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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

VS. CAUSE NO. 24-34169-A

CARLY MADISON GREGG DEFENDANT

RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

JUDGEMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT

COMES NOW, the State of Mississippi and files this, its Response to the defendant’s

Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict. The

defendant’s motion fails to comply with Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 34 as it fails to

state the specific factual grounds and specific legal authority in support of her allegations.

However, should this Honorable Court consider the defendant’s motion to be proper, the State

would show the following in opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for a New Trial, or in the

Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict:

On September 20, 2024, a Rankin County Jury found the defendant guilty of murder,

attempted murder and tampering with physical evidence. The defendant was represented by

attorneys with a combined almost 40 years of legal experience in Mississippi. Those attorneys

made multiple decisions during the trial based upon their trial experience. Their trial strategy

was to admit to the jurors that the defendant committed the crimes, but to argue that she was

insane at the time of the crimes.

Regarding trial strategy, "[t]his Court has held that the conduct of trial counsel is

measured toward the view that he has wide latitudinal discretion in effectuating reasonable

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representation on behalf of his client and that the decisions made at trial are strategic." Nichols v.

State, 27 So. 3d 433, 443 (¶36) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (internal quotations omitted). "This Court

rarely second guesses trial counsel regarding matters of trial strategy." Id. Renfrow v. State, 202

So. 3d 633, 636 (Miss. App. 2016). Not liking the outcome of a trial, is not grounds for a new

trial.

Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 25.1(b) outlines grounds for a new trial:

(1) if required in the interests of justice;

(2) if the verdict is contrary to law or the weight of the evidence;

(3) if new and material evidence has recently been discovered which probably
would produce a different result at a new trial and, by reasonable diligence, such
evidence could not have been discovered sooner;

(4) if the jury has received any evidence, papers or documents, not authorized by
the court, or the court has admitted illegal testimony, or excluded competent and
legal testimony;

(5) if the jurors, after retiring to deliberate on the verdict, separated without leave
of court;

(6) if the court has misdirected the jury in a material matter of law, or has failed to
instruct the jury on all questions of law necessary for their guidance; or

(7) if, for any other reason, the defendant has not received a fair and impartial
trial.

MRCrp 25.1(b). The Rankin County Jury got the verdict correct and there were no errors by the

Court that adversely affected the defendant. She is not entitled to relief under Mississippi Rule of

Criminal Procedure 25.1.

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Standard for Motion for New Trial

A motion for a new trial is based on the weight of the evidence and will be disturbed only

when the verdict "is so contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence that to allow it to

stand would sanction an unconscionable injustice." Herring v. State, 691 So. 2d 948, 957 (Miss.

1997). Such a motion is within the discretion of the Court. The Court takes “the evidence in a

light most favorable to the verdict.” Id. Nelson v. State, 10 So. 3d 898, 908 (Miss. 2009) citing to

Jones v. State, 904 So. 2d 149 (Miss. 2005). Ordering a new trial, “should be invoked only in

exceptional cases in which the evidence preponderates heavily against the verdict." Anderson v.

State, 973 So. 2d 1044, 1046-47 (Miss. App. 2008)(quoting Amiker v. Drugs for Less, Inc., 796

So. 2d 942, 947 (P18) (Miss. 2000)).

Applying this standard to the case at bar, the defendant’s motion for new trial should be

denied. The defense opted for the trial strategy of telling the jurors this was not a case of

“whodunit.” They cannot now claim that the weight of the evidence resulting in the defendant’s

conviction for the crimes serves as unconscionable injustice.

Standard for Motion Notwithstanding the Verdict, Directed Verdict and Peremptory
Instructions
In a criminal proceeding, motions for a directed verdict and a [JNOV] challenge the

legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the guilty verdict." Williams v. State, 122 So. 3d 105,

108 (¶15) (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (citation omitted) (citing Croft v. State, 992 So. 2d 1151, 1157

(¶24) (Miss. 2008)). Moise v. State, 159 So. 3d 1205, 1210 (Miss. App. 2015). “Motions for a

directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict challenge the legal sufficiency of the

evidence, and the standard of review for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the

verdict are identical.” Croft v. State, 992 So. 2d 1151, 1157 (Miss. 2008) (citations omitted).
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“A motion for directed verdict challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, and the critical

inquiry is whether the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused committed the

act charged, and that he did so under such circumstances that every element of the offense

existed. In judging the sufficiency of the evidence, the trial judge is required to accept as true all

evidence that is favorable to the State, including reasonable inferences that may be drawn

therefrom, and to disregard evidence favorable to the defendant.” Jackson v. State, 68 So. 3d 709,

719 (Miss. Ct. App. 2011) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); Weaver v. State, 265

So. 3d 182, 186-87 (Miss. App. 2018)

Challenges “to the sufficiency of evidence require a determination of whether, after

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact

could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Bush v. State,

895 So.2d 836, 843 (Miss. 2005); Sherron v. State, 959 So. 2d 30, 38 (Miss. App. 2006).

If the evidence was sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt and support a

guilty verdict, the denial of the motion for a directed verdict is to be affirmed. Shelton v. State,

853 So. 2d 1171, 1186 (P48) (Miss. 2003). Nichols v. State, 965 So. 2d 770, 772 (Miss. App.

2007).

The standard of review for peremptory instructions and directed verdicts are the

same. Williams v. State, 863 So. 2d 63, 66-67 (¶11) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003) (citations omitted). "In

passing upon a request for a peremptory instruction, all evidence introduced by the State is to be

accepted as true, together with any reasonable inferences that can be drawn from that evidence,

and if sufficient evidence to support a verdict of guilty exists, the [request] for a [peremptory

instruction] is to be overruled." Id. at 66 (¶11). "Mississippi law is clear on the subject of

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peremptory instructions in criminal cases: peremptory instructions should be refused if there is

enough evidence to support a verdict." Id. at 67 (¶15). This Court "will reverse only when

reasonable and fair-minded jurors could only find the accused not guilty." Id. Strickland v. State,

215 So. 3d 514, 517 (Miss. App. 2017)

Applying this standard to the case at bar, the defendant’s motion for judgment

notwithstanding the verdict should be denied. Additionally, the Court’s denial of a preemptory

instruction and motion and renewal of their motion for directed verdict were proper.

Standard Regarding Insanity

“The M'Naghten test for determining insanity is whether the accused knew right from

wrong at the time the act was committed.” Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158, 163 (¶ 27) (Miss.

2001) (citing Russell v. State, 729 So. 2d 781, 784 (Miss. 1997)). “Specifically, the Court has

held that prove insanity under M'Naghten, it must be proven that, at the time of the act, the

accused "was laboring under such defect of reason from disease of the mind as (1) not to know

the nature and quality of the act he was doing or (2) if he did know it, that he did not know that

what he [*294] was doing was wrong." Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 163 (¶ 27) (quoting Roundtree

v. State, 568 So. 2d 1173, 1181 (Miss. 1990)).”

The determination of a defendant's sanity under the M'Naghten Rule is within the

province of the jury, and the jury has discretion to accept or reject expert and lay testimony on

the subject. Easley v. State, 158 So.2d 283 (Miss. 2015) citing Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158

(Miss. 2001); Russell v. State, 729 So. 2d 781 (Miss. 1997). A jury's finding on a defendant's

sanity "will not be reversed if it is supported by substantial evidence." Woodham, 779 So. 2d at

164 (¶ 29) (citing Davis v. State, 551 So. 2d 165, 173 (Miss. 1989)). We have held that, "[i]n

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insanity defense cases, perhaps more than any other, a jury's verdict ought to be given great

respect and deference." Sanders v. State, 63 So. 3d 497, 503 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2011) (citing Laney v.

State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss. 1986)).

Applying this standard, the jury’s verdict and determination of the defendant’s sanity

should be accepted as it is supported by the substantial evidence. As such, the defendant’s motion

for a new trial or for the jury’s verdict to be set aside should be denied.

The defendant’s argument about not having a jury of her peers is improper and lacks
merit.
The defendant argues that she was not “tried by a jury of her peers.” She fails to cite to

any authority for this argument. This argument is without merit and not supported by the law. In

our system of justice, every person charged with a crime is entitled to receive a fair trial before

an impartial jury of his peers. Miss. Const. Art 3, § 26; U.S. Constitution amend. VI. Despite the

defendant’s assertion that a juror of her peers would be someone of a similar age, neither the

United States Constitution nor the Mississippi Constitution require that a jury of a defendant’s

peers be someone of the same or similar age. In fact, our courts have previously held that age is

not a protected class in juries.

More importantly, the defendant failed to object to the jury panel at any time during the

trial. Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that a failure to object contemporaneously

at trial forfeits an issue on appeal. Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 788 (Miss. 2017). More

specifically, a failure to object to the jury’s composition before it is impaneled waives any right

to complain thereafter. See Myers v. State, 565 So. 2d 554, 1990 Miss. LEXIS 294 (Miss. 1990).

The attorneys’ decisions regarding the final composition of the jury should be determined to be

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matters of trial strategy.” See Smith v. State, 877 So. 2d 369, 2004 Miss. LEXIS 547 (Miss.

2004).

The applicable amendment to the United States Constitution regarding a fair and

impartial jury is found at Amendment 6. It reads:

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have
the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.

USCS Const. Amend. 6. Nothing in this amendment entitles a defendant to a jury made up of

individuals who are of a similar age.

The Mississippi Constitution, Article 3, Section 26 outlines that a defendant is entitled to

a fair trial and impartial jury. However, it lacks any language about being a jury of the

defendant’s “peers.” Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 26 says in pertinent part:

In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall have a right to be heard by himself or
counsel, or both, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation, to be confronted by
the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and, in all prosecutions by indictment or information, a speedy and public trial by
an impartial jury of the county where the offense was committed; and he shall not be
compelled to give evidence against himself

Miss. Const. Art. 3, § 26.

The Mississippi Supreme Court has held that "age is a well-supported, race-neutral

reason for a peremptory strike." H.A.S. Elec. Contractors Inc. v. Hemphill Const. Co., 232 So. 3d

117, 138 (¶23) (Miss. 2016); Johnson v. State, 288 So. 3d 342, 354 (Miss. App. 2019); See,

e.g., Stewart v. State, [*139] 662 So. 2d 552, 558 (Miss. 1995) (citing Harper v. State, 635 So.

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2d 864, 868 (Miss. 1994); Simon v. State, 633 So. 2d 407, 411 (Miss. 1993); Locket v. State, 517

So. 2d at 1351)).

Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-1 outlines who are competent jurors, it states:

Every citizen not under the age of twenty-one years, who is either a qualified elector, or a
resident freeholder of the county for more than one year, is able to read and write, and has
not been convicted of an infamous crime, or the unlawful sale of intoxicating liquors
within a period of five years and who is not a common gambler or habitual drunkard, is a
competent juror. No person who is or has been within twelve months the overseer of a
public road or road contractor shall, however, be competent to serve as a grand juror. The
lack of any such qualifications on the part of one or more jurors shall not, however,
vitiate an indictment or verdict. Moreover, no talesman or tales juror shall be qualified
who has served as such talesman or tales juror in the last preceding two years, and no
juror shall serve on any jury who has served as such for the last preceding two years. No
juror shall serve who has a case of his own pending in that court, provided there are
sufficient qualified jurors in the district, and for trial at that term.

Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-1. The defendant has not shown that any of the individual jurors or the

jury panel as a whole failed to be qualified under Miss. Code Ann. §13-5-1.

Mississippi Code Annotated Section 13-5-2 outlines the public policy behind a jury being

selected at random from the qualified citizens. It outlines protected classes of individuals, but

fails to including any mention of age. Mississippi Code Annotated § 13-5-2 says:

It is the policy of this state that all persons selected for jury service be selected at random
from a fair cross section of the population of the area served by the court, and that all
qualified citizens have the opportunity in accordance with this chapter to be considered
for jury service in this state and an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that
purpose. A citizen shall not be excluded from jury service in this state on account of race,
color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status.

Miss. Code Ann. § 13-5-2. The jury in this matter was made up of qualified electors from Rankin

County, Mississippi. No one was excluded based upon race, color, religion, sex, national origin

or economic status.
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Our Courts have long allowed for the Legislature to determine juror qualifications.

In State v. Hall, 187 So. 2d 861 (Miss. 1966), the Court held “that the power to prescribe the

qualifications for jurors rests with the Legislature and that it has power to make reasonable

classifications.” See 50 C.J.S. Juries § 142 at 866-867 (1957).

The right to a jury of one's peers does not entitle him to a jury which includes convicted

felons or bootleggers, and the Legislature has a right to impose reasonable qualifications for

jurors when such qualifications do not violate the constitutional rights of accused persons to be

tried by an impartial jury. Shows v. State, 267 So. 2d 811, 812 (Miss. 1972). No error was

committed by this Court in qualifying the jury as required by statute, which did not include 15-

year-olds. More importantly, the defendant through trial strategy selected jurors and failed to

make any objections at trial about the individuals or jury panel as a whole. She is now barred

from making this claim. The claim also fails under Mississippi law.

Defendant’s argument that motive is required is not supported in law or reason.

Despite the law not including motive as an element of murder, attempted murder or

tampering with physical evidence, the defendant makes the claim that “an absence of motive to

commit the alleged crimes do[es] not support the verdict or sentence in this case. Therefore, the

matter calls for a new trial, or in the alternative, a judgement notwithstanding the verdict.” This

argument defies logic and is completely contrary to the law, which says the State is not required

to prove motive.

“Proof of motive is not essential to a conviction for a felonious homicide." Barnett

v. State, 232 Miss. 208, 98 So.2d 656 (1957); Swanson v. State, 218 Miss. 103, 65 So.2d 232

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(1953); Roberts v. State, 458 So. 2d 719, 722 (Miss. 1984); Clark v. State, 769 So. 2d 199, 202

(Miss. App. 2000); Wilson v. State, 83 So.3d 421, 436-437 (Miss. App. 2011).

Prior to trial, the State submitted jury instructions with the elements of each crime:

murder, attempted murder and tampering with physical evidence. See Jury Instructions given by

the Court to the jury. The defendant failed to object to those elements instructions, and they were

given to the jury. Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that a failure to

object contemporaneously at trial forfeits an issue on appeal. Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 788

(Miss. 2017). Motive is not included in any of the elements for the crimes the defendant was

found guilty. As such, the defendant’s argument about lack of motive is without merit.

Defendant’s claim about the victim saying Carly was not in her right mind and did not
recognize him does not rise to M’Naghten insanity.

Among other things, the defendant asserts that there is undisputed evidence at trial of the

defendant’s mental illness. This is simply not true. In fact, there was absolutely a dispute with

regards to the defendant’s mental illness. The defendant puts a lot of stock in their argument that

the living victim, Heath Smylie, said “Carly was not in her right mind and did not recognize him

at the time of the offense.” This statement contradicts all of the other evidence wherein the

defendant actually texted the victim asking when he would be home, specifically told her friend

that she put three in her mom and had three more waiting for her stepdad. Also, when the

defendant asked her friend if she wanted to go outside while she took care of her stepdad.

Additionally, based off the evidence presented at trial that the defendant only asked about how

her stepdad was after she was taken into custody, indicating she knew she shot him. Furthermore,

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there was a mountain of evidence at trial regarding the fact the defendant was sane and knew

right from wrong at the time of the crimes.

However, even if this Honorable Court was to ignore all the other evidence, Heath saying

Carly was not in her right mind does not meet the M’Nagthen standard. Our appellate court has

found that a strange look on the defendant’s face at the time of a shooting was not enough to

prove insanity. See Winters v. State, 773 So.2d 973, 975 (Miss. App. 2000).

The State argued prior to trial and during the trial that the defendant’s expert Dr. Andrew

Clark should not have been able to testify in front of the jury as his testimony was not proper and

did not apply the correct M’Nagthen standard. Specifically, the State argued and continued to

assert that Dr. Clark’s testimony was nothing more than hypotheses and was more of a

diminished capacity argument, which our court does not recognize. However, Dr. Clark did

testify that it appeared at times the defendant knew what she was doing at times. This indicates

that she was not insane at the time of the crimes.

Again assuming you ignore all of the other evidence demonstrating that the defendant

knew right from wrong when she texts the victim, texts her friends, Facetimed her friends, called

her friends, told her friends she messed up, told her friend it was too late when they said don’t

harm anyone else, told her friends not to call 911, hid the gun out of site of the camera, removed

the camera, fled the crime scene, admitted to law enforcement that she was the one who was

involved in the shooting, admitted to Dr. Clark and Dr. Gugliano that she has flashbacks of

holding and shooting a gun, of the loud gunshots, that she gets queasy thinking about the crimes

among many other facts and believe Dr. Clark that the defendant had bipolar II and

schizophrenic symptoms, that does not get you past the second part of M’Nagthen which

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requires someone to not know right from wrong. There are lots of people that have bipolar

disorder and/or schizophrenia and/or anxiety and depression that do not murder people.

In Parker v. State, 273 So.3d 695 (Miss. 2019), the Court discussed that Parker’s

testimony of taking prescription drugs for anxiety and depression and a suicide attempt years

prior “has no apparent relevance to his ability to know right from wrong at the time of the

incident.” Sanders v. State, 63 So. 3d 497, 506 (Miss. 2011) ("Just because a person is

schizophrenic does not mean that person is M'Naghten insane." (citing Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d

1242, 1245 (Miss. 1986))). Nor does Parker's testimony that he does not remember shooting Eric

establish M'Naghten insanity. Not being able to remember is not the same thing as not being

able to distinguish right from wrong. See, e.g., United States v. Holsey, 995 F.2d 960, 963 (10th

Cir. 1993) (holding that the defendant's testimony that he "had 'blacked out' and did not

remember robbing the bank" did not amount to evidence that the defendant suffered from a

mental defect rendering the defendant "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or the

wrongfulness of his acts"); Williams v. State, 237 Ga. 399, 228 S.E.2d 806, 807 (Ga.

1976) ("This testimony by appellant, that he does not remember what happened, does not require

a charge on insanity."); Jackson v. State, 149 Ga. App. 253, 253 S.E.2d 874, 877 (Ga. Ct. App.

1979) ("Evidence that the defendant does not remember or was in a 'blanked out' state of mind

during the commission of the acts charged is insufficient to raise the issue of insanity." (citations

omitted)); Sparkman v. State, 469 S.W.2d 692, 696-97 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) ("Insanity and

amnesia are distinct conditions, even though amnesia sometimes is an incident of

insanity. Insanity is incapacity to discriminate between right and wrong, while amnesia is simply

the inability to remember."); Jeffley v. State, 938 S.W.2d 514, 515 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) ("Loss of

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memory, however, is insufficient to show insanity."); Ex parte Saylee, No. 03-18-00124-CR,

2019 Tex. App. LEXIS 2497, 2019 WL 1413043, at *6 (Tex. Ct. App. Mar. 29, 2019) ("Not

remembering conduct is distinct from not knowing that conduct is wrong and does not entitle an

accused to the insanity defense."). This is especially so when the memory loss may be

attributable to voluntary intoxication or drug use. See Smith v. State, 445 So. 2d 227, 231 (Miss.

1984) ("[I]f a person, when sober, is capable of distinguishing right and wrong and voluntarily

intoxicates or drugs himself to the extent that he does not know or understand his actions, e.g.,

steals, robs, or murders, he is responsible and he may be convicted and sentenced for the crime."

(citing McDaniel v. State, 356 So. 2d 1151, 1161 (Miss. 1978) (Sugg, J., specially

concurring))); Patterson v. State, 127 So. 3d 1124, 1131 (Miss. Ct. App. 2013) (holding that not

being able to remember committing the crime due to voluntary intoxication is not a viable

insanity defense).

Similar, to the testimony in Parker, at best the defendant herein sought to introduce

evidence of "diminished capacity"—a defense that is not recognized under Mississippi

law. Cannaday v. State, 455 So. 2d 713, 720 (Miss. 1984); Patterson, 127 So. 3d at 1131.

Defense expert, Dr. Andrew Clark, also failed to state his testimony was to a reasonable

degree of medical certainty during his direct examination. However, the Court allowed him to

continue to testify. Regardless, of whether his testimony was proper or not, the determination of

a defendant's sanity under the M'Naghten Rule is within the province of the jury, and the jury has

discretion to accept or reject expert and lay testimony on the subject. Easley v. State, 158 So.2d

283 (Miss. 2015) citing Woodham v. State, 779 So. 2d 158 (Miss. 2001); Russell v. State , 729 So.

2d 781 (Miss. 1997). A jury's finding on a defendant's sanity "will not be reversed if it is

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supported by substantial evidence." Woodham, 779 So. 2d at 164 (¶ 29) (citing Davis v. State,

551 So. 2d 165, 173 (Miss. 1989)). We have held that, "[i]n insanity defense cases, perhaps more

than any other, a jury's verdict ought to be given great respect and deference." Sanders v. State,

63 So. 3d 497, 503 (¶ 18) (Miss. 2011) (citing Laney v. State, 486 So. 2d 1242, 1246 (Miss.

1986)).

The jury weighed the credibility of the witnesses and the testimony and determined that

the defendant was not insane at the time she committed the crimes of murder, attempted murder

and tampering with physical evidence. As such, their verdict and sentence should not be set

aside.

Defendant’s claim of new evidence is deceptive and misleading.

