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From Values to Behavior and from Behavior to Values

Chapter · August 2017

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-56352-7_10

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 From values to behavior and from behavior to values

Ronald Fischer

School of Psychology & Centre for Applied Cross-Cultural Research, Victoria University of Wellington,
New Zealand & Interacting Minds Centre, Aarhus University, Denmark

Cite as:

Fischer, R. (2017). From values to behavior and from behavior to values. In S. Roccas & L.
Sagiv (eds), Values and Behavior. Taking a cross-cultural perspective, pp. 219-235).
Berlin: Springer.

Abstract

Values are commonly defined as guiding principles in life. Therefore, we could expect to see some
correlation between values and behavior. In this chapter, I critically review the existing literature,
drawing upon research that has used paper-pencil reports of behavior, value-behavior linkages in public
speech and texts as well as field experimental studies that examined the relationship between values
and ritualistic action. Self-reports of de-contextualized behavior are moderately associated with
motivationally congruent values, especially if there are few social and environmental constraints.
Studies of public speeches and texts as well as laboratory and field studies investigating effects of
collective rituals also show some moderately strong correlation between values and behaviors, but
suggest that values trail behaviors and/or situational demands (e.g., individuals adjust their behaviors
after they enact a behavior or when placed in a specific situation). To examine plausible causal links, I
focus on self-perception theory, construal level theory and neuroscience theories of mental
representations. Bringing these different strands together, I sketch the outlines of a development-based
eco-cultural neuroscience theory of values and behavior that is consistent with the currently available
data.

Keywords: values, behavior, self-reports, neuroscience, collective ritual, public speech analysis, self-
perception theory, construal level theory
Values are commonly defined as abstract beliefs, as “guiding principles in people’s lives” (Schwartz,
1992, p. 2) and “stable meaning-producing superordinate cognitive structure” (Rohan, 2000; p. 257).
These definitions imbue values with a causal importance of great significance: values structure people’s
cognitive architecture and guide behavior and thought. Yet, the same definitions often refer to values as
motivations, reflecting the needs of the individual and group within which the individual is embedded.
Motivations are much more malleable and transient. Needs in particular are often best conceptualized
as homeostatic, which means that motivations based on basic physiological and affiliative needs may be
fluctuating in a cyclical fashion. In this case, behavior – that is the interaction of body with the physical
and social environment – might be the causal factor that allows the satisfaction or frustration of needs
and therefore may increase or decrease the importance of certain values over others.

What do we know about value-behavior links? Even a casual observer will quickly be struck by
the fact that actual behavior is largely absent from psychological research. When a colleague and I tried
to summarize the available evidence of the value-attitude-behavior linkage (Boer & Fischer, 2013), we
soon realized that there were very few, if any studies that had examined the same type of behavior
repeatedly. In order to make valid claims about any empirical fact, you need a substantive body of
literature with multiple studies replicating proposed relationships. This is clearly not the case with values
and behavior. There are isolated studies showing relationships with diverse constructs, but no
substantive body of research that allows substantive claims. In the end, we could only analyze value-
attitude relations, but not the relationship of values with behavior. Psychology after the cognitive turn
appears to have abandoned the study of behavior and psychologists now instead focus on what
participant think, feel or believe they have done or want to do.

Problems with Self-Reports

Surveys ask participants about self-reports of past behavior or intentions of future behavior. A
long history of work has shown that attitudes are often poor predictors of behavior that are important
(e.g., Griffeth, Hom & Gaertner, 2000; LaPiere, 1934; Mesmer-Magnus & Viweswaran, 2005).
Correlational designs often suggest high correlations between intentions and actual behavior (for a
comprehensive review of this literature, see for example Sheeran, 2002). Yet, these relationships cannot
be seen as conclusive. First, since many studies are cross-sectional, it is a distinct possibility that the
causal relationship is reverse – people may infer their intentions based on how they behaved in the past
(Behm, 1972; see below for further discussions of the theoretical mechanisms). Second, in cross-
sectional designs correlations might be inflated because people are often concerned with the need to
appear consistent. This introduces a significant bias that is affecting intention-behavior correlations.
Third, even though longitudinal studies are more powerful in detecting possible causal changes over
time, they are not conclusive. Both intentions and behavior could be caused by an unmeasured third
variable that is affecting both variables.

