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On Divine Foreknowledge
 Luis de Molina

On Divine Foreknowledge
(Part IV of the Concordia)

Translated, with an Introduction

and Notes, by

AlfredJ. Freddoso

Cornell University Press

ITHACA AND LONDON

 Copyright © 1988 by Cornell University

All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or parts
thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without permission in writing from
the publisher. For information, address Cornell University Press, 124 Roberts
Place, Ithaca, New York 14850.

First published 1988 by Cornell University Press.

International Standard Book Number 0-8014-2131-4

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 88-3887
Printed in the United States of America
Librarians: Library of Congress cataloging information
appears on the last page of the book.

The paper in this book is acid-free and meets the guidelines for
permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines
for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.
 CONTENTS

Preface vii

Introduction i

1. Foreknowledge and Providence i

2. Contingency and Freedom g

3. Alternatives to Molinism 29

4. The Theory of Middle Knowledge 46

5. Objections and Replies 62

Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia,

Praedestinatione et Reprobatione Concordia, Part IV

Disputation 47: On the Source of Contingency 85

Disputation 48: Whether All the Things That Exist, Have

Existed, and Will Exist in Time Are Present to God from
Eternity with Their Own Proper Existence g8

Disputation 49: Whether Euture Contingents Are Known by

God with Certainty because They Are Present to Him with
Their Own Existence, and Whether the Contingency of
These Things Might Thereby Be Reconciled with Divine
Eoreknowledge 111

Disputation 50: Whether It Is through the Ideas That God

Knows Euture Contingents with Certainty, and at the Same
Time the Views of Scotus and Durandus Are Examined 130
[vi]
Contents

Disputation 51 : Whether Freedom of Choice and the

Contingency of Things Are Correctly Reconciled with Divine
Foreknowledge by the Thesis That Whatever Is Going to
Occur because of Innate Freedom of Choice Is Such That
God Will Bring It About That from Eternity He Knew None
Other than That Thing 145

Disputation 52: Whether in God There Is Knowledge of

Future Contingents. Also, the Way in Which Freedom of
Choice and the Contingency of Things Accord with This
Knowledge 164

Disputation 53: On Predeterminations, and Where the

Certitude of God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents
Comes From 196
Part 1: The Positions of Others on Both the Topics
Mentioned in the Title 196
Part 2: The Foregoing Position Is Attacked 212
Part 3: The Extent to Which Predeterminations Should Be
Countenanced 238
Part 4: Some Objections Are Answered 253

Bibliography 275
Index of Names 281
Index of Subjects 283
 PREFACE

Luis de Molina, SJ. (1535—1600), was a leading actor in the remark¬

able sixteenth-century revival of Scholasticism on the Iberian Peninsula,
a revival fueled in large measure by the Protestant Reformation and the
subsequent Catholic response at the Council of Trent. Though little
known nowadays, Molina played a central role in one of the most tu¬
multuous intramural doctrinal disputes in Catholic intellectual history.
The dispute, revolving around the perennial theological question of
how best to reconcile the doctrine of human freedom with the doctrines
of grace, providence, foreknowledge, and predestination, pitted the
youthful Society of Jesus (founded in 1540) against the more established

religious orders, especially Thomas Aquinas’s own Dominicans. On the

side of the Jesuits, self-proclaimed champions of human freedom, the
main protagonists were Molina and the brilliant young luminary Fran¬
cisco Suarez (1548—1617). On the side of the self-avowed defenders of
divine prerogative stood the Mercederian Francisco Zumel (1 540- 1 607)
and, above all, the Dominican Domingo Banez (1528—1604), perhaps
best known as the friend and spiritual adviser of the celebrated mystic
and Doctor of the Church Teresa of Avila. And as anyone familiar with
this turbulent period in Church history might have anticipated, in the
wings loomed the imposing hgure of Cardinal Robert Bellarmine, S.J.
(1542-1621), a distinguished theologian in his own right but, more
important in this case, a voice of moderation and reconciliation within
the often tempestuous domain of ecclesiastical politics.

The publication in 1588 of the hrst edition of Molina’s Concordia

ignited a herce controversy that had already been smoldering for several
years and that threatened to cause even deeper divisions in a Church still
reeling from the effects of the Reformation. Political and religious lead¬
ers in Spain and Portugal hnally implored the Vatican to intervene. In
1597 Pope Clement VIII established the Congregatio de Auxiliis (Com-

[vii]
[viii] Preface

mission on Grace), thus initiating a ten-year period of intense study and

public disputation which rendered the Concordia one of the most care¬
fully scrutinized books in Western intellectual history. For a long time
things did not go well for the Jesuits; in 1 600 Molina died in Madrid amid
rumors that his opinions were about to be condemned in Rome. How¬
ever, largely as a result of the efforts of Bellarmine and Cardinal Jacques
du Perron, himself a convert from Calvinism, Molina’s views emerged
unscathed in the end. In 1607 Pope Paul V issued a decree forbidding

the antagonists to call one another’s views heretical or even temerarious,

in the technical jargon of theological censure. The Holy See would, the
pope continued, resolve the issue at an opportune time. It stands as a
tribute to the prudence of Paul V and his successors that this “oppor¬
tune” time has yet to arrive.^
Molina’s place in the history of theology is thus well established. But
this does not explain why a professional philosopher trained mainly in
the “analytic tradition” should be resurrecting a relatively esoteric piece
of Scholastic theology. The explanation is, in fact, quite simple: Molina’s
treatment of God’s foreknowledge is strikingly creative and yet at the
same time more deeply rooted in its proper theological setting than
almost anything written on this topic in the last twenty years by analytic
philosophers of religion. (This last point is extremely important; I will
return to it in Section 1 of the Introduction.)
But if the explanation is simple, the path has been somewhat more
circuitous. My interest in temporal modality led me naturally into the
debates over freedom and divine foreknowledge. Convinced as I was
(and still am) that in philosophical theology one can do no better than
begin with Aquinas, in 1981 I decided to offer a graduate seminar on St.

Thomas’s disputed questions De Veritate, a work that contains his most

extensive discussion of God’s knowledge. The debate between Molinists
and Bahezians, as it happens, hnds its source at least partly in puzzles
generated by the Thomistic texts. I already had been alerted to (or at

least reminded of) the debate by Robert Adams’s paper “Middle Knowl¬
edge and the Problem of Evil”^ and Anthony Kenny’s little book The God
of the Philosophers.^ With the aid of John Heitkamp, then a graduate

•Those who wish to learn more of Molina’s life and the De Auxiliis controversy should
consult Friedrich Stegmiiller, “Neue Molinaschriften,” Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philoso-
phie und Theologie des Mittelalters, band 32 (Munster, 1935), pp- 1*— 80*; and Johann
Rabeneck, S.J., “De Vita et Scriptis Ludovici MoVim,” Archivurn Historicum Societatis lesu 19
(1950): 75-145. For an engaging historical account in English of the dispute itself and of
Bellarmine’s role in resolving it, see James Brodrick, S.J., Robert Bellarmine: Saint and
Scholar (London, 1961), chap. 8.
'^American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977): 109—1 17.
aOxford, 1979.
 [ix]
Preface

student in the Medieval Institute at Notre Dame, I began to appreciate

the complex philosophical and theological context of the Concordia.
Because Molina’s Latin was difficult for me to read at sight, I decided to
make a written translation of various sections of Part IV. As I read and
translated, I became more and more convinced that I did not yet have a
firm enough grasp of the issues to make an intelligent contribution to
the contemporary discussion. So in 1983 I abandoned the project of
applying my previously published work on temporal modality to the
problem of freedom and foreknowledge and instead plunged headlong
into the Concordia. The more I conversed with colleagues about the
content of the work, the more they encouraged me to translate the
whole of Part IV, the section on divine foreknowledge, and make it
generally available. Thus the present volume was born.
My hope is that this book as a whole will help to reshape and refocus
the current discussion of divine foreknowledge in ways that make it
more sensitive to the broader theological context within which questions

about God’s knowledge have traditionally arisen. What we learn from

the history of this debate, it seems to me, are not Just strategies for
dealing with a problem that is already well understood, but also how to
understand the problem itself and the criteria for an adequate resolu¬
tion of it. There is, I am convinced, a general lesson to be learned here,

since all too often the contemporary discussion of an ostensibly “tradi¬

tional” theological problem turns out to have only a loose connection
with the problem that those who established the tradition took them¬
selves to be dealing with.
Now a word about the Concordia itself, the complete title of which is
Liheri Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedesti-
natione et Reprobatione Concordia [The Compatibility of Free Choice with
the Gifts of Grace, Divine Foreknowledge, Providence, Predestination
and Reprobation]. As mentioned above, the hrst edition (O) was pub¬
lished in 1588, and the second and revised edition (A) appeared in 1595.
In addition, most sections of the Concordia (including almost all of Part

IV) are found in parallel form in another source (C), Molina’s Commen-
taria in Primam Divi Thomae Partem [Commentaries on the First Part of St.

Thomas’s Summa Theologiae], published in 1592.

Fortunately, we have an excellent critical edition of the Concordia,
prepared by Johann Rabeneck, S.J., and published in 1953 at Ona and
Madrid. Rabeneck’s goal, ably accomplished, was to establish a canonical
version of the second edition, correcting typographical errors and other
flaws in various copies of A with alternate readings from O and C. In

addition, he painstakingly tracked down and verihed each of Molina’s

numerous references to the works of his predecessors and contempo-
 [X] Preface

raries. The result is an edition in which the translator can have full
conhdence.

The actual text of the Concordia occupies pages 1-611 of Rabeneck’s

volume. It opens with a brief two-page commentary on Summa Theo-
logiae I, question 14, article 8, “Whether God’s Knowledge Is a Cause of
Things,” and is thereafter divided into seven parts:

III. On the Assistance of Divine Grace [70 pages]

IV. On Divine Foreknowledge [113 pages]

Parts I-IV constitute Molina’s strikingly extensive commentary, di¬

. vided into hfty-three disputations, on a single article from the First Part
On th
e Powe
of St. Thomas’s
I r ofSumma Theologiae, namely, question 14, article 13,
Free C
. “Whether God Has hoice
Knowledge
On On Go [156of p Future Contingents.” Part IV com¬
Goprises
d’s
d ’ s Gene
Disputations ral 47—52 in the hrstageedition
s] and Disputations 47—53 in
Concur
the Wisecond
ll rence 53 contains Molina’s long response to
edition. Disputation [64 pa
[
some of24Zumel’s
pag criticisms of the hrst geedition.
s]
. es]
Translating Molina’s Latin into English has proved to be a difficult
On challenge. His style has justihably been described as “lumbering.”
Divi
Whether because of a Renaissance-inspired desire to emulate Cicero or
ne
Pr
ovi
simply because
den of the tendency toward careful qualihcation which natu¬
c
e [
22 p
rally results when one’s ages work is regularly being sent off by intellectual
I ]
foes to the relevant ecclesiastical authorities, Molina often resorts to
I
.
On Pr
sentences
edestthat are twelve, thirteen, or even fourteen lines long in the
inatio
n and
critical edition. I have Reresisted
probat the strong temptation to divide these
ion [
sentences into shorter ones. The reason 158 pa is that, after several attempts at
ges]
it, I became convinced that I could not do this without altering the sense
of the original. To cite a simple example, when a sentence of such length
is of the form ‘Since A, B, C, and D, it follows that T,’ it is not at all clear
that nothing is lost if one changes it to ‘A. B. C. D. So E' I have used
lowercase roman numerals and letters to mark subordinate clauses, thus
making the structure of these sentences easier to grasp. Anyone who is
still annoyed by the length of many of the sentences should keep in mind
that the readers of the original had exactly the same complaint; even the
sympathetic Bellarmine seems on occasion to have been exasperated by

Molina’s writing style. So in this regard I have done nothing more than
preserve an arguably important feature of the Latin text. Within such
constraints I have tried to make the text as readable as possible.
 Preface
[xi]

The notes to the translation are of three basic types: (i) explications of
technical philosophical concepts with references, where appropriate, to
contemporary as well as medieval sources; (ii) references to other sec¬
tions of the Concordia and Commentaria ; and (iii) references to works of
other authors cited by Molina in the text. When a cited author is likely to
be unfamiliar to contemporary readers, I have provided a brief bio¬
graphical sketch. I have relied heavily on Rabeneck for references to the

texts cited by Molina, though I have checked Rabeneck’s citations for

accuracy in cases where this was possible.

A volume of this size owes much to others. There is no better intellec¬

tual environment for engaging in philosophical theology than that nur¬
tured by the Philosophy Department at the University of Notre Dame.
Indeed, it would be difficult to name a single one of my colleagues who
has not in some context or other made a comment or suggestion that led
(in many cases without their knowledge) to some substantial improve¬
ment in this book. I am deeply grateful in particular to those associated
over the past few years, either permanently or as visiting fellows, with

Notre Dame’s Center for Philosophy of Religion, especially the Rever¬

end David Burrell, C.S.C., Thomas Flint, Laura Zimmerman Garcia,
Thomas Morris, Richard Otte, Philip Quinn, and David Widerker, each
of whom has had a significant impact on this project.
At various points along the way I have benefited as well from sugges¬
tions made by Robert Audi, William Craig, William Hasker, Christopher
Menzel, and Robert Sleigh. (Sleigh has encouraged me, perhaps un¬
intentionally, to become, per impossibile, even more strident than I was
before in insisting that a close study of sixteenth- and early seventeenth-
century Scholasticism will contribute immensely to our understanding
of pre-Kantian modern philosophy.) In addition, a number of graduate
students in both the Philosophy Department and the Medieval Institute
at Notre Dame have by their persistence forced me to dig deeper into the
issues surrounding divine foreknowledge.They include Stephen Bilyn-
skyj, John Heitkamp, Stephen Julian, Kevin Kolbeck, Thomas Lough-
ran, John Ry lander, Jonathan Strand, and Jerry Walls.
Nor could I in good conscience fail to thank my readers, Scott Mac¬
Donald and Eleonore Stump, who carefully scrutinized the entire manu¬
script and made enough incisive criticisms to keep me busy making
revisions throughout the summer months of 1987. It is hard to imagine
two more astute reader reports than theirs.
Work on this project has been generously supported by a Research
Materials Grant from the National Endowment for the Humanities,
whose overworked staff has always treated me with exceptional patience
[xii] Preface

and courtesy, and by a summer grant from Notre Dame’s Institute for
Scholarship in the Liberal Arts, under the able leadership of Michael
Loux and Nathan Hatch.
Finally, I wish to single out for special thanks and praise a brilliant
philosopher and splendid man whose influence on my thought and,
more important, my life has been more profound than either of us can
fully appreciate in statu viatoris. To Alvin Plantinga I dedicate this book.

Alfred J. Freddoso
Notre Dame, Indiana
On Divine Foreknowledge
 INTRODUCTION

This introduction has three main purposes. First, I have tried to

provide enough background from Parts I— III of the Concordia to put the
reader in a position to grasp the modal notions and account of freedom

presupposed in Part IV. Second, I have tried to make Molina’s own

theory and his criticisms of alternative theories more accessible to con¬
temporary readers than an untutored perusal of Part IV might allow.
Third, I have indicated ways in which a contemporary Molinist might

attempt to respond to the most common objections to Molina’s theory of

middle knowledge. Thus the last section of the Introduction comple¬
ments Disputation 53, Part 4, where Molina himself responds to some
objections.

1 Foreknowledge and Providence

1.1 Two Questions about Foreknowledge

In Part IV of the Concordia Molina comes to grips with two distinct

questions concerning God’s knowledge:

(a) How is it that God knows future contingents with certainty, that is,
what is the source of and explanation for the fact that God knows
future contingents with certainty?
(b) How is this divine foreknowledge to be reconciled with the contin¬
gency of what is known through it?

I will call (a) the source-question and (b) the reconciliation-question. Both
questions stand in need of amplihcation, but for now I will assume that
their import is plain enough for us to broach the key but often neglected
issue of how they bear on each other.

[1]
 Introduction
[2]

The problem posed by the reconciliation-question cannot be fully

comprehended until we grasp clearly the criteria for an adequate answer
to the source-question. This assertion is bound to strike some as pecu¬
liar. The central philosophical difficulty posed by God’s foreknowledge
of future contingents, they will contend, is how to reconcile it with the
contingency of its objects and, more specifically, with creaturely free
choice. But an answer to the source-question is obviously not germane to
that problem. Perhaps it is just a brute inexplicable fact that God has
foreknowledge; perhaps not. But in any case it matters little as far as the
reconciliation-question is concerned how God comes by His foreknowl¬
edge.
Although this attitude appears to be widespread today, it is nonethe¬
less profoundly misguided. Indeed, its very pervasiveness is symptom¬
atic of the surprising extent to which the lively contemporary discussion
of foreknowledge and freedom is detached from the theological context
within which perplexities about foreknowledge and contingency have
traditionally arisen.^
I do not, of course, mean to deny that the reconciliation of freedom
and contingency with any sort of foreknowledge is extremely problem¬
atic. I will call this the problem of simple precognition. However, I do
mean to affirm that the problem of divine precognition runs far deeper
than the problem of simple precognition. To understand exactly why,
we must begin by recognizing that the belief in divine foreknowledge is
not in itself a foundational tenet of classical Western theism. Instead, it
derives its lofty theological status from its intimate connection with the
absolutely central doctrine that God is perfectly provident. But the
doctrine of providence carries with it a causal dimension that virtually
guarantees that no solution to the problem oi simple precognition, even
comprehensive and infallible precognition, will constitute a full and
adequate solution to the problem of divine precognition.

1.2 The Doctrine of Providence

Let me elaborate this last point and in so doing set the stage for Mo¬
lina’s treatment of divine foreknowledge. As traditionally expounded,

* For an excellent overview of the recent literature, see William Hasker, “Foreknowledge
and Necessity,” Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985): 121 — 157. At one point (p. 125) Hasker
explicitly sets aside the question of how God knows the contingent future, even though he
later (p. 140) acknowledges the connection in traditional theology between divine fore¬
knowledge and the doctrine that God has providentially prearranged things “in view of
this knowledge.” Notice, too, that the relationship between foreknowledge and providence
must be more complex than this last remark suggests. For God’s providential act of will
must in some way be prior to His knowing the actual or absolute future. Otherwise, His
foreknowledge would present Him with a fait accompli. More on this below.
 I. Foreknowledge and Providence [3]

the doctrine of divine providence involves the thesis that God, the divine
artisan, freely and knowingly plans, orders, and provides for all the
effects that constitute His artifact, the created universe with its entire
history, and executes His chosen plan by playing an active causal role
sufficient to ensure its exact realization. Since God is the perfect artisan,
not even the most trivial details escape His providential decrees. Thus,
whatever occurs is properly said to be specifically decreed by God; more
precisely, each effect produced in the created universe is either specifi¬
cally and knowingly intended by Him (providentia approbationis) or, in
concession to creaturely defectiveness, specifically and knowingly
ted by Him, only to be then ordered toward some appropriate good
{providentia concessions ).^
So divine providence has both a cognitive and a volitional aspect. By
His prevolitional knowledge God knows with certainty which effects
would result, directly or indirectly, from any causal contribution He
might choose to make to the created sphere.^ This prevolitional knowl¬
edge is potentially practical knowledge. That is, it serves as a principle
of action capable of being directed by an appropriate act of the divine
will toward the purposeful production of particular created effects — in
much the same way that the artisan’s prevolitional knowledge is a princi¬
ple of action capable of being directed by an appropriate intention
toward the purposeful production of particular artifacts. This is why

medieval theologians were wont to assert that God’s prevolitional knowl¬

edge is a cause of things.'^ The volitional aspect of divine providence has

2See Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 22, a. 1—4, and q. 103, a. 1—8; and De Veritate, q. 5,
a. 1-10. In De Veritate, q. 5, a. 4, St. Thomas attributes the distinction hcCwetn providentia
approbationis 2iX\d providentia concession^ to St.John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa II, chap.

29. Here and in what follows I join Molina in using the term ‘intend’ to cover whatever God
wills either antecedently or consequently. For an explanation of this distinction see Dis¬
putation 53, pt. 3, n. 13.
Near the end of Part IV Molina emphasizes against certain unnamed critics that his own
theory does indeed entail that every effect — evil as well as nonevil — is individually decreed
by God. See Disputation 53, pt. 3, secs. 7—8 and 14-18.
^By dubbing such kno^wledge prevolitional I mean to point to a conceptual or logical, rather
than temporal, ordering within the divine knowledge. Here I follow Molina, who claims
repeatedly that such an ordering has a basis in reality. See especially Disputation 53, pt. 1 ,
sec. 20.
^See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 8. Molina comments on this article at the
very beginning of the Concordia. See Johann Rabeneck, ed., Luis de Molina, S.J.: Liberi
Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia, Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione
Concordia (Oha and Madrid, 1953), pp. 3—4 (hereafter cited as Rabeneck). St. Thomas
holds that God’s prevolitional knowledge, that is, the knowledge God has independently of
any free act of will on His part, is a remote cause of created effects, whereas His providential
act of will is a proximate cause of those effects. Since, as we shall see, God makes a causal
contribution to every created effect, including those brought about by free created causes,
it follows that God’s prevolitional knowledge is a (partial) remote cause of free human
choices and acts. Hence, Stephen Davis is mistaken in his conjecture that St. Thomas
[4] Introduction

two distinct but complementary moments. First, God chooses one from
among the infinity of total sequences of created effects which are within
His power to bring about, where, according to orthodoxy, the choice not
to create anything at all is a limiting option always open to Him. Second
and concomitantly. He wills to make a causal contribution that He knows

with certainty will result in His chosen plan’s being effected down to the
last detail.
This thumbnail sketch delineates a broad array of assumptions shared
by Molina and his Bahezian rivals.^ Yet it also leaves unresolved an
equally wide range of critical issues that spawned rancorous disputes
among sixteenth-century Catholic theologians, issues Molina deals with
at length in the Concordia : What precisely does God know by His prevoli-
tional knowledge and what constraints, if any, does that knowledge

impose on the scope of His power? What are the modes of God’s causal
activity in the created universe? What causal contribution does He make
to the sinful or otherwise defective effects that He permits? Exactly how
is God’s causal involvement to be reconciled with the attribution of
genuine causal power to created substances and, in particular, with the
attribution of free choice to rational creatures? More fundamentally,
what is the nature of contingency and of free choice?
I delve into these difficulties below, but for the moment I will highlight
the shared assumptions in order to make clear just how the two questions
we began with are related to each other. Molinists and Bahezians agree
that it is because He is perfectly provident that God has comprehensive

knowledge of what will occur in the created order. More precisely, God’s
speculative postvolitional knowledge of the created world — His so-called
knowledge of vision — is to be explained wholly by reference to (i) His
prevolitional knowledge and (ii) His knowledge of what He Himself has
willed to do. Unlike us, God does not have to be acted upon by outside
causes in order for His cognitive potentialities to be fully actualized; He

means to exempt free human actions from the dictum that God’s knowledge is a cause of
things. See Davis’s Logic and the Nature of God (Grand Rapids, Mich., 1983), pp. 64—65. This
issue is discussed more fully in Section 2 below.
do not want to give the impression that Banezianism and Molinism exhausted the
field in sixteenth-century Catholic debates over divine foreknowledge of future con¬
tingents. Indeed, in Disputations 49 and 51 Molina criticizes two other positions, positions
that in Section 3 below I call the eternalist theory and the concomitance theory. Nonethe¬
less, it is fair to say that Banezianism and Molinism were the dominant positions in late
sixteenth-century Catholic theology.
In what follows I use the terms ‘Bahezian’ and ‘Banezianism’ to designate the position, to
be spelled out in some detail below, which Molina saw as his chief rival. This position is
very often referred to as ‘Thomism’ in the Catholic theological literature on divine fore¬
knowledge. I will refrain from calling it such, however, mainly in deference to those who
have insisted, rightly or wrongly, that Bahez departed radically from St. Thomas.
 I. Foreknowledge and Providence [5]

does not, as it were, have to look outside Himself in order to find out what

His creative act has wrought. (Indeed, as a being who is ‘pure actuality’.
He cannot depend causally on any other being for His perfections.)
Rather, He knows ‘in Himself what will happen precisely because He
knows just what causal role He has freely chosen to play within the
created order and because He knows just what will result given this
causal contribution on His part.
In short, no contingent truth grasped by the knowledge of vision can

be true prior to, even conceptually prior to, God’s specifically intending
or permitting it to be true or to His specifically willing to make the
appropriate causal contribution toward its truth. This explains the spirit

behind Aquinas’s hard saying that whereas we humans acquire truth by

conforming our intellects to the created world, the created world itself is
capable of yielding such truth only because it in turn, as a necessary
condition for its very existence, conforms to the intellect of the transcen¬
dent divine artisan.® Accordingly, since it is divine foreknowledge of
future contingents we are concerned with, and not just simple fore¬
knowledge of future contingents, an adequate answer to the source-
question must essentially appeal to God’s active causal role in the created
world and must eschew even the faintest suggestion that God’s knowl¬
edge of effects produced in the created world is causally dependent on
the activity of His creatures.

1.3 Two Consequences

This intertwining of the doctrines of divine foreknowledge and divine

providence has two important consequences for our understanding of
the reconciliation-question, one obvious and the other more subtle.
First, the problem posed by the reconciliation-question is more exten¬
sive than the problem of simple precognition, since a complete answer to
the reconciliation-question must include both a solution to the problem
of simple precognition and a solution to the problem of how to reconcile
contingency and freedom with the fact that God knows the future,
including the contingent future, because He has providential control
over its being the way it is.
The second and less obvious consequence is this: Unless we keep the
close bond between providence and foreknowledge vividly in mind, we

®See Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 2, for an especially clear statement of this point. Notice
that God’s speculative knowledge, as so conceived, does not correspond to the knowledge
that might be had by an ideal observer viewing the world from an ‘absolute’ or ‘purely
epistemic’ point of view. To the contrary, God’s knowledge of vision is the speculative
knowledge had by a provident creator who causally contributes to what He knows.
[6] Introduction

are likely to be tempted by solutions to the problem of divine precogni¬

tion which are incompatible with the doctrine of divine providence. For
instance, certain Ockhamistic solutions seem to entail (i) that free crea¬
tures cause God to have (or have had) the beliefs about future con¬
tingents He actually has and also (ii) that those same creatures have
the power to cause God to have (or have had) beliefs about future

contingents contrary to those He in fact has.'^ Similarly, one standard

“Thomistic” solution involves the claim that God has something akin to
perceptual knowledge of future contingents, the main difference be¬
tween God and us being that His perceptual field has no spatial or
temporal limitations.^ So stated, this solution apparently entails that
God acquires His knowledge of vision from created things themselves
and thus that true future contingents have their truth conceptually, if

not temporally, prior to God’s intending or permitting them to be true.

