APPROVED FOR RELEASE BY THE DNI ON 22 JULY 2025 Oversight Investigation & Referral 18 September 2020 The Intelligence Community Assessment (ICA) “Russia's Influence Campaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election”Why This Stuoy? The conclusions ofthe intelligence ‘Community Assessinent (ICA), “Russian Influence Compaign Targeting the 2016 US Presidential Election,” raised concerns about Russian attempts to undermine ‘confidence in the US election system, prompting a comprehensive examination of the ICA's analysis Investigators compared the ICA analyte tredecraft against the standards prescribed in intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 203, “Analytic Standards,” the primary guiding document for evaluation of analytic products for the Intelligence Community (IC) Investigators spent ‘over 2,300 hours reviewing the ICA and its source reports, mostly at CIA Headquarters in the compartmented ‘eports vault, and on outside related research. In addition, 20 interviews were conducted of intelligence officers or FBl agents who were associated with managing or drafting the ICA or the production of raw a5 ICA sources. 2. Improve peer review of controversial assessments involving limited-access intelligence 2. Require political appointees to recuse themselves from managing such assessments during a presidential transition, 3. Mandate that finished analysis, citing substandard raw intelligence reports include a context footnote explaining all factors that reduce confidence in the information. Most ICA judgments on Russia's activities in the US election employed proper analytic tradecraft and were consistent with observed Russian behavior. The key judgments found to be credible include: 1) President Putin ordered conventional and cyber influence operations, notably by leaking politically sensitive emails obtained from computer intrusions; 2} Putin’s principal motivations in these operations were to undermine faith in the US democratic process and to weaken what the Russians considered to be aan Inevitable Climon presidency; and 3) Putin held back leaking some compromising material for post-election use against the expected Clinton administration, In contrast to the rest of the ICA, the judgment that Putin developed “s clear preference” for candidate Trump and “aspired to help his chances of victory” did not adhere to the tenets of the ICD, Analytic Standards: ©. The Director of CIA (OCIA) ordered the post- election publication of 15 reports containing. previously collected but unpublished intelligence, ‘three of which were substandard—containing information that was unclear, of uncertain origin, potentially biased, or implausible—and those became foundational sources for the ICA judgments ‘that Putin preferred Trump aver Clinton. The ICA. misrepresented these reports as reliable, without ‘mentioning their significant underlying flaws. ° One scant, unclear, and unverifiable fragment of a sentence from ane ofthe substandard reports constitutes the only lasified information cited to suggest Putin “aspired” to help Trump win * The ICA gnared or selectively quoted reliable inteligence reports tht challenged—and in some cates undermined-—judgments that Putin sought to elect Trump © The ICA failed to consider plausible alternative explanations of Putin's intentions indicated by reliable intelligence and observed Russian actions > CIA picked five CIA analysts to write the ICA, and rushed its production in order to publish two weeks before President-elect Trump was sworn-in. Hurried coordination and limited access to the draft ‘reduced opportunities for the IC to discover rmisquoting of sources and other tradecraft errors.DETAILED FINDINGS ‘This is the unredacted, fully-sourced, limited- ‘access investigation report that was drafted and stored in a limited-access vault at CLA Headquarters. * «Although the principal findings of this report are identical to the Too Secret downgraded version prepared for members of Congress, this version ‘contains significantly more detailed ‘quotations from sensitive reports—to Include source descriptions from raw intelligence—and extensive footnotes citing raw intelligence reports and interviews of IC officers. © ., The names of IC officers quoted in the main text were omitted by prior agreement with the agencies, but are available in the footnotes of the original sourced copy, * Fineling #2: The Bulk of ICA Judgments Russia's Election Operations Ware Sound and Employed Proper Analytic Tredecraft ‘The majority found most ICA judgments on Russia's election activities to be well reasoned, consistent with observed Russian actions, properly documented, and~particularly on the cyber intrusion sections—employed appropriate caveats on sources and identified assumptions. The key ICA judgments that the Majority found credible are summarized below: ‘® Russian efforts to influence the 2016 US presidential election represent the most recent expression of Moscow's longstanding desire to undermine the US lipersi democratic order. © Russian intelligence services, acting on the orders of Russian President ihe ONI describes inteligence Cammunity Directive (C0) 203 Anolytic Standards as the document that Vladimir Putin, launched conventional and cyber influence operations—notably by leaking politically sensitive emails obtained from computer intrusions during the 2016 election. ° Putin's principal motivations in these infiuence operations were to advance ‘Moscow’s longstanding desire to undermine faith in US democracy, and to weaken from the start what the Russians considered to be an inevitable Clinton presidency a ° Putin held back leaking some compromising material to use against the expected Clinton Administration after they took office. The operations officers at CIA and NSA who produced the raw intelligence cited in the ICA showed great professionalism. © ClACollection Management Officers (CMOs) in particular, did an excellent job of employing detailed context statements that spelled-out evidentiary problems affecting the reliability of raw Intelligence. © Thedrafters of ICA did not accurately cite the most critical context statements (addressed in detail later inthis study) but the original raw reports were gonetheless professionally prepared Mall Finding #2: Significant Tredecraft Fallings Cast Doubt on ICA Judgmants of Putin's Intentions In contrast to the ICA’s other Judgments, the sections addressing Putin's intentions for influencing the US election did not observe professional criteria set forth in ICD 203, Analytic Standards “establishes the Intelligence Community (IC) analytic standards that govern the production and evaluation 7‘These failures were serious enough to call into question judgments that allege Putin “developed 2 clear preference for candidate Trump” and “aspired to help his chances of victory” and that “Aussi leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton aa ' “The ICA defined these as “high confidence” judgments based on a “body of reporting from multiple sources” (see box “Putin's intentions) a What the ICA Says: Putin's Intentions, *Wefurtherassess Putinand the | Russian goverment developed a clear preference for [candidate Truma). We have high confidence in these judgments” (emphasis added). cap 8. coup. af “CIA and FB! also assess with high confidence that Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help feancidate Trump's} chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton (emphasis added). pap 3 casei) “"\e assess thot Russian leaders never entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton." “When it appeared Secretary Clinton was likely to wvin the election, the Russian influence campaign began to focus more on undermining her future presidency.” ica page? fea ‘The ICA judgments on Putin's intentions failed ‘to adhere to the following analytic standards ‘within ICD 203: “Property describe quality and credibility of underlying sources." “Properly express and explain uncertainties associated with major analytic judgments. of analyte products; articulates the responsibility of intelligence analyst to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices.” © Base confidence assessments on “the quantity and quality of source material, 2 "Be informed by all relevant information available." > "Consider alternative perspectives and contrary information ‘i ® "Be independent of political considerations. Despite the ICA’s significant tradecraft failures, the assessment demonstrated awareness of the ICD standards In a section describing analytic proce 2 “These standards include describing sources (including their rellabiity and access to information), clearly exoressing uncertainty, distinguishing