A number of studies have used more powerful experimental and controlled observational
methods to examine the extent to which changes in intentions are causally related to changes in
behavior. For example, Rhodes and Dickau (2012) conducted a meta-analysis of experimental studies
targeting physical activity. Studies needed to include random assignment of participants to an
experimental condition compared to a control group, interventions needed to have produced a
detectable difference in behavioural intentions and, importantly, the behavioural measure had to be
taken after the intention measure. They found a correlation of .07, which led them to conclude that
passive correlational designs overestimate intention-behavior links and that monitoring and targeting
intentions might be of little value for practical purposes. A subsequent analysis of the intention-behavior
gap showed that the intention-behavior gap might be substantial (Rhodes & de Bruijn, 2013): 46% of a
sample of 3,899 participants did not follow through with their intentions. A larger meta-analysis (Webb
& Sheeran, 2006) found a correlation of .18 between intentions and behavior across 47 experimental
tests. The direct effect of the intervention on behavior was still significant, indicating that other
processes may translate interventions into behavior change. Hence, we have to be careful about
generalizing from correlations between values and behavioural intentions to a possible link between
values and behavior.

Focusing on correlations on self-reports of behavior with values, I already alluded to the

problem of causality. It is a distinct theoretical possibility that people might infer intentions from their
behavior. More problematic is the fact that questionnaire based reports of behavior share the same
method with the measurement of values, leading to problems of common method variance (Podsakoff
et al., 2003). When the same method is used for assessing a set of constructs, the estimated correlations
might be inflated because of the shared variance that is due to the method. These effects are
particularly strong in areas where no objective criteria are available to assess the psychological construct
(which is the case for values as subjective interpretations of what is important in somebody’s life)
(Moorman & Podsakoff, 1992). One remedy that has been suggested is to use reports by others – e.g.,
assess personal values in the target person and get another person to report on the behaviours of that
individual. Yet, this does not solve the problem. We often socialize with those people who share our
values (Boer et al., 2011). This then is likely to lead to rater biases when being asked to evaluate value-
related behaviours (see Lee et al., 2009). Other possible biases include halo rater effects and social
desirability responses when being asked to evaluate the behavior of others that we know well
(Podsakoff et al., 2003). This is not to argue that this research is of limited value – I just urge some
caution of an uncritical acceptance of these correlations. This self- or other-report research is useful to
the extent that it provides some boundary conditions for examining value-behavior associations.

The only actual behavior that has been systematically studied is behavior within the context of
economic games. These are typically studied to gauge social cooperation, so this evidence is reviewed in
other chapters (cross reference). What other evidence is available? An interesting line of research that
taps into actual behavior is public speeches, in which individuals refer to specific values in association
with events and actions that they or others have taken or need to take. This is a more indirect window
into value-behavior linkages, but obviously here the audience will modulate what values are being
communicated. A further line of research that might be of relevance is an emerging program of research
that examines cultural rituals and how they transform individuals over time. This research is limited by
the fact that it is conducted within often messy field settings associated with religious performances.

I will briefly review some key studies within these different lines of research and combine and
contrast the insights gained from these studies with the work that has been built on self-reports as well
as neuroscience research on human values. This is not an exhaustive review but I aim to illustrate some
key issues in the study of value-behavior linkages. I then propose an outline of a developmental theory
of values and behavior and finish by discussing exciting research directions for the future.

