Low-voltage Microgrid Protection

The structure of LV Traditional Distribution

Networks
AD4
L4 AD5
 Step-down transformer L5
FD1
with the capacity of from Fuse 1
T
Fuse 2
160kVA to several MVA
L1 L2 L3
supplies several LV LV Feeder 1
20/0.4 kV AD10
feeders;
FD2
 Loads are connected L10
3Ø Load/ AD9
along the feeders and Customer
protected by fuses; 1Ø Load/
L6
LV Feeder 2
L7 L8 L9

Customer
 Inherently unbalanced
due to single-phase loads; FD: feeder fuse FD3
L11 L12
 Earthing system: TN-S, AD: load fuse
LV Feeder 3

TN-C, TN-S-C, TT, IT.

 Protection scheme of LV Traditional
Distribution Networks
 For transformers with rated AD4
L4 AD5
outputs of max. 400 kVA HV
L5
HRC fuses are responsible for FD1
T
protecting against internal Fuse 1 Fuse 2
transformer faults, including L1 L2 L3
LV Feeder 1
short-circuits at the low-
voltage terminals. LV HRC 20/0.4 kV AD10
are used at low-voltage side 3Ø Load/ FD2
L10
against overload and busbar Customer AD9
short-circuits (scheme 1). 1Ø Load/
L6 L7 L8 L9
 For transformers with rated Customer LV Feeder 2
outputs ≥ 500 kVA circuit Feeder
breakers controlled by Protection Zone
FD3
overcurrent relays are used Load/Customer
(scheme 2). Protection Zone L11 L12
LV Feeder 3
 Feeders and loads are
usually protected by fuses.
 Protection coordination of scheme 1

 Selectivity between series-

connected fuses
» The feeding line and the outgoing
circuits branching from the busbar of a
distribution board carry different
operating currents and, therefore, also
have different cross sections.
Consequently, they are usually
protected by fuses with different rated
currents, which ensure selectivity on
account of their different response
behaviors.
» Selectivity between series-connected
fuses with identical operational class:
• selectivity is generally ensured across the
entire overcurrent range up to the rated
switching capacity (full selectivity) if the rated
currents differ by a factor of 1.6 or higher
 Protection coordination of scheme 1

 Selectivity between series-

connected fuses
»Selectivity between series-connected
fuses with identical operational
class:
• when grading rating currents in the ratio
1:1.6, a comparison of characteristics in
the time-current diagram can be omitted
for fuses of the same operational class.
» Selectivity between series-
connected fuses with different
operational classes: Since the shape of
the time-current characteristics differ for
different operational classes (for example aM
and gG) a comparison of characteristics is
necessary. The associated data must be
provided by the manufacturer.
 Fuse characteristics of scheme 1
3 AD
10
Fuse 2 FD L5a

2 3NA 400A Fuse 2 L4c

10 20/0.4 kV FD1
Fuse 1 Fuse 2 AD
1 Feeder 1 L01 L2a
10 FD
L3b
3NA 250A
Time, s

Utility Transformer L6a

0
FD2
10 L7b
3Ø Load
Feeder 2
L8c
0.1 0.5s 1Ø Load
FD: feeder fuse FD3 L9a L10b

0.01 AD: load fuse L11c

Feeder 3
L12
0.001
300 6 1000 2 4 6 4
10
Current, A
 System parameters:
»S T = 400 kVA; »S Load_Feeder 1 = 33.6 kVA; SLoad_Feeder 2 = 170
»Fuse 1: 15A; Fuse 2: 400A; kVA
FD: 250 A. » SLoad_Feeder 3 = 50 kVA;
Fault analysis
 Fault types: F1 L4
»Feeder fault: F1; FD1
L5

»Busbar fault: F2; F4 Fuse 1 T F3

Fuse 2
»Transformer fault: F3; LV Feeder 1 L1 L2 L3
»Fault in MV grid: F4. 20/0.4 kV
F2

