ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148560, November 19, 2001

Facts:

Petitioner Joseph Estrada prosecuted An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder,
wishes to impress upon the Court that the assailed law is so defectively fashioned that it
crosses that thin but distinct line which divides the valid from the constitutionally infirm. His
contentions are mainly based on the effects of the said law that it suffers from the vice of
vagueness; it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions; and it
abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code
saying that it violates the fundamental rights of the accused.

The focal point of the case is the alleged “vagueness” of the law in the terms it uses.
Particularly, this terms are: combination, series and unwarranted. Because of this, the petitioner
uses the facial challenge on the validity of the mentioned law.

Issue:

WON Plunder Law is unconstitutional for being vague

Held:

No. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who
are subject to it what conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be
sustained. The amended information itself closely tracks the language of law, indicating w/
reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is alleged to have
committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense.

Petitioner however bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal
acts. These omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for
being impermissibly vague and overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of his fundamental right to due
process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or
because of the employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of
common intelligence most necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such
instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects – it violates due process
for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of what conduct  to
avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad
because of possible “chilling effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in
permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is outweighed by the possibility that the
protected speech of other may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester because of
possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take
chances as in the area of free speech.
 ORCEO vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 190779; March 26, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner asserts that playing airsoft provides bonding moments among family members, and
families are entitled to protection by the society and the State under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. Pursuant thereto, they are free to choose and enjoy their recreational activities.
These liberties, petitioner contends, cannot be abridged by the COMELEC. Thus, petitioner
contends that Resolution No. 8714 is not in accordance with the State policies. As a response,
COMELEC defends that constitutional freedoms are not absolute in a sense, and they may be
abridged to some extent to serve appropriate and important interests.

Issue:

WON the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in including airsoft guns and their
replicas/imitations in the term “firearm” in Section 2(b) of RA 8714?

Ruling:

NO. A word of general significance in a stature is to be taken in its ordinary sense and
comprehensive sense, unless it is shown that the word is intended to be given a different or
restricted meaning; what is generally spoken shall be generally understood and general words
shall be understood in a general sense.

The term “firearm” in Resolution No. 8714 was intended for purposes of the gun ban during the
election period. The inclusion of airsoft guns in the term “firearm” and their resultant coverage
by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in sowing fear,
intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able to
distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. It is fear subverting the will of a voter,
whether brought about by the use of a real gun or a recreational gun which is sought to be
averted.
 Mustang Lumber vs. CA

Facts:

Petitioner Mustang Lumber Corporation assailed the nature of the seizure of its lumber products
by the Court of Appeals.

RULING:

The court held that the term ‘lumber’ as used in the information against petitioners, although not
mentioned in express terms as among the prohibited articles under Section 68 of P.D. No.
705(Revised Forestry Code) must be understood in its ordinary and common usage. Lumber is
to be understood as a processed log or timber. The court said that since the law makes no
distinction between raw or processed timber, neither should we. Ubi lex non distinguere
debemus. The court held that the petitioners were then correctly charged with the offense of
violating Sec68 of PD No 705 as alleged by the facts in the information.

The court also held that the seizure of items and the truck carrying the same was done lawfully
as it falls under lawful warrantless searches. Search of moving vehicles is one of the exceptions
to the general rule that searches must be done with a warrant. Furthermore, such search and
seizure was a valid exercise of the power vested upon the forest officer or employee by Section
80 of P.D. No. 705, as amended by P.D. No. 1775.

Finally, the court stressed petitioner’s violation of Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. The court held
that Secretary Factoran or his authorized representative indeed had the authority to seize the
Lumber since petitioner’s license, at the time of seizure, was still suspended. Thus, petitioner
was in illegal possession of the seized articles.

The Court ruled against petitioner in all three consolidated cases.

 LITO CORPUZ vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014

FACTS:

Accused Corpuz received from complainant Tangcoy pieces of jewelry with an obligation to sell
the same and remit the proceeds of the sale or to return the same if not sold, after the expiration
of 30 days.

The period expired without Corpuz remitting anything to Tangcoy.

When Corpuz and Tangcoy met, Corpuz promised that he will pay, but to no avail.

Tangcoy filed a case for estafa with abuse of confidence against Corpuz.

Corpuz  argued as follows:

a. The proof submitted by Tangcoy (receipt) is inadmissible for being a mere photocopy.

b. The information was defective because the date when the jewelry should be returned and the
date when crime occurred is different from the one testified to by Tangcoy.

c. Fourth element of estafa or demand is not proved.

d. Sole testimony of Tangcoy is not sufficient for conviction

ISSUES and RULING

Can the court admit as evidence a photocopy of document without violating the best evidence
rule (only original documents, as a general rule, is admissible as evidence)?

Yes. The established doctrine is that when a party failed to interpose a timely objection to
evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such objection shall be considered as
waived.

Here, Corpuz never objected to the admissibility of the said evidence at the time it was
identified, marked and testified upon in court by Tangcoy. Corpuz also failed to raise an
objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s formal offer of evidence and even admitted
having signed the said receipt.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMAN DERILO

Facts:

Roman Derilo, Isidoro Baldimo y Quillo, Lucas Doños, Alejandro Cofuentes and one John Doe
were charged with the so-called crime of murder. Of the five accused, only accused-appellant
Isidoro Q. Baldimo was apprehended and brought within the trial court's jurisdiction. At his
arraignment on March 18, 1985, and after the information was translated in the Waray dialect
with which he is well versed, appellant pleaded not guilty. However, by the time the People had
formally finished presenting its evidence on August 6, 1986, appellant, through his counsel de
parte, manifested to the court a quo that he wanted to withdraw his earlier plea of not guilty and
substitute the same with one of guilty. Consequently, a re-arraignment was ordered by the lower
court and, this time, appellant entered a plea of guilty to the charge of murder. Appellant does
not deny his participation in the commission of the crime. Rather, in his brief pitifully consisting
of two pages, he merely asks for the modification of the death penalty imposed by the lower
court to life imprisonment.

