Murdoch Seal
Murdoch Seal
Electronically
PR23-00813
2024-09-12 05:22:05 PM
Alicia L. Lerud
Clerk of the Court
1 3370 Transaction # 10563237
12 _____________________________________/
15 On September 4, 2024, The New York Times Company, CNN, The Associated Press,
16 National Public Radio, Inc., The Washington Post, and Reuters filed a Motion to
17 Intervene, Motion for Access, and Motion to Unseal on Order Shortening Time
18 (“Motion”), where movants argue “this matter should be immediately unsealed and
19 all court proceedings and records should be open to the public.” Following entry of
20 an order shortening time to respond, the party identifying itself as DOE 9 filed Doe
21 9’s Opposition to: Proposed Intervenors’ Motion to Intervene, Motion for Access, and
22 Motion to Unseal on September 8, 2024 (the “Doe 9 Opposition”). On that same day,
23 the party identifying itself as DOE 3 also filed an opposition (the “Doe 3 Opposition”).
1
1 Parties identifying themselves as DOE 1 and DOE 2 have joined the Doe 9
5 disposes of that motion as well. This court, having reviewed the Motion, its
6 oppositions, and reply, and being apprised of the premises, enters the following:
9 As an initial matter, the Doe 9 Opposition “does not oppose the Proposed
10 Intervenors’ intervention in this matter for the limited purpose of seeking access”,
11 and the court finds the Motion is persuasive in arguing that parties seeking access
13 advocate for access. See Stephens Media, LLC v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cty. Of
14 Clark, 125 Nev. 849, 860 (2009)(“[W]e hold that the public and the press have the
19 movants should be granted the right to intervene in this case for the purpose of
21 The substance of the instant Motion argues that the First Amendment
22 implies a right to access the proceedings in this case based on the principles
23 announced in Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 140 Nev. Adv. Op. 8, 543 P.3d 92
2
1 (2024), and the several persuasive authorities cited in the Motion. In light of the
2 filing of the Motion, and the Nevada Supreme Court’s ruling in Falconi, the court
3 considers these arguments below by first reviewing the statutory bases for sealing
4 of records in this case to consider whether and to what extent the movants’
5 requested information can be released consistent with those statutes, and then
6 considers whether and how the public and media’s constitutional rights are
7 implicated by the court’s conclusions. The court then considers the movants’
10 In accordance with a request in the initial petition in this case, which request
11 was assented to by all appearing parties in this case, the court entered an Order
12 Sealing Proceedings and Closing Court Hearings on January 26, 2024. That order
13 directed the sealing of the court file and the closing of hearings to the public because
14 “the pleadings and documents filed in these proceedings, and the proceedings
16 the Trust and its beneficiaries or other family members who the Trustee serves.”
17 That order expressly cited NRS 669A.256, but was equally grounded in NRS
18 164.041, which was cited in petitioner’s initial petition. The court’s order directed
19 that “[a]ll court hearings on this matter are closed to the public” and that “the court
20 file on this matter is confidential and is therefore sealed” to all persons except
23 inquiries the clerk of the court has made certain information about this case
3
1 available to the public via the Second Judicial District Court’s website at
3 includes the case name, case number, the notation “**sealed**”, the case type,
4 initiation date, as well as an index of all the documents filed in the case, listed by
5 date and document code. All other information in this case has been sealed by the
6 clerk of the court. It is not correct then, as claimed by movants, that “nothing in
7 the case is available to any member of the public.” Motion, p. 2, ln. 12-13. Though
8 the information made available by the clerk of the court has been limited, the
10 Weeks after the court’s January 26, 2024 Order Sealing Proceedings and
11 Closing Court Hearings, the Nevada Supreme Court decided Falconi v. Eighth Jud.
12 Dist. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Clark, 543 P.3d 92 (2024). In that case, the Nevada
13 Supreme Court found on traditional common law and constitutional grounds that
14 “there is a presumption that civil proceedings must be open, just like criminal
15 proceedings.” 543 P.3d at 97. The Falconi court found that NRS 125.080, which
16 permits parties in a divorce proceeding to demand that the “trial and issue or issues
18 open and that statute “preclude[s] the district court from applying the balancing
20 Like the Falconi Court, this probate court recognizes “the critical importance
21 of the public's access to the courts and the role that thoughtful, reasoned judicial
22
1
The use of a separate web page to display this case information, rather than the Court’s publicly available “Detailed
23 Case Search” is a result of the present inability of the court’s electronic case management system to tailor search results
to limit the release of information that is protected under NRS 164.041, NRS 669A.256 and the Court’s sealing order.