The defendant alleges that a reporter for Fox 40/WLBT informed defense counsel that

Kevin Gregg, the defendant’s father, told them that the defendant “was placed in equestrian

therapy as a young child due to experiencing auditory hallucinations.” This statement is simply

not true. The State hopes that this misrepresentation was unintentional rather an intentional lie to

the Court. WLBT has released both an edited and unedited version of Kevin Gregg’s interview as

well as a story in print where they stated that they had reviewed the transcript from the interview

and spoke with both interviewers and no such comment was made. See Exhibit “A,” article and

interviews. 1

The defendant relies upon this allegation to claim that this “new information supports Dr.

Clark’s diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenic disorder and is likely to lead toa different result at

a new trial.” See Defendant’s Motion for JNOV at Page 6-7. The defendant ignores the fact that

1
A physical copy of the videos will be provided to the Court.
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the jury did hear from Dr. Clark regarding his diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenic disorder.

He testified that the defendant did not tell any medical provider prior to March 19, 2024, about

auditory hallucinations. The jury also heard from the defendant’s therapist, Rebecca Kirk, who

by the defendant’s own admission she trusted. The defendant saw Mrs. Kirk on the day prior to

the crimes and failed to say anything about hearing voices or having any other symptoms. See

Trial Exhibit D21.

Dr. Clark further testified that the defendant told providers at the jail, after she was

arrested, that she had auditory hallucinations and they the voices took over her and told her to

harm her mom. See Trial Exhibit D13, Vital Core records at Bates 000954]. Specifically, on

March 28, 2024, the defendant told her provider that “she feels that something took over her and

the voices were telling her to harm her mother.” Id. Despite this statement, the defendant told

ALL other providers, including her own expert, that the voices she heard (which were only

reported after the crimes) never gave her commands. The jury heard this testimony as well as the

testimony of Dr. Amanda Gugliano and Dr. Jason Pickett. Dr. Gugliano testified that the

defendant reported she started hearing these voices around the age of 4 or 5. Dr. Gugliano

testified that is not typical of schizophrenic patients to start hearing these voices at such a young

age, but rather later in their teens. Dr. Pickett testified that he did not diagnosis the defendant

with schizophrenia. Dr. Pickett further testified that even if his diagnosis was wrong, that the

defendant did not meet the M’Naghten standard for insanity and that she was sane at the time of

the crimes. The diagnosis of a mental disease or defect is only the first part of the M’Naghten

insanity standard.

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Regardless, there are ZERO medical records, counseling records and/or therapy records

prior to March 19, 2024, that mention anything about auditory hallucinations. Additionally, the

defense knew prior to trial that the defendant received equestrian therapy which was court

ordered during her parents’ divorce. In fact, this was referenced in Dr. Amanda Gugliano’s

report. Dr. Andrew Clark, the defense expert, relied upon the Precise Clinical Neuroscience

Specialists records in rendering his testimony and report. He mentioned the defendant’s prior

court ordered therapy:

Carly was in therapy for a number of years when younger. In generally, she did not find it
helpful- she did not like or trust some of the therapist and found that some seemed to be
trying to get information to use against her father. The therapy was court ordered. Her
mother encouraged it. Her mother was quite concerned that Carly would turn into her
father.

Dr. Clark’s report at Page 3, Trial Exhibit D22, ID.

The defendant introduced the defendant’s medical records from Magnolia Counseling at

trial. See Trial Exhibit D21. Included in those records was the intake sheet filled out by Ashley

Smylie. When asked if the defendant had previously seen a counselor, she marked yes and stated

that she “saw a few court-ordered counselors due to issue w/visitations (father) Vicksburg, ~ages

5-10.” [Trial Exhibit D21, Bates 000690].

More importantly, the defendant introduced the Precise Clinical Neuroscience Specialists

Records at trial as Exhibit D19. Included at State’s Bates No. 000742, it states:

She started going to counseling and seeking legal help in 2015 and continued for 2 years.
Court ordered equine therapy and therapy with an alternative counselor until she was
stable and did not want to go any longer.

[Trial Exhibit D19-Bates State 000742]. Based upon all the medical records and the interview

from Kevin Gregg, there is a complete of support that the defendant was placed in equestrian
16
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therapy for auditory hallucinations. Rather, this therapy was Court ordered during her parent’s

divorce. This argument by the defendant is without merit and the jury’s verdict and sentence

should be upheld.

It was not error for the Court to exclude and/or limit witnesses by the defendant.

The defendant argues that it was error for this Court to exclude two of her witnesses and

limit the testimony of others. These witnesses were not named by the defense in her motion.

These arguments are without support and merit. While this Court did properly find that the

defendant’s discovery violates were willful, the testimony the defendant sought to introduce

actually came in through other witnesses.

This Court is aware that the State asked for discovery from the defense multiple times.

There were multiple motions filed requesting the defendant to comply with discovery. See MEC

Doc. No. 57, 74, and 175. See also hearing transcripts from 08/19/2024 and 09/10/2024.

The defendant failed to call any witnesses at trial that were excluded. The defendant

failed to proffer any proposed testimony of any witnesses during the trial or during any pretrial

hearing. Our appellate courts have repeatedly held that a failure to object contemporaneously

at trial forfeits an issue on appeal. Potts v. State, 233 So. 3d 782, 788 (Miss. 2017).

“When testimony is not allowed at trial, a record of the proffered testimony must be made

in order to preserve the point for appeal." Green v. State, 89 So. 3d 543, 554 (¶28) (Miss.

2012) (quoting Metcalf v. State, 629 So. 2d 558, 567 (Miss. 1993)); see M.R.E. 103(a)(2). The

burden to make the proffer is on the offering party. Redhead v. Entergy Miss. Inc., 828 So. 2d

801, 808 (¶20) (Miss. Ct. App. 2001). Without a proffer a court cannot "know

what testimony was excluded." Id. Young v. State, 194 So. 3d 904, 908 (Miss. App. 2016).
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The defendant failed to name the excluded witnesses. However, the State is assuming the

defendant is talking about Vicki Breeland and James Daniel Floyd. During a hearing on August

19, 2024, the Court ordered both sides to make sure all discovery in their possession was

exchanged by August 20, 2024. On September 3, 2024, the defendant sent a witness list for the

first time. It was not accompanied by any statements.

If, at any time prior to trial, it is brought to the attention of the court that a party has failed

to comply with an applicable discovery rule or an order pursuant thereto, the court may [(1)]

order such party to permit the discovery of material and information not previously disclosed,

[(2)] grant a continuance, or [(3)] enter such other order as it deems just under the circumstances.

MRCrP 17.9(a). The weight of the sanction should be based on the motivation of the offending

party in violating the discovery rule. Coleman v. State, 749 So. 2d 1003, 1009 (¶17) (Miss.

1999). Generally, the rule is that evidence must not be excluded. Williams v. State, 54 So. 3d at

215 (¶10). But when the court determines that a discovery violation is "willful and motivated by

a desire to obtain a tactical advantage," the exclusion of the evidence may be entirely

proper. Darby v. State, 538 So. 2d 1168, 1170 (Miss. 1989) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.

400, 401, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798 (1988)).

The following was stated during the pretrial conference:

THE COURT: The Court went over S1. The Court looked at it. For example, Vicki Breland is a
witness closely identified with the Defendant. The late disclosure this Court -- that's what this
Court has a problem with, with a witness closely identified with the Defendant. What is provided
is not the substance of her testimony. Same with James Daniel Floyd.

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What the rules are concerned with is not a listing of witnesses. Nowhere in the rules does it say
provide a list of witnesses. It says provide a name, the address, the substance of the testimony,
written, recorded or oral otherwise.

When I look at Vicki Breland and James Floyd, Shera Higbee, Tricia Gilbreath, those are
witnesses closely identified with the Defense. For those reasons, the Court stands by its prior
ruling.

Heath Smylie: Mr. Smylie has made it very clear that he wishes to stand with the Defendant.
That's a witness closely identified with the Defense. He will be limited to everything he's
testified to before or the statements previously provided by the State.

See Hearing Transcript from 09/10/204 at Page 79.

The defense failed to abide by any of the Court’s prior deadlines for discovery. The State

asked the Court to exclude testimony pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure

17.9(c). The Court properly found that the defendant’s failure to disclose these witnesses was

willful and motived by a desire to obtain a tactical advantage. See Darby v. State, 538 So. 2d

1168, 1176, (Miss. 1989); Barnes v. State, 99 So. 3d 785, Miss. Ct. App. 2012; McGregory v.

State, 979 So. 2d 12, 17(Miss. Ct. App. 2008) (citing Coleman v. State, 749 So. 2d 1003, 1007

(Miss. 1999)). The defense willfully refused to provide the State certain discovery in its

possession. As such, it was proper to exclude these witnesses.

The United States Supreme Court addressed exclusion of evidence as a sanction for the

defense’s failure to comply with discovery rules. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400. In Taylor, on

the first day of trial the Defense added names of two (2) eyewitnesses he intended to call at trial.

id. Then on the second day of trial, the Defense added two (2) additional witnesses. Id. The

Illinois trial court heard testimony that the Defense knew of these witnesses well in advance of

trial. Id. The trial court found that the “discovery rules had been violated and that the witness'

veracity was doubtful, precluded the witness' testimony as a sanction for the discovery
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violation.” Id. The Defendant was convicted and appealed the trial court’s ruling stating that the

sanction was “unnecessarily harsh”. Id at 416. In upholding the trial court’s sanction and

exclusion of testimony, the United States Supreme Court agreed with the trial Court and found

that the inference that the defense was deliberately seeking a tactical advantage was inescapable.

Id. at 417. Consistent with Taylor, this Court’s ruling was proper.

In Page v. State, 269 So. 3d 440, 452-53 (Miss. App. 2018), the defendant argued that the

Court should have given the State a continuance rather than excluding his witnesses, which were

provided 11 days prior to trial. The defense offered no good reason for the late disclosure. The

Court of Appeals reviewed the exclusion of those witnesses. The court said:

We review the exclusion of witnesses as a sanction for discovery violations under the
abuse of discretion standard. McGregory v. State, 979 So. 2d 12, 17 (¶7) (Miss. Ct. App.
2008). The trial court must not "disregard the 'fundamental character of the defendant's
right to offer the testimony of witnesses in his favor.'" Id. at (¶8) (quoting Coleman v.
State, 749 So. 2d 1003, 1009-10 (¶¶16-17) (Miss. 1999)). However, "[u]pon weighing all
relevant factors in the case, unless there is clear error in judgment as to the sanctions
imposed . . . , this Court will affirm the imposed sanction." Id. at (¶7).

P37. Here, even on the morning of trial, Page's counsel was unable to state what the
witnesses might [**22] say or whether any of them would attempt to provide an
alibi. Under these circumstances, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by excluding
the witnesses as a sanction for Page's discovery violations. Moreover, trial counsel
candidly admitted that the witnesses had provided little information to his investigator
and probably would not be called, and the record contains no further proffer as to what
the witnesses' testimony might have been. Thus, there is no support in the record for
Page's pro se claim that he was prejudiced by the exclusion of the witnesses. This issue is
without merit.11 See Davis v. State, No. 2015-KA-01491-COA, 243 So. 3d 222, 2017
Miss. App. LEXIS 581, 2017 WL 4386694, at *10-*12 (¶¶61-69) (Miss. Ct. App. Oct. 3,
2017) (rejecting a similarly unsubstantiated claim alleging error in the exclusion of
defense witnesses), cert. denied, 246 So. 3d 69, 2018 Miss. LEXIS 208, 2018 WL
2540527 (Miss. May 10, 2018).