Responding to the alarming increase of horrible crimes being committed in the country,
Congress passed a law imposing the death penalty on certain heinous offenses and further
amending for that purpose the Revised Penal Code and other special penal laws. Said law was
officially enacted as Republic Act No. 7659 and took effect on December 31, 1993. This is now
the governing penal law at the time of this review of the case at bar.

Issue:

Whether or not the penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed to the accused instead of
death penalty.

Ruling:

For failure of the prosecution to prove the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation
and by virtue of the command of the 1987 Constitution, the judgment of the court a quo is
accordingly MODIFIED. Accused-appellant Isidoro Q. Baldimo is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of
P50,000.00 in consonance with our current case law and policy on death indemnity.

It can be readily seen that the reduction of the penalty is not and was not made dependent on a
law, decree, condition, or period before the aforementioned Section 19 can be applied by the
courts. It cannot be inferred, either from the wordings of the subject provision or from the
intention of the framers of the Constitution, that a death sentence should be brought to the
Supreme Court for review within a certain time frame in order that it can be reduced to reclusion
perpetua. The fundamental principle of constitutional construction is to give effect to the intent of
the framers of the organic law and of the people adopting it. The intention to which force is to be
given is that which is embodied and expressed in the constitutional provisions themselves.
Interpretatio fienda est ut res magis valeat quam pereat. A law should be interpreted with a view
to upholding rather than destroying it.
 VISAYAS COMMUNITY MEDICAL CENTER (VCMC) v. ERMA YBALLE, NELIA ANGEL,
ELEUTERIA CORTEZ and EVELYN ONG

FACTS:

Respondents were hired as staff nurses (Ong and Angel) and midwives (Yballe and Cortez) by
petitioner Visayas Community Medical Center (VCMC), formerly the Metro Cebu Community
Hospital, Inc. (MCCHI). MCCHI is a non-stock, non-profit corporation hich operates the Metro
Cebu Community Hospital (MCCH), a tertiary medical institution owned by the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines (UCCP).

The National Federation of Labor (NFL) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the rank-
and-file employees of MCCHI.Under the 1987 and 1991 Collective Bargaining Agreements
(CBAs).

On December 6, 1995, Nava wrote Rev. Iyoy expressing the union desire to renew the CBA,
attaching to her letter a statement of proposals signed/endorsed by 153 union members.Nava
subsequently requested that the following employees be allowed to avail of one-day union leave
with pay on December 19, 1995. However, MCCHI returned the CBA proposal for Nava to
secure first the endorsement of the legal counsel of NFL as the official bargaining representative
of MCCHI employees.

Meanwhile, Atty. Alforque informed MCCHI that the proposed CBA submitted by Nava was
never referred to NFL and that NFL has not authorized any other legal counsel or any person for
collective bargaining negotiations.

On February 26, 1996, upon the request of Atty. Alforque, MCCHI granted one-day union leave
with pay for 12 union members. The next day, several union members led by Nava and her
group launched a series of mass actions such as wearing black and red armbands/headbands,
marching around the hospital premises and putting up placards, posters and streamers.Atty.
Alforque immediately disowned the concerted activities being carried out by union members
which are not sanctioned by NFL.MCCHI directed the union officers led by Nava to submit
within 48 hours a written explanation why they should not be terminated for having engaged in
illegal concerted activities amounting to strike, and place them under immediate preventive
suspension.

Responding to this directive, Nava and her group denied there was a temporary stoppage of
work, explaining that employees wore their armbands only as a sign of protest and reiterating
their demand for MCCHI to comply with its duty to bargain collectively.

On March 13 and 19, 1996, the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office
No. 7 issued certifications stating thatthere is nothing in their records which shows thatNAMA-
MCCH-NFL isa registered labor organization, and that said union submitted only a copy of its
Charter Certificate on January 31, 1995.MCCHI then sent individual notices to all union
members asking them to submit within 72 hours a written explanation why they should not be
terminated for having supported the illegal concerted activities of NAMA-MCCH-NFL which has
no legal personality as per DOLE records.

On March 13, 1996, NAMA-MCCH-NFL filed a Notice of Strike but the same was deemed not
filed for want of legal personality on the part of the filer.

Meanwhile, the scheduled investigations did not push through because the striking union
members insisted on attending the same only as a group.MCCHI again sent notices informing
them that their refusal to submit to investigation is deemed a waiver of their right to explain their
side and management shall proceed to impose proper disciplinary action under the
circumstances.

Unfazed, the striking union members held more mass actions.The means of ingress to and
egress from the hospital were blocked so that vehicles carrying patients and employees were
barred from entering the premises.Placards were placed at the hospital entrance gate stating:
lease proceed to another hospitaland e are on protest. Employees and patients reported acts of
intimidation and harassment perpetrated by union leaders and members.With the intensified
atmosphere of violence and animosity within the hospital premises as a result of continued
protest activities by union members, MCCHI suffered heavy losses due to low patient admission
rates.

The hospital suppliers also refused to make further deliveries on credit.With the volatile situation
adversely affecting hospital operations and the condition of confined patients, MCCHI filed a
petition for injunction in the NLRC on July 9, 1996.A temporary restraining order (TRO) was
issued on July 16, 1996. MCCHI presented 12 witnesses (hospital employees and patients),
including a security guard who was stabbed by an identified sympathizer while in the company
of Nava group.MCCHI petition was granted and a permanent injunction was issued on
September 18, 1996 enjoining the Nava group from committing illegal acts mentioned in Art.
264 of the Labor Code.

Thereafter, several complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice were filed by the
terminated employees against MCCHI. Rev. Iyoy, UCCP and members of the Board of Trustees
of MCCHI.

Executive Labor Arbiter Reynoso A. Belarmino rendered in his decision dismissing the claim of
unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal and declaring the termination of the following as an
offshoot of the illegal strike.

NLRC dismissed the motion for reconsideration filed by the respondents.

