MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner, vs. The Heirs of GRACE M.

any objection from petitioner, it commissioned Sheriff de la Cruz

MAGALIT, respondents. [G.R. No. 141423. November 15, 2000] to hear and submit a report on the issue. If it is true, as she claims,
that the September 17, 1992 Order constituted a final judgment,
FACTS: then she should have objected to any further proceedings.
Pepito Magalit, deceased husband of Dr. Grace M.
Magalit (now substituted by her heirs as respondents in view of her
recent demise), filed for a fishpond application with the then
Philippine Fisheries Commission (now BFAR). The application was DANIEL T. SO, PETITIONER, VS. FOOD FEST LAND, INC.
for eleven (11) hectares of land situated in the Municipality of RESPONDENT
Batan, Province of Aklan. Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband [G.R. No. 183628, February 09, 2011]
of petitioner, filed for application with the BFAR for five of the
eleven hectares which Magalit had previously applied for. FACTS:
However, BFAR rejected Macahilig’s application for his failure to The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals Decision ordering Food
submit all the requirements. Fest to pay So liquidated damages in the amount equivalent to
Undaunted, Macahilig protested Magalit’s application 25% of the total sum due and demandable. Further, it affirmed
contending that for a period of 20 years, he had been in actual the ordering of So to pay attorney's fees in the amount equivalent
possession of the five-hectare area included in Magalit’s to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. The dispositive
application. portion reads:
The director of BFAR ordered the Committee on Fishpond
Claims and Conflict to hear and determine the rights of Macahilig WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision of April 18, 2008
and Magalit over the disputed area. The Committee concluded that is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Food Fest is ORDERED to pay
the former was merely the latter’s laborer and caretaker and So liquidated damages in the amount equivalent to 25% of the
advise them to vacate the premises after the finality of the order. total sum due and demandable. Further, So is ORDERED to pay
Macahilig elevated this disposition to the Office of the attorney's fees in the amount equivalent to 25% of the total sum
President which was denied with finality. due and demandable. In all other respects, the decision
Subsequently, Macahilig challenged this action via a Petition is AFFIRMED.
for Review with Prayer for an Issuance of a Writ of Injunction
and/or Restraining Order. Such petition was denied and Macahilig After passing on the arguments raised in the Motion for
was ordered to vacate the property and turn it over to the heirs of Reconsideration, the Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the
Magalit as the challenged decision has long become final and Court's Decision.
executory.
Dr. Magalit filed for an issuance of writ of execution to Clarification is in order, however, respecting the second
enforce such decision which was granted on Sept. 17, 1992. paragraph of the above-quoted dispositive portion of the Decision
However, Spouses Macahilig refuse to turn over Lot 4417 which which ordered So to pay attorney's fees in the amount equivalent
was disputed to be part of Magalit’s lot. to 25% of the total sum due and demandable. The relevant
The trial court appointed a commissioner to determine portion of this Court's Decision - basis of the order reads:
whether Lot 4417 was included in the parcels of land awarded to This Court notes that the appellate court did not award liquidated
the deceased Magalit. Upon careful examination, it was ruled by damages in contravention of the contract. As for the appellate
the court on June 18, 1993 that said Lot belong to the Magalits. court's award of P20,000.00 as attorney's fees, the contractual
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but her motion was stipulation should prevail.
denied on July 14, 1993. Petitioner filed with the CA, but was again
denied. The relevant portion of the Lease Contract between So and Food
Fest provides:
ISSUE: Should So be compelled to seek judicial relief against Food Fest,
W/N the September 17, 1992 Order constitute res judicata the latter shall, in addition to any other claim for damages pay as
barring the June 18 and July 14, 1993 Orders of the trial court? liquidated damages to So an amount equivalent to twenty-five
percent (25%) of the amount due, but in no case less than
RULING: P500.00: and an attorney's fee in the amount equivalent to 25%
The court ruled in the negative. of the amount claimed but in no case less than P3,000.00 as well
For res judicata to apply, the following elements must as all expenses of litigation.
concur: (1) there is a final judgment or order; (2) the court ISSUE:
rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the W/N the body of the decision or the dispositive portion of the
parties; (3) the judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, decision is controlling
between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and RULING:
cause of action. For example, an order overruling a motion to
dismiss does not give rise to res judicata that will bar a subsequent The general rule is that where there is a conflict between the
action, because such order is merely interlocutory and is subject to dispositive portion or the follo and the body of the decision,
amendments until the rendition of the final judgment. Strictly the fallo controls. This rule rests on the theory that the fallo is the
speaking, res judicata does not apply to decisions or orders final order while the opinion in the body is merely a statement
adjudicating interlocutory motions. ordering nothing. However, where the inevitable conclusion from
The interlocutory nature of the Order of September 17, 1992 the body of the decision is so clear as to show that there was a
is evident from the fact that the trial court proceeded to hear and mistake in the dispositive portion, the body of the decision will
determine the inclusion of Lot 4417 in the Fishpond Case. Without prevail.[2]
 as undeniable as an express, waiver of the right to appeal against
Given the above-quoted portion of the Decision vis-a-vis the said decision. Thus, a decision on a compromise agreement is
above quoted Lease Contract between the parties, it should be final and executory, and is conclusive between the parties. As
Food Fest Land, Inc., as lessee, not So, the lessor, who should such, a judgment on a compromise agreement is a judgment in
be ordered to pay attorney's fees as stipulated in the contract. action not stayed by the filing of an appeal.

Other judgments in actions declared to be immediately executory

Diamond Builders Conglomeration, et al. vs Country Bankers and not stayed by the filing of an appeal are for: (1)
Insurance compromise, (2) forcible entry and unlawful detainer, (3) direct
G.R. No. 171820, December 13, 2007 contempt, and (4) expropriation.

FACTS:
ESPIRITA N. ACOSTA vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
The controversy originated from a civil case filed by Marceliano JUDGE GENOVEVA COCHING MARAMBA, in her capacity as
Borja against Rogelio S. Acidre for the latter’s breach of his Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San
obligation to construct a residential and commercial building. Fabian/San Jacinto, Pangasinan and RAYMUNDO I. RIVERA
Rogelio is the sole proprietor of petitioner Diamond Builders G.R. No. 131488. August 3, 1998
Conglomeration (DBC).
FACTS:
To put an end to the foregoing litigation, the parties entered into Petitioner Acosta, won by a margin of 4 votes, as Punong Barangay
a Compromise Agreement. of Bgy. Sobol, San Fabian, Pangasinan against Rivera during the
1997 elections. Rivera filed an election protest with the MTC
In compliance with the Compromise Agreement, Rogelio obtained alleging that the votes cast for him on some precints were not duly
a Surety Bond from Country Bankers in favor of the spouses and properly accounted for due to misreading, non-reading,
Borja. In this regard, Rogelio and other petitioners herein, signed mistallying, and misappreciation of ballots/votes, and praying for a
an Indemnity Agreement consenting to their joint and several recount of the votes.
liability to Country Bankers should the surety bond be executed
upon. MCTC summoned Acosta who filed for a Motion for Time to File
Answer. Court denied said motion and concluded that the election
On April 23, 1992, Country Bankers received a Motion for protest was sufficient in form and substance, it also ordered the
Execution of the surety bond filed by Borja for Rogelio’s alleged COMELEC Election Registrar and/or the Municipal Treasurer to
violation of the Compromise Agreement. Consequently, Country bring to court the ballot boxes, together with their keys, list of
Bankers, advised petitioners that in the event it is constrained to voters with voting records, book of voters and other election
pay under the surety bond to Borja, it shall proceed against documents.
petitioners for reimbursement.
Petitioner filed with the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and
The Court issued the Writ of Execution. Pending motion of prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ of
reconsideration, the Sheriff arrived at Country Bankers office, and preliminary injunction, questioning the order of the MCTC. This
the latter was thus constrained to pay the amount of the surety was docketed as SPR No. 13-97.
bond. The latter then demanded reimbursement from the The following day, MCTC rendered a decision nullifying petitioners
petitioners under the Indemnity Agreement. However, petitioners proclamation and declaring Rivera as the duly elected Punong
refused to reimburse Country Bankers. Barangay. To which petitioner filed a notice of appeal and the
respondent Judge granted in an order of even date. Said appeal
As a result, Country Bankers filed a complaint for sum of money was assigned UNDK No. 5-97 before the COMELEC.
against the petitioners was dismissed by the trial court. However,
on appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. The COMELEC issued an en banc Resolution in SPR No. 13-97
dismissing the petition for lack of merit, and affirming the assailed
ISSUE: order dated of MCTC which denied petitioner’s Motion for Time to
File Answer and ordered recount, as well as the same court’s
Whether petitioners should indemnify Country Bankers for the decision declaring Rivera as the winner. Thus this case.
payment of the surety bond.
ISSUE: The propriety of COMELEC En Banc to render judgment on
RULING: the case. (REQUISITES OF A VALID JUDGMENT)