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Page v. State, 269 So. 3d 440, 452-53 (Miss. App. 2018). Similarly, to Page, the defendant herein

failed to properly disclose the substance of the witness’s testimony and failed to proffer their

testimony at the trial.

In Davis v. State, 243 So. 3d 222, 235-37 (Miss. App. 2017), the defense during trial

attempted to call a witness which it had intended to call for several months. The defendant

argued that the witness was a rebuttal witness and argued the name was mentioned in discovery

provided to him by the State. The trial judge excluded the defense witness. The Court of Appeals

addressed this argument finding:

The trial judge's ruling was not an abuse of discretion.16 Rule 9.04(C)(1) clearly required
Davis to disclose the "[n]ames and addresses of all witnesses in chief which the
defendant may offer at trial," together with a copy of any written or recorded statement
"and the substance of any oral statements made by such witness." URCCC 9.04(C)(1)
(emphasis added). The rule contains no exception for a witness who is referenced in
materials that the State produced in discovery.

Davis v. State, 243 So. 3d 222, 235-37 (Miss. App. 2017). The current rule Mississippi Rule of

Criminal Procedure 17.3 is similar to the former Uniform Rules of Circuit and Chancery Court

9.04(C)(1). It was not error for this Court to exclude and/or limit witnesses which the defense

failed to timely disclose for a tactical advantage.

In certain cases, a trial court has discretion to exclude a defense witness who was not

disclosed to the State prior to trial. "[I]f 'the omission was willful and motivated by a desire to

obtain a tactical advantage that would minimize [*237] the [**34] effectiveness of cross-

examination and the ability to adduce rebuttal evidence,' it [is] entirely appropriate to exclude the

witness'[s] testimony." De La Beckwith v. State, 707 So. 2d 547, 575 (¶103) (Miss.

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1997) (quoting Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400, 415, 108 S. Ct. 646, 98 L. Ed. 2d 798

(1988)); accord Overton, 195 So. 3d at 718 (¶10) ("[T]he record must contain evidence that the

defendant committed a discovery violation to obtain a tactical advantage before exclusion

becomes the appropriate sanction."). The record in this case shows that it was for a tactical

advantage.

MS. TODD: Your Honor, I feel like talking about this now is somehow going to
prejudice Carly with the jury, so I'd rather –

See 09/10/224 hearing transcript at page 53. This failure to disclose was clearly willful and for a

tactical advance.

The defendant’s argument regarding the exclusion or limiting of witnesses fails and it

was not error for the Court to limit and/or exclude these witnesses. Should this Court determine

it was error, which the State denies, then any error was cured by the fact that B.G., S.R. and

Heath Smylie all testified at trial. Further, that Dr. Andrew Clark testified and failed to consider

any of Vicki Breeland’s interview as relevant in his opinion of whether or not the defendant was

insane at the time of the crimes. Further, Dr. Clark testified about his interview with Heath

Smylie. The defendant was able to present her theory of defense and that was that she was

allegedly insane at the time of the crimes. However, the jury did not believe that affirmative

offense, but rather found that the defendant was sane at the time of the crimes.

Vicki Breeland

Included in the defendant’s witness list was Vicki Breeland, the mother of the victim

Ashley Smylie and the maternal grandmother of the defendant. Ms. Breeland had been in

constant communication with the defendant and her defense team. Her proposed testimony was

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about Ashley Smylie’s mental and physical health and Carly’s mental state from the fall of 2023

to the present. The State was not provided any statement from Ms. Breeland. The defendant

knew about this witness and failed to disclose her until September 3, 2024, after the Court’s

deadline of August 20, 2024. As such, this witness so properly excluded.

The following took place at the hearing prior to the Court excluding this witness:

MS. TODD: The next witness is Vicki Breland, the maternal grandmother. And it's going to go
to the statements she made not to me but the statements she made to the expert witness, Dr.
Clark, regarding the family's mental health history.

09/10/2024 Hearing Transcript at Page 54. Per the defendant’s argument at the pretrial hearing,

the testimony she would have provided was what was provided to Dr. Clark.

The defendant was able to call their expert, Dr. Andrew Clark. Dr. Clark said he had an

interview with Vicki Breeland, but he did not rely on anything she said when rendering his

opinion. If Dr. Clark determined this testimony was not relevant to the defendant’s sanity at the

time of the crime, it certainly would not have been relevant or likely admissible at trial. Again,

the defense took the trial strategy of saying this wasn’t a “whodunit,” but rather a question of

whether or not the defendant was sane at the time of the crimes. As such, it was proper to

exclude her testimony.

James Daniel Floyd

James Daniel Floyd was also disclosed on September 3, 2024. However, he had been in

constant contact with the defendant and defense team. He is the husband to the defendant’s

maternal aunt. His proposed testimony was regarding his personal knowledge and observations

regarding the events on March 19, 2024, and the investigation by the Rankin County Sherriff’s

Office. No statements were provided. Moreover, the testimony is improper and irrelevant as he is

23
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not an expert in investigations and the defense to this case was insanity, not that she did not

commit the crimes.

The following took place at the hearing regarding James Floyd:

THE COURT: All right. Who is the next witness?

MS. TODD: The next witness is James Daniel Floyd.

THE COURT: All right. Show me what you turned over in relation to Mr. James Daniel Floyd.

MS. TODD: Your Honor, the only thing we're anticipating calling Mr. Floyd about is just what
he saw on the day of the investigations. I have not had personal conversations with Mr. Floyd.
He's just going to confirm the demeanor of Mr. Smylie during the investigations when the police
were at the house.

THE COURT: How is that relevant?

MS. TODD: I think it will be relevant to the case in chief when we start talking about the
investigation that's gone on, and cross-examination with the --

THE COURT: Well, I thought you weren't -- he's not testifying to the investigation. What is he
going to testify to about the investigation?

MS. TODD: Your Honor, I feel like talking about this now is somehow going to prejudice Carly
with the jury, so I'd rather --

THE COURT: Ms. Todd, you can't hide evidence. You can't go to trial and them not know what
the witness is going to say. This is basic 101 law.

Mr. Camp, can you cite me a single case, a single case, one, where a Defendant got to go to trial
and not tell them what the other side is going to say?

MR. CAMP: I definitely agree we have to turn over our evidence to you.

09/10/2024 Hearing Transcript at page 53-54. The defense attorney agreed that they are required

to turn over evidence. As such, the exclusion of this improper witness was correct.

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B.G. and S.R.

The defendant also listed B.G. and S.R. in their September 3, 2024 witness list. The State

previously disclosed these witnesses to the defense and provided investigator’s notes and

recorded statements for these individuals. The defendant did not provide any additional proposed

testimony or statements. As such, the Court limited their testimony to what was provided in

discovery. This was proper.

The following took place at the hearing:

THE COURT: Who is the next witness on your list up above?

MS. TODD: The next witness on our list is S.R., followed by B.G. These are the same witnesses
the State's going to all, and we're calling them for same reasons, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Okay. So you didn't turn anything else over? No statements from those --
from the juvenile witnesses. Correct?
MS. TODD: I haven't even spoken to S.R., so no.
THE COURT: What about B.G.?
MS. TODD: B.G., spoke to him briefly, but the testimony is the same thing that the State
recorded in their interviews.
THE COURT: All right. Then they won't be allowed to testify to anything other than what's in
the State's interviews. As the Court appointed you to case law, there is no exception to the
discovery requirement for the Defendant just because they're listed in the discovery by the State.
So you can't elicit anything that's not in their report.
MS. TODD: Wasn't planning to.

09/10/2024 Hearing Transcript at Page 52-53. The defendant during the pretrial conference

agreed that the testimony that these witnesses were going to provide is what the State produced.

As such, they were not limited.

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Heath Smylie

The defendant also listed the living victim, Heath Smylie. His proposed testimony would

include among other things Ashley Smylie’s mental and physical state. The State requested any

medical records the defendant had regarding Ashley Smylie and were told they had none.

Additionally, Heath was allegedly going to offer testimony about “Carly’s behavior and mental

health issues from the fall of 2023 through the present.” The State was provided no statements to

this effect. In fact, during his interview with law enforcement Heath said he did not know why

Carly would do this. The only thing he knew of was that she was on medication and seeing a

therapist for anxiety and depression. The State provided the defense with several recorded

statements and/or videos of this witness prior to the August 20, 2024 discovery deadline. The

defendant through counsel stated on August 20, 2024, that she sent Heath and other witnesses

typed up questions and they sent responses. The State agreed that the attorney’s questions would

be considered attorney work product. However, that the responses were not and should be

provided to the State pursuant to discovery rules. The defendant never provided the State with

any statements from the victim or any other witness.

Additionally, Heath Smylie would not provide a statement to Dr. Amanda Gugliano, the

State’s psychologist, but did provide an interview to the defendant’s expert Dr. Andrew Clark.

Dr. Clark relied on this interview in preparing his report and trial testimony. As such, despite not

providing Heath’s statement to the State, it was allowed in through Dr. Clark. While the

defendant was being evaluated by Dr. Jason Pickett, the State’s physiatrist, the defense attorney

mentioned that she would have Heath Smylie reach out to Dr. Pickett to talk about the defendant

26
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“zoning out.” He did call Dr. Pickett. Nothing in the conversation with Heath Smylie caused Dr.

Pickett to opine anything other than that the defendant was sane at the time of the crimes.

The following took place at the pretrial hearing regarding Heath Smylie:

MR. CAMP: We don't have any written statements from Heath Smylie, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did he give you any oral statements?

MR. CAMP: Just what the -- the same thing that he's given to both sides. I mean, that's the --

THE COURT: Great. So all he'll be able to testify to is what was provided in the State's
discovery. Correct?

MR. CAMP: That's correct, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So he'll not be testifying to anything other than what he's testified to in
open court or what he's given a statement of?

MR. CAMP: That's correct.

Transcript for Pretrial Conference Hearing on 09/10/2024 at Page 42.

MR. CAMP: Your Honor, Dr. Clark talked to Heath Smylie, and that is in Dr. Clark's report. So
that has been furnished.

Id. at Page 43.

MS. TODD: Would you like me to proceed to Mr. Smylie until we can --

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. TODD: Same thing with Heath Smylie.

He has given a statement, which was listed in Dr. Clark's report as a 90-minute ZOOM
conference call. He has done a witness interview, which we received with -- which we received
from the State and several -- just the body camera footage of things that happened on March
19th. That's what we're calling him to talk about.