FD2
L10
3Ø Load/
Customer
L6 L7 L8 L9
1Ø Load/ LV Feeder 2
Customer

FD: feeder fuse FD3

AD: load fuse L11 L12

LV Feeder 3
 Performance of protection scheme 1
 Fault type: F1 » fault at the end of the feeder L4
L5
FD1 F1
T
Fuse 1 Fuse 2
FD1 blown at
t=0,624s L1 L2 L3
20/0.4 kV
FD2
L10

L6 L7 L8 L9

FD3
L11 L12

 System parameters:
»S T = 400 kVA;
Current flowing through
Current flowing into feeder 1
transformer »Fuse 1: 15A; Fuse 2: 400A;
FD: 250 A.
 Performance of protection scheme 1
 Fault type: F1 » fault at the middle of the feeder L4
L5
FD1
T
FD1 blown at t=0, Fuse 1 Fuse 2
F1
L1 L2 L3
20/0.4 kV
FD2
L10

L6 L7 L8 L9

FD3
L11 L12

 System parameters:
»S T = 400 kVA;
Current flowing through
Current flowing into feeder 1
transformer »Fuse 1: 15A; Fuse 2: 400A;
FD: 250 A.
Performance of protection scheme 1
 Fault type: F1 » fault closed to the L4
L5
LV secondary busbar of the feeder T
FD1
Fuse 1 Fuse 2
F1
L1 L2 L3
FD1 blown at t=0,03s
20/0.4 kV
FD2
L10
4000
Phase A
Phase B L6 L7 L8 L9
3000 Phase C
FD3
Current, A

L11 L12
2000

 System parameters:
1000
»S T = 400 kVA;

0
50A »Fuse 1: 15A; Fuse 2: 400A;
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 FD: 250 A.
Time, s
Current flowing into feeder 1
 Operation of protection scheme 1
 For fault at F1 – LV feeder fault in case of FD1 L4
failure L5
FD1
T
Fuse 1 Fuse 2
F1
Fuse 2 blown L1 L2 L3
20/0.4 kV
FD2
L10
2500 2500

2000 2000 L6 L7 L8 L9
Phase A
Current, A

Current, A
1500 Phase B 1500
Phase C FD3
1000 1000
L11 L12

500 500  System parameters:

160A

»S
60A 0A
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
0 T = 400 kVA;
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Time, s

Current flowing into feeder 1Current flowing through

Time, s
»Fuse 1: 15A; Fuse 2: 400A;
FD: 250 A.
transformer
 Operation of protection scheme 1
 For fault at F3 – Transformer fault L4
L5
FD1
T F3 Fuse 2
Fuse 1
Fuse 1 blown
L1 L2 L3
20/0.4 kV
FD2
300 L10
Phase A
Phase B
250 L6 L7 L8 L9
Phase C

200 FD3
Curent, A

L11 L12
150

100
t = 0.04 s
50
5A
0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Time, s
 Zone-selective interlocking (ZSI)

 Grading of HV HRC fuses

with LV CBs and downstream
LV HRC fuses
 Integration of Distributed Energy Resources
(DERs)
 Photovoltaic systems are PV4

PV5
connected anywhere along the L4
FD1 L5
LV feeders. Fuse 1
T
Fuse 2
 Currently, it is required to L1 L2 L3

disconnect all DERs 20/0.4 kV

PV1 PV2 PV3
automatically from the network 3Ø
Circuit
after both planned and 1Ø
PV10
unplanned switching Circuit FD2 L10
operations (by anti-islanding
protection incorporated in L6 L7 L8 L9

DERs) due to safety concerns

PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9
and in compliance with existing
control and protection FD3
L11 L12
constraints of distribution
systems. PV11 PV12
 Islanding
 Islanding is a situation that occurs PV4

PV5
when part of a network is L4
FD1 L5
disconnected from the utility grid T
Fuse 1 Fuse 2
but is still energized by one or
L1 L2 L3
more DGs. 20/0.4 kV