CA reversed the rulings of the Labor Artbiter and NLRC, ordered the reinstatement of
respondents and the payment of their full back wages.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents did not commit illegal acts during strike?

HELD: The strike held by respondents was illegal.

Labor Law - Illegal Strike

Paragraph 3, Article 264(a) of the Labor Code provides that . .any union officer who knowingly
participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment
status. . .

We stress that the law makes a distinction between union members and union officers. A worker
merely participating in an illegal strike may not be terminated from employment.It is only when
he commits illegal acts during a strike that he may be declared to have lost employment status.
In contrast, a union officer may be terminated from employment for knowingly participating in an
illegal strike or participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike.The law grants the
employer the option of declaring a union officer who participated in an illegal strike as having
lost his employment. It possesses the right and prerogative to terminate the union officers from
service.

In this case, the NLRC affirmed the finding of the Labor Arbiter that respondents supported and
took part in the illegal strike and further declared that they were guilty of insubordination.It noted
that the striking employees were determined to force management to negotiate with their union
and proceeded with the strike despite knowledge that NAMA-MCCH-NFL is not a legitimate
labor organization and without regard to the consequences of their acts consisting of displaying
placards and marching noisily inside the hospital premises, and blocking the entry of vehicles
and persons

Are respondents then entitled to back wages? In G & S Transport Corporation v. Infante, ruled
in the negative: with respect to backwages, the principle of a air day wage for a fair day labor
remains as the basic factor in determining the award thereof.If there is no work performed by
the employee there can be no wage or pay unless, of course, the laborer was able, willing and
ready to work but was illegally locked out, suspended or dismissed or otherwise illegally
prevented from working. x x xIn Philippine Marine Officers Guild v. Compaia aritima, as affirmed
in Philippine Diamond Hotel and Resort v. Manila Diamond Hotel Employees Union, the Court
stressed that for this exception to apply, it is required that the strike be legal, a situation that
does not obtain in the case at bar.

In fine, we sustain the CA in ruling that respondents who are mere union members were illegally
dismissed for participating in the illegal strike conducted by the Nava group.However, we set
aside the order for their reinstatement and payment of full backwages.

Petition for review on certiorari is PARTLY GRANTED.

 Gonzales vs COMELEC

Facts:

In June 1967, Republic Act 4913 was passed. This law provided for the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite for the proposed amendments to the Constitution. It was provided in the said law that
the plebiscite shall be held on the same day that the general national elections shall be held
(November 14, 1967). This was questioned by Ramon Gonzales and other concerned groups
as they  argued that this was unlawful as there would be no proper submission of the proposals
to the people who would be more interested in the issues involved in the general election rather
than in the issues involving the plebiscite.

Gonzales also questioned the validity of the procedure adopted by Congress when they came
up with their proposals to amend the Constitution (RA 4913). In this regard, the COMELEC and
other respondents interposed the defense that said act of Congress cannot be reviewed by the
courts because it is a political question.

ISSUE: 

I. Whether or not the act of Congress in proposing amendments is a political question.

II. Whether or not a plebiscite may be held simultaneously with a general election.

HELD:

I. No. The issue is a justiciable question. It must be noted that the power to amend as well as
the power to propose amendments to the Constitution is not included in the general grant of
legislative powers to Congress. Such powers are not constitutionally granted to Congress. On
the contrary, such powers are inherent to the people as repository of sovereignty in a republican
state. That being, when Congress makes amendments or proposes amendments, it is not
actually doing so as Congress; but rather, it is sitting as a constituent assembly.  Such act is not
a legislative act. Since it is not a legislative act, it is reviewable by the Supreme Court. The
Supreme Court has the final say whether or not such act of the constituent assembly is within
constitutional limitations.

II. Yes. There is no prohibition to the effect that a plebiscite must only be held on a special
election.  SC held that there is nothing in this provision of the [1935] Constitution to indicate that
the election therein referred to is a special, not a general election. The circumstance that the
previous amendment to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in
special elections merely shows that Congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances
then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit proposed amendments for ratification in
general elections.

Note: **Justice Sanchez and Justice JBL Reyes dissented. “Plebiscite should be scheduled on
a special date so as to facilitate “Fair submission, intelligent consent or rejection”. They should
be able to compare the original proposition with the amended proposition.
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ISIDRO FLORES y LAGUA

G.R. No. 188315, August 25, 2010

FACTS: 

AAA lived with her adoptive mother, BBB, since she was just a few months old. BBB is married
to appellant, who was working abroad for six years. Appellant came home in 1997 and lived with
AAA and BBB. BBB was working as a restaurant supervisor from 4pm to 2am for six days a
week. 

In February 1999 at around 9:30 pm, AAA then 11 yrs old, was sleeping inside the house when
she felt and saw appellant touch her thighs. The following day, at around the same time and
while BBB was at work, appellant again touched AAA from her legs up to her breast. 

Two weeks after the incident, AAA was already asleep when she suddenly woke up and saw
appellant holding a knife, then appellant was able to penetrate her. Two days after, appellant
again raped her. AAA recounted that appellant raped her at least 3 times a week at the same
time until October 15, 2002, when she was 14 yrs. old. 

RTC rendered judgment finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 181 counts of
rape.CA affirmed the finding that AAA was raped by appellant, but did so only on 2 counts and
consider the qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship. 

ISSUE: 

Whether or not appellant should be consider as a guardian of the victim even without court
authority 

Whether that the qualifying/aggravating circumstances of relationship is applicable. 

HELD: 

To justify the death penalty, the prosecution must specifically allege in the information and prove
during the trial the qualifying circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the
offender. 

Jurisprudence dictates that the guardian must be a person who has a legal relationship with his
ward. The theory that a guardian must be legally appointed was first enunciated in the early
case of People vs. Dela Cruz which held that the guardian referred to in the law is either a legal
or judicial guardian as understood in the rules on Civil Procedure. 