(I will return to St. Thomas in a moment.) Still other responses to the
reconciliation-question in essence dissolve the problem of divine pre¬
cognition by limiting the scope of God’s knowledge. Some philosophers
have argued, for example, that even if God has all the knowledge of the
created world anyone could possibly have, this is still not enough for
Him to have the certain and comprehensive knowledge of future contin¬
gents attributed to Him by traditional philosophical theology — so that
in creating the world God freely chooses to keep Himself partially
ignorant of the future in order to allow for the possibility of creaturely
freedom. 9 Clearly, if the picture of divine providence sketched above is

myself must plead guilty here, since I at least hint at such a position in “Accidental
Necessity and Power over the Past,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 63 (1982): 54—68, and
“Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism, ’’yowrna/ of Philosophy 80 (1983): 257—278.
Whether this position is actually Ockham’s is a moot point. His own discussions of future
contingency appear in Marilyn McCord Adams and Norman Kretzmann, trans., William
Ockham: Predestination, God’s Foreknowledge and Future Contingents, 2d ed. (Indianapolis,
Ind., 1983).
For recent criticisms of Ockhamistic replies to the reconciliation-question, see Hasker,
“Foreknowledge and Necessity,” sec. IV, pp. 130-137; and John Martin Fischer, “Free¬
dom and Foreknowledge,” Philosophical Review 92 (1983): 67-79, “Ockhamism,”
Philosophical Review 94 (1985): 81 — 100. Some of the relevant issues are treated in Sections
3.4 and 4.5 below.
®This position, which may or may not be St. Thomas’s, is discussed at some length in
Section 3.2 below. Notice that it is not necessary to appeal to God’s eternity or timelessness
in order to make use of a perceptual model. Stephen Davis employs such a model in Logic
and the Nature of God, pp. 52—67, though he denies that God is timeless.
^This thesis has recently been defended or at least looked upon with kindness by a
number of highly influential authors. See, e.g., J. R. Lucas, The Freedom of the Will (Oxford,
1970), pp. 75—77; Richard Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford, 1977), pp. 172—
178; Peter Geach, Providence and Evil (Cambridge, 1977), pp. 40—66; and Robert Adams,
“Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (1977):
109—1 17, and “Alvin Plantinga on the Problem of Evil,” pp. 225—255 in James Tomberlin
and Peter Van Inwagen, eds., Alvin Plantinga (Dordrecht, Holland, 1985).
 I. Foreknowledge and Providence [7]

an important constituent of orthodox belief, then no such responses to

the reconciliation-question are acceptable.
Admittedly, many modern theologians and philosophers have jetti¬
soned this strong conception of divine providence, ultimately, it seems,
on the ground that it excludes genuine contingency and genuine human
freedom. Molina, like St. Thomas before him, would undoubtedly re¬
spond in the first place that the theological authority of Scripture and
Tradition, along with sound philosophical scrutiny of the notion of a
perfect being, militates forcefully against any such move. But Molina’s
work is especially noteworthy and exciting precisely because he is pre¬
pared to meet the modern challenge on its own terms. To wit, he begins
with exceptionally strong notions of contingency and freedom and goes
on to argue with much ingenuity that these notions mesh perfectly with
an equally strong interpretation of the doctrine of divine providence.
What’s more, as I argue below, the objections to Molina’s theory, al¬
though not without merit, are by no means decisive. We should be wary,
then, of being swept too easily into thinking that the reconciliation-
question cannot be given a plausible answer unless the doctrine of divine
providence is in effect eviscerated.

1 .4 The Role of St. Thomas

Having fixed the broad systematic context for the sixteenth-century

debate over divine foreknowledge, I will now show briefly how the work
of St. Thomas helped shape the concrete dialectical parameters of that
debate. As noted in the Preface, Part IV of the Concordia constitutes one

segment of Molina’s remarkably extensive commentary on question 14,

article 1 3 of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae. In that place, as well as
in question 2, article 12 of the earlier disputed questions De Veritate
(though not, curiously, in Summa Contra Gentiles I, chapter 67), St. Thom¬
as uses perceptual models to explain his contention that all temporal
things — past, present, and future — are present to God in eternity and
hence that future contingents are known by Him as present rather than
as future. This apparently led many commentators to attribute to St.
Thomas the view, discussed by Molina in Disputation 49, that the pres¬
ence of things to God in eternity is by itself a sufficient ground for His
knowing future contingents with certainty. Like us, God perceives what
is present to Him; unlike us. He has present to Himself all past and
future entities. And since perceiving something to be the case does not
entail causing it to be the case, God’s knowledge of future contingents is
compatible with their contingency.
But this cannot be the whole story. As is abundantly evident from the
Thomistic corpus taken as a whole, St. Thomas never intends to suggest
[8] Introduction

that God is a passive recipient of information about the created world.

To the contrary, in many places he states quite unambiguously that the
created world is known by God just as an artifact is known by the artisan
who has fashioned it; and in equally many places he explicitly denies that

created things are a cause of God’s knowledge of them.^^ Why, then,

does he resort to perceptual models? Why does he not instead empha¬
size God’s providential designs and His active causal contribution to the
future? Does he recognize a tension here? If not, is it because he is
uncharacteristically blind to a real problem or instead because he be¬
lieves upon reflection that there is no problem?
Such questions helped define the particular dialectical context of the
sixteenth-century disputes over grace, foreknowledge, divine causation,
providence, predestination, and reprobation. In fact, both Banezian-
ism and Molinism are probably best regarded as alternative attempts to
compensate for what many Catholic thinkers, especially in light of the
Reformers’ influential writings on these very matters, took to be a lacuna
or at least a lack of explicitness in St. Thomas’s work.
Of course, some commentators, then and now, have wished a plague
on both Banez and Molina, claiming in effect that both sides misinter¬
pret St. Thomas, who himself had long before forged an acceptable via
media between their extreme positions. Maybe so, though in fairness to
Molina and Banez and perhaps to St. Thomas himself, I should report
that I for one do not find the arguments for this claim very convincing. ^ 2

*®See, e.g., Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 5, 8, and 16; De Veritate, q. 2, a. 3 and 14; Summa
Contra Gentiles I, chap. 65, and II, chap. 24.
^*See the beginning of Disputation 49 (secs. 1—7) for Molina’s own convoluted discus¬
sion of how St. Thomas ought to be interpreted.
I should acknowledge here that the historical sketch I have given, although accurate as
far as it goes, pays scant attention to the lively fourteenth- and fifteenth-century debates
over future contingency, debates that very often issued in distinctively non-Thomistic
accounts of divine foreknowledge. For the relevant historical background and a philo¬
sophically sophisticated discussion of the key issues, see Calvin Normore, “Future Con¬
tingents,” pp. 358—381 in Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg, eds.,
The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (New York, 1982), and “Divine Omni¬
science, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An Overview,” pp. 3—22 in T. Rudavsky,
cd., Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht, Holland, 1 985). I
have included in the Bibliography references to several translations by Norman Kretz¬
mann of fourteenth- and fifteenth-century material, as well as several Kretzmann transla¬
tions of medieval commentaries on chapter 9 of Aristotle’s De Interpretatione.
Molina, it should be noted, lumps together the various non-Thomistic positions and
deals with them en masse in Disputation 51. See Section 3.4 below.
i^For some recent attempts to articulate and defend an alternative “Thomistic” position,
see Mark Pontifex, Freedom and Providence (New York, i960); Dom M. John Farrelly,
O.S.B., Predestination, Grace and Free Will (Westminster, Md., 1964); Jacques Maritain, God
and the Permission of Evil (Milwaukee, 1966); Bernard Lonergan, S.J., Grace and Freedom
(New York, 1971); andjames Ross, “Creation II,” pp. 1 15—141 in AlfredJ. Freddoso, ed.,
 2. Contingency and Freedom [9]

1,5 An Outline of What Follows

In what follows I discuss the main theses of Part IV of the Concordia.

Section 2 is devoted to Molina’s account of contingency and freedom,

and I there explicate the causal modalities he makes use of in his discus¬
sion of the relation between providence and foreknowledge. Section 3
focuses on his critique of the major alternatives to his own view of how
God foreknows future contingents with certainty. In Section 4 I ex¬
pound Molina’s controversial theory of middle knowledge and examine
his attempt to reconcile freedom and foreknowledge. Finally, in Section
5 I briefly address the most important objections to the theory of middle
knowledge.

2 Contingency and Freedom

2.1 Preliminary Comments

Part IV of the Concordia opens with a brief discourse on contingency

and its sources. After making a few remarks about the bearers of modal
attributes and about metaphysical and temporal modality, I sketch an

account of causal modality meant to serve as a backdrop for Molina’s

assertions about divine causation, contingent effects, and future con¬
tingency. I then turn to his account of creaturely free choice and to his
views on natural, as opposed to free, indeterministic causation.
Part I of the Concordia is devoted to free choice and Part II to causa¬
tion, both divine and creaturely. Since Part IV presupposes a familiarity
with at least the main contours of Parts I and II, this section of the
Introduction furnishes the reader with the metaphysical background

required for a thorough appreciation of Molina’s discussion of God’s

foreknowledge.

2.2 The Bearers of Modal Attributes

Molina typically ascribes modal attributes such as necessity and con¬

tingency to states of affairs (complexiones) and propositions {complexiones
or propositiones or enuntiationes) , entities that, he assumes throughout,

are eternally and indeed necessarily available as objects of God’s intel-

The Existence and Nature of God (Notre Dame, Ind., 1983). In Section 3.4 below I discuss in
general some of the problems afflicting any position that tries to mediate between
Bahezianism and Molinism. In addition, I hope to articulate in another place some specific
difficulties I have with the works just alluded to — especially Lonergan’s, which is probably
the most subtle and certainly the most influential.
[lO] Introduction

lect, related in some intimate fashion to the divine ideas attributed to

God almost unanimously by medieval theologians.*^
As just intimated, Molina’s use of the Latin term complexio oscillates
between the English terms ‘proposition’ and ‘state of affairs’. Accord¬
ingly, I will simply assume that there is an exact isomorphism between
propositions and states of affairs. That is, to each proposition there
corresponds just one state of affairs, and vice versa; and a proposition is
true (false) if and only if the corresponding state of affairs obtains (fails
to obtain). In addition, Molina takes propositions and states of affairs to
be tensed, though he reserves a special use of present-tense verbs to
express the eternal rather than the temporal present.*^ Future contin¬
gents are thus properly construed as future-tense propositions or states
of affairs of a certain sort to be specihed below.
Three distinct types of modality play a prominent role in Part IV, and
I deal with them one by one. In so doing I speak only of states of affairs,
leaving it to the reader to formulate the matching theses about proposi¬
tions. Also, I make use of the currently popular notion of a possible
world, taking it for granted that the idea of a total and comprehensive
way things might have been is tolerably clear in itself and intuitively
accessible to the reader.

2 .3 Metaphysical Modality

The hrst type of modality is what I call (though Molina does not)
metaphysical modality. Metaphysical necessity and impossibility are the
strongest species of necessity and impossibility. A metaphysically neces¬
sary state of affairs is one that obtains no matter what, whereas a meta¬
physically impossible state of affairs is one that fails to obtain no matter
what. States of affairs corresponding to elementary mathematical and
logical truths are normally taken to be paradigmatic instances of meta¬
physically necessary states of affairs, whereas their complements (or ne¬
gations) are paradigmatic instances of metaphysically impossible states
of affairs. Metaphysical contingency, on the other hand, is the weakest
species of contingency. A metaphysically contingent state of affairs is one

that might obtain and that also might fail to obtain, where ‘might’ is taken
in the widest sense. For instance, Sandra Day O’Connor’s having served

It may be that abstract entities such as properties, states of affairs, and propositions
should simply be identified with various elements (predicates, sentences, nominalizations of
sentences) in the language of the divine mind. For an argument on behalf of this thesis, see
Michael J. Loux, “Towards an Aristotelian Theory of Abstract Objects,” Midwest Studies in
Philosophy ii (1986): 495—512.
•■^See Disputation 48, sec. 8.
 2. Contingency and Freedom [11]

on the Supreme Court in 1985 is a state of affairs which might never have
obtained, even though it in fact obtains and indeed cannot any longer (in
1986) be made not to obtain. Again, even if the water on my stove is now
being made to boil by causes that have necessitated its boiling, still the

water’s boiling at this time is a metaphysically contingent state of affairs.

For the water might never have existed, and even given its existence, it
might never have been acted upon by causes that would make it boil at
the present time.
We can put all this into possible-worlds jargon as follows, where ‘5’
designates a state of affairs:

5 is metaphysically necessary if and only if 5 obtains at every moment in every

possible world.

5 is metaphysically impossible if and only if S does not obtain at any moment in

any possible world.

S is metaphysically contingent if and only if S is neither metaphysically neces¬

sary nor metaphysically impossible.

God’s prevolitional knowledge of all the metaphysically necessary

states of affairs is called His natural knowledge. Molina maintains that

God’s natural knowledge could not have had objects other than those it
in fact has. The reason is that for any state of affairs S, 5’s having the
metaphysical modality it has is itself a metaphysically necessary state of

affairs. If S is metaphysically contingent, then the state of affairs of 5’s

being metaphysically contingent is itself metaphysically necessary — and
likewise if 5 is metaphysically necessary or impossible. In short, what is
metaphysically necessary or impossible or contingent does not vary from
one possible world to another. So God has the same natural knowledge
in every possible world in which He exists and has any natural knowl¬
edge at all, and, in addition, by His natural knowledge He knows the

metaphysical modality of every state of affairs. What’s more, if we grant

with Molina and his contemporaries that God’s existing and being all¬
knowing are themselves metaphysically necessary, it follows further that
God has exactly the same natural knowledge in every possible world. It
is, so to speak, part of His nature to know all the metaphysically neces¬
sary states of affairs — and this is one reason such knowledge is called
natural.

calling such knowledge prevolitional I do not, of course, mean to imply that God
lacks it after His act of will. I simply mean to contrast it with the sort of knowledge, namely,
free knowledge, that God has only posterior to, and because of. His act of will. (Once again,
the ordering relations invoked here are conceptual and not temporal. )
*®See Disputation 50, sec. 6.
[12] Introduction

According to Molina, metaphysical modality “pertains to the natures”

of things. 1"^ To know a thing’s nature is, in technical terms, to comprehend
it, and to comprehend it is, as Molina puts it, to know “all the possible
modes of the thing,” that is, to know the exact range of its metaphysical
possibilities.!^ But this, it seems, is just to know the metaphysical mo¬
dality of each state of affairs that involves it. So God’s natural knowledge
includes a perfect comprehension of the natures of all possible entities —
and this is another reason for calling it natural.

Notice that God’s natural knowledge includes a comprehensive grasp

of all the active and passive causal powers creatures might have and
exercise, since such causal powers are ultimately rooted in their na¬
tures.!^ What’s more, by His natural knowledge God knows all the
possible spatial and temporal arrangements of creaturely agents and
patients and hence knows all the ways in which they might causally
interact with one another. And by His natural knowledge He also knows
prevolitionally (i) what would result from any possible causal interaction
in which all the relevant created causes act deterministically and (ii) what
might result from any possible causal interaction in which some created
cause acts indeterministically. This is why, as explained in Section i,

God’s natural knowledge is, like that of an artisan, potentially a cause of

things.
Still, God does not by His natural knowledge know which, if any, states
of affairs will actually obtain by virtue of the causal activity of created
substances. This He can know only by His postvolitional or free knowl¬
edge. For all such states of affairs are metaphysically contingent and, in
addition, their obtaining at any given time is a function not only (i) of the
‘intrinsic’ natures of the relevant created causes but also (ii) of the
‘extrinsic’ arrangement of those causes at the time in question and, even
more fundamentally, (iii) of God’s free decision to create, conserve, and
cooperate with them.
So all states of affairs which obtain because of the causal activity of
created substances are metaphysically contingent.^® Still, as Molina is
quick to emphasize, such contingency

*^See Disputation 47, sec. 2, and Disputation 50, sec. 6.

^®See Disputation 52, sec. 9, and Disputation 53, pt. 1, secs. 18 and 20.
*9This, at least, is the standard view of medieval Aristotelians. For a recent attempt to
articulate and defend some of the central elements of this view, see my “The Necessity of
Nature,” Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1986): 215-242. Among these central elements is
the claim that laws of nature are metaphysically necessary propositions linking causal
powers, tendencies, and dispositions with natural kinds. See pp. 231—236 of the paper just
mentioned.

20What I have said does not imply that all metaphysically contingent states of affairs
known by God are known through His free knowledge. This is so only for metaphysically
 [13]

2, Contingency and Freedom

does not rule out fatalistic necessity. For if all agents acted by a necessity of
nature, then, without a doubt, even if nothing pertaining to the natures of
the terms were incompatible with things turning out otherwise, everything
that occurs would still, in relation to its causes as constituted and arranged in
such a universe, occur with a fatalistic and infallible necessity in just the way
it in fact occurs.

So if there is to be genuine indeterminism and freedom, then some

states of affairs which obtain because of created causes must be not only

metaphysically contingent but also contingent in a way that “rules out

the fatalistic and extrinsic necessity that results from the arrangement of
causes. ”22 This is causal or natural contingency, and I deal with it below,
in Section 2.5.

2.4 Temporal Modality

Before that, however, I must introduce another type of modality

indispensable to any sophisticated treatment of foreknowledge and free¬
dom, namely, temporal or accidental modality. 23 This modality has to do
neither with the natures of things nor with the arrangement of causes in
the universe, but rather with the mere passage of time. For some meta¬
physically contingent states of affairs become necessary simply by virtue
of being fixed unalterably as part of the history of the world, regardless
of their causal ancestry.
Suppose Susannah played baseball at some past time T. Then the

metaphysically contingent state of affairs of Susannah’s having played

baseball at T is now necessary in such a way that it can no longer be
caused not to obtain; and its complement is now impossible in such a way
that it can no longer be caused to obtain. Any possible world sharing the
same history with our world at the present moment (call it T*) is such
that at no time at or after T* in that world can anyone or anything cause
it to be false that Susannah played baseball at T or cause it to be true that
she did not play baseball at T. And this is so even if she freely played
baseball at T.

contingent states of affairs whose obtaining constitutes a created causal effect in one of the
ways to be spelled out below. In fact, Molina’s theory of middle knowledge is distinctive
precisely because it entails that God has prevolitional knowledge of some metaphysically
contingent states of affairs, namely, conditional future contingents. More on this in
Sections 2.8 and 4.2 below.
21 Ib
22 Disputation
id. 47, sec. 2.

23For some background, see my “Accidental Necessity and Logical Determinism.” (As I
note in Section 4.5, however, I no longer subscribe to the account of accidental necessity
laid out in that paper.)
[14] Introduction

In Section 4, below, we see that an exact characterization of the

accidental modalities cannot be given unless we first take a stand on
certain controversial issues, issues with regard to which Molina himself
holds a minority view. However, all sides agree at least that a state of
affairs is now accidentally contingent if it can still be caused to obtain and
still be caused not to obtain. They also concur that this sort of con¬
tingency, although stronger than metaphysical contingency, is too weak
to rule out that “fatalistic and extrinsic necessity that results from the
arrangement of causes.” For even if a metaphysically contingent state of
affairs is now accidentally contingent as well, its obtaining or not obtain¬
ing at some future time might nonetheless be wholly determined by
presently operative causes. Real freedom requires an even stronger
notion of contingency. To this I now turn.

2 .5 Causal Modality

To appreciate Molina’s account of causal contingency we must have at

least a rough grasp of the metaphysical framework within which the
medieval Aristotelians approach questions concerning causal modality
and efficient causation. I have elsewhere developed and defended this
framework at some length. 24 So my treatment of it here is relatively
elementary and informal, even at the risk of oversimplification.
The medieval Aristotelians conceive of the created world as a dynamic
system of interacting substances endowed by nature with causal powers,
dispositions, and inclinations. Their natures thus delimit the range of
causal contributions, both active and passive, which created substances
can make toward the production of effects. In typical cases certain
substances (agents) act upon other substances (patients) to produce a
given effect. 25 So efficient causation is a relation holding between sub¬
stances (agents and patients) on the one hand and states of affairs on the
other.26 For instance, in a given set of circumstances a gas flame acts

24See my “The Necessity of Nature.” Also, for a discussion of some of the philosophical
and theological issues at stake in the debate between Aristotelian and occasionalist philoso¬
phies of nature, see my “Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case Against Secondary Causa¬
tion in Nature,” in Thomas V. Morris, ed.. Divine and Human Action: Essays in the Metaphysics
of Theism (Ithaca, 1988).
25 An atypical case that plays a central role in medieval philosophy and theology is that of
creation ex nihilo, in which God acts to bring about a created effect but does not act on any
patient in so doing.
26The states of affairs in question ordinarily involve states of the substances that are
acted upon. Whether all such states must be thought of as involving accidents inhering in
these substances is a moot ontological question that would receive different answers from
different medieval Scholastics.
 [15]

2. Contingency and Freedom

upon a steel kettle filled with water in such a way as to bring about the
state of affairs of the water’s boiling.
The system is dynamic because the various substances are poised to
make characteristic causal contributions in the appropriate circum¬
stances unless they are in some way impeded or prevented from doing
so. In the above example the water will boil unless something either
stops the action of the gas flame or removes the water from the sphere of
its causal influence. So the causal contribution actually made at any
given time by a group of potentially interacting substances is a function
both of the causal powers they have and of their being in a position to
exercise those powers at that time.
Deterministic causation results when the relevant substances are such

that given the opportunity to exercise their causal powers, they automat¬
ically come together to bring about the unique effect to which they are
naturally ordered in the relevant circumstances. When I put the kettle of
water over the gas flame at time T*, I have initiated a deterministic
causal chain that, if left unimpeded, will result in the water’s boiling at
some future time, say T. Of course, one deterministic causal chain of this
sort might be impeded by another. If a piece of plaster falls from the
ceiling just after T* and knocks the kettle off the stove, then the water
will not boil at T. But suppose that no other chain of deterministic causes
is poised to interfere with the one in question. In that case we can
reasonably attribute to the world itself an all-things-considered deter¬
ministic propensity toward the water’s boiling at T. I will call this sort of
propensity a deterministic natural tendency. And if the water boils at T as a
result of this tendency, then the state of affairs of its boiling obtains by a
necessity of nature at T. So a deterministic natural tendency is an all-
things-considered deterministic propensity on the part of the world
toward a given state of affairs 5 at a given time t, a propensity that, if left

unimpeded by indeterministic causes, issues forth in 5’s obtaining at t by

a necessity of nature.
In the place cited above I have proposed a detailed analysis of the
concept of a deterministic natural tendency. The informal remarks
above have been, I trust, sufficient to render this notion passably clear
and to motivate the following rough characterization of causal or natu¬
ral necessity, impossibility and contingency:

S is naturally necessary (or obtains by a necessity of nature) at t if and only if 5

obtains at t by virtue of the world’s having at (at or before t) a deterministic
natural tendency toward S at t.

S is naturally impossible (or fails by a necessity of nature to obtain ) at Df and only if

the complement of 5 obtains at t by virtue of the world’s having at t*- (at or

before t) a deterministic natural tendency toward it at t.
[i6] Introduction

5 is naturally contingent at t if and only if 5 is (i) metaphysically contingent,

and (ii) accidentally contingent at t, and (iii) neither naturally necessary nor
naturally impossible at t.

So a present-tense state of affairs which obtains at a time t is naturally

contingent at t only if it is caused to obtain at t directly by an indeterministic
cause. As we shall see below, natural contingency as thus explicated is
too narrow a notion to encompass everything that Molina wants to
classify under the rubric of a contingent effect. But it is nonetheless true
that nothing will count as a contingent effect unless at least 50w^ states of
affairs which actually obtain are naturally contingent at the times they
obtain.
Now suppose that all the causal contributions of created agents them¬
selves resulted from deterministic natural tendencies. Then every causal
effect of created agents would obtain by a necessity of nature. In short,

the world would be thoroughly deterministic. This bears out Molina’s

claim that “if all agents acted by a necessity of nature, then . . . any cause
that . . . was able to [read, had the power to and was in a position to]

impede another cause would in fact impede it. ”27 For the intersection of
any two or more deterministic causal chains would itself occur by a
necessity of nature.
By contrast, if the world is not utterly deterministic, then there are
substances whose causal activity is not always determined to a unique
effect by the conjunction of their intrinsic natures with the extrinsic
arrangement of causes in the universe. Such substances are thus (i) capa¬
ble of bringing about states of affairs which are naturally contingent at
the time they obtain and also (ii) capable, to the extent that their power
allows, of interfering with deterministic natural tendencies.
As Molina sees it, God is the paradigmatic indeterministic cause, an
all-powerful being capable of freely impeding any and every determinis¬
tic natural tendency in the created world. He is the first or primary cause
and His causal activity is absolutely pervasive. He created the original
constituents of the universe ex nihilo, and no creature can exist or possess
causal power through any interval of time unless God conserves it and its

powers in being at every instant in that interval. What’s more, no crea-

turely or secondary cause is able to exercise its causal power unless God
also acts contemporaneously to bring about its effect. 2^

2'^ Disputation 47, sec. 2.