Transcript for Pretrial Conference Hearing on 09/10/2024 at page 57.

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The defense expert, Dr. Andrew Clark, relied upon his interview with Heath Smylie.

Heath provided information to him about Ashley’s mental and physical health as well as him

telling Dr. Clark that the defendant would “zone out” when Ashley Smylie would be fussing at

her. Heath further told him, and he relied upon the fact that the defendant seemed to “develop

problems with her memory.”

As pointed out above, the defense agreed that Heath Smylie would testify consistent to

what he provided to law enforcement and at a prior hearing. The defense also wanted to rely

upon the information Heath Smylie provided to Dr. Andrew Clark. Despite that interview not

being recorded or produced to the State, Dr. Clark was able to testify at trial consistent with the

information he learned from Heath Smylie. As such, there was no limit to his testimony.

Shera Hibgee and Tricia Gilbreath

The defendant also listed some teachers, Shera Higbee and Tricia Gilbreath. The

proposed testimony of these witnessed was alleged to be that they did not notice anything

different about the defendant on the day of the crime and that she had a good relationship with

her mom. The State did not oppose these witnesses testifying to this information if called as

character witnesses, since this testimony is character evidence. See Hearing transcript from

09/10/2024. However, the defendant chose not to call these witnesses. In addition to being proper

to exclude any testimony that was not timely turned over some of the testimony the defendant

was seeking to illicit was character testimony, which is only proper after the defendant has

testified, which didn’t occur in this case.

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Defendant’s claim that important trial evidence was still being produced in the weeks prior
to trial is misplaced.

The defendant argued that:

There was sufficient time for either the Defense or the State to gain a tactical advantage
at trial. Important trial evidence was still being produced in response to subpoena in the
weeks leading up to trial.

See Defendant’s Motion for JNOV at Page 5. The defendant is correct that there was sufficient

time for either side to gain a tactical advantage at trial if they had information in their possession

but failed to produce it to the other side. This is exactly what the defendant was attempting to do.

The defense attorney even told this Honorable Court that “Your Honor, I feel like talking about

his now is somehow going to prejudice Carly with the jury, so I’d rather--.” See Hearing

Transcript from 09/10/2024 at Page 53. It appears the defendant fails to realize that all evidence

is prejudicial to one side or the other or it would not be relevant at trial. However, what you

cannot do is attempt to hide evidence or the substance of someone’s testimony until you are in

the middle of trial.

Furthermore, the defendant’s argument about receiving important trial information in the

weeks leading to trial is a bit disingenuousness as ALL of the subpoena duces tecums requested

and issued in this case were done at the State’s request. The defendant never told the State or this

Honorable Court that it was waiting on any additional records or information prior to trial.

Furthermore, the defendant failed to ever request a continuance. Rather, her attorneys argued that

it was detrimental to her physical and mental health to be in isolation at the jail. The defendant

has not provided any grounds for needing a continuance. Our appellate court has noted

29
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“that whether to request a continuance is clearly a decision that falls within the ambit of trial

strategy. McCoy v. State, 954 So. 2d 479, 485-86 (Miss. App. 2007).

The State properly disclosed its witnesses in discovery.

The defendant argues that they were not provided the state’s witness list until September

8 or 9, 2024. The defendant failed to object to any of the witnesses testifying at trial. The failure

to object to testimony at trial 'waives any assignment of error on appeal.'" Ross v. State, 16 So. 3d

47, 57 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 214 (Miss. 1985));

Chatman v. State, 241 So. 3d 649, 653 (Miss. App. 2018).

Nothing in Mississippi Rule of Criminal Procedure 17 requires that the State actually

provide a written witness list. However, since the defense continued to ask for such one was

filed. However, to claim that they were only provided with the information on September 8, 2024

is quite disingenuous. The State provided discovery compliant with Mississippi Rule of Criminal

Procedure 17.2. In addition to the other material provided, the State provided the names,

addresses/contact information and substances of each witness’s testimony in the discovery

provided to the defense on June 4, 2024. Specifically, on June 4, 2024, the witnesses listed in the

State’s Amended Witness List numbers 1-10, 12-47, and 50 were all provided on June 4, 2024,

104 days prior to trial.

On June 4, 2024, the defendant was provided discovery from the State with the following

people’s names, addresses/contact information and the substance of their testimony through the

Rankin County Sheriff’s Department case file, CAD notes, records, reports, phone extractions,

911 call, and/or body cam videos: Investigatory Zachary Cotton, Investigator Tyler Burnell,

Investigator Chris Cousin, Deputy Tony Shack, Officer Allison Dufour, Investigator Justin Davis,

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Investigator Christy Snow, Deputy Hunter Lewis, Deputy Dustin Smith, Deputy Jordan

McQueary, Kevin Collins, Thomas Woods, Cheyenne Myers, Jessica Cox, Investigator Ryan

Wigley, Officer Sean Haddakin, Deputy Napoleon Valino, Deputy Jesse Zetterholm, Deputy John

Johnson, Deputy Jeremiah Jordan, Deputy James Rayborn, Retired Deputy Ronnie Moore,

Investigator Fred Lovett, Investigator Brad Turner, Deputy Chance White, Deputy Jesse Paggard,

David Ruth, Cliff Dunlap, Paul Herbert, Carey McCuskley, James McDonald, Lamarcus

Wallace, John Throne, John Morganti, Gerrad Bacon, Lee McDivitt, Rebecca Gregory, Dr. Edgar

Heath, III, B.G., Heather Germany, B.W., T.G., S.K.R., H.T, A.H., Heath Smylie and Christy

Emerson.

Additionally, Christy Emerson with Region 8 provided an initial assessment of the

defendant on March 20, 2024, and that assessment was turned over to the defendant’s public

defender Kevin Stewart. As such, the defendant actually had Ms. Emerson’s report prior to this

case being indicted by the grand jury.

During the course of the proceedings, the defense asked the State if they had the jail

remove books from the defendant’s cell. The State had no idea what the defense was talking

about, so the State requested any jail records from the jail regarding any incidents with the

defendant. The State received records from a medical incident, a strange and/or disturbing

colored photograph (which the defense said was done by the attorney and given to the

defendant), and copies of pages in a book where the defendant wrote in the book. These items

were forwarded to the defense on September 3, 2024. Witness number 11, Amanda Thompson

was the representative the State named in the witness list to potentially provide testimony about

where these items were recovered. The State did not seek to introduce these items during the

31
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guilt phase of the trial. The State did seek to introduce the colored photograph during the

sentencing phase, but that request was denied by the Court and Ms. Thompson was never called

to testify.

Witness number 48, Dr. Amanda Gugliano- On June 16, 2024, the State filed a motion for

mental evaluation asking that Dr. Amanda Gugliano be appointed to evaluate the defendant. Her

information was provided in that motion. On 08/08/2024 her CV was provided. On August 15,

2024, the defendant received her report and opinions. The State received this report after the

defense.

Witness number 49, Dr. Jason Pickett -On August 12, 2024, the State filed an amended

motion for mental evaluation asking that Dr. Jason Pickett be appointed to evaluate the

defendant’s sanity. His contact information was provided at that time. On 08/21/2024 his CV was

provided. On September 9, 2024, his report and opinions were provided to the defendant at the

same time the State received them.

Witness number 51, Summer Miller, NP- On July 7, 2024, the State requested a subpoena

duces tecum for the defendant’s medical records from Region 8 for treatment she received during

custody. The defense did not oppose that request and the Court signed an order allowing the

subpoena duces tecum to be issued. The State served Region 8 with that subpoena duces tecum.

The State received the Region 8 records and produced them to the defense on August 6, 2024.

However, the defense stated that the defendant was on medication while at the jail and that

information was not provided in those records. The State followed up multiple times seeking to

get the prescription records from Region 8. The State found out the Vital Core provides medical

services to the inmates through Region 8 and that those records would need to be requested

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directly from them. The State reached to the defense to see if they had these records, if they

intended to request them or if they opposed the State seeking a subpoena duces tecum for these

records. The defense responded that they had no objection to the subpoena duces tecum request.

The state file a motion on August 26, 2024, and subsequently received an order granting that

motion without objection by the defendant. The State got a subpoena duces tecum issued and

served on Vital Core. On 08/28/2024, the State received the Vital Core records and produced

them to the defense. Ms. Miller’s name, contact information and records were found in that

discovery. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence 503(f), the State could not speak to this

individual (other than for trial scheduling purposes) about her treatment of the defendant.

However, nothing other than trial strategy stopped the defendant from speaking to this provider.

Witness number 52, Olivia Leber, NP- On July 22, 2024, the State filed a motion seeking

the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum for the defendant’s medical records from this provider.

At a hearing, the defense said they had no objection to the motion. An order was signed and a

subpoena duces tecum was issued. It was served on Precise Clinical Neuroscience on July 23,

2024. The State received those records and provided them to the defense on August 8, 2024. Ms.

Leber’s name, contact information and treatment notes were found in those records. Pursuant to

Mississippi Rule of Evidence 503(f), the State could not speak to this individual (other than for

trial scheduling purposes) about her treatment of the defendant. However, nothing other than trial

strategy stopped the defendant from speaking to this provider.

Witness number 53, Rebecca Kirk- 08/06/2024, The Defendant previously had these

records and failed to turn them over to the State, but did provide them to Dr. Amanda Gugliano

prior to 08/06/2024. On July 22, 2024, the State filed a motion seeking the issuance of a

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subpoena duces tecum for the defendant’s medical records from this provider. At a hearing, the

defense said they had no objection to the motion. An order was signed and a subpoena duces

tecum was issued. It was served on Magnolia Counseling on July 23, 2024. The State received

those records and provided them to the defense on August 8, 2024. Ms. Kirk’s name, contact

information and treatment notes were found in those records. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of

Evidence 503(f), the State could not speak to this individual (other than for trial scheduling

purposes) about her treatment of the defendant. However, nothing other than trial strategy

stopped the defendant from speaking to this provider.

Witness number 54- Dr. Jimmie Smith- The defense was provided a copy of the autopsy

photographs and the death report in the initial discovery on June 4, 2024. On August 30, 2024,

The State had a trial subpoena issued for Dr. Jimmie Smith. The State arranged for his travel and

accommodations for trial. Then while preparing for trial, realized that his autopsy report had not

been provided in discovery. The State got a copy of that report and sent it to the defendant via

email on September 12, 2024. The defense stated they would stipulate to the manner and cause

of death, this was never done by stipulation. Due to the late disclosure of this witness’s report,

the State did not call this witness to testify and instead used the Rankin County Deputy Coroner

Cliff Dunlap to talk about his death report, which was produced in discovery on June 4, 2024.