The law requires a legal or judicial guardian since it is the consanguineous relation or the
solemnity of judicial appointment which impresses upon the guardian the lofty purpose of his
office and normally deters him from violating its objectives. The appellant cannot be considered
as the guardian falling within the ambit of the amendatory provision introduced by RA
7659.Since both logic and fact conjointly demonstrate that he is actually only a custodian, that
is, a mere caretaker of the children over whom he exercises a limited degree of authority for a
temporary period, we cannot impose death penalty contemplated for a real guardian under RA
7659, since he does not fit into that category. 

Be that as it may, this qualifying circumstance of being a guardian was not even mentioned in
the Information. What was clearly stated was that appellant was the “adopting father” of AAA,
which the prosecution nonetheless failed to establish. 

For failure of the prosecution to prove the qualifying circumstance of relationship, appellant
could only be convicted for two counts of simple rape, and not qualified rape.
 LIWAG vs. HAPPY GLEN LOOP HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC.

G. R. No. 189755, July 04, 2012

Facts:

In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop, loaned from Ernesto
Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The former failed to settle its debts with the
latter, so, he assigned all his rights to Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision
including the receivables from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo
represented to lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the subdivision. The said
water facility has been the only source of water of the residents for thirty (30) years. In
September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5 to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-350099was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died.
Petitioner, wife of Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding
the removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused and filed a
case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T. P. Marcelo Realty
Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor
of the respondent Association. One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement
for water system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein the
deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the HLURB Board of
Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not an open space.

Issue:

Whether or not Lot 11, Block 5 of the Happy Glen Loop is considered an “open space” as
defined in P. D. 1216.

Ruling:

Yes, the aforementioned parcel of land is considered an “open space.”

The Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to determine
whether the area falls under “other similar facilities and amenities” since P. D. 1216 makes no
specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities.

Ejusdem generis - states that where a general word or phrase follows an enumeration of
particular and specific words of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or of the same kind or class as, those
specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the enumeration refers
to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.

Therefore, the phrase “other similar facilities and amenities” should be interpreted in like
manner. It is without a doubt that the facility was used for the benefit of the community. Water is
a basic necessity, without which, survival in the community would be impossible
 CIR V AMERICAN EXPRESS INTERNATIONAL, INC. (Phil. Branch)

Facts:

Respondent, a VAT taxpayer, is the Philippine Branch of AMEX USA and was tasked with
servicing a unit of AMEX-Hongkong Branch and facilitating the collections of AMEX-HK
receivables from card members situated in the Philippines and payment to service
establishments in the Philippines.

It filed with BIR a letter-request for the refund of its 1997 excess input taxes, citing as basis
Section 110B of the 1997 Tax Code, which held that “xxx Any input tax attributable to the
purchase of capital goods or to zero-rated sales by a VAT-registered person may at his option
be refunded or credited against other internal revenue taxes, subject to the provisions of Section
112.”

In addition, respondent relied on VAT Ruling No. 080-89, which read, “In Reply, please be
informed that, as a VAT registered entity whose service is paid for in acceptable foreign
currency which is remitted inwardly to the Philippine and accounted for in accordance with the
rules and regulations of the Central Bank of the Philippines, your service income is
automatically zero rated xxx”

Petitioner claimed, among others, that the claim for refund should be construed strictly against
the claimant as they partake of the nature of tax exemption.

CTA rendered a decision in favor of respondent, holding that its services are subject to zero-
rate. CA affirmed this decision and further held that respondent’s services were “services other
than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside
the Philippines” and paid for in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance
with the rules and regulations of BSP.

Issue:

W/N AMEX Phils is entitled to refund

Held:

Yes. Section 102 of the Tax Code provides for the VAT on sale of services and use or lease of
properties. Section 102B particularly provides for the services or transactions subject to 0%
rate:

(1)    Processing, manufacturing or repacking goods for other persons doing business outside
the Philippines which goods are subsequently exported, where the services are paid for in
acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of
the BSP;

(2)    Services other than those mentioned in the preceding subparagraph, e.g. those rendered
by hotels and other service establishments, the consideration for which is paid for in acceptable
foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with the rules and regulations of the BSP
Under subparagraph 2, services performed by VAT-registered persons in the Philippines (other
than the processing, manufacturing or repackaging of goods for persons doing business outside
the Philippines), when paid in acceptable foreign currency and accounted for in accordance with
the R&R of BSP, are zero-rated. Respondent renders service falling under the category of zero
rating.

As a general rule, the VAT system uses the destination principle as a basis for the jurisdictional
reach of the tax. Goods and services are taxed only in the country where they are consumed.
Thus, exports are zero-rated, while imports are taxed.

In the present case, the facilitation of the collection of receivables is different from the utilization
of consumption of the outcome of such service. While the facilitation is done in the Philippines,
the consumption is not. The services rendered by respondent are performed upon its sending to
its foreign client the drafts and bulls it has gathered from service establishments here, and are
therefore, services also consumed in the Philippines. Under the destination principle, such
service is subject to 10% VAT.

However, the law clearly provides for an exception to the destination principle; that is 0% VAT
rate for services that are performed in the Philippines, “paid for in acceptable foreign currency
and accounted for in accordance with the R&R of BSP.” The respondent meets the following
requirements for exemption, and thus should be zero-rated:

(1)    Service be performed in the Philippines

(2)    The service fall under any of the categories in Section 102B of the Tax Code

(3)    It be paid in acceptable foreign currency accounted for in accordance with BSP R&R.
 Romualdez vs Marcelo 
G.R. Nos. 166510-33
July 28, 2006

Facts:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive
the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the
first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon
before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription.

In its Comment, the Ombudsman argues that the dismissal of the informations in Criminal Case
Nos. 13406-13429 does not mean that petitioner was thereafter exempt from criminal
prosecution; that new informations may be filed by the Ombudsman should it find probable
cause in the conduct of its preliminary investigation; that the filing of the complaint with the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) in 1987 and the filing of the information
with the Sandiganbayan in 1989 interrupted the prescriptive period; that the absence of the
petitioner from the Philippines from 1986 until 2000 also interrupted the aforesaid period based
on Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code.