between underlying information and analysts’ judgments and assumptions, exploring alternatives .." © Acritical part of the analyst's task is to explain uncertainties associated with ‘major judgments based on the quantity ‘and quality of the source materia! (emphasis added) Unlike routine IC analysis, the ICA wasa high- profile praduct ordered by the President, directed by senior IC agency heads, and created by just five CIA analysts, using one principal drafter. Production of the ICA was subject to ‘unusual directives from the President and senior political appointees, and particularly OCIA. The draft was not properly coordinated within CIA or the IC, ensuring it would be published without significant challenges to its conclusions, ‘The tradecraft failures identified in this review are limited to sections of the ICA addressing Putin's intentions only. Because the ICA did not follow standard procedures for 2drafting or coordination within CIA and the IC, they should not be seen as an indication of systemic prablems with analysis from C1A, NSA or Fail Finding #3: The ICA Falled to Acknowiadzs ‘That Key Judgments on Putin's intentions Were Based on Raw Intelligence That Dig Not Meet ‘Tradecraft Standards ICD 203 instructs that inteligence tradecraft “properly describes quality and crediblity of underlying sources” to include factors affecting the reliability oftheir information, such as “source access, motivation, possible bias or ‘deception, and accuracy and completeness” (emphasis added). Accurate citation of raw intelligence reporting is critical to explaining to the reader the reliability of the evidence used to drive judgments, yet the ICA disregarded these fundamentals in sections that claimed Putin intended for Trump to win A Key classified reports, cited by the ICA In ‘support of judgments that Putin developed “a lear preference” for candidate Trump ang “aspired to help his chances of victory” contained ‘iaws in terms of clarity or reliability. The ICA omitted or obscured such information from context statements—that the CIA's Directorate of Operations had properly added to raw human source intelligence (HUMINT) reports—thus felling to warn the reader of significant flaws in the quality or creaibility of foundational sources. 3 MMIII C18 officers ais said that DCIA personally 2 ‘strongly preferred Republicans" does vat pete a MCE Tee © EEE 00. Seen rcar ne “Kremlin had found it easier to reach agreements with US Presidents from the Republican Party” and that this was because Republicans were “iess concerned with issues that were Unpleasant for Russia such as democracy and human rights.” 9 I 104 cd not Take the bastcanalvlestep, however, of comparing the plausibility of the unknown subsouree aims tothe documented policies of the past three Republican Presidents al of whom featured democracy and human rights 28 cornerstones of tel forelgn pales. f brings o mind President Reagan's famous quote, “Mr. Gorbachev tear down this wall” or President George W. Bush's comments on “the als of el.” © The information does not appear to make sense in the historical context, further raising the question of the reliability of the unknown subsource. By both obscuring that the reporting is from ‘an unknown source with unknown access and that the information does not make sense, the ICA leaves the reader unaware of the weakness of the evidence cited to support the major judgment on Putin's intentions. Reaot's Unknovs Even part of the ICA's own classified text—based on reliable reporting—contradicts the information contained in the third substandard report, This raised further questions about why, contrary to ICD 203 criteria, the third report was cited as evidence of Putin's intentions without further explanation [Some sentor Russian officials worried a Trump administration woula bring hardline I security advisers or that a Republican controlled Congress would not support measures that would be beneficial to \ 5,‘cautioned about the risks to Russia of a Republican Administration, noting that “those who would hold positions in la lnistration should he win will likely adhere to conservative anti-Russian positions.” MEE cfr, cots the historical record and source materials for the ICA's "annex 0: Historical Patterns of Russian Influence In US Elections’ indicate thet the A “strongly preferred Republicans” judgment glossed over details in the Annex—from reliable fources—that contradict the claims from the unknown source on Russia's historical preference for Republicans © MIB “there are no [Russian] plans to target any Democratic presidential candidate for active measures because any Democratic candidate is preferable to Prasident Reagan’, ‘© | Despite unknown sourcing, reliable contrary evidence, and implausible claims, the then Director of National Inteligence, James Clapper, responding to 2 request to double check the sourcing behind the judgment, responded ina letter to the Committee that he nonetheless endorsed the ICA Judgment (see box “DNI"). DNI Clapper Comments on ICA Citation of the Third Report “I have reviewed the underlying source ‘material myself and entirely concur in the judgment of the analysts, which | believe is consistent with standards of analytical tradecraft and objectivity.” [tener to Hrs, 32 sama 2027) The Ca Faisely Claimed he 2 Report Wi orore: v of ing. The ICA text is misleadingly drafted to suggest that some of the Qualities of candidate Trump aligned with Putin's preferences for international partners, citing the ‘third substandard report as evidence for the ICA judgment that "Putin developed a clear preference” for candidate Trump. 2 | The ICA further claimed information from the third report was corroborated by liaison, diplomatic, and press reporting, as well as sensitive signals intelligence (SIGINT). ©. Butin following-up every citation, none were found to corroborate the ICA claims. MEE The (C4 also used the third substandard report to claim that members (of Putin's “inner circle” had compared Trump to other leaders with “business interests" that Putin could work with, using this a part of the Supporting evidence for the judgment that Putin “aspired” to help Trump win. © NT The cites isison reporting didn’t mention Trump at all, and was from 2014, before Trump was a sandidatell © IIS The cited SiGiNT also didn’t mention Trump, and was © IIE The cited diplomatic report isa postelection overview of Moscow from the US Ambassador that references @ media opinion item by a Russian pundit suggesting that Trump anc Putin should “work together ike businessmen" which ishardly a corroboration of Putin's “inner circle” preferring Republicans or susinesemen ill 1© MME ronically, he same Embassy ‘cable quotes Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov as saying of Trump's election, “We do not feel any euphoria’ citing 2 “bipartisan anti-Russian consensus”, Which directly contradicts the ICA ‘Udement that the Russians preferred Trump. Finding #6: The IGA Excluded Significant Intelligence That Contre icted Its idgrnesre That Putin Asptrad to Help Trump Win 100 203 also instructs that intelligence analysts “must perform their functions with ‘objectivity and that judgments "must consider alternative perspectives and contrary information.” It further directs that “analysis informe relevant information available” (emphasis added), The ICA selectively omitted quates from key HUMINT and SIGINT reports that contradicted the judgments on Putin’s intentions while, conversely, It included quotes-—from those same HUMINT and SIGINT reports—that supported the ICA thesis. This was done multiple times, to include citations of two foundational sources for the ICA, This cherry picking of reports is an important indicator for evaluating ICA tradecraft, By selectively quoting a repot repaatediy, the ‘authors both demonstrated their regard for the value of the source, while simultaneously providing evidence of disregard for ICD 203 criteria on objectivity and consideration of contrary information, The ICA Selectively a Contradicted Judgi: Although the ICA quoted the reliable report four times, it omitted the most critical element of the report that strongly conflicted with the ICA major judgments on Putin’s intentions Mii ated o Key Reco s on Putin's Inter: MR ssc fron the ica was significant intelligence that ia HB 2 longtime Putin confidant, told a sensrive contact I that: ° MERE “Putin told him he did not care who won the election”; ° BR ons often outlined the weaknesses of both major candidates.” 