The Court ruled in the affirmative. Country Bankers should be RULING: The COMELEC indeed exceeded the bounds of its
reimbursed for the amount it paid to Borja under the surety bond. authority when it affirmed the trial court’s decision when said
judgment was not the subject of SPR No. 13-97, a special civil action
Ordinarily, a judgment based on compromise is not appealable. It assailing an interlocutory order of the same lower court.
should not be disturbed except upon a showing of vitiated
consent or forgery. The reason for the rule is that when both The fact that the decision was eventually elevated to the COMELEC
parties enter into an agreement to end a pending litigation and on appeal does not cure the defect since said appeal was not
request that a decision be rendered approving said agreement, it consolidated with SPR No. 13-97. In fact, it was still undocketed at
is only natural to presume that such action constitutes an implicit,
the time and the parties had not yet submitted any evidence on for months.The court warned that should Prosecution fail to
relating to the election protest. resolve the accused’s pending motions for reconsideration, it was
possible that Criminal Cases would be dismissed.
Due process dictates that before any decision can be validly
rendered in a case, the following safeguards must be met: (a) the After several motions and deferments were granted still the
court or tribunal must be clothed with judicial authority to hear prosecution failed to complete its reinvestigation process, until
and determine the matter before it; (b) it must have jurisdiction another motion for deferment of the scheduled arraignment and
over the person of the party or over the property subject of the pre-trial conference at the scheduled but the request was denied
controversy; (c) the parties thereto must have been given an by the Justice Nario, Chairman of the Fourth Division, who issued
opportunity to adduce evidence in their behalf, and (d) such an oral order dismissing the case on account of the long delay
evidence must be considered by the tribunal in deciding the case. associated with the Prosecution’s resolution of the motions for
reinvestigation filed by accused.
While the COMELEC cannot be faulted for resolving the issue raised
by petitioner in SPR No. 13-97, which questions the order of the Since Justice Nario and the other (2) regular members of the Fourth
MCTC in denying his Motion for Time to File Answer and ordering Division of the Sandiganbayan could not reach unanimity on
recount, it exceeded its authority and thereby gravely abused its upholding Justice Nario’s dismissal of Criminal Cases, a Special
discretion when, in the same resolution, it affirmed said Fourth Division composed of five (5) members of the Honorable
court’s decision nullyfing his declaration and proclaiming Rivera Sandiganbayan was constituted pursuant to Revised Rules of the
the winner, which was the subject of petitioners appeal, UNDK No. Sandiganbayan which later on set aside the dismissal of thecases
5-97. orally ordered in open court by the Chairman of the Fourth Division
during its court session.
Furthermore, the Court notes that the assailed resolution was
issued by the COMELEC en banc, again in excess of its jurisdiction Petitioners filed their MR questioning the resolution of the special
because per the Constitution, COMELEC must hear and decide division. MR dismissed.
election cases in division, provided that MRs of decision shall be
decided by the Commission en banc. ISSUE: Validity of oral judgment made by Justice Nario. (FORM OF
JUDGMENT)
Petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The assailed resolution of the
COMELEC en banc is NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and the records of RULING: The Verbal Order of Dismissal by Justice Nario Is A Nullity
this case are ordered REMANDED to a Division of the COMELEC for In the unanimous Resolution of December 12, 2003, the
proper disposition of SPR No. 13-97 and UNDK No. 5-97. Sandiganbayan ruled as follows:
In the cases at bar, the dismissal made in open court by
the Chairman, which was not reduced in writing, is not a
MARIALEN C. CORPUZ and ANTONIO H. ROMAN, SR vs. THE valid dismissal or termination of the cases. This is because
SANDIGANBAYAN (Special Fourth Division) and THE PEOPLE OF the Chairman cannot unilaterally dismiss the same
THE PHILIPPINES without the approval or consent of the other members of
G.R. No. 162214 November 11, 2004 the Division. The Sandiganbayan is a collegiate court and
under its internal rules prevailing at the time, an order,
FACTS: The case is a petition for certiorari for the nullification of resolution or judgment, in order to be valid – that is to say,
the resolution of the Sandiganbayan setting aside the verbal Order in order to be considered as an official action of the Court
of Justice Narciso S. Nario, the Chairman of its Fourth Division, itself – must bear the unanimous approval of the
ordering the dismissal of several criminal cases; and its resolution members of the division, or in case of lack thereof, by the
denying the motions for reconsideration of the petitioners, and the majority vote of the members of a special division of five.
other accused in said cases, as well as their petition for mandamus
to compel the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the said cases. Section 1, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
mandates that a judgment must be written in the official language,
The petitioners Antonio H. Roman, Sr. and Marialen C. Corpuz, the personally and directly prepared by the judge and signed by him
President and Vice-President of FILSYN Corporation, the and shall contain clearly and distinctly a statement of the facts and
Undersecretary of Finance Antonio P. Belicena, and the officers of the law upon which it is based. The rule applies to a final order
the Petron Corporation, were charged with violation of Anti-Graft dismissing a criminal case grounded on the violation of the rights
and Corrupt Practices Act, involving the so-called "tax credit scam" of the accused to a speedy trial.
in several information.Some cases involving allegedly anomalous
TCC transfers were raffled to the Fourth Division of the A verbal judgment or order of dismissal is a violation of the
Sandiganbayan. provision; hence, such order is, in contemplation of law, not in
esse, therefore, ineffective. Justice Nario failed to issue a written
Petitioners filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a "Very Urgent resolution dismissing the criminal cases for failure of the
Motion for Leave to File Motion for Reconsideration or prosecution to submit its report on the reinvestigation of the cases
Reinvestigation" to which the Fourth Division of the Sandiganbayan within the sixty-day period fixed by the graft court. Moreover, the
granted giving the Prosecution sixty (60) days to resolve the said verbal order was rejected by majority vote of the members of the
motions. Sandiganbayan Special Division. In fine, there has been no valid and
effective order of dismissal of the cases. The Sandiganbayan cannot
However, the prosecution’s failure to resolve the motions for then be faulted for issuing the assailed resolutions.
reconsideration filed by petitioners and the other accused dragged PETITION denied.
SALLY MIGUEL, et. al, v. JCT GROUP, INC.,* and VICENTE CUEVAS
G.R. No. 157752. March 16, 2005 CORPORATION), Petitioner, vs.
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 66, and G.P.
FACTS: Petitioners were former employees of De Soleil Apparel SARMIENTO TRUCKING CORPORATION,Respondents.
Manufacturing Corporationand American Inter-Fashion Facts: Records show that private respondent G.P. Sarmiento
Corporation or AIFC. Following the EDSA Revolution, PCGG Trucking Corporation (GPS) agreed to transport thirty (30) units of
sequestered De Soleil and AIFC and took over their assets and Condura S.D. white refrigerators in one of its Isuzu trucks, driven
operations. by Lambert Eroles (Eroles), from the plant site of Concepcion
JCT Group, Inc. and De Soleil, thru its Officer-In-Charge and Head Industries, Inc. (CII) in Alabang, to the Central Luzon Appliances in
of the PCGG Management Team, executed a Management and Dagupan City. On its way to its destination, however, the Isuzu
Operating Agreement for the purpose of servicing De Soleil’s truck collided with another truck resulting in the damage of said
export quota to ensure its rehabilitation and preserve its viability appliances.
and profitability. The MOA expired on and was not renewed. De FGU Insurance Corporation (FGU), the insurer of the damaged
Soleil ceased business operations, effectively terminating refrigerators, paid CII, the insured, the value of the covered
petitioners employment. shipment, in turn, as subrogee of the insured’s rights and
Petitioners filed complaints for illegal dismissal and payment of interests, sought reimbursement of the amount it paid from GPS.
backwages and other monetary claims before the NLRC Arbitration The failure of the GPS to heed FGU’s claim for reimbursement, led
Branch against De Soleil, AIFC, PCGG, Glorious Sun, JCT, Nemesio the latter to file a complaint for damages and breach of contract
Co and Cuevas. of carriage against the former and its driver, Eroles, with the RTC.
JCT and Cuevas filed a MTD founded on lack of jurisdiction over During the hearing of the case, FGU presented evidence
the subject matter of the action because of the absence of establishing its claim against GPS. For its part, GPS filed a motion
employer-employee relationship between them. to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, which was granted by
Without resolving the MTD, Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in the RTC.
favor of the petitioners. The RTC ruled, among others, that FGU failed to adduce evidence
Respondents filed a MR but was denied. They elevated the matter that GPS was a common carrier and that its driver was negligent.
to the SC via petition for certiorari but it was denied. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the ruling of the RTC. The SC
Meanwhile, they appealed the labor arbiters decision to the NLRC. rendered a decision3 agreeing with the lower courts that GPS was
Petitioners filed a MTD both appeals. not a common carrier but nevertheless held it liable under the
NLRC modified the labor arbiter’s decision by absolving Glorious doctrine of culpa contractual.
Sun from liability and dismissing respondents appeal. An entry of judgment5 was issued certifying that the decision of
CA reversed the Decision of the NLRC and remanded the case to this Court became final and executory.
the labor arbiter for further proceedings. The appellate court ruled FGU filed a motion for execution6 with the RTC praying that a writ
that the circumstances presented factual questions whose of execution be issued to enforce the judgment award of this
resolution had to precede that of the issue of whether private Court.
respondents were liable to petitioners. It found no factual basis for GPS filed its Opposition to Motion for Execution. GPS alleged that
the ruling that JCT had become the employer of petitioners after it discovered, upon verification from the insured, that after the
the cessation of operations of Glorious Sun. Similarly, the Decisions insured’s claim was compensated in full, the insured transferred
of the NLRC and the labor arbiter failed to explain the reason for the ownership of the subject appliances to FGU. In turn, FGU sold
holding Cuevas solidarily liable with AIF, De Soleil and JCT. the same to third parties thereby receiving and appropriating the
ISSUE: Whether CA was correct to remand the case to LA for for consideration and proceeds of the sale. GPS believed that FGU
further proceedings. should not be allowed to "doubly recover" the losses it suffered.
RULING: YES. CA did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it GPS filed a Motion to Set Case for Hearing on the Merits. RTC
remanded the case for further proceedings. issued an order granting GPS motion to set case for hearing.
Upon denial of its motion for reconsideration, FGU filed this
The labor arbiter and the NLRC gravely abused their discretion petition for mandamus directly with this Court on the following
when they ruled in favor of herein petitioners without determining grounds: (1) THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI CITY,
the existence of an employer-employee relationship between BRANCH 66 UNLAWFULLY NEGLECTED THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS
them and respondents. The Decisions were silent on why JCT and DUTY WHEN IT RE-OPENED A CASE, THE DECISION OF WHICH HAD
Cuevas were held liable. ALREADY ATTAINED FINALITY; (2)THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 66 UNLAWFULLY NEGLECTED THE
The facts and the law on which decisions are based must be clearly PERFORMANCE OF ITS MINISTERIAL DUTY WHEN IT DENIED THE
and distinctly expressed.The failure of the labor arbiter and the ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF EXECUTION.
NLRC to express the basis for their Decisions was an evasion of their Issue: Whether the RTC is correct in setting the case for hearing
constitutional duty, an evasion that constituted grave abuse of even after the case becomes final and executory
discretion. Ruling: Under the doctrine of finality of judgment or immutability
A decision that does not clearly and distinctly state the facts and of judgment, a decision that has acquired finality becomes
the law on which it is based leaves the parties in the dark as to immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any
how it was reached and is specially prejudicial to the losing party, respect, even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous
who is unable to pinpoint the possible errors of the court for conclusions of fact and law, and whether it be made by the court
review by a higher tribunal. that rendered it or by the Highest Court of the land. Any act which
A decision with nothing to support it is a patent nullity and should violates this principle must immediately be struck down.
be struck down and set aside as void. But like any other rule, it has exceptions, namely: (1) the
Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED. correction of clerical errors; (2) the so-called nunc pro tunc
entries which cause no prejudice to any party; (3) void judgments; charge of ante-dating the questioned decision in CAR Case No.
and (4) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the 1794-TP'72 (Castro case) is devoid of merit, nevertheless, by
decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. 13 The respondent's own admission he deliberately, deferred the
exception to the doctrine of immutability of judgment has been promulgation of the same. Respondent did not file the decision
applied in several cases in order to serve substantial justice. with the Clerk of Court, which filing is the essential act that
In the case at bench, the Court agrees with the RTC that there is constitutes rendition of the decision and gives it validity and
indeed a need to find out the whereabouts of the subject binding effect, for otherwise, the Judge can readily change, alter,
refrigerators. For this purpose, a hearing is necessary to revise, or modify his decision while the same is under his personal
determine the issue of whether or not there was an actual control and custody. The rule is well established that the filing of
turnover of the subject refrigerators to FGU by the assured CII. If the derision, judgment or order with the Clerk of Court, not the
there was an actual turnover, it is very important to find out date of the writing of the decision or judgment, nor the signing
whether FGU sold the subject refrigerators to third parties and thereof or even the promulgation thereof, that constitutes
profited from such sale. These questions were brought about by rendition thereof.
the contention of GPS in its Opposition to Motion for Since there is no dispute that the Castro case was declared
Execution19 that after the assured, CII, was fully compensated for submitted for decision together with the Tibay case on September
its claim on the damaged refrigerators, it delivered the possession 9, 1975, and the decisions in both cases were rendered only on
of the subject refrigerators to FGU as shown in the certification of February 26, 1976, a clear violation of Section 151, Republic Act
the Accounting/Administrative Manager of CII. Thereafter, the No. 3844, The Agricultural Land Reform Code, has been
subject refrigerators were sold by FGU to third parties and FGU committed by respondent Judge, which section provides as
received and appropriated the consideration and proceeds of the follows:
sale. GPS claims that it verified the whereabouts of the subject Sec. 151. Judge's Certification as to Work
refrigerators from the CII because it wanted to repair and sell Completed.-The judges of the Courts of Agrarian
them to compensate FGU. Relations shall certify at the end of each month
If, indeed, there was an actual delivery of the refrigerators and that all petitions and motions in all cases
FGU profited from the sale after the delivery, there would be an pending decision or resolution for a period of
unjust enrichment if the realized profit would not be deducted thirty days from submission by the parties have
from the judgment amount. "The Court is not precluded from been determined and decided before the date
rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to of the making of the certificate. No leave shall
the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the be granted and no salary shall be paid without
sacrifice of justice for technicality." such certificate.

FELICIDAD CASTRO, complainant, vs. JUDGE ARTURO A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719*

