset of external attacks. They
involve exploiting vulnerabilities during the migration process, potentially compromising VMs during the
move.
Administrative VM Attacks: Attacks on administrative VMs can be categorized as insider attacks, as they
involve malicious users who may misuse their knowledge about the cloud device.
KNOWN VIRTUALIZATION SYSTEM SPECIFIC ATTACKS:
• Malicious movement from one virtual machine to another within the same virtualization environment.
• The attacker identify two virtual machine likely in the same hosted physical hardware.
• Attacker wants the data from virtual machine A ( cannot directly get it) penetrate to virtual machine
B by trying to get access to virtual machine A.
• Attacker access to (less secure ) then attack the other. Attack hop from one virtual machine to
another and gain complete access to the hypervisors.
• Attacker attack all the virtual machine while the guest virtual machine attack mean the focus on
a single virtual machine and attack it.
POTETIAL ISSUES:
VM ESCAPE: Attacker attack hypervisor, the hypervisor escape. The attacker core access virtualized
infrastructure.
CROSS VM INFECTION: Infect multiple virtual machine with malware in the virtual machine, affect the
functionality (services).
DATA BREACHES: Attacker get access sensitive data in multiple virtual machine. Sensitive data’s are like
personal data, confidential business data and etc.
LATERAL MOVEMENT: Attempts to navigate and target the vulnerable systems/ sensitive data.
1. Hypervisor Security:
• Keep the hypervisor up to date: Regularly apply patches and updates to the hypervisor to
address known vulnerabilities.
• Implement strong access controls: Restrict access to the hypervisor to authorized
personnel only.
2. VM Isolation:
• Use security groups or network segmentation to isolate VMs: This prevents an attacker
from moving laterally between VMs.
• Employ network security tools: Implement firewalls, intrusion detection and prevention
systems (IDS/IPS), and network monitoring to detect and block unusual network
activity.
3. Secure VM Images:
• Ensure that VM images are free from vulnerabilities: Regularly update and patch the
operating systems and applications within VMs.
• Employ security software within VMs: Use antivirus and endpoint security software to
detect and prevent malicious activities.
4. Monitor VM Activities:
• Implement continuous monitoring: Use security information and event management
(SIEM) systems to monitor VM activities and detect suspicious behavior.
• Set up alarms and alerts: Configure alerts for unusual or unauthorized actions within VMs.
5. Access Controls:
• Implement strict access controls: Employ role-based access control (RBAC) to ensure
that only authorized users have access to VMs and the hypervisor.
HYPERVISOR RISKS:
• The hypervisor is the part of a virtual machine that allows host resource sharing and enables
VM/host isolation.
• Therefore, the ability of the hypervisor to provide the necessary isolation during intentional
attack greatly determines how well the virtual machine can survive risk.
• One reason why the hypervisor is susceptible to risk is because it’s a software program; risk
increases as the volume and complexity of application code increases.
• Ideally, software code operating within a defined VM would not be able to communicate or affect
code running either on the physical host itself or within a different VM; but several issues, such as
bugs in the software, or limitations to the virtualization implementation, may put this isolation at risk.
• The attacker creates a rogue element within a virtual machine. This rogue element contains
unauthorized code that they want to introduce into the virtualized system. They may attempt to
take control of the hypervisor, which is the software responsible for managing the virtual
machines.
• The attacker's goal is to essentially hijack the hypervisor and make it do their bidding. By doing
so, they can hide their actions and code from the regular security checks and monitoring tools.
• This allows them to operate covertly within the virtualized environment, making it challenging
for security measures to detect and remove their unauthorized activities.
• Hyper jacking is an attack in which a hacker takes malicious control over the hypervisor that
creates the virtual environment within a virtual machine (VM) host.
• The point of the attack is to target the operating system that is below that of the virtual machines so
that the attacker's program can run and the applications on the VMs above it will be completely
oblivious to its presence.
• Hyper jacking involves installing a malicious, fake hypervisor that can manage the entire server
system.
•
In additional to the execution of the rootkit payload, a poorly protected or designed hypervisor can
also create an attack vector.
• Therefore, a self-protected virtual machine may allow direct modification of its hypervisor by an
external intruder.
• This can occur in virtualized systems that don’t validate the hypervisor as a regular process.
VM Escape:
• Due to the host machine’s fundamentally privileged position in relationship to the VM, an improperly
configured VM could allow code to completely bypass the virtual environment, and obtain full root or
kernel access to the physical host.
