11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

 Week 3 - Problem Set

Quiz, 10 questions

 Congratulations! You passed! Next Item

1/1
 point

1. 
Suppose a MAC system (S, V ) is used to protect les in a le system

by appending a MAC tag to each le. The MAC signing algorithm S

is applied to the le contents and nothing else. What tampering attacks

are not prevented by this system?

Changing the last modi cation time of a le.

Correct 
The MAC signing algorithm is only applied to the le contents and

does not protect the le meta data.

Replacing the contents of a le with the concatenation of two les

on the le system.

Changing the rst byte of the le contents.

Replacing the tag and contents of one le with the tag and contents of a le

from another computer protected by the same MAC system, but a di erent key.

1/1
 point

2. 
Let (S, V ) be a secure MAC de ned over (K, M , T ) where M = {0, 1}n and T = {0, 1}128 . That is, the key space is K , message space is {0, 1}n , and
tag space is {0, 1}128 .

Which of the following is a secure MAC: (as usual, we use ∥

∥ to denote string concatenation)

S ′ (k, m) = S(k, m ⊕ m) and

V ′ (k, m, t) = V (k,  m ⊕ m,  t)

Un-selected is correct 

S ′ (k, m) = S(k,   m[0, … , n − 2]∥

∥ 0) and

V ′ (k, m, t) = V (k,   m[0, … , n − 2]∥

∥ 0,   t)

Un-selected is correct 

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 1/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

S (k, m) = S(k,  m∥

′
∥ m) and
 Week 3 - Problem Set
V ′ (k,Quiz,
m, t)10 questions ∥
= V (k,  m∥ m,  t).

Correct 
a forger for (S ′ , V ′ ) gives a forger for (S, V ).

S ′ ((k1 , k2 ),  m) = (S(k1 , m), S(k2 , m)) and

V ′ ((k1 , k2 ), m, (t1 , t2 )) = [V (k1 , m, t1 ) and V (k2 , m, t2 )]

(i.e., V ′ ((k1 , k2 ), m, (t1 , t2 )) outputs ``1'' if both t1 and t2 are valid tags)

Correct 
a forger for (S ′ , V ′ ) gives a forger for (S, V ).

S ′ (k, m) = S(k, m) and

V ′ (k, m, t) = {
V (k, m, t) if m ≠ 0n
“1” otherwise

Un-selected is correct 

S ′ (k,  m) = [t ← S(k, m),  output (t, t) ) and

V ′ (k, m, (t1 , t2 )) = {
V (k, m, t1 ) if t1 = t2
"0" otherwise

(i.e., V ′ (k, m, (t1 , t2 )) only outputs "1"

if t1 and t2 are equal and valid)

Correct 
a forger for (S ′ , V ′ ) gives a forger for (S, V ).

1/1
 point

3. 

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 2/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera
Recall that the ECBC-MAC uses a xed IV   (in the lecture we simply set the IV to 0).

 Week 3 - Problem Set

Suppose insteadQuiz,
we chose a random IV for every message being signed and include the IV in the tag. In other words, S(k, m)
10 questions := (r,   ECBCr (k, m))

where ECBCr (k, m) refers to the ECBC function using r as

the IV. The veri cation algorithm V given key k , message m,

and tag (r, t) outputs ``1'' if t = ECBCr (k, m) and outputs

``0'' otherwise.

The resulting MAC system is insecure.

An attacker can query for the tag of the 1-block message m

and obtain the tag (r, t). He can then generate the following

existential forgery: (we assume that the underlying block cipher

operates on n-bit blocks)

The tag (r ⊕ m,  t) is a valid tag for the 1-block message 0n .

Correct 
The CBC chain initiated with the IV r ⊕ m and applied

to the message 0n will produce exactly the same output

as the CBC chain initiated with the IV r and applied to the

message m. Therefore, the tag (r ⊕ m,  t) is a valid

existential forgery for the message 0.

The tag (r ⊕ t,  r) is a valid tag for the 1-block message 0n .

The tag (m ⊕ t,  r) is a valid tag for the 1-block message 0n .

The tag (r,  t ⊕ r) is a valid tag for the 1-block message 0n .

1/1
 point

4. 

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 3/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera
Suppose Alice is broadcasting packets to 6 recipients

 Week 3 - Problem Set

B1 , … , B6 . Privacy
Quiz, is
10not important but integrity is.
questions

In other words, each of B1 , … , B6 should be assured that the

packets he is receiving were sent by Alice.