4
1 decision-making plays in identifying the compelling interests at stake and
3 or criminal in nature; and . . . to what extent such closure should apply.” Falconi,
4 543 P.3d at 99. While the principles announced in Falconi may have general
5 application to all court proceedings, the Falconi decision dealt with the closing of
6 hearings under NRS 125.080 and associated court rules, rather than the sealing of
7 court records pursuant to statute. To govern sealing, the Nevada Supreme Court
8 has promulgated rules that provide a “uniform procedure for the sealing and
9 redacting of court records in civil actions” in Part VII of Supreme Court Rules, the
10 Nevada Rules for Sealing and Redacting Court Records (“SRCR”). Those rules
11 expressly exclude cases brought under Title 13 of Nevada Revised Statutes, under
12 which the present case was brought, and at least nine other broad categories of
13 cases for which specific sealing statutes apply. For Title 13 cases, NRS 164.041 and
14 NRS 669A.256 provide for the sealing of specific court records in cases such as this
15 one. While this probate court under its inherent powers may have additional
16 discretion to seal records in Title 13 cases, the court’s sealing of records in this case
17 was based exclusively in those statutes. In light of the Motion, it is appropriate for
18 this court to revisit the sealing of records and proceedings to ensure that the court’s
19 sealing hews most closely to the statutory requirements upon which it is based, and
20 the principles announced in Falconi to the extent they are applicable here. While it
21 is true that the January 26, 2024 sealing order has not been made available to the
23 that omission and supplant that order with the benefit of the briefing submitted in
5
1 connection with the Motion. As detailed below, this probate court recommends
2 granting the Motion in part, unsealing certain records in this case to the extent that
3 those records do not violate the sealing permitted or required under NRS 164.041
4 and NRS 669A. In addition, the court takes this opportunity to clarify its own order
5 closing all hearings in this case, and concludes that the hearings should remain
7 information that is protected under the applicable sealing statutes. To the extent
8 that this recommendation is inconsistent with the court’s January 26 order or any
11 B. Sealing of Records
13 In any court proceeding relating to a trust or estate, the family trust company,
licensed family trust company, other fiduciary of the trust, settlor or any
14 beneficiary, may petition the court to order the following trust documents to be
sealed:
15 (a) Any trust instruments;
(b) Any inventories;
16 (c) Any accounts;
(d) Any statements filed by a fiduciary;
17 (e) Any annual reports of a fiduciary;
(f) Any final reports of a fiduciary;
18 (g) All petitions, exhibits, objections, pleadings and motions relevant to the
trust or its administration; and
19 (h) All court orders. 2
20 It is not contested by the parties, and this probate court again finds, that this
21
22 2
Chapter 669A identifies certain additional information as “confidential information” relating to regulation of family
trust companies and protected from public disclosure, including: “The names of stockholders, members or other
23 owners”; “Ownership information”; “Capital contributions”; “Addresses”; “Business affiliations”; and “Information
obtained from the family trust company.” NRS 669A.040.
6
1 case involves a trust governed by a trustee who is a “family trust company” under
2 NRS 669A.080 who has the right to petition the court to seal the documents
5 sealing of records “relating to trusts”, entitling any party, without first petitioning
6 the court, to file “confidential information” under seal and providing that
7 “confidential information, once redacted or filed under seal must be redacted and
8 filed under seal without a prior court order in all subsequent filings and orders in
9 the matter relating to the petition.” NRS 164.041(2). This “confidential information”
10 includes:
17
It is again undisputed, and the court again finds, that this case involves
18
parties and witnesses that include settlor(s), beneficiaries, and a family trust
19
company in a dispute over a trust’s terms, including its dipositive terms.