28See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles III, chaps. 66—70, and De Potentia, q. 3, a. 7;
and Molina, Concordia, Part II, disp. 25—28 (Rabeneck, pp. 159—185). In these places
Aquinas and Molina explicitly reject the view that God’s causal contribution to ordinary
 [17]

2. Contingency and Freedom

2.6 God's General Concurrence

This last point deserves closer attention. When God brings about a
created effect by Himself, He acts as a particular cause, since His causal
contribution by itself determines the specihc nature of the effect. How¬
ever, the medieval Aristotelians maintain, in opposition to occasional-
ists, that all creatures have genuine causal power, too — though, as just
noted, in order for them to exercise this power God must also act to
produce the relevant effect. When He thus cooperates with secondary
causes. He acts as general or universal cause of the effect, and His causal
contribution is called W\s> general concurrence or concourse {concur sus gener-
alis). The nomenclature is indicative of the fact that in such a case the

particular nature of the effect is traceable not to God’s causal contribu¬

tion, necessary though it is in order for any effect to be produced at all,
but rather to the natures and causal contributions of the relevant
ary causes, which act as particular causes of the effect.

Medieval writers frequently appeal to the sun’s causal influence on

terrestrial events in order to illuminate this point. By providing heat and
light the sun causally contributes to animal reproduction on earth. But
this causal influence is general, since it has to be channeled or rendered
particular by further causes. So, for instance, the sun is a general cause
in the production of, say, this calf, since its causal contribution has to be
channeled toward the production of a calf (as opposed to, say, a duck¬
ling) by further, particular, causes (a cow and a bull). Likewise, God’s
general causal influence is required in order for secondary causes to
bring about any effects whatever anywhere in the created world. But
God’s causal influence as the primary and maximal universal cause must
be particularized and channeled toward given effects by secondary
causes. So, for instance, when the gas flame makes the water boil, the
fact that the effect is the boiling of water rather than, say, the blossoming

of a flower is due not to God’s causal contribution (which might just as

well have contributed to the water’s freezing, had other conditions ob¬
tained), but rather to the specihc natures of the secondary causes (gas,

water, and the like). God’s general concurrence is, so to speak, a deter¬
minable that has to be particularized by the secondary causes. St. Thom¬
as puts it this way: “The proper effect of the primary agent is being . . .
whereas the secondary agents, which, as it were, particularize and deter-

natural effects is exhausted by His creating and conserving the causes of those effects. This
view is, in fact, regarded as false by virtually all medieval Scholastics, even though it falls
far short of the claim that God’s causal role in the production of (nonmiraculous) natural
effects is limited to His having created secondary causes.
[i8] Introduction

mine the action of the primary agent, produce as their proper effects

further perfections that serve to determine being. ”29

To sum up, \hGn,pace occasionalism, secondary causes make a unique
and unduplicated causal contribution to the effects they produce, and

yet they are not capable of producing effects without God’s positive and
contemporaneous cooperation.
This much is accepted by both Molina and his Bahezian rivals. They
part ways, however, on two significant issues. First, Molina insists that
God’s general concurrence is an action of God’s directly on the effect and
not on the secondary agents themselves, whereas his Thomistic oppo¬
nents take God’s general concurrence to be a divine action directly on the
secondary agents (“premoving” them) and through them on the effect.
Molina thus denies what his opponents affirm, namely, that secondary
causes must be moved by God in order to exercise their causal power. In
this way he stresses their autonomy, albeit limited autonomy, in reaction
to what he takes to be the excessively occasionalistic tenor of the Thomis¬
tic position. This disagreement about whether God’s general concur¬
rence constitutes a “premotion” is both deep and deeply puzzling. But
since the issues involved do not figure prominently in what follows, I
leave a full discussion of them for another time.
The second disputed point has to do with the intrinsic character of

God’s general concurrence. When secondary causes produce an effect

that God intends them to produce, God’s general concurrence is said to
be efficacious with respect to that effect. But when, because of some
defect on their part, they fail to produce an effect that God intends them
to produce and for the sake of which He grants His cooperation, then
His general concurrence is said to be inefficacious (though sX\\\ sufficient or
enough) with respect to the intended effect. If a deficient effect (for ex¬
ample, a sinful action) is instead produced, it is one that God merely per¬
mits rather than intends. Against this backdrop, Molinists and Banez-
ians disagree about whether efficacious and inefficacious concurrence
differ from each other intrinsically. Banezians hold that efficacious con¬
currence is intrinsically or essentially efficacious with respect to the in¬
tended effect and that merely sufficient concurrence is intrinsically ineffi¬
cacious with respect to such an effect. Molina contends to the contrary

that God’s general concurrence is in itself neither efficacious nor ineffi¬

cacious, but is instead an intrinsically ‘neutral’ causal influence that is
rendered efficacious or inefficacious extrinsically by the relevant second-

^^Summa Contra Gentiles III, chap. 66. The analogy with the sun is, as Molina himself
points out, defective in one crucial respect, namely, that God’s general causation is exactly
contemporaneous with the action of the agent, whereas the sun’s is not. See Concordia, pt.
II, disp. 26, secs. 12-13 (Rabeneck, pp. 167—169).
 [19]

2. Contingency and Freedom

ary causes. As we will see, this disagreement has an immediate and

profound impact on the analysis of free choice and of causal indetermin¬
ism in general.

2 .7 Contingent Effects

God is the paradigmatic indeterministic cause. But suppose God were

the only indeterministic cause. And suppose further that His causal role
in the created world were limited to creation, conservation, and general
concurrence, and that He never interfered with or impeded any deter¬
ministic natural tendency. Then, says Molina, “contingency would be
taken away from all the effects of secondary causes and everything
would have to happen by a kind of fatalistic necessity.
To grasp the full import of this remark we need to understand more
precisely what is to count as a contingent effect. According to our
previous characterization of natural contingency, the only naturally
contingent states of affairs that actually obtain are brought about di¬
rectly or immediately by the action of an indeterministic cause. Yet even
a state of affairs 5 that obtains by a necessity of nature at a time t might
still be a contingent effect in the sense that at some previous (perhaps far
distant) time the world did not have a deterministic natural tendency

toward S at t. To return to our simple example, even though the water’s

boiling obtains by a necessity of nature at T, nonetheless, prior to my
freely putting the kettle on the fire the world did not have a determinis¬
tic natural tendency toward the water’s boiling at T — assuming with
Molina that human free choice is essentially indeterministic. So the

water’s boiling at T is a contingent effect. Thus, contingency as ascribed to

effects is diffusive, having its source in the action (or inaction) of an
indeterministic cause and then spreading outward even along causal
chains that are themselves wholly deterministic.^*
We might be tempted at this point to conclude that an effect is
contingent just in case it has the action of an indeterministic cause

^^Disputation 47, sec. 9.

We must include inaction (or failure to act) here, since even if a present effect E does
not have the action of an indeterministic secondary cause anywhere in its causal ancestry, it
might nonetheless be true that E would not be occurring now if at some earlier time t an
indeterministic agent A had not failed to do something that it had the power and the
opportunity to do. In such a case, A’s inaction is clearly part of E's causal history and,
moreover, a part that renders E a contingent effect. Further evidence of E's contingency is
the fact that in order for God to have foreknown from eternity that E would occur now. He
would have to have foreknown from eternity that A would fail (indeterministically) to act
at t.
I should also note that in the following discussion I am drawing from Disputation 47,
secs. 10-1 1; Disputation 52, secs. 18-19; and Disputation 53, pt. 3, secs. 2—4.
 Introduction
[20]

somewhere in its causal ancestry. But such an analysis is too crude. For
given the orthodox doctrine that God freely creates, conserves, and
cooperates with secondary causes, it would follow that every effect pro¬
duced in the created world is contingent, even one with no indeterminis¬
tic secondary causes in its causal history. Yet, as the passage just quoted

demonstrates, Molina sees clearly that if God’s action were the only
actual source of contingency, then the world would for all practical
purposes be thoroughly deterministic.
What we need, obviously, is an account of contingent effects which
allows us to draw a meaningful distinction between the contingent and
noncontingent (or necessary) effects of secondary causes, so that an effect
produced by secondary causes will be contingent only if its causal ances¬
try includes the action (or inaction) of some indeterministic secondary
cause; otherwise it will count as a necessary effect. Speaking more gener¬
ally, an effect is contingent if and only if it either is produced immediately
by God alone or has the action (or inaction) of an indeterministic second¬
ary cause somewhere, either immediately or remotely, in its causal his¬
tory. And an effect is necessary if and only if it is produced by secondary
causes but does not have the action (or inaction) of any indeterministic
secondary cause anywhere in its causal history. So the definition of a
necessary effect presupposes the divine activities of creation, conserva¬
tion, and general concurrence.

If we combine Molina’s discussions of contingent effects in Disputa¬

tions 47, 52, and 53, Part 3, we can distinguish four distinct categories of
such effects:

Category A: effects that God freely produces by Himself and that do not in
any way presuppose the action (or inaction) of indeterministic secondary
causes. Examples are God’s creation and conservation of spiritual sub¬
stances (angels and intellective souls) and of matter as such.

Category B: effects that God freely produces by Himself but that presup¬
pose the action (or inaction) of indeterministic secondary causes to provide
the circumstances for His unilateral action. For instance, the man born

blind is made to see by God’s action alone, but his very existence and many
of his properties have resulted from the free actions (or omissions) of his
ancestors, parents, friends.

Category C: effects that are naturally contingent at the time they are pro¬
duced, having been brought about directly by an indeterministic secondary
cause. The most obvious examples are free choices themselves.

Category D: effects that occur by natural necessity at the time they are
produced, but have the action (or inaction) of indeterministic secondary
 2. Contingency and Freedom [21]

causes somewhere in their causal ancestry. An example is the boiling of the

water at some time after the water is put into proximity to the gas flame by
the free action of some human agent.

According to Molina, God is the immediate source of the contingency

of effects in categories A and B, with effects in the latter category also
having indeterministic secondary causes as a remote source of their
contingency. By contrast, effects in categories C and D have indeter¬
ministic secondary causes as the immediate source of their contingency
and God as a remote source of their contingency.

2.8 Absolute and Conditional Future Contingents

God knows future necessary effects with certainty simply by virtue of

(i) His natural knowledge and (ii) His knowledge of the total causal
contribution He Himself wills to make to the created world. Moreover,
among future contingent effects, only those produced hy secondary causes
(effects in categories C and D) pose a special epistemic problem. Every¬
one will agree that it is simply by virtue of knowing His own causal
intentions that God knows which contingent effects in category A will be
produced. And once we grant God knowledge of the contingent effects
of secondary causes. He can know which effects in category B will be
produced simply by virtue of knowing, once again. His own causal
intentions. Accordingly, in what follows I restrict the term ‘future con¬
tingent’ to the effects of secondary causes.
We customarily think of future contingents as categorical future-tense
states of affairs which now obtain or, alternatively, as categorical present-
tense states of affairs which will obtain. These are what Molina calls
absolute future contingents. Examples might include the state of affairs of
its being the case that Peter will freely sin at T (category C) and its being
the case that this water will boil at T, where the boiling of the water will
emanate in part from my having freely decided at T* to place the kettle
on the stove (category D).

We will better understand Molina’s views and the controversies gener¬

ated by them, however, if we take absolute future contingents to be
derivable from conceptually prior conditional states of affairs which we
might fittingly call conditional future contingents. These conditional states
of affairs indicate which effects in categories C and D would in fact be

32 By ‘categorical’ I mean states of affairs which are most naturally expressed by simple
subject-predicate sentences (including quantified sentences). Excluded are states of affairs
most naturally expressed by conjunctions or disjunctions of such sentences or by condi¬
tional sentences. This distinction between categorical and compound (or ‘hypothetical’)
propositions is standard in medieval logic.
[22] Introduction

produced, remotely or immediately, by indeterministic secondary causes

under a condition or hypothesis that specifies a possible spatio-temporal
arrangement of secondary causes. An example might be the state of
affairs of its being the case that Peter would freely sin at T if hypothesis H

were to obtain at T, where H includes among other things Peter’s having

the power and opportunity at T to sin freely. Another example might be
the state of affairs of its being the case that the water would boil at T if //
were to obtain at T, where H includes among other things my having had
the power and opportunity at T* to put the kettle on the stove. If the
condition H will in fact obtain, then the consequent is an absolute future
contingent; if H will not obtain, then the whole conditional is a mere
conditioned future contingent.
More formally, let 5 be a present-tense categorical state of affairs and
P{S) the state of affairs of its being the case that 5 will obtain at t, where t
designates a time; and \etP(S) on H be the state of affairs of its being the
case that 5 would obtain at t if hypothesis H were to obtain at t. Then:^"^

P{S)on Hh from eternity a conditional future contingent if and only if (i) P(S)
on H obtains from eternity; and (ii) S, H, and F‘{S) on H are all metaphysi¬
cally contingent; and (iii) it is true from eternity that if H were to obtain at t,
then S would be a contingent effect produced by secondary causes (category
C or D).

P{S) is from eternity an absolute future contingent if and only if for some H,
(i) P(5) on H is from eternity a conditional future contingent and (ii) it is
true from eternity that H will obtain at t.

P{S)onH‘\s from eX.c:vn\iy conditioned future contingent if and only if (i) F'{S)
on H is from eternity a conditional future contingent and (ii) it is true from
eternity that neither H nor S will obtain at t.

When contingent effects of category D are involved, the relevant H must include
reference to past situations in which secondary causes had the power and opportunity to
act indeterministically. Notice that analogous conditionals describing effects whose causal
history includes only deterministic secondary causes are metaphysically necessary rather
than metaphysically contingent. Hence, they are known by God via His natural knowledge.
3‘^Since our interest is in God’s knowledge, I will characterize future contingency ‘from
eternity’. But the fact that God’s knowledge of conditional future contingents is from
eternity does not by itself settle the question of whether that knowledge is prevolitional or
postvolitional. It is precisely here that Molinists diverge from Banezians, and the account
of future contingency given below is meant to be neutral with respect to this disagreement.
Also, for reasons that are discussed in Section 4.3 below, it is probably best to regard a
state of affairs as a conditional future contingent only if the relevant H includes a total
description of the causal history and contemporaneous causal circumstances of any ex¬
ercise of indeterministic causation which hgures directly in the production of the effect
designated by the consequent.
 [23]

2. Contingency and Freedom

Molina claims that infinitely many conditional future contingents

obtained from eternity and that from eternity God had comprehensive
knowledge of them. However — and this is very important, though not
widely appreciated — neither of these claims distinguishes him from his
Bahezian antagonists.^^ What is distinctive about Molina is his contro¬
versial claim that God’s knowledge of conditional future contingents is
prevolitional rather than, as the Bahezians would have it, postvolitional.

To make this clearer, I will present a preview of Molina’s explanation

of how it is that God has foreknowledge of absolute future contingents.

As we have seen, Molina affirms against the Banezians that God’s general
concurrence is intrinsically neither efficacious nor inefficacious. Thus, if
God had only natural knowledge of metaphysically necessary states of
affairs plus knowledge of His own total causal contribution to the created
world. He would not thereby know any absolute future contingents. His
natural knowledge tells Him only what each indeterministic secondary
cause is able to do, not what it would in fact do, in any possible situation in

which it is in a position to act; and if God’s concurrence is intrinsically

‘neutral’, then His own causal contribution to contingent effects in cate¬
gories C and D does not uniquely determine those effects. So, according
to Molina, if there is genuine causal indeterminism in the created world,
God can be provident in the way demanded by orthodoxy only if His
prevolitional knowledge includes an understanding of which effects
would in fact result from causal chains involving indeterministic created
causes. But this is just for God to have full prevolitional knowledge of
conditional future contingents. Since this knowledge has metaphysically

contingent states of affairs as its objects, it is not part of God’s natural

knowledge; since it prevolitional, it is not part of God’s free knowledge.
It stands ‘midway’ between natural knowledge and free knowledge —
hence its title, middle knowledge.

On Molina’s view, then, the source of God’s foreknowledge of abso¬

lute future contingents is threefold: (i) His prevolitional natural knowl¬
edge of metaphysically necessary states of affairs, (ii) His prevolitional
middle knowledge of conditional future contingents, and (iii) His free
knowledge of the total causal contribution He himself wills to make to
the created world. By (i) He knows which spatio-temporal arrangements

^^For an unambiguous admission of the point in question by a Banezian, see Reginald

Garrigou-Lagrange, O.P., The One God (St. Louis, 1943), pp. 461—462 (n. 134) and 471. It
is hard to overemphasize the importance of this point, given a marked tendency among
recent writers to err by simply identifying the Molinist doctrine of middle knowledge with
the claim that God has knowledge of conditional future contingents (or so-called counter-
factuals of freedom). This claim, to repeat, is not a distinctively Molinist one, and, indeed,
it was never in dispute in the rancorous sixteenth-century debates between Molinists and
Bahezians.
[24] Introduction

of secondary causes are possible and which contingent effects might

emanate from any such arrangement. By (ii) He knows which con¬
tingent effects would in fact emanate from any possible spatio-temporal
arrangement of secondary causes. By (iii) He knows which secondary
causes He wills to create and conserve and how He wills to cooperate
with them via His intrinsically neutral general concurrence. So given His
natural knowledge, His middle knowledge, and His free knowledge of
His own causal contribution to the created world. He has free knowl¬
edge of all absolute future contingents.^® That is. He has within Himself
the means required for knowing with certainty which contingent effects
will in fact emanate from the actual arrangement of secondary causes.
By contrast, Bahezians deny that any metaphysically contingent state
of affairs, even a conditional future contingent, can obtain conceptually

prior to God’s decreeing (by either intention or permission) that it

obtain. Since they must accordingly try to get by with just (i) and (iii)

above, they maintain that Molina’s account of God’s general concur¬

rence is unacceptably weak and that his account of freedom and causal
indeterminism is unacceptably strong. The other theories to be explored
in Section 3 resemble Bahezianism in appealing to just (i) and (iii), but
they resemble Molinism in holding to a strong account of creaturely
indeterminism and freedom. By now we should have a glimmer of why
the proponents of these other theories must settle for something less
than the robust account of divine providence sketched in Section 1.
(More on this in Section 3).

2.9 Freedom

Molina’s conception of freedom is strongly indeterministic; in mod¬

ern terms he is an unremitting libertarian. We must not conclude forth¬
with, however, that the dispute between Molinists and Banezians over
the nature of free choice is a precise analog of the contemporary dispute
between libertarians and compatibilists, the latter holding that it is possi¬
ble for a free action to occur by a necessity of nature. For, as we shall
soon see, Bahezians as well as Molinists deny this possibility.
In Disputation 2, after distinguishing freedom from coercion, Molina
goes on to say:

But freedom can be understood in another way, insofar as it is opposed to

necessity. In this sense that agent is called free which, with all the prerequi-

^®It follows from what has been said that there are two distinguishable moments in
God’s free knowledge. First, God knows how He Himself wills to act ; second, He knows
what will result from this decision. Only the latter of these moments is, strictly speaking,
po5^volitional — even though for the sake of convenience I will continue to use the terms
‘free knowledge’ and ‘postvolitional knowledge’ interchangeably.
 [25]

2. Contingency and Freedom

sites for acting posited, is able to act and able not to act [freedom of
contradiction], or is able to do one thing in such a way that it is also able to do
some contrary thing [freedom of contrariety]. And by virtue of this sort of
freedom the faculty by which such an agent is able so to act is called free. . . .
It follows from this that free choice (if it is to be conceded anywhere) is
nothing other than the will, in which freedom exists formally, guided by a
previous judgment of reason.

A few lines later it becomes clear that such “previous judgments of

reason” do not necessitate free acts of will:

And so given the same disposition and cognition ... on the part of the
intellect, the will is by its innate freedom able to will or to dissent or to
neither will nor dissent.^®

My concern here is to isolate the sense in which free action is causally

indeterministic on Molina’s view. So I will merely lump these cognitive

prerequisites with the other causal antecedents of free choice, even
though a thorough investigation of freedom would single them out for
special consideration.
For Molina, then, to be free with respect to a given object (that is, a
state of affairs) is to have a faculty, namely, a will or intellective appetite,
by virtue of which one is capable of choosing indeterministically with
respect to that object. In paradigmatic instances the agent has three
options: (i) to elicit an act of willing the object, (ii) to elicit an act of
dissenting from or rejecting the object, or (iii) to refrain from either
willing or dissenting. So every free action involves a free choice, which

then typically issues forth in a ‘commanded’ (as opposed to ‘elicited’)

act — most often, in free human action, a basic bodily movement.
This is not the place to explore or defend the common Scholastic
thesis that every free action involves freedom with respect to elicited
mental acts of willing or dissenting. I will only remark in passing that I

concur with Alan Donagan’s judgment that the modern objections to

this thesis are not compelling and sometimes are not even to the point.^^
At any rate, since the task before us is to formulate a necessary

^^Rabeneck, p. 14. I have inserted the phrases ‘freedom of contradiction’ and ‘freedom
of contrariety’ to aid the reader’s understanding of Molina’s use of these phrases in Part IV
of the Concordia. See Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. 17. For engaging (though, to my mind,
unduly unsympathetic) treatments of Molina’s conception of freedom, see Gerard Smith,
S.J., Freedom in Molina (Chicago, 1966); and Anton Pegis, “Molina and Human Liberty,”
pp. 75—131 in Gerard Smith, S.J., ed., Jesuit Thinkers of the Renaissance (Milwaukee, 1939).
^^Rabeneck, p. 14.
39See Donagan’s “Thomas Aquinas on Human Action,” pp. 642-654 in Kretzmann,
Kenny, and Pinborg, eds.. The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. For more on
the distinction between elicited and commanded acts, see Disputation 47, n. 14.
[26] Introduction

condition for freedom that suffices to express the indeterminism as¬

cribed by Molina to free choice and free action, I will put to one side for
now the distinction between elicited and commanded acts. Instead I will

speak simply of a person’s freely making a causal contribution at a given

time to a state of affairs, a state of affairs which may or may not involve
an elicited act.
Libertarians often assume that the indeterminism of free actions can
be epitomized by the simple requirement that a free action be one that is
not naturally determined by the causal history of the world, that is, one
that is not naturally necessitated by causes operative at times before it
takes place. Given our previous characterization of the causal modal¬
ities, this requirement can be stated more simply as follows, where P
designates an agent, 5 a state of affairs, and t a time:

Alt P freely contributes causally to 5 only if (i) at f P contributes causally to S

and (ii) P’s contributing causally to 5 does not obtain at i by a necessity of
nature.

This condition is one that modern libertarians accept and that modern
compatibilists repudiate. Nonetheless, it is too weak to capture the caus¬
al indeterminism that Molina attributes to free action. A sure sign of this
is that Bahezians can avidly endorse it. Their dispute with Molinists has

to do not with the world’s causal history or past deterministic natural

tendencies, but rather with the intrinsic character of God’s general con¬
currence at the very moment the action takes place.
But just how might one go about arguing that the condition in ques¬
tion is insufficient to capture the causal indeterminism endemic to free
action? Consider the following story
It is 1984. Katie is about to cast her vote in the presidential elections.
Unbeknown to her, a very powerful genius is closely monitoring her

“^oThe example that follows resembles those used by Harry Frankfurt in “Alternate
Possibilities and Moral Responsibility, ’’/owma/ of Philosophy 66 (1969); 829—839, and is in
fact adapted, with some signihcant changes, from John Martin Fischer’s reply to Frankfurt
in “Responsibility and ControX,” Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982); 24-40. Frankfurt’s exam¬
ples are meant to illustrate his contention that responsibility does not entail the ability to do
otherwise. It is not clear to mejust how the discussion that follows in this section is related to
the puzzles about freedom, control, and responsibility posed by Frankfurt-type examples. I
certainly do not claim that the revised necessary condition for freedom proposed below
provides the basis either for a libertarian response to all Frankfurt-type examples or for a
general libertarian account of the relationship between freedom, responsibility, and the
ability to do otherwise. My hesitation stems in part from the fact that the particular example
I am using is carefully tailored to help clarify the differences between Molinists and
Banezians. Most important, I stipulate that the genius’s action is (like God’s general
concurrence) contemporaneous with Katie’s decision, though this is by no means a general
feature of all Frankfurt-type examples.
 [27]

2. Contingency and Freedom

voting behavior. If Katie decides on her own to vote for Mondale, he will
do nothing. But if she shows an inclination to decide to vote for Reagan,
then at the very moment of decision he will act in such a way as to
guarantee that she actually decides to vote for Mondale.
There are two cases to consider. Suppose, hrst, that Katie is on the
verge of deciding to vote for Reagan, but that at the very moment of
decision the genius intervenes in such a way as to guarantee that she
decides to vote for Mondale instead. Is her choice free? Obviously not.
Yet the condition stated above is not strong enough to exclude it, since

the genius’s action is contemporaneous with Katie’s decision and hence

not part of the causal history of the world at the moment of decision.

Assuming that the genius’s action is itself free, Katie’s decision is not the
culmination of any deterministic natural tendency.
Clearly, we need an additional clause that focuses on the activity of
causes other than the agent in question at the very moment when the
free action takes place. Consider this:

hitP freely contributes causally to S only if (i) at t P contributes causally to S

and (ii) P’s contributing causally to 5 does not obtain at ^ by a necessity of

nature and (iii) the total causal activity at t of causes other than P is compos-
sible with P’s not causally contributing at t to 5.

(Two or more states of affairs are compossible just in case their conjunc¬
tion is metaphysically possible.)

According to this amended condition, Katie’s deciding to vote for

Mondale is not free if the genius intervenes in the way described above.
For there is no possible world in which he thus intervenes at t and yet in

which Katie fails to decide at t in favor of Mondale. The genius’s contem¬

poraneous causal activity precludes any other choice in each such world.
But what if she decides to vote for Mondale on her own, without any

“assistance” from the genius? Does she then choose freely? My own clear
intuition is that the answer is yes, even though in one fairly obvious sense
she could not have done (or willed) otherwise. Apparently, however, this
is not the sense of “could have done otherwise” which is central to free
action — at least not if our revised necessary condition is correct. For
here once again this condition yields a result that matches intuitive
expectations. If Katie decides on her own to vote for Mondale, the
genius does nothing relevant to her decision at the time she decides, and
it seems utterly obvious that in at least one possible world (perhaps very
remote from ours) in which the genius refrains from intervening at t,
Katie decides not to vote for Mondale.
Though the analogy between God and the genius is imperfect in many
 Introduction
[28]

respects, Katie’s story helps make clear how the debates in sixteenth-
century Catholic theology over the nature of freedom came to focus on

God’s general concurrence, a concurrence that constitutes His contem¬

poraneous causal contribution to creaturely free action. Bahezians reject
the amended condition because they hold that God’s general concur¬
rence with the free actions of creatures is intrinsically efficacious when
those actions are not morally evil and intrinsically inefficacious when they

are. Assume that Katie’s deciding to vote for Mondale is not a morally evil
act. Then, since God’s concurrence with her decision is intrinsically
efficacious, there is no possible world in which God makes just that
contemporaneous causal contribution and in which she refrains from
deciding to vote for Mondale. Banezians must thus reject the revised
condition in order to affirm that Katie decides freely. (Notice, though,

that by substituting “secondary causes” for “causes” in (iii) we arrive at a

condition that no sophisticated Banezian would contest but that no card-
carrying contemporary compatibilist would even think of endorsing.
This is important, since it shows that Banezians are, at least by modern
standards, far from being the sort of crass determinists that Molina
accuses them of being.) Molina, by contrast, can enthusiastically embrace
the amended condition as it stands because he holds that God’s concur¬
rence is intrinsically compossible both with Katie’s deciding to vote for
Mondale and with her not so deciding.