 Unintentional islanding may cause 3Ø

PV1 PV2 PV3

Circuit
some of the following issues:
PV10
» Safety issues since a portion of the 1Ø
Circuit FD2 L10
system remains energized when it is
not expected;
» Loss of control over system frequency L6 L7 L8 L9

and voltage levels;

» Insufficient grounding of the islanded PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9

network over DG interconnection;

FD3
» Out of phase re-closure problems L11 L12
which may damage the equipment.
PV11 PV12
Anti-Islanding

 Because of these issues, a DG unit should pass either one of the three
anti-islanding standard tests, UL 1741 or IEEE 1547 or DIN VDE 0126-
1-1 / A1 VFR 2014 before it can be installed.
 Moreover, almost all utilities require DG units to be disconnected from
the grid as soon as possible in case of islanding. IEEE 929-2000
standard requires the disconnection of DG units once the microgrid is
islanded.
 The IEEE 1547-2003 standard on the other hand requires all DGs to be
shut down after a maximum delay of 2 s once islanding is detected.
 The DIN VDE 0126-1-1 / A1 VFR 2014 requires the PV systems to
quickly disconnect from the network in less than 0.2 s if the rms
voltage is too far away from the nominal 230 V, more precisely if it is
no longer between 184 V and 264.5 V.
Standards related to Islanding Issues and
Microgrid Protection

 IEEE standard 1547-family: Interconnecting

Distributed Resources (DR) with Electric Power Systems;
» IEEE standard 1547.1;
» IEEE standard 1547.4.
 IEEE Std 929-2000: IEEE Recommended Practice for
Utility Interface of Photovoltaic (PV) Systems;
» IEEE standard 1547-family
 IEEE standard 1547.1: When any voltage is in a range
given in the following Table, the DR shall cease to energize
the utility grid within the clearing time as indicated.

b
DR ≤ 30 kW, maximum clearing times; DR > 30kW, default
clearing times
 IEEE Std 929-2000

 The connected PV system should be response to the

abnormal conditions in the utility system. The
abnormal utility conditions are voltage and
frequency excursions above or below -theTrip time” refers to
the values
time between the
states below: abnormal condition
being applied and
the inverter ceasing
to energize the
utility line.
- The purpose of the
allowed time delay is
to ride through
short-term
disturbances to
DIN VDE 0126-1-1 / A1
 PV system behavior under fault
10
 Fault current level depends
upon the location of faults.
5
 The maximum value of fault
PV Current, A

Closed to fault PV
Far to fault PV currents contributed by PV
0 systems are less than two
times of their rated
currents.
-5
 The response of PV
systems towards the
-10 occurrence of fault is
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Time, s instantaneous due to their
low inertia
 Performance of protection scheme 1
3500 3500

ƩPPV = 20% ƩPload 3000

Phase A
Phase B
Phase C
3000
Phase A
Phase B
Phase C

Scenar Fault location: at 2500 2500

Current, A
Current, A
io the beginning of
2000 2000

1500 1500

feeder 1 (F1) 1000 1000

F1 500 500
FD1 L5 135A 100A
50A 0A
Fuse 2 0 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Time, s Time, s
F3 F2 top_FD1 = 0,05s
L1 L2 L3
Current flowing into Current flowing through
20/0.4 kV

feeder 1 transformer
T FD2 PV1 PV2 PV3 1 1

0.8 0.8
Fuse 1
L6 L7 L8 L9

Voltages, V
PV 01

Voltages, V
0.6 0.6 PV 06
PV 2a
PV 7a
PV 3b
PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 0.4 0.4
PV 8b
PV 4c
PV 9c
PV 5a
PV 10
0.2 Tripping threshold 0.2
FD3 Tripping threshold

L11 L12 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
Time, s
Time, s
PV11 PV12
Feeder 01 PV Feeder 02 PV
Voltages Voltages
 Performance of protection scheme 1
2500
2000