9 RII 75 essere that, In either case, “Russia was strategically placed to outmaneuver either one.” MS 00s orrsivaience ‘about the two candidates is further supported by EEE —a1s0 omitted from the ICA }. Putin's made no positive mention of Trump. Instead, it revealed his pessimism that neither Trump nor Clinton would be able to crrect the strained relationship. although he indicated that there could be opportunities to gradually improve relations, he made clear that he didn’t have a preference for ether candidate, © RIE Reinforcing his ambivalence about the twa candidates Putin was pessimist that ether one could overcome strong ant-Russian political sentiment in Washington in the near term, but seemed wing to work wither intone Tamg nating a, there could be room to “yodaaiy id the bilateral dialogue of irritants," MR 1s theme was echoed by a iia | ae noted thet, "Regardless of who wins the election, Russia will be able to begin a 2fresh dialogue with the new administration” and that “Russia is ina stronger position than 8 years ago, "ill . JA Russian| said Tiss was lang for con Crimes cory bora "they knew where [she] stood and despite media stories, Russia could work with her”, code oS 2 “collaborative source with excellent sceese" but hows raporting had not been corroborated Mild A preoccupation of Russian officals and analysts was that neither Trump nor Clinton would respect Russia's strategic interests or treat Russia as an equal on the world stage, and it would take years to repair the relations, ee : a po MS wore thar, “regardless of the party affiliation” of the next President, the US would "not view Russia as an equal partner. 0 ics HIME cautioned, "Russia uncerstands that t should not labor under the illusion that relations will get better soon after the November US Presidential election” and that is “unlikely [Trump] wil be able to take stens to correct lations “it ¢ MR oti’: 0p Us experts echoed that view, noting it would take vears for Teump or Clinton to fix the relationship © The ICA Omisted Reliable Evidence That Putin's Key Advisers Saw Significant Downsides to Trump Presidency. The ICA selectively excluded information from reliable intelligence sources that senior Russian officials had serious reservation about how a potential Trump administration could be bad for Moscow and complicate repairing relations with Washington. The significance of that omission becomes apparent when reading the ICA's judgment of ‘what Russian officials thought, which pushed the “clear preference for Trump” judgment that was directly contradicted by the raw reports cited by the ICA as sources (see box “Russian Views"). What the ICA Says: Russian Views of Trump ‘To support the judgment, “Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government | developed a clear praference for [Trump] ovar Secretary Clinton” the ICA stated! “in late NN prepared an analysis for Russia's senior-most America experts i which he said the [Trump's] positive attributes—such as his perceived unwillingness to criticize Putin, his background as a businessman, and the presence of advisers viewed as positively Inclined toward Russian interests— ‘outweighed potential negatives such as (REI 4: 2 sun0 2016 Moscow conference on US politics, President Putin and two prominent Russian experts on US politics — Head of the USA-Canada Institute Sergey Rogov and Ambassador to Washington Sergey Kislyak— gave speeches on the implications for Russia of the US election. The format was an examination ff the pros and cans of a Trump victory. (EES 7 (Ca focused on the “pros” of Russian attitudes towards Trump, while ignoring the “cons” the Russians worried about in, ‘the event of a Trump victory. The Russian officials and America experts were thinking hard about all Implications, including that a Trump win might keep the House and Senate in Republican hands, and how that would be bad for Russia, a‘By omitting the below evidence, the ICA who won, Moscow expected a prolonged struggle denied the reader access to significant to repair strained relations with Washington. telligence that undermines the major judgment thet Pn prefered um ‘cena eee Was Excluded Frame Considerscion. Investigators ents _sualssdulaadinriere ated tenes LMU NSrGRWaNeT ton, etometinharatiorin gourds ofameatiy st ‘positions in [a Trump] Administration congressional privilege. The ICA glosses over the he win will there to likely significance of the unexamined additional ‘conservetive anti-aussian positions." ‘material to ICA judgments (see box a... Ueno), —___ that, “the implications of a [Trumo) | What the ICA Says: Unexamined Russian enemas! | yaa ‘Serious, Legislatively, a conservative | SRE EEE 's in possession of sala, Legit aconeratve Sar Seacatidcatecton, exfiltrated from US Government and think tank entities and dated at least which may further Inform the judgments inthis assessment. To dat, and developing Russizn-US relations.” il ° ES BD 012 clear that he "took exception’ toa “favorable view" of candidate Trump. He cautioned the IC have not reviewed this data.” ‘that there was “no basis for enthusiasm” | ‘optnate “b ICA, 0.5] simply because Trump refrained from -_ —_ us ng ra russiaTaeone Putin RBI Ths intelligence consisted of cyber data exfiltrated by the Russians, beginning in rhetoric 2014, from computer systems «(i aS os | RED specifically noted that itis and political groups and think tanks. “unlikely Trump willbe able to take steas to-correct relations” while (U) The ICA footnote affords the reader ne HERB ered thet Trump was unlikely to insight, however, inta why this evidence was not win and would be unable to improve US reviewed or the potential significance of the Russia relations if he did. additional material to ICA judgments. . ES eos 2 BEEBE 4 senior F81 analyst told REE ettributed his pessimism to investigators that there were “many factors beyond the control of Trump or victims" from these Russian nacks A Clinton, such as “Washington's inertia” = : i and “e-consensus among Washington 2 MEE the same analyst said that he argued that this intelligence should have been shared with the Directors! Fusion Cell analysts because it might have MEE (2-00 ssowings clarified the scope of Moscow's ‘consensus “clear preference for Trump”, the operational capabilites and potential evidence Indicates Putin and Russian officials saw feverggg From adaitiona|laflvence ‘downsides to a potential Trump administration fonts The intelligence also showed, that regardiess of pet echoed by 16© BBB the anaiyst explained that the (Obama Administration denied ICA drafters access to this intelligence on grounds of Executive or Congressional privilege a Finding #8: The ICA Disvegerded Russian Behavior That Undermined Its Judgment That Putin Aspired to Help Trump Win ICD 203 notes that analysis requires “clear and logical argumentation” and that all analytic Judgments should be effectively supported by relevant inteligence information and “coherent reasoning’ (emphasis added). © "Clear and logical argumentation” ‘would require the ICA to explain actions Putin took that damaged Trump, which ‘were contrary to the ICA's judgments. ©. Similarly, “coherent” reasoning ‘demands @ thorough analysis of why, if Putin “aspired” to help Trump win, he did not take actions available to him at critical moments in the campaign that were consistent with those objectives. © | “The ICA also should have examined the full scope of covert influence options available to Putin, and what his action and inaction say about his true Intentions. The ICA Ignored That Putin’s Decision Not zo Help Trump in the Closing Weeks of the Compcign Was Not Consistent With ICA Judgments. The ICA judged that Putin wanted to “yelp Trump's chances of victory when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton” and that he “never abandoned this objective.” Yet when the race evolved to the point that it became possible for Putin to help Trump win— ‘the polls narrowed dramatically as Election Day approached—the ICA did not address why Putin chose not to leak more discrediting material on Clinton in order to “help Trump's chances of victory. RE 4 v2:iety of intelligence sources indicate that Russian experts on US politics were following the election polls, briefing Putin on the status of the race, and providing analysis of where the candidates were heading, according to CIA analysts ai ° he cr warned Putin in early September that Teume would ection witha derogatory information on Clinton, according to ——e ° As the election entered the decisive final stages in October, Putin possersed proven, twist, cut-out platforms for [eating documents vie OCeaksom Wikileaks, and “Guccifer 2.0 and an arsenal of material on Clinton ill ee arieuar cermin fae kely would hove created greater scandals than material already leaked by the GR sae == (aaa Pica DERE €14 analysts confirmed that Moscow was ceceiving renorts of US election polling 15Clinton's strong (+7.0 percent) lead in mid= October gradually fell by over half (to +3.1 percent) by the end of the month, according to the Real Clear Politics average of key election polls. The lowest point came five days before the election, when her lead was down to just-+1.3 percent. During those decisive final three weeks of the election, new scandals might have been ‘expected to stand a good chance of sinking Clinton's struggling campaign (see box "Final ‘Three Weeks of the Campaign) i ‘The Final Three Weeks of the ‘Campaign: Real Clear Politics Pol] Average (Date [Clinton [Trump | Clinton (row fase pais Gino 7] ioe [490] e139) Ginton #74 ier [486 [424 | Gintonsé-s 20 Oct 48.5 424 linton +64 | moa [48a iT Ginton 6.2 moa [480 [ai | Ginter sei 70a [479] 420 | cinton 5.9 won [478 [423 | Ginton 55 30a [48a | 432 | Gimonss.a | [aeoct [4448.0 | clinton 54 Tok [478 (423 | Gimonss.6 | moc [ara 125 | Ginter a0 won | a7a | 425 _ | Ginton va [30d [are | 433 |Gantonvas soa [480/449] Cintonv3.4 sine [os [ss | cnenvea || nora PB Glen de] GSNov [465 45.0 | Clinton vis GENov [46644] Ginton vt.8 07 Nov a7. 