MALAZO, respondent. ATTY. ARNOLD B. LUGARES, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH
GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 60,
Facts: Romeo Tibay filed a complaint for reliquidation, leasehold, Mandaluyong City,Respondent.
and fixing of rental with damages with The Court of Agrarian A.M. No. MTJ-08-1722**
Relations, Tayug. Pangasinan (hereinafter referred to as the Tibay
case) against Felicidad Castro, (the complainant herein), and JOSE MARIA J. SEMBRANO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH
Enriqueta Salcedo-Cruz, the owner of the piece of land situated in GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Presiding Judge Metropolitan Trial Court,
Pozzorubio, Pangasinan. Alleging that he was a tenant or Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.
agricultural lessee of the said landholding, Tibay prayed that A.M. No. MTJ-08-1723***
Castro be restrained from dispossessing him of his tenancy. MARCELINO LANGCAP, Complainant, vs. JUDGE LIZABETH
Spouses Felicidad Torio-Castro and Bonifacio Castro instituted GUTIERREZ-TORRES, Presiding Judge Metropolitan Trial Court,
CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (hereinafter called the Castro case) Branch 60, Mandaluyong City, Respondent.
against Romeo Tibay, Alfonso Cruz and Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz Facts: Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1719 was commenced
also before the Court of Agrarian Relations, alleging that they by a complaint1 filed by Atty. Arnold Lugares (Atty.
were the lessees of Francisca Quinto, the deceased mother of Lugares) charging Judge Torres with Gross Inefficiency, Undue
Enriqueta Salcedo Cruz, and that Tibay had forcibly entered the Delay in the Administration of Justice, Indecisiveness, Manifest
premises. They prayed for reinstatement as tenants or lessees of Partiality, and Gross Ignorance of the Law relative to Civil Case.
the landholding, and for fixing of rental and damages. Atty. Lugares alleged that he instituted a civil case for ejectment
Subsequently, the cases were deemed submitted for decision. against Zenaida and Alex Bautista before the MeTC. Summons
Complainant herein addressed a letter to this Court complaining was duly served on the defendants but they failed to file their
and charging respondent with delay in deciding CAR Case No. answer within the reglementary period of ten (10) days.
1794-TP'72 (the Castro case). He submits "the information that Consequently, Judge Torres issued an order2 stating that she
CAR Case No. 1794-TP'72 (Castro case) had been decided on would render judgment in the case. Defendants filed a motion for
September 15, 1975, but the decision was not immediately reconsideration3 with leave of court to admit attached responsive
released because I wanted the same be released simultaneously pleading, but their motion was denied on April 12, 2005.
with the decision, promulgated today, in CAR Case No. 1822- More than a year, or specifically six months, after the denial of
TP'72 (Tibay case). the motion to admit responsive pleading, Judge Torres issued an
Issue: Whether the actuation of Judge Malazo is proper order7 admitting defendants’ answer. Atty. Lugares posited that
Ruling: No. The actuation of Judge Malazo is not proper the issuance of the Order, which was in contradiction with the
While the records support the claim of respondent that he signed April 12, 2005 Order, was obviously intended to accommodate
the decision on September 15, 1975 and that consequently, the the defendants. He added that the failure to immediately decide
the case in accordance with the Rules on Summary Procedure In Civil Case No. 19063, complainant Sembrano filed a total of five
aggravated the conflict between the parties which resulted in the (5) motions to resolve the case but to no avail and the decision
filing of several cases between them. thereon had been overdue for more than three (3) years before
Despite repeated follow-ups and notwithstanding the lapse of the filing of an administrative complaint against respondent
more than a year, no decision was still rendered by Judge Torres. judge. On the other hand, complainant Marcelino Langcap alleged
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1722 was initiated through a that judgment in Civil Cases Nos. 17765 and 18425 was due as
Complaint-Affidavit, filed by Jose Maria J. early as March 2004 or more than three (3) years prior to the
Sembrano (Sembrano) charging Judge Torres with having filing of his letter-complaint.
committed a Violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct relative to Respondent judge’s actuation is quite contrary to the rationale of
Civil Case No. 19063 for damages. Sembrano claimed that no the Rules on Summary Procedure which was promulgated
judgment had yet been rendered by respondent judge despite the particularly for the purpose of achieving "an expeditious and
fact that the case had already been submitted for decision, inexpensive determination of cases. Her lackadaisical attitude in
Sembrano filed a motion14 to resolve the case. Subsequently, he sitting on the subject cases for years as well as her failure to
filed his second and third motions15 to resolve. All the foregoing immediately render judgment after the defendants therein failed
notwithstanding, Judge Torres still failed to render a decision in to file their answer, clearly manifested her utter disregard of
Civil Case No. 19063, which constrained Sembrano to file a fourth settled rules and jurisprudence relative to the Revised Rules on
and fifth motion17 to resolve. Sembrano opined that since the Summary Procedure, to the detriment and prejudice of the
case was governed by the Rules on Summary Procedure, complainants.
judgment was long overdue for more than three (3) years. In the process, respondent judge also contravened Section 16,
Administrative Matter No. MTJ-08-1723 was lodged by one Article III of the Constitution which provides that "all persons shall
Marcelino Langcap (Langcap) in a letter-complaint charging Judge have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all
Torres with Delay in the Disposition of Civil Case. Langcap claimed judicial, quasi-judicial, or administrative bodies." Any delay in the
that after the termination of the joint preliminary conference in administration of justice, no matter how brief, deprives the
the two cases the parties were directed to submit their respective litigant of his right to a speedy disposition of his case.37 Not only
position papers together with the affidavits of their witnesses and does it magnify the cost of seeking justice, it likewise impairs the
other evidence. The parties filed the required pleadings and people’s faith in the administration of justice and reinforces in the
documents within the reglementary period. Langcap maintained minds of the litigants the impression that the wheels of justice
that judgment on both cases was due as early as March 2004. grind ever so slowly.
When Langcap and his counsel inquired as to the status of said
cases, he was assured by Judge Torres that the decision was
"already being finalized and [would] soon be released." 24 Until the Valentin v. Santa Maria (Gr. L-30158, January 17, 1974)
filing of his letter-complaint, Langcap had yet to receive the
decision. Facts:
Issue: Whether the actuations of Judge Torres deserve dismissal Lorenzo Valentin was defendant in a land dispute cased against
from service Yolanda Matias which the court ruled in favor of Matias. The case
Ruling: As a general principle, rules prescribing the time within was promulgated by Judge Samuel F. Reyes, who had totally heard
which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings taken, the case while in CFI of Bulacan before assuming office as district
are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of judge in the province of Rizal.
needless delays and the orderly and speedy discharge of judicial Thus Valentin questioned the legality of judgement promulgated
business. By their very nature, these rules are regarded as against him by Judge Reyes assailing the decision on the of People
mandatory. With respect to cases falling under the Rules on v. Soria wherein the Supreme Court ruled that a judge who left his
Summary Procedure, first level courts are only allowed thirty (30) office before the promulgation of judgement cannot rule on the
days following the receipt of the last affidavit and position paper, case making his subsequent ruling null and void.
or the expiration of the period for filing the same, within which to He filed a Motion to Disregard Judgement upon the CFI of Bulacan.
render judgment.29 The Court has consistently impressed upon Judge Santa Maria then denied the said motion and the motion for
the magistrates the need to dispose of the court’s business reconsideration.
promptly and decide cases within the required periods, for it
cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied. Issue:
In A.M. No. MTJ-08-1719, basic is the rule that after the failure of Whether or not the judgment promulgated by Judge Reyes upon
the defendant to answer the complaint, the court shall render totally hearing the case and assuming office to another court is
judgment as may be established by the facts alleged in the void.
complaint. The Revised Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes a
judge to render a decision on his own initiative or upon motion of Ruling:
the plaintiff. Judge Torres starkly deviated from the required The Supreme Court ruled that the Judgement Promulgated by
procedure when she admitted defendants’ answer at that stage Judge Reyes was valid and dismissing the case.
of the proceedings even when she had previously denied In the decision of the SC, the judgement in the case of
admission of said pleading. The Court finds no logic in her sudden People v. Soria had already been made ineffective by the ruling in
change of heart. Instead, respondent judge should have given due the case of People v. Donesa wherein a judge who had been
course to Atty. Lugares’ motion for early resolution and tranferred to Cavite from Abra had dismissed a criminal case for
manifestation, and should not have entertained the defendants’ failure to present one witness. The Court ruled that a district judge
comment and counter-manifestation considering that the case who has left the court of his original assignment or appointment by
was summary in nature, and a period of more than one (1) year permanent (not merely temporary) transfer or assignment to
had lapsed after the case was submitted for decision. another court of equal jurisdiction without having decided a case
totally heard by him and which was duly argued or opportunity and that she agreed to pay for his studies. And that police had
given for argument to the parties or their counsel may lawfully already interrogated him 4 times. In further proceedings he
prepare and sign his decision in said case anywhere within the identified the two named accused in a line-up.
Philippines and send the same by registered mail to the clerk of the In their alibi, they say that they were conducting an intelligence
court to be filed in the court as of the date when the same was mission against the npa. They deny the allegations and tell that
received by the clerk, in the same manner as if the judge had been npa's are the culprit of the murder.
present in the court to direct the filing of the judgment. The trial court found the evidence for the prosecution to convict
Furthermore, Compelling considerations support such the two accused and rendered judgment therein.
abandonment of Soria and a reversion to the old rulings cited in Issue:
the main opinion that the public interest and the speedy Whether or not the trial judge gravely erred in blindly believing the
administration of justice will be best served if the judge who heard testimony of Lorenzo Miguel, notwithstanding the fact that he was
the evidence (although he may have been permanently transferred not the one who heard his testimony and the presence of evidence
to another province or station) renders the decision rather than to showing the bias character of the witness, the improbability of his
leave a mountain of evidence and transcripts for the perusal and testimony in the light of the evidence adduced showing the
appreciation of a new judge totally unfamiliar with the case and contrary.
who did not have the opportunity of hearing the witnesses and Held:
observing their deportment for purposes of gauging their Upon the question of credibility of witness, it is only natural for the
credibility and appraising their testimony." Nor is there any bereaved family to be concerned with the safety of their lone
offense to the sense of right, nor any affront to the cause of justice. witness in order to vindicate the wrong done against them.
More than the successor, the judge who heard the witnesses Further, the initial reluctance of witnesses to volunteer
testify, who presumably had pored over the documentary information about a criminal case and their unwillingness to be
evidence, certainly is in a much better position to appraise the facts involved in criminal investigations is common and has been
and thereafter to apply the statute or codal provision involved. A declared as not affecting their credibility. The testimony of minor
litigant's expectation as to his suit being adjudged with care and children of sound mind is likely to be more correct and truthful
thoroughness has greater chances then of being satisfied under than of older persons, so that once established that they have fully
such circumstances. This is so even on the assumption that the one understood the character and nature of an oath, their testimony
who succeeds him on the bench is much more skillful and should be given full credence.
penetrating in his scrutiny of the proof and much more proficient It is not necessary that the judge who heard the case be the same
in the jurist's art. Independently then of the social consideration judge to pen the decision. The judge trying the case may die, resign,
involved, the notion of law as a reflection of reason and given be disabled, or transferred to another court while the case was
expression under conditions that assure an impartial and thorough ripening for decision, and before he could decide it. In such an
adjudicative process is more likely to be served when the one who eventuality, another judge has to continue and finish the trial.
hears the case renders the decision himself. Anyway, the succeeding judge can examine and evaluate the
Added to this, it could happen that after a new incumbent evidence already presented by the simple expedient of going over
had been qualified to the position thus vacated, an abandonment the transcripts of the testimonies of witnesses, in the same manner
of Soria could result in a situation where two judges would be as appellate courts review evidence on record.
legally competent to promulgated a decision. To avoid such an The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not himself the
undesirable state of affairs, they likewise were in full agreement one who prepared, signed and promulgated the decision
with what was said on the matter by Justice Teehankee: "The only constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and
qualification that I would add — of purposes of avoiding any conclusions, and does not per se render his decision void.
unnecessary conflict in case another judge has already been
appointed to his former court and the same is no longer vacant or
unoccupied (although in the case at bar, it appears that respondent Citibank v. Sabiniano (GR. 156132 October 16 2006)
judge's former court remained vacant) — is that in line with the Facts:
statutory proviso therein governing cases 'heard only in part,' as Petitioner Citibank is a banking corporation duly authorized under
well as with the first paragraph of the cited section providing for the laws of the USA to do commercial banking activities n the
detail of judges, the interested parties should obtain from this Philippines. Sabeniano was a client of both Petitioners Citibank and
Court the corresponding authorization for the permanently FNCB Finance. Respondent filed a complaint against petitioners
transferred judge who heard in toto the case and the evidence to claiming to have substantial deposits, the proceeds of which were
render the decision thereon, in the same manner as temporarily supposedly deposited automatically and directly to respondent’s
transferred or assigned judges on detail." account with the petitioner Citibank and that allegedly petitioner
refused to despite repeated demands. Petitioner alleged that
People vs. Tumaru GR: 95751, December 2 1999 respondent obtained several loans from the former and in default,
Facts: Citibank exercised its right to set-off respondent’s outstanding
Oic mayor Eduardo Madrid and municipal councilor Santiago loans with her deposits and money.
Umoso while riding on a motorcycle was gunned down by unknown Upon the trial in the RTC, it took tem years and over 4 presiding
assailants which would be later found out as Jaime Tumaru and judge to decide the case which was finally penned by the 4th Judge
Alex Maun upon the testimony of one Lorenzo Miguel, a minor. namely Judge Vitorio.
In his testimony he stated that while pasturing their carabao during Issue:
his summer vacation in apayao, he saw the two assailant who shot Whether or not the ponente of the decision is not the presiding
Atty Madrid and Umoso. Due to shock he was sent back to Laoag judge who heard and tried the case valid.
upon seeing the gruesome murder incident by his father. On his Ruling:
cross-examination they learned that he was living with Mrs. Madrid The court ruled for the validity of the assailed decision.
What deserves stressing is that, in this jurisdiction, there exists a Issue: Whether or not the RTC violated the constitutional
disputable presumption that the RTC Decision was rendered by the requirement of contents of a decision
judge in the regular performance of his official duties. While the Ruling:
said presumption is only disputable, it is satisfactory unless Yes. The Constitution requires that [N]o decision shall be rendered
contradicted or overcame by other evidence. Encompassed in this by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
presumption of regularity is the presumption that the RTC judge, facts and the law on which it is based. The 1985 Rules of Criminal
in resolving the case and drafting his Decision, reviewed, Procedure, as amended, provides that [T]he judgment must be
evaluated, and weighed all the evidence on record. That the said written in the official language, personally and directly prepared by
RTC judge is not the same judge who heard the case and received the judge and signed by him and shall contain clearly and distinctly
the evidence is of little consequence when the records and a statement of the facts proved or admitted by the accused and the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) are complete and law upon which the judgment is based.
available for consideration by the former. Although a memorandum decision is permitted under certain
Although it is true that the judge who heard the witnesses testify conditions, it cannot merely refer to the findings of fact and the
is in a better position to observe the witnesses on the stand and conclusions of law of the lower court. The court must make a full
determine by their demeanor whether they are telling the truth or findings of fact and conclusions of law of its own.
mouthing falsehood, it does not necessarily follow that a judge Consequently, the decision of the regional trial court is a
who was not present during the trial cannot render a valid decision nullity. Very recently, speaking of a similarly worded decision of a
since he can rely on the transcript of stenographic notes taken regional trial court, we said:
during the trial as basis of his decision. [I]t is starkly hallow, otiosely written, vacuous in its content and
Irrefragably, by reason alone that the judge who penned the RTC trite in its form. It achieved nothing and attempted at nothing,
Decision was not the same judge who heard the case and received not even at a simple summation of facts which could easily be
the evidence therein would not render the findings in the said done. Its inadequacy speaks for itself.[17]
Decision erroneous and unreliable. While the conduct and Judges similarly disposed to pay lip service to their work must
demeanor of witnesses may sway a trial court judge in deciding a rethink their place in the judiciary or seriously take refresher
case, it is not, and should not be, his only consideration. Even more courses on decision writing. We warn them of stiff sanctions for
vital for the trial court judges decision are the contents and such lackadaisical performance.
substance of the witnesses testimonies, as borne out by the TSNs, Consequently, the case may be remanded to the lower court for
as well as the object and documentary evidence submitted and compliance with the constitutional requirement of contents of a
made part of the records of the case. decision. However, considering that this case has been pending for
sometime, the ends of justice will be fully served if we review the
evidence and decide the case.
[G.R. No. 113006. November 23, 2000]
ONG CHIU KWAN, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, and the Sandoval Shipyards, Inc., Petitioner, vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Philippine Merchant Marine Academy (PMMA), Respondent
GR No. 188633, April 10, 2013
Facts: Facts:
An information was filed charging petitioner with unjust vexation Respondent entered into a Ship Building Contract with Sandoval
for cutting the electric wires, water pipes and telephone lines of Shipyards, Inc. through the latter's agent, Rimport Industries, Inc.
Crazy Feet, a business establishment owned and operated by (petitioners). The contract states that petitioners would construct
Mildred Ong. Petitioner ordered Wilfredo Infante to relocate the two units of lifeboats to be used as training boats for the students
telephone, electric and water lines of Crazy Feet, because said of respondent.
lines posed as a disturbance. However, Ong Chiu Kwan failed to The parties agreed on the specifications of the boats, the date of
present a permit from appropriate authorities allowing him to cut delivery and the amount of payment as stated in the contract.
the electric wires, water pipe and telephone lines of the business Respondent sent an inspection team to where the two lifeboats
establishment. were docked to check whether the plans and work specifications
After due trial, on September 1, 1992, the Municipal Trial Court had been complied with. The team found that the construction
found Ong Chiu Kwan guilty of unjust vexation, and sentenced being done by the petitioner was not in conformity with the
him to imprisonment for twenty days. The court also ordered him approved plan. For these reasons, respondent's dean submitted a
to pay moral damages, finding that the wrongful act of abruptly report and recommendation to the president of petitioners
cutting off the electric, water pipe and telephone lines of Crazy stating the latter's construction violations and asking for
Feet caused the interruption of its business operations during rectification.
peak hours, to the detriment of its owner, Mildred Ong. The trial Consequently, a meeting was held between representatives of
court also awarded exemplary damages to complainant as a respondent and petitioners. The latter were reminded that they
deterrent to the accused not to follow similar act in the future should strictly comply with the agreed plan and specifications of
and to pay attorneys fees. the lifeboats, as there were no authorized alterations thereof.
On appeal to the Regional Trial Court, Bacolod City, the latter Petitioners were also advised to put into writing their request for
court in a decision, simplistically adopted the decision of the an extension of time for the delivery of the lifeboats which was
lower court in toto, without stating the reasons for doing so. granted by respondent.
By petition for review, Ong Chiu Kwan elevated the case to the Despite repeated demands from respondent, petitioners refused
Court of Appeals which dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the to deliver the lifeboats that would comply with the agreed plans
lower courts finding that petitioner was guilty beyond reasonable and specifications. As a result, respondent filed a Complaint for
doubt of unjust vexation. Rescission of Contract with Damages against petitioners before
Hence, this petition for review. the RTC, and trial ensued.
The RTC held that although the caption for the complaint filed by The Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc., (PCFI) filed with the
PMMA was for Rescission for Contract, the allegations in the body Board of Energy (BOE) a "Petition for Specific Performance,
were for breach of contract. Thus, the respondents were made Damages and Violation of P. D. No. 551"[6] against the Manila
jointly and severally liable for actual damages plus attorney’s fees Electric Company (Meralco).
plus cost of suits. PCFI sought for the immediate refund by Meralco to its customers
The petitioners appealed the case to the CA where it found that of all the savings it realized under P.D. No. 551, through the
indeed the petitioners committed a clear substantial breach of reduction of its franchise tax from 5% to 2%, with interest at the
contract which warranted its rescission. However, since legal rate; and for the payment of damages and a fine in the
rescission requires mutual restoration of benefits received, the amount of P50, 000.00 for violating P.D. 551.
respondents cannot be compelled to return what it does not In its answer to the petition, Meralco alleged that it was duly
possess - the lifeboats which the petitioners failed to deliver. A authorized by the BOE to retain the disputed savings; and that the
motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioners but was said Order had long become final.
denied by the CA. The BOE dismissed PCFI's petition, declaring that Meralco was
Hence the petition for certiorari filed under rule 45. Petitioners indeed authorized by the BOE to retain the disputed savings
rehash the arguments they posited before the CA with the under P.D. 551.
additional contention that the judge who wrote the Decision was PCFI filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the BOE.
not present during the trial and did not have the advantage of Hence, PCFI filed a Petition for Certiorari which was also denied by
firsthand assessment of the testimonies of the witnesses. the SC.
Issue: Whether or not a factual review is warranted, considering Four years thereafter, PCFI and a certain Edgardo S. Isip, private
that the trial judge who penned the Decision was different from respondents herein, filed with respondent Regional Trial Court,
the judge who received the evidence of the parties Branch 76, Quezon City, a petition for declaratory relief.
Ruling: Private respondents prayed for a ruling on who should be entitled
No. The fact that the trial judge who penned the Decision was to the savings realized by Meralco under P.D. No. 551. They
different from the one who received the evidence is not one of insisted that pursuant to Section 4 of P.D. No. 551, the savings
the exceptions that warrant a factual review of the case. belong to the ultimate consumers.
Petitioners cannot carve out an exception when there is none. We Meralco, in its answer, prayed for the dismissal of the petition on
have already addressed this matter in Decasa v. CA,29 from which the ground of res judicata.
we quote:chanr RTC rendered the assailed Decision declaring null and void the
Resolution of the SC and on the basis of the Dissenting Opinion of
x x x we have held in several cases that the fact that the judge the late Justice Claudio Teehankee, held that the disputed savings
who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the belong to the consumers.
judgment; and that for the same reason, the latter did not have Meralco moved for a reconsideration of the above Decision but
the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during was denied by respondent court in its Order of September 10,
the trial but merely relied on the records of the case does not 1991.
render the judgment erroneous. Even though the judge who Hence, Meralco's petition for review on certiorari
penned the decision was not the judge who heard the testimonies Issue: Whether or not the RTC can annul a decision already
of the witnesses, such is not enough reason to overturn the rendered by the SC
findings of fact of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses. It Ruling:
may be true that the trial judge who conducted the hearing would No. A lower court cannot reverse or set aside decisions or orders
be in a better position to ascertain the truth or falsity of the of a superior court, especially of this Court, for to do so will negate
testimonies of the witnesses, but it does not necessarily follow the principle of hierarchy of courts and nullify the essence of
that a judge who was not present during the trial cannot render a review. A final judgment, albeit erroneous, is binding on the whole
valid and just decision. The efficacy of a decision is not necessarily world. Thus, it is the duty of the lower courts to obey the Decisions
impaired by the fact that its writer only took over from a of this Court and render obeisance to its status as the apex of the
colleague who had earlier presided at the trial. That a judge did hierarchy of courts. "A becoming modesty of inferior courts
not hear a case does not necessarily render him less competent in demands conscious realization of the position that they occupy in
assessing the credibility of witnesses. He can rely on the the interrelation and operation of the integrated judicial system of
transcripts of stenographic notes of their testimony and calibrate the nation."[25] "There is only one Supreme Court from whose
them in accordance with their conformity to common experience, decisions all other courts should take their bearings," as eloquently
knowledge and observation of ordinary men. Such reliance does declared by Justice J. B. L. Reyes.[26]
not violate substantive and procedural due process of law. Respondent RTC, and for this matter, all lower courts, ought to be
reminded that a final and executory decision or order can no longer
[G.R. No. 101783. January 23, 2002] be disturbed or reopened no matter how erroneous it may
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE be. Although judicial determinations are not infallible, judicial error
CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC., EDGARDO S. ISIP, should be corrected through appeals, not through repeated suits
HON. JUDGE MANUEL M. CALANOG, JR., and HON. on the same claim.[27] In setting aside the Resolution and Entry of
JUDGE TIRSO D'C. VELASCO, respondents. Judgment of this Court in G.R. No. 63018, respondent court grossly
Facts: violated basic rules of civil procedure.
Former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, with the objective of In fine, we stress that the rights of Meralco under P.D. No. 551, as
enabling the grantees of electric franchises to reduce their determined by the BOE and sustained by this Court, have acquired
rates "within the reach of consumers",[4]promulgated Presidential the character of res judicata and can no longer be challenged.
Decree No. 551[5] providing for the reduction from 5% to 2% of
the franchise tax paid by electric companies.
 AMELIA AQUINO vs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY matter before the CA, the court reversed the decision. Thereafter,
G.R. No. 181973 | April 17, 2013 the petitioners elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE:
FACTS:
WON the appellate court erred in reversing the ruling of the
By virtue of President Marcos’ issuance of a letter authorizing regional trial court taking into consideration the inapplicability of
the implementation of standard compensation position the doctrine of res judicata in this case.
classification plans for the infrastructure/utilities group of
government-owned or controlled corporation on August 31, 1979, RULING:
respondent PPA issued a Memorandum Circular dated October 1,
1987 which granted to its officials holding managerial and NO.
supervisory positions representation and transportation allowance
(RATA) in an amount equivalent to 40% of their basic salary. Although the principle of res judicata is not applicable, the
petition must still fail because the ruling must adhere to the
On October 23, 1987, the RATA entitlement was extended to doctrine of stare decisis.
its Section Chiefs or heads of equivalent units, Terminal
Supervisors and senior personnel at the rate of 20% of their basic In Chinese Young Men’s Christian Association of the Philippine
pay. On November 14, 1990, PPA issued a Memorandum Circular Islands v. Remington Steel Corporation, 550 SCRA 180 (2008), the
which adjusted effective January 01, 1990 the RATA authorized Court expounded on the importance of this doctrine in securing
from 20% to 40% based on the standardized salary rate. certainty and stability of judicial decisions, thus: Time and again,
the court has held that it is a very desirable and necessary judicial
Finding justification in the increase in salary due these officials practice that when a court has laid down a principle of law as
brought about by the standardization mandated by RA 6758 or The applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle
Salary Standardization Law which took effect on July 01, 1989, PPA and apply it to all future cases in which the facts are substantially
paid RATA differentials to its officials. However, the Commission on the same.
Audit disallowed the payment of the RATA differentials and
disallowed in the grant of RATA to PPA Section Chiefs or heads of Stare decisis et non quieta movere. Stand by the decisions and
equivalent units, Terminal Supervisors and senior personnel disturb not what is settled. Stare decisis simply means that for the
occupying positions with salary grades of 17 and above who were sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
appointed after the effectivity of RA 6758. The reason for the applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same,
disallowances was the replacement of the LOI issued on 1979 by even though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first
Section 16 of RA 6758. principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where
The affected PPA officials filed a petition before the SC. The the same questions relating to the same event have been put
case was entitled Philippine Ports Authority vs Commission on forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case
Audit. The case was decided in favor of COA. The same resulted to litigated and decided by a competent court, the rule of stare decisis
the division of PPA officials into two categories. First, those is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issue.
receiving the 40% RATA under the LOI of Pres. Marcos who were
occupying their positions as of July 01, 1989, and second, those THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC. vs. ATTY. BRAIN
receiving lesser RATA under the General Appropriations Act, MASWENG
employed subsequent to the effectivity of RA 6758, although they G.R. No. 180882 | February 27, 2013
hold the same rank, title and may have the same responsibilities as
their counterparts in the first category.
FACTS:
On July 26, 2000, the officials under the 2nd category filed a
petition before the RTC of Manila claiming entitlement over the The private respondents, claiming ownership over several
40% RATA anchored on the decision of the SC in De Jesus vs COA parcels of land in what is now known as the Busol Watershed
which was decided 6 years after the decision in their case. They Reservation, filed a Petition for Injunction, with an application for
claim that certain issuances were released by the COA and the a TRO, and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the
Department of Budget and Management (DBM), which in effect, National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) seeking to
extended the cut-off date in the grant of the 40% RATA to October enjoin the petitioners from fencing the property. The fencing
31, 1989, thus entitling them to these benefits. PPA filed a motion project of petitioners would allegedly impede their access to and
to dismiss on the ground of res judicata. from their residences, farmlands and water sources, and
dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals and ceremonies
Finding merit in PPA’s motion, the RTC ordered the dismissal are usually held.
of the petition. However, the CA declared that the principle of res
judicata is not applicable to the case because of the existence of The NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Masweng granted the
DBM and COA issuances. The CA stated that when new facts or petition. Thereafter, herein petitioners filed before the CA a
conditions intervene before the second suit, furnishing a new basis Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the
for the claims and defenses of the party, the issues are no longer part of Atty. Masweng in issuing the TRO and the writ of
the same. It remanded the case to the RTC. The RTC issued a preliminary injunction. In dismissing the petition, the CA ruled that
decision in favor of the petitioners. When the PPA raised the since the petition before the NCIP involves the protection of
private respondents’ rights to their ancestral domains in GRECO ANTONIOUS BEDA B. BELGICA vs. PAQUITO N. OCHOA
accordance with the provisions of the IPRA, the NCIP clearly has G.R. No. 208566 | November 19, 2013
jurisdiction over the dispute. FACTS:

