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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
Present: Honorable JOSEPHINE L. STATON, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
Charles A. Rojas N/A
Deputy Clerk Court Reporter
Attorneys Present for Plaintiffs: Attorneys Present for Defendant:
Not Present Not Present
PROCEEDINGS: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
DISMISS (Doc. 30)
Before the Court is a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant SAG-AFTRA. (Mot.,
Doc. 30.) Plaintiffs opposed and SAG-AFTRA responded. (Opp., Doc. 34; Reply, Doc.
38.) The Court took the matter under submission and, for the following reasons,
GRANTS the Motion.
I. BACKGROUND
This action was originally initiated as forty separate actions in Los Angeles
County Superior Court, and SAG-AFTRA removed the actions to federal court on March
13, 2024. (See Notice of Removal (“NOR”), Doc. 1.) All forty cases arise from alleged
harm caused by vaccine mandates implemented in accordance with SAG-AFTRA’s
Return-to Work Agreement during the COVID-19 pandemic. (See Dorian Kingi Compl.
¶¶ 1, 72, 81, & 96, Doc. 1-1.) On April 28, 2024, the Court consolidated the cases,
finding that they feature common questions of law and fact. (See Consolidation Order,
Doc. 24.)
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
Plaintiffs then filed an Amended Consolidated Complaint (“ACC”). (ACC, Doc.
29.) The ACC brings eight claims on behalf of the forty named Plaintiffs 1: breach of the
duty of fair representation under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”); breach of
contract; breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of fiduciary duties;
negligence; tortious interference with business advantage; intentional infliction of
emotional distress (“IIED”); and negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”).
(See generally id.)
Plaintiffs allege that they are opposed to getting the COVID-19 vaccine for several
personal, religious, and health reasons. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 45, 48, 77.) Plaintiffs further
allege that, following SAG-AFTRA’s implementation of the Return-to-Work Agreement,
which permitted studios and producers to impose vaccine requirements at production
sites, Plaintiffs faced difficulty getting work and were discriminated against because of
their non-vaccinated status. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 81, 87.) Exemptions were allegedly
difficult to get and routinely denied. (See, e.g., id. ¶¶ 54, 57.) Many Plaintiffs describe
lost work opportunities as early as 2021 when the Return-to-Work Agreement was first
implemented. (See id. ¶¶ 36, 48, 54, 57, 75, 81, 87, 90, 111, 123, 138, 141, 144, 151.)
Several Plaintiffs recorded complaints with SAG-AFTRA regarding the alleged
discrimination they were experiencing because of the Return-to-Work Agreement. (See
id. ¶¶ 36, 39, 48, 54, 57, 66, 75, 77, 84, 93, 120, 123, 126, 138.) Nevertheless, SAG-
AFTRA retained the Agreement until it expired on May 11, 2023. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Because of the allegedly discriminatory nature of the Return-to-Work Agreement,
Plaintiffs contend that the negotiation and implementation of that Agreement violated
several of SAG-AFTRA’s contractual and legal duties, including duties contained in the
SAG-AFTRA Constitution, the Collective Bargaining Agreement (“CBA”), and the
1
Not all claims are brought on behalf of every Plaintiff; for example, six Plaintiffs do not
bring a negligence claim. But for the purposes of deciding this Motion, the analysis is not
affected by which Plaintiffs brought which claims.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
SAG-AFTRA Membership Agreement. (Id. ¶¶ 12, 13, 16–17.) SAG-AFTRA has now
moved to dismiss, arguing that all of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted by § 301
of the Labor Managements Relations Act (“LMRA”) and that the only cognizable
claim—the duty-of-fair-representation claim—is untimely.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), courts must accept as true all
“well-pleaded factual allegations” in a complaint. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679
(2009). Furthermore, courts must draw all reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party. See Daniels-Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992,
998 (9th Cir. 2010). However, “courts are not bound to accept as true a legal conclusion
couched as a factual allegation.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)
(cleaned up). The complaint must contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual
content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for
the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).
“A motion to dismiss based on the running of the statute of limitations period may
be granted only if the assertions of the complaint, read with the required liberality, would
not permit the plaintiff to prove that the statute was tolled.” Supermail Cargo, Inc. v.
United States, 68 F.3d 1204, 1206 (9th Cir. 1995) (cleaned up). But if “it appears beyond
doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would establish the timeliness of the
claim,” the complaint may be dismissed. Id. at 1207.
Finally, the Court may not dismiss a complaint without leave to amend unless “it
is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
amendment.” Karim-Panahi v. L.A. Police Dep’t, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir.
1988) (cleaned up).