2.10 Indeterminism in Nature

Molina’s official view is that free action is the only type of indeter¬
ministic causation actually found in the created world. In fact, in Dis¬
putation 2 he distinguishes natural causes Irom free causes precisely by
claiming that the former always act by a necessity of nature and are

always determined to one effect.'* ^

Interestingly, however, in Disputation 47 he acknowledges that it is
possible for there to be indeterministic causes not endowed with the
cognitive capacities required for free action:

In this discussion we have not included among the sources of contingency

those effects in which, when commenting on . . . Aristotle’s Physics, we
claimed to find contingency, of the sort found in the shattering of a vase full
of water, by which the water, if it were frozen and there were no external
atmosphere, would rush out to fill the vacuum. For in such a case, if the vase
were in all its parts uniform and of equal resistance, then since there would
be no more reason it should shatter in this part rather than that part —

“^•Rabeneck, p. 14.
 [29]

5- Alternatives to Molinism

though it would necessarily have to shatter, lest there be a vacuum — clearly,

the fracture’s occurring in a given part will be said to happen by chance or
fortune and hence contingently.

Though conceivable, such effects “do not seem to be able to occur in

nature, presumably because the ideal conditions in which they would
be produced cannot be realized in our world.

Since Molina’s time, of course, indeterminism has cropped up in

physics, chemistry, and biology, and although the jury is still out, such
indeterminism seems to be genuinely metaphysical and not just a func¬
tion of our ignorance. Pace Einstein, it appears that God does indeed
play dice with the universe.
Notice, however, that Molina’s theory of divine providence can easily
accommodate indeterminism in nature. This point is overlooked in all
the discussions of Molinism which I know of, mainly because they focus
exclusively on those conditional future contingents that involve free

action. Indeed, many writers simply identify Molina’s theory of middle

knowledge with the thesis that God has prevolitional knowledge of so-
called counterfactuals of freedom, that is, conditional future contingents
specifying how creatures endowed with free choice would freely act in
various hypothetical situations.
This is a mistake that I have tried to avoid above by speaking of
indeterministic secondary causes in general (and not just of free causes)
and of conditional future contingents in general (and not just of counter¬
factuals of freedom). Indeed, if indeterminism in nature is so much as
possible, then counterfactuals of freedom make up only a proper frac¬
tion of what God knows by His middle knowledge. For He also knows by
His middle knowledge how natural indeterministic causes would act in

all possible situations involving them. So on Molina’s view God really can
play dice with the universe, and hence there can be genuine causal
indeterminism in nature. But, Molina insists, a truly provident God
knows by His middle knowledge exactly which numbers will come up on
each roll.

3 Alternatives to Molinism
3. 1 Foreknowledge and Orthodoxy

We are now in a position to investigate the three accounts of divine

foreknowledge which Molina deems his most important competitors. All

“^2 bi
«I Disputation 47, sec. 13.
d.
 Introduction
[30]

of them presuppose as a theological certitude that God has comprehen¬

sive and infallible knowledge of absolute future contingents. Indeed, this
presupposition serves as a touchstone of orthodoxy for both Catholic
and Reformed thinkers in the sixteenth century — and no wonder, given
the extensive support for it in both Scripture and Tradition. Years later
the First Vatican Council was to put the matter officially beyond dispute
for Roman Catholics in its Dogmatic Constitution on the Catholic Faith:

“By His providence God watches over and governs all the things He has
created, reaching from end to end with might and disposing all things

with gentleness (see Wisdom 8:i). ‘All things are exposed and open to
His eyes’ (Hebrews 4:13), even those things that are going to occur by the
free action of creatures. Not surprisingly, then, Molina never se¬
riously entertains the idea that God might lack knowledge of future
contingents. That this idea has gained a foothold in some sectors of
twentieth-century Christian philosophy and theology would no doubt be
a source of consternation not only to him but also to his contemporaries
on both sides of the Reformation — and well it should be, in light of the
intimate connection between foreknowledge and providence.
Molina takes up the rival accounts in Disputations 48-5 1 and 53, Parts
1 and 2. Here I provide just a brief commentary.

3.2 Disputations 48 and 49; The View from Eternity

According to the standard interpretation endorsed by all of the most

important Thomistic commentators before the late sixteenth century
(Cajetan excepted), St. Thomas holds that God knows all future con¬
tingents with certainty solely because future entities, although they do

not yet exist ‘outside their causes’ in time, nonetheless exist in eternity
and so are present to the divine vision. Further, their existence in
eternity is real and not just objective, where objective existence is had by a
thing merely insofar as it is an object of thought.
In the idiom of states of affairs, St. Thomas holds that if FfS) is from
eternity a future contingent and t is still in our future, then S, though it
does not yet obtain in time, obtains from eternity and in eternity as an

object of God’s knowledge of vision. S really obtains in eternity; God’s

knowing it is not merely a matter of His knowing that it will obtain at t.
Indeed, future contingents cannot be known with certainty as future.
What God knows is that 5 now obtains, where ‘now’ designates an ever¬
present eternal duration that admits of no past or future, and the source

Denzinger and A. Schdnmetzer, eds., Enchiridion Symbolorum, 32d ed. (Freiburg,

i963)» 3003 (new numbering), p. 587.
 5- Alternatives to Molinism
[31]

of God’s knowledge, according to the standard interpretation, is just the

fact that 5 obtains in eternity.

Let me provide some background here on God’s relation to time. The

Aristotelian Scholastics generally agree that whereas God’s existence is
metaphysically necessary, the existence of time or temporal succession is
metaphysically contingent, tied directly to change and motion in the

created universe. They thus reject the ‘temporalist’ thesis, popular in

some quarters today, that God is an essentially temporal being and that
time taken as infinite in both directions is the proper durational measure

of God’s being.^^ They hold instead that the proper and adequate
measure of the divine being is eternity and not everlasting time. In itself
eternity is a duration that admits of neither before nor after, since God
has full and perfect being all at once. He alone exists adequately or
properly in eternity. Unlike finite creatures. He is pure actuality and thus
does not have potentialities that need time in order to be actualized; nor
is He subject to losses of perfection that take place over time. He would
still exist and be just as perfect even if there were no such thing as time.
Time is the proper and adequate durational measure only of finite

beings, which are both perfectible and corruptible.'*®

But although God’s eternity is metaphysically independent of time, it
necessarily ‘embraces’ every moment of time that in fact exists. Indeed, it
is because of His eternality that God is temporally omnipresent. Medi¬
eval philosophers often explicate this temporal omnipresence by anal¬
ogy with God’s spatial omnipresence. God is necessarily present by His
being, power, and knowledge to every spatial location that He causes to
exist. That is. He gives being to whatever exists at any place, and He is
able to act or bring about effects at any place, and He has exhaustive
knowledge of whatever transpires at any place. No one place is intrin¬
sically more accessible to Him than any other; all are equally accessible
(or present) to Him and He is equally present to each. So, too, because of
His eternality He is necessarily present by His being, power, and knowl-

“^^The most penetrating defense I have seen of the temporalist thesis is found in Nicholas
Wolterstorff, “God Everlasting,” pp. 77-98 in Steven M. Cahn and David Shatz, eds.,
Contemporary Philosophy of Religion (Oxford, 1982). The best recent defense of the doctrine
of eternity and related doctrines is contained in two long papers by Eleonore Stump and
Norman Kretzmann: “Eternity,” /owma/ of Philosophy 79 (1981): 429—458, and “Absolute
Simplicity,” Faith and Philosophy 2 (1985); 353-382. See also William Hasker, “The Intel¬
ligibility of ‘God is Timeless,’” New Scholasticism 57 (1983): 170—195; and David Burrell,
C.S.C., “God’s Eternity,” Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984): 389—406.
46 Medieval theologians also typically posit a special durational measure for angels, who
are not subject to physical generation and corruption or to physical motion. This measure
is called aevum (aeviternity) and is marked by a succession of discrete cognitional and
volitional states. (See Disputation 49, secs. 22-24). In order to keep my presentation as
simple as possible, I ignore aeviternity in what follows.
 Introduction
[32]

edge to every temporal location that He causes to exist. That is, He gives
being to whatever exists at any time, and He is able to act or bring about
effects at any time, and He has exhaustive knowledge of whatever
transpires at any time. No one time is intrinsically more accessible to
Him than any other; all times are equally accessible (or present) to Him
and He is equally present to each. And it is because of His temporal
omnipresence that time-bound entities, which eydsl adequately or properly
in time, also exist, albeit nonadequately or improperly, in eternity as well.
That is, they are present to God in eternity, but only because of God’s
temporal omnipresence and not because they have eternity as their
proper durational measure.
So creatures exist adequately in time and nonadequately in eternity. We
should not infer, however, that they have two kinds of existence, one
temporal and one eternal. Rather, they exist nonadequately in eternity
with the very same existence by which they exist adequately in time. To
say that they exist in eternity as objects of God’s power and knowledge is
just to say that God is present by His power and knowledge to all the
times at which they exist.
Here, however, there is a parting of ways, at least as Molina sees it. He
holds that just as a place cannot be present to God when it does not exist
(for co-presence is a dyadic relation requiring the existence of both
terms), so too a moment or interval of time cannot be present to God
before it exists (for, once again, co-presence is a dyadic relation requir¬
ing the existence of both terms). This failure of co-presence is not,
Molina emphasizes, due to any defect in God; rather, it is simply due to
the nonexistence of the moment or interval in question. Yet, Molina
laments, Boethius and St. Thomas seem to hold (i) that a future time can
now, in the temporal present, exist in eternity and be present to God in
eternity even though it does not yet exist in its own right and, concomi¬
tantly, (ii) that a merely future entity can now, in the temporal present,
exist in eternity and be present to God in eternity even though it does
not yet exist in time. That is, Boethius and St. Thomas seem to hold that
for any future time t, all the things that will exist at t even now exist in
eternity, and all the states of affairs that will obtain at t even now obtain in
eternity, where ‘now’ designates the temporal present.
To be sure, Molina cheerfully concedes that the proposition ‘All fu¬
ture things exist in eternity’ is true, as long as ‘exist’ expresses the eternal
present.^"^ What he means is simply that there will never be a creature
that exists in time without being present to God in eternity, and this by
virtue of the fact that God’s eternity, as explained above, necessarily

^’See Disputation 48, secs. 9—11, and Disputation 49, secs. 15—16.
 Alternatives to Molinism
[33]

‘embraces’ every moment of time that happens to exist. He vigorously

denies, however, that merely future entities, which do not yet exist in

time, now exist in eternity, where ‘now’ designates the temporal present:

It should not be thought that the things that come to be successively in time
exist in eternity before they exist in time — as though it was because of some
sort of anticipation they have in eternity with respect to existence outside
their causes that they are known with certainty in eternity while they are still
future in time. Yet this is what would have had to be true in order for it to be
the case that it was because of the existence of things in eternity that God
foreknew them with certainty before they came to be true.
But if this was the claim being made by Boethius, St. Thomas, and the
others who affirm on this basis that God knows future contingents with
certainty, then I frankly confess that I do not understand it, nor do I think
that there is any way in which it can be true.^®

Perhaps Molina simply misunderstands Boethius and St. Thomas

here. For it is certainly difficult to imagine either Boethius or St. Thomas
assenting to the claim that merely future things exist in eternity now (that
is, at the present time), even before they come to exist in time. More
probably, Molina is charging that this claim is one that Boethius and St.
Thomas (on the standard interpretation) are logically committed to,
given their account of how God knows future contingents with certainty.
The argument runs like this: In order for the presence of things in

eternity to be the sole source of God’s knowledge of future contingents,

it must be the case that the proposition ‘All future things exist in eternity’
is now true. But this proposition has two readings. If ‘exist’ expresses the
eternal present, then the proposition is true but unhelpful to the de¬
fender of the standard interpretation. For, as we saw above, it merely
asserts that nothing will ever exist in time without also existing in eter¬
nity. What the defender of the standard interpretation needs instead is
the stronger claim that all future things (now) exist in eternity even
though they do not (now) exist in time — and it is for this reason that God
knows with certainty things that are now (in time) future contingents.

But this is just to assert the proposition ‘All future things exist in eter¬
nity’ while taking ‘exist’ to express the temporal, and not the eternal,
present.
I will leave it to others to judge the cogency of this argument. There is,

however, a related point worth tarrying over briefly. Molina’s strong

adherence to the doctrine that God is eternal does not deter him from

using tensed language when speaking of God’s knowledge of and causal

^^Disputation 49, sec. 16.

[34] Introduction

influence on temporal creatures. He apparently takes such language to

be permissible and, indeed, appropriate as long as it is carefully dissoci¬
ated from the temporalist thesis that God’s act of understanding and act
of willing are properly and adequately measured by time. So, it seems,
according to Molina it is perfectly correct to assert, St. Thomas, that
God knows future contingents with certainty as future. At the very least
we can say this much: An absolute future contingent P{S) is known by

God with certainty prior — at least conceptually prior — to S’s obtaining

in either time or eternity.
So Molina has certain difficulties with the way St. Thomas under¬
stands and employs the concept of eternity. Still, this is not his only, or
even his most penetrating, objection to the view embodied by the stan¬
dard interpretation. In fact, the objections that follow have force even if
we grant provisionally that future contingents are even now really pres¬
ent in eternity as objects of God’s knowledge.
The hrst objection is that the standard interpretation cannot account

for God’s knowledge of all future contingents. In particular, the pres¬

ence of things in eternity cannot be a source of certitude regarding
conditioned future contingents, since the antecedents and consequents of
conditioned future contingents never obtain in time and hence do not
obtain in eternity either. Yet it is clear from Sacred Scripture that God
knows conditioned future contingents. For instance, Christ knew that
the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would have repented and been con¬
verted if the wonders worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida had been
worked in their presence (Matt. ii). Similarly, God revealed to David
that if he stayed in Keilah, Saul would invade, and, further, if David
stayed and Saul invaded, then the men of Keilah would hand David over
to Saul (i Sam. 23). So David fled. Again, Wisdom 4 tells us that God
often takes the virtuous from this life prematurely because He knows
that they would become corrupted by sin if they were to live longer. (In
Section 5.2 I briefly discuss Molina’s use of these biblical texts.)
Notice, this objection is one that Banezians endorse wholeheartedly.
They, too, believe that God knows conditioned as well as absolute future
contingents, and they, too, hold that this knowledge of conditioned
future contingents cannot have as its source the presence of things in
eternity. Their problem with Molina has to do instead with his claim

^^See Disputation 49, sec. 9.

^^Garrigou-Lagrange claims that St. Thomas makes use of the notion of eternity not to
explain the source of God’s foreknowledge of future contingents, but instead to demon¬
strate that this foreknowledge is intuitive rather than inferential. See The One God, p. 454.
According to both Molinists and Banezians, God’s knowledge of absolute future con¬
tingents is based on His prevolitional knowledge, but is not inferred from the latter in any way
that involves a process of reasoning. God has all His knowledge from eternity, despite the
fact that some part of that knowledge is conceptually prior to other parts.
 5- Alternatives to Molinism [35]

that the knowledge in question is prevolitional rather than the result of

God’s free act of will.
So the presence of things in eternity cannot be the source of God’s
knowledge of conditioned future contingents. Nor, Molina argues fur¬
ther, can it be the source even of God’s knowledge of absolute future
contingents. For, as we saw in Section 1, if God is truly provident, then
He has perfect knowledge of absolute future contingents simply by
virtue of (i) His prevolitional knowledge of what would happen given
any possible causal activity on His part, and (ii) His knowledge of the
actual causal contribution He freely wills to make to the created world.

So if P{S) is an absolute future contingent, then S’s actual obtaining,

whether in time or eternity, is conceptually posterior to God’s knowl¬
edge of P{S). For this reason S’s actually obtaining at t adds not a whit of
certitude or perfection to God’s knowledge. God does not need future
things to be present in eternity in order to know them; He knows them
‘in’ His own act of will. So, Molina concludes, the presence of things in
eternity is wholly irrelevant to the question of how a perfectly provident
being comes to know absolute future contingents.^^ And this, too, is an
objection Bahezians acquiesce in, though they deny with good reason
that it counts against what St. Thomas actually said — even if it does
count against the view commentators standardly attribute to him.
The third objection also invokes the doctrine of providence. If God is
perfectly provident, then His specihcally willing or permitting a given
contingent effect S cannot be conceptually posterior to His knowing
with certainty that S does or will obtain. Otherwise His willing or permit¬
ting S would be a reaction to something already accomplished and known
prior to His specific approbation or permission; His particular knowl¬
edge of S would in effect prevolitional. But a perfectly provident being
knows each absolute future contingent in, and not before, His specifically
willing or permitting it. It is up to Him to decide which future con¬
tingents are absolute and which will remain forever merely conditioned.
And His knowledge of absolute future contingents follows upon and
cannot precede this choice.
The standard interpretation seems to violate this stricture by using
perceptual metaphors that strongly suggest the following conceptual
sequence: A future contingent effect is first there to be seen by God;
then it is in fact seen and known by God; and only then is it specifically

Disputation 49, sec. 15, Molina says: “The proposition ‘From eternity all things
coexist with God or are present to God with their own existence outside their causes,’ taken
in the sense explained in the preceding disputation, contributes nothing, as I see it, either
toward establishing the certitude of divine foreknowledge concerning future contingents
or toward reconciling the contingency of things with divine foreknowledge.”
 Introduction
[36]

decreed, that is, willed or permitted by Him, depending on whether or

not He approves of what He sees.
This, of course, is just the reverse of what the doctrine of providence
requires, at least as Molina sees it. And not only Molina. For St. Thomas
himself says the very same thing in many places. That is why Bahezians
argue that the standard interpretation is mistaken and that St. Thomas
could not have held that the presence of things in eternity is the sole and

sufficient source of God’s knowledge of future contingents. We now

turn to the Bahezian version of Thomism.

3.3 Disputations 50 and 55; Divine Predeterminations

What I have dubbed Bahezianism actually encompasses several dis¬

tinct theories that agree on primary principles but, as Disputation 53
attests, diverge on various subtleties. I will try to give a clear presentation
of the fundamentals here. ^2
Bahezians and Molinists concur that a provident God has within Him¬
self the resources to know all future contingents with certainty. Crea¬
tures do not cause God to have knowledge of them; rather, by His own
act of will God Himself brings it about from eternity that He knows
absolute future contingents. The origins of this knowledge lie entirely in
(i) His prevolitional knowledge and (ii) His free causal contribution to
the created world.
But what exact role is to be attributed to each of these elements?

Molina begins with a strong account of freedom and causal indetermin¬

ism according to which God’s causal contribution to the contingent
effects of secondary causes is not by its intrinsic nature efficacious with
respect to those effects — even the good ones. So in order for God to
have knowledge of absolute future contingents. He must know prevoli-
tionally exactly which contingent effects would in fact result from His
(intrinsically neutral) concurrence with any possible array of secondary
causes. It follows that some metaphysically contingent states of affairs,
namely, conditional future contingents, obtain prior to and hence inde¬
pendently of God’s willing or permitting them to obtain.
Whereas Molina starts ‘from below’ with creaturely freedom, Bahez¬
ians begin ‘from above’ by stressing that God is sovereign and the source

^2 Here I follow Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 449-473. The main parameters of
Bahez’s theory are contained in his Scholastica Cornmentaria in Primam Partem Summae
Theologicae S. Thomae Aquinatis, first published in 1585. A modern edition, edited by Luis
Urbano, O.P., appeared in Madrid in 1934. Molina’s discussion of this theory is far richer in
arguments and details than my presentation here might suggest, so I urge the reader to
look carefully at Disputation 50 and the first two parts of Disputation 53.
 5- Alternatives to Molinism [37]

of all goodness. Because God is sovereign, they claim, no metaphysically

contingent state of affairs, not even a conditional future contingent, can
obtain without His antecedent approbation or permission. Inasmuch as
God is the source of all goodness, no good effect can be produced by
creatures without His intrinsically efficacious concurrence. If God’s con¬
currence were intrinsically neutral instead, then His causal contribution
in any given case could result in either a good effect or an evil effect —
which is both absurd and contrary to the faith. Still, both faith and
reason also teach us that some creatures have the power of free choice.
So the indeterminism proper to freedom must, pace Molina, be defined
as nondetermination by secondary causes only.
We should note in passing that the dispute over efficacious concur¬
rence is not confined to the natural order. Catholics believe that through

Christ’s salvific act God beneficently confers supernatural grace on hu¬

man beings. More pertinent, by His actual grace He (i) antecedently
empowers and disposes us to elicit free acts that are supernaturally
meritorious as well as morally good {prevenient actual grace) and (ii) con¬
temporaneously concurs with such acts {cooperating actual grace). Pre¬
dictably, Banezians contend that cooperating grace is intrinsically effica¬
cious when good acts ensue and intrinsically inefficacious or merely
sufficient when evil acts ensue. Molina counters that although actual
grace is a supernatural influence on us that inclines and incites us to act
well, it is not in itself efficacious or inefficacious, but is instead efficacious
or inefficacious only because of our free cooperation with it or freely
chosen lack thereof.
So on the Banezian scheme God foreknows ih^good contingent effects
of created agents just because He causally predetermines those effects.
The evil effects He knows by the very fact that He has not efficaciously
concurred with their causes to produce the corresponding good effects.
I will return to this last point, but first I must fill out the Banezian picture
in a way that highlights its differences with Molinism.
Let us say that God is in a creation situation when (as we conceive it) He
possesses prevolitional knowledge but has not yet decided what to will or
permit.^^ At this stage, Banezians aver, God has only natural knowledge
of metaphysically necessary states of affairs. Despite His ultimate con¬
trol over all contingent states of affairs. He has not yet decided which
ones will obtain.

Suppose that F^{S) on // is a metaphysically contingent state of affairs

which would be a conditional future contingent if it obtained, and

^^Once again, despite my use of temporal language, the ordering relations invoked here
are meant to be conceptual and not temporal.
 Introduction
[38]

suppose further that 5 would be a good effect were it to obtain at t in

situation H. Note that if this conditional is indeed contingent, H does not

specify the intrinsic character of God’s concurrence with the causes of 5.

At most, H can say only that God does concur, leaving open the question
of whether this concurrence is intrinsically efficacious or intrinsically
inefficacious.
Unlike Molina, Banezians hold that in a creation situation God does
not yet know whether P{S) on H obtains. That is up to Him to decide.
Yet by His natural knowledge He does know that F^{S) on H would obtain
and be a conditional future contingent if He were to resolve that in the
event that H obtained at t, He would grant intrinsically efficacious
concurrence to the causes of 5. This is a metaphysically necessary truth.
Likewise, by His natural knowledge God knows that P(>S) on H would not
obtain if He resolved that in the event that H should obtain at t, He
would grant only inefficacious concurrence to the relevant causes. This,
too, is a metaphysically necessary truth.

Now, Molinists and Banezians all believe that a provident being’s

creative act of will is absolutely comprehensive; God decides from eter¬
nity not only what He will in fact do but also what He would have done in
situations that will never obtain but might have obtained. He knows, for
instance, whether the Incarnation would have occurred even if Adam
had not sinned.
Banezians may properly hold, then, that what God does first (as we
conceive it) in a creation situation is to determine which states of affairs
are conditional future contingents. He does this by deciding, for each
possible ordering H of created causes capable of producing a good
contingent effect, whether or not He will grant intrinsically efficacious
concurrence to the relevant indeterministic causes in the event that H
should obtain. Given His resultant free knowledge of conditional future
contingents. He then decides which of the antecedents of these condi¬
tionals He decrees (that is, wills or permits) to obtain. This gives Him
knowledge of all those absolute future contingents that He predeter¬
mines by His efficacious concurrence.
But what of the evil effects that God only permits and does not
causally predetermine? How does He know them?
Banezians disagree on the fine points here, but all of them hold that
the very fact that God does not causally predetermine an intended good

^^The following reconstruction is my own, though it seems to be perfectly consistent with

the main Bahezian sources I have consulted and with what Molina says about the Banezian
theory in Disputation 53, pt. 3, secs. 10—18. What’s more, the modern Molinist Louis Billot,
S.J., attributes the same sequential ordering of divine decrees to his Thomistic opponents
in De Deo Uno et Trino (Rome, 1926), p. 211.
 5- Alternatives to Molinism [39]

effect 5 in an actual situation H entails that S will not obtain in H. So by

antecedently resolving to act by merely sufficient concurrence to pro¬
duce S in H, God knows with certainty that S will not obtain in H. If, for
example, God does not predetermine, via His intrinsically efficacious

grace, the intended effect of Judas’s repenting, it follows directly that

Judas will not repent — even though God intends that he repent and
grants him grace sufficient for, albeit merely sufficient for, repentance.
And so, too, for every other evil effect.
Molina, needless to say, has grave reservations about this account of

God’s knowledge of future contingents. Three of the objections I cite

below concern God’s relation to evil effects, and the last has to do with
the Bahezian conception of freedom.
The hrst charge is that Bahezians lack an explanation of the detailed
knowledge God has of evil effects. It is not enough simply to show how
God knows that a good effect will not obtain; one must also show how
God knows exactly which evil effects will obtain instead. Take the state of

affairs of Peter’s remaining loyal to Christ in H, where H is the situation

in which Peter in fact freely denies Christ. Given that God’s concurrence
with Peter in H is in itself merely sufficient to produce the intended

effect of Peter’s remaining loyal, it follows only that Peter will not remain
loyal. But there are any number of ways in which Peter might deny
Christ, any number of intentions he might act on, different degrees of
cowardice or outright malice his act might evince, different words he
might use. How can God know all the relevant details with precision,

given only His prior resolution not to causally predetermine Peter’s

remaining loyal in //?
Banezians are not without resources here. One possible strategy is to
argue that many components of evil effects are not themselves intrin¬
sically evil and hence are such that God might causally predetermine

them. There is nothing inherently wrong, for instance, with Peter’s

uttering the words “I have never seen him before in my life.” On
occasion, his so speaking might be positively virtuous. So even in H, the
claim goes, God can efficaciously concur in the production of this ele¬
ment of Peter’s sin. The promise is that if we follow this course to the

^^For Molina’s discussion of the Bahezian account of the causal genesis of evil effects, see
esp. Disputation 50, secs. 11 — 14, Disputation 53, pt. 2, secs. 1—9. Interestingly, this
account is meant to apply to natural as well as to moral evil. That is to say, God sometimes
permits natural effects (for example, birth defects) which He does not intend, just as He
sometimes permits moral evils that He does not intend. Christians believe that God, as the
Lord of history, invariably orders such evils, whether they are natural or moral, toward
some further goods. (Notice, however, that it does not follow from this belief that those
further goods provide the reason for God’s permission of the relevant evils. This is a
separate matter.) Below I limit my examples to moral evils.
 Introduction
[40]

end, we will reach a unique and fully determinate evil state of affairs that
is produced in H just in case God fails to predetermine the intended
effect but does predetermine each of the nonevil components of the evil
effect that is instead produced.