For its part, the PCGG avers in its Comment that, in accordance with the 1987 Constitution and
RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, the Ombudsman need not wait for a new
complaint with a new docket number for it to conduct a preliminary investigation on the alleged
offenses of the petitioner; that considering that both RA No. 3019 and Act No. 3326 or the Act
To Establish Periods of Prescription For Violations Penalized By Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin To Run, are silent as to whether
prescription should begin to run when the offender is absent from the Philippines, the Revised
Penal Code, which answers the same in the negative, should be applied.

Issues:

(a) Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by the Ombudsman in Criminal Case Nos.
13406-13429 was a nullity?

(b) Whether the offenses for which petitioners are being charged with have already prescribed?
Held:

Petitioner claims that the Office of the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in
recommending the filing of 24 informations against him for violation of Section 7 of Republic Act
(RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; that the Ombudsman cannot revive
the aforementioned cases which were previously dismissed by the Sandiganbayan in its
Resolution of February 10, 2004; that the defense of prescription may be raised even for the
first time on appeal and thus there is no necessity for the presentation of evidence thereon
before the court a quo. Thus, this Court may accordingly dismiss Criminal Case Nos. 28031-
28049 pending before the Sandiganbayan and Criminal Case Nos. 04-231857–04-231860
pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, all on the ground of prescription
 San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation vs Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Facts:

San Pablo Manufacturing Corporation (SPMC) was assessed a 3% tax on its sales of corn and
edible oil as manufactured products – this is pursuant to Section 168 of the 1987 Tax Code.
Said corn and edible oil products were sold to United Coconut Chemicals (UNICHEM) who in
turn exports these products and sell them abroad.

SPMC invoked that it is exempt from the tax as it invoked the same Section of the 1987 Tax
Code which provides in part:

xxx Provided, however, That this tax shall not apply to rope, coconut oil, palm oil and the by-
product of copra from which it is produced or manufactured and desiccated coconut, if such
rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by-products and desiccated coconuts, shall be removed for
exportation by the proprietor or operator of the factory or the miller himself, and are actually
exported without returning to the Philippines, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or
part of any manufactured article or products: xxx (underscore added by uberdigests)

SPMC’s interpretation of the law is as follows:

That there is indeed a 3% tax on edible oil products;

But that said tax exempts manufacturers who export these edible oil products;

That SPMC is considered to be an exporter because it sells the oil products to UNICHEM, its
purchaser, who then exports the oil products.

ISSUE: Whether or not SPMC’s interpretation is correct.

HELD: No. The legal maxim “Expressio Unius est Exclusio Alterius” applies. Nowhere in the law
was “corn oil” included in the enumeration of tax exempt exported products. Nor did it mention
to exempt a manufacturer who, though not directly exporting its edible oil products nevertheless
sells said product to a purchaser who does export. Where the law enumerates the subject or
condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not
expressly mentioned. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the
enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or
reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. The rule proceeds from
the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had
the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned.
 COCONUT OIL REFINERS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs. HON. RUBEN TORRES, et. al.

G.R. No. 132527; July 29, 2005

Facts:

This is a Petition to enjoin and prohibit the public respondent Ruben Torres in his capacity as
Executive Secretary from allowing other private respondents to continue with the operation of
tax and duty-free shops located at the Subic Special Economic Zone (SSEZ) and the Clark
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ). The petitioner seeks to declare RA 7227 as unconstitutional on
the ground that it allowed only tax-free (and duty-free) importation of raw materials, capital and
equipment. Petitioners contend that the wording of RA 7227 clearly limits the grant of tax
incentives to the importation of raw materials, capital and equipment only thereby violating the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. He also assailed the constitutionality of EO 97-A for
being violative of their right to equal protection. They asserted that private respondents
operating inside the SSEZ are not different from the retail establishments located outside. The
respondent moves to dismiss the petition on the ground of lack of legal standing and
unreasonable delay in filing of the petition

Issue:

WON there is a violation of equal protection clause?

Ruling:

NO. The phrase “tax and duty-free importations of raw materials, capital and equipment” was
merely cited as an example of incentives that may be given to entities operating within the zone.
Public respondent SBMA correctly argued that the maxim “expressio unius est exclusio
alterius", on which petitioners impliedly rely to support their restrictive interpretation, does not
apply when words are mentioned by way of example.

The petition with respect to declaration of unconstitutionality of EO 97-A cannot be, likewise,
sustained. The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based
which was based on reasonable classification. A classification, to be valid, must (1) rest on
substantial distinction, (2) be germane to the purpose of the law, (3) not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. Applying the foregoing
test to the present case, the Court finds no violation of the right to equal protection of the laws.
There is a substantial distinctions lying between the establishments inside and outside the zone.
 COA CEBU vs. PROVINCE OF CEBU

G.R. No. 141386; November 29, 2001

Facts:

The provincial governor of the province of Cebu, as chairman of the local school board, under
Section 98 of the Local Government Code, appointed classroom teachers who have no items in
the DECS plantilla to handle extension classes that would accommodate students in the public
schools. It was charged against the provincial Special Education Fund (SEF) along with college
scholarship grants of the province. Consequently, COA issued Notices of Suspension saying
that disbursements for the salaries and scholarship grants are not chargeable to SEF. Faced
with the Notices of Suspension, the Province of Cebu filed a petition for declaratory relief with
the trial court to which a decision declaring the questioned expenses as authorized expenditures
was rendered.

Issue:

May the salaries and personnel-related benefits of public school teachers appointed by local
chief executives in connection with the establishment and maintenance of extension classes as
well as the expenses for college scholarship grants be charged to the SEF of the local
government unit concerned?