Witness number 55, Felicia McIntire-The Defendant knew the items were at the

Mississippi Forensics Laboratory being tested from the discovery. The State received a

completed firearms report from Felicia McIntire on September 4, 2024, and provided the same to

the defense. During the trial of this matter, the defendant during opening statements argued this

was not a “whodunit,” case. Since the defense trial strategy was that of an insanity defense, they

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were not contesting guilty, but rather whether or not the defendant was insane at the time of the

crimes. The defendant did not object to this witness at any time prior to or during the trial.

Witness number 56, David Whitehead- The Defendant knew the items were at the

Mississippi Forensics Laboratory being tested from the discovery. The State received a

completed gunshot residue testing report from David Whitehead on September 3, 2024, and

provided the same to the defense. During the trial of this matter, the defendant during opening

statements argued this was not a “whodunit,” case. Since the defense trial strategy was that of an

insanity defense, they were not contesting guilty but rather whether or not the defendant was

insane at the time of the crimes. The defendant did not object to this witness at any time prior to

or during the trial.

Witness number 57, Nathan Holly- The Defendant knew the items were at the Mississippi

Forensics Laboratory being tested from the discovery. The State received a completed DNA

testing report from Nathan Holly on September 6, 2024 and provided the same to the defense.

During the trial of this matter, the defendant during opening statements argued this was not a

“whodunit,” case. Since the defense trial strategy was that of an insanity defense, they were not

contesting guilty but rather whether or not the defendant was insane at the time of the crimes.

The defendant did not object to this witness at any time prior to or during the trial.

All of the State’s witnesses were properly disclosed to the defendant. Further, the

defendant failed to object to the testimony of these witnesses. The failure to object to testimony

at trial 'waives any assignment of error on appeal.'" Ross v. State, 16 So. 3d 47, 57 (¶21) (Miss.

Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 214 (Miss. 1985)); Chatman v. State,

241 So. 3d 649, 653 (Miss. App. 2018).

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Defendant’s claim that she should not be in an adult prison is misplaced.

The defendant claims that she should “not be placed in an adult prison, or have to wait,

for the year or longer that it will take for the appellate courts to address this issue. Justice

delayed is justice denied.” This allegation lacks any support or relevance. In fact, the defendant

is currently housed in the Youthful Offender Facility at Central Mississippi Correctional Facility.

The website for Central Mississippi Correctional Facility states the following:

Youthful offenders are housed in a separate facility. The Youthful Offender Unit (YOU)
opened on Dec. 12, 2012, as a separate, independent facility to serve individuals under
the age of 18. It offers a wide range of programs to include academic classes, vocational
programs, mental health counseling, psychological and psychiatric services in a group
and individual basis, alcohol and drug treatment, social services, religious and
recreational services.

Clearly, the defendant is housed with other offenders under the age of 18. Defendant’s

argument is without merit. Justice would be denied if this Honorable Court overturned the jury’s

verdict and/or sentence, which is supported by the evidence and law.

Extensive pretrial media was caused by the defendant.

Despite the State previously citing where the defendant’s attorneys had violated the

Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Professional Conduct in the Motion for

Gag Order when making pretrial statements to the media, the defendant includes extensive

pretrial media coverage as to why the defendant “was denied a fair and impartial trial.” See

State’s Motion for Gag Order [MEC Doc. No. 177]. Any pretrial coverage which took place

outside of the courtroom was done by the defendant’s defense team. The defendant cannot now

claim to be prejudiced by their own willful violations of the rules. As such, this unsupported

argument is without merit.

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The defendant failed to state any alleged improper statement by the State.

The defendant mentions improper statement made by the State during the pretrial

hearings. One of the attorneys for the defense mentioned this previously in email. However, the

State requested that these alleged improper statements be provided to the State so that if there

was an unintentional misstatement that it could be corrected. The defense attorney failed to

provide any such statements. Again, the motion lacks anything more than this broad allegation

and is unsupported by facts or law.

Rebecca Kirk’s testimony was proper.

The defendant argued that the testimony regarding the defendant reading Crime and

Punishment was not disclosed and that the testimony of this witness was improper. However, the

defendant was in possession of the Magnolia Counseling records prior to State receiving them. It

is absurd to say they were not provided this information. Ms. Kirk’s testimony was solely based

upon her treatment and the treatment records of the defendant. The defendant received these

records in discovery from the State on August 6, 2024. Pursuant to Mississippi Rule of Evidence

503(f), the State could not speak to this individual (other than for trial scheduling purposes)

about her treatment of the defendant. However, nothing other than trial strategy stopped the

defendant from speaking to this provider.

All argument regarding Rebecca Kirk’s testimony is meritless and improper. The

defendant introduced the medical records of Magnola Counseling during the trial, Exhibit D21.

These are a complete and accurate copy of the records for the therapy sessions and initial intake

for the defendant with Rebecca Kirk. These records contained the statement about the defendant

reading Crime and Punishment. The defendant argued in her motion that Mrs. Kirk’s testimony

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was “one of the last statements the jury heard prior to beginning their deliberations.” See Motion

for JNOV at Page 6. Mrs. Kirk’s testimony was authentic and truthful. Her testimony was based

upon her treatment and records of the defendant. The defense crossed examined Mrs. Kirk about

her testimony, specifically, Crime and Punishment. However, her statements were not even close

to being the last statement the jury heard prior to deliberations. In fact, the jury also heard the

direct examination of Dr. Amanda Gugliano, then the defendant’s cross and redirect.

Additionally, they heard from Dr. Jason Pickett and then all four attorneys involved in case

argued during closing arguments to the jury prior to their deliberations.

Rebecca Kirk’s testimony was likely prejudicial to the defendant as she saw her the day

prior to the crimes and did not notice any sort of mental defect or disassociation as alleged by the

defendant. However, all evidence is prejudicial to one side, or it would not be relevant. This

testimony was more probative than prejudicial and therefore it was proper. See Mississippi Rules

of Evidence 402 and 403. The defendant knew the State intended to call Rebecca Kirk.

The failure to object to testimony at trial 'waives any assignment of error on appeal.'" Ross v.

State, 16 So. 3d 47, 57 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Johnson v. State, 477 So. 2d 196,

214 (Miss. 1985)); Chatman v. State, 241 So. 3d 649, 653 (Miss. App. 2018). Mrs. Kirk’s

testimony was proper and admissible, and the contents of that testimony were previously

disclosed. As such, the argument regarding her testimony is meritless.

Dr. Pickett possessed the proper expertise necessary to testify in this matter.

The defendant alleges that Dr. Pickett “did not possess the proper expertise necessary to

testify in this matter due to his inexperience with evaluating children and adolescence with

forensic evaluations in general, and his inadequate background in child and adolescent

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psychiatry.” During the voir dire portion of Dr. Pickett’s testimony, the defense attorney stood up

and stated that they did not object to his qualifications or Dr. Pickett being tendered as an expert

in Emergency Medicine and Forensic Psychiatry. To say that in another way, the defendant did

not object to his qualifications or opinions at trial. Dr. Pickett is triple board certified in

emergency medicine, psychiatry and forensic psychiatry. He testified that he regularly evaluates

defendants through the Mississippi State Hospital. The defense attempted to discredit Dr. Pickett

and his qualifications during cross examination. However, they confessed his qualifications

during his direct examination. The failure to object to testimony at trial 'waives any assignment

of error on appeal.'" Ross v. State, 16 So. 3d 47, 57 (¶21) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Johnson

v. State, 477 So. 2d 196, 214 (Miss. 1985)); Chatman v. State, 241 So. 3d 649, 653 (Miss. App.

2018).

During Dr. Pickett’s testimony he referenced his experience in treating children within

the emergency room setting as well in general psychiatry. More specifically, he outlined that he

had conducted over one hundred forensic evaluations prior to this case. Interestingly, the

defendant’s expert Dr. Clark corrected the defense attorney when they sought to introduce him as

a forensic psychiatrist. He said rather, he should be admitted as a child and adolescent

psychiatrist. Both Dr. Amanda Gugliano and Dr. Jason Pickett testified about the difference in a

general psychiatrist and the forensic psychiatrist. Forensic psychiatrists focus on how mental

health conditions and disorders apply to the criminal justice system. Dr. Pickett is more than

qualified to offer the opinions and testimony he provided in this case. His testimony was

properly admitted without objection by the defendant.

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It was proper to deny a jury instruction defining reasonable doubt.

The defendant alleges that the Court erred with it failed to provide the jury a definition of

reasonable doubt. Our courts have long held that reasonable doubt defines itself and the Court

should deny jury instructions attempting to define reasonable doubt. “Mississippi state courts do

not allow judges to give jury instructions on reasonable doubt.” Lett v. State, 902 So. 2d 630,

638 (Miss. App. 2005). The Court acknowledged that federal courts allows similar instructions,

but our courts do not.

The Mississippi Supreme Court has repeatedly and consistently asserted that "reasonable

doubt defines itself." Martin v. State, 854 So. 2d 1004, 1009 (P12) (Miss. 2003); Chase v.

State, 645 So. 2d 829, 851 (Miss. 1994); Williams v. State, 589 So. 2d 1278, 1280 (Miss.

1991); Allman v. State, 571 So. 2d 244, 252 (Miss. 1990); Barnes v. State, 532 So. 2d 1231, 1235

(Miss. 1988); Anderson v. State, 413 So. 2d 725, 728 (Miss. 1982); Smith v. State, 394 So. 2d

882, 884-85 (Miss. 1981); Isaacks v. State, 337 So. 2d 928, 930 (Miss. 1976); [**19] Simmons v.

State, 206 Miss. 535, 538, 40 So. 2d 289, 290-91, (1949); Boutwell v. State, 165 Miss. 16, 143

So. 479, 483 (1932).

Periodically, our courts have explained why jury instructions defining reasonable

doubt should be refused. "The instruction as given in effect tells jurors that they should be able to

state a reason why they have a doubt. Such an instruction is erroneous because, in our

jurisprudence, jurors are never required to articulate any explanation of their

decision." Isaacks, 337 So. 2d at 930 (citing Cannon v. State, 190 So. 2d 848, 851 (Miss.

1966)). In Berry v. State, 859 So. 2d 399, 404 (P17) (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), the Mississippi Court

of Appeals stated that it was proper to refuse the jury instruction defining reasonable

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doubt because the instruction was superfluous. "The jury received a plethora of instructions

concerning reasonable doubt. The jury had been fully informed that before it could return a

verdict of guilty it had to believe beyond a reasonable doubt that [the defendant] was guilty."

Similarly, in this case all of the State's jury instructions instructed the jury to find the defendant

guilty only if the State established those elements guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. As such,

denying a jury instruction attempting to define reasonable doubt was proper and this argument is

without merit.

The Court did not error in denying the defendant’s pretrial motions and granting the
State’s motions.

The defendant argues that the Court erred in granting all of the State’s pretrial motions

and post-trial motions. However, many of these motions were either unopposed or the defense

filed an answer after the response deadline. The only two motion the defendant filed which were

opposed by the State were the Motion to Change Venue to Youth Court [MEC Doc. NO. 16] and

the Motion to Suppress Urine Drug Test [MEC Doc. No. 166].