Molina retorts that Peter’s sin just consists in his saying the relevant
words in circumstances H. The fact that it is not always wrong for him to
speak in this way is beside the point. What is crucial is that his doing so in
H constitutes a sin, and so if God predetermined rather thdiO yosi permitted
Peter to utter these words while in H, then God Himself would be to
blame.

The strategy in question and Molina’s response to it plunge us deep

into the murkiest issues in action theory, issues I will not pursue here.^®
Molina reports in any case that neither Banez nor Zumel himself relies
on this strategy. Yet what positive alternative do they have to offer? How

exactly will they explain God’s detailed knowledge of evil without ap¬
pealing either to middle knowledge or to divine predetermination of evil
effects? They surely want to avoid claiming that when God does not
predetermine a free agent to a good effect, the agent is led by a necessity
of nature into a unique sinful action. This is just the error that Catholics
accuse the Reformers of making, as Molina is only too happy to point
out.

Molina’s second objection aims to discredit what Bahezians consider a

chief virtue of their account, namely, the radical asymmetry they posit in

God’s causal contribution to good and evil effects. Molina points out that
a sinful act might possibly differ from a virtuous counterpart only in,
say, some historical circumstance. For instance, it could be that the very
same act of sexual intercourse, with all its physical and psychological
components, is virtuous if the agents are married but sinful if they are

not. Suppose further that the history of the couple’s relationship in the
two cases is exactly similar except for a brief visit to a priest. Is it not silly,

Molina asks, to think that God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence is

required in the one case but not in the other? After all, if the agents are
capable of performing the act without intrinsically efficacious concur¬
rence when it is sinful, why should they not likewise be capable of
performing the same act without intrinsically efficacious concurrence
when it is virtuous?

56 How, for instance, are actions individuated? Is Peter’s uttering the relevant words at T
a distinct action from his uttering those words at T while in circumstances f/P If so, does it
follow that these two actions might have distinct causal histories, so that God could
efficaciously concur in the production of the one but not of the other? Or is there, rather,
just one action here with several components? If so, what is the relationship between an
action and its components? How is the causal history of the various components related to
the causal history of the action itself?
 3- Alternatives to Molinism

[41]
Third, how can Banezians affirm that God truly intends the good
effects He chooses not to predetermine by His intrinsically efficacious
concurrence? If God really intends for Judas to repent and if He can
bring this about simply by granting Judas intrinsically efficacious grace,
then why does He refrain from doing so? More generally, why fault
creatures for their sinful actions if those actions invariably result from the

mere absence of God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence?

This leads us directly to Molina’s fundamental philosophical problem
with Banezianism, its conception of creaturely freedom. As we saw
above, Banezians are not compatibilists in any standard sense. They
deny that free acts can result from deterministic natural tendencies; they
even go so far as to accept the condition that an act occurring at a time t is
free only if some contrary act is compossible with the activity at t of all
secondary causes other than the agent of the act in question. They thus
reject what the modern Bahezian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange labels
“determinism of the circumstances.”^'^
Yet Molina insists repeatedly that this is not enough. He argues in

effect that the intrinsic nature of God’s concurrence just is one of the
circumstances of human action. So if that concurrence is intrinsically
efficacious or inefficacious and not intrinsically neutral, then putatively
free creatures are little more than puppets in the hands of God, and God
alone is free.
In the same vein, Molina accuses his opponents of distorting what
Christ says in Matthew 11. For if the Banezians are right, then the

Tyronians and Sidonians would not be converted by Christ’s miracles

unless God in addition concurred with their acts of faith by His intrin¬
sically efficacious grace. Yet such grace would have likewise effected the
conversion of the people of Chorozain and Bethsaida if it had been
granted to them. How, then, can we resist concluding that any differ¬
ences between the two groups are traceable not to their own actual or

potential use of free choice but rather solely to God’s prior resolution to
confer intrinsically efficacious concurrence in the one case but not in the
other? But then it seems utterly unjust of Jesus to reproach the residents
of Chorozain and Bethsaida for their lack of faith and to compare them
unfavorably with their neighbors.
Banezians respond that their account of freedom is both philosophi¬
cally sound and, unlike Molina’s, fully consistent with the doctrine that
God is the ultimate source of all goodness. Moreover, God’s transcen¬
dence makes it perfectly appropriate to hold that His concurrence is not
one of the circumstances of the free actions of creatures. As St. Thomas

^'^Garrigou-Lagrange, The One God, pp. 461 and 465.

 Introduction
[42]

makes clear, God stands wholly outside the order of created causes; He
determines not only the good effects themselves but even the modality
with which they are produced. Thus, God can causally predetermine that a

good effect should be brought about freely by secondary causes.^® What’s

more, God’s efficacious grace necessarily acts in harmony with free
choice. Suppose that Peter has just performed a good action under the
influence of God’s efficacious grace. Banezians can still consistently hold
that if Peter had chosen to perform an evil action instead, God would not
have conferred intrinsically efficacious grace on him. So even though

Peter’s action necessarily results from God’s intrinsically efficacious

grace, that grace is efficacious only in cooperation with creaturely free
choice.
Though Banezians fail to qualify as modern compatibilists, the above
exchange is nonetheless redolent of the familiar debate between liber¬
tarians and compatibilists. My own sympathies lie with Molina, but I
realize that the prospects for a conclusive victory are dim at best. Still, as
I noted in Section 2.9, there are sound intuitive grounds for accepting
the strong necessary condition on freedom which separates Molinists
from Banezians. In fact, if St. Thomas is right in holding that a transcen¬
dent being alone can contemporaneously move a created will directly
and from within, then only God can actually assume the role played by

the genius in Katie’s story. But in the case of Katie many of us had clear
intuitions confirming the Molinist contention that when the genius

intervenes efficaciously, Katie’s decision is not free — and this despite the
fact that the genius acts only ‘through’ her will. So even if Molina is rash
in claiming that Bahezianism obviously annihilates human freedom, Mo¬
linist freedom is surely undeserving of the epithet “I know not what
freedom” hurled at it, Molina reports, by one of his more ardent antago¬
nists.^^

3.4 Disputation yi: Concomitant Decrees

Molina and Bahez agree (i) that God’s decreeing (willing or permit¬
ting) that a contingent effect S will obtain is prior, in our way of conceiv¬
ing it, to His knowing from eternity that S will obtain and (ii) that this
eternal knowledge that S will obtain is in turn prior to S’s actually
obtaining in time. To be sure, Molina denies, where S is good, that S is
causally predetermined by God and, where S is evil, that S results from
the mere absence of God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence. Still, on

^®See, e.g., Aquinas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 19, a. 8. For a sustained defense of this claim,
see Garrigou-Lagrange, God: His Existence and Nature (St. Louis, 1936), pp. 71—91.
^^Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. 20.
 [43]
5- Alternatives to Molinism

the Molinist scheme good contingent effects are predetermined in that by

His middle knowledge God plans for them in detail and knows that they
will ensue given the total causal contribution He has willed to make to
the created world. Likewise, evil effects are antecedently permitted in that
by His middle knowledge God allows for them in detail and knows that
they will ensue given that same causal contribution. So despite their
quarrels, Molina and Bahez agree that by His act of will God brings it
about that He knows each absolute future contingent P{S) from eter¬
nity, prior to and independently of S’s obtaining in time. This knowl¬
edge simply flows from His having antecedently ordered all of creation
as the Lord of history.
In Disputation 51 Molina examines a position whose leading princi¬
ples are shared by any attempt to find a viable alternative to Banezianism

and Molinism. All sides hold that God’s decreeing and knowing a con¬
tingent effect cannot posterior to its obtaining. Otherwise, God would
not be truly provident. But, the claim goes, the causal indeterminism

involved in contingent effects also rules out the idea that God’s decree¬
ing and knowing them is prior, in our way of conceiving it, to their

obtaining. It follows that, for any future contingent F{S), (i) God’s
decreeing F{S), (ii) His knowing F{S), and (iii) 5’s obtaining are all
simultaneous or concomitant.

This argument for the ‘concomitance theory’ r^sts upon two presup¬
positions. The first is that a contingent effect 5 has metaphysical deter-
minacy or certitude only when, and not before, 5 is produced by its causes.
This principle, endorsed by Molina, rests on a strong account of indeter¬
minism which directly excludes causal predeterminations of the Banez-
ian ilk.^o The second presupposition is that until a contingent effect S
has metaphysical certitude, no one, not even God, can have epistemic certi¬
tude with respect to F{S). This premise, accepted by Banezians, cuts
against Molinism. For a key Molinist tenet is that middle knowledge
gives God epistemic certitude with respect to each absolute future con¬
tingent F{S) prior to 5’s having metaphysical certitude. As Molina puts it,
God knows with (epistemic) certainty what is in itself (metaphysically)
uncertain.^!
The two presuppositions together entail the seeming paradox that
God can foreknow with certainty that a contingent effect S will obtain at

60 More precisely, a contingent state of affairs 5 has metaphysical certitude only after
each of the indeterministic causes in its causal ancestry has acted. After that time 5 either
actually obtains (category C effect) or is completely present in its deterministic causes
(category D effect). So, strictly speaking, a contingent effect of category D will have
metaphysical certitude before it obtains. I will, however, ignore this complication below.
o^See, e.g.. Disputation 52, secs. 33 and 35.
[44]
Introduction

a time t only if He already knows with certainty that S does obtain at t. So

it is no surprise that writers like William James and Peter Geach should
appeal to such premises in rejecting the classical doctrine that God has
comprehensive knowledge of the contingent future. Concomitance
theorists, however, shy away from this radical move. They contend
instead that when a contingent effect S comes to obtain at a time t, then
at t itself God concomitantly causes it to be the case that He has always
known P{S). Likewise, at t itself concomitantly causes it to be the case

that he has always decreed FfS). This is the ‘temporalist’ version of the
theory. According to the ‘eternalist’ version, God’s knowing and willing
are properly measured by eternity, and so it is better to say that as (and
not before) contingent effects occur in time, God concomitantly causes it
to be the case that He eternally knows and decrees them.
Although concomitance theorists thus allow for comprehensive divine
knowledge of the contingent future, their clear intent is to deny, a la
James and Geach, that God antecedently plots out in detail the whole
history of the world, complete with all its contingent effects. The most
that God can do antecedently is to decide how He will accommodate
each possible eventuality, so that as history unfolds He can keep inte¬
grating the way things in fact turn out into a unified eternal plan. If
Peter freely sins at T, then at T God concomitantly causes it to be the case
that He eternally permits Peter to sin at T and eternally knows that he
will sin at T. If Peter instead acts virtuously at T, then at T God concomi¬
tantly causes it to be the case that it is Peter’s acting well at T, and not his
sinning, that is eternally part of the divine scheme. But at times before T

neither Peter’s sinning at T nor his acting well at T is as yet fixed

unalterably as part of God’s eternal plan. So God’s foreknowledge of
future contingents is in no way a function of antecedent providential
decrees.
Temporalist proponents of the theory must attribute to God at least
limited power over the past. They typically claim along Ockhamist lines
that even though the ‘hard’ causal history of the world is now acciden¬
tally necessary and so unalterable by any human or divine power, many

‘soft’ facts about the past, including facts about God’s past knowledge of
absolute future contingents, are accidentally contingent and still subject
to human or at least divine power.^^ For instance, even if it was true ten

^^See James, “The Dilemma of Determinism,” pp. 145—183 in The Will to Believe and
Other Essays in Popular Philosophy (New York, 1897, 1956); and Geach, Providence and Evil,

pp. 40-66.
®^For more on the distinction between hard and soft facts, see Marilyn Adams, “Is the
Existence of God a ‘Hard’ Fact?” Philosophical Review 76 (1967): 492— 503; Joshua Hoffman
and Gary Rosenkrantz, “Hard Facts and Soft Facts,” Philosophical Review 93 (1984): 419—
 5- Alternatives to Molinism [45]

years ago that Peter would sin at T, where T is in our future, this soft fact

about the past is now accidentally contingent and still within Peter’s
power to render false. Peter, of course, will not exercise the power in
question at T, but this does not mean that he lacks it. Likewise, even if
God knew ten years ago that Peter would sin at T, where T is in our

future, this soft fact about God’s past knowledge is now accidentally
contingent. God will still have the power at T to cause it to be the case
that He has always known that Peter would not sin at T. Given that Peter
in fact sins at T, it follows only that God does not exercise this power at T,

not that He lacks it. Prior to T, then, God’s eternal plan is still flexible
enough to accommodate whatever free choice Peter makes.

We can easily anticipate two of Molina’s objections to the concomi¬

tance theory. First, though this theory pays lip service to God’s knowl¬
edge of future contingents, its advocates hold both that God’s prevoli-
tional knowledge is merely natural and that His contribution to
contingent effects is neither intrinsically efficacious nor intrinsically
inefficacious. They are thus forced to deny, against the doctrine of

providence, that God’s knowledge of the contingent future arises solely

from the conjunction of His prevolitional knowledge with His knowl¬
edge of His own causal contribution to the world. Far from God’s
providing for future contingents. He literally reacts to them as to effects
brought about independently of His specific approval or permission.
Second, the concomitance theory does not explain the source of, and

perhaps does not even allow for, God’s knowledge of conditional future
contingents, since it invokes neither middle knowledge nor predeter¬
mining decrees. In this regard it resembles the standard interpretation
of St. Thomas.
But Molina breaks new ground by claiming, third, that any version of
the concomitance theory must attribute to God not only power over soft
facts about the past but also power over the hard causal history of the
world. The most engaging argument for this claim occurs in section 19

of Disputation 51 and concerns Christ’s prophecy of Peter’s denial.

At T Jesus utters the Aramaic for “You will deny me three times.”
Concomitance theorists hold that before T*, the time of the denial,
Peter’s sin is not yet a fixed part of God’s plan. But in that case, argues
Molina, neither is Christ’s utterance. For suppose Peter refrains from
sinning at T*. Then, on the concomitance theory, at T’* God will cause it
to be true that He has always known (or eternally knows) that Peter will

434; and John Martin Fischer, “Freedom and Foreknowledge” and “Hard-Type Soft
Facts,” Philosophical Review 95 (1986): 591-601. In “Accidental Necessity and Logical
Determinism” I attempted to draw a similar distinction between two senses of the expres¬
sion ‘the history of the world’.
 Introduction
[46]

not deny Christ at 7"*. But what of Christ’s previous utterance? At 7"* the
fact that Christ has already made this utterance is clearly part of the

world’s causal history. It is a hard fact about the past by anyone’s reckon¬
ing. Now if this fact cannot be altered at T*, then the alleged prophecy
will have been false. But this is absurd, since the God-man cannot err in
this manner. The only way out for concomitance theorists is to claim that
if Peter does not sin at T*, then at T* God will cause it to be the case that
Christ did not utter the words in question at T. But this is to attribute to
God power over a hard fact about the past — which even concomitance
theorists admit is absurd.
I will return to the problem of prophecy in Section 4. Note for now
that Molina rejects the Ockhamist distinction between the hard and the
soft past, at least insofar as this distinction is meant to undergird the
thesis that there is power (albeit limited power) over the past. To the
contrary, he holds that the schema

Agent P has the power at t to contribute causally to 5’s obtaining before t

never expresses a truth. Nonetheless, Molina insists (i) that Peter has at
T* the power to refrain from sinning and (ii) that if he were to exercise
this power, then Christ would never have uttered the dire prophetic
words. That is, the corresponding schema

Agent P has the power at t to contribute causally to 5*’s obtaining at or after

t\ and if 5* were going to obtain at or after t, then S would never have
obtained before t

may express a truth even if S is past-tense and already at t part of the

causal history of the world. Below I will show how Molina reaches these
conclusions and argue that his solution to the problem of prophecy far
outstrips its competitors.

4 The Theory of Middle Knowledge

4.1 Preliminary Remarks

Like Molina, I have laid out the essentials of the theory of middle

knowledge while treating the alternative accounts of God’s knowledge of

future contingents, especially Bahezianism. Following the contours of
Disputation 52, I will now hrst hll in the more signihcant details of the
theory and then show how Molina reconciles divine foreknowledge with
creaturely freedom.
 [47]
4. The Theory of Middle Knowledge

4.2 Divine Knowledge: Natural, Middle, and Free

As noted above, middle knowledge derives its name from the fact that

it stands ‘midway’ between natural knowledge and free knowledge. Like

natural knowledge but unlike free knowledge, middle knowledge is
prevolitional, with the result that God has no more control over the
states of affairs He knows through His middle knowledge than He does
over the states of affairs He knows through His natural knowledge. Like
free knowledge but unlike natural knowledge, middle knowledge is such
that the states of affairs known through it might have failed to obtain,
with the result that what God knows through His middle knowledge may
vary from one possible world to another just as what He knows through
His free knowledge may vary from one possible world to another. So
God has middle knowledge only if He knows some metaphysically con¬
tingent states of affairs over which He has no control.
There is another way in which middle knowledge lies between natural
and free knowledge. Natural knowledge has among its objects all the
possible future contingents, whereas free knowledge has among its ob¬
jects all actual or absolute future contingents. By contrast, middle knowl¬
edge has as its objects conditional or subjunctive future contingents that

stand ‘between’ the actual and the merely possible. By His natural
knowledge God knows that it is metaphysically possible but not meta¬
physically necessary that Adam will sin if placed in the garden; by His
free knowledge He knows that Adam will in fact be placed in the garden
and will in fact sin. What He knows by His middle knowledge, on the
other hand, is something stronger than the former but weaker than the
latter, namely, that Adam will sin on the condition that he be placed in the
garden. So God has middle knowledge only if He knows all the condi¬
tional future contingents.
As stressed above, however, this necessary condition is not sufficient.
For even Bahezians, who vehemently repudiate middle knowledge,
cheerfully concede that God knows conditional future contingents. So
we must combine the two conditions and say that God has middle
knowledge if and only if He has comprehensive prevolitional knowledge
of conditional future contingents.

4.3 Creation Situations and Divine Power

As characterized in Section 3, a creation situation reflects the extent of

God’s prevolitional knowledge. In fact, we might simply define the

creation situation for a world w {CS{w)) as the set that has as members all

and only those states of affairs which God knows prevolitionally in w‘,
 Introduction
[48]

and we can say that a creation situation obtains just in case each of its
members obtains. If we grant that God exists and is all-knowing in every
possible world, it follows that each world contains a creation situation.
Creation situations mark the range of the divine power or, better, the
range of effects that may issue, directly or via secondary causes, from
exercises of that power. In other words, creation situations constitute the
antecedently hxed frameworks within which God operates as a cause.
So, as intimated above, God has no control over the states of affairs that
belong to the creation situation He finds Himself in. What He does have
control over is each state of affairs that is such that neither it nor its
complement is a member of that creation situation.
Banezians hold that the only prevolitional knowledge God has or can
have is natural knowledge, and that He has this knowledge in every
possible world. So for any worlds w and CS{w) is the same as CS{w^).
That is, there is just one possible creation situation, namely, the set, call
it N, which has as members all and only the metaphysically necessary
states of affairs. On the Banezian view, then, it is a necessary truth that
God has control over every metaphysically contingent state of affairs.
Molina, to be sure, believes that any creation situation contains N as a
subset. He also agrees that any creation situation obtains in, and hence is
shared by, many distinct possible worlds. For this is just to say that in any
creation situation God has alternative courses of action to choose from,
each culminating in the actualization of a distinct possible world. In
contrast to Banezianism, however, Molinism entails that there are
many — indeed, uncountably many — distinct creation situations, each
containing, in addition to A^, a full complement of mutually compossible
conditional future contingents known by God through His middle
knowledge. More formally,

CS(w) is a Molinist creation situation if and only if CS{w) is a set of states of

affairs such that (i) every member of is a member of C5(a;) and (ii) for any
pair of potential conditional future contingents of the form P{S) on H and
P{not-S) on H, the one that obtains in re is a member of CS{w) and (iii) every
metaphysically contingent state of affairs included (or entailed) by the
conjunction of two or more members of CS{w) is itself a member of

Each creation situation CS{w) defines a set of possible worlds which

has as members all and only those worlds in which CS{w) obtains.

last condition ensures that truth-functional compounds of conditional future

contingents belonging to CS{w) will themselves belong to CS(w). It also ensures that the
complement of a conditional future contingent 5 belongs to just in case 5 does not
itself belong to CS{w).
 [49]
4^ The Theory of Middle Kiiowledge

Following Thomas Flint, I will call this set the galaxy for CS{w).^^ Thus a
world w* is a member of the galaxy for CS{w) if and only if C5(w*) is the
same as CS{w). Since distinct creation situations are mutually incompat¬
ible, each possible world belongs to at most one galaxy. What’s more, it
follows from what was said above that each possible world belongs to at
least one galaxy. So creation situations divide the held of possible worlds
into groups, namely, the galaxies, which are mutually exclusive and
jointly exhaustive.
Intuitively, the galaxy for CS{w) has as members the only worlds that
God can antecedently arrange to be actualized, by His own power and
that of secondary causes, should He hnd himself in CS(w). For instance,
if He knows prevolitionally in CS(w) that Adam will sin if placed in H,
then He cannot arrange things in such a way that Adam will be in H and
yet not sin. For no world that includes this absolute future contingent is a
member of the galaxy for CS{w). Of course, even if God in fact puts
Adam into H, He still intends that Adam not sin. And it may even be true
in CS{w) that there is a situation very much like H in which Adam would
not freely sin. Nonetheless, H itself is such that if God antecedently wills
or permits it to obtain, then Adam will sin by his own free choice. Over
this fact God has no control, since He has no control over which creation
situation actually obtains. In general, if God finds Himself in CS{w),
then He is able to decree that a world tc* be actualized if and only if
is the same as CS{w), that is, if and only if is a member of the

galaxy for CS{w) and hence accessible to God’s providential decrees.

And unlike Banezianism, Molinism entails that for any creation situa¬
tion CS{w) there will be possible worlds that God cannot antecedently
decree to be actualized should He find Himself in
Though a Molinist creation situation puts more restrictions on the

exercise of God’s power than does its Banezian analog, ample room is
left for the execution of divine providence — or so, at least, Molina
claims. First, it is still entirely up to God whether or not to create
anything at all.®^ Second, it is still true that no creature can produce even
the most trifling effect unless God cooperates with it by His general
concurrence. Third, any good act effected by a free creature requires, in
addition to divine general concurrence, the particular though nondeter-

®^See Thomas P. Flint, “The Problem of Divine Freedom,” American Philosophical Quar¬
terly 20 25^-264.
66This is the thrust of Alvin Plantinga’s argument against ‘Leibniz’s Lapse’ in The Nature
of Necessity (Oxford, 1 974), pp. 1 69- 1 84. For an attempt to accommodate this argument in
constructing an account of omnipotence, see Thomas P. Flint and Alfred J. Freddoso,
“Maximal Power,” pp. 81 — 1 13 in Alfred J. Freddoso, ed.. The Existence and Nature of God.
®'^This first thesis, although consistent with Molinism, is not entailed by it. Molina accepts
on faith the notion that each galaxy contains a world in which no creatures exist.
 Introduction
[50]

mining causal influence of various sorts of natural and supernatural

divine assistance. Supernaturally meritorious acts, for example, require
the causal influence of prevenient and cooperating actual grace. Fourth,
no evil effect can be brought about by a creature if God does not
antecedently and specifically permit it. So even though God has no
control over which creation situation obtains or hence over which galaxy
He must choose from. He nonetheless does have total control over
which effects, if any, are actually produced in the created universe.