20
By its terms, the right to seal information under NRS 164.0413 belongs to the
21
parties without petitioning the court, and once invoked all further “confidential
22
23 3
By this court’s reckoning, the case at bar is the first case in the Second Judicial District Court, and perhaps in the State
of Nevada, to invoke a party’s right to seal under NRS 164.041.
7
1 information once redacted or filed under seal must be redacted and filed under seal”.
3 production of “copies of petitions, filings and orders that have been redacted or filed
4 under seal to an interested person”, NRS 164.041(3), this provision is not availing
5 for the movants. Under NRS 132.185, an “interested person” is defined as “a person
8 show that they have a right or interest under the trust in this case, as they are
12 “unredacted and complete copies of sealed records to “other persons for cause
13 shown”, but the court cannot interpret that phrase to require dissemination of
14 sealed or redacted records to the public when their “cause shown” is simply the
15 public’s (or the media’s) general right to access court proceedings. To require
16 unsealing of records any time that a member of the public or the media asserted a
17 right to access would be to strip the parties’ right to seal “confidential information”,
18 rendering the statute meaningless and subverting the intent of the legislature. In
19 other words, while the court can envision that certain persons, in certain cases,
20 might show good cause to require production of this confidential information, the
21 right of the general public to do so under the statute is narrow, at best. Cf. Matter
23 (“Absent presence of such important issues, the general public’s right to inspect
8
1 sealed private documents relating to a person’s personal finances is highly
3 Taken together, NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 provide (though not
4 expressly) for the sealing of all papers filed in this case. This court cannot discern
5 any document in the record that is exclusive of “[a]ll petitions, exhibits, objections,
6 pleadings and motions relevant to the trust or its administration”, “all court orders”,
7 any document that does not include the “names or addresses of trust settlors and
10 Furthermore, the court in its January 26, 2024 order deemed “personal, financial,
11 and business information of the Trust and its beneficiaries or other family members
12 who the Trustee serves” as confidential because (to the extent this information is
15 personal life rather than the domain of public life, and the public’s interest in this
17 like the one at issue in this case, even when it is a stockholder in publicly traded
19 statutes recognize.
20 Movants argue that “[e]ven if legitimate privacy and safety interests were at
21
22 4
Even revealing the trust’s name would reveal the name of the settlor of the trust, which is why this case, from its
inception, has borne the caption “The Doe I Trust”. The right of the parties to protect the names of settlors and
23 beneficiaries under NRS 164.041(4)(b) is, as a practical matter, the most broad and impactful as the court considers
which papers should be sealed under that statute.
9
1 issue . . . the appropriate remedy would be redaction.” Motion, p. 10, ln. 14-15.
2 While redaction is preferred under SRCR 4(3), those rules are not applicable to Title
3 13 cases; NRS 669A.256 provides for “sealing”, and not redaction, while NRS
4 164.041 permits the parties to use sealing or redaction at their election. These
5 statutes do not offer the court the same flexibility to determine whether sealing or
6 redaction is appropriate.
7 Turning to the constitutional issues raised in the Motion, this probate court
9 unconstitutional on its face. First, the Nevada Supreme Court does not appear to
10 have yet considered either statute; Further, these statutes appear to strike a
11 balance between the public’s right to court records in normal civil cases, and
12 protection of private parties from disclosure of their personal, family, and financial
13 information in trust cases. Applied to this case, these statutes protect the privacy
14 of information well within the domain of the parties’ private, family life, such as the
16 fiduciaries, and their succession planning which, as in many trust cases, was
17 undertaken, at least in part, to avoid public proceedings. Both NRS 669A.256 and
18 NRS 164.041 appear tailored to protect these important, even compelling, privacy
19 interests of the parties in this case by keeping from public view information that
20 could easily be used by members of the public to facilitate identity theft or other
22 among other malicious acts. The court cannot conclude that the public’s right to
10
1 outweighed by the statutory rights of the parties to keep it confidential. “Statutes
2 are presumed to be valid, and the challenger bears the burden of showing that a
3 statute is unconstitutional.” Silvar v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. ex rel. Cnty. of Clark, 122