Following a hearing where the Court heard from Corey Gerber, the Rankin County Youth

Court Prosecutor, and arguments from the parties, the Court denied the defendant’s motion to

transfer venue to youth court. This ruling is proper and is supported by the evidence and the

arguments provided at the hearing and in the State’s Response in Opposition to the Motion to

Change Venue to Youth Court [MEC Do. No. 20].

Additionally, following a hearing where the Court heard from the defendant’s witness

(whom the State called) Corey Gerber, the Rankin County Youth Court Prosecutor, and

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arguments from the parties, the Court denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the drug urine

results.

The defense sought to exclude a drug screen collected at the Rankin County Juvenile

Detention Center. This was not error by the Court, but rather a proper ruling as the State was

limited and not allowed to introduce the drug screen in its case and chief. Regardless, the State

did not introduce the drug screen from the juvenile detention center at trial at all. Rather, the

defense introduced a separate urine screen collected at the Rankin County Jail through Trial

Exhibit D13, the Vital Core medical records. See Urine Drug Screen, THC Preliminary positive.

[Trial Exhibit D13, Bates 000839, 000858]. As such, the defense is barred from claiming any

prejudice based upon its introduction of the evidence at trial.

The defendant’s sentences are not excessive and are proper.

The defendant alleges that her sentence:

is excessive, not supported by the evidence, is disproportionate to the sentences imposed

on other similarly situated defendants and violates the Eight and Fourteenths Amendment
to the United States Constitution and corresponding sections of the Mississippi
Constitution.

See Motion for JNOV at Page 7. This argument is not supported by any actual facts or law. The

sentence the defendant received is based upon the evidence and is proper under the law. In fact,

the Mississippi Supreme Court just upheld a life sentence for a juvenile convicted of murder here

in Rankin County. See Johnson v. State (Miss. 2024; 2023-CA-00117-SCT). The heinous nature

of the crimes in the defendant’s case far outweighs that of Johnson’s crime. As such, the

defendant’s sentence is proportionate with similarly situated defendants in his jurisdiction.

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"The only exception for a party seeking relief who cannot show that his/her sentence

exceeds the statutory penalty is 'proof of gross disproportionality.'" Smith v. State, 291 So. 3d 1, 6

(¶13) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Willis v. State, 911 So. 2d 947, 951 (¶16) (Miss. 2005)). The

defendant failed to substantiate a disproportionality claim and her sentences fall within the

statutorily allowed sentences. As such, her argument is without merit.

A two-step process is employed "to determine whether a lengthy sentence is

unconstitutional." Id.; Mapp v. State, 310 So. 3d 335, 338-39 (Miss. App. 2021). The test is

outlined below:

First, the person seeking relief must show that the sentence itself leads to an inference of
gross disproportionality. Generally, sentences that do not exceed the maximum
punishment allowed by statute will not be considered grossly disproportionate and will
not be disturbed on appeal, but in some circumstances, proportionality review of
sentences is required.

Id. (citations and internal quotations marks omitted). Second, if it is shown that there is
an inference of gross disproportionality, the United States Supreme Court has set forth
factors in Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290-93, 103 S. Ct. 3001, 77 L. Ed. 2d 637 (1983),
to determine whether a sentence is disproportionate. These factors include: "(i) the
gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on
other criminals in the same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for
commission [**5] of the same crime in other jurisdictions." Id. at 292; accord Smith, 291
So. 3d at 6-7 (¶14).

In Mosley v. State, 104 So. 3d 839, 841 (¶¶7-8) (Miss. 2012), the Mississippi Supreme
Court addressed a defendant's argument that the circuit court's imposition of three
consecutive sentences totaling 126 years "involve[d] a threshold showing of being
'grossly disproportionate' to the crimes charged." Noting that the "three-pronged test set
forth in Solem" will only be applied "when a threshold comparison of the crime
committed to the sentence imposed leads to an inference of 'gross disproportionality,'" the
supreme court concluded that "since Mosley's sentences clearly f[e]ll [*339] within the
statutory limits," there was no "such inferential showing here." Id. at 841-42 (¶¶10-
11); see also Anderson v. State, 293 So. 3d 279, 297 (¶55) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (holding
that "[b]ecause Anderson's sentences were within the statutory limits[,] there [was] no
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inference of 'gross disproportionality,'" and therefore this Court was "not bound to
undertake a proportionality analysis"), cert. denied, 291 So. 3d 1112 (Miss.
2020). Moreover, as the supreme court recently noted, "[d]etermining whether multiple
sentences run concurrently or consecutively is within [**6] the [circuit] court's
discretion." Thomas v. State, 277 So. 3d 532, 536 (¶17) (Miss. 2019). Therefore, there is
no need for this Court to proceed to the second step and address the Solem factors.

Mapp v. State, 310 So. 3d 335, 338-39 (Miss. App. 2021).

All three of the defendant’s sentences imposed by this Honorable Court fall within the

applicable statutory sentencing limits. Additionally, this Honorable Court chose to run the

defendant’s two life sentences concurrently rather than consecutively. Therefore, she was

actually given less that the applicable sentences allowed by law. As such, there is no inference of

gross disproportionality. The jury in this case, not the Court, sentenced the defendant to life

sentences for murder and attempted murder after hearing the evidence at trial of these heinous

crimes. Additionally, this was after the sentencing phase of the trial wherein they considered the

Miller v. Alabama factors.

Miss. Code Ann. 97-3-21(2) outlines the sentence for a juvenile convicted of murder. It

states:

(b) A juvenile offender who is convicted of first-degree murder after July 1, 2024, may be
sentenced to life imprisonment in the custody of the Department of Corrections if the
punishment is so fixed by the jury. If the jury fails to fix the penalty at life imprisonment,
the court shall fix the penalty at not less than twenty (20) nor more than forty (40) years
in the custody of the Department of Corrections.

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-21.

If there was any error in the sentence it was that the State gave the jury the potential

sentence of life with parole. Pursuant to the parole statute found at Mississippi Code Annotated

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Section 47-7-3, life for a murder conviction means without the possibility of parole. Miss. Code

Annotated §47-7-3(d) states:

(d) Murder. No person sentenced for murder in the first degree, whose crime was
committed on or after June 30, 1995, or murder in the second degree, as defined
in Section 97-3-19, shall be eligible for parole;

Miss. Code Ann. § 47-7-3.

However, out of an abundance of caution, the State filed jury instructions which allowed

the jury to consider life with the possibility of parole. If this was error, it is error that weighs in

favor of the defendant.

As outlined in Miss. Code Ann. §97-3-21, the defendant was found guilty in the guilt

phase of murder. Then, the Court held a separate sentencing phase where the jury affixed the

punishment of life without the possibility of parole. The jury considered the Miller factors during

the sentencing phase. See Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407

(2012). Specifically, the jury considered the following: (1) The Defendant’s chronological age,

(2) The Defendant’s family and home environment, (3) The circumstances of the homicide

offense, (4) The Defendant’s incompetencies associated with youth, and (5) The Defendant’s

possibility of rehabilitation. See Jury Instructions given at trial. These factors were just upheld as

being proper for a juvenile convicted of murder and given a sentence of life without the

possibility of parole here in the Rankin County Circuit Court. The Mississippi Supreme Court

upheld this sentence. See Johnson v. State (Miss. 2024; 2023-CA-00117-SCT). In the instant

case, the jury heard from multiple witnesses during the guilt phase including Dr. Amanda

Gugliano who talked about the defendant’s competency to stand trial and ability to assist her

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counsel. They heard from Dr. Jason Pickett about the defendant and his opinion she was sane at

the time of the crimes. Additionally, the jury heard from the defense expert, Dr. Andrew Clark

regarding the defendant’s age and any incompetencies associated with youth. There was also

testimony by multiple witnesses, including the experts, about the defendant’s family and home

environment, the circumstances of the homicide and her possibility of rehabilitation. Specifically,

during Dr. Pickett’s testimony he talked about the fact that the defendant’ claimed to be in a

disassociated state (similar to when she committed the crimes) during his evaluation.

With regard to the attempted murder charge, Mississippi Code Annotated §97-1-7(2)

outlines the punishment, it states:

(2) Every person who shall design and endeavor to commit an act which, if
accomplished, would constitute an offense of murder under Section 97-3-19, but shall fail
therein, or shall be prevented from committing the same, shall be guilty
of attempted murder and, upon conviction, shall be imprisoned for life in the custody of
the Department of Corrections if the punishment is so fixed by the jury in its verdict after
a separate sentencing proceeding. If the jury fails to agree on fixing the penalty at
imprisonment for life, the court shall fix the penalty at not less than twenty (20) years in
the custody of the Department of Corrections.

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-1-7.

As outlined in Miss. Code Ann. §97-1-7, the defendant was found guilty in the guilt

phase of attempted murder. Then, the Court held a separate sentencing phase where the jury

affixed the punishment of life without the possibility of parole.

With regards to the tampering with physical evidence charge, Mississippi Code

Annotated §97-9-125 and §97-9-129 outline the punishment. Mississippi Code Annotated §97-9-

125(2) states:

(2) Tampering with physical evidence is a Class 2 felony.

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Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-125.

Mississippi Code Annotated §97-9-129 outlines what the punishment is for a Class 2

felony under this article, it states:

(2) A person who has been convicted of any Class 2 felony under this article shall be
sentenced to imprisonment for a term of not more than ten (10) years or fined not more
than Three Thousand Dollars ($3,000.00), or both.

Miss. Code Ann. § 97-9-129.

After the jury found the defendant guilty of tampering with physical evidence, this Court

sentenced her to ten years in the custody of the Mississippi Department of Corrections. This

sentence is a proper sentence under both Mississippi Code Annotated §§97-9-125 and 97-9-129.

All three of the defendant’s sentences imposed by this Honorable Court and/or the jury

fall within the applicable statutory sentencing limits. As such, the defendant’s unsupported

argument around the punishment being excessive is without merit.

Conclusion

For these reasons and other supported upon examination of the record (once complete),

the Defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the alternative, Motion for a Judgment

Notwithstanding the Verdict should be denied. On September 20, 2024, a Rankin County jury

found the defendant guilty of murder, attempted murder and tampering with physical evidence.

The jury then deliberated in a separate sentencing phase and sentenced her to life without the

possibility of parole for the murder and attempted murder. This Honorable Court sentenced the

defendant to ten years for the tampering with physical evidence. The verdict and the sentences

are proper according to law and supported by the weight and sufficiency of the evidence. The
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verdict and sentence should stand and the defendant’s Motion for New Trial, or in the

Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict should be denied.

THIS, the 7th day of October, 2024.