The appellate court upheld the conclusion of Atty. Masweng Before the Court are consolidated petitions, taken under
that the NCIP can issue injunctive writs as a principal relief against Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, all of which assail the
acts adversely affecting or infringing on the rights of ICCs or IPs, constitutionality of the Pork Barrel System.
because “(t)o rule otherwise would render NCIP inutile in
preventing acts committed in violation of the IPRA. Pork Barrell refers to an appropriation of government
spending meant for localized projects and secured solely or
Despite ruling in favor of private respondents, the Court of primarily to bring money to a representative's district.In the
Appeals nevertheless found merit in petitioners’ own application Philippines, the “pork barrel” has been commonly referred to as
for injunction and observed that certain activities by private lump-sum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature,
respondents without regard for environmental considerations although, its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of
could result in irreparable damage to the watershed and the the President such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential
ecosystem. It enjoined private respondents from introducing Social Fund.
constructions at the Busol Watershed and from engaging in
activities that degrade its resources, until viable measures or The Malampaya Funds was a special fund created under PD
programs for the maintenance, preservation and development of 910 issued by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos for the
said reservation are adopted pursuant to the provisions of IPRA. development of indigenous energy resources vital to economic
The case was elevated to the SC. growth.

ISSUE: The Presidential Social Fund is sourced from the share of the
government in the aggregate gross earnings of PAGCORthrough
WON the appellate court gravely and patently erred in affirming which the President provides direct assistance to priority
the actions of the NCIP. programs and projects not funded under the regular budget.
In 1996, an anonymous source later identified as Former Marikina
RULING: City Romeo Candazo revealed that huge sums of government
money went into the pockets of legislators as kickbacks.
YES.
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification
G.R. No. 180206, a case previously decided by the SC, involves of the PDAF for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack of
the same parties and the same arguments and counter-arguments any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in
as in the present case. The only difference is that in the first case, the form of kickbacks has become a common exercise of
the petition was to enjoin herein petitioners from implementing unscrupulous Members of Congress, the petition was dismissed.
the order to demolish the allegedly illegally constructed structures
by private respondents in the subject property. In that case, the SC In July 2013, NBI began its probe into allegations that “the
upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP. government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion over the past
10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
However, it ruled that private respondents were not entitled lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost
to the relief granted by the Commission due to the absence of projects.” The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of
vested right over the property, the private respondents being six whistle-blowers who declared that JLN Corporation (stands for
nothing more than claimants thereof. While res judicata does not Janet Lim Napoles) had facilitated the swindling of billions of
apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at bar pesos from the public coffers for “ghost projects” using no fewer
and G.R. No. 180206, the principle of strare decisis may be applied. than 20 dummy non-government organizations for an entire
decade.
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final In August 2013, the Commission on Audit released report
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law revealing substantial irregularities in the disbursement and
has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and utilization of PDAF by the Congressmen during the Arroyo
closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to administration.
relitigate the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons:
economy and stability. Under this doctrine, once a court has laid As for the 'Presidential Pork Barrel', whistle-blowers alleged
down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it that "at least P900 Million from royalties in the operation of the
will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future cases where Malampaya gas project off Palawan province intended for
the facts are substantially the same. agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into a dummy NGO.

Spurred in large part by the findings contained in the CoA

Report and the Napoles controversy, several petitions were
lodged before the Court similarly seeking that the Pork Barrel
System be declared unconstitutional.

PROCEDURAL ISSUES + RULING:

 Salud, Edgar Lo, respondent Felipe Chua, and John Does before the
1) Res Judicata (does not apply) Makati City RTC.