III. ANALYSIS
To decide this Motion, the Court first addresses whether the LMRA preempts
Plaintiffs’ state-law claims; second, the Court evaluates the sufficiency of the duty-of-
fair-representation claim.
A. Preemption of State-Law Claims
Legal Standard
Section 301 of the LMRA has complete preemptive force over any state law claim
in certain circumstances. Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393–94 (1987); see
also Associated Builders & Contractors, Inc. v. Loc. 302 Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 109
F.3d 1353, 1356 (9th Cir. 1997) (explaining that § 301 “preempts any state cause of
action based on a collective bargaining agreement or whose outcome depends on analysis
of the terms of the agreement” and “has been construed quite broadly to cover most state-
law actions that require interpretation of labor agreements”). “The Supreme Court
decided early on that in enacting this statute, Congress charged federal courts with a
mandate to fashion a body of federal common law to be used to address disputes arising
out of labor contracts.” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th Cir.
2007) (cleaned up). “The preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace
entirely any state cause of action for violation of contracts between an employer and a
labor organization.” Id. (cleaned up). Thus, once preempted under LMRA § 301, any
claim purportedly based on state law is “considered, from its inception, a federal claim,
and therefore arises under federal law.” Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
Courts in the Ninth Circuit use a two-step analysis to determine whether claims
are preempted under § 301. First, the court evaluates the “legal character of the claim by
asking whether it seeks purely to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA itself,” for
example, whether “the CBA is the only source of the right the plaintiff seeks to
vindicate.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 920–21 (9th Cir. 2018) (en
banc) (cleaned up). The question is “whether the asserted cause of action involves a right
conferred upon an employee by virtue of state law, not by a CBA.” Burnside, 491 F.3d at
1059. “If the right exists solely as a result of the CBA, then the claim is preempted, and
[the] analysis ends there.” Id. “[C]laims are not simply CBA disputes by another name,
and so are not preempted under this first step, if they just refer to a CBA-defined right;
rely in part on a CBA’s terms of employment; run parallel to a CBA violation; or invite
use of the CBA as a defense.” Alaska Airlines, 898 F.3d at 921 (cleaned up). At the
same time, claims “style[d] as state law claims” can still be preempted by the LMRA.
Curtis v. Irwin Indus., Inc., 913 F.3d 1146, 1151 (9th Cir. 2019). “Artful pleading cannot
sidestep Section 301 preemption.” Loaiza v. Kinkisharyo Int’l, LLC, 2020 WL 5913282,
at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2020).
Second, if the court determines that the claim is not grounded in a CBA, it “must
still consider whether [the claim] is nevertheless substantially dependent on analysis of a
[CBA].” Burnside, 491 F.3d at 1059 (cleaned up). A state law right is “substantially
dependent on the terms of a CBA” if it requires a court to interpret, rather than merely
“look to,” the CBA to resolve the plaintiff’s claim. Id. at 1060 (cleaned up). In this
context, “interpretation” is “construed narrowly” and “a state claim may avoid
preemption if it does not raise questions about the scope, meaning, or application of the
CBA.” Curtis, 913 F.3d at 1153. “Claims are [] preempted [only] to the extent there is
an active dispute over the meaning of contract terms.” Id. (cleaned up).
To the extent Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted, either because they seek
to vindicate a right or duty created by the CBA or because they are dependent on an
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
analysis of the CBA, the LMRA “precludes adjudication” of those claims and the claims
must be dismissed. Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024, 1036
(9th Cir. 2016).
Analysis
Here, it is evident from the face of the ACC that all of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims
are substantially dependent on analysis of the CBA. “To the extent that [a plaintiff’s]
claims are based on the Union’s failure to represent her, section 301 preempts her
claims.” Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1991). And
indeed, the bulk of the state-law claims pleaded in the ACC are expressly based on SAG-
AFTRA’s failure to represent Plaintiffs.
• Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of contract alleges that SAG-AFTRA “failed to
adequately represent each union member.” (ACC ¶ 164.)
• Plaintiffs’ claim for breach of fiduciary duties alleges that SAG-AFTRA
“had a duty … to represent members fairly and equally.” (Id. ¶ 167.)
• Plaintiffs’ claim for negligence alleges that SAG-AFTRA breached its
“duty to fairly and adequately represent Plaintiff[s’] interests as a labor
union.” (Id. ¶¶ 178–79.)
• Plaintiffs’ claim for IIED alleges that SAG-AFTRA caused “emotional
distress by intentionally failing to adequately represent Plaintiff[s’]
interest[s] in collective bargaining.” (Id. ¶ 188.)
• Finally, Plaintiffs’ claim for NIED alleges that SAG-AFTRA “acted
negligently in failing to adequately represent Plaintiff[s’] interests.” (Id.
¶ 193.)