ƩPPV = 20% ƩPload 2000

Phase A
Scena Fault location:
1500
Phase A Phase B

Currents, A

Currents, A
Phase B 1500 Phase C

rio at the middle of 1000

Phase C

1000

feeder 1 (F1) 500

500
F1 135A 100A
FD1 L5 50A
0 0
Fuse 2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Time, s Time, s

F3 F2 top_FD1 = 0,63s
L1 L2 L3
Current flowing into Current flowing through
20/0.4 kV

feeder 1 transformer
T FD2 PV1 PV2 PV3
1.2
1

1
Fuse 1 0.8
L6 L7 L8 L9 PV 01 0.8

Voltages, V
Voltages, V
0.6 PV 2a PV 06
PV 3b 0.6 PV 7a
PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 PV 4c PV 8b
0.4
PV 5a 0.4 PV 9c
Setting Threshold PV 10
0.2 0.2
FD3 Setting threshold

L11 L12 0
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Time, s Time, s
PV11 PV12
Feeder 01 PV Feeder 02 PV
Voltages Voltages
New characteristics for PV protection unit
 Performance of protection scheme 1
2500
2000

ƩPPV = 20% ƩPload 2000

Phase A
Scena Fault location:
1500
Phase A Phase B

Currents, A

Currents, A
Phase B 1500 Phase C

rio at the middle of 1000

Phase C

1000

feeder 1 (F1) 500

500
F1 135A 100A
FD1 L5 50A
0 0
Fuse 2 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Time, s Time, s

F3 F2 top_FD1 = 0,63s
L1 L2 L3
Current flowing into Current flowing through
20/0.4 kV

feeder 1 transformer
T FD2 PV1 PV2 PV3 1.2 1

1
0.8
Fuse 1
L6 L7 L8 L9 0.8
PV 06

Voltages, V

Voltage, V
0.6 PV 7a
PV 06
PV 8b
0.6 PV 7a
PV 9c
PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9 PV 8b 0.4
0.4 PV 10
PV 9c
Tripping threshold
PV 10
0.2
FD3 0.2 Setting threshold

L11 L12 0 0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Time, s Time, s
PV11 PV12
VDE-0126-1-1 compliant FRT compliant
protection
VDE newest
 Conclusion

 Fuses provide a proper protection for distribution networks

with high penetration of PV systems if the islanded
operation is not allowed.
 Chỉnh lại đặc tính của PV protection
 Lấy lại đặc tính cầu chì FD 400: đưa trường hợp tác động
nhầm. – để thay đổi đặc tính bảo vệ: thay đổi ngưỡng bảo vệ
của anti-islanding.
 Fault detection indicator (multi-agent) MV distribution
network;
 MV feeder CB using machine learning.
 Conclusion
 Short circuits and earth faults are the most important faults for which the
protection must be provided. The following are characteristic for these faults:
» Overcurrent
» Collapse and displacement of the voltages
 The protection function is based on the determination and evaluation of these
variables. Overcurrent and voltage changes occur not only in the immediate vicinity
of the fault location, but in wide areas of the network or throughout the entire
network.
 It is therefore not enough to only measure these variables in order to decide
whether a relay that responds to these variables should trip or not. Usually,
additional selection criteria must be introduced in order to be able to decide about
the regulation-compliant tripping operation. Particularly important for these
additional variables are:
» Time Energy
» Current direction
Formation of Microgrid
 For realization of maximum advantages of high DG
penetration, the islanded operation of Microgrid must be
considered which will obviously have strong
consequences on the existing safety, control, protection
and dispatch practices and strategies of electrical energy.
 IEEE Standard 1547.4-2011 with title of “IEEE guide for
design, operation and integration of distributed resource
island systems with electric power systems” has been
developed which covers the intentional islands in electric
power systems that contain distributed resources. In this
guide Microgrid has been termed as “DR island system”
and seven types of planned or intentional DR island
system configurations have been presented.
 Formation of LV Microgrid
 However, microgrid concept should be
defined in a more general way as a smart
distribution grid part with island operation
capability. In that case microgrid would
mean certain part of distribution network
with DER
» 1. Separate island grid;
» 2. Small feeder LV microgrid or LV customer
microgrid
» 3. LV microgrid consisting of all LV feeders
connected downstream from MV/LV
distribution transformer
that is managed as a whole with intelligent
MMS.
 In overall the role of MMS can be seen as
distributed intelligence of DMS to lower
voltage levels in distribution networks.
Operation of the microgrids