Ruling:

YES. The SEF was created by virtue of RA 5447 which defined the activities of DECS that may
exclusively be funded. Under the doctrine of necessary implication, the allocation of the SEF for
the establishment and maintenance of extension classes logically implies the hiring of teachers
who should, as a matter of course, be compensated for their services. Ex necessitate legis.
Verily, the services and the corresponding compensation of these teachers are necessary and
indispensable to the establishment and maintenance of extension classes.
 Gutierrez v. House Committee on Justice, et al.

FACTS:

For resolution is petitioners "Motion for Reconsideration.

To argue, as petitioner does, that there never was a simultaneous referral of two impeachment
complaints as they were actually referred to the committee "separately, one after the other"is to
dismantle her own interpretation ofFranciscothat the one-year bar is to be reckoned from the
filing of the impeachment complaint. Petitioners Motion concedesthat theFranciscodoctrine on
the initiation of an impeachment proceeding includes the Houses initial action on the complaint.
By recognizing the legal import of a referral, petitioner abandons her earlier claim thatper
Franciscoan impeachment proceeding is initiated by the mere filing of an impeachment
complaint.

Having uprooted her reliance on the Francisco case in propping her position that the initiation of
an impeachment proceeding must be reckoned from the filing of the complaint, petitioner insists
on actual initiation and not "constructive initiation by legal fiction" as averred by Justice Adolfo
Azcuna in his separate opinion in Francisco.

In Justice Azcunas opinion which concurred with the majority, what he similarly found untenable
was the stretching of the reckoning point of initiation to the time that the Committee on Justice
(the Committee) report reaches the floor of the House. Notably, the provisions of the
Impeachment Rules of the 12th Congress that were successfully challenged in Francisco
provided that an impeachment proceeding was to be "deemed initiated" upon the Committees
finding of sufficiency of substance or upon the Houses affirmance or overturning of the
Committees finding, which was clearly referred to as the instances "presumably for internal
purposes of the House, as to the timing of some of its internal action on certain relevant
matters." Definitely, "constructive initiation by legal fiction" did not refer to the aspects of filing
and referral in the regular course of impeachment, for this was precisely the gist of Francis coin
pronouncing what initiation means.

The Court adhered to the Francisco-ordained balance in the tug-of-war between those who
want to stretch and those who want to shrink the term "initiate," either of which could disrupt the
provisions congruency to the rationale of the constitutional provision. Petitioners imputation that
the Courts Decision presents a sharp deviation from Francisco as it defers the operability of the
one-year bar rule rings hollow.

Petitioner urges that the word "initiate" must be read in its plain, ordinary and technical meaning,
for it is contrary to reason, logic and common sense to reckon the beginning or start of the
initiation process from its end or conclusion.
Petitioner would have been correct had the subject constitutional provision been worded as "no
initiation process of the impeachment proceeding shall be commenced against the same official
more than once within a period of one year," in which case the reckoning would literally point to
the "start of the beginning." To immediately reckon the initiation to what petitioner herself
concedes as the start of the initiation process is to countenance a raw or half-baked initiation.

In re-affirming what the phrase "no impeachment proceedings shall be initiated" means, the
Court closely applied Francisco on what comprises or completes the initiation phase. Nothing
can be more unequivocal or well-defined than the elucidation of filing-and-referral in Francisco.
Petitioner must come to terms with her denial of the exact terms of Francisco.

Petitioner posits that referral is not an integral or indispensable part of the initiation of
impeachment proceedings, in case of a direct filing of a verified complaint or resolution of
impeachment by at least one-third of all the Members of the House.

ISSUE: Whether the period of one year to file impeachment complaint is mandatory.

HELD: The decision is sustained

POLITICAL LAW impeachment

The House cannot indeed refuse to refer an impeachment complaint that is filed without a
subsisting bar. To refer an impeachment complaint within an existing one-year bar, however, is
to commit the apparently unconstitutional act of initiating a second impeachment proceeding,
which may be struck down under Rule 65 for grave abuse of discretion. It bears recalling that
the one-year bar rule itself is a constitutional limitation on the Houses power or function to refer
a complaint.

Tackling on the House floor in its order of business a clearly constitutionally-prohibited second
impeachment complaint on the matter of whether to make the appropriate referral goes
precisely into the propriety of the referral and not on the merits of the complaint. The House
needs only to ascertain the existence or expiry of the constitutional ban of one year, without any
regard to the claims set forth in the complaint.

To petitioner, the intervening days from the filing of the complaint to whatever completes the
initiation of an impeachment proceeding is immaterial in mitigating the influx of successive
complaints since allowing multiple impeachment charges would result to the same harassment
and oppression. She particularly cites Constitutional Commissioner Ricardo Romulo’s concerns
on the amount of time spent if "multiple impeachment charges" are allowed. She fails, however,
to establish whether Commissioner Romulo limited or quantified his reference to not more than
one complaint or charge.

In sum, the Court did not deviate from, as it did apply the twin rule of filing and referral in the
present case, with Francisco as the guiding light. Petitioner refuses to see the other half of that
light, however.
The Constitution clearly gives the House a wide discretion on how to effectively promulgate its
Impeachment Rules. It is not for this Court to tell a co-equal branch of government on how to do
so when such prerogative is lodged exclusively with it.

Still, petitioner argues that the Court erred when it ruled that "to require publication of the House
Impeachment Rules would only delay the impeachment proceedings and cause the House of
Representatives to violate constitutionally mandated periods" She insists that the Committee,
after publishing the Impeachment Rules, would still have a remainder of 45 days out of the 60-
day period within which to finish its business.

Indubitably, an impeachment is not a judicial proceeding, but rather a political exercise.

Petitioner thus cannot demand that the Court apply the stringent standards it asks of justices
and judges when it comes to inhibition from hearing cases. Incidentally, the Impeachment Rules
do not provide for any provision regarding the inhibition of the Committee chairperson or any
member from participating in an impeachment proceeding. The Committee may thus direct any
question of partiality towards the concerned member only. And any decision on the matter of
inhibition must be respected, and it is not for this Court to interfere with that decision.