As these excerpts make clear, these state-law claims rely on SAG-AFTRA’s
representational duties and determining whether SAG-AFTRA complied with those
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
duties requires interpretation of the CBA. See Perugini, 935 F.2d at 1089; see also
Adkins v. Mireles, 526 F.3d 531, 540–42 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that breach-of-contract
claims, negligence claims, and IIED claims were preempted to the extent that those
claims “implicated the statutory duty of fair representation” or were “inextricably linked
to [the defendants’] performance of duties owed in their capacity as union
representatives,” particularly where plaintiffs “made no showing of additional duties
beyond the normal incidents of the union-employee relationship”). Therefore, all the
claims cited above—breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, negligence, IIED, and
NIED—are preempted.
That leaves the claims for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
and tortious interference with a business advantage. As pleaded, these claims do not
explicitly invoke SAG-AFTRA’s duty of fair representation. Nevertheless, the Court
concludes that those claims are also inextricably linked with that duty. As to the claim
for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, such claims are often
“preempted to the same extent the breach of contract claim is.” Audette v. Int’l
Longshoremen’s & Warehousemen’s Union, 195 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 1999). The
same is true here. The claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing
derives from the exact same contracts that support the alleged breach of contract. (See
ACC ¶ 174.) And Plaintiffs identify no breaches of SAG-AFTRA’s good faith
obligations that are separate and apart from the failure to “protect” Plaintiffs’ interests in
negotiations as Plaintiffs’ union representatives. (Id. ¶¶ 1, 30, 170–75.) Therefore, the
claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing is preempted as well.
Finally, as to the claim for tortious interference with a business advantage, it is
necessary to examine the elements of that claim to demonstrate why it is preempted:
The elements … are: (1) an economic relationship between the plaintiff and
some third party, with the probability of future economic benefit to the
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentional
[or negligent] acts on the part of the defendant designed to disrupt the
relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm
to the plaintiff proximately caused by the acts of the defendant.
Crown Imports, LLC v. Superior Court, 223 Cal. App. 4th 1395, 1404 (2014) (cleaned
up). Furthermore, “the alleged interference must have been wrongful by some measure
beyond the fact of the interference itself.” Id. “For an act to be sufficiently
independently wrongful, it must be ‘unlawful, that is, … it is proscribed by some
constitutional, statutory, regulatory, common law, or other determinable legal standard.’”
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 29 Cal.
4th 1134, 1159 (2003)).
Here, Plaintiffs must be able to identify a legal standard against which SAG-
AFTRA’s conduct was independently wrongful. As with Plaintiffs’ other state-law
claims, there is no wrongful conduct that has been identified other than SAG-AFTRA’s
breach of its representational duties. (See ACC ¶¶ 181–86.) The tortious interference
claim is, therefore, inextricably linked to SAG-AFTRA’s performance of duties owed in
its capacity as union representatives and is preempted.
Plaintiffs argue that their state-law claims do not “rely upon the interpretation of
the CBA.” (Opp. at 18.) For the reasons just explained, this is not true; all of Plaintiffs’
state-law claims depend upon whether SAG-AFTRA breached its representational duties,
which requires interpretation of what those duties are under the CBA. Plaintiffs further
argue that, because they cite to other documents, like the SAG-AFTRA Constitution, the
SAG-AFTRA Membership Agreement, and the Return-to-Work Agreement, the alleged
breaches of duties contained within those documents can be analyzed without reference
to the CBA at all. (Id.) But this argument derives from a misunderstanding of § 301
preemption.
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CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 8
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
Section 301 applies to “[s]uits for violation of contracts between an employer and
a labor organization.” 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (emphasis added). Questions of preemption
refer most frequently to CBAs because those are now the prototypical contract between
employers and unions, but any other labor contract can serve as the basis for preemption.
As SAG-AFTRA argues, all these other documents—the Constitution, Membership
Agreement, and Return-to-Work Agreement—amount to labor contracts. (See Reply at
15.) The Supreme Court has already explained that union constitutions amount to labor
contracts. Wooddell v. Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Loc. 71, 502 U.S. 93, 99 (1991). The
Return-to-Work Agreement is also plainly a contract between SAG-AFTRA, a labor
organization, and employers. (See ACC ¶ 23.) And finally, even though the Membership
Agreement is a contract between a union and union member rather than a union and an
employer, the relevant terms cited in the ACC do nothing but bind SAG-AFTRA and its
members to the Constitution and the CBA. (See id. ¶ 12.) The enforceable rights all
derive from labor contracts and so there is nothing in the Membership Agreement for
Plaintiffs to enforce other than their rights under labor contracts.