 Microgrids should be able to operate in two modes of

operation including grid-connected and islanded.
 The microgrids are connected to the main grid via a fast-
operating switch.
 The interconnecting switch must open during any
unacceptable power quality disturbance or fault on the main
grid and the DERs must be capable to carry the load on the
islanded section while maintaining the proper levels of voltage
and frequency for the islanded loads.
 Suitable load-shedding schemes should be implemented if DER
generation capacity does not meet the load demand of
islanded system.
Operation of the microgrids

 After the restoration of the main grid supply, the switch

should not close unless both the grid and islanded system are
properly synchronized, that is, voltage, frequency and phase
angle of the both systems must be within acceptable limits.
 For faults within the island system, the protection system
must sense the fault and quickly isolate the faulty portion
from the rest of the system ensuring minimum loss of
generation and load interruptions.
 The protection system of islanded system must be more
sensitive because fault currents in islanded system will be of
much lower magnitudes than those of the grid-connected
system.
 Protection issues of the protection scheme 1

 When the microgrid is PV4

required to be able to L4 PV5

FD1
operate in islanded. Fuse 1
T
Fuse 2
L5

» The fuse F1 or F2 cannot detect L1 L2 L3

the fault in the MV network due 22/04 kV
to the limited fault currents of PV1 PV2 PV3
3Ø
the connected PV systems  Circuit
microgrid cannot be able to be PV10
1Ø
switched to islanded mode in Circuit FD2 L10
case of fault event in the main
grid. L6 L7 L8 L9
» Short circuit in one feeder can
cause the PV systems of the PV6 PV7 PV8 PV9
neighbouring feeders to
disconnect unnecessarily due to FD3
L11 L12
the operation of PV anti-islanding
protection and also the lack of PV11 PV12
their FRT capability.
 Protection issues of the protection scheme 1

 When the microgrid is required to be able to operate in

islanded.
» The fuse F1 or F2 cannot detect the fault in the MV network due to the
limited fault currents of the connected PV systems  microgrid cannot
be able to be switched to islanded
F3 mode in1.2case of fault event in the
main grid. The voltage of the inslanded
F1 microgrid has collapsedPhase in
A case
FD1 Phase B
F6 of faults
T F5 at F5 or F6
1
Phase C
L2
LPU L1 F2
0.8

Fuse 1 Fuse 2
F4 0.6
PV2
PVPU PV1
FD2 0.4

0.2
L3 L4
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
PV3 PV4 Time, s

Secondary busbar voltage

 Protection issues of the protection scheme 1

 When the microgrid is required to be able to operate in

islanded.
» Several issues still exist. For example, faults occur on the feeder 1
during island operation of the microgrid, high fault currents from the
utility grid are not present, the
F3 limited fault currents of the PV systems
15

connected to feeder 2 are not sufficient

F1 for the fuse to operate.
FD1
F6 T F5
L2 10
LPU L1 F2

Current, A
Fuse 1 Fuse 2
F4
PV2
PVPU PV1
5
FD2

L3 L4
0
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Time, s
PV3 PV4
 Protection issues of the protection scheme 1