Finally, Molina can still consistently hold that God’s providential act of
will is absolutely comprehensive. That is, in CS{w) God not only decides
which world in the galaxy for CS{w) will be actualized, but He also
decides, for any creation situation CS(w*) distinct from CS{w), what He
would have decreed had He been in instead. All these elements
taken together, Molina asserts, constitute the strongest account of divine
providence consistent with a correct understanding of the doctrine that
some creatures are endowed with the power of free choice.
Let me return briefly to the characterization of a Molinist creation

situation. Many philosophers stand ready to dispute Molina’s assump¬

tion that necessarily, for any pair of potential conditional future con¬
tingents of the form P{S) on H and P(not-S) on H, exactly one obtains
and one does not. I believe that this assumption, known as the law of
conditional excluded middle, is plausible, but I acknowledge that a full
defense of it must be set within a general theory of subjunctive condi¬
tionals at odds in certain respects with currently popular theories.®^ Still,
two points are worth immediate mention. First, some might object to the
assumption in question on the grounds that the antecedent H is not

always ‘informative’ enough to ‘sustain’ either P{S) or P{not-S) as a

consequent. Even though I do not endorse the conception of the rela¬
tion between antecedent and consequent which underlies this objection,
I should nonetheless point out that Molina can and ought to endorse the
added stipulation that P(S) on H is a. potential conditional future con¬
tingent only if H includes a total description of the causal history and
contemporaneous causal circumstances of any exercise of indeterminis¬
tic causation which figures directly in the consequent. Alternatively, a
Molinist can consistently hold that the obtaining of a potential condi¬
tional future contingent is always relative to a total causal context of this
sort, in much the same way that the obtaining of, say, a past-tense state

®®For some relevant background, see Robert Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the
Problem of Evil,” p. 110; David Lewis, Counterfactnab (Oxford, 1973), pp- 79ff- ; and Robert
Stalnaker, “A Theory of Conditionals,” pp. 98—112 in Nicholas Rescher, ed.. Studies in
Logical Theory (Oxford, 1968), pp. io6ff. I discuss this complicated issue more in Section 5.6
below. I hope to address the relevant questions at length elsewhere.
 The Theory of Middle Knowledge

[51]
of affairs is always relative to a time. Second, Thomas Flint has shown in
effect that as long as we grant that conditional future contingents can in

principle provide God with ‘positive’ information about the activity of

indeterministic secondary causes in various hypothetical situations, the
Molinist can get by just as well with the weaker and hence more digest¬
ible assumption that, necessarily, any potential conditional future con¬
tingent is such that either it or its complement obtains. As we shall see
in Section 5, some philosophers reject even this assumption. But it is
important to separate their more general objection from the ‘infor¬
mativeness’ objection cited above.

4.4 Comprehension and Supercomprehension

Even if there are ‘positive’ conditional future contingents, how might

they be known? Banezians have no special problem here: God knows
conditional future contingents in the same way He knows absolute
future contingents, namely, in and through His decreeing that they
obtain. But such an approach is obviously not available to Molina. In the

end he appeals simply to God’s cognitive perfection and to the depth of

His prevolitional grasp of all possible creatures.
In Section 2 we saw that, according to Molina, comprehending an
entity involves grasping the metaphysical modality of every state of
affairs involving it. So it is by His natural knowledge that God compre¬
hends each possible entity, including Himself. But comprehension so
characterized plainly does not include any knowledge of conditional
future contingents. If I comprehend Adam, I know that both his sinning
in the garden and his not sinning in the garden are metaphysically
possible. But I do not thereby know whether or not Adam will in fact sin
if placed in the garden. Middle knowledge demands a cognition that
penetrates far deeper than comprehension as just defined, a cognition

that came to be known in Molinist literature as ‘supercomprehension’.

Though this term is not Molina’s own, he clearly believes that God
alone can supercomprehend and that creatures alone can be super-
comprehended. For the cognitive power of one who supercomprehends

®^See Flint, “The Problem of Divine Freedom.” That is, for any state of affairs of the
form P{S) on H, either it or its complement, that is, no^-[P(5) on H], obtains. So the claim is
that the law of bivalence will do just as well as the law of conditional excluded middle,
provided that some affirmative states of affairs of the form in question obtain. This
qualification is necessary, since Molinism would be undermined if no such affirmative state
of affairs could obtain. For in that case there would be just one possible creation situation:
the union of N with the set of all the negations of potential conditional future contingents.
Moreover, in such a creation situation God would have no positive knowledge of how
created indeterministic causes would act.
 Introduction
[52]

an entity must, Molina claims, “surpass in perfection by an infinite

distance” the entity in question. More precisely, one who super-
comprehends must be able to have epistemic certitude regarding states
of affairs that do not (at least as yet) have metaphysical certitude. As
Molina rather misleadingly puts it, by His middle knowledge God knows
creatures “in a more eminent way than that in which they are knowable
in themselves.
We must be careful not to misinterpret Molina here. He is not making
the absurd claim that by His middle knowledge God knows something

that is not there ‘objectively’ to be known. To the contrary, the states of

affairs which God knows by His middle knowledge really obtain from
eternity and the corresponding propositions are really true from eter¬
nity. Nor is Molina asserting that conditional future contingents are
completely inaccessible epistemically to anyone other than God. He
would gladly concede that even human beings can have well-grounded
beliefs about how they themselves or others would freely act in various

hypothetical situations. “^2 return to this point in Section 5.8.)

Molina is claiming instead that what is ‘there’ to be known prevoli-
tionally about future contingents can be known infallibly and with certi¬
tude only by a cognitively perfect being, where a subject P has infallible
cognition of a state of affairs 5 in an epistemic context C only if it is
metaphysically impossible that P be mistaken in C about whether or not
5 obtains. Only God can have such cognition of conditional future
contingents, and this by virtue of the fact that only the divine cognitive
power exceeds what is required for the mere comprehension of crea¬
tures.

This way of putting it helps explain Molina’s contention that God does
not know prevolitionally what He Himself would choose to do in any
creation situation, including the actual one. For His cognitive power
does not surpass His own nature in the way that it surpasses creaturely
natures. So it is only in and by His act of will that He knows what He
Himself in fact decrees and what He would decree in other creation
situations. This is part of His free knowledge and not of His middle
knowledge.
The foregoing account of how God has middle knowledge is arguably

^^Disputation 52, sec. 13.

Ibid., secs. 1 1 and 35. The discussion that follows is meant as a reply to Robert Adams’s
(as well as Suarez’s) objection that the words quoted here commit Molina to the incoherent
claim that God knows something it is metaphysically impossible for anyone to know. See
Adams’s “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” p. 111.
^‘^Suarez makes much of this point in De Scientia Quam Deus Habet de Futuris Contingen-
tibus, bk. 2, chap. 5, pp. 198—200 in Suarez, Opera Omnia (Venice, 1741), vol. 10.
 4- The Theory of Middle Knowledge [53]

the weakest link in the Molinist chain. Yet it is not for that reason
obviously untenable. Some Molinists have retreated at this point to the
simple assertion that because God is essentially omniscient, one has only
to establish that conditional future contingents obtain in order to show
that God has comprehensive and infallible prevolitional knowledge of
them. Supercomprehension is thus rendered superfluous — or at least
swept under the rug.
This claim, although promising in some respects, is weaker than

Molina’s own, mainly because it can supply no rationale for the thesis
that God has no prevolitional knowledge of what He Himself will do.
Perhaps this point is not important, but, then again, perhaps it is. For
Molina argues at some length that God’s own freedom of choice would
be obliterated if He had infallible knowledge of His own free decisions
conceptually prior to His making them.^^ I will not rehearse the argu¬
ment here, but will only point out that if it is sound, Molinists are
burdened with the task of finding some way to explain the fact that God
has prevolitional cognition of the free actions of creatures but lacks
prevolitional cognition of His own free actions.

4.5 Foreknowledge and Freedom

Now for Molina’s reconciliation of divine foreknowledge with crea-

turely freedom. He first argues that his theory coheres with and is
corroborated by the traditional maxim according to which it is not the
case that a contingent effect 5 will obtain because God foreknows that 5
will obtain, but rather God foreknows that S will obtain because 5 will in
fact obtain.
The first half of this maxim is easy enough to establish within the

Molinist scheme. God’s knowing that, say, Peter will deny Christ is a
piece of free knowledge and is thus conceptually posterior to the act of

will by which God decrees Peter’s being so situated that he will freely
deny Christ. So unlike God’s prevolitional knowledge, which in Molina’s
own words is a partial and remote cause of created effects, God’s free
knowledge that Peter will sin comes too late, conceptually speaking, to

cause anything at all and is in fact itself an effect of God’s act of will. In
technical terms, God’s free knowledge is a speculative knowledge of

^^See Disputation 52, secs. 11-15, and Disputation 53, pt. 1, secs. 17 and 19. Since the
argument found in these places, if successful, rules out only infallible knowledge of one’s
own future free choices, it applies to God alone and cannot be turned into a general
argument for the claim that no agents can have justified true beliefs regarding their own
future free choices.

^^For Molina’s discussion of this point, see Disputation 52, secs. 10 and 19.
[54]
Introduction

vision and, unlike His prevolitional knowledge, not a potentially practi¬

cal knowledge ordered toward the production of effects. Thus it is not
because of God’s knowledge of Peter’s sin that Peter will sin.
But what of the second half of the maxim? What of the claim that God
foreknows that Peter will deny Christ because Peter will in fact deny
Christ. Molina, as emphasized above, dismisses the notion that Peter

causally contributes to God’s free and eternal knowledge of the act in

question. After all, God had this knowledge long before Peter existed
and, Molina insists repeatedly, there is no power of any sort over the
past. Nor, as far as I can tell, does (or should) Molina subscribe to the
idea that Peter causally contributes to God’s foreknowing that Peter
would deny Christ if placed in the relevant circumstances. For, once
again, God had this piece of middle knowledge long before Peter ex¬
isted.
How, then, can it be true that God knows that an effect 5 will obtain

because S will obtain? As I understand it, Molina’s answer is a general one

holding for all the effects of secondary causes, both necessary and

contingent. It goes like this: God’s knowing that 5 will obtain follows
upon His decreeing (either approvingly or merely permissively) that 5
will obtain. But this divine decree, which is 3. partial 3nd proximate cause
of its object, is guided by infallible prevolitional knowledge of how any
possible secondary cause would act in any possible set of circumstances

involving it. Thus God’s decreeing that 5 will obtain guarantees, and so
renders it true from eternity, that S will be produced with God’s concur¬
rence by the relevant secondary causes. In short, God knows postvoli-
tionally that 5 will obtain because His own decree has already guaran¬
teed that the future-tense state of affairs F{S) obtains from eternity.
The prevolitional knowledge pertinent to necessary effects is purely
natural, whereas with contingent effects middle knowledge comes into
play as well. What God knows through His middle knowledge is, to be
sure, metaphysically contingent. It need not have been the case that, say,
Peter would deny Ghrist if placed in the relevant circumstances. Still,
given that God knows infallibly by His middle knowledge that Peter
would in fact freely deny Christ if placed in those circumstances, it
follows that by decreeing that Peter will be in those circumstances God
ensures that it is true from eternity that Peter will freely sin — long
before Peter actually brings about the effect in question. So God freely
knows that Peter will sin because it is already true by divine decree that
Peter will sin, just as God freely knows that a given necessary effect will
obtain because it is already true by divine decree that it will obtain. And it
is in this sense — and this sense alone — that God knows by His free
knowledge that 5 will obtain because S will in fact obtain.
 /f. The Theory of Middle Knowledge [55]

I will now briefly examine Molina’s response to what is generally

acknowledged to be the most powerful argument for the thesis that
divine foreknowledge is incompatible with creaturely freedom. My pre¬
sentation of the argument will be more detailed than his, so that I can
show clearly how his response differs from all the others. (I follow
Molina in shifting here to the language of propositions.)
Four principles serve as presuppositions of this argument. All deal
with temporal or accidental necessity. The first is simply an intuitively
appealing account of what it is for a proposition to be accidentally
necessary at a given time:

(A) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is metaphysically

contingent and (ii) p is true at t and at every moment after t in every possible
world that shares the same history with our world at t.

From (A) it follows directly that this necessity is closed under entail-
ment for metaphysically contingent propositions:

(B) If (i) p entails q and (ii) q is metaphysically contingent and (iii) p is

accidentally necessary at t, then q is accidentally necessary at t.

If a proposition is now such that it can no longer be false, then obviously

any proposition it entails is likewise such that it can no longer be false.
The third principle relates accidental necessity to causal power and,
once again, appears to follow directly from (A):

(C) If p is accidentally necessary at t, then no agent has the power at or

after t to contribute causally to p’s not being true.

If a proposition is such that it can no longer be false, then it seems clear

that no agent can cause it to be false.
The fourth principle, finally, gives a sufficient condition for a proposi¬
tion’s being accidentally necessary. Here P represents the past-tense
propositional operator:

(D) If p is true at t, then the proposition Pp is accidentally necessary at

every moment after t.

That is, once a proposition has been true at a given time, its having
been true at that time is from then on necessary and hence, by (C), not
subject to any future causal influence.
These principles all have considerable intuitive appeal. At the very
least, each has been deemed nonnegotiable by one or another of the
 Introduction
[56]

many eminent thinkers who have wrestled with the problem of divine
foreknowledge.
Now take a future act that is allegedly both free and foreknown, for

example, Peter’s sinful denial of Christ at T, where T, we will assume, is

in our distant future. The following argument purports to show that if
this action of Peter’s has ever been foreknown by God, then it cannot be
free, because no agent (Peter, God, Katie’s genius) could have the power
at or before T to make it false that Peter is sinning at

(1 ) The proposition God foreknows, infallibly and with certainly, that Peter will
sin at T is now true, [assumption]

(2) So at every future moment the proposition God foreknew, infallibly and
with certainty, that Peter would sin at T will be accidentally necessary. [(1) and
(D)]

(3) But the proposition God foreknew, infallibly and with certainty, that Peter
would sin at T entails the metaphysically contingent proposition is present,
Peter is sinning, [assumption]

(4) So at every future moment the proposition IfTis present, Peter is sinning
will be accidentally necessary. [(2), (3) and (B)]

Therefore, no agent will have the power at any future moment to contrib¬
ute causally to its being the case that the proposition IfTis present, Peter is
sinning is not true. That is, no agent (Peter, God) will have the power at any
future moment to make it true that Peter is not sinning when T is present.
[(4) and (C)]

There are three standard responses to this argument. In summarizing

them below, I also briefly note Molina’s objections to them.

Aristotelian responses in effect concede the point of the argument by
denying (1) on the ground that since the proposition Peter will sin al T is
about the contingent future, it cannot be known infallibly and with
certainty prior to T. Some who favor this response explicitly reject the
doctrine that God knows or can know the contingent future. Others, fol¬
lowing St. Thomas, admit that the contingent future cannot be known
with certainty as future but insist that God can nonetheless know the
contingent future as {eternally) present in a way that does not jeopardize

^^The argument presented here is a reconstruction of the second objection (sec. 3) in

Disputation 52. Molina replies to it in secs. 32—34. In “Accidental Necessity and Logical
Determinism,” I laid out and discussed an exactly similar argument for logical determin¬
ism, though I did not in that place cite Molina’s position as one of the possible replies.
 The Theory of Middle Knowledge [57]

creaturely freedom. Molina rejects this Thomistic response, in part, it

seems, because he believes that future contingent propositions are true
from eternity by divine decree and hence can be known from eternity by
God as future. There is another reason as well for having doubts about
this Thomistic response. Consider the proposition Now {before T) it is true
to say that God knows eternally that Peter sins at T. If Thomists accept this
proposition, as it seems they should, it can serve as the first premise of
another argument that is both exactly like the one laid out above and
ostensibly insoluble by appeals to God’s eternity. On the other hand,
suppose that they reject this proposition. What possible justification
might they offer for this rejection? If they claim, following Aristotle, that
it is not true before T that Peter will sin at T, then how can God reveal
future contingents to time-bound creatures through His prophets? At
the very least, some further explanation is called for here.
What I will dub the Geachian response denies (3) by claiming that the
proposition God foreknew, infallibly and with certainty, that Peter will sin at T
entails only that the world was at one time tending toward Peter’s
sinning at T.'^^ Since such a tendency may be impeded or even reversed
before T, it does not follow from this proposition that if T is now present,
then Peter is sinning. This response, unlike its Aristotelian counterpart,
allows future contingent propositions to be known by God with cer¬
tainty, but it also clearly entails that the resulting divine knowledge falls
far short of comprehensive knowledge of the contingent future. At best,
God can have only comprehensive knowledge of present tendencies
toward the contingent future.
The Ockhamistic response, on the other hand, rejects the inference
from (1) to (2) on the ground that (D), despite its intuitive attractiveness,
does not distinguish the ‘real’ history of the world from the ‘soft’ past,
which is still under God’s control. God, the Ockhamists maintain, still
has the power before T to cause it to have been true that He foreknew
with certainty that Peter would not sin at T. To be sure. He will never
exercise this power, but this does not mean that He lacks it. As we saw in
Section 3.4, Molina rejects this response by insisting that no proposition
at all, even one that does not, strictly speaking, concern the causal history
of the world, can now be caused to have been true or caused to have been
false by any agent, God included.
At this point it might seem that Molina has closed off every viable
avenue of escape. And, indeed, I can attest from personal experience

'^®See Geach, Providence and Evil, pp. 40-66.

^^This is analogous to the position I defended in “Accidental Necessity and Logical
Determinism,” as a response to the argument for logical determinism. The reader might
wish to consult that paper for a more extensive discussion of Ockhamism.

(
 Introduction
[58]

that at first glance his response to the argument is apt to strike one as
astonishing. In a word, he rejects the inference from (2) and (3) to (4) by
denying (B), the thesis that accidental necessity is closed under entail-
ment:

Even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because . . . these two things cannot
both obtain, namely, that God foreknows something to be future and that
the thing does not turn out that way), and even if (ii) the antecedent is
necessary in the sense in question (because it is past-tense and because no
shadow of alteration can befall God), nonetheless the consequent can be

purely contingent.^®

But how so? After all, (B) follows directly and obviously from (A).
Molina is not very explicit here, but it is clear that he must reject (A) as
well as (B). Consider this line of reasoning: God’s foreknowledge is not a
cause of Peter’s sinning. To the contrary, it is evident that Peter’s sinful
act satisfies the necessary condition for indeterministic freedom pre¬
sented in Section 2.9. There is, after all, no reason to think that God’s
foreknowledge makes the sin occur by a necessity of nature or that it is in
any way a contemporaneous cause of the sin. Yet it is also true that there
is absolutely no power over the past. If God knew from eternity that
Peter would deny Christ at T, then no agent can now cause it to be true
that God never knew this. But if God’s past foreknowledge is thus
accidentally necessary and entails that Peter will sin at T, and if, in
addition, Peter’s action will satisfy the causal conditions necessary for it
to be free, then accidental necessity must not be closed under entail-
ment. Since this conclusion conflicts with (A), it must be the case that (A)
does not correctly capture the necessity of the past.
Notice in passing that this chain of reasoning presupposes the falsity
of a principle that libertarians might naturally be inclined to endorse,
namely, that an agent P freely performs an action A at a time t only if
there is a possible world w such that (i) w shares all and only the same
accidentally necessary propositions with our world at t and (ii) at ^ in w P
refrains from performing A. In opposition to the Ockhamists, Molina
holds that God’s past beliefs are just as necessary in the sense in question
as are any other truths about the past. And, of course, there is no
possible world in which God once believed that Peter would sin at T and
in which Peter does not in fact sin at T. Yet if this alleged condition on
freedom is meant to capture the sense in which free action is indeter¬
ministic, then Molina himself has what seems to be a wholly adequate
alternative condition. For he can distinguish what is accidentally neces-

^®Disputation 52, sec. 34.

 The Theory of Middle Knowledge [59]

sary at a given time from what belongs, strictly speaking, to the causal

history of the world at that time, where the world’s causal history in¬
cludes only past exercises of causal power.’^^ And consonant with what
was said about freedom in Section 2.9, he can distinguish the principle
just rejected from the benign principle that an agent P freely performs

an action A at a time t only if P’s performing A does not obtain at ^ by a

necessity of nature, where what occurs at a given time by a necessity of
nature is a function of the causal history of the world at that time. Since

Molina holds that God’s foreknowledge of absolute future contingents is

not a cause of anything, he can consistently hold that Peter’s sin satisfies
this principle.
But what can a Molinist substitute for (A)? The best I have been able to
come up with is this:

(A*) p is accidentally necessary at t if and only if (i) p is metaphysically

contingent and (ii) p is true at t and (iii) for any possible world w such that w
shares the same causal history with our world at t, no agent has the power at
or after Gn zi; to contribute causally top's not being true.

Because Molina brooks no power of any sort over the past, every truth
about the past is equally impervious to any present or future causal
activity.®^ So no agent can now cause it to have been true that God never

notion of the causal history of the world may well be equivalent to the conjunction
of what Ockhamists are wont to call ‘hard’ facts about the past. In this sense, Molina is not
rejecting the claim that there is some distinction to be drawn between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ facts
about the past. What he rejects is instead the claim that agents can have causal power over
the soft facts about the past.
®OAs I emphasize in Section 5.7 below, we must draw a sharp distinction between an
agent’s causally contributing to a state of affairs S, on the one hand, and S’s obtaining being
(merely) counterf actually dependent on something an agent does. I have no exact account of
this distinction to offer, but I have tried to flesh it out more precisely in Section 3 of
“Medieval Aristotelianism and the Case against Secondary Causation in Nature.’’ At any
rate, a Molinist will insist that genuine causal contribution is always future-oriented, where¬
as mere counterfactual dependence may, given the model provided by the theory of
middle knowledge, be past-oriented or backtracking.
Also, a Molinist can consistently accept the claim that there may be different degrees of
counterfactual dependence. God’s middle knowledge seems directly or strongly counter-
factually dependent on how indeterministic secondary causes would act, whereas other
past-tense states of affairs may be only indirectly or weakly dependent on such actions, since
the dependence in question is metaphysically contingent and has to be mediated by God’s
middle knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that I will not in fact sin in H, but that if God had
known from eternity that I would sin if placed in H, then He would have decided to
actualize a possible world other than the one He has in fact actualized — a world in which,
say, Abraham never exists. In that case, Abraham’s having existed would be weakly
counterfactually dependent on how I act in H. Alvin Plantinga discusses cases like this in
“On Ockham’s Way Out,” Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986): 235—269. On Plantinga’s own
account of accidental necessity (see p. 261), those past-tense states of affairs which are
directly counterfactually dependent on future indeterministic causes are not accidentally
 Introduction
[6o]

foreknew that Peter would sin at T. In short, this is false at every moment
prior to T :

Peter now has the power to contribute causally to its being false that God
foreknew that Peter will sin at T.

But, of course, Peter’s sin will be free. So this is true at some time prior
to T :

Peter now has the power to contribute causally to its being false that he sins
when T is present.

It follows that accidental necessity as characterized by (A*) is not

closed under entailment. Now suppose further that Peter were going to
exercise the power in question and refrain from sinning at T. Then from
eternity God would have known infallibly by His middle knowledge that
Peter would not deny Christ if placed in the relevant circumstances.
That is, the following is true:

If Peter were going to contribute causally to its being false that he sins when
T is present, then God would never have believed that Peter would sin at T.

So even though Peter cannot now cause it to be true that God never
believed that he would sin at T, he nonetheless can now cause some¬
thing, namely, his not sinning at T, such that had it been true from
eternity that he would cause it if placed in the relevant circumstances,
God would never have believed that he would sin at T. And, signifi¬
cantly, the theory of middle knowledge provides an intuitively accessible
model on which both parts of this claim come out true.
Notice that Molina can apply exactly the same solution to the problem
of prophecy. Once Christ prophesies at T* (before T) that Peter will

necessary. So his account differs from the Molinist account embodied in (A*). I am
inclined, however, to believe that this difference is merely verbal. A Molinist may agree
that there are several sorts of temporal necessity, one of which is captured by (A*) and
another of which is captured by Plantinga’s formula, as long as it is not claimed that any
agent has causal power over the past. A more interesting historical question is whether
Ockham or his followers would have accepted Plantinga’s account. For on this account it
seems to follow straightforwardly that the past-tense proposition Jesus uttered the prophecy that
Peter would deny him at T, even if true, is not accidentally necessary at any time before T ; and
although Ockhamists would welcome this result, they might nonetheless worry that the
victory had been won too easily. For most of them struggle with the intuition that the past
physical utterance of a given string of words is a paradigmatic instance of a ‘hard’ fact
about the past. For a discussion of various Ockhamist attempts to solve the problem of
prophecy, see Aron Edidin and Calvin Normore, “Ockham on Prophecy,” International
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 13(1 982); 1 79- 1 89.
 4- The Theory of Middle Knowledge [6i]

deny him at T, then no agent (Peter, God) can any longer cause it to be
false that Christ uttered the words in question. And Christ’s uttering
these words at T* clearly entails that Peter will deny him at 7".^^ Yet his
uttering of the words does not make Peter’s denial occur at T by a
necessity of nature; nor is it a contemporaneous cause of Peter’s sin. So
despite the fact that before T it is accidentally necessary that Christ
uttered the prophetic words, Peter’s denial satisfies the causal precondi¬
tions for free action. What’s more, if Peter were going to refrain from
denying Christ in the relevant circumstances, then God would have
known this from eternity by His middle knowledge and would have
ensured from eternity that Christ would not utter the words in question
at T*.
I know of no other even remotely plausible solution to the problem of
prophecy. Aristotelianism and Geachianism do not so much as allow for
the possibility that future contingents might be prophesied infallibly.
Thomism, if it does allow for this possibility, is subject to the problem
noted above. Ockhamism commits one to having to choose between the
Scylla of claiming that God can undo the causal history of the world and
the Charybdis of claiming that divine prophecies might be deceptive or
mistaken. On a personal note, my own conversion from Ockhamism to
Molinism is a direct result of my having finally and reluctantly reached
the conclusion that Ockhamism simply cannot deal adequately with
genuine prophecy of future contingents.
But what of (A*) itself? Is it an adequate substitute for (A)? Since the
right-hand side of (A*) is obviously a necessary condition for accidental
necessity, the issue boils down to whether it is a sufficient condition as
well. Our preanalytic intuitions are not, I believe, subtle enough to yield
a clear and definitive answer. So the choice between (A) and (A*) in the
final analysis must be made on systemic grounds. But that puts Molinism
in a relatively favorable position, since the theory of middle knowledge is
a tool of immense philosophical and theological power. Beyond what we
have already seen, a moment’s thought suggests applications to theo¬
logical issues that go far beyond the immediate concerns of the Concor¬
dia: the inspiration of Sacred Scripture, the infallibility of Church teach¬
ings on faith and morals, the efficacy of petitionary prayer. (Notice that

®‘Some Ockhamists have resisted this claim, but to my mind unsuccessfully. For a
concurring opinion, see Edidin and Normore, “Ockham on Prophecy.”
®2Normore suggests that Ockhamists have been unduly reluctant to concede that God
might deceive. See his “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An
Overview,” p. 19. As Normore himself is aware, however, such a concession would have
profound theological consequences in a tradition built upon the thesis that divine revela¬
tion is trustworthy because God “can neither deceive nor be deceived,” to quote the act of
faith once memorized by every Catholic schoolchild.
[62] Introduction

even though Molina must deny that God literally reacts to prayers, as
though prayers had causal influence over Him, he can still hold that God
decrees certain future states of affairs in part because He knows that His
creatures will in the relevant circumstances pray that those states of
affairs obtain.)
I do not, of course, mean to imply that Molinism is immune to criti¬
cism. Indeed, in the next section we will look at objections that have led
some to think that accepting the theory of middle knowledge is too high
a price to pay for any supposed benefit. But I hope to have succeeded in
at least intimating just how great the benefits in fact are, especially for
one striving to remain faithful to traditional Christian doctrine.