Res judicata means “a matter adjudged”. The focal point of In Tan’s amended complaint, he alleged that before he went
res judicata is the judgment.The res judicata principle states that abroad for medical treatment, he turned over to respondent Chua,
a judgment on the merits in a previous case rendered by a court the original copies of TCT Nos. 124275 and 157581, titles to lands
of competent jurisdiction would bind a subsequent case if, owned by, and registered in the name of, CST. The respondent
between the first and second actions, there exists an identity of informed him that CST’s properties had been fraudulently used as
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. collateral for loans allegedly taken out in CST’s name, but without
proper authority from CST stockholders and/or the Board of
The res judicata principle cannot apply in this case. The Directors.
required identity is not present since Philconsa and LAMP,
respectively, involved constitutional challenges against the 1994 Tan discovered that a certain Atty. Jaime Soriano had issued a
CDF Article and 2004 PDAF Article, whereas the cases at bar call Secretary’s certificate, which stated that John Dennis Chua was
for a broader constitutional scrutiny of the entire Pork Barrel authorized during a duly constituted CST board meeting to open
System. Also, the ruling in LAMP is essentially a dismissal based a bank account and obtain credit facilities under the name of CST
on a procedural technicality – and, thus, hardly a judgment on the with PBB. This Secretary’s Certificate also authorized John Dennis
merits . Chua to use CSTs properties as security for these loans. Using this
Secretarys Certificate, Chua took out loans with PBB in the total
2) Stare Decisis (does not apply) amount of (P91,100,000.00), and used CST properties as
collateral. Respondent Chua signed as co-maker with John Dennis
Stare decisis non quieta et movere (or simply, stare decisis) Chua, who signed both as the representative of CST, as well as in
means “follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been his personal capacity, on six promissory notes to PBB to evidence
settled”. The focal point of stare decisis is the doctrine created. parts of this loan.
The stare decisis principle, entrenched under Article 8 of the Civil
Code, evokes the general rule that, for the sake of certainty, a When PBB threatened to foreclose the mortgage on these
conclusion reached in one case should be doctrinally applied to properties after CST defaulted, Tan filed the present complaint,
those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even arguing that the loans/promissory notes and mortgage made out
though the parties may be different. It proceeds from the first in CST’s name are unenforceable against it, since they were
principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing entered into by persons who were unauthorized to bind the
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. company.

The Philconsa resolution was a limited response to a In its Amended Answer, PBB claimed that the loans to CST, as well
separation of powers problem, specifically on the propriety of as the corresponding mortgage over CST properties, were all valid
conferring post-enactment identification authority to Members of and binding since the loan applications and documents
Congress. On the contrary, the present cases call for a more accomplished by John Dennis Chua were supported by the duly
holistic examination of the entire Pork Barrel System. The accomplished secretary’s certificate, which authorized him to
complexity of the issues and the broader legal analyses herein obtain credit facilities in behalf of CST. In addition, the original
warranted may be, therefore, considered as a powerful copies of the titles to the properties were offered to PBB as
countervailing reason against a wholesale application of the stare collaterals.
decisis principle.
Chua’s Answer claimed that he never applied for a loan with the
In addition, the Court observes that the Philconsa ruling was PBB and denied authorizing John Dennis Chua to apply for any
actually riddled with inherent constitutional inconsistencies which loans in CSTs name, or to use CST properties as security for any
similarly countervail against a full resort to stare decisis. As for loans. He admitted that he signed, as co-maker, 6 promissory
LAMP, suffice it to restate that the said case was dismissed on a notes covering the loans obtained by John Dennis Chua with
procedural technicality and, hence, has not set any controlling PBB. According to respondent Chua, he executed these promissory
doctrine susceptible of current application to the substantive notes after the loans had already been consummated to persuade
issues in these cases John Dennis Chua to pay off the unauthorized loan and retrieve
from cross-claimant PBB the CST titles.