• This would result in a complete failure of the security mechanisms of the system, and is called
VM escape.
• Virtual machine escape refers to the attacker’s ability to execute arbitrary code on the VM’s physical
host, by “escaping” the hypervisor.
• VM escapes could occur through virtual machine shared resources called VMchat, VMftp, vCAT,
and VMdrag-n-Drop.
VM MIGRATION:
• Migration VM attack is an attack on the network during VM migration from one place to
another. This attack is an exploit on the mobility of virtualization.
• Since VM images are easily moved between physical machines through the network,
enterprises constantly move VMs to various places based on their usage.
• Thus, when VMs are on the network between secured perimeters, attackers can exploit the
network vulnerability to gain unauthorized access to VMs.
• In some cases, attackers may initiate unauthorized VM migrations to gain control of VMs, leading to
security breaches.
• Similarly, the attackers can plant malicious code in the VM images to plant attacks on data
centres that VMs travel between.
• During migration, data is transmitted between the source and destination hosts. Attackers
can intercept and capture this data, potentially exposing sensitive information.
TYPES OF VM MIGRATION:
1. Live Migration:
• Definition: Live migration, also known as live VM migration or hot migration, allows a
virtual machine to be moved from one host to another while it's still running and serving
user requests.
• Use Cases: Live migration is commonly used to ensure uninterrupted service, load
balancing, or hardware maintenance without causing downtime.
• Challenges: It requires synchronization of memory and device states between the source
and destination hosts, which can be complex.
2. Cold Migration:
• Use Cases: Cold migration is often used for tasks like backups, archiving, or moving
VMs when service interruption is acceptable.
3. Storage Migration:
• Definition: Storage migration is the process of moving a VM's storage, including its
virtual disks and associated data, to a different storage location.
• Use Cases: Storage migration is used when you want to change the underlying storage for
a VM or optimize storage resources.
• Challenges: It may require additional time and resources, and it can impact I/O performance.
Cloud Security
• Cloud service providers must learn from the managed service provider (MSP) model
and ensure that their customers' applications and data are secure if they hope to retain
their customer base and competitiveness.
• Cloud environment should be free from abuses, cheating, hacking, viruses, rumors, and
privacy and copyright violations.
Example: Amazon’s “Simple Storage Service” [S3] is incompatible with IBM’s Blue Cloud, or
Google, or Dell).
• Customers want their data encrypted while data is at rest (data stored) in the cloud
vendor’s storage pool.
• Data integrity means ensuring that data is identically maintained during any operation
(such as transfer, storage, or retrieval).
• Data integrity is assurance that the data is consistent and correct.
• One of the key challenges in cloud computing is data-level security.
• It is difficult for a customer to find where its data resides on a network controlled by
its provider.
• Some countries have strict limits on what data about its citizens can be stored and for
how long.
• Banking regulators require that customers’ financial data remain in their home country.
• The Intrusion Detection System(IDS) and Intrusion Prevention Systems(IPS) detects
malicious activity at virtual machine level.
• The co-location of multiple virtual machines increases the threat from attacker.
• If Virtual machines and physical machine use the same operating systems in a cloud
environment, increases the threat from an attacker.
• A fully or partially shared cloud environment is expected to have a greater attack than
own resources environment.
• Virtual machines must be self-defending.
• Cloud computing provider is incharge of customer data security and privacy.
Software as a Service Security (Or) Data Security (Or) Application Security (Or)
Virtual Machine Security.
Cloud computing models of the future will likely combine the use of SaaS (and other
XaaS's as appropriate), utility computing, and Web 2.0 collaboration technologies to leverage the
Internet to satisfy their customers' needs. New business models being developed as a result of the
move to cloudcomputing are creating not only new technologies and business operational
processes but also newsecurity requirements and challenges
Log inspection
Virtual servers have security requirements identical to those of physical servers. The
same applies to the applications and services they host. Virtualization provides security benefits:
each virtual machine has a private security context, potentially with separate authentication and
authorization rules, and with separate process, name and file system spaces. Deploying
applications onto separate virtual machines provides better security control compared to running
multiple applications on the same host operating system: penetrating one virtual machine's OS
doesn't necessarily compromise workload and data residing in other virtual machines.
Nonetheless, some practices should be kept in mind to prevent virtualization from introducing
security vulnerabilities.