4 Nev. 289, 292 (2006). Movants have not sufficiently made that showing.
5 Accordingly, this probate court concludes that all papers filed in this case
6 should remain sealed, with the exception of this recommendation and its confirming
7 order, or any order that declines to adopt the findings and conclusions of this
8 recommendation, all of which should be made available to the movants and the
9 public. Further, the clerk of the court should make any papers filed in connection
10 with a petition for judicial review of this recommendation available to the movants
11 and the public. With respect to these moving papers, the clerk of the court should
12 be ordered to redact any information that is protected under NRS 164.041 (these
13 papers are not anticipated to include matters sealed under NRS 669A.256). Counsel
14 for the parties, as officers of the court, should be ordered to assist with this
15 redaction. The release of these papers is appropriate because they are not “relevant
17 public’s right to seek the unsealing of court records. The public release of any other
19 private information of the parties and the risks associated with such dissemination.
20 Even while the parties’ papers filed in this case to should remain sealed,
21 certain court records that are not presently publicly available related to this case
11
1 name of the judges and judicial officers presiding over this case available to the
2 public; Furthermore, neither of those statutes requires the sealing of the names of
3 the attorneys of record for the parties. And, to the extent that appearing parties in
4 this case are neither settlors nor beneficiaries of the trust at issue, the names of
5 those parties are not protected from public dissemination under applicable statutes.
7 make publicly available all case information normally available to the public in
8 unsealed cases (but not including any papers filed in this case) unless that
9 information includes the name of any settlor or beneficiary, or any other information
10 protected by NRS 669A.256 or NRS 164.041. All other records in this case should
11 remain sealed. The sealing of records in this case should not be any broader than
14 The basis for the court’s closing of hearings in this case to the public, and to
15 the media, is based on the conclusion that allowing public or media access would
17 discussed in Section “B” above. Based on the constitutional issues raised in the
18 instant motion however, and specifically Movant’s reliance on Falconi, which deals
19 with public access to court hearings rather than sealing of records, this probate
20 court finds it appropriate to clarify the second part of its January 26, 2024 Order
22 The Falconi decision highlights certain key principles and tests in evaluating
12
1 case, but there are key differences between the statute and rules at issue in that
2 case, and the court’s basis for closing all hearings in this case.
3 Under Falconi, a court must first look to “history and logic” to determine if a
4 First Amendment right to access attaches. The present case is not necessarily an
5 “ordinary civil proceeding” at common law, cf. NBC Subsidiary (KNBC-TV), Inc. v.
6 Superior Ct., 980 P.2d 337, 359 (1999), but a statutory proceeding under NRS
7 164.010, NRS 164.015, and NRS 30.060. Trust proceedings such as this one have
8 their roots in courts of equity, and while the distinction between law and equity is
11 from common law matters. See Doe 9 Opposition, p. 14-17. Of course, like all
12 court proceedings, trust and probate matters are generally open to the public, but
13 this probate court cannot conclude that a First Amendment right to access
15 different historically and presently. To illustrate, while the Nevada Rules of Civil
16 Procedure apply to “all civil actions”, they are only applicable to Title 13 cases
17 through NRS 164.005 (as incorporated through NRS 155.180), and only to the
18 extent they do not conflict with the other procedural rules of Titles 12 and 13.
19 Title 13 cases are exercises of the court’s in rem jurisdiction, see NRS 164.010(1),
20 and are distinct from common civil cases in their procedures for seeking relief
21 (through “petitions”, NRS 132.270, rather than complaints), their due process
22 requirements (compare NRS 155.010-155.090 with NRCP 4 and 5), and the
23 availability of a jury trial. See NRS 155.150; Cf. Nev. Const. Art. 3, s 1.