Alice decides to use a MAC. Suppose Alice and B1 , … , B6 all

share a secret key k . Alice computes a tag for every packet she

sends using key k . Each user Bi veri es the tag when

receiving the packet and drops the packet if the tag is invalid.

Alice notices that this scheme is insecure because user B1 can

use the key k to send packets with a valid tag to

users B2 , … , B6 and they will all be fooled into thinking

that these packets are from Alice.

Instead, Alice sets up a set of 4 secret keys S = {k1 , … , k4 }.

She gives each user Bi some subset Si ⊆S

of the keys. When Alice transmits a packet she appends 4 tags to it

by computing the tag with each of her 4 keys. When user Bi receives

a packet he accepts it as valid only if all tags corresponding

to his keys in Si are valid. For example, if user B1 is given keys {k1 , k2 } he will accept an incoming packet only if the rst and second tags are valid. Note
that B1 cannot validate the 3rd and 4th tags because he does not have k3 or k4 .

How should Alice assign keys to the 6 users so that no single user

can forge packets on behalf of Alice and fool some other user?

S1 = {k1 , k2 },   S2 = {k2 , k3 },   S3 = {k3 , k4 },   S4 = {k1 , k3 },   S5 = {k1 , k2 },   S6 = {k1 , k4 }

Un-selected is correct 

S1 = {k1 , k2 },   S2 = {k1 },   S3 = {k1 , k4 },   §4 = {k2 , k3 },   S5 = {k2 , k4 },   S6 = {k3 , k4 }

Un-selected is correct 

S1 = {k1 , k2 },   S2 = {k1 , k3 },   S3 = {k1 , k4 },   §4 = {k2 , k3 },   S5 = {k2 , k4 },   S6 = {k4 }

Un-selected is correct 

S1 = {k2 , k4 },   S2 = {k2 , k3 },   S3 = {k3 , k4 },   S4 = {k1 , k3 },   S5 = {k1 , k2 },   S6 = {k1 , k4 }

Correct 
Every user can only generate tags with the two keys he has.

Since no set Si is contained in another set Sj , no user i

can fool a user j into accepting a message sent by i.

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 4/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

1/1
  point Week 3 - Problem Set
Quiz, 10 questions

5. 
Consider the encrypted CBC MAC built from AES. Suppose we

compute the tag for a long message m comprising of n AES blocks.

Let m′ be the n-block message obtained from m by ipping the

last bit of m (i.e. if the last bit of m is b then the last bit

of m′ is b ⊕ 1). How many calls to AES would it take

to compute the tag for m′ from the tag for m and the MAC key? (in this question please ignore message padding and simply assume that the message
length is always a multiple of the AES block size)

Correct 
You would decrypt the nal CBC MAC encryption step done using k2 ,

the decrypt the last CBC MAC encryption step done using k1 ,

ip the last bit of the result, and re-apply the two encryptions.

n+1

0/1
 point

6. 
Let H : M → T   be a collision resistant hash function.

Which of the following is collision resistant:

(as usual, we use ∥ to denote string concatenation)

H ′ (m) = H(m∥
∥ m)

This should be selected 

H ′ (m) = H(m)∥
∥ H(m)

Correct 
a collision nder for H ′ gives a collision nder for H .

H ′ (m) = H(m) ⨁ H(m ⊕ 1∣m∣ )   

(where m ⊕ 1∣m∣ is the complement of m)

Un-selected is correct 

H ′ (m) = H(m∥
∥ 0)

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 5/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

Correct 
 nder Week 3 - Problem Set
′
a collision Quiz,for
10H gives a collision nder for H .
questions

H ′ (m) = H(m[0, … , ∣m∣ − 2])   

(i.e. hash m without its last bit)

Un-selected is correct 

H ′ (m) = H(0)

Un-selected is correct 

H ′ (m) = H(m)[0, … , 31]   

(i.e. output the rst 32 bits of the hash)

Un-selected is correct 

1/1
 point

7. 
Suppose H1 and H2 are collision resistant

hash functions mapping inputs in a set M to {0, 1}256 .

Our goal is to show that the function H2 (H1 (m)) is also

collision resistant. We prove the contra-positive:

suppose H2 (H1 (⋅)) is not collision resistant, that is, we are

given x ≠ y such that H2 (H1 (x)) = H2 (H1 (y)).

We build a collision for either H1 or for H2 .