Except for the constitutionally mandated periods, the pacing or alleged precipitate haste with
which the impeachment proceeding against petitioner is conducted is beyond the Courts control.
Again, impeachment is a highly politicized intramural that gives the House ample leg room to
operate, subject only to the constitutionally imposed limits. And beyond these, the Court is duty-
bound to respect the discretion of a co-equal branch of government on matters which would
effectively carry out its constitutional mandate.

DENIED FOR BEING BEREFT OF MERIT.

 City of Manila vs Judge Perfecto Laguio

Facts:

On 30 Mar 1993, Mayor Lim signed into law Ord 7783 entitled AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING
THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS
OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-
MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES. It basically prohibited establishments such as bars, karaoke bars, motels and
hotels from operating in the Malate District which was notoriously viewed as a red light district
harboring thrill seekers. Malate Tourist Development Corporation avers that the ordinance is
invalid as it includes hotels and motels in the enumeration of places offering amusement or
entertainment. MTDC reiterates that they do not market such nor do they use women as tools
for entertainment. MTDC also avers that under the LGC, LGUs can only regulate motels but
cannot prohibit their operation. The City reiterates that the Ordinance is a valid exercise of
Police Power as provided as well in the LGC. The City likewise emphasized that the purpose of
the law is to promote morality in the City.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7783 is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the said Ordinance is null and void. The SC noted that for an
ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government
unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it  must also
conform to the following substantive requirements:

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;

(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;

(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;

(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;

(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and

(6) must not be unreasonable.

The police power of the City Council, however broad and far-reaching, is subordinate to the
constitutional limitations thereon; and is subject to the limitation that its exercise must be
reasonable and for the public good. In the case at bar, the enactment of the Ordinance was an
invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
 Ricardo Fernandez vs. NLRC and DM Consunji, Inc. (1994, Nocon)

FACTS: Fernandez was hired by DM Consunji (November 1974). He worked for the latter until
March 1936, when his employment was terminated on the ground that the project to which he
was assigned was already completed. He thus filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
Labor Arbiter.

The Labor Arbiter (May 1988) found that Fernandez worked continuously in various projects
ranging from 5 to 20 years and belonged to a workpool (i.e. his dismissal was illegal). DM
Consunji appealed, on the ground that Fernandez was a project employee hired on a project-to-
project basis, depending on the availability of projects. It pointed to the gaps in Fernandez’
employment history to show that he was hired on an “off-and-on” basis.

The NLRC (September 1989), in view of (1) lack of evidence to prove the continuous
employment of Fernandez, and (2) the intermittent nature of their work as shown by project
contracts, ruled that Fernandez was a project employee. Fernandez interposed a MFR which
was denied for lack of merit (July 1991). The NLRC also noted that the MFR was filed only on
January 29, 1990, which was beyond the 10d reglementary period from date of receipt of
decision (November 13, 1989).

Without mentioning the denial of the MFR, Ricardo Fernandez filed a petition before the SC,
assailing the NLRC Decision, arguing that it is more in keeping with the intent and spirit of the
law to consider him as regular employees.

ISSUE: W/N the NLRC acted with GAD in reversing the Labor Arbiter’s decision by dismissing
the complaint for illegal dismissal on the finding that they were project employees. NO.

RULING:

[Procedural] The yardstick to measure the timeliness of a petition for certiorari is the
reasonableness of the duration of time that had expired from the commission of the acts
complained of up to the institution of the proceedings to annul the same. Here, Fernandez’
negligence or indifference for such a long period of time (November 13, 1989 - receipt of
Decision; Agusut 2, 1991 - receipt of denial of MFR; July 21, 1992 - filing of petition for
certiorari) has in the meantime rendered the questioned decision final and no longer assailable.
[Substantive] DM Consunji presented material documents (covering November 5, 1974 - March
23, 1986) showing that Fernandez was hired as a project employee with the specific dates of
hiring, duration of hiring, dates of his lay-offs, and the termination reports submitted to the
Minister of Labor. Such documents clearly showed gaps of month/s between the hiring of
Fernandez in numerous projects where he was assigned. Thus, he is governed by Policy
Instruction No. 20:

Project employees are those employed in connection with a particular construction

project. They are not entitled to termination pay if they are terminated as a result of the
completion of the project or any phase thereof in which they are employed, regardless of the
number of projects in which they have been employed by a particular construction company.

The proviso in the second par. of Art. 280 (LC) (refer to your codal) deems as regular
employees only those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service
regardless of the fact that such service may be continuous or broken. It is NOT applicable to
project employees who are specifically exempt therefrom. (Mercado vs. NLRC):

GR: Office of a proviso is to qualify or modify only the phrase immediately preceding it or
restrain or limit the generality of the clause that it immediately follows. A proviso is to be
construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is
attached, and not to the statute itself or to other sections thereof. EXC: Where the clear
legislative intent is to restrain or qualify not only the phrase immediately preceding it (the
proviso) but also earlier provisions of the statute or even the statute itself as a whole.

A careful reading of the proviso discloses that the same relates to employment where the
employee is engaged to perform activities that are usually necessary or desirable in the usual
business or trade of the employer but hastens to qualify that project employment is specifically
exempted therefrom.

The NLRC correctly observed that Fernandez failed to consider the requirement in Policy
Instruction No. 20 that to qualify as a member of a work pool, the worker must still be
considered an employee of the construction company while in the work pool. There must be
proof to the effect that Fernandez was under an obligation to be always available on call of DM
Consunji and that he was not free to offer his services to other employers. However, Fernandez
failed to introduce such evidence during the times when there were no projects.
Lastly, Fernandez’ layoff and the termination reports were duly submitted to the Minister of
Labor in accordance with Policy Instruction No. 20:

Moreover, the company is not required to obtain a clearance from the Secretary of Labor
in connection with such termination. What is required of the company is a report to the nearest
Public Employment Office for statistical purposes.