Values and Paper-Pencil Reports of Behavior

Two major lines of research have examined value-behavior relations using questionnaires. First, values
have consistently found to relate to behaviours that are thought to be motivationally congruent with
values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003). Second, values also correlate consistently with behavioural dispositions
as measured by personality inventories (Fischer & Boer, 2015, Parks et al., 2015). These studies show
that individuals who rate values also systematically report engaging in motivationally congruent
behaviors. At the same time three major patterns are evident in this data. First, observer ratings of
behavior are consistently more weakly correlated with values than self-ratings of behavior (Bardi &
Schwartz, 2003). This implies that self-reports of behavior are possibly inflated and driven by method
biases (the same individual gave ratings of his/her values and his/her behavior) as well as various
memory and self-presentation biases. In defense of self-reports, sometimes observers might not be able
to adequately assess whether a target person performs behaviors, whereas self-reports do not face this
limitation. For example, typical items include ‘study late at night before exams’ or ‘lend things to
neighbors’. To overcome these issues, we need more actual behavior measures (which now are
increasingly available through wearable technology, see below). Second, the strengths of the links
between values and behaviors is not consistent across the spectrum. Behaviors that are more socially
oriented (e.g., helping others) and potentially driven by normative concerns (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003;
see also Fischer et al., 2009) are less strongly correlated with self-reported values. This suggests that
values might be mainly related to behaviors where fewer external social constraints are operating.
Third, the meta-analysis by Fischer and Boer (2015) demonstrated that broad levels of constraints and
threats (ecological, financial and institutional) moderated the strength of correlations between value
and behavioral traits. Values were more strongly correlated with behavioral traits if the environment
was relatively free of various threats.

Values in Public Speeches and Texts

Values in public speeches and texts are interesting because they can provide an indirect insight into the
value-behavior relationship. They are obviously behaviors, because it is a vocalization or written
behavioral manifestation that publicly endorses values. For this reason, it is similar to a value
endorsement in a paper and pencil survey. At the same it is different in that the voicing of values in
speeches or public texts is geared towards a specific audience, therefore, it is a public positioning of the
speaker or writer in terms of the endorsed value. This by itself is an interesting component. The value in
speeches or texts can become even more interesting if these endorsements are related to other
behaviors or the larger context that indicates the necessity to take (different) actions.

Bardi et al (2008) developed a value lexicon and then related the occurrences of the selected
values in across newspapers in the USA across a 100-year period with a small number of objective
indicators. What was striking is that the selected three words per value type on average correlated quite
highly with changes in objective indicators across this 100-year period. Self-direction for example was
represented by independence, freedom and liberty and the mentioning of these three terms (adjusted
for number of words and other values) within a year correlated moderately with turnout of voters.
Power was captured by the word triplet of power, strength and control. The relative frequency of these
three terms in newspapers correlated with the percentage of the US population enlisted in the army.
Obviously, no causal relationship can be drawn from the relation between these two indicators, but the
pattern suggests that values and behavior at a macro societal level are indeed related.

Using a more restricted time frame, Suedfeld and Brcic (2011) monitored the public
communications by terrorist groups (various branches of al-Qa’ida). They found that values in these
communications fluctuated over time. Interestingly, universalism and self-direction values declined in
communications when approaching a major attack. Since these attacks are often planned well in
advance, this suggests that once a decision to attack is being made and the behavior is being carried out,
certain values, especially those related to the caring of others and autonomy-related values, decline.
This points to values following behaviors (at least to values being expressed in public speeches once a
commitment to action has been made).
 Portman (2014) focused more directly on public speeches by Finnish presidents and monarchs
over a nearly 200-year period, therefore, this shifts the emphasis to individuals over time and allows
greater insights into how contexts are correlated with values in public speeches by the same individual
over time as well as an incumbent in the same position. A couple of patterns are noteworthy.
Independent of the individual, speeches held for religious occasions showed different and relatively
consistent value patterns in which spirituality, conformity and tradition values were mentioned more
frequently. The context therefore matters for what values are expressed in public.

Second, a number of national crises (wars, energy and economic crises) were associated with
differences in mentioned values. Specifically, security values tended to increase during a national crisis
compared to before or after. For some of these crises (e.g., the energy crisis in the 1970s), conformity
values also increased. Overall, this pattern again suggests that expressed values are somewhat reactive
to situational demands. Rulers adjust their expressed value behaviors to fit perceived needs of the
situation that the nation is facing.

A similar trend towards changes in expressed public values after some life changing event is also
evidenced in the analysis of reports of astronauts after they returned from space (Suedfeld et al., 2010).
After return to earth, astronauts used more universalism values and values geared towards the
collective good. These values were geared towards humanity, but not towards individuals close to the
astronauts (no change in benevolence values). Overall, achievement values were the most central
values, probably reflecting the high selection pressure on this elite group of military personnel. There
was also a strong increase in power values, driven by an increase in social recognition-related values.