This will prove that if H1 and H2 are collision resistant

then so is H2 (H1 (⋅)). Which of the following must be true:

Either x, y are a collision for H1 or

x, y are a collision for H2 .

Either x, y are a collision for H1 or

H1 (x), H1 (y) are a collision for H2 .

Correct 
If H2 (H1 (x)) = H2 (H1 (y)) then

either H1 (x) = H1 (y) and x ≠ y , thereby giving us

a collision on H1 . Or H1 (x) ≠ H1 (y) but

H2 (H1 (x)) = H2 (H1 (y)) giving us a collision on H2 .

Either way we obtain a collision on H1 or H2 as required.

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 6/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

 Week 3 - Problem Set

Either x,Quiz,
y are a collision for H2
10 questions
or

H1 (x), H1 (y) are a collision for H1 .

Either H2 (x), H2 (y) are a collision for H1 or

x, y are a collision for H2 .

1/1
 point

8. 
In this question you are asked to nd a collision for the compression function:

f1 (x, y) = AES(y, x) ⨁ y ,

where AES(x, y) is the AES-128 encryption of y under key x.

Your goal is to nd two distinct pairs (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 ) such that f1 (x1 , y1 ) = f1 (x2 , y2 ).

Which of the following methods nds the required (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 )?

Choose x1 , y1 , y2 arbitrarily (with y1 ≠ y2 ) and let v := AES(y1 , x1 ).

Set x2 = AES −1 (y2 ,  v ⊕ y1 ⊕ y2 )

Correct 
You got it !

Choose x1 , y1 , y2 arbitrarily (with y1 ≠ y2 ) and let v := AES(y1 , x1 ).

Set x2 = AES −1 (y2 ,  v ⊕ y2 )

Choose x1 , y1 , x2 arbitrarily (with x1 ≠ x2 ) and let v := AES(y1 , x1 ).

Set y2 = AES −1 (x2 ,  v ⊕ y1 ⊕ x2 )

Choose x1 , y1 , y2 arbitrarily (with y1 ≠ y2 ) and let v := AES(y1 , x1 ).

Set x2 = AES −1 (y2 ,  v ⊕ y1 )

1/1
 point

9. 
Repeat the previous question, but now to nd a collision for the compression function f2 (x, y) = AES(x, x) ⨁ y .

Which of the following methods nds the required (x1 , y1 ) and (x2 , y2 )?

Choose x1 , x2 , y1 arbitrarily (with x1 ≠ x2 ) and set

y2 = y1 ⊕ AES(x1 , x1 ) ⊕ AES(x2 , x2 )

Correct 
Awesome!

Choose x1 , x2 , y1 arbitrarily (with x1 ≠ x2 ) and set

y2 = y1 ⊕ AES(x1 , x1 )
https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 7/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

Choose Week
x1 , x2 , y13arbitrarily
- Problem (with x1Set
≠ x2 ) and set
 Quiz, 10 questions
y2 = y1 ⊕ x1 ⊕ AES(x2 , x2 )

Choose x1 , x2 , y1 arbitrarily (with x1 ≠ x2 ) and set

y2 = AES(x1 , x1 ) ⊕ AES(x2 , x2 )

1/1
 point

10. 
Let H : M → T   be a random hash function where ∣M ∣ ≫ ∣T ∣   (i.e. the size of M is much larger than the size of T ).

In lecture we showed

that nding a collision on H can be done with O(∣T ∣1/2 )

random samples of H . How many random samples would it take

until we obtain a three way collision, namely distinct strings x, y, z

in M such that H(x) = H(y) = H(z)?

O(∣T ∣2/3 )

Correct 
An informal argument for this is as follows: suppose we

collect n random samples. The number of triples among the n

samples is n choose 3 which is O(n3 ). For a particular

triple x, y, z to be a 3-way collision we need H(x) = H(y)

and H(x) = H(z). Since each one of these two events happens

with probability 1/∣T ∣ (assuming H behaves like a random

function) the probability that a particular triple is a 3-way

collision is O(1/∣T ∣2 ). Using the union bound, the probability

that some triple is a 3-way collision is O(n3 /∣T ∣2 ) and since

we want this probability to be close to 1, the bound on n

follows.

O(∣T ∣3/4 )

O(∣T ∣)

O(∣T ∣1/4 )

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 8/9
11/28/2018 Cryptography I - Home | Coursera

 Week 3 - Problem Set

Quiz, 10 questions

https://www.coursera.org/learn/crypto/exam/ECqUF/week-3-problem-set 9/9