Philippine Business Bank vs. Felipe Chua PBB subsequently filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
based on Section 1, Rule 35 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
FACTS: claiming that since respondent Chua already admitted the
execution of the promissory notes in favor of PBB amounting to
Tan, a stockholder and director/Treasurer of CST, filed a derivative P75,000,000.00, insofar as its cross-claim against him was
suit for the Declaration of Unenforceability of Promissory Notes concerned, there was no genuine issue on any material fact on the
and Mortgage, Nullity of Secretarys Certificate, Injunction, issue of his liability to PBB. PBB argued that although respondent
Damages with Prayer for the Issuance of Temporary Restraining Chua claimed that he signed the promissory notes merely to
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction against PBB, Francis Lee, persuade John Dennis Chua to pay off his loan to PBB, he was still
Alfredo Yao, Rodulfo Besinga, Stephen Taala, Rose Robles, Henry liable as an accommodation party under Section 29 of the
Ramos, Yu Heng, Mabuhay Sugar Central, Inc., Nancy Chan, Henry Negotiable Instruments Law.
Chan, John Dennis Chua, Jaime Soriano, Voltaire Uychutin, Peter
RTC issued a partial summary judgment on PBB’s crossclaim finding which authorized John Dennis Chua to take out loans, and execute
respondent Chua liable as a signatory to the promissory notes promissory notes and mortgages for and on behalf of CST, as well
amounting to P75,000,000.00. CA partially affirmed RTC’s order as the validity of the resultant promissory notes and mortgage
and held that respondent Chua could not appeal the partial executed for and on behalf of CST, remained unresolved.
summary judgment while the main case remained pending, in
keeping with Section 1(g), Rule 41 of the Rules. However, the CA Chua shares common interest with co-defendant debtors
held that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it
issued the writ of execution against respondent Chua. PBB has a common cause of action against respondent Chua with
his alleged co-debtors, John Dennis Chua and CST, it would simply
ISSUE: not be proper to treat respondent Chua separately from his co-
debtors. Had the trial court truly intended to treat PBB’s cross-
Whether or not the CA erred in recalling and setting aside the writ claim against respondent Chua separately, it could easily have
of execution and all the proceedings taken for its implementation ordered a separate trial via Section 2, Rule 31 of the Rules.
on the wrong notion that the partial summary judgment has not
become final and executory. PBB already admitted that the partial summary judgment is not a
judgment or final order that completely disposes of the case. In
RULING: all the above instances where the judgment, or final order is not
appealable, the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special
Petition is denied for being unmeritorious. civil action under Rule 65. The propriety of the summary judgment
may be corrected only on appeal or other direct review, not a
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules provides: Section 1. Summary petition for certiorari, since it imputes error on the lower courts
Judgment for claimant. - A party seeking to recover upon a claim, judgment. It is well-settled that certiorari is not available to correct
counterclaim, or cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory relief may, errors of procedure or mistakes in the judges findings and
at any time after the pleading in answer thereto has been served, conclusions of law and fact.
move with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions for a
summary judgment in his favor upon all or any part thereof. We affirm the CA’s ruling that the partial summary judgment is an
interlocutory order which could not become a final and executory
When the pleadings on file show that there are no genuine issues judgment, notwithstanding respondent Chua’s failure to file
of fact to be tried, the Rules allow a party to obtain immediate a certiorari petition to challenge the judgment. Accordingly, the
relief by way of summary judgment, that is, when the facts are not RTC grievously erred when it issued the writ of execution against
in dispute, the court is allowed to decide the case summarily by respondent Chua. In view of this conclusion, we find it unnecessary
applying the law to the material facts. The rendition by the court to resolve the issue raised by respondent Chua on the validity of
of a summary judgment does not always result in the full the RTC’s appointment of a special sheriff for the implementation
adjudication of all the issues raised in a case. The partial summary of the execution writ.
judgment envisioned by the Rules is an interlocutory order that
was never meant to be treated separately from the main case. It is well settled that no question will be entertained on appeal
unless it has been raised in the proceedings below. Furthermore,
As explained in Guevarra v. Court of Appeals: It will be noted that this issue would be better resolved in the proper appeal, to be
the judgment in question is a partial summary judgment. It was taken by the parties once the court a quo has completely resolved
rendered only with respect to the private respondents first and all the issues involved in the present case in a final judgment. If we
second causes of action alleged in their complaint. It was not were to resolve this issue now, we would be preempting the CA,
intended to cover the other prayers in the said complaint, nor the which has primary jurisdiction over this issue.
supplementary counterclaim filed by the petitioners against the
private respondents, nor the third-party complaint filed by the SISTER MA. ANGELINA M. FERNANDO, R.V.M., petitioner,
petitioners against the Security Bank and Trust Company. A partial vs. HON. CESAR D. SANTAMARIA, Presiding Judge of the Regional
summary judgment is not a final or appealable Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 145, Makati City,
judgment. (Moran, Vol. 2, 1970 Edition, p. 189, citing several CHUA PING HIAN, WILLIBALDO UY, LAUREANA P. BORRES and the
cases.) It is merely a pre-trial adjudication that said issues in the REGISTER of DEEDS FOR MAKATI CITY, respondents.
case shall be deemed established for the trial of the FACTS:
case. (Francisco, Rules of Court, Vol. II, p. 429.)
Petitioner filed a complaint against respondents Willibaldo Uy
In the Guevarra case, the Court held that the summary judgment (Uy), Chua Ping Hian (Chua) and the latter’s agent, Laureana P.
rendered by the lower court was in truth a partial summary Borres (Borres). She alleged that on 3 separate occasions, she
judgment because it failed to resolve the other causes of action in obtained loans from Chua in the total amount of P5.5 million. As
the complaint, as well as the counterclaim and the third party security for said loans, she executed a real estate mortgage over a
complaint raised by the defendants. lot covered by TCT No. 124391, registered in her name and located
at No. 1661, Evangelista St., Bangkal, Makati City. Before the third
The partial summary judgment in question resolved only the cross- loan could be released, she signed a deed of absolute sale
claim made by PBB against its co-defendant, respondent Chua, conveying the lot in favor of Chua in consideration of the amount
based on the latter’s admission that he signed promissory notes as of P3 Million upon the assurance of Borres that the deed was a
a co-maker in favor of PBB. This partial summary judgment did not mere formality. On November 9, 1995, however, she learned that
dispose of the case as the main issues raised in plaintiff Tomas her title over the property was cancelled and that a new one was
Tan’s complaint, i.e., the validity of the secretary’s certificate issued on November 8, 1995 in the name of Chua.
 Otherwise stated, even if the trial court debunk petitioner’s claim
Petitioner filed a complaint on the following causes of action: (1) that respondents (including Borres) connived in defrauding her to
annulment of the deeds of absolute sale over the subject lot in convey the property, the action against Borres for sum of money
favor of Chua and Uy and the cancellation of the TCT issued in the will still subsist because it is based on issues which has nothing to
name of the latter; (2) recovery from Borres of the amount of do with the issue of fraud, i.e., whether Borres received the
P200,000.00 which she allegedly gave as payment of the real amount of P120,000.00 and whether she has the obligation to pay
property taxes of the lot as well as the amount of P120,000.00 the real estate taxes of the mortgaged lot. As to the amount of
which Borres unlawfully deducted from her third loan; and (3) P200,000.00 the question is the validity of the deduction of said
recovery of damages against all respondents. amount from the third loan obtained by petitioner.
RTC dismissed the complaint against all the respondents on the The cause of action for collection of sum of money against Borres
grounds of prescription, ratification and abandonment of cause of can thus proceed independently of the dismissal of the action to
action but it modified its order by reinstating the complaint insofar hold her solidarily liable with Chua and Uy for the alleged
as the action for recovery of sum of money against Borres is fraudulent conveyance of the lot (first, second and fourth causes
concerned. The Order of dismissal of the complaint against Chua of action of the complaint). As admitted by petitioner in her motion
and Uy still stands. for reconsideration of the July 24, 2001 Order, the issue against
Petitioner filed a notice of appeal questioning the orders of the trial Borres is one for misappropriation of the amounts sought to be
court. Chua filed a motion to dismiss petitioner’s appeal for failure recovered.
to file a record on appeal within the required period. RTC granted Petitioners cause of action against Borres for collection of sum of
the motion. money is clearly severable from her action against the other
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the CA contending that respondents. Thus, rendition of several judgment is proper.
her complaint seeks to hold all respondents solidarily liable for the
fraudulent conveyance of her property and claimed that the trial VIRGINIA Y. GOCHAN, FELIX Y. GOCHAN III, LOUISE Y. GOCHAN,
court cannot render several judgment and separate the liability of ESTEBAN Y. ESTEBAN Y. GOCHAN, JR., and DOMINIC Y.
Borres with that of her co-respondents. GOCHAN, Petitioners, vs. CHARLES MANCAO, Respondent.
CA dismissed the petition holding that the trial court validly FACTS:
rendered several judgment because the liability of Borres in Felix Gochan, Amparo Alo and Jose A. Cabellon were co-owners of
petitioner’s third cause of action is distinct from the liability of the Lot Nos. 1028 and 1030 of Subdivision Plan Psd-21702 located in
other respondents. To perfect an appeal, the CA ruled that Cebu City, Cebu. Petitioners are successors-in-interest of Gochan,
petitioner must file a record on appeal in addition to the notice of while respondent bought Lot Nos. 1028-D-1, 1028-D-3, 1028-D-4,
appeal within 30 days from notice of the assailed order pursuant and 1028-E covered by TCT Nos. 139161-139164 from the children
to Section 2(a) and 3, Rule 41 of the Revised Rules of Civil of Angustias Velez and Eduardo Palacios, who, together with Jose,
Procedure. Jesus, Carmen, and Vicente, all surnamed Velez, acquired Lot Nos.
ISSUE: 1028-D and 1028-E from Alo.
Whether or not the trial court validly rendered several judgment petitioners, including Mae Gochan, filed a case for legal
because the third cause of action was distinct from the liability of redemption of Lot Nos. 1028-DD, 1028-EE, 1028-FF, 1028-GG,
the other respondents. 1028-HH, 1028-II, 1028-JJ, 1028-KK, 1028-LL, 1028-MM, 1028-NN,
RULING: 1028-OO, 1028-PP, 1028-QQ, 1028-RR, 1028-SS, 1028-TT, 1028-
Yes. Section 4, Rule 36 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure UU, 1028-VV, 1030-I of Subdivision Plan Psd-21702 covered by TCT
provides, Several judgments - In an action against several Nos. 2318 to 2337.
defendants, the court may, when a several judgment is proper, The TCTs are registered under the names of Gochan, Alo and
render judgment against one or more of them, leaving the action Genoveva S. De Villalon, who is the successor-in-interest of
to proceed against the others. Cabellon. The case was brought against the spouses Bonifacio
A several judgment is proper when the liability of each party is Paray, Jr. and Alvira Paray, who purchased the lots from the heirs
clearly separable and distinct from that of his co-parties, such that of Alo. The parties executed a Compromise Agreement whereby,
the claims against each of them could have been the subject of for and in consideration of the amount of Php650,000.00, the
separate suits, and judgment for or against one of them will not Spouses Paray conveyed to petitioners and Mae Gochan all their
necessarily affect the other. shares, interests, and participation over the properties. The court
In the instant case, the trial court correctly applied the foregoing approved the agreement and rendered judgment in accordance
provision because the complaint was filed against several with its terms and conditions.
defendants with respect to whom, rendition of several judgment is
proper. Respondent filed a suit before the CA for "Declaration of Nullity of
It is clear that the third cause of action for payment of the amounts Final Decision and Compromise Agreement and the Registration of
of P200,000.00 and P120,000.00 is directed only against Borres to the Same Documents with the Register of Deeds."
the exclusion of Uy and Chua. There is no dispute that Chua, Respondent’s Reply to Answer with Counterclaim further averred
through Borres, granted loans to petitioner secured by a mortgage that even the estate tax return on the estate of answering
on the subject lot. The issues of whether or not Borres should [petitioners’] father Esteban Gochan filed in 1997 does not include
reimburse the amount of P120,000.00 allegedly received from as part of his supposed estate the road lots made subject matter of
petitioner for payment real estate taxes of the lot, and the the questioned compromise agreement and the resultant decision.
P200,000.00 purportedly deducted by Borres from petitioners The records of the City Assessor of Cebu City on the late Esteban
third loan, are distinct from and independent of the question of Gochan’s property holdings likewise do not show these road lots to
whether petitioner signed the deed of absolute sale through the be part of(sic). For this, and the above mentioned indications,
misrepresentation of respondents. [petitioners] should do well in disclaiming ownership than
appropriating the road lots as their own
Petitioners and Mae Gochan countered that the petition states no in one sole owner. Legal redemption is in the nature of a privilege
cause of action on the grounds that: (1) respondent is not a co- created by law partly for reasons of public policy and partly for the
owner of the properties subject matter of the legal redemption benefit and convenience of the redemptioner, to afford him a way
case, hence, not a real party-in-interest required to be impleaded out of what might be a disagreeable or inconvenient association
therein; and (2) the reasons relied upon by him constitute neither into which he has been thrust.
extrinsic fraud nor lack of jurisdiction. CA ruled in favor of The mere fact that respondent was not impleaded as a party in Civil
respondent. Case No. CEB-22825 is not in itself indicative of extrinsic fraud. If a
seller/co-owner is not treated as an indispensable party, how much
ISSUE: more is a third person who merely alleged that his lots are affected
thereby? The exclusion of respondent (or other alleged subdivision
Whether or not the CA erred that extrinsic fraud was present when lot owners who are equally affected) from the legal redemption
the respondent was not impleaded in the redemption case and case does not entitle him to the right to ask for the annulment of
when petitioners entered into a compromise agreement with the judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules, because he does not even
Bonifacio Paray. have any legal standing to participate or intervene therein.
We reverse the CA findings as it is grounded entirely on
RULING: speculation, surmises or conjectures. The evidence presented by
The petition is impressed with merit. respondent are plainly wanting to show any specific trick, artifice,
The general rule is that, except to correct clerical errors or to make or device employed by petitioners that caused them to prevail over
nunc pro tunc entries, a final and executory judgment can no the Spouses Paray. In fact, when petitioners contended that
longer be disturbed, altered, or modified in any respect, and that extrinsic fraud must be present in an action to annul judgment,
nothing further can be done but to execute it. A final and executory respondent erroneously countered that it is "immaterial" and even
decision can, however, be invalidated via a petition to annul the admitted that "the present case is based on the illegality of the acts
same or a petition for relief under Rules 47 and 38 of the 1997 of the petitioners arising from the nature of the lots dealt with and
Rules of Civil Procedure. the resultant violation by the petitioners of the law declaring the
Extrinsic fraud shall not be a valid ground if it was availed of, or act to be so."
could have been availed of, in a motion for new trial or petition The issues raised by respondent are not proper subjects of, as
for relief. An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of these would effectively muddle the proper issues for
fraud will lie only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. determination in, a suit for legal redemption. A full-blown trial is
There is extrinsic fraud under Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where proper where these factual and legal issues could be completely
it is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, threshed out. The Court has repeatedly stressed that an action to
or real contest, or from presenting all of his case to the court, or annul a final judgment is an extraordinary remedy, which is not to
where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the judgment be granted indiscriminately. It is a recourse equitable in character,
itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no adequate or
not a fair submission of the controversy. appropriate remedy available (such as new trial, appeal, petition
It refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing party in the litigation for relief) through no fault of petitioner.
which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the The basic rule of finality of judgment is grounded on the
defeated party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that at
the case by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent. the risk of occasional error, the judgment of courts and the award
Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been prevented of quasi-judicial agencies must become final at some definite date
from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on fixed by law. Instant Petition is GRANTED
him by his opponent, as by keeping him away from court, a false Spouses Sy vs Young
promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had any
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the Facts: Genalyn alleged that she is the legitimate daughter of
plaintiff; or where an attorney fraudulently or without authority spouses George Young and Lilia Dy. When George died, he left an
connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that unregistered parcel of land. On September 3, 1993, Lilia executed
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the a Second Supplemental to the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and
case are reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside the property was adjudicated solely in Lilia’s favor in the partition.
and annul the former judgment and open the case for a new and Subsequently, Lilia obtained a loan from the spouses Sy with the
fair hearing. property as security. When Lilia defaulted on her loan, the property
In this case, the CA concluded that petitioners committed extrinsic was foreclosed and sold to the spouses Sy and later on the spouses
fraud, since they "employed schemes which effectively excluded Sy registered the certificate of sale and obtained a tax declaration
respondent and other co-owners from participating in the trial." It in their name.
opined that while the subject lots may have been registered in the
name of petitioners, they could not be the subject of any contract  On July 20, 2000 - Genalyn filed with the RTC a Motion to
or compromise because they are road lots which are for public use Admit a Supplemental Complaint with the attached
and, therefore, beyond the commerce of men. Supplemental Complaint invoking her right to exercise legal
Petitioners are not guilty of committing extrinsic fraud. The redemption as a co-owner of the disputed property. However,
governing law with respect to redemption by co-owners in case the the RTC denied the motion in its Order dated December 28,
share of a co-owner is sold to a third person is Article 1620 of the 2000.
New Civil Code. Article 1620 contemplates of a situation where a  She filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65
co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso shares to a third party or docketed as CA-G.R. Sp. No. 65629 with the CA. The CA denied
stranger to the co-ownership. Its purpose is to provide a method the petition in its decision dated November 18, 2002. It held
for terminating the co-ownership and consolidating the dominion
 that Genalyn’s cause of action in the supplemental complaint proceeding.
is entirely different from her original complaint. Thereafter,
she elevated the case with this Court in a petition for certiorari The rationale behind this rule is to enable an appellate court to
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court docketed as G.R. No. perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently, which would be
157955. impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were
to be litigated anew in the same case upon any and every
Trial in the RTC continued while CA-G.R. Sp. No. 65629 was pending subsequent appeal. Without it, there would be endless litigation.
in the CA. Litigants would be free to speculate on changes in the personnel of
a court, or on the chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely
 Consequently, Genalyn moved to suspend the proceedings ruled on solemn argument and handed down as the law of a given
until the CA has decided on the propriety of the admission of case.
the supplemental complaint. However, the RTC denied the
motion. On a trial dated August 29, 2001, Genalyn filed a
Motion to Cancel Hearing on the ground that she was Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs Fortune Tobacco Corp
indisposed. As a result, the RTC issued an Order dated August
30, 2001 which dismissed the complaint on the ground of non- Facts: Respondent FTC (Fortune Tobacco Corporation) is a
suit. The RTC denied Genalyn’s motion for reconsideration in domestic corporation that manufactures cigarettes packed by
an Order dated January 4, 2002. On January 16, 2002, the RTC machine under several brands. Prior to January 1, 1997, Section
issued an Order correcting the January 4, 2002 Order due to a 142 of the 1977 Tax Code subjected said cigarette brands to ad
typographical error. valorem tax. On January 1, 1997, R.A. No. 8240 took effect. Sec.
 On January 31, 2002, Genalyn filed an appeal docketed as CA- 145 thereof now subjects the cigarette brands to specific tax and
G.R. SP No. 74045, she questioned the RTC Orders dated also provides that: (1) the excise tax from any brand of cigarettes
August 30, 2001, January 4, 2002, and January 16, 2002. The within the next three (3) years from the effectivity of R.A. No. 8240
the CA reversed the RTC’s ruling and remanded the case for shall not be lower than the tax, which is due from each brand on
further proceedings. The CA also denied the spouses Sy’s October 1, 1996; (2) the rates of excise tax on cigarettes
motion for reconsideration, prompting them to file the enumerated therein shall be increased by 12% on January 1, 2000;
present petition. Tirelessly, Genalyn filed a petition for review and (3) the classification of each brand of cigarettes based on its
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court before this Court, docketed average retail price as of October 1, 1996, as set forth in Annex D
as G.R. No. 157745 which was consolidated with G.R. No. shall remain in force until revised by Congress. The Secretary of
157955. Finance issued RR No. 17-99 to implement the provision for the
12% excise tax increase on cigars and cigarettes packed by
On September 26, 2006, this Court promulgated a decision on the machines by January 1, 2000. FTC filed 2 separate claims for refund
consolidated cases entitled "Young v. Spouses Sy." We granted the or tax credit of its purportedly overpaid excise taxes for the month
petition in G.R. No. 157955 but denied the petition in G.R. No. of January 2000 and for the period January 1 to December 31,
157745 for lack of merit. 2002. It assailed the validity of RR No. 17-99 in that it enlarges
Section 145 by providing the aforesaid qualification. In this
Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in setting aside the RTC Orders, petition, petitioner CIR alleges that the literal interpretation given
which dismissed the case for non-suit. by the CTA and the CA of Section 145 would lead to a lower tax
imposable on 1 January 2000 than that imposable during the
Ruling: No. The present action is barred by the law of the case. In transition period, which is contrary to the legislative intent to raise
denying the petition, we necessarily must reiterate our ruling in revenue.
Young which constitutes as the controlling doctrine or the law of
the case in the present case. Certain undisputed predicates have to be laid and basic premises
restated to explain the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 167274-75 and
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a G.R. No.192576, thus:
former appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably
established the controlling legal rule of decision between the same 1. As may be recalled, FTC filed before the CTA three (3) separate
parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case petitions for refund covering three different periods involving
whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts varying amounts as hereunder indicated: (a) CTA Case No. 6365
on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of (Jan. 1 to Jan. 31, 2000) for ₱35,651,410.00; (b) CTA Case No. 6383
the case before the court. (Feb. 1, 2000 to Dec. 31, 2001) for ₱644,735,615.00; and (c) CTA
Case No. 6612 (Jan. 1 to Dec. 31, 2002) for 355,385,92. In three (3)
We point out in this respect that the law of the case does not have separate decisions/resolutions, the CTA found the claims for
the finality of res judicata. Law of the case applies only to the same refund for the amounts aforestated valid and thus ordered the
case, whereas res judicata forecloses parties or privies in one case payment thereof.
by what has been done in another case. In law of the case, the rule
made by an appellate court cannot be departed from in 2. From the adverse ruling of the CTA in the three (3) cases, the BIR
subsequent proceedings in the same case. Furthermore, law of the Commissioner went to the CA on a petition for review assailing in
case relates entirely to questions of law while res judicata is CA-G.R.SP No. 80675 the CTA decision/resolution pertaining to
applicable to the conclusive determination of issues of fact. consolidated CTA Case Nos. 6365 & 6383. A similar petition,
Although res judicata may include questions of law, it is generally docketed as CA G.R. SP No.83165, was subsequently filed assailing
concerned with the effect of adjudication in a wholly independent the CTA decision/resolution on CTA Case No. 6612.
3. Eventually, the CA, by Decision dated September 4, 2004, denied Decision of the Court of Appeals rendered in the consolidated cases
the Commissioner’s consolidated petition for review. The appellate of CA-G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA-G.R. SP No. 83165, thus: Hence,
Court also denied the Commissioner’s motion for reconsideration this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
on March 1,2005. Court which seeks the nullification of the Court of Appeals’
(1)Decision promulgated on September 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No.
4. It is upon the foregoing state of things that the Commissioner 80675 and CA-G.R. SP No. 83165. The two CA cases were later
came to this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 to defeat FTC’s claim for consolidated. Since the appellate court rendered its September 28,
refund thus granted initially by the CTA and then by the CA in CA- 2004 Decision in the consolidated cases of CA G.R. SP Nos. 80675
G.R. SP No. 80675and CA-G.R. SP No. 83165. and 83165, what reached and was challenged before this Court in
G.R. Nos. 167274-75 is the ruling of the Court of Appeals in both
By Decision dated July 21, 2008, the Court found against the cases. When this Court rendered its July 21, 2008 Decision, the
Commissioner, disposing as follows: WHEREFORE, the petition is ruling necessarily embraced both CA G.R. SP Case Nos. 80675 and
DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 83165 and adjudicated the respective rights of the parties. Clearly
80675, dated 28 September 2004,and its Resolution, dated 1 then, there was indeed an inadvertence in not specifying in the