The study of public speeches offers an important and interesting new avenue for value and
behavior studies. At the same time, like all methods, there are certain problems with this approach.
Most importantly and somewhat similar to survey studies, the selection of marker values is crucial.
Given the diverse contexts and time frames, different marker values might be relevant and important.
By focusing on a limited and typically small number of value markers, researchers may both over or
underestimate the actual strength of the value-behavior relationship. Sampling theory would predict
that the probability of committing a type 1 errors is increased due having only a small set of values.

Second, the speeches are typically scored by humans, which introduces potential rater biases,
similar to those discussed above. It is important to estimate interrater reliability, but this is only relevant
to the extent that there is no systematic bias in the overall procedure (for example, if both raters share
the same biases, interrater reliability is not going to identify this problem).

A third problem is the source and timing of the speeches and reports. Presidents may have
speech writers, astronauts may read out prepared texts that were partly shaped by others and online
communication by extremist groups might be written by various individuals. Similarly, often speeches
are given some time after they were written, leading to a gap between production and delivery. This is a
significant challenge of this methodology. The limitation of timing is shared with questionnaire based
approaches, if a cross-sectional approach is used. The issue of shared authorship is a problem if the
focus is on individuals. If the focus is on the value structure of groups (or leaders as representatives of a
collective), this shared authorship is probably less of concern. It will depend on the focus of the analysis
whether co-authorship is a major threat.

Values and Collective Ritual

The study of ritual has emerged as a major line of inquiry in the cognitive study of religion. These studies
are typically motivated to test broad evolutionary claims about the functions of ritual, especially those
ritualistic practices that involve significant costs on behalf of participants. Many religious and secular
activities require considerable dedication of time, energy and resources with limited return for the
individual. Some ritual practices such as fire walking, ritualistic piercing, fledging, tattooing or fasting are
posing even larger puzzles in terms of the costs versus benefits for participants. Why do individuals
engage in these actions that are painful and discomforting, since avoidance of pain and discomfort is
one of the most central reflexes for any sentient biological being? The main argument is that such
ritualistic practices have evolved over time as a costly signal that demonstrates commitment to the
group and as a consequence leads to more cohesive and socially tight groups (Fischer & Xygalatas, 2014;
Henrich, 2009; Irons, 2001; Xygalatas et al., 2013). A number of studies have demonstrated that
elements common in many rituals such as behavioral synchrony (joint chanting, marching, dancing, etc.)
and discomfort (shared suffering or painful activities) increase prosocial behaviors both in the lab and
the real world (Bastian et al., 2014; Fischer et al., 2013; Reddish et al., 2013, 2014; Wiltermuth & Heath,
2009; Xygalatas et al., 2013). The major assumption is that repeated enactment of these ritualistic
practices gradually transforms individuals into more socially oriented group members. The key outcome
variables have a close resemblance to the major two axes within the Schwartz Value framework. We
could expect that ritualistic actions shift value priorities of participants towards being more conservative
(traditional group oriented) and self-transcendent (overcoming selfish interests and desires). A number
of studies are starting to test some of these implications. For example, Mogan-Naidu (2016) conducted
an experimental study in which 40 participants were assigned to a joint breathing exercise (common in
many types of religious practices and Eastern meditations) or a control condition (in which participants
solved puzzle tasks). Values were assessed with the full version of the revised Portrait Value
Questionnaire (Schwartz et al., 2012; see Schwartz, Chapter 3 in this volume). The results suggested that
individuals that were subjected to a joint breathing exercises reported greater conservation values and
less self-directed values. Interestingly, Mogan-Naidu also reported lower universalism values (note the
economic game studies reviewed in Chapter 4, this volume), which may indicate that group rituals
highlight parochial cleavages over universalistic inclusive cleavages.

In a field study in a high ordeal ritual, Fischer and Roepstorff (2016) studied 137 participants in a
large South East Asian religious festival. Values were assessed with a shortened nine item measure of
values (Boer et al., 2011). Despite the brief measure, the reliabilities were comparable to instruments
that used longer value lists and a structural analysis using multi-dimensional scaling showed that all
values (except one achievement related item) appeared in their theoretically predicted space. Randomly
sampling individuals over a period of 11 days, Fischer and Roepstorff reported a gradual shift from self-
centered towards more self-transcendent values among participants. This suggests that collective rituals
transform basic human values of participants as they participate in large collective events. Repeated
behavioral actions including chanting and praying together appear to shift individuals’ values at a basic
level.