Additional care must be given to virtual machine disk images. In most cases the virtual
disks are made available over the network for migration and failover purposes. In many cases
they are files, which could easily be copied and stolen if the security of network storage is
compromised. Therefore it is essential to lock down the NAS or SAN environments and prevent
unauthorized access. An intruder with root access to a workstation on the storage network could
mount storage assets and copy or alter their contents. Use a separate network for transmission
between the storage servers and the Oracle VM hosts to ensure its traffic is not made public and
subject to being snooped. Make sure that unauthorized individuals are not permitted to log into
the Oracle VM Servers, as that would give them access to the guests' virtual disk images, and
potentially much more.
All of these steps require controlling access to the Oracle VM Manager and Oracle VM
Server domain 0 instances. Network access to these hosts should be on a private network, and the
user accounts able to log into any of the servers in the Oracle VM environment should be
rigorously controlled, and limited to the smallest possible number of individuals
cases such as service – to- service interaction, authentication involves verifying the
network service.
LDAP or Active Directory) that acts as a repository for the identity, credential, and user
attributes of the organization’s user pool. The directory interacts with IAM technology
components such as authentication, user management, provisioning, and federation services that
support the standard IAM practice and processes within the organization.
The IAM processes to support the business can be broadly categorized as follows:
User management: Activities for the effective governance and management of identity life
cycles
Authentication management: Activities for the effective governance and management of the
process for determining that an entity is who or what it claims to be.
Authorization management: Activities for the effective governance and management of the
process for determining entitlement rights that decide what resources an entity is permitted to access
in accordance with the organization’s policies.
Access management: Enforcement of policies for access control in response to a request from
an entity (user, services) wanting to access an IT resource within the organization.
Data management and provisioning: Propagation of identity and data for authorization to IT
resources via automated or manual processes.
Monitoring and auditing: Monitoring, auditing, and reporting compliance by users regarding
access to resources within the organization based on the defined policies.
Credential and attribute management: These processes are designed to manage the life cycle
of credentials and user attributes— create, issue, manage, revoke—to inappropriate account use.
Credentials are usually bound to an individual and are verified during the authentication process.
The processes include provisioning of attributes, static (e.g., standard text password) and
dynamic (e.g., one-time password) credentials that comply with a password standard (e.g.,
passwords resistant to dictionary attacks), handling password expiration, encryption management
of credentials during transit and at rest, and access policies of user attributes (privacy and
handling of attributes for various regulatory reasons).Minimize the business risk associated with
Identity impersonation.
Compliance management: This process implies that access rights and privileges are monitored
and tracked to ensure the security of an enterprise’s resources. The process also helps auditors
verify compliance to various internal access control policies, and standards that include practices
such as segregation of duties, access monitoring, periodic auditing, and reporting. An example is
a user certification process that allows application owners to certify that only authorized users
have the privileges necessary to access business-sensitive information.
Identity federation management: Federation is the process of managing the trust relationships
established beyond the internal network boundaries or administrative domain boundaries among
distinct organizations. A federation is an association of organizations that come together to
exchange information about their users and resources to enable collaborations and transactions.
capabilities, our assessment is that they still fall short of enterprise IAM requirements formanaging
regulatory, privacy, and data protection requirements. The maturity model takes into account the
dynamic nature of IAM users, systems, and applications in the cloud and
addresses the four key components of the IAM automation process:
• User Management, New Users
• User Management, User Modifications
• Authentication Management
• Authorization Management
IAM practices and processes are applicable to cloud services; they need to be adjusted to the cloud
environment. Broadly speaking, user management functions in the cloud can be categorize as
follows:
• Cloud identity administration, Federation or SSO
• Authorization management
• Compliance management
Cloud Identity Administration: Cloud identity administrative functions should focus on life
cycle management of user identities in the cloud—provisioning, deprovisioning, identity
federation, SSO, password or credentials management, profile management, and administrative
management. Organizations that are not capable of supporting federation should explore cloud-
based identity management services. This new breed of services usually synchronizes an
organization’s internal directories with its directory (usually multitenant) and acts as a proxy IdP
for the organization.
Federated Identity (SSO): Organizations planning to implement identity federation that enables
SSO for users can take one of the following two paths (architectures):
• Implement an enterprise IdP within an organization perimeter.
• Integrate with a trusted cloud-based identity management service provider.