1438 | Ginton+3.2 weno. [ HecTON pay | 1 “Clinton, shown in (Fev cay #2! D © Putin’s decision not to leak additional ‘derogatory information on Secretary Clinton as the polls narrowed undermines the ICA's claim that he “aspired” to help Trump win and “never entirely abandoned hope fora defeat of Secretary Clinton.” © EE ©.:i0s decision to stop leaking is consistent with alternative explenations—omitted by the CA—that Putin didn't care who wan because he saw weaknesses for Russia in both candidates. overi9.. The ICA mentioned that Moscow refrained from using “additional information." But It did so without addressing the strategic implicat he versus what was leaked, and how this speaks to Putin's objectives (see box “Moscow Could Have Done More”) What the ICA Says: Moscow Could Have Done More | MES“) 105cow had additions! information i obtained from {cyber collection against US government and nongoverament targets—such as reports on Secretary Clinton's health—that it coula have use agains Clinton Admiration’s policies and nominees, based on | 1 7 ‘We asters that Moscaw refrained from the full spectrum of | actions it could have taken to affect the US | election, We judge that the Kremlin could isciosed additional material..." jee ee RE 11 04's gocric Gescription of the material Putin held back makes the reader unaware of significant Information available to Moscow ta denigrate Secretary Clinton. This violated /CO 203 directives that analysis "be informed by all relevant information available” given that documents leaked duringthe election were far less damaging to Secretary Clinton than those Putin chose not to leak fill © RII As of september 2016, the Russian Foreign Inteligence Service (SVR) had Democratic National Committee (DNC) information that President Obama and party leaders found state of Clinton's be “extraordinarily alarming” and fet it ould have “serious negative Impact” on her election prospects, Her health information was being kept in ‘strictest secrecy’ and even close advisors were not being fully informed i + RBI The 512 possessed DNC communications that Clinton was suffering from “intensified psycho- emati Judi uncontrolled fits of anger, aggression, and cheerfulness." Clinton was placed on a dally regimen of “heavy tranquilizers” and while afraid of iosing, she remaines “obsessed with a thirst for power. El © MR The Sve also had information that Clinton suffered from “Typed diabetes, ischemic heart disease, deep vein thrombosis, and chronic ‘obstructive pulmonary disease,’ © MEE The SVR possessed ‘a campaign email discussing a plan tary Ci link Putin and Russian hackers to candidate, Trump in order to “distract the The Russian Federal Security ‘Service (FSB) published a report in early September ‘quoting "European government experts” that noted candidate Clinton was building her lead in battleground states, and that candidate Trump would hhave “only minimal chances” of winning unless he was “cable to take advantage of yet more revelations concerning CLINTON's work as Secretary of State and, in particular, the growing scandal surrounding her use of her government position to attract large donors to the Clinton Family Foundation.” The text suggests that Russian intelligence services were aware of candidate rican] public” from the Clinton emai server scandal Mi © MBI Te Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in August had details of secret meetings with multiple rramed US religious organkzations, in Which US State Department ‘representatives offered—in exchange for supporting Secretary Clinton — “significant increases in financing” from Oepartment funds and “the patronage” of State In dealing with “post-Soviet” countries. © EEE <5) Director ames Comey testified to the Committee that, in ‘August 2026, the SVR had DNC emails in which the head ofthe DNC “was telling people that [former attorney General h was work nrolme and keeping a named member of the Clinton campaign informed on what the FBl was doing in the {Ciinton] email investigation." © I 2 SVR ais0 naa information that the ONC leadership and Clinton's foreign policy advisors had heard that US allies "in London, Bertin, Paris, and Rome” were not optimistic about a Clinton Presidency. They had “expressed notes of doubt regarding her ability to perform the fun a f-state” and her election would "create Clinton's potential vulnerability to ethical issues, which ‘woul highlighted the potential value of leaking the details of the secret meetings offering State Department patronage to religious groupsin exchange for support ta the Clinton campaign. The ClAredacted source details ofthis report, however, so itis difficult. +0 assess the value ofthis intelligence without latifestion of source access, relabilty, or motivation, itis also not clear, because of redactions, if this. information went to President Putin or his Presidential Administration staff. The ICA did not quote this report, v7Unfavorable conditions for advancing the foreign policy interest of the Us.” i © REE The Sv2 reported in January 2016 that ithad information taken from 2 US think tenk indiceting thet a high ranking offical n the Democratic National Committee (ONC) knew about the application of political pressure on the FBI in the Clinton eral investigation by 2 high ranking official ofthe US Department of Justice ill © BREE © Viarch 2016, the ‘SVR had intercepted discussions between a high-ranking ONC official and a US non- governmental organization indicating ‘that a Clinton staffer was receiving, updates on the FBI's Clinton email Investigation from a high ranking Department of Justice official il Its difficult to justify the ICA judgment that Putin “aspired!” to help Trump win by discrediting Secretary Clinton, given that in the closing weeks of the campaign—when such devastating leaks could have been decisive—President Putin elected not to inject this material into the campaign. ‘At a minimum, the ICA should have identified this contrary evidence and addressed it. By not including this significant intelligence, the CIA violated ICD 203 directives that analysis “should be informed by el relavant information avsilabie” and that assessments “must not be distorted by, ‘or shaped for, advocacy ofa particular audience or agenda, While the ICA dia not address the significant strategic implications ‘of what was held back, it does speculate on possible SVR tactical motives to explain Putin’s decision to stop leaking after October (see bax Speculation on Tactical Priorities). | __ What the ICA Say ‘Tactical Priorities : Speculation on SVR officers \were protective of the accesses they used to derive intelligence reports for Putin... and may have argued to prevent the disclosure of ‘non-public material. that, if disclosed, would have endangered continued collection on US decisionmaking” emphasis added). ca ps3) The ICA speculation about SVR tactical priorities doesn’t make sense, given that the media had already reported on Russian intrusions into DNC servers by June, Sa" accesses were already blown by the GRU leaks and subsequent media reports and forensic investigations by private US companies, © The cyber security company CrowdStrike had done an analysis of the attacks on DNC servers, and company officials testified that security measures had been improved. ai The ICA pointed out that politically sensitive decisions to leak or not were made by President Putin personally. Sot stil wauld have been his call— regardless of ICA speculation on what the SVR might nave argued—to hold back material uring, the critical final three