In another recent study, Kesberg and colleagues (2016) sampled participants repeatedly over a
two-week period after they had joined a full-day ritual activity (e.g., a celebration of the Hindu festival of
light). Values were measured every two to three days with a short 13 item measure of values that
capture the four main value types. For all values (except for openness to change values), the reliabilities
were above .70 in each wave. Openness to change values showed reliabilities of .60 or higher.
Therefore, the reliabilities were sufficiently high (and in fact higher than for many value studies) to rule
out unreliability as a major alternative explanation. Examining the changes over this two-week period,
there were substantive fluctuations of prosocial values with a shift towards benevolent and
universalistic values (e.g., emphasizing the well-being of the in-group as well more distant groups,
Kesberg et al., 2016). Even in individuals with relatively low level of belief in the religious element, the
mere exposure to and participation in a religious ritual seems to trigger some general re-evaluation of
basic values. Sampling values more frequently after some significant event seems to suggest greater
variability in value ratings than the relative high test-retest correlations often found across longer time
intervals.

These findings are interesting in the larger context of values and religiosity. In a meta-analysis of
value-religiosity research involving studies of Jews, Christians and Arabs in 15 countries (N=8,551),
Saroglou et al. (2004) found that religious individuals reported more traditional values and much lower
hedonism values. Religious individuals also had somewhat higher conformity and benevolence values
and reported somewhat lower stimulation and self-direction values. The major differentiation between
religious and non-religious individuals therefore was between an endorsement of conservative values
that uphold the traditions and customs of one’s society and religion versus endorsement of values that
emphasize independent self-gratification, pursuing stimulating activities and ideas. A more recent meta-
analysis by Boer and Fischer (2013) with data from participants in 21 countries (N=18,357) showed the
same picture. Religiosity was most negatively correlated with hedonism and showed the strongest
positive correlations with traditional values. Their research also indicated that the ecological and
cultural context moderated the strength of the relationship between values and religiosity. In less
threatening environments and with populations that emphasized uncertainty avoidance and
collectivism, links between values and religiosity were stronger.

Comparing the relative importance of values versus personality for explaining religiosity,
Saroglou and Munoz-Garcia (2008) reported that in a study of Spanish Christians, values were unique
predictors of religiosity and emotional ties to religion over and above personality traits. After accounting
for values, personality did not predict much additional variance (in the case of overall religiosity) and no
variance (for emotional bonds to religion) after taking into account the contribution of values.
Therefore, the combination of experimental, field and correlational studies on religiosity suggest that
there is a relative consistent pattern than ritualistic behaviors are related to a systematic shift towards
in-group related values. Reliability is an issue within the field studies discussed (even though internal
consistency was high), but the experimental evidence to date suggests that the shift might be due the
effect of behaviors on value ratings (instead being an issue of fluctuations due to diminished test-retest
reliabilities). However, this is an emerging line of research and needs systematic replication.

An interesting extension of this research into the cultural realm is to examine the relative
frequency of ritualistic activities in different populations around the world. Currently, there are no good
data bases that track ritual activities globally. However, it is noteworthy that some of the activities that
might induce strong tradition focused values are more common in some religious contexts than others
(e.g., the synchronized yogic postures in Islam). It could be speculated that the differential distribution
of ritualistic behaviors is one part of the reason why we see different value distributions globally. Ritual
practices might be a stabilizing force in the maintenance of cultural value differences between different
populations. This is an intriguing avenue for further studies.

From Observations Back to Theory

What have we seen so far? Self-reports of de-contextualized behavior are moderately associated with
motivationally congruent values. Yet these relationships seem to be strongest if there are few social and
environmental constraints. Studies of economic games show moderately strong associations of
universalism values with decisions that benefit others. This is the only reliable effect across a large
number of studies. Here, the causal direction is often assumed to run from values to behavior. Studies of
public speeches and texts provide some evidence of value-behavior linkages, but the causal relationship
seems to point towards values trailing behaviors and/or situational demands. The plausibility of this
reverse causal relationship is also supported by recent evolutionary-oriented laboratory and field
studies investigating effects of collective rituals on basic psychological processes.