5 Objections and Replies

5.1 Preliminary Remarks

In considering the most important objections to Molinism, I make no

pretense that my responses are exhaustive. (This is especially true for
the objection considered in Section 5.6 below.) I do, however, hope to
show at least that none of the objections is decisive as it stands and to
indicate promising lines of defense which might fruitfully be pursued in
more depth. I will begin with four theological objections and then move
on to three philosophical ones. The sources for these objections include
the modern Banezian Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and the philoso¬
phers Robert Adams, Anthony Kenny, and William Hasker.

5.2 The Use of Sacred Scripture

The first objection, aimed at Banezianism as well as Molinism, raises

doubts about the strength of the scriptural underpinnings for the claim

that God knows conditional future contingents. Kenny’s terse argument

goes as follows:

It would commonly be thought nowadays by theologians that the biblical

texts quoted by Molina do not prove his case. The passage about Tyre and
Sidon is clearly rhetorical. The knowledge of what people would have done
if they had not died, as attributed to God by the Wisdom of Solomon, is no
more than a knowledge of their characters and dispositions when alive. The
oracle consulted by David, the ephod, had only two sides to it, probably
marked ‘yes’ and ‘no’. Such an apparatus would be incapable of marking the
difference between knowledge of counterfactuals and knowledge of the
truth-value of material implications. Since the antecedent of David’s ques-
 [63]

5- Objections and Replies

tions was false, the same answers would have been appropriate in each
case.®^

Among those contemporary theologians who accept the doctrine of

divine providence, many lean toward some version or other of the
concomitance theory. So it is hardly surprising that they should feel a
need to cast aspersions on the conclusions drawn by Molinists and
Bahezians from these biblical texts. But Kenny’s arguments, at least, are
far from compelling.

Jesus’ words concerning Tyre and Sidon are indeed clearly rhetorical;
but, as Kenny himself would undoubtedly admit, it hardly follows that
they are merely rhetorical. Often enough, the plain truth has far greater
rhetorical force than an obvious exaggeration. So Molinists and Bahez¬
ians may justihably insist that the burden of proof is on those who claim
that the words in question are not to be taken in the most natural way.

Remember, too, that a few lines later (Matt. 1 1 : 22-24) Jesus “solemnly
assures” his listeners that on the day of judgment it will go easier for
Tyre, Sidon, and even Sodom than for Chorozain, Bethsaida, and Ca¬
pernaum. The clear message is that those he has favored with miracles
are less receptive to his demand for repentance than their heathen
neighbors would have been had they been likewise favored.
Second, the passage from Wisdom says explicitly that those to be
taken prematurely by death are now upright and pleasing to God, that is,
now have good characters and virtuous dispositions. What’s more, even if
these people now have certain tendencies toward evil, such present
tendencies are able to be impeded and hence cannot serve as a basis for
infallible knowledge of the future. So the knowledge ascribed to God by

the text in question must be more than just “knowledge of their charac¬
ters and dispositions when alive.” What God knows with certitude is that
those whose characters and dispositions are now righteous would acquire
corrupt characters and vicious dispositions if they were allowed to live
longer.
Third, David consulted the ephod to get advice about how he should
act, and we may safely assume that even if God knows of the distinction
between counterfactual and material implication, David did not. But in

that case God’s affirmative answers were deceptive if His advice presup¬
posed that David’s questions involved material implication. At the very
least, David would have every right to feel betrayed upon learning that

yes was likewise an “appropriate” answer to the alternative question, “If

I stay in Keilah, will Saul refrain from invading?”

Kenny, The God of the Philosophers (Oxford, 1979), p. 64.

[64] Introduction

There is more to be said here, but even this much shows that Kenny’s
arguments are hardly irresistible as they stand.

5.3 The Asymmetry Thesis

According to Bahezians, the Molinist thesis that God’s concurrence

and actual grace are intrinsically neutral entails that God is related in
exactly the same way to both good and evil free actions. As Garrigou-
Lagrange puts it: “God would be no more the author of. good than of
bad acts, at least as regards their intrinsic and free determination, be¬
cause neither good nor bad acts would come from Him, at least as
regards the [exercise] of these acts. He would be the cause of the good
determination only by proposing the desirable object. And this even

men can do.”®^

That is, on Molina’s theory God’s internal and direct aids of grace do
not causally determine free creatures to elicit morally good acts of will.
And although God can try to move the wills of such creatures extrin-
sically and indirectly by making what is truly good seem desirable to
them as an end to be sought, this sort of causal influence, all agree, is
nondetermining. (This, in fact, is the type of causal influence we our¬
selves can exercise over one another’s free actions through argument,
commandment, threat, prohibition, and counsel.) So Molinists must
admit that God’s total causal contribution to free actions is nondetermin¬
ing and hence that the very same causal influence on God’s part may
result indifferently in either a good act or an evil act. It follows that any
Molinist who holds that God is a cause of good must likewise hold that
God is a cause of evil in exactly the same sense. By the same token, it
follows that any Molinist who denies that God is a cause of evil must
likewise deny that God is a cause of good. But this violates the asymme¬
try thesis according to which God is a cause of the goodness of good
effects but not of the evil of evil effects.
As should be obvious, however, what is here claimed to follow does
not follow at all. According to Molina, actual grace is a particular rather

than a general cause. Unlike God’s general concurrence, this grace en¬
dows a free agent with a causal tendency, more specifically, a tendency

toward choosing the good. Thus, actual grace is “intrinsically neutral”

only in the sense that it is not deterministic, that is, only in the sense that

its presence is compatible with the agent’s making an evil choice. It is not
“intrinsically neutral” in the stronger sense of not inclining the agent in
one direction or the other.

^'^The One God, p. 466.

 [65]

5- Objections and Replies

So God’s causal relation to good and evil effects is indeed asymmetric

on the Molinist scheme. If a good act of will is elicited, then the grace in
question is a particular (though partial) efficient cause of the act and
hence partially determines the specific moral character of the act; if an
evil act of will is elicited, then this act has been elicited despite and in
opposition to the inclination toward the good engendered by the grace. So
when a good act is elicited, it is perfectly proper to say that it was elicited

because of God’s grace acting as a cause that inclined the agent internally
toward such an act. When an evil act is elicited, it is perfectly proper to

say that God’s particular causal influence on the subject has been im¬
peded, so that His only effective causal contribution to the act has been
His general concurrence, which is intrinsically neutral in the strong
sense and hence does not determine in any way the specific moral
character of the act.

5.4 The Principle of Predilection

The next objection concerns God’s role in determining the goodness

of created agents relative to one another. Banezians claim that Christian

doctrine entails what Garrigou-Lagrange calls the ‘principle of predilec¬

tion’, according to which “no one would be better than another unless he
were loved more and helped more by God.”®^ But Molina argues that
God’s concurrence and actual grace are intrinsically nondetermining
and so he must hold that it is possible for two persons, say, Peter and
Judas, to be situated in exactly similar circumstances and to receive equal
actual grace and yet for the one (Peter) to act well and the other (Judas)
to sin. This violates the principle of predilection. For in such a case it

would not be God’s grace that singles Peter out from Judas, “since what
two persons equally have is not a reason for singling out one from the
other”; instead, Peter’s being better than Judas would stem entirely
from “that which of himself he adds to [God’s grace], namely, ... his
consent to and use of the grace.
Molinists might be tempted here to deny the principle of predilection.
But this would be a very risky move, since, as Banezians are wont to
point out, something very much like this principle finds frequent ex¬
pression in St. Paul’s epistles and is reaffirmed against the Pelagian
heresy by theologians of the stature of St. Augustine and St. Thomas. So
Molinists have little to gain and much to lose by conceding that on their
theory Peter singles himself out from Judas in a way contrary to the

®^Ibid., p. 463.
86Ibid.
[66] Introduction

Pauline dictum that “God has mercy on whom He wishes, and whom He
wishes He makes obdurate.”®^
A more promising and indeed perfectly defensible strategy is simply
to deny that Molinism breaches the principle. It is God, after all, who
grants the grace that by His middle knowledge He knows with certainty
will be efficacious for Peter’s acting virtuously. So it is God who gra¬
tuitously singles Peter out by arranging things in such a way that Peter
will freely act well. By the same token, God permits Judas to sin by
allowing him to be so situated that, as God knows via middle knowledge,
he will freely sin. That God should so favor Peter over Judas is just as
much a mystery on the Molinist scheme as on the Bahezian. And al¬
though this is a mystery many feel deeply disturbed by (the doctrine of
predestination lurks in the background, of course), it is nonetheless one
that is deeply rooted in Sacred Scripture and in the teachings and
theological tradition of the Church.

5.5 Divine Passivity

Molina denies that creatures cause God to have knowledge of either

absolute or conditional future contingents. Nonetheless, Bahezians
charge, Molinism entails that God is in some sense or other dependent
on creatures for His middle knowledge. Garrigou-Lagrange poses a
dilemma:

God’s knowledge cannot be determined by anything which is extrinsic to

Him, and which would not be caused by Him. But such is the scientia media
[middle knowledge], which depends on the determination of the free condi¬
tioned future; for this determination does not come from God but from the
human liberty, granted that it is placed in such particular circumstances. . . .
Thus God would be dependent on another, would be passive in His knowl¬
edge, and would no longer be Pure Act. The dilemma is unsolvable: Either
God is the first determining Being, or else He is determined by another;
there is no other alternative. In other words, the scientia media involves an
imperfection, which cannot exist in God. Hence there is a certain tinge of
anthropomorphism in this theory.®®

®^Rom. 10: 18. 1 should note in passing that Molinism as dehned here does not uniquely
determine all the important questions concerning predestination and reprobation. Does
God, for example, decide to predestine, say, Peter independently of His middle knowledge
and only then use His middle knowledge to ensure that Peter will be saved? Or does He
rather, as Molina himself holds, predestine Peter concomitantly with His decision to
actualize a possible world in which, as He knows by His middle knowledge, Peter would
respond well to supernatural grace?
^^The One God, pp. 465—466.
 [67]

5- Objections and Replies

According to Molina, what God knows by His middle knowledge is, to

be sure, dependent on what His creatures would do in various situations.
From eternity God knew that Peter would deny Christ if placed in such-
and-such circumstances. But if Peter had not been going to deny Christ
in those circumstances, then God would not have believed what He in

fact believed. So we may properly say that God’s middle knowledge is

from eternity ‘counterfactually dependent’ on what creatures will do if
placed in various circumstances. But this does not distinguish middle
knowledge from any other sort of knowledge God has about creatures.

Obviously, all God’s knowledge of created effects — of necessary effects

as well as contingent effects, of absolute future contingents as well as
conditional future contingents — is counterfactually dependent on what
secondary causes would do in various circumstances. In general, for any
created effect S such that 5 will or would obtain in circumstances H, if
the relevant secondary agents were not going to cause 5 to obtain in H,
then God would never have believed that S would obtain in H. Even

Bahezians must admit this. So the mere fact that God’s middle knowl¬
edge is counterfactually dependent on what creatures would do is not at

all problematic, but is rather a simple consequence of God’s being neces¬

sarily omniscient.
What, then, is the source of the Bahezian complaint? It can only be the
Molinist claim that God does not and cannot determine which condi¬
tional future contingents obtain and which do not. Since God does not
actively determine what He knows by His middle knowledge. He must
be passively determined by the objects of that knowledge. But in that
case God suffers from an imperfection.

Bahezians, I trust, have a plausible argument to show that God’s status

as the sovereign “hrst determining Being” is not compromised by the
fact that He has no control at all over the metaphysically necessary states
of affairs He knows by His natural knowledge. (He is not, presumably,

‘passively determined’ by such states of affairs.) Whatever the argument

might look like, the conclusion will be that a first determining Being has
control in a world w over every state of affairs which is such that neither
it nor its complement is a member of the creation situation for w. But, of
course, this conclusion is perfectly acceptable to Molina. So the present
objection must in the final analysis be aimed at the contention that
creation situations contain metaphysically contingent states of affairs.
In that case, however, this objection seems to have no independent
status, but is instead reducible to one or the other of two more basic

objections. On the one hand, since Molina’s claim that creation situa¬
tions contain metaphysically contingent states of affairs is based mainly
on his analysis of causal indeterminism, the objection might simply be
[68] Introduction

construed as an attack on that analysis. I have already discussed this issue

in some detail. On the other hand, perhaps the worry is that a meta¬
physically contingent state of affairs would have no grounds for obtain¬
ing, and so would not and could not obtain, unless it was causally
determined to obtain. To this matter I now turn.

5.6 The Ground for Conditional Future Contingents

Bahezians object that conditional future contingents cannot obtain

before God’s act of will or hence be objects of God’s prevolitional knowl¬

edge. Thus Garrigou-Lagrange:

Before the divine decree, there is no object for scientia media, because the
conditionally free act of the future is not determined either in itself or in
another. . . . The scientia media does not precede the divine decree, because
there is no cause in which this conditioned future is determined; for it is not
determined in the divine cause or in human liberty or in the circumstances;
and if it is said that God knows infallibly this conditioned future by explor¬
ing the circumstances, then this theory would end in determinism of the
circumstances. Thus the scientia media, which is devised to save human

liberty, would destroy it.®®

Bahezians go on to infer that since God does indeed know conditional

future contingents. He must be able, in a way that does not threaten
human freedom, to decree that they obtain.
Robert Adams disagrees with this inference, but is in full sympathy
with the charge that Molinism does not provide adequate grounding for
conditional future contingents. Since his presentation of the argument
is the most sophisticated I know of, I will quote it at length. After citing
the biblical passage concerning David and Saul, Adams writes:

This passage was a favorite proof text for the Jesuit theologians. They took
it to prove that God knew the following two propositions to be true:
(1) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul would besiege the city.
(2) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah
would surrender David to Saul. . . .
I do not understand what it would be for [these] propositions to be true,
given that the actions in question would have been free, and that David did
not stay in Keilah. I will explain my incomprehension.
First we must note that middle knowledge is not simple /or^ knowledge.
. . . For there never was nor will be an actual besieging of Keilah by Saul, nor
an actual betrayal of David to Saul by the men of Keilah, to which those
propositions might correspond.

®®Ibid., p. 465.
 [69]
5- Objections and Replies

Some other grounds that might be suggested for the truth of (1) and (2)
are ruled out by the assumption that the actions of Saul and the men of
Keilah are and would be free in the relevant sense. The suggestion that

Saul’s besieging Keilah follows by logical necessity from David’s staying

there is implausible in any case. It would be more plausible to suggest that

Saul’s besieging Keilah follows by causal necessity from David’s staying

there. . . . But both of these suggestions are inconsistent with the assump¬
tion that Saul’s action would have been free.
Since necessitation is incompatible with the relevant sort of free will, we
might seek non-necessitating grounds for the truth of (1) and (2) in the
actual intentions, desires and character of Saul and the Keilahites. . . .
But the basis thus offered for the truth of (1) and (2) is inadequate
precisely because it is not necessitating. A free agent may act out of charac¬
ter, or change his intentions, or fail to act on them. Therefore the proposi¬
tions which may be true by virtue of correspondence with the intentions,
desires and character of Saul and the men of Keilah are not (1) and (2) but
(5) If David stayed in Keilah, Saul 'wouXd probably besiege the city.
(6) If David stayed in Keilah and Saul besieged the city, the men of Keilah
would probably surrender David to Saul.
(5) and (6) . . . will not satisfy the partisans of middle knowledge. It is part of
their theory that God knows infallibly what definitely would happen, and
not just what would probably happen or what free creatures would be likely
to do.^^

I will join Adams here in speaking of propositions rather than states of

affairs. The leading principle of his objection is that a proposition p is
true only if there are what we might call adequate metaphysical grounds for
the truth of p. He then argues inductively that there are not and indeed
cannot be adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of the alleged
objects of middle knowledge — at least not if a strong libertarian account
of freedom and causal indeterminism is correct. It follows that there are
not and cannot be true conditional future contingents. In keeping with
contemporary parlance, we might thus aptly say that Adams espouses
antirealism with respect to conditional future contingents.
As Alvin Plantinga has pointed out, the notion of adequate meta¬
physical grounds appealed to here is far from pellucid.^ ^ Still, the objec¬
tion to Molinism posed by Adams and (albeit less precisely) by Garrigou-

Adams, “Middle Knowledge and the Problem of Evil,” pp. 110-111.

See “Replies to My Colleagues,” in Tomberlin and Van Inwagen, eds., Alvin Plantinga,
PP- 374“375- Plantinga suggests that counterfactuals of freedom relating to God's free
action are routinely accepted as true by Christians. At the very least, one such conditional
proposition, Even if Adam and Eve had not sinned, God would have become incarnate, became
the focus of a famous theological debate, with some (for example. Duns Scotus) holding it
to be true and others (for example, St. Thomas) arguing that the contrary counterfactual
of freedom, If Adam and Eve had not sinned, God would not have become incarnate, is true
instead.
 Introduction
[70]

Lagrange seems to have considerable intuitive appeal. So I will assume

that the fundamental notion underlying the objection has at least some
validity and attempt to flesh it out sympathetically.
We must, it is clear, draw a basic distinction between the grounds for
the truth of metaphysically necessary propositions and the grounds for
the truth of metaphysically contingent propositions. The former will
presumably involve just the constant and necessary relations of natures
or properties to each other. (Of course, it need not be that all of these
relations are self-evident to us or even so much as conceivable by us.)
But, the claim goes, such grounds are inadequate to underwrite the
truth of metaphysically contingent propositions. These require causal
grounding in order to be true. That is, they must be caused to he true by
some agent or agents, since it is not of their nature to be true.
The idea of metaphysical grounding is commonly invoked in similar
fashion by those who espouse antirealism with respect to absolute future
contingents, that is, by those who deny that there are or can be con¬
tingent truths about the absolute, as contrasted with the conditional,
future. They typically claim that there are at present no adequate meta¬
physical grounds for, say, Peter’s freely denying Christ at some future
time T, and that the proposition Peter will freely sin at T thus cannot now
be true — even if it turns out that when T is present Peter freely denies
Christ. And they support their antirealism regarding absolute future
contingents with arguments exactly like the one Adams produces for the
case of conditional future contingents. Specifically, they note that the
causal history of the world up to the present does not logically entail
Peter’s sinning at T ; nor does the world now have a deterministic natural
tendency toward this state of affairs. Perhaps, because of Peter’s charac¬
ter and the present likelihood of a test of his virtue occurring at T, it is
now true that the world is tending, albeit nondeterministically, toward
his sinning at T. That is, perhaps the proposition Peter will probably sin at
T is now true, where the probability in question is metaphysical rather
than epistemic. But, of course, this proposition might now be true even
if the proposition Peter is sinning turns out to be false when T is present.
So there are not and cannot be adequate metaphysical grounds at pres¬
ent for the truth of the absolute future contingent Peter will sin at T.
Sophisticated Molinists will not only welcome but insist on this parallel
between antirealism regarding conditional future contingents and anti¬
realism regarding absolute future contingents. Indeed, they will go so
far as to claim that the former entails the latter. For on the Molinist view
the absolute future is conceptually posterior to, and emerges by divine
decree from, the many conditional futures that define the creation
situation God finds Himself in. To be sure, concomitance theorists will
 5- Objections and Replies

[71]
deny that this entailment holds, since on their view God knows absolute
future contingents without knowing conditional future contingents. But
the close parallel between the arguments for the two sorts of antirealism
undeniably engenders an inclination in those who espouse one of them
to embrace the other as well.

The most promising Molinist strategy for dealing with the ‘grounding’
objection is, I believe, to build upon the arguments against antirealism
regarding the absolute future. I cannot do this exhaustively here but will
instead concentrate on just one such argument, an argument having to
do with prediction viewed both retrospectively and prospectively.
Suppose that John has ruefully predicted beforehand that Peter will
deny Christ at time T. Then, after Peter’s denial at T, John can reason¬
ably maintain that his prediction was true and thus that he spoke the
truth before T when he asserted the proposition Peter will deny Jesus. So it
is reasonable to hold that this proposition was true before T.
The same point can be made more starkly in the case of random
events. Suppose I predict that on the next toss the coin in your hand will
come up heads. And suppose for the sake of argument that the coin’s
coming up one way or the other is wholly indeterminate, so that prior to
the toss the world is not tending, even nondeterministically, either to¬
ward the coin’s coming up heads or toward its coming up tails. In that
case

(P) The coin will probably come up heads

and

(Q) The coin will probably come up tails

are both false, where the probability in question is objective or meta¬

physical. Suppose, hnally, that when you toss the coin, it in fact comes up
heads. In that case it is perfectly reasonable for me to claim that my
prediction was true, that is, that I spoke the truth in asserting be¬
forehand the proposition The coin will come up heads. So it is reasonable
for me to maintain that this proposition was true before you tossed the
coin, even though neither (P) nor (Q) were true at that time.
So much for the retrospective argument. The prospective argument
appeals to common intuitions about what we are asserting when we
make predictions about the future. If I know that you have promised to
meet me for dinner at 6:00 p.m. and know further that you are a very
reliable person, then I am highly justihed in asserting that you will in fact
meet me at 6:00 p.m. To be sure, my evidence for this assertion consists in
 Introduction
[72]

my beliefs about your character and in other beliefs about the world’s
present tendencies. But what I assert is the nonmodal proposition

(R) You will meet me at 6:oo p.m.

and not the ‘probabilistic’ proposition

(S) You will probably meet me at 6:oo p.m.,

where the probability is, once again, objective or metaphysical. This is so

even if, when challenged, I hedge my prediction by saying something
like “She W\\\ probably meet me at 6:oo p.m.” For normally the probability
so expressed is epistemic rather than metaphysical. That is, the hedging is
indicative of my wavering confidence in the truth of (R) rather than of
my firm belief in (S). Or so, at least, many of us would be prone to claim.
But if there are true absolute future contingents, what are the meta¬
physical grounds for their truth? Notice, exactly the same question can
be raised about past-tense propositions that are true in the present.
What are the grounds for the present truth of, say, the proposition
Socrates drank hemlock} Let/? stand for present-tense propositions and P
for the past-tense propositional operator. The proper response, I think,
is that there are now adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of a
past-tense proposition Pp Just in case there were at some past time
adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of its present-tense coun¬
terpart p. Likewise, a realist about the absolute future will claim that
there are now adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of a future-
tense proposition Fp just in case there will be at some future time
adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of its present-tense coun¬
terpart/?. So in order for propositions about the past or the future to be
true now, it is not required that any agent now be causing them to be
true. Rather, it is sufficient that some agent has caused or will cause the
corresponding present-tense propositions to be true.
But if this is so, then it seems reasonable to claim that there are now
adequate metaphysical grounds for the truth of a conditional future
contingent F^(p) on //just in case there would be adequate metaphysical
grounds at t for the truth of the present-tense proposition p on the
condition that H should obtain at t. At any rate, the argument leading up
to this claim is exactly the same as before. Take the case of Peter and
John. John might just as easily make his prediction by asserting the
conditional proposition If Peter were tempted anytime soon to deny Jesus, he
would succumb. And after Peter’s denial John may reasonably maintain
that what he had asserted was true. Indeed, even if Peter had luckily
 [73]
5- Objections and Replies

been spared any such temptation, John could still reasonably maintain
that what he had asserted was true — and he might even be able to
convince Peter of this.