weeks of the election, Putin's strategic priorities would have trumped any SVR tactical concerns about accesses 18ie The ICA Did Not Atcempt to Explain Russi. Leaks to Damage Trump That Were Inconsi With ICA Judgments on Putin's Intentions. The ICA does not directly address the GRU's September leaks of emails that were embarrassing to Trump and highly critical of his character. ICD 203 tradecraft standards Indicate that the reader is owed an explanation for such contrary evidence, which is at odds with ICA assumptions behind the thesis that Putin “aspired” for Trump to win. ‘The GRU-associated DcLeaks.com in September 2026 leaked emails belonging to Colin Powell, the former Republican Secretary of State under President George W. Bush, according to media reports and forensic information. In the leaked emails, Secretary Powell attacked the character of candidate Trump: * Donald Trumps “e national disgrace ‘and.an international pariah. All his es and nonsense just pile up .. | just go back to the unforgivable one. Trying to destroy the President elected by the American people with his fictitious investigation into his source of bicth. Absolutely disgraceful.” ¢ "Trump is taking on water. He doesn't have a GOP philosophy or even a ‘conservative philosophy, il These leaks were contrary to the ICA judgments about Putin’s intentions to help Trump, Yet instead of addressing the issue, the ICA only acknowledged that additional Russian ‘compromises of US systems occurred, without tackling the significant implications of why Putin would want to hurt Trump. The ICA only notes that additional Russian compromises of US systems "may have" occurred (see box “Targeting Republicans"). What the ICA Says: Targeting Republicans GR “The GRU cosy have compromised additional personal email accounts of leading US political figures from both parties, judging from onthe extent of its spearphishing campaign from March through June” (emphasis). p11 MN +9005) v2 Russian collection on some Republican- eit center tne aig eaters estan fees {[___ ‘related information ica. 9.7 if Putin wented Trump ta win, it would seem logical that he would aot have leaked anti-Trump materia ©. Leaking the Powell emails that discredited Trump would make sense, however, if Putin didn’t care who won, © Discrediting Trump would also be consistent with Putin's objectives to undermine faith in the US democratic process and to fuel divisions in the country, The ICA Also Felled to Adequately Exar the Disparity in tne Scope of Russian Leaks Involving Clinton ane Frum2. The ICA stops with simply stating the fact that this occurred (ses box "Additional Compromises of US Political Figures.") ‘What the ICA Says: Additional Compromises of US Political Figures Je assess ‘that the SVR and GRU both conducted cyber operations against targets ‘associated with the 2016 US presidential election, inciuding targets associated with both major US political parties."ica, 4) 19‘The ICA leaves the reader to assume Russia's ‘unequal leak activates were another data point confirming the thesis that Putin aspired to help ‘Trump win. But the ICA fails to consider that ‘Moscow likely had substantially fewer documents available on Trump. ©, Clinton's communications profile was larger and more exposed, as she ran a well-funded conventional campaign, connected to the Democratic National Committee (ONC), ©» Trump's smaller staffand unconventional campaign, by contrast, ‘was less integrated with the Republican National Committee, and presented @ smaller footprint and fewer apportunities for Putin to breach than was the case with Clinton's more traditional campaign. ©. Clinton was also likely to have been 2 priority Russian intelligence collection ‘target for @ much longer time than Trump (this was her second run for President and she was a high profile political Personality for some 25 years). The ICA Notes, by contrast, that Moscow only considered Trump a “fringe candidate” prior to the summer of 2016. The ICA Falie to adequately Address tne Likelinoad Taat Russian Intelligence Services ‘onai—Fossibly Voluminous—Damaging iefornration on Sasretary clinton. The IGA details the methods Russia employed to leak emails, but does not give sufficient consideration to Clinton's vulnerability to other collection, or the capabilities of Russian intelligence services to collect nan-cyber sources, such as audio or video surveillance of private meetings or intercepts of her private calls with foreign leaders, Ooama ‘Administration officials, campaign managers or advisers, or other sensitive conversations, * © Secretary Clinton would have been a Russian intelligence collection target for some 25 years, first as a politically active First Lady, then as. Senator on the ‘Armed Services Committee, the Secretary of State, and as a two-time presidential candicate, © Her extensive travel overseas as Secretary of State—inciuding to Russia— would have created situations where she was more vulnerable to various Russian Intelligence surveillance and monitoring capabilities. © FBI Director Comey stated publicly in July 2036 that Secretary Clinton's careless security practices increased her vulnerability to inteligence collection ‘We know that Putin held back significant ‘derogatory material that he had on Secretary Clinton. But tis probable that he had more that ‘what was contained in the ICA source material Finding #8: The ICA Mi Documents on Putia’s Int ICD 203 states that proper tradecraft “makes accurate judgments and assessments.” Accurate judgments require that raw reports be correctly quoted, and significant “contrary information” that does not support the judgments be included and explained, Significant reports cited in support of Judgments of Putin's intentions were not quoted Accurately. were not quated in context, or were selectively quoted to omit evidence that undermined ICA major judgments. Moreover, critical information that undermined source credibility and veracity of key reporting was ‘omitted from both the ICA text and the subsequent briefings of the document tot! President-elect, the US Congress, and the White House staff. 20A Key Russior Polltical Assessment Wos Incorrectly Cited As Supporting the ICA judgment That Putin Aspired te Help Trumz Jn. The (CA falsely cited an analysis of the US elections by Russian experts on American politics as evidence of Putin's intentions. On closer examination of the raw intelligence, however, the report was not only badly misquoted, it provided additional evidence that Putin didn’t care if ‘Trump won or not, the opposite of the ICA ent that it was alleged to st MERE 2021): following American poltics II sent their ‘assessment of the final two months of the US ec iD examined the prospects for candidates Trump and Clinton, and various factors that could influence the outcome. ME 1's report revealed what Putin was being told by| IEE, which might have influenced his thinking. tt was obtained from —— acm << FAR analysts speculated that Republican Speaker Ryan wanted candidate Trump to lose, so Ryan could run against President Clinton in 2020, and that “traditional Republican supporters” were fusing to assist candidate Trump! © MR Tre 2ssessment predicted Trump would lose the election, based on a host of factors, and that the only way he might win was f he obtained “remarkable compromising material” on Secretary Clinton. assessed with a high degree of probability that, “regardless of who won" pelther candidate uid lew Russia os, an equal petne lll ‘The ICA cites this report using a misleading topic sentence, “We assess that Russian leaders ever entirely abandoned hope for a defeat of Secretary Clinton” (see box "Misrepresenting a Key Russian Assessment”) What the ICA Says: Misrepresenting a Key Russian Assessment | there were four bullets of evidence under the ICA judgment that the Russian influence campaign “aspired” to help candidate Trump win. The third bullet—citing the Russian analytic report—says RR Ws bromramenmmte i ned hope for a di \f Secret | Clinton. KN assessed for Russian | leadership RR the only way to improve [Trump's] chances was if his ‘campaign had sufficiently derogatory information at its disposal about Secretary Ciinton, "(emphasis added) tc 3 ‘The wording implies that reliable reporting ‘supports the judgment. But the actual cited intelligence says something quite different Specifically, the raw report: + 0 1: See ie ee eter isin aefeatg Conn, aos ev i tha worl -hipe Graivier phneng 2° BREE D005 not in any way describe the aspirations, plans or Intentions of Putin or other Russian leaders Ma © IE D005 not describe Putin’s “aspiration to help Trump's chances of victory” nor does it propose Contrasig Clinton unfavorably