How do these observations fit with relevant theories?

Probably the most important theory for value – behavior relations is construal level theory. Originally
developed by Liberman and Trope (1998), the central premise is that goal directed activities and
decision making of distant events involve high level construal, that is more decisions are driven by their
desirability; whereas near future events are evaluated and acted upon in terms of their feasibility, that is
a low level of construal. Values are desirable goals, therefore, it could be argued that values are more
likely invoked in relation to distant events or goals. Indeed, Eyal et al. (2009) found that values are more
relevant for behavioral intentions related to distant situations compared to proximate situations. Upon
reflection, this makes intuitive sense. Values are abstract beliefs about desirable goals: their very nature
of being abstract beliefs should make values most relevant for distant goals that are not constrained by
practicalities. In reverse, we can expect that values most likely have less relevance for understanding
day-to-day activities as these are more strongly influenced by situational variabilities and feasibility
considerations (cf Schwartz, 1992). Therefore, this theoretical account fits the general patterns observed
in self-report studies of behavior and may also relate to the moderate correlations between
universalism and highly abstract decisions within economic games.

A second theoretical account that appears highly relevant is self-perception theory (Bem, 1967,
1972). To state it in Daryl Bem’s words: ‘individuals come to “know” their own attitudes, emotions, and
other internal states partially by inferring them from observations of their own overt behavior and/or
the circumstances in which this behavior occurs. … the individual is functionally in the same position as
an outside observer, an observer who must necessarily rely upon those same external cues to infer the
individual’s inner states.’ (Bem, 1972, p. 2). Values are often poorly cognitively elaborated (Maio, 2010;
Maio et al., 2007), which makes it likely that individuals infer their values from their internal
observations of their behavior. An important element of self-perception is that behaviors are only used
as guides for updating internal states if the behavior falls within a latent acceptance range (the behavior
is not too inconsistent with other behaviors that an individual has engaged in previously) and the
behavior cannot be attributed to external constraints or factors (Fazio et al., 1977). In other words,
individuals are likely to infer their values from their voluntary actions, but only if these behaviors fall
within a general latitude that the individual finds acceptable and the behavior is not induced or
constrained by external factors. This theoretical explanation fits the patterns in experimental studies of
ritual quite well. Repeated engagement in collective behavior seems to trigger internal updating of
values that may transform values towards greater in-group driven prosociality. Self-perception may also
explain some of the patterns observed in textual analyses of speeches and public texts. People may
downplay certain values once certain behaviors have been initiated (see Suedfeld and Brcic, 2011).

Values and Behavior – A Neuroscience Perspective

Neuroscience has made much progress in helping us understand how human behavior is planned,
executed and evaluated across various diverse brain networks (Lindquist & Barrett, 2012). There are first
studies examining how values might be processed in the brain. Brosch and Sander (2013) review a
number of these studies. The currently available evidence suggests that thinking about values activates
reward networks (associated with making economic decisions, reward sensitivity and evaluating the
valence of a reward) and social cognition related networks (involved in forming impressions of others
and evaluating the needs and goals of others, also called Theory of Mind). Some activations were also
observed in networks involved in and linked to processes of behavioral inhibition and tracking errors
after execution as well as areas that integrate self-related information and abstract long-term goals
(note the link to construal level theory reviewed above).

These neuroscience studies provide an interesting new angle for evaluating the causal
relationship between values and behavior. Brosch and Sanders (2013, see also Brosch et al., 2011)
argued in line with self-perception theory reviewed above, that value hierarchies in the brain are
constructed and adjusted when repeated genetically or epigenetically driven behavioral predispositions
are reinforced and anticipated outcomes of these behaviors are more positively evaluated. Once these
value hierarchies are integrated in a coherent self, these mental representations may become self-
rewarding even in the absence of concrete choice or reward situations. The individual will then actively
seek out situations associated with those values that are experienced as rewarding. This is an interesting
developmental proposal that merits further examination.