March 2005, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs. SO fallo of our July 21, 2008 Decision that the September 28, 2004 CA
ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied.) Decision included not only CAG.R. SP No. 80675 but also CA G.R. SP
From the foregoing narration, two critical facts are at once No. 83165 since the two cases were merged prior to the issuance
apparent. First, the BIR Commissioner came to this Court on a of the September 28, 2004 Decision. Given the above perspective,
petition for review in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 to set aside the the inclusion of CA G.R. SP Case No.83165 in the fallo of the
consolidated decision of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA- Decision dated July 21, 2008 is very much in order and is in keeping
G.R. SP No. 83165. Second, while the Court’s Decision dated July with the imperatives of fairness.
21, 2008 in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 denied the Commissioner’s 2. The very contents of the body of the Decision dated July 21,2008
petition for review, necessarily implying that the CA’s appealed rendered by this Court in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 undoubtedly reveal
consolidated decision is affirmed in toto, the fallo of that decidendi that both CA G.R. SP No. 80675 and CA G.R. SP No. 83165 were the
makes no mention or even alludes to the appealed CA decision in subject matter of the petition therein. And as FTC would point out
CA-G.R. No. 83165, albeit the main decision’s recital of facts made at every turn, the Court’s Decision passed upon and decided the
particular reference to that appealed CA decision. In fine, there merits of the September 28,2004 Decision of the Court of Appeals
exists an apparent in consistency between the dispositive portion in the consolidated cases of CA G.R.SP Case Nos. 80675 and 83165
and the body of the main decision, which ideally should have been and necessarily CA G.R. SP No. 83165 was included in our
addressed before the finality of the said decision. disposition of G.R. Nos. 167274-75. The legality of Revenue
Issue: Regulation No. 17-99 is the only determinative issue resolved by
1. Whether or not it is necessary to render a judgment nunc pro the July 21, 2008 Decision which was the very same issue resolved
tunc on the July 21, 2008 decision. YES. by the CA in the consolidated CA-G.R. SP Nos.80675 and 83165 and
2. Whether or not there’s a conflict between the Dispositive exactly the same issue in CTA Nos. 6365, 6383 and 6612.
Portion and the Body of the Decision. YES. From the foregoing cogent reasons, We conclude that CA-G.R. SP
No. 83165 should be included in the fallo of the July 21, 2008
Ruling: After a scrutiny of the body of the aforesaid July 21, 2008 decision. It is established jurisprudence that "the only portion of
Decision, the Court finds it necessary to render a judgment nunc the decision which becomes the subject of execution and
pro tunc and address an error in the fallo of said decision. The office determines what is ordained is the dispositive part, the body of the
of a judgment nunc pro tunc is to record some act of the court done decision being considered as the reasons or conclusions of the
at a former time which was not then carried into the record, and Court, rather than its adjudication."
the power of a court to make such entries is restricted to placing In the case of Ong Ching Kian Chung v. China National Cereals Oil
upon the record evidence of judicial action which has actually been and Foodstuffs Import and Export Corporation, the Court noted
taken. The object of a judgment nunc pro tunc is not the rendering two exceptions to the rule that the fallo prevails over the body of
of a new judgment and the ascertainment and determination of the opinion, viz: (a) where there is ambiguity or uncertainty, the
new rights, but is one placing in proper form on the record, that body of the opinion may be referred to for purposes of construing
has been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to the judgment because the dispositive part of a decision must find
make it show what the judicial action really was, not to correct support from the decision’s ratio decidendi; (b) where extensive
judicial errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought and explicit discussion and settlement of the issue is found in the
to have rendered, in place of the one it did erroneously render, not body of the decision.
to supply non-action by the court, however erroneous the Both exceptions obtain in the present case. We find that there is
judgment may have been. The Court would thus have the record an ambiguity in the fallo of Our July 21, 2008 Decision in G.R. Nos.
reflect the deliberations and discussions had on the issue. In this 167274-75 considering that the propriety of the CA holding in CA-
particular case it is a correction of a clerical, not a judicial error. The G.R. SP No.83165 formed part of the core issues raised in G.R. Case
body of the decision in question is clear proof that the fallo must Nos. 167274-75, but unfortunately was left out in the all-important
be corrected, to properly convey the ruling of this Court. decretal portion of the judgment. The fallo of Our July 21, 2008
Decision should, therefore, be correspondingly corrected.
We thus declare that the dispositive portion of said decision should
be clarified to include CA G.R. SP No. 83165 which affirmed the
December 4,2003 Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals in CTA Case
No. 6612, for the following reasons, heretofore summarized:
1. The petition for review on certiorari in G.R. Nos. 167274-75 filed
by respondent CIR sought the reversal of the September 28, 2004
 Marikina Development Corp vs Flojo In paragraph (a) of their motion, petitioners claimed that the
evidence submitted was insufficient to show that the
Facts: Jose Reyes Sytangco instituted a complaint for reconveyance downpayment for the purchase of the España Street property had
of a piece of land against petitioner Marikina Valley Development in fact come from private respondents' predecessor-in-interest
Corporation ("Marikina Valley") and Milagros Liamzon. Jose Reyes Jose Reyes Sytangco. The Trial Court had not discused the
Sytangco alleged that he entrusted some funds to Milagros presumption of regularity of private transactions invoked by the
Liamzon in order to purchase a property from its former owners. petitioners.
Milagros Liamzon, however, in alleged violation of the trust
reposed upon her, purchased the property in her own name and In paragraph (b) of their motion, petitioners, building upon their
had title to the same registered in her name. paragraph (a), argued that since the money used to pay the
property did not belong to the plaintiff, no constructive trust arose
Thereafter, she transferred title over that property to petitioner between Jose Reyes Sytangco and Milagros Liamzon. Accordingly,
Marikina Valley, a closed corporation owned by the Liamzon they argued that the Reyes Sytangco spouses would be entitled
family. The trial court ruled in favor of Sytangco. The trial court only to reiumbursement of the downpayment and not to
directed petitioner Marikina Valley to execute a Deed of reconveyance of the property itself. The trial court had not
Conveyance covering the property involved in favor of Sytangco. addressed this argument in its decision.
Petitioners moved for reconsideration. Reyes Sytangco opposed JUDITH YU, Petitioner, vs. HON. ROSA SAMSON-TATAD,
petitioners' motion for reconsideration upon the ground that it Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch 105,
was a pro forma one. He contended that the allegations of and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
insufficiency of evidence were couched in very general terms, Facts: Based on the complaint of Spouses Sergio and Cristina
contrary to the requirements of Section 2, Rule 37 of the Rules of Casaclang, an information for estafa against the petitioner was
Court. filed with the RTC. RTC convicted the petitioner as charged.
Fourteen (14) days later, the petitioner filed a motion for new
On 21 November 1991, the trial court denied petitioners' motion trial with the RTC, alleging that she discovered new and material
for reconsideration for lack of merit. That, the there is no sufficient evidence that would exculpate her of the crime for which she was
evidence to show that the down payment for the property came convicted.
from the plaintiff; Petitioners received a copy of the above order Respondent Judge denied the petitioner’s motion for new trial for
on 22 November 1991. On 25 November 1991, they filed a notice lack of merit.
of appeal with the trial court. – Denied for having been filed The petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the RTC, alleging that
beyond the reglementary period to perfect an appeal. The trial pursuant to our ruling in Neypes v. Court of Appeals,5 she had a
judge reasoned that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was "fresh period" of 15 days from November 3, 2005, the receipt of
pro forma and hence did not stop the running of the reglementary the denial of her motion for new trial, or up to November 18,
period. Thereupon, the trial judge granted private respondents' 2005, within which to file a notice of appeal.
motions for execution. In the meantime, private respondent heirs The prosecution filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for being
moved for execution of the decision of 11 October 1991. filed 10 days late, arguing that Neypes is inapplicable to appeals in
criminal cases.
Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari and Issue: Whether the "fresh period rule" enunciated in Neypes
injunction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition, declaring applies to appeals in criminal cases.
that petitioners' motion for reconsideration was indeed a pro Ruling: The “fresh period rule” applies in criminal cases. In
forma and, "therefore, clearly without merit." Neypes, the Court modified the rule in civil cases on the counting
of the 15-day period within which to appeal. The Court
Issue: Whether the motion for reconsideration of the petitioners is categorically set a fresh period of 15 days from a denial of a
pro forma. motion for reconsideration within which to appeal.
The raison d’être for the "fresh period rule" is to standardize the
Ruling: No. The rule in our jurisdiction is that a party aggrieved by appeal period provided in the Rules and do away with the
a decision of a trial court may move to set aside the decision and confusion as to when the 15-day appeal period should be
reconsideration thereof may be granted when (a) the judgment counted. Thus, the 15-day period to appeal is no longer
had awarded "excessive damages;" (b) there was "insufficiency of interrupted by the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for
the evidence to justify the decision;" or (c) "the decision was reconsideration; litigants today need not concern themselves with
against the law." A motion for reconsideration based on ground (b) counting the balance of the 15-day period to appeal since the 15-
or (c) above must point out specifically the findings and conclusions day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a
of the judgment which are not supported by the evidence or which motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration or any final
are contrary to law, making express reference to the testimonial or order or resolution.
documentary evidence or to the provisions of law alleged to be While Neypes involved the period to appeal in civil cases, the
contrary to such findings and conclusions. Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should
equally apply to the period for appeal in criminal cases under
In Luzon Stevedoring Company v. Court of Industrial Relations, 12 Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
the Supreme Court declared that: it is not enough that a motion for for the following reasons:
reconsideration should state what part of the decision is contrary First, BP 129, as amended, the substantive law on which the Rules
to law or the evidence; it should also point out why it is so. Failure of Court is based, makes no distinction between the periods to
to explain why will render the motion for reconsideration pro appeal in a civil case and in a criminal case. Section 39 of BP 129
forma. (Emphasis supplied) categorically states that "[t]he period for appeal from final orders,
resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions of any court in all Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash 3rd Alias Writ of Execution.
cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the Petitioner alleged that apart from not being made aware that
final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed she was impleaded as one of the parties to the case, the LA
from." Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguere debemos. When decision did not hold her liable in any form whatsoever.
the law makes no distinction, we (this Court) also ought not to Executive Labor Arbiter denied the motion. Upon appeal, NLRC
recognize any distinction.17 denied the appeal for lack of merit. NLRC ruled that in so far as
Second, the provisions of Section 3 of Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of overseas migrant workers are concerned, it is R.A. 8042 itself
Civil Procedure and Section 6 of Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of that describes the nature of the liability of the corporation and
Criminal Procedure, though differently worded, mean exactly the its officers and directors. It is not essential that the individual
same. There is no substantial difference between the two officers and directors be impleaded as party respondents to the
provisions insofar as legal results are concerned – the appeal case instituted by the worker. A finding of liability on the part of
period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or the corporation will necessarily mean the liability of the
reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order corporate officers or directors. The CA affirmed the NLRC
denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration. It was this decision. The two Motions for Reconsideration were denied.
situation that Neypes addressed in civil cases. No reason exists ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner may be held jointly and
why this situation in criminal cases cannot be similarly addressed. severally liable with PRO Agency Manila, Inc. in accordance with
Third, while the Court did not consider in Neypes the ordinary Section 10 of R.A. 8042?
appeal period in criminal cases under Section 6, Rule 122 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure since it involved a purely civil HELD: The Petitioner may not be held jointly and severally liable.
case, it did include Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on LABOR LAW: liability of corporate officers
petitions for review from the RTCs to the Court of Appeals (CA), The pertinent portion of Section 10, R.A. 8042 reads as follows:
and Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governing The liability of the principal/employer and the
appeals by certiorari to this Court, both of which also apply to recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this
appeals in criminal cases, as provided by Section 3 of Rule 122 of section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall
Were we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in Neypes be a condition precedent for its approval. In Sto. Tomas v. Salac,
and make it applicable only to the period to appeal in civil cases, we had the opportunity to pass upon the constitutionality of this
we shall effectively foster and encourage an absurd situation provision. We have thus maintained: the Court has already held,
where a litigant in a civil case will have a better right to appeal pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate
than an accused in a criminal case – a situation that gives undue directors and officers is not automatic. To make them jointly and
favor to civil litigants and unjustly discriminates against the solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that
accused-appellants. It suggests a double standard of treatment they were remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such
when we favor a situation where property interests are at stake, as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities.
as against a situation where liberty stands to be prejudiced. We Hence, for petitioner to be found jointly and solidarily liable,
must emphatically reject this double and unequal standard for there must be a separate finding that she was remiss in directing
being contrary to reason. Over time, courts have recognized with the affairs of the agency, resulting in the illegal dismissal of
almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not respondents. Examination of the records would reveal that
allowed in law – Quod est inconveniens, aut contra rationem non there was no finding of neglect on the part of the petitioner in
permissum est in lege. directing the affairs of the agency. In fact, respondents made no
mention of any instance when petitioner allegedly failed to
G.R. No. 196036 : OCTOBER 23, 2013 ELIZABETH M. GAGUI, manage the agency in accordance with law, thereby contributing
Petitioner, v. SIMEON DEJERO and TEODORO R. PERMEJO, to their illegal dismissal.
Respondents. SERENO, C.J.: Petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
FACTS: On 14 December 1993, respondents Simeon Dejero and
Teodoro Permejo filed separate Complaints for illegal dismissal, Hermana R. Cerezo vs. David Tuazon
nonpayment of salaries and overtime pay, refund of G.R. No. 141538. March 23, 2004
transportation expenses, damages, and attorney fees against
PRO Agency Manila, Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al Mahwes. The FACTS: A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a tricycle
Labor Arbiter Pedro Ramos rendered a decision ordering in Pampanga. As a result, tricycle driver Tuazon suffered serious
respondents Pro Agecy Manila Inc., and Abdul Rahman Al physical injuries, making him unable to walk and disabled. Tuazon
Mahwes to pay complainants. The LA also issued a Writ of filed a complaint for damages against Mrs. Cerezo, as the owner of
Execution. When the writ was returned unsatisfied, an Alias the bus line, her husband Atty. Cerezo and bus driver Foronda.
Writ of Execution was issued, but was also returned unsatisfied. The trial court issued summons against the Cerezo spouses at
Respondents filed a Motion to Implead Respondent Pro Agency the Makati address however, the summons was returned unserved
Manila, Inc. Corporate Officers and Directors as Judgment as the Cerezo spouses no longer held office nor resided in Makati.
Debtor. It included petitioner as the Vice- TC issued alias summons against the Cerezo spouses at their
president/Stockholder/Director of PRO Agenct, Manila, Inc. The address in Barangay Sta. Maria, Camiling, Tarlac.
LA granted the motion. A 2nd Alias Writ of Execution was Cerezo spouses filed a comment with motion for bill of particulars
issued, which resulted in the garnishment of petitioner bank and a reply to opposition to comment with motion.
deposit in the amount of P85,430.48. Since, judgment remained Atty. Valera who appeared on behalf of the Cerezo spouses Valera
unsatisfied, respondents sought a 3rd alias writ of execution. filed for the issuance of new summons on the Cerezo spouses to
The motion was granted resulting in the levying of two parcels satisfy proper service in accordance with the Rules of Court which
of lot owned by petitioner located in San Fernando Pampanga.
was later on denied. TC held that any infirmity in the service of the a motion for new trial under Section 1 (a) of Rule
summons has been cured by this that order. 37;
Spouses filed an urgent ex-parte motion for reconsideration. TC c) If the defendant discovered the default after the
denied. judgment has become final and executory, he may
TC issued an order directing the Cerezo spouses to file their answer file a petition for relief under Section 2 [now Section
within 15 days but spouses failed to answer. 1] of Rule 38; and
Tuazon filed a motion to declare the Cerezo spouses in default. TC d) He may also appeal from the judgment rendered
granted. against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law,
TC ruled in favor of Tuason. There is no pronouncement on even if no petition to set aside the order of default
Foronda’s liability since there was no summons on him. Atty. has been presented by him (Sec. 2, Rule 41).
Cerezo was relieved of the liability and found Mrs Cerezo solely (Emphasis added)
liable for the damages sustained by Tuazon arising from the Mrs. Cerezo admitted that she received a copy of the trial court’s
negligence of her employee. decision and based on this admission, Mrs. Cerezo had at least
three remedies at her disposal: an appeal, a motion for new trial,
Mrs. Cerezo filed before TC a petition for relief from judgment on or a petition for certiorari.
the grounds of fraud, mistake or excusable negligence. Both Mrs. Mrs. Cerezo could have appealed under Rule 41 from the default
Cerezo and Atty. Valera denied receipt of notices of hearings and judgment within 15 days from notice of the judgment. She could
of orders of the court. Atty. Valera added that he received no have availed of the power of the Court of Appeals to try cases and
notice before or during the 1995 elections, when he was busy as conduct hearings, receive evidence, and perform all acts necessary
senatorial candidate. to resolve factual issues raised in cases falling within its appellate
On appeal, Cerezo spouses said that TC have not acquired jurisdiction.
jurisdiction over them because of lack of service of summons on Mrs. Cerezo also had the option to file under Rule 37 a motion for
Foronda, whom the Cerezo spouses claimed was an indispensable new trial within the period for taking an appeal. If the trial court
party. Tuazon also failed to reserve the right to institute a separate grants a new trial, the original judgment is vacated, and the action
civil action for damages in the criminal action. will stand for trial de novo. The recorded evidence taken in the
CA denied the petition for certiorari and affirmed the TC order former trial, as far as the same is material and competent to
denying the petition for relief from judgment. CA declared that the establish the issues, shall be used at the new trial without retaking
Cerezo spouses failure to file an answer was due to their own the same.[27]
negligence, considering that they continued to participate in the Mrs. Cerezo also had the alternative of filing under Rule 65 a
proceedings without filing an answer. petition for certiorari assailing the order of default within 60 days
The Cerezo spouses filed before SC a petition for review from notice of the judgment. An order of default is interlocutory,
on certiorari under Rule 45. SC denied. and an aggrieved party may file an appropriate special civil action
Undaunted, the Cerezo spouses filed before the Court of a petition under Rule 65. In a petition for certiorari, the appellate court may
for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 with prayer for declare void both the order of default and the judgment of default.
restraining order. CA denied. Clearly, Mrs. Cerezo had every opportunity to avail of these
remedies within the reglementary periods yet she opted to file a
ISSUE: Whether Mrs. Cerezo properly resorted to the proper petition for relief from judgment, which is available only in
remedies when she was declared solely liable. (Motion for new exceptional cases. A petition for relief from judgment should be
trial) filed within the reglementary period of 60 days from knowledge of
judgment and six months from entry of judgment, pursuant to Rule
RULING: No. An examination of the records of the entire 38.
proceedings shows that three lawyers filed and signed pleadings After SC denied Mrs. Cerezo’s petition for relief became final and
on behalf of Mrs. Cerezo, namely, Atty. Daga, Atty. Valera, and executory,she filed before the CA a petition for annulment of the
Atty. Cerezo. Despite their number, Mrs. Cerezos counsels failed judgment. Mrs. Cerezo insists that lack of jurisdiction, as her
to avail of the proper remedies. ground for filing the petition for annulment of judgment. However,
a party may avail of the remedy of annulment of judgment under
It is either by sheer ignorance or by malicious manipulation of Rule 47 only if the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition
legal technicalities that they have managed to delay the for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no
disposition of the present case, to the detriment of pauper litigant longer available through no fault of the party.
Tuazon. She could have availed of a new trial or appeal but through her
Lina v. Court of Appeals enumerates the remedies available to a own fault she erroneously availed of the remedy of a petition for
party declared in default: relief, which was denied with finality. Thus, Mrs. Cerezo may no
a) The defendant in default may, at any time after longer avail of the remedy of annulment.
discovery thereof and before judgment, file In any event, the trial court clearly acquired jurisdiction over Mrs.
a motion under oath to set aside the order of Cerezos person. Mrs. Cerezo actively participated in the
default on the ground that his failure to answer was proceedings before the trial court, submitting herself to the
due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable jurisdiction of the trial court. The defense of lack of jurisdiction fails
negligence, and that he has a meritorious defense in light of her active participation in the trial court
(Sec. 3, Rule 18 [now Sec. 3(b), Rule 9]); proceedings. Estoppel or laches may also bar lack of jurisdiction as
b) If the judgment has already been rendered when the a ground for nullity especially if raised for the first time on appeal
defendant discovered the default, but before the by a party who participated in the proceedings before the trial
same has become final and executory, he may file court, as what happened in this case.
PETITION denied.
 G.R. No. 150739 August 18, 2005
SPOUSES BENIGNO QUE and ERLINDA QUE, and ADELA URIAN, Hence, this petition
Petitioners, - versus - COURT OF APPEALS, HON. FLORENCIO A.
RUIZ, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC Br. 24, Cabugao, Ilocos Sur, Issue: Whether or not the case should be remanded to the
and ISABEL COSTALES, Respondents RTC for new trial on the ground that their previous
counsels negligence constitute excusable negligence
Facts:
Since 1960, respondent Costales has been occupying as owner a Ruling:
parcel of land in Sta. Monica, Magsingal, Ilocos Sur. Designated as
Lot No. 6023, the property was originally owned by one Lorenzo NO. Under Section 1, the negligence must be excusable and
Cario who died in 1960. In 1997, respondent declared the property generally imputable to the party because if it is imputable to the
in her name for taxation purposes. counsel, it is binding on the client.[17] To follow a contrary rule and
allow a party to disown his counsels conduct would render
Petitioner Urian is Lorenzo’s grandniece, being the adopted proceedings indefinite, tentative, and subject to reopening by the
daughter of Lorenzo’s nephew Gonzalo Cario, son of Lorenzo’s mere subterfuge of replacing counsel.[18] What the aggrieved
brother Mariano Cario. litigant should do is seek administrative sanctions against the
erring counsel and not ask for the reversal of the courts ruling. [19]
Respondent filed a complaint against Urian and petitioners
Benigno Que and Erlinda Que (spouses Que) for Annulment of Petitioners nevertheless seek exemption from the above rule
Quitclaim[,] Ownership, Possession and Damages over a lot she because their counsels negligence allegedly deprived them of their
inherited from her grandfather. day in court and, if the ruling of the Court of Appeals stands, they
will suffer deprivation of property without due process of law.
When respondent filed her Complaint, the spouses Que had taken Admittedly, this Court has relaxed the rule on the binding effect of
possession of Lot No. 6023. The spouses Que also declared the land counsels negligence and allowed a litigant another chance to
in their name for tax purposes. present his case (1) where [the] reckless or gross negligence of
counsel deprives the client of due process of law; (2) when [the
After petitioners received the complaint with the summonses, they rules] application will result in outright deprivation of the clients
hired the services of Atty. Ranot. However, Atty. Ranot failed to file liberty or property; or (3) where the interests of justice so
petitioners Answer. Respondent moved to declare petitioners in require.[20]
default. During the hearing of respondent’s motion, only Urian
appeared and manifested that Atty. Ranot was still preparing the None of these exceptions obtains here.
Answer.
For a claim of counsels gross negligence to prosper, nothing short
The trial court found Urian’s manifestation unmeritorious and of clear abandonment of the clients cause must be shown.[21] Here,
issued an Order in open court declaring petitioners in default. The what petitioners first, second, and third counsels did was fail to file
trial court granted respondents motion to present her evidence ex the Answer, file a belated and defective motion for reconsideration
parte. Respondent presented her evidence accordingly, and the or new trial, and belatedly and erroneously file a petition for relief
case was submitted for judgment. from judgment, respectively. While these acts and omissions can
plausibly qualify as simple negligence, they do not amount to gross
The trial court rendered judgment in respondent’s favor. negligence to justify the annulment of the proceedings below.