 If fuses F1 and F2 are PV4

replaced by circuit CB1 CB2 L4 PV5

breakers controlled by IEDs

FD1 L5
T
F1 F2
 the microgrid can be L1 L2 L3

smoothly transfered to 22/04 kV

PV1 PV2 PV3
operate in stand-alone 3Ø
Circuit

mode in case of faults in 1Ø PV9 PV10

Circuit
the main grid. FD2 L9 L10

L6 L7 L8

PV7 PV8
PV6

FD3
L11 L12

PV11 PV12
 Protection issues of the protection scheme 1

 The fuses F1 or F2 PV4

cannot detect the fault L4 PV5

FD1
in the MV network due CB1
T
CB2
L5

to the limited fault L1 L2 L3

currents of the 22/04 kV

PV1 PV2 PV3
connected PV systems  3Ø
Circuit
microgrid cannot be 1Ø PV9 PV10

able to be switched to Circuit FD2

L9 L10

islanded mode in case L7 L8

L6
of fault event in the
main grid. PV6
PV7 PV8

FD3
L11 L12

PV11 PV12
Protection issues of the protection scheme 2

 CB1 and CB2 also still fail to

PV4
detect faults in the main grid PV5
L4
due to the low-level fault current FD1 L5
fed by the connected PV systems CB1
T
CB2
 The incorporated overcurrent L1 L2 L3

relays of the CBs have fixed 22/04 kV

PV1 PV2 PV3
setting group and do not have 3Ø
Circuit
directional function  cannot
PV9 PV10
protect the islanded microgrid. 1Ø
Circuit FD2
L9 L10

 New protection scheme must be L7 L8

L6
developed;
PV7 PV8
 The developed protection scheme for PV6

microgrid must be supported by the FD3

technical choices made in the L11 L12

microgrid operation and control PV11 PV12

issues.
 Framework for Microgrid Protection
 The levels of LV
Microgrid: FPU1
T
» Level 1: LV feeder. LPU L1
L2

» Level 2: LV microgrid MGPU2 MGPU1

consisting of all LV feeders PV2
PVPU PV1
connected downstream from
FPU2
MV/LV distribution
transformer.
L4
L3

 Types of Protection PV4

Devices: PV3

» MGPU Microgrid Protection

Unit.
» FPU: Feeder Protection Unit;
» LPU: Load Protection Unit;
» PVPU: PV Protection Unit.
 Fault analyses

 The developed protection F3

scheme has to deal with F1
FPU1
different locations of fault. F5 T F4

»
L2
F1: Customer fault; LPU L1 F2

» F2: PV fault; MGPU2 MGPU1

PV2
» F3: Feeder fault; PVPU PV1

» F4: Transformer fault;

FPU2

» F5: Grid fault.

L4
L3

PV3 PV4
 Fault analyses - influence of FRT control mode for
normal power flow
F3
 Three different pre-fault F1
FPU1
power flow situations were F5 T F4
investigated. From these L2
LPU L1 F2
results, only the ones for the
MGPU2 MGPU1
normal and for the reverse PV2
power flow (RPF) are PVPU PV1
presented here. In the RPF FPU2
situation, the active power is
exported from the LV level
L3 L4
through the MV and HV level
to the eHV network. PV
systems connected to LV level PV3 PV4
are operating with inductive
power factor to keep their The results are further differentiated
terminal voltage within the between PV systems connected close to the
admissible voltage band, MV/LV transformer where the network
hence, exchanging reactive impedance is predominantly inductive (X/R =
power with the network pre- 4.4) and other PV systems connected to the
fault. end of the LV feeder where the network
 Fault analyses - influence of FRT control mode for
normal power flow
F3
 To help existing DG F1
FPU1
installations to run through F5 T F4
voltage dips, new PV systems L2
LPU L1 F2
would have to provide full
MGPU2 MGPU1
dynamic voltage support PV2
during FRT mode. PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4

To help existing DG installations to run through voltage dips, new PV systems would have to
provide full dynamic voltage support during FRT mode.
 Fault analyses – Grid-connected mode of
operation

 Fault at F1 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Fault analyses – Grid-connected mode of
operation

 Fault at F2 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Fault analyses – Grid-connected mode of
operation

 Fault at F3 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Fault analyses – Grid-connected mode of
operation

 Fault at F4 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Fault analyses – Grid-connected mode of
operation