Towards a Theory of Values and Behavior

To develop a theory of the value-behavior linkages, we need to study how values are first formed during
socialization. The available evidence demonstrates that even pre-school children clearly differentiate
between human values in line with the Schwartz value theory (Doering et al., 2015). At the same time,
both values and behaviours are likely to be driven by broad behavioural approach vs avoidance systems
(DeYoung, 2014). The neuroscience data reviewed above shows that values are connected to core
processes of the behavourial approach vs avoidance system at the neural level. This makes it highly
likely that both values and behaviors are driven by the same underlying neurobiological mechanisms.
Obviously, values also include other neurocognitive processes (e.g., related to emotion processing and
empathy). But core elements that are important for developing values as trans-situational life goals
appear to be shared with systems regulating behavior. The question then becomes whether values are
emerging earlier during the ontogenetic development path, or whether they trail behavioural
dispositions. Obviously, once values are formed, disentangling the causal orientation becomes more
experimentally demanding.

Drawing upon neuroscience studies of values and connecting it to behavioural research, the
most plausible initial relationship between values and behaviors is from behaviors to values. Infants are
likely to construct and adjust value hierarchies based on their own observations of their genetically and
epigenetically driven behaviors (Bem, 1972). An infant predisposed to be outgoing might observe herself
to engage with other children and adults to a greater extent than other children and therefore forms a
concept that she values meeting others (a precursor to universalism). There is good evidence that stable
behavioral dispositions emerge even within the first few months post-partum that predict personality
traits later on in life (Caspi et al., 2003; Moffitt et al., 2011; Slobodskaya & Kozlova, 2016). Similarly,
caretakers might reinforce and reward certain types of behaviors (“It is so nice that you play with all the
other children”), leading to implicit evaluations associated with observed self-behaviors.

As the cognitive and perceptual capacities of children develop, the value constructs become
more clearly differentiated and increasingly integrated in an emerging sense of self. Continuing
observations of behavior as well as reinforcements of these behaviors are compared with the
internalized value hierarchy and periodically updated and revised. Especially as individuals move into
different roles that require new types of behavior (see Gouveia et al., 2015), the associated values
within the overall hierarchy need to be updated and re-adjusted (Heider, 1958). In all these examples,
behavior is assumed to be driving value development and differentiation at the cognitive level. Many
day-to-day behaviors are automated or strongly influenced by situational demands (Mischel & Shoda,
1995). In line with both construal level theory and self-perception theory, values are unlikely to causally
affect behaviors on a regular basis, unless they are seen as been associated with the same
neurobiological mechanisms that also instantiate the behaviors.

At the same time, values may also influence the selection of long-term behavioral choices, once
values are integrated into the overall system of a person’s personality (DeYoung, 2014). If values are
central to somebody’s core self-concept (e.g, I do care about others, this is why I would like to work in a
profession where I can help others = Universalism), these values might guide conscious decisions about
behaviors. In this sense, value hierarchies at the neural level become self-rewarding and an individual
will seek out situations and roles that may reinforce and provide positive rewards (see Brosch et al.,
2011). This can reverse the causal order, in that internalized value hierarchies now ‘drive’ behaviors
because of the positive internal feedback (feeling good about oneself) that certain behavioral choices
entail. Yet, these behaviors need to be consciously interpreted in evaluative terms. As implied by
construal level theory, many day-to-day activities are probably more influenced by other psychological
processes than values.

In summary, the causal relationship between values and behavior might change over the
developmental trajectory. Initially, behaviors observed by the self might be taken as inputs to construct
a conscious value hierarchy. This hierarchy will be updated and reinforced upon reflection of day-to-day
behavioral choices. Once this value hierarchy is formed and integrated into a coherent self, values can
start to also influence long-term behavioral choices, either through seeking social situations that allow
an easier enactment of values congruent with the personal value hierarchy or through deliberate
choices of long-term directed behaviors (e.g., selection of work place, behavior that is highly visible [e.g.,
vegetarianism], engagement with specific groups that engage in value congruent behaviors [e.g.,
political or civic groups]) that are consistent with a person’s value hierarchies. This changed direction of
causality from values to behavior might be primarily driven by internal reward feedback. However, it is
important to note that current evidence suggests that both behaviors and values are related to the
same neurophysiological and neurobiological systems (DeYoung, 2014). If talking about causal order, it is
related to differential conscious awareness of values (potentially during extended periods of
deliberation and reflection about decisions that are central to the self). If behaviors are more
automated, values are clearly secondary. In this case, post-hoc evaluations of values in line with
behavioural choices reflect either a) the common neurobiological organization of behavior and value
systems or b) the need of individuals to present consistent narratives about oneself (the self-
representation biases discussed above).