Petitioners, through a new counsel, Atty. Bateria, sought In Legarda v. Court of Appeals,[22] where the Court initially held
reconsideration or new trial. Petitioners blamed their previous that the counsels failure to file pleadings at the trial court and later
counsel for the non-filing of their Answer. on appeal amounted to gross negligence, the Court, on
respondents motion, granted reconsideration and applied the
The trial court denied petitioners motion. general rule binding the litigant to her counsels negligence. The
Court noted that the proceedings which led to the filing of the
Petitioners, represented this time by Atty. Cachapero, filed with petition in that case were not attended by any irregularity. The
the trial court a petition for relief from judgment under Rule 38 of same observation squarely applies here. Neither can petitioners
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioners claimed that their rely on Boyer-Roxas v. Court of Appeals[23] because there, as here,
failure to file an Answer and to seek reconsideration or new trial the Court held that the petitioners counsel was not grossly
on time was due to the excusable negligence of their previous negligent.
counsels. Petitioners also invoked mistake and fraud as they were
allegedly under the impression that Atty. Ranot had prepared and Nor were petitioners denied procedural due process. In essence,
filed the necessary pleading or that the necessary pleading to procedural due process is simply the opportunity to be
vacate the judgment and secure new trial was prepared xxx and heard.[24] Petitioners were afforded such opportunity. Thus,
filed xxx. petitioners were served a copy of the complaint and the
summonses and given 15 days to file their Answer. While there is
The trial court denied the petition for relief from judgment. The no showing from the records when petitioners received their copy
trial court held that the negligence of their counsels bound of the 18 May 2000 Order declaring them in default, there is no
petitioners. dispute that Urian was present at the hearing when the trial court
Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals issued that Order in open court. Petitioners were also served a
which denied the petition. copy of the trial courts Decision of 6 September 2000 from which
they had 15 days to appeal, seek reconsideration, or new trial. in case a new trial is granted, because a new trial would serve no
Indeed, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration or new trial purpose and would just waste the time of the court as well as the
albeit belatedly and without complying with proper formalities. parties if the complaint is after all groundless or the defense is nil
Plainly, there was no denial of due process to petitioners. or ineffective. Under the Rules, the moving party must show that
he has a meritorious defense. The facts constituting the movant’s
good and substantial defense, which he may prove if the petition
ELPIDIO S. UY vs. FIRST METRO INTEGRATED STEEL CORP. were granted, must be shown in the affidavit which should
G.R. No. 167245 | September 27, 2006 accompany the motion for a new trial.
Upon examination of the petitioner’s Affidavit of Merit and
FACTS: the Court found that it did not contain clear statements of the facts
constituting a good and valid defense which he might prove if given
Private respondent First Metro filed a complaint for sum of the chance to introduce evidence. The allegations that he has a
money with prayer for writ of preliminary attachment with the RTC “meritorious defense” and a “good cause” are mere conclusions
of Manila against petitioner Uy for non-payment of the deformed which did not provide the court with any basis for determining the
steel bars delivered to him. nature and merit of the case. An affidavit of merit should state
facts, and not mere opinion or conclusions of law. Petitioner’s
Hearings were thereafter conducted for the reception of motion for new trial and affidavit of merit did not mention the
evidence of FMISC, Robert and MICC. After series of cancellations evidence which he was prevented from introducing, nor did it
and the change in counsel, the initial reception of petitioner’s allege that such evidence would change the outcome of the case.
evidence was finally set. During the scheduled hearing, Atty.
Bañares, the petitioner’s counsel, arrived late. Upon motion of the
private respondent, the trial court ordered that petitioner’s right
to present evidence is deemed waived. The parties were directed
to file their respective memorandum, and the case was deemed
submitted for decision.

Prior to the issuance of the RTC’s decision, Atty. Bañares

withdrew his appearance with petitioner’s conformity.
Subsequently, the court ruled in favor of respondent First Metro.
The petitioner through Atty. Lucas C. Carpio, Jr. filed a Motion for
New Trial on the ground of gross negligence of petitioner’s counsel
in failing to attend the hearing for the reception of evidence, thus
impairing his rights to due process.

The RTC denied the motion. The case was appealed to the CA,
but the same was dismissed. When the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration was denied, he elevated the case to the SC.

ISSUE:

WON the appellate court erred when it affirmed the decision of the
lower court denying the petitioner’s motion for new trial.

RULING:

NO.

Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in

the trial court as a result of the ignorance, inexperience or
incompetence of counsel do not qualify as a ground for new trial.
If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-opening cases,
there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new counsel
could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had
not been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put
a premium on the willful and intentional commission of errors by
counsel, with a view to securing new trials in the event of
conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant case.

The SC added that for motions for new trial founded on fraud,
accident, mistake or excusable negligence, the Rule requires that
they must be accompanied by affidavits of merits, i.e., affidavits
showing the facts (not mere conclusions or opinions) constituting
the valid cause of action or defense which the movant may prove