In other cases, it was uniformly held that the failure of the employer to report to the nearest
employment office the termination of workers everytime a project is completed proves that the
employees are not project employees. Contrariwise, the faithful and regular effort of DM
Consunji in reporting every completion of its project and submitting the lay-off list of its
employees proves the nature of employment of the workers involved therein as project
employees. Thus, it is clear that Fernandez does not belong to the workpool from which DM
Consunji would draw workers for assignment to other projects at its discretion.
 Arenas v. City of San Carlos, Pangasinan

FACTS:

RA 5967 provides that second and third class judges would receive an annual salary of
P18,000. Arenaswas receiving a monthly salary of P1000.00, P350 of which was from the
national government and theremaining P650 comes from the city government. Petitioner had
repeatedly requested the city to enact thesaid RA but the Respondent City refused.

ISSUE:

W/N Judge Arenas should be granted the increase in his salary from P12,000 to P18,000.

HELD:

Looking at the Senate deliberations, the intention in enacting the RA was that the salary of a
city judge should not be higher than the salary of the city mayor. Moreover, exceptions, as a
general rule, shouldbe strictly but reasonably construed they extend only so far as their
language fairly warrants, and all doubts should be resolved in favor of the general provisions
rather than the exception. In case there is repugnancy between the proviso and the main
provision, the latter provision, whether a proviso or not, is given preference because it is the
latest expression of the intent of the legislation, but more so because provisosare negatively
written and gives off a more mandatory tone
 BALAGTAS MULTI-PURPOSE COOPERATIVE, INC., and AURELIO SANTIAGO, versus
COURT OF APPEALS, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and JOSEFINA
HIPOLITO-HERRERO

FACTS 

Balagtas Multi-Purpose Cooperative, Inc. is a duly organized and existing cooperative under the
laws of the Philippines. Sometime in April 1991, Balagtas hired Josefina G. Hipolito-Herrero, as
part time manager in its office in Sulok, Panginay, Balagtas, Bulacan, where she was required
to report.

In September 1992, Balagtas created a branch office at Wawa, Balagtas, Bulacan. Josefina was
required to report at the said Wawa branch from 8:00 to 12:00 noon before reporting to her
office at Sulok from 2:00 to 6:00 p.m. For the additional work, Josefina received a proportionate
increase in salary. 

In the early part of 1994, the board members contemplated closing its Wawa Branch Office
inasmuch as the desired number of the members and volume of transactions were not met with,
rendering it more costly to maintain. 

On May 1, 1994, in their monthly meeting, Josefina informed them that she intends to take a
leave of absence from May 9 to May 30, 1994. Her proposal was immediately approved by the
board. 

Subsequently, the board members resolved to close its Wawa branch. Meantime, after the
lapse of her leave of absence on May 30, 1994, Josefina did not report for work anymore. Later
on, she filed her resignation. 

Almost nine (9) months thereafter Josefina filed a complaint with the Provincial Office of the
Department of Labor in Malolos, Bulacan for illegal dismissal, and non-payment of 13th month
pay or Christmas Bonus. She prayed that she be reinstated and paid backwages as well as
moral damages. 

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in favor of Josefina ordering the petitioners to pay
separation pay, backwages and 13th month pay. 

Aggrieved, Balagtas appealed the decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
but failed to post either a cash or surety bond as required by Article 223 of the Labor Code.
Instead, petitioners filed a manifestation and motion, stating, among others, that under Republic
Act No. 6938, Article 62(7) of the Cooperative Code of the Philippines, petitioners are exempt
from putting up a bond in an appeal from the decision of the inferior court. In a Resolution, the
NLRC ordered the Petitioner to post a bond within 10 days. 

Petitioners then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, alleging that the NLRC acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in directing them to post an
appeal bond despite the clear mandate of Article 62, paragraph (7) of Republic Act No. 6938
(Cooperative Code) which dispensed with such requirement. 

After the parties submitted their respective pleadings, the CA resolved to dismiss the petition in
the assailed decision dated September 27, 2002 holding that the exemption from putting up a
bond by a cooperative applies to cases decided by inferior courts only. 
ISSUE 

Whether cooperatives are exempted from filing a cash or surety bond required to perfect an
employer’s appeal under Section 223 of Presidential Decree No. 442 ,the Labor Code. 

HELD 

The provision cited by petitioners cannot be taken in isolation and must be interpreted in relation
to the Cooperative Code in its entirety. It must be kept in mind that the enactment of the
Cooperative Code is pursuant to the State’s declared policy of fostering the “creation and
growth of cooperatives as a practical vehicle for prompting self-reliance and harnessing people
power towards the attainment of economic development and social justice.” In line with this,
certain benefits and privileges were expressly granted to cooperative entities under the statute.
The provision invoked by petitioners regarding the exemption from payment of an appeal bond
is only one among a number of such privileges which appear under the article entitled “Tax and
Other Exemptions” of the code. 

Considering that the provision relates to “tax and other exemptions,” the same must be strictly
construed. This follows the well-settled principle that exceptions are to be strictly. An express
exception, exemption, or saving clause excludes other exceptions. Express exceptions
constitute the only limitations on the operation of a statute and no other exception will be
implied. The rule proceeds from the premise that the legislative body would not have made
specific enumerations in a statute, if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its
terms to those expressly mentioned. 

The term “court” has a settled meaning in this jurisdiction which cannot be reasonably
interpreted as extending to quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC unless otherwise clearly and
expressly indicated in the wording of the statute. Simply because these tribunals or agencies
exercise quasi-judicial functions does not convert them into courts of law. 

For this reason, petitioners must comply with the requirement set forth in Article 223 of the
Labor Code in order to perfect their appeal to the NLRC. It must be pointed out that the right to
appeal is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a privilege of statutory origin and,
therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may validly provide limitations
or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by
the losing party. 

In this case, the obvious and logical purpose of an appeal bond is to insure, during the period of
appeal, against any occurrence that would defeat or diminish recovery by the employee under
the judgment if the latter is subsequently affirmed. This is consistent with the State’s
constitutional mandate to afford full protection to labor in order to forcefully and meaningfully
underscore labor as a primary social and economic force.