Respectfully submitted,

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

_/s/ Kathryn W. Newman ________

Kathryn White Newman
Assistant District Attorney
Kathryn White Newman (MSB#103250)
Twentieth Judicial District Attorney’s Office
P. O. Box 68
Brandon, MS 39043
Phone: 601-825-1472
Fax: 601-825-9605
knewman@rankincounty.org

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Kathryn White Newman, Assistant District Attorney with the State of Mississippi, do

hereby certify that I have this day caused to be delivered via MEC the foregoing State’s

Response in Opposition to the Defendant’s Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative

Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict to:

Kevin Camp
Bridgett Todd

THIS, the 7th day of October, 2024.

__/s/ Kathryn W. Newman __________

Kathryn White Newman

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IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF RANKIN COUNTY, MISSISSIPPI

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI PLAINTIFF

VS. CAUSE NO. 24-34169-JA

CARLY MADISON GREGG DEFENDANT

MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL, OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE,

JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDIT
________________________________________________________________

COMES NOW the Defendant, Carly Madison Gregg (hereinafter referred to

as “Carly” or “Defendant”) by and through her attorneys of record, and files this her

Motion for New Trial, or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,

and in support thereof would show unto the Court the following facts and matters,

to wit:

1.

Following her criminal trial, Carly was convicted of First Degree Murder,

Attempted Murder, and Tampering with Evidence. The jury announced their verdict

on Friday, September 20th, 2024.

2.

Pursuant to Rule 25.1 of the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure, Carly

moves this Court for a new trial.

3.

Specifically, a new trial is required in this matter based on the following

factors:

(a) it is in the interests of justice;

(b) the verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence presented at trial;
 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 2 of 9

(c) New evidence and material has recently been discovered which probably

would produce a different result at a new trial; and by reasonable

diligence, such evidence could not have been discovered sooner;

(d) witnesses necessary to establish Carly’s defense were improperly

excluded from testifying at the trial;

(e) witnesses were improperly restricted in the testimony they could provide

in Carly’s defense; and,

(f) Carly did not receive a fair and impartial trial.

4.

A new trial is in the interests of justice for several reasons. Carly was not

tried by a jury of her peers. Carly was fifteen (15) years old when her trial

commenced on September 16th, 2024. Mississippi requires a person to be age

twenty-one (21) and older to serve on a jury, despite the fact that a person can

legally register to vote at age of eighteen (18). The juror age prerequisite is founded

on the understanding that with age comes maturity. Mississippi believes that only

a person twenty-one (21) or older possesses the maturity necessary to make

decisions about the life of another. However, Mississippi also holds that a fourteen

(14)/fifteen (15) year old possesses the maturity necessary to make decisions

about plea offers, understand the nature of the alleged offenses, comprehend the

nature of the charges against them, effectively participate in their defense at trial,

and face the same lifelong sentences of an adult. However, these two

fundamentally opposing legal standards cannot be rectified. This contradiction in

 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 3 of 9

law constitutes a new trial, or in the alternative, a judgment notwithstanding the

verdict.

5.

The undisputed evidence at trial of Carly’s mental illness, loving relationship

with her mother and stepfather, absence of prior criminal charges, absence of prior

violence, good school record, maternal family support, community support, the

victim’s testimony that Carly was not in her right mind and did not recognize him at

the time of the offense, and the State’s admission to an absence of motive to

commit the alleged crimes do not support the verdict or sentence in this case.

Therefore, this matter calls for a new trial, or in the alternative, a judgment

notwithstanding the verdict.

6.

On Wednesday, September 26th, 2024, a reporter for Fox 40/WLBT informed

defense counsel that Kevin Gregg, Carly’s biological father, had given an interview,

part of which would be aired later that night. In an unaired portion of his interview,

Kevin Gregg disclosed that Carly was placed in equestrian therapy as a young

child due to experiencing auditory hallucinations. Defense counsel contacted the

attorney representing Ashley Smylie in her civil proceedings against Kevin Gregg

regarding documentation or information that might be helpful in Carly’s criminal

trial. However, no such documentation was identified or produced. Kevin Gregg

refused to cooperate in Carly’s defense, refused to talk to the State, refused to talk

to the mental health professionals evaluating Carly, and refused to come to any

pretrial hearings or a single day of Carly’s criminal trial. This new information
 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 4 of 9

supports Dr. Clark’s diagnosis of unspecified schizophrenic disorder and is likely

to lead to a different result at a new trial. As such, Carly is entitled to a new trial.

7.

Carly timely disclosed her witness list to the State pursuant to the timeline

established by the Mississippi Rules of Criminal Procedure. Carly produced her

witness list to the State on September 3rd, 2024, thirteen (13) days prior to trial.

Carly’s witness list was comprised of nine (9) total witnesses, and one (1) witness

would only testify at a pre-trial hearing. All of the witnesses listed were known to

the State prior to the production of the witness list.

8.

The State’s Witness List (MEC #234) was produced to the Defendant on

September 8th, 2024, eight (8) days prior to trial. It was comprised of fifty-five (55)

witnesses. The State’s Amended Witness List (MEC #239) was produced to the

Defendant on September 9th, 2024, seven (7) days prior to trial. It was comprised

of fifty-seven (57) witnesses. However, it was the Defendant the Court found had

engaged in a willful discovery violation motivated by the desire to gain a tactical

advantage at trial. As a result, the Court struck two (2) of the Defendant’s witnesses

and restricted the testimony of the remaining defense witnesses. The two (2)

witnesses struck by the Court were both immediately family members of the

Defendant, both of whom had both spoken to law enforcement as early as March

19th, 2024 and March 22nd, 2024. Both witnesses were present during at least one

of law enforcement’s searches of the crime scene. The State never contacted

either witness, never requested a continuance, and interviewed several of the

 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 5 of 9

defenses remaining witnesses. Moreover, this case was tried less than four (4)

months following the indictment and six (6) months after the incident occurred.

There was sufficient time for either the Defense or the State to gain a tactical

advantage at trial. Important trial evidence was still being produced in response to

subpoena in the weeks leading up to trial.

9.

The Court’s finding of a willful discovery violation is not supported by

Mississippi case law. The radical sanction imposed by the Court was improper,

constitutes a constitutes a gross violation of Carly’s 6th Amendment Rights and

Due Process, and merits reversal on appeal. Carly should not be placed in an adult

prison, or have to wait, for the year or longer that it will take for the appellate courts

to address this issue. Justice delayed is justice denied.

10.

Due the extensive pretrial media coverage, the improper statements made

by the State during the live-streamed pretrial hearings, and highly prejudicial and

improper testimony from Rebecca Kirk, Carly’s counselor, regarding a book Carly’s

wished to read Carly was denied a fair and impartial trial. Rebecca Kirk’s testimony

regarding Carly’s comment about wishing to read Dostoevsky’s Crime and

Punishment was not disclosed as an oral statement by the State in their Amended

Witness. This testimony was of no importance in to the facts in Carly’s case and

was elicited for the sole purpose of prejudicing the jury. This fact is highlighted by

the State’s erroneous belief that Mrs. Kirk was concerned about Carly reading this

book as the title was underlined in her records, without realizing that it was simply
 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 6 of 9

grammatically proper to underline the titles of novels. This testimony was elicited

during the state’s rebuttal and was one of the last statements the jury heard prior

to beginning their deliberations.

11.

Dr. Pickett’s testimony regarding his diagnosis/undiagnosis of Kevin Gregg,

Carly’s biological father, was improper, unethical, and highly prejudicial at trial.

Pursuant to the ethical guidelines established by of the American Psychiatric

Association, the Goldwater Rule prohibits and enjoins psychiatrists from offering

opinions about the mental health of someone they have not personally examined.

Dr. Pickett was the last witness called during the State’s rebuttal, and his was the

last testimony the jury heard prior to beginning their deliberations. Dr. Pickett’s did

not possess the proper expertise necessary to testify in this matter due to his

inexperience with evaluating children and adolescence, with forensic evaluations

in general, and his inadequate background in child and adolescent psychiatry.

Carly is entitled to a new trial based on the unfair and improper trial she received.

12.

The Court erred in refusing the Defendant’s requests to instruct the jury to

return a verdict of not guilty made at the close of the State’s evidence and at the

close of the evidence presented by the Defendant and erred in denying

Defendant’s request for a peremptory instruction.

13.

The Court erred by denying the Defendant’s proposed jury instructions by

failing to provide to the jury a definition of “reasonable doubt.”

 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 7 of 9

14.

The Court erred in granting all of the State’s pre-trial, trial and post-trial

motions which the Court granted; likewise, the Court erred in overruling each of

the Defendant’s pre-trial, trial, and post-trial motions which the Court denied.

15.

The Court erred in sustaining all of the State’s objections which the Court

sustained; likewise, The Court erred in overruling all of the Defendant’s objections

which the Court overruled.

16.

The interests of justice require that this Court exercise its supervisory

powers and grant the Defendant a new trial and/or judgment of acquittal or

judgment notwithstanding the verdict.

17.

The sentence of the Defendant is excessive, not supported by the evidence,

is disproportionate to the sentences imposed on other similarly situated defendants

and violates the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States

Constitution and corresponding sections of the Mississippi Constitution.

18.

Cumulative error in the trial requires a new trial.

19.

Other grounds to be assigned once the transcript is available and upon the

hearing hereon.
 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 8 of 9

WHEREFORE, PREMISIS CONSIDERED, the Defendant, Carly Madison

Gregg, prays that this Court will grant her Motion for New Trial without delay or in

the alternative, enter a Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict for the reasons

outlined herein above. Carly further prays for such other relief, either general or

specific, to which she may show herself entitled in a Court of Law.

Respectfully Submitted, this the 26th day of September, 2024.

CARLY MADISON GREGG, DEFENDANT

By: /s:/ Bridget R. Todd__________________

Bridget R. Todd, MSB #104350
Cole Todd Legal Group, PLLC
200 East Government Street
Brandon, Mississippi 39042
Telephone: (601) 824-5040
Email: todd.bridget@gmail.com
Attorneys for Carly M. Gregg
 Case: 61CI1:24­cr­34169­JA Document #: 283 Filed: 09/26/2024 Page 9 of 9

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Bridget R. Todd, hereby certify that on this the 26th day of September,

2024, I submitted a true and accurate copy of the above-foregoing Motion for New

Trial, or in the Alternative, Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, via electronic

transmission using the MEC system to the following persons:

Kathryn W. Newman, Esq.,

Michael Smith, Esq.,
District Attorney Office for the 20th Judicial District
P.O. Box 68
Brandon, Mississippi 39043
Telephone: (601) 825-1472
Email: knewman@rankincounty.org
Email : mssmith@rankincouty.org
Assistant District Attorney for the 20th Judicial District

By: /s:/ Bridget R. Todd_____________

Bridget R. Todd, MSB #104350
Cole Todd Legal Group, PLLC
200 East Government Street
Brandon, Mississippi 39042
Telephone: (601) 824-5040
Email: todd.bridget@gmail.com
Attorneys for Carly M. Gregg