Again, in the coin tossing example, I could just as easily have said, “If
you tossed the coin, it would come up heads.” As before, both

(T) If you tossed the coin, it would probably come up heads

and

(U) If you tossed the coin, it would probably come up tails

would be false. But after the toss is completed and the coin comes up
heads, it seems perfectly reasonable for me to claim that I spoke the
truth when I asserted beforehand the proposition If you tossed the coin, it
would come up heads, even though both (T) and (U) were then false.
What’s more, unless conditional future contingents are unlike all other
conditional propositions, they can be true even if their antecedents are
false. So given that the proposition in question was true when I made the
prediction, I may reasonably claim that it would still have been true even
if the coin had never been tossed. Of course, in that case we would never
have found out whether or not the proposition was true, but that is
another matter.
The prospective argument likewise goes as before. Knowing you well,
I might say with conhdence, “If you promised to meet me at 6:00 p.m.,
you would do so.” To be sure, my evidence for this assertion consists in my
beliefs about your character and about tendencies the world would have
if you were to make the promise in question. Still, what I assert is the
proposition

(V) If you promised to meet me at 6;oo p.m., you would meet me at 6:00
P.M.,

and not the probabilistic proposition

(W) If you promised to meet me at 6:00 p.m., you would probably meet me
at 6:00 P.M.,

where the probability in question is metaphysical. Once again, of course,

a third party might challenge my prediction and even induce me to
qualify it by saying, “Well, she v^ould probably meet me.” But the proba¬
bility thus invoked would at least normally be epistemic, reflecting my
 Introduction
[74]

wavering confidence in (V) rather than my unflinching confidence in the

weaker (W).
The position I am urging has some far-reaching consequences for the
semantics of subjunctive conditionals. I am suggesting, in effect, that
when such conditional propositions are not probabilistic, the connection
between antecedent and consequent is not reducible to any logical or,
more important, causal connection. This suggestion cuts against the
spirit, if not the letter, of the standard possible-worlds semantics for
subjunctive conditionals. For it is usually assumed that the similarities
among possible worlds invoked in such semantics are conceptually prior
to the acquisition of truth-values by the subjunctive conditionals them¬
selves. The intuitive idea seems to be that the truth-value of a subjunc¬
tive conditional p depends asymmetrically on the categorical (including
causal) facts about the world at which p is being evaluated, so that until
the full range of such categorical facts is in place, the truth-value of p is
still indeterminate. On this view, then, the determination of the true
conditional future contingents is posterior to the determination of
which possible world is actual. This is the source of one of Kenny’s
complaints about middle knowledge:

Prior to God’s decision to actualize a particular world those counterfactuals

[about the behavior of free humans] cannot yet be known: for their truth-
value depends ... on which world is actual. . . . The problem is that what
makes the counterfactuals true is not yet there at any stage at which it is
undecided which world is the actual world. The very truth-conditions which
the possible-world semantics were introduced to supply are absent under
the hypothesis that it is undetermined which world the actual world is.^^

I will not tarry over the moot question of whether the standard
possible-worlds semantics for subjunctive conditionals in fact implies or
presupposes that the acquisition of truth-values by such conditionals is
conceptually posterior to and dependent on the determination of which
world is actual. It is clear, however, that on the Molinist view the depen¬
dence runs in just the opposite direction when the conditionals in ques¬
tion are conditional future contingents. For Molinists hold that condi¬
tional future contingents delimit prevolitionally the range of worlds God
is able to actualize. If the standard possible-worlds semantics for sub¬
junctive conditionals presupposes otherwise, then Molinists will have to
modify it or propose an alternative capable of sustaining realism with

^^The God of the Philosophers, p. 70. For more on the possible-worlds semantics for
subjunctive conditionals, see Lewis, Counterfactuals ; and Stalnaker, “A Theory of Condi¬
tionals.”
 5- Objections and Replies [75]

respect to conditional future contingents. There are, in any case, inde¬

pendent grounds for having doubts about the standard semantics, for
example, its inability to accommodate the intuitively plausible belief that
subjunctive conditionals with impossible antecedents may differ from
one another in truth-value.^^
My aim here has merely been the negative one of showing that the
grounding objection is not conclusive. I believe I have succeeded in this.
But, as Michael Dummett has suggested, the doctrine of middle knowl¬
edge is the most vivid and perhaps the most extreme example of philo¬
sophical realism in the history of thought.^^ And I freely admit that the
positive task of elaborating a metaphysical and semantic foundation for
this doctrine is enormous and has hardly yet begun.

5.7 Conditional Future Contingents and Freedom

The last two objections try to show that Molinism suffers from irreme¬
diable defects even if it is granted that there are true conditional future
contingent propositions. The hrst of these objections is raised by Wil¬
liam Hasker, who argues in “A Refutation of Middle Knowledge” that
the truth of such future contingents is incompatible with creaturely
freedom.

Masker’s paper is divided into two parts. He hrst tries to establish that
created agents do not and cannot brin^ about the truth of those condi¬
tional future contingent propositions that involve their own free actions.
Although I believe that Masker’s argument for this conclusion is se¬
riously flawed, I have already conceded, and indeed insisted, that Molin¬
ism does not entail that created agents cause conditional future con¬
tingents to be true or to have been true from eternity. So if Hasker is

^^For a brief discussion of this point, see my “Human Nature, Potency and the Incarna¬
tion,” Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986); 27-53, PP- 43~45-
^"^See Dummett’s Truth and Other Enigmas (Cambridge, Mass., 1978), p. 362.
20 (1986): 545-557.
96The basic flaw in Hasker’s argument in the first part is his claim that the proponents of
middle knowledge hold, or should hold, that the truth of a counterfactual of freedom is as
fixed in the worlds closest to the actual world as is the truth of a law of nature. (See n. 7, in
which Hasker appeals to the argument of Kenny’s quoted in Section 5.6 above.) On this
basis he argues roughly as follows: Suppose that the proposition (P) If Elizabeth were offered
a research grant, she would accept it is true. Then (P) would still be true even if Elizabeth did
not accept the grant. The reason is that the true counterfactuals of freedom, including (P),
remain fixed in those closest possible worlds in which Elizabeth does not accept the grant.
So if Elizabeth were not to accept the grant, it would be because the grant was never
offered to her and not because (P) was false. Thus (P) remains true whether or not
Elizabeth accepts the grant, and so it is reasonable to deny that she can bring it about that
(P) is true.
As a matter of fact, however, Molina is in no way committed to holding that because God
 Introduction
[76]

using the term ‘bring about’ in a straightforward causal sense, Molinists

should have no problem accepting the conclusion of this part of his

paper.
He then goes on to argue, however, that if creatures cannot cause
conditional future contingents to be true, then they lack a power that is
absolutely essential for their acting freely. A somewhat simplified ver¬
sion of the argument goes like this:
Suppose that the proposition

(X) If Peter were in H, he would deny Christ

has always been true and that its contrary,

(Y) If Peter were in H, he would not deny Christ,

has always been false. Within the present dialectical context, all agree
that Peter does not and cannot cause either (X) or (Y) to be true or to
have been true. Suppose now that Peter is in H. Molinists contend that
even though, given the truth of (X), Peter in fact denies Christ in H, he
nonetheless has the power to refrain from denying Christ. But, counters
Hasker, this cannot be so, since “a little thought” will show the following
principle to be true:

(Z) If (i) agent A has the power to bring it about that p is true and (ii) p
entails q and (iii) q is false, then A has the power to bring it about that q is
true.

Let p be the proposition In H Peter does not deny Christ. According to

Molinists, Peter has the power at the relevant time to bring it about that/?
is true. But/? entails (Y), which by hypothesis is false. So given principle

cannot decide which counterfactuals of freedom are true, the truth of these counter-
factuals is just as fixed in nearby worlds as is the truth of laws of nature, over which God
does have control. To the contrary, Molina holds that even though the truth of counter¬
factuals of freedom is in no way dependent on what God decides, it is dependent (though
not causally dependent) on what creatures would freely do. For a more rigorous presenta¬
tion of the Molinist defense against this argument, see Thomas Flint, “Hasker’s ‘Refuta¬
tion’ of Middle Knowledge” (unpublished paper).
Note, by the way, that if Hasker takes the argument of the first part of the paper to show
not only that free creatures cannot cause counterfactuals of freedom to be true, but also
that there is nothing they can do such that were they to do it, contrary counterfactuals of
freedom would have been true, then it is essential for the Molinist to refute the argument
of the first part of the paper as well as that of the second part. I assume in the text that
Hasker means to cast aspersions only on the stronger causal thesis when he denies that
creatures can ‘‘bring about” the truth of counterfactuals of freedom. But in conversation
David Widerker has shaken my confidence in this assumption.
 5- Objections and Replies [77]

(Z), Peter has the power to refrain from denying Christ in H only if he
has the power to bring it about that (Y) is true. But as we have just seen,
Molinists concede that Peter does not have the power to bring it about
that (Y) is true. Therefore, concludes Hasker, they are likewise forced to
concede that he does not have the power to bring it about that/? is true. It
follows that Peter does not have the power to refrain from denying
Christ in H. But the same argument applies to all creaturely actions. So,
Hasker concludes, Molinism implies that no creature can refrain from
acting as it in fact does act.
To begin with, I reiterate my assumption that Hasker is taking the
phrase ‘bring it about that/? is true’ to be equivalent to ‘cause/? to be true’
or, better, ‘causally contribute to /?’s being true,’ where A’s having the
power to contribute causally to/?’s being true entails something stronger
than A’s merely having the power to do something such that, were A to
do it, p would be or would have been true. For, as we saw above, if ‘bring
about’ is taken (improperly, I would argue) in this weak sense of mere
counterfactual dependence, then Molinists can consistently claim that
created agents do in fact have the power to bring about the truth of
conditional future contingents. So if the argument just presented is to
pose a serious threat to Molinism, ‘bring about’ must be taken in a
stronger sense.
It is worth noting immediately that (Z) will be rejected by those who
accept either compatibilism or Bahezianism and yet deny that anyone
has power over the past. Suppose once again that Peter in fact sins in H.
Then, a typical compatibilist will claim that even if the conjunction of the
actual causal history of the world (C) with the laws of nature (L) entails
that Peter will sin in H, it is nonetheless true that Peter has the power to
refrain from sinning in H — and this despite the fact that he lacks the
power to cause the proposition not-(C and L), which is in fact false, to be
true. Likewise, a Bahezian will claim that even though God’s having
decided from eternity not to confer intrinsically efficacious grace on
Peter in H entails that Peter will sin in H, Peter nonetheless has the
power not to sin in H — and this despite the fact that he lacks the power
to cause the proposition God decided from eternity to confer intrinsically
efficacious grace on Peter in H, which is in fact false, to be true. So these
thinkers will deny that (Z) as it stands is true.
But perhaps it is unseemly for Molinists to make common cause in this
way with compatibilists and Banezians. Consider, then, that (Z) will also
be rejected by all those libertarians who believe that there are contingent
truths about the absolute future and yet deny that there is any sort of
causal power over the past. They will hold that even though the proposi¬
tion In H Peter does not deny Christ entails the proposition It has never been
 Introduction
[78]

the case that Peter will deny Christ in H, still Peter has the power to refrain
from sinning in H — and this despite the fact that he does not have the
power to cause the proposition It has never been the case that Peter will deny
Christ in H, which is false, to be true. All that is required, they will
contend, is that Peter have the power to do something such that were he
to do it, the proposition It has never been the case that Peter will deny Christ in
H would be true. And, like Molina, they will insist that Peter’s having
such power in H is fully consonant with a strong libertarian account of
the causal indeterminacy involved in free action.
So Molinists are not alone in rejecting (Z), even though they can
consistently concede the possibility that some close relative of (Z), suita¬
bly qualified to circumvent their proposed counterexamples, might be
true. To be sure, their position would be stronger if they could produce
some uncontroversial counterexample to (Z), one that would convince
even the friends of (Z) that some modification is called for. But even in
the absence of such a counterexample, Molinists can appeal to strong
intuitive grounding for their opposition to (Z), since both the belief that
there is no power over the past and the belief that there are true absolute
future contingents are intuitively appealing. Moreover, the evident sys¬
temic virtues of Molinism, both philosophical and theological, provide
yet another reason for rejecting any competing theory that includes (Z).

5.8 Knowledge of Conditional Future Contingents

According to the final objection, even if conditional future contingent

propositions are, as Molinism insists, true prior to any act of the divine
will, these propositions are nonetheless by nature such that it is impossi¬
ble that anyone should know them. After all, by Molina’s own lights
conditional future contingents lack “metaphysical certitude” prior to
God’s act of will; indeed, those that remain forever merely conditioned
future contingents never attain metaphysical certitude. So even if we
grant that their being true does not require their having metaphysical
certitude, it hardly follows that their being known does not require their
having such certitude. Compare what Aquinas says shout absolute future
contingents. He seems to admit that there are true absolute future
contingents even while insisting that, because of their lack of metaphysi¬
cal determination, they cannot be known by anyone “as future.” So the
Molinist must show not only how conditional future contingents can be
true, but also — and this is a separate task — how they can be known.
Those who pose this objection will not be appeased by Suarez’s retort
that since whatever is true is thereby in itself intelligible and hence
knowable, Molinists need only show how conditional future contingents
 5- Objections and Replies [79]

might be true in order to establish that an omniscient being can have

middle knowledge. They will counter that just as any plausible account
of omnipotence must distinguish what can obtain from what can be caused
to obtain by even the most powerful conceivable agent, so too it may well
be that a plausible account of omniscience will have to draw a distinction
between what is true and what is knowable by even the most powerful
conceivable intellect. The Suarezian gambit thus fails to convince.
How, then, might Molinists respond more effectively? My suspicion is
that the gulf separating the objector from the Molinist is in this case so
deep and fundamental that no convincing reply is possible. Nonetheless,
something can be said. First of all, if we think of knowledge merely as
justihed true belief, then it seems fairly obvious that even we hnite
subjects have knowledge of at least some conditional future contingents.
At the very least, we have true justified beliefs about how we would
freely act under specihed conditions. For instance, I have a highly
justihed belief that were I offered a no-strings-attached grant to do
research for hve years and to do just as much teaching as I cared to do, I
would freely accept it. So if this conditional is true, then I know it.
Likewise, I have highly justihed beliefs about how my wife and children
and close friends would freely act in various hypothetical situations. And
contrary to what Adams claims, it seems clear to me that the propositions
I believe in such cases are nonprobabilistic conditional future contin¬
gents. It may be appropriate to call my knowledge ‘probable’, but the
probability in question is epistemic, rehecting the fact that my justihca-
tion falls short of rendering the relevant propositions certain. The up¬
shot is that if even we can have some limited knowledge of conditional
future contingents, it is hardly surprising that God can know them.
This line of response is not without merit. Nonetheless, it obviously
has limited usefulness. After all, God’s middle knowledge is absolutely
certain and infallible and is not inferred from an antecedent knowledge
of the characters of free creatures. And it would surely be foolhardy to
claim that our knowledge of conditional future contingents enjoys this
high epistemic status.
At this point, I think, the best the Molinist can do is to provide a model
to aid our thinking. Molina speaks here of supercomprehension, where¬
as Suarez relies on talk about God’s comprehensive grasp of individual
essences. Can we flesh out these notions in a way more appealing to the
imagination?

The best attempt to do this that I know of is Calvin Normore’s. Since I

cannot improve on Normore’s own words, I will quote them in full:

^■^See Suarez, De Divina Gratia, prologue 2, chap. 7, no. 1, p. 24 in Opera Omnia, vol. 7.
[8o] Introduction

Imagine that God’s mind contains a perfect model of each possible thing — a
complete divine idea of a particular or, if you like, an individual concept.
Imagine that God simulates possible histories by thinking about how the
being which is A would behave under circumstances C — i.e., he simulates C
and ‘sees’ how A behaves. Now if there is a way in which A would behave in C,
a perfect model should reflect it, so if conditional excluded middle is valid
such a model is possible and God knows the history of the world by knowing
that model, i.e., by knowing his own intellect and his creative intentions.
But would the belief ‘state’ which God would be in on the basis of such a
model be a state of knowledge? Would it not rather bear to knowledge much
the same relation which veridical hallucination bears to perception? Here
we have a particularly striking form of another problem of divine omni¬
science. How can God be transcendent on the one hand and, on the other,
know what transpires in the world? It seems to me that anyone who claims
that a transcendent God knows contingent facts will have to admit significant
disanalogies between divine and human knowledge. It also seems to me that

supposing God’s knowledge of the world to be like veridical hallucination

locates these disanalogies in the right place. First it goes some way toward
accounting for the intuitive (as contrasted with discursive) character of

divine knowledge; God knows contingent facts intuitively because he ‘sees’

rather than infers that they obtain. Second by admitting counterfactual
connections (however mysterious) between divine belief and its mundane
objects, such an account preserves at least some of the intuition that God
knows and is infallible. Third by making these connections indirect it sug¬
gests a way one might also admit divine impassibility. Moreover almost any
mediaeval writer would have considered the counterfactual connections

suggested weaker than true (Aristotelian) causal connections.®^

Normore here brings together nicely many of the themes discussed

above. God’s knowledge of the world is providential and hence only

counterfactually (and not causally) dependent on contingent effects.

The fact that God’s middle knowledge varies from one creation situation
to another does not entail that creatures cause God to have such knowl¬
edge. (Of course, there remains the philosophical task of delineating
more precisely the difference between ‘true’ causal dependence and
mere counterfactual dependence.) So God knows but does not ‘find out’
how His creatures freely act. Moreover, the suggested model is conso¬
nant with, though it goes beyond, what Molina seems to be aiming at in
his brief remarks about supercomprehension.

None of this will suffice to silence Molina’s philosophical and theologi¬

cal critics. But in the end it is crucial to ask exactly what the alternatives

^SNormore, “Divine Omniscience, Omnipotence and Future Contingents: An Over¬

view,” pp. 15-16.
 5- Objections and Replies [8i]

are. Those unsympathetic with Molina’s wider theological project may

of course simply reject the notion of providence which underlies it,

either by denying God’s existence altogether or, more insidiously, by

replacing the conception of a perfectly provident being with that of a
limited God more like us. But those who — correctly, to my mind — resist
the temptation to remake God in our own image have to contend with
Molina’s trenchant criticisms of Bahezianism and the concomitance the¬
ory. When the alternatives are posed starkly in this way, it is clear to me
for one that Molinism is at least as good as its competitors — and, indeed,
arguably better.
 m

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 Luis de Molina, SJ.

Liberi Arbitrii cum Gratiae Donis, Divina Praescientia,

Providentia, Praedestinatione et Reprobatione
Concordia

Part IV

Question 14, Article 13, Disputations 47—53

 Disputation 47

On the Source of Contingency

1 . Thus far we have subjected our freedom of choice to intellectual

scrutiny, reconciled it to the extent our weakness allows with God’s
general concurrence and with divine grace, and shown with the clarity
permitted us that there is contingency both in the works of nature and in
those of grace.
In order that we might return to the explication of St. Thomas and to
the issues that pertain to this article,^ we must now, first of all, investi¬
gate the source of contingency, so that the contingency of future things
might thereby be fully and more clearly established. What’s more, we
will explain the way in which God knows future contingents, and, hnally,
we will reconcile divine foreknowledge with our freedom of choice^ and
with the contingency of things.

2. To understand the source or origin of contingency, we must note

that there are two senses relevant to the present undertaking in which a
state of affairs may be said to be contingent.^

‘Molina refers here to Part I, question 14, article 13, of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Summa
Theologiae, “Whether God Has Knowledge of Future Contingents.” The first four parts of
the Concordia, which occupy pp. 5—405 of the critical edition prepared by Johann Rabe-
neck, S.J. (see Introduction, n. 4, above), constitute an extended commentary on this
article, consisting of 53 disputations. Unless otherwise indicated, the disputations cited
below from the Concordia are part of the commentary on Part I, q. 14, a. 13.
^Literally, the freedom of our choice {nostri arbitrii libertas). In Disputation 2, where
Molina discusses the nature of free choice, he claims that free choice is a power that has the
will as its subject, though the exercise of this power has intellective or cognitive prerequi¬
sites as well. See Rabeneck, pp. 13-19, and Section 2.9 of the Introduction.
3 Molina here and elsewhere uses the Latin term complexio in a way that sometimes

suggests the translation ‘proposition’ and at other times suggests the translation ‘state of
affairs’. For instance, in the next paragraph he speaks of the subject and predicate of a
complexio, whereas two paragraphs after that he talks about a complexio being indifferent as
to whether it is going to occur or obtain (evenire). I have chosen the translation ‘state of
[85]
 Disputation 4y
[86]

A state of affairs is contingent in the first sense when, if you think just
of the natures of the terms, the subject no more lays claim to the
predicate that is affirmed of it than to the opposite of that predicate. For
instance, that Socrates is sitting is contingent, since Socrates as such no
more lays claim to sitting than to standing or to lying down.
Contingency taken in this sense does not rule out fatalistic necessity.
For if all agents acted by a necessity of nature, then, without a doubt,
even if nothing pertaining to the natures of the terms were incompatible
with things turning out otherwise, everything that occurs would still, in
relation to its causes as constituted and arranged in such a universe,
occur with a fatalistic and infallible necessity in just the way that it in fact
occurs.'^ For any cause that, given the constitution and arrangement of
the universe in question, was able to impede another cause would in fact
impede it. Thus, given this hypothesis, anyone who knew all the causes
in such a universe would thereby know infallibly and with certainty all
the things that were going to be.
By contrast, a given future state of affairs is called contingent in a
second sense, because it rules out not only the necessity that has its source
in the natures of the terms, but also the fatalistic and extrinsic necessity
that results from the arrangement of causes. So given this universe of
things which we see around us and given that all the causes are arranged
in just the way they are now in fact arranged, such a state of affairs is still

affairs’ for two reasons. First, later in Part IV Molina uses the image of a complexio as a
combination of simple things {simplicia) rather than of linguistic items. Indeed, the Latin
word extremum, translated here as ‘term’, is often used by medieval writers to stand not for
linguistic entities but for the things they apply to. Second, Molina commonly uses the
terms propositio and enuntiatio when he wants to speak unambiguously of propositions.
Notice that Molina apparently thinks of a proposition as an interpreted sentence —
whether spoken, written, or mental — rather than as a nonlinguistic abstract entity. This is
a standard, though by no means the only. Scholastic view of propositions. See Norman
Kretzmann, “Medieval Logicians on the Meaning of ‘Propositio, ’’’/owma/ of Philosophy 67
(1970): 767-787.
^Molina construes the notion of an agent in a broad Aristotelian sense to include both
free and nonfree (or ‘natural’) sources of causal activity. So individual substances are
thought of as agents endowed with causal powers, tendencies, and dispositions; and
(efficient) causation is treated as a relation between an agent and an event (or state of
affairs) rather than, in keeping with standard Humean accounts, as a relation between
events (or states of affairs). For an excellent thumbnail sketch of the resulting Aristotelian
view of nature, see Peter Geach’s essay on Aquinas in P. T. Geach and G.E.M. Anscombe,
Three Philosophers (Ithaca, 1961), esp. pp. 101-109. I have tried to provide a systematic
account of natural necessity within such a framework in “The Necessity of Nature,”
Midwest Studies in Philosophy 11 (1986): 215—242.
This philosophical conception of nature is— deservedly in my opinion — undergoing a
revival in contemporary philosophy of science. See esp. R. Harre and E. Madden, Causal
Powers (Totowa, N.J., 1975). For an excellent discussion of the effect of this and other
philosophical conceptions of nature on Christian theology and, specifically, on the theol¬
ogy of miracles, see Stephen Bilynskyj, “God, Nature and the Concept of Miracle” (Ph.D.
diss., University of Notre Dame, 1982).
 [87]

Disputation ^7

indifferent as to whether it is or is not going to obtain by virtue of the

same causes through which it ordinarily obtains.
It is in this second sense that we will be speaking of contingency in the
present context, as we inquire into its source. For the very natures of the
terms of a state of affairs are the source of contingency taken in the hrst
sense.

3. In Disputation 35 we considered the position of Scotus, who

asserts that the divine will is by itself the total source of contingency.^
There we argued against this position and rejected it as dangerous and
as not sufficiently in accord with the Catholic faith.
Therefore, in order that it might be clear which causes are the source
or origin giving rise to the contingency of various things, it should be
noted that there are some things (for example, angels, the heavens, the
human soul, and primary matter) whose production and conservation
depends solely on God in such a manner that they cannot in any way be
destroyed by the power of natural agents, whereas there are other things
whose conservation does not depend on God alone. Again, there are
some things that belong to the order of nature, whereas there are other
things that pertain to the order of grace and everlasting happiness (for
example, the supernatural means whereby we are disposed toward and
prepared for everlasting beatitude).^

^Rabeneck, pp. 218—222. In Disputation 35 Molina cites the following texts from Duns
Scotus’s Ordinatio: I, dist. 2, q. 2; I, dist. 8, q. 5; I, dist. 39; and II, dist. 1, q. 3. He goes on to
attack the thesis, which he attributes to Scotus, that if God were to exercise exactly the same
causal influence He now exercises on the created universe, but by a necessity of nature rather
than freely, then no effects would be contingent. Molina contends to the contrary that even
if per impossibile the antecedent of the foregoing conditional were true, there would still be
genuine causal contingency as long as some creatures had freedom of choice or at least a
‘trace’ of freedom, as in the case, to be discussed shortly, of certain brute animals.
60n Molina’s view, explained more clearly in Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. 25, God gra¬
tuitously wills for human beings not only a supernatural end, namely, the everlasting
beatific vision of God Himself, but also the supernatural means by which we are to attain
that end within the order of salvation contingently established by God. More specifically,
through the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ human beings are gratuitously
furnished with supernatural aids and graces that empower us and dispose us to act
righteously and thus to merit eternal life within the framework of the order of salvation
freely ordained by God. So, on the one hand, the fundamentally gratuitous nature of
salvation is preserved, along with the doctrine that it is only by God’s special supernatural
assistance that any of us is empowered to merit salvation or is even so much as moved
toward exercising that power; whereas, on the other hand, the emphasis on merit is meant
to highlight the fact that God does not force salvation on us, but leaves us free instead to
refuse His gracious offer and to condemn ourselves by our own sins. One crucial differ¬
ence between Molina and his Bahezian opponents centers about the question of whether
God’s assistance, when efficacious, is, as the Bafiezians claim, intrinsically or essentially
efficacious or whether it is not instead efficacious only contingently or by ‘extrinsic de¬
nomination’, to use the relevant Scholastic term. This question is addressed directly and at
length in Disputation 53. See Sections 2.6— 2.9 of the Introduction.
 Disputation 4y
[88]

4. Let this, then, be the first conclusion : Since, as was proved in Part I,
q. 3, a. 4, disp. 1,^ no created thing is necessary in relation to the first
cause, but rather all were produced by Him in such a way that they were
able not to exist, it follows that God’s free will should be regarded as the
sole source of all the contingency discerned (i) in the fact that there were
things that were hrst produced by God alone (as, for instance, in the
original establishment of this universe with respect to all its parts and
embellishments), and also (ii) in the fact that those things whose conser¬
vation depends on God alone are conserved and continue in existence.
In relation to effects of this sort, however, God should be called a free
cause rather than a contingent cause. Even though the effects themselves
were produced freely by Him and hence are not contingent effects in the
sense of having been produced accidentally or fortuitously by the con¬
currence of two diverse causes and unintentionally on the part of both,
but are instead free effects, still, because they were able to be produced
and also able not to be produced by their cause, and because they are
able to be conserved in the future and also able not to be conserved by
that same cause, it can be said with absolute propriety that these effects
did and will exist contingently. From here on we will join the other
Doctors in speaking in this way, and it is in this sense that we are here
investigating the contingency of those things.^
The proposed conclusion is perfectly obvious. For the fact that all
effects of the sort in question are such that they are able to exist and able
not to exist derives from God’s free will alone, and so God’s will must be
called the sole source of and total explanation for their contingency.^

5. Before we propose the remaining conclusions, it should be noted

that although we must not countenance in brute animals even the

^The disputation referred to here is titled “Whether in God Essence and Existence Are
the Same.” As explained in the Preface, in 1592 Molina published his massive Commentaria
in Primam