Moving Forward

Values and behavior should be linked by definition. Yet, the inherent ambiguity of the causal nature of
the relationship within the definition of values – both as a guide of behavior as well as expression of
internal motivations that underlie homeostatic processes – remain open to further empirical and
theoretical development. Psychology overall has neglected the study of behavior and instead has
focused on mental states that may or may not relate to actual behavior (behavioral intentions and
recollections of past behavior). A number of large scale meta-analyses have demonstrated that
behavioral intentions are a poor predictor of behavior in real world settings (Grifffeth et al., 2000,
Mesmer-Magmus & Viwesvaran, 2005). Studying intentions or recollections of behavior is not going to
provide us with a good understanding of how values relate to behavior. Insights into the value-behavior
link requires sophisticated studies of actual behavior in the real world as well as the lab. In the following
I briefly outline two avenues for observational studies as well as refer to ongoing experimental studies
that can help to evaluate this proposed theoretical account and more generally shed new lights on the
relationships between values and behavior.

First, the availability of mobile technology that captures important dimensions of behavior
makes sophisticated value-behavior studies increasingly feasible. For example, using wearable sensors
that track basic activity levels, correlations between general behavioral parameters and social
interaction patterns over the period of a month can be related to basic personality dimensions (Olguin,
Gloor & Pentland, 2009). Innovative use of big data available through wearable sensors in cell phones,
fitbits or other devices open exciting opportunities for studying how basic human values are related to
behavior in the real world. To what extent are daily behavioral choices guided by human values as
studied in psychology? This is a most fascinating question awaiting empirical data.

Second, observational studies of targeted behavior (e.g., behavior ratings during interviews or
specific activities) could be related to self-report of values (for a limited example from personality
research, see for example, Gurven et al., 2012). The difference to current studies of observer ratings is
that multiple raters judge specific behaviors instead of relying on memory or general impressions of the
behavior of an individual. These behaviors can be studied in real-life contexts or in laboratory settings
while participants engage in specific tasks.

However, these two methods are still correlational and cannot address the causal relationship
between the variables. If these methods are used with longitudinal assessments of values via diary
methods or experience sampling (Mehl & Conner, 2012), we can start to unpack the causal relationship
between values and behavior in real world contexts. An added advantage would be longitudinal
developmental studies that can shed light on the developmental emergence of both values and
behavioral traits. As indicated by the emerging neuroscience literature, examining value-behavior
correlations in adults might be too late because the crucial windows for assessing the ontogeny and
underlying causal development might have been missed. Ideally we need long-term observational
studies with infants that shed light on the behavioral patterns and the emerging values hierarchies
during early childhood.

A critical observer of the literature may argue that values show relatively high stability across
time, indicated by moderate to strong test-retest correlations (Bardi et al. 2009). What these
correlations mask are systematic situational influences that are relevant and meaningful from a
homeostatic relationship perspective (Mischel & Shoda, 1995). Some people will always be higher or
lower on general needs (this is what test-retest correlations are tracking), but these needs will fluctuate
across situations. Preliminary work in our laboratory using more frequent ratings of values using dairy
methods suggest relatively high day to day changes in values, even though there is a relative stability in
the overall consistency of the value hierarchy. If there is a systematic linkage between values and
behaviors, we need to capture these fluctuations and examine whether there are systematic patterns in
the contextual salience of values and behaviors in that situation.

A second avenue for addressing the causal direction of any relationship between values and
behavior is to study the link experimentally. The work by Greg Maio and his group is the most
sophisticated in this context (for a general overview, see Maio, 2010). Specifically, it would be
informative to prime motivational goals and then test whether these experimentally primed goals
influence both values and actual behavior in the lab or the real world. Importantly, it would be
interesting to examine whether values do mediate the experimental priming effect on behaviors.

Examining the relationship between values and behavior in cultural context is a fruitful avenue
for further systematic research. The self-report literature has indicated that there should be systematic
links. Now it is time to move into the realm of real behavior and examine the causal unfolding of this
relationship across time and situations. Some tentative theoretical processes have been offered in this
chapter.

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