For these reasons, the state-law claims are preempted by federal law and must be
DISMISSED. And because these claims are clearly based on SAG-AFTRA’s
representational duties, amendment would be futile. The dismissal is WITH
PREJUDICE.
B. Timeliness of the Duty-of-Fair-Representation Claim
Because all of Plaintiffs’ state-law claims are preempted by the LMRA, the only
viable cause of action available is Plaintiffs’ federal claim. Plaintiffs bring a duty-of-fair-
representation claim under the implied rights of the NLRA; all parties agree that such a
claim must be brought within six months of when the claim accrues. See DelCostello v.
Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163 (1983) (applying the statute of limitations of
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
six months, as provided in § 10(b) of the NLRA, to claims brought by union members
against unions for duty-of-fair-representation claims).
Here, there is a dispute about when Plaintiffs’ claims accrued and whether the
Court should equitably toll the limitations period. First, SAG-AFTRA argues that,
because the allegations of the ACC focus on the negotiation of the Return-to-Work
Agreement and whether the terms of that Agreement were negotiated in the best interest
of all union members, the claim should accrue when negotiations were completed, which
was July 19, 2021. (Mot. at 14 (citing Addington v. U.S. Airline Pilots Ass’n, 606 F.3d
1174, 1181–82 (9th Cir. 2010)).) Plaintiffs respond that, even though the alleged breach
of duty arose here in “a non-grievance context,” the Court should rely on Galindo v.
Stoody Co., 793 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1986), and toll the claim throughout the period of the
Return-to-Work Agreement’s implementation because Plaintiffs could have been
resolving their claims through grievance procedures. (Opp. at 9–10.) Indeed, some
Plaintiffs appear to have attempted nonjudicial resolution of their disputes with SAG-
AFTRA. (See ACC ¶¶ 36, 39, 48, 54, 57, 66, 75, 77, 84, 93, 120, 123, 126, 138.)
While the Court is not convinced that the reasoning of Galindo applies here,
assuming without deciding that the duty of fair representation claims did not accrue until
May 2023 when the Return-to-Work Agreement expired, Plaintiffs claims are
nonetheless untimely. The six-month statute of limitations would have expired in
November 2023, and Plaintiffs’ claims were not filed until between December 2023 and
February 2024. (Mot. at 10.)
To overcome this untimeliness, Plaintiffs argue that the limitations period should
be equitably tolled because of the SAG-AFTRA strike that took place between July 14,
2023, and November 9, 2023, arguing that “[t]here would be no reasonable way to
determine whether the [inability to work] was ultimately from being blacklisted for
refusing the COVID-19 vaccine or non-compliance with the [Return-to-Work
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
Agreement] or whether lack of employment was due to the strike.” (Opp. at 10.) There
are two problems with this argument. First, it is belied by Plaintiffs’ own allegations;
several Plaintiffs describe their trouble getting work beginning in 2019 and 2021,
meaning they were aware for years of an alleged slowdown in work opportunities that
had nothing to do with the strike. (See ACC ¶¶ 36, 48, 54, 57, 75, 81, 87, 90, 111, 123,
138, 141, 144, 151.)
Second, it is unsupported by case law. Equitable tolling applies if “despite all due
diligence, a plaintiff is unable to obtain vital information bearing on the existence of the
claim.” Supermail Cargo, 68 F.3d at 1207 (cleaned up). “Federal courts have typically
extended equitable relief only sparingly.” Irwin v. Dep’t of Veterans Affs., 498 U.S. 89,
96 (1990). Plaintiffs do not explain how the strike prevented their awareness of the
existence of a claim. At most, Plaintiffs appear to complain of an inability to ascertain
their damages—how much of their lost work was attributable to their unvaccinated status
versus how much was attributable to the strike. That is not the same as an inability to
ascertain whether SAG-AFTRA’s alleged wrongdoing gave rise to possible claims.
Therefore, the claim is barred by the statute of limitations. Because the allegations
in the ACC clearly establish that Plaintiffs were aware of the circumstances giving rise to
their duty-of-fair-representation claim against SAG-AFTRA prior to the lapse of the
Return-to-Work Agreement in May 2023, subsequent events, including the SAG-AFTRA
strike, cannot serve as the basis for equitably tolling the claim. Rather, the duty-of-fair-
representation claim accrued when the Return-to-Work Agreement expired and must be
DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE as untimely.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL
Case No. 2:24-cv-01996-JLS-JC Date: July 17, 2024
Title: Dorian Kingi, et al. v. SAG-AFTRA
IV. CONCLUSION
For the above reasons, the Court GRANTS the Motion. The ACC is DISMISSED
WITH PREJUDICE. Within five days of this Order, SAG-AFTRA shall file a proposed
judgment.
Initials of Deputy Clerk: cr
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CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL 12