 Fault at F5 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Discussion

 Fault at F5 F3
F1
FPU1
F5 T F4
L2
LPU L1 F2

MGPU2 MGPU1
PV2
PVPU PV1
FPU2

L3 L4

PV3 PV4
 Proposed protection strategy

 F
Framework for Microgrid Protection
 FPU – Feeder Protection Unit
consisting of CB and IED
(Intelligent Electronic Devices);
 IED:
»can store and use several setting
groups which may correspond to
different states of the protected
system/equipment. However, this
functionality is rarely used by
distribution network operators.
Framework for Microgrid Protection
 MMS: Microgrid
Management System
PV Modelling
 As mentioned earlier our solution approach depends on estimating the
fault current at the relay, while taking into consideration the DG
location and output current. Therefore
we need first a system model.
 To determine our system model we will make two approximations, the
first approximation is to neglect the transients in the DG response,
that is neglect the DG response during the first 0.1 seconds of the
fault duration. This approximation is acceptable since it is more
conservative to account only for the steady state current. This
approximation will allow us to model the DG as a current source with
constant output power during fault duration.
 The other important approximation is considering the fault current at
the relay to be constant and equal to the steady state fault current
value, as seen in figure 9. This will introduce an insignificant error
that could be neglected.
 Re-synchronisation

 Microgrid has to be reconnected with utility grid as soon

as utility is ready to connect all previously disconnected
loads due to islanding.
 Various types of Microgrid synchronisation schemes:
active, passive and open-transition transfer
synchronisation.
 Automatic re-synchronisation scheme incorporated
through Microgrid central controller using
communication network is suggested for complicated
Microgrid structures in [1]

[1] S. Chowdhury, S.P. Chowdhury, P. Crossley, Microgrids and active distribution networks, in: IET Renewable Energy Series 6, The
Institution of Engineering and Technology, London, United Kingdom, 2009.
Events/faults during grid-connected mode

 Currently, it is required to disconnect all DERs automatically from the

network after both planned and unplanned switching operations (by anti-
islanding protection incorporated in DERs) due to safety concerns and in
compliance with existing control and protection constraints of distribution
systems.
 For realization of maximum advantages of high DG penetration, the
islanded operation of Microgrid must be considered which will obviously
have strong consequences on the existing safety, control, protection and
dispatch practices and strategies of electrical energy.
 IEEE Standard 1547.4-2011 with title of “IEEE guide for design, operation
and integration of distributed resource island systems with electric power
systems” has been developed which covers the intentional islands in
electric power systems that contain distributed resources.
 In this guide Microgrid has been termed as “DR island system” and seven
types of planned or intentional DR island system configurations have
been presented.
 Events/faults during grid-connected mode

 For a fault on the utility grid during normal operation, the response of the
protection devices of individual DERs (anti-islanding protection) should be
not to trip before the protection device at PCC trips and DERs should
continue operation during sensing and switching of PCC device. To allow
this all DERs should have fault ride through (FRT) capability [2].
 For a fault within Microgrid during normal operation, the response of
line/feeder protection must be to disconnect the faulty portion from the
rest of system as quick as possible and how it is done depends on the
features and complexity of Microgrid and the protection strategy used [3].
 There may be some non-fault cases resulting in low voltages at PCC like
voltage unbalances and non-fault open phases which are difficult to be
detected and may potentially create hazards for sensitive loads,
microsources etc.
[2] S. Voima, K. Kauhaniemi, H. Laaksonen, Novel protection approach for MV Microgrid, in: CIRED 21st International Conference on
Electricity Distribution, 6–9 June, 2011, Frankfurt, 2011 (Paper 0430).
[3] N. Hatziargyriou, H. Asano, R. Iravani, C. Marnay, Microgrids, IEEE Power Energy Mag. 5 (2007) 78–94.
Events/faults during islanded mode

 In grid-connected mode, the fault currents of higher magnitudes

(10–50 times the full load current) are available from the utility
grid in order to activate conventional OC protection devices.
 On the contrary, for a stand-alone Microgrid with a large
number of converter-based DERs are connected in Microgrid, the
fault currents of only 2–3 times the full load current (or even less
depending on control method of converter [22]) are available.
 The high-set instantaneous OC devices and OC devices with
extremely inverse characteristics like fuses are most likely to be
affected
 Anti-islanding protection