to Trump, 2RR Fe ct ec anaycic report is nothing more than clinical analysis of actors affecting the election contest, written by iB political analysts. ill -. The assessment is intended to inform ‘Putin of factors that might affect the election, not to tell him what his abiectives ought to be. The ICA points ‘out that sensitive decisions on Russia's covert influence policy are made by Putin personally, and it would thus be inappropriate in the Russian lligence ans e Presi is goals ough’ regarding candidate Clinton: \ TheICA cites no other classified report to make the case that Putin “never entirely abandoned hope for 2 defeat of Secretary Clinton.” anak tual undermines the broader ICA judament that Putin “aspired” to hele Trump win, to include the secondary judgment.that Putin “never abandoned hope” for defeating Clinton 0 A ep 0t demonstrated that Putin's intelligence analysts warned him that candidate ‘Trump was likely to lose without “remarkable compromising material” on Secretary Clntongpat would “serait pecans ¢ EEE +; deseites earlier in this investigation report, Putin did possess “remarkable” compromising material on candidate Clinton, and not ‘only did he hold it back, he did so when it ‘mattered most in the closing weeks of ‘the campaign as the polls narrowed. The ICA thus not only misquotes the report, but falls to adhere to /CD 203 directive to address “contrary information’ such as why Putin chose not to help Trum in such help would be critical to Trump having any chance of winning the election. REE 15 fusion anayticreport also provides evidence—supported by ther classified reports from multiple sources—thet some Russian officials and experts believed there was little difference between candidates Trump and Clinton in terms of helping Moscow's strategic interests, o I he BB reo0r: concludes By nating "with a high degree of confidence” that US Russa relations are unikcely to improve sexargls ot which candidate” were to win, Es. : Sere i etir Create would improve elton with Moscow woul hardy be likely to cause Putinto take ation tor one candidate Sk er har Masato eat preference orTramp, The conclusion tMatrettertandaate would good for Rusia appents ta bev conltent hema emiong Rss intelligence and diplomatic experts, according to other HUMINT, SIGINT and giglomatic reporting detailed in tis assessren The ICA included a two-page summary ofa series of anti-Trump political opposition research reports—which have collectively come to be known as "the dossier” in the media—that was produced on behalf of the Democratic National Committee (DNC) and the Clinton campaign—by former British intelligence officer, Christopher Steele. The dossier's most significant claims—that Russi launched cyber activites to leak political emalls—were little more than a regurgitation of stories previously published by multiple media outlets prior to the creation of the dossier. Other dossier reports 22‘were either proven false or were unsubstantiated, and these largely disparaged candidate Trump's character and alleged collusion between him or his campaign and Russian inteligence in a criminal conspiracy to influence the US 2016 election Ml ..: Contradicting public claims by the DCIA that the dossier “was not In any way” Incorporated into the ICA, the dossier was referenced in the ICA main body text, and further detailed in a two- page ICA annex (see box “Fourth Bulle’) What the ICA Says: Fourth Bullet of Evidence Putin Aspired to Help Trump Inthe CIA main body text, the key judgment ‘We assess the influence of victory’ was followed by four bullets of supporting evidence. The fourth bullet referred the reader to a detailed summary and analysis of the dossier: . a ian plans and intentions, please see Annex A: Additional Reporting from an FBI Source (on Russian Influence Efforts. cs p3) The ICA "Annex A” summarized the Dossier anti-Trump allegations, and included some analysis that struggled to imply that some dossier findings might have been corroborated by Intelligence. The lead author af ICA, a CIA officer. sald that he drafted the Annex A in coordination. ‘with FBI, even though FBI had provided the dossier information via a memo from their Assistant Director, Counterintelligence division +. By devoting nearly two pages of ICA text to summarizing the dossier in a high profile assessment intended for the President and President-elect, the ICA misrepresented both the significance and crediblity ofthe dossier repors. ©. The ICA referred to the dossier as “aussian plans and intentions,” falsely implying to high-level US policymakers that the dossier had intelligence value for understanding Moscow's influence operations. Even though the dossier information was unclassified, the dossier summary was only included in the highest classified version of the ICA that was briefed to President Obama and President-elect Trump, and was seen by various national security officials and senior political appointees. It was omitted from both the Top Secret version of the ICA released for Congress, and the unclassified, public-release version. 2 Byrelegating the dossier text to only the highest classified version of the ICA, the authors were better able to shield the assessment from scrutiny, since accesses to that ICA version was so limited: ‘The DCIA Rejected Reauzsis Frown Ci Professionals That the Dossier 82 Keat Ou the ICA. ClAanalysts and operations officers led to explain how the ICA—written for ‘two Presidents and other high-level officials— could have included dossier information without, Identifying and vetting primary sources and without explaining the political circumstances surrounding why the report was produced and funded. violated so many ICD 203 directives, that the text, would normally not have passed first-line supervisor review at CIA, FB! or other IC agencies, Moreover, the dossier made outlandish claims and was written In an amateurish conspiracy and political propaganda tone that invited skepticism, If not ridteule, over its content. ©. Twosenior CIA officers—one trom Russia operations and the other from Russia analysis—argued with OCIA that the dossier should net be included at all inthe ICA, because it failed to meet basic 23tradecraft standards, according to a senior officer present at the meeting, lil 2 The seme officer said that OCIA refused to remove it, and when confronted with the dossier’s many flaws responded, “Yes, but doesn’tit ring tue ©. ClAveterans noted that they could ‘not imagine any previous director allowing such information in a formal CIA product, much less one intended for two Presidents, and then overriding the objections of experienced senior officers to do so. ©. Every CIA analyst and operations officer who was asked about the “dossier” took pains to emphasize that they had nothing to do with the decision to include Annex A, could not vouch for I, did not believe it should have been included, and some CIA officers blamed FBI officials for adding it to the ICA © Explaining the analytic debate over ‘the dossier, a FBI senior analyst said that CIA didn’t want it in the ICA because they “were not comfortable with the sourcing.” Echoing comments by CIA officers discus the three substandard CIA HUMINT reports, the FB senior analyst said that they were told by FBI ‘leadership that all material, regardless of traditional sourcing standards, was to be made available in drafting the ICA, ©. “Our instructions were that anything we had was to be used .. we were to, ‘push this “ill © When pressed to explain the decision, the analyst said that FBI leadership decided "it was the right thing to do” but ‘in mid-January, four months before this interview, the F8l met with Mr. Steele's prinepal subsource, and found that he did not have access te Russian covert that “we were not able to verify It [the dossier].” © The senior analyst also addressed the poor sourcing, noting that “we were fing ine who the Steele subsources were, The question is, who are these people? Are they credible? We need to qualify the path of how this got to'Steele”” He further noted that, "/m not comfortable that we don’t know how a this got te St The analyst did not say that any FBI personnel objected to the inclusion of the dossier in the ICA, as was clearly the case at CIA. The analyst's words were carefully chosen, however, highlighting strong concerns over unverifiable sourcing of dossier reports and thelr chain of acquisition. The FBI would not aliow any other analysts to be interviewed, and it would be Interesting to meet with other about thelr views of the dossier and the ICA, ‘The FBI Assistant Director of the Counter- intelligence Division and one of his senior officers, acting on behalf of their Director, pushed to have the Dossier woven throughout the main text of the ICA, according to CIA and FBI analysts. i) ® Ultimately, the decision of how to handle the dossier was jointly made by the Directors of CIA and FBI, who overruled the objections trom Cia officers, and agreed to reference it with other ICA text bullets describing Putin's intentions, while placing the details of the dossier in the ICA Appendix A, according to senior CIA officials. 