13
1 These distinctions, and the authorities cited by the Doe 9 Opposition at p.
2 14 – 16, do not establish that trust cases have always been closed to the public, or
3 that they should or must be closed to the public. Indeed, as a general rule, these
4 proceedings are open to the public, see NRS 155.130 (as incorporated into Title 13
5 by NRS 164.005), and the media. See SCR 230(2). There is good reason to permit
6 the public to observe their government institutions and public servants at work,
7 and to gain experience and confidence in the workings of those institutions. But
8 there is also good reason to restrict the public’s access to certain types of facts
9 that are commonly contained in many trust filings and, in some cases, lie at the
10 very heart of the parties’ dispute. This probate court is unable to conclude that
12 neither the Falconi case, nor any other authority cited by movants has
13 demonstrated that Trust cases meet the “history and logic” test that would make a
14 constitutional right to access apply. Even if such a right did attach to these
15 proceedings, the question of whether to close hearings where parties have invoked
16 their rights under NRS 164.041 or NRS 669.256 is different than the question
18 The statute at issue in Falconi, NRS 125.080, allows a party to request that
19 the court direct “any divorce action” be “private”. The statute offers no detail as to
20 what information the statute protects from disclosure or what interests are
21 protected. In contrast, both NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 designate specific
23 make that information sealed. The private information protected under each statute
14
1 requires little guesswork to determine why it is protected, being information that is
2 often kept private, even from family members, or involving personally identifying
5 are omnipresent in this case, and protecting that information from public
7 hearings, which are the only hearings presently scheduled to occur. Any hearing in
8 this case is certain to reveal the names and personally identifying information of the
9 settlor(s) and beneficiaries, and any evidentiary hearing will also reveal certain of
13 669A.256, and NRS 669A.040, all of which the Nevada Legislature has determined
15 Stated otherwise, NRS 164.041 and NRS 669A.256 create statutory rights of
16 privacy of certain personal information in a trust case that, in this case, where the
17 parties have invoked those rights and litigated under their protection, gives rise to
19 outweighed by the public’s right to information that concerns private, family trust
22 right to access these proceedings, the court also recognizes that several of the
23 parties and witnesses in this case—as even movants concede—are well known to
15
1 the public and the subjects of intense media and public scrutiny. These parties
2 warrant additional security measures to ensure that their own physical access to
3 the courts is not infringed, and that malicious actors who might wish them harm
4 cannot use their appearances in this probate court to facilitate that harm. Certainly,
5 additional court security measures can partially mollify these risks, but closure of
6 hearings is another tool this court can employ to ensure these parties’ safe access
9 considerations weigh in favor of closure when combined with the other privacy
10 factors discussed above. Cf. SCR 230(2)(b) and (c)(identifying “[t]he impact of
11 coverage upon the right of privacy of any party or witness” and “the impact of
12 coverage upon the safety and well-being of any party, witness or juror” as factors to
13 consider in permitting electronic coverage of hearings that are not otherwise closed).
14 The first rule of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure, incumbent on this
15 probate court under NRS 155.180 and 164.005, is “to secure the just, speedy, and
17 fulfill the promise of this rule to all litigants who appear before it—no matter how
19 the run of cases, has a right and an important interest in observing the workings of
20 its courts, and to the confidence in its institutions that this transparency provides,
21 that right should not be accorded more weight simply because the parties may be
23 in any given case, these considerations can, and in this case do, outweigh the
16
1 public’s and the media’s interests in access to the proceedings. This court concludes
2 that closure is the only way to prevent public dissemination of this protected
3 information. This evaluation is what caused the court to close the hearings in this
4 case to the public in its January 26 order, and provides good grounds to deny the
8 limited purpose of asserting the public’s and the media’s rights to access the records
11 with the court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law in Section “B” above; the
12 clerk of the court shall make available to the public all records in this case not
13 protected under NRS 669A.256 or NRS 164.041, exclusive of all papers filed in this
14 case, with the exception of those papers related to this recommendation identified
15 for unsealing in Section “B”. Attorneys for the parties are directed to assist with this
17 3. The Motion for Access to the hearings in this case is denied. All
18 hearings in this case shall remain closed to the public and to the media, including
19 the movants.
21 IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.
22 _______________________________
PROBATE COMMISSIONER
23
17