 The deactivation of anti-islanding protection is generally required if

the amount of distributed generation within Microgrid is very high.
 If anti-islanding protection is kept activated then there is chance that
it may cause uncontrolled islands within Microgrid due to its fast
tripping.
 Hence, it will be desirable to deactivate anti-islanding protection
instantly when an isolated Microgrid is detected to be formed, to do
that, DERs must have FRT capability to cope with voltage and
frequency transients caused by islanding.
 As reported in [1], the most reliable and fast method to deactivate
anti-islanding protection of DERs is to send a trip blocking signal
through Microgrid central controller using communication link.

[1] S. Chowdhury, S.P. Chowdhury, P. Crossley, Microgrids and active distribution networks, in: IET Renewable Energy Series 6, The
Institution of Engineering and Technology, London, United Kingdom, 2009.
Role of Microgrid control architecture in
protection

 Microgrid configuration may change due to various control actions like load-
shedding in peak-hours or increase in local generation for export to grid for
optimum and economical operation of Microgrid.
 Therefore, adaptive protection system will be required to change protection
relay settings dynamically according to changing configuration of Microgrid.
 Adaptive protection scheme can be implemented with centralized or
decentralized control approaches, but each approach requires different
communication architecture.
 The centralized control architecture for adaptive protection is the conventional
method. In this method, a central controller coordinates the protection settings.
However, failure of central controller causes full loss of adaptive protection and
therefore, redundancy in central controller is required.
 The centralized communication architecture is supported by various
communication protocols like Modbus, DNP3, IEC 60870-5-101/104, IEC 61850
and it can be implemented with serial/bus communication, over PLC (power-line
carrier) or via Ethernet network.
Role of Microgrid control architecture in
protection

 The decentralized control architecture depends on information

exchange between distributed
intelligent electronic devices (IEDs).
 Each IED acts autonomously after receiving information from
other IED to change its active setting group. The decentralized
architecture is only feasible when the communication protocol
allows direct communication between IEDs.
 Presently, the industry is focused on IEC 61850 as the standard
protocol for decentralized communication. The decentralized
architecture requires a bus or Ethernet network for
implementation, though it can also be implemented with 4G
wireless network or over PLC.
Role of Microgrid control architecture in
protection

 The earlier research shows that traditional protection devices with

single setting are incompatible with Microgrid protection philosophy
which ensures safe and secure operation of Microgrid in both the
grid-connected and islanded mode of operation.
 Hence it becomes inevitable to look for alternate means and methods
of faults detection and isolation which can work equally well in both
grid-connected and islanded mode of operation, that is, new
protection schemes must be adaptable [1,2,31,32].
 The new protection schemes should not only consider the reduction in
fault levels but also consider the chances of bidirectional fault current
flow in some feeders [1]; besides, the new protection schemes should
also use communication links to ensure fast and reliable operation.
Protection schemes for Microgrids

 The earlier research shows that traditional protection devices with

single setting are incompatible with Microgrid protection philosophy
which ensures safe and secure operation of Microgrid in both the
grid-connected and islanded mode of operation.
 Hence it becomes inevitable to look for alternate means and methods
of faults detection and isolation which can work equally well in both
grid-connected and islanded mode of operation, that is, new
protection schemes must be adaptable [1,2,31,32].
 The new protection schemes should not only consider the reduction in
fault levels but also consider the chances of bidirectional fault current
flow in some feeders [1]; besides, the new protection schemes should
also use communication links to ensure fast and reliable operation.
IEC 61850 and IEC 60870-5-104 based
communication

 D. Ishchenko, A. Oudalov, and J. Stoupis, “Protection coordination

in active distribution grids with IEC 61850,” in Proc. IEEE T&D
Conf., Orlando, FL, USA, 2012.
 The decision to switch between the pre-calculated trusted setting
groups, as well as remote DER and load control are done by the
logic programmed into centralized controller based on IEC 61131-
3 compatible programming languages.
 Detection and location of faults using multi-
agent.