2 The decision by the two directors was, confirmed by the FBI senior analyst who sald, “it was debated for several days upper levels (at FB! and CIA} decided to action plans, that he was not credible, and most of what he reported was fabricsted or poorly sourced hearsay.puttin’ and by @ memo for the record written by Director FBI, in which he told White House officials that "I thought it very important that it be included.” i The ICA Ignored Abundant Evidence Ti Steale’s Alleged Source Network Did Not Appe2: Cradible, Forat least four months prior to the Publication of the dossier, the FBI possessed indications that the alleged source network behind the dossier was implausible, and that Christopher Steele was dishonest, based on Interviews with the FBI agent who handled Mr. Steele (until he was fired—for being dishonest— by FI in October 2016). =" Even a cursory examination of the dossier documents revealed that the only significant verifiable information had come from media stories. Ignoring ICD 203 directives to “properly describe quality and credibility of underlying sources," the ICA made no effort to address the implausible qualities of Steele's alleged high-level Russian agent network. © The dossier author claimed to have a ‘network of sources with access to at Putin’ asitive covert action plans and objectives, information that would be exceptionally sensitive, closely held, and subject to Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) countorintelligence monitoring © © TheICA leaves the reader to wonder how an experienced British intelligence officer like Mr. Steele—after developing such a seemingly priceless network— ‘would risk exposing his sources by giving their reports to numerous media outlets ‘or political clients with the intent of making them public? ©. Atleast as early as September 2026, Mr. Steele was offering his dossier reports to a dozen media outlets, all of ‘whom refused to publish them until ‘Buzzfeed.com did so on 10 January 2017, following leaks to CNN thatthe FBI Director briefed the dossier to President- elect Trump ifthe reports from Mr. Steele's alleged source network were accurate, their -ublication in the media would have tr ere FSB counter-inteligence ‘nwestigation. * ‘Standard FSB practice would have counterinteligence officers compare the published classified information to the small citle of individuals with access to Putin's covert action plans, and use interrogations, polygraphs, computer forensics, surveillance, travel records, and other methods to identify the culprits. ° ‘That Steele deliberately exposed the dossier to the media suggests that he elther knew the information to be fabricated, ordidn'tcare about his assets! safety, possibly because his alleged network lacked eny meaningful access to Putin, his inner circle, or genuine covert action plans. Mr, Steele raised more red flags—ignored by the ICA—when he delivered the dossier reports to the FBl using a circuitous route that bypassed USand UK intelligence authorities in London, and appeared designed to get the material into ‘official FBI channels while minimizing the prospects for scrutiny of his suspect source network. Mr. Steele, who resided in London, delivered the first dossier reports to FBI in early July 2016, He could have easily passed the reports in London via the British Secret Intelligence Service, the FBI Legal Attaché, or the CIA Station. But he instead exploited an old contact at FBI with whom he had warked on unrelated criminal matters years prior. He persuaded the agent, who was based In Rome, to fly to London in early July 2046 to retrieve the documents, fly the documents back to Rome on a commercial flight, 25‘ang then pass them back to FI Headquarters, according to the agent who received the dossier °°, Delivering the documents to Washington via British intelligence or the ‘American Embassy in London would have been more convenient and secure, and Mr. Steele had established British and ‘American intelligence contacts in London i @ The Rome-hased FAI agent admitted that he had no intelligence training, nor slid he have experience working with foreign intelligence services, but he had worked with Steele previously on an unrelated criminal matter ll © The FB agent also said he accepted the dossier reports from Steele without ‘getting even basic source information or in bs something a trained intel would have insisted on, The agent said he trusted Steele because, "He had been helpful on a past criminal case” and “seemed professional.” il © The agent also noted that he was not sure how to handle reporting of this Nature, and had to discuss dissemination ‘methods with colleagues in the FBI's New York Field Office where he was previously assigned Mr. Steele refused to be interviewed for this investigation, but as @ former intelligence officer, he had to know that experienced British or ‘American intelligence professionals probably would have balked at using official channels to transmit to Washington unsourced gossip that ‘appeared to have political motivations. Doing so would have called into question their tradecraft judgment and risked being viewed in Washington £28 using thelr office to advance partisan smears of a US presidential candidate: © The dossier’s unknown souring falled ‘to meet basic tradecraft standards required of US and British field intelligence reports, ® Steele's unsubstantiated claims of network in Moscow would have appeared fanciful to a professional, and even raised counterintalligence concerns ‘that the dossier might be Russian disinformation. ©. Itisnoteriously difficult to run sources aut of Moscow, and Steele was unable to demonstrate that he had such resources, much less that they were vetted, per discussions with the FBI analyst © The dossier tone and content appeared to be dubious, and was highly political and specifically intended to denigrate candidate Trump. ‘The Romme-based FB! agent testified that he was contacted in September 2016 by a senior Department of Justice official who had met with Steele that same month, and had been speaking or texting regularly with Mr. Steele, The official's wife worked for the company (Fusion GPS) that Contracted with Steele to produce the dossier. The official wanted to verify that the documents had been received by FBI Headquarters and were being used by the FB! investigation team looking © Steele was thus able to successfully cexpioit his previous relationship with a senior Justice Department official and an FBI agent who exclusively worked criminal investigations to get the dossier to Washington in official channels, where they might carry an air of credibility they would not otherwise have = Indeed, when the dossier summary was sent to CIA Headquarters by the FBI Assistant Director for Counterintelligence, it was described as coming from a “confidential human source” and the paragraphs were classified SECRET NOFORN ORCON 26(originator controlled), as iit were legitimate inteligencei © =" The same FBI agent also testified that Steele had been touting his relationship with the FBI when he tried to persuade media outlets to publish his dossier, lustrating the vz the FBI association Ml Although the agent who received the Steele dossier came from the criminal investigations side of FBI, that was net the case with the personnel in the CROSSFIRE HURRICANE team at Fal Headquarters (a group of F8l agents and analysts charged with investigating Trump Campaign ties to Russia). © 4 The CROSSFIRE team was comprised of veteran Fal Counterintelligence Division agents and analysts. ‘©. Itissurprising, therefore, that FBI CROSSFIRE team was willing, without further vetting, to rely on the dossier to secure surveillance warrants on US citizens, and push to include it in the ICA, given its many sourcing, bias, and ‘credibility protien ill ‘Citing the Dossier, the ICA Violated ICO 203 Tenets For Proper Source Description. While referring to the Dossier as “additional reporting” ‘of Putin's intentions, the ICA failed to mention significant information—known to the FBl during ‘the drafting process—that speaks to source bias and credibility. According to the Fa! agent responsible for obtaining the dossier and other sources, prlor to incorporating the Dossier into the IGA, Mr. Steele: * (Told a senior Department of Justice official in September 2016 that he was “desperate that Donald Trump not get elected and was passic sotbelog resident lll © Told an FBI agent on 1 November 2016 that he was angry at the F31 Director for reopening the investigation into the Clinton email scandal © Was terminated by the FBI ona. November 2016 for being dishonest after the FBI learned he had vielated his agreement with them by discussing with the media the dossier and his FBI relationship il ©. Told the FBI and media sources that he was angry that the FBI was investigating Secretary Clinton's email server scandal instead of Trump's ties to Russia. ©. Had admitted to be working for Fusion GPS, a political messaging company being retained by the Clinton Campaign and the Democratic National ‘Committee (DNC) to gather and disseminate anti-Trump disinformation, £8y omitting these vital problems affecting source credibility, the ICA violated ICD 203 directives that analysis “properly describes quality and credibility of underlying sources” affecting source quality and credibility, including “source access, validation, motivation, and possibie bias,‘ The Dossier Was tisieadingly Describes Using Intelligence Terminology That Imptle Was Fram e Legitimate FBI UMINT source. The ICA further lent an inaccurate sense of credibility to the dossier by describing it using intelligence terminology, but without addressing all of the serious intelligence tradecraft red flags that characterized the dossier. Reporting from “an FBI source” implies that the information was acquired following standard source validation and that any shortcomings would highlighted to the reader. This did not occur in the ICA. © The ICA misleadingly described the dossier as coming from “an FBI source.” But Mr. Steele was not an FBI source as he had already been fred two manths 27,before the ICA was published for lying to ‘the Bureau, critical information that should have been clarified. 2 ‘+The ICA also describes dossier Information as collected from "a layered network of identified and unidentified subsources” although the ICA did not clarify that FBI and CIA had so few details on the alleged network, that they didn’t know ifthis material was all or in part fabricated by Mr. Steele, his subsources, or if ft was Russian disinformation fed to ‘the subsources i ©, While generically mentioning Steele's alleged network included “identified and unidentified subsources", the ICA omitted that Fl and CIA could nat verify ‘the dossier chan of acquisition or the accesses, reliability, motivations, biases, and reporting records of any of the alleged subsources wha actually acquired the Information. The ICA Mode Faise, IMisleading, 0 complete Statements in Summarizing the Dossier. Compounding the tradecraft errors on identifying source credibility, the ICA also included statements that, through misstatement cor omission, were false or misleading based on publicly released FBI information, media reporting, and other classified sources. ‘The nature of these misleading statements Indicates the ICA author intended te distract the reader from the many tradecraft problems that made the dossier unreliable. This raises ‘questions about why the Directors of CIA and FBI insisted this material be incuded. & The ICA claimed the source “collected this information on behalf of prvete clionts” while falling to note those clients—the DNC and the Clinton ididate Trums’s politic opponents, information known to the FBI at the time. This was extraordinarily important for assessing source motivation and the veracity of his reporting, and it was intentionally omitted based on analysis of the testimony of Steele's FBI handler, Fusion GPS officials, and media exposures ofthe relationship © The |CAalso excluded that the political messaging firm that hired the dossier author, Fusion GPS, was also working on behalf of Russian interests to uncover information that was shared with the Kremlin, raising serious counterintelligence concerns over ssi is A dossier ® The [CAmisleadinely daimed that “the source...was not compensated for {the dossier information] by the FBI,” when in fact the FB! had authorized payment of $25,000 to Mr. Steele for his Initial work on the dossier prior to his termination, according to the FB agent working the case. (He didn’t receive the money because the F8t bureaucracy had not processed the payment fast enough before Steele was fred.) © tis not clear why did the ICA authors decide to cover-up these payments. © Given the poor quality and bias of dossier reporting, this also raises Questions sbout the motivations ofthe FB! leadership, in particular, who used Use government funds to pay for iunk produced bye political campaign Mi The IGA falsely clajmed that Mr. Steele's reporting “appears to have been acquired by multiple Western press organizations starting in October” when the FB! knew—pecause Mr. Steele told them—that he had delivered the dossier to the media well before that. © According to the testimony of the FBI agent and later confirmed by Mr. Steele's ‘own testimony in a British court, Mr 28,Steele had peddled the dossier to five ‘major media outlets at least as early as September 2016. Moreover, on 23, September, the US news outlet Yahoo! published an article about the dossier sourced to Mr. Steele. The dossier was not accidently “acquired” by probing Journalists, 2s the ICA suggests. It is not ‘lear why the ICA covered-up that the dossier was deliberately fed to the media by the FI former source, Mr. Steele, as political messaging (on behaif of the Clinton campaign and ONC. The ICA analysis of the dossier also did not take the form of a defensive counterintelligence briefing, as The Director of FBI and Department of Justice officials testified. The credibility of the FBI Director's claim that the dossier needed to be Included in the ICA to “warn the President that it ‘was out there” is destroyed by the fact that the ‘most essential evidence affecting the credibility of the dossier was intentionally omitted by FBI and Cia ©... Atrue defensive briefing, ostensibly to warn Trump of Russian threats to himself or his staff, would not have ‘omitted so much key information, nor would it have excluded information on can associates, such as Carter Page. ©,» Italso would have been inappropriate to share defencive briefing date ina document disseminated to C\A analysts and 250 other US government officials, including appointees who were candidate ‘Trump's political opponents lll By leaving out so much critical information— the dossier’ origins, purpose, sponsors, and source bias—all of which would have undermined the product's credibility, the ICA falsely encouraged senior policymakers to draw alarmist conclusions about the dossier's significance that were not warranted by evidence, This was subsequently confirmed by numerous questions and concerns about the dossier—voiced by President Trump and the White House staff— after the publication of the (CA The ICA Misleadingly Claimed That Some 2) the Dossier Was Carraborar=". The ICA further claimed “Iimitec” intelligence corroboration of Steele's information, but failed to mention that his dossier was produced after Russian election hacking operations had already been exposed in the media—beginning 4 June 2036, while Mr. Steele delivered his first report to FBI on 5 July 2016—and thus any dossier mention of Russian hacking was neither predictive, nor was ft unique information that was “corroborated” by intelligence. “"Regurgitated” would have been a mare descriptive term to describe the dossier, in that it parroted media or internet stories and pundit comments on Russian hacks of the DNC. Mr. Steele even admitted under oath in a British court that some of the information in his dossier reports was obtained from anonymous internet postings. ‘The dossier offered no other significant or Unique information that could be verified, per the testimony of the FBI Deputy Director. Much of the “verified” material consisted of broad observations that could be separately surmisable from unclassified sources media stories, ‘academic literature, or internet research| ‘The ICA claimed that “some” of the source's information “has been corroborated in the past” but failed to clarify that no significant 2016 information from Mr. Steele on Putin's covert action operations—the topic of the ICA—had ever been corroborated. ©. Mr, Steele's reporting from prior years on unrelated criminal matters had ‘ng bearing on the veracity of his Information on the far more sensitive ‘topic of Putin’s covert action plans against US democracy, and it was misleading for the ICA to equate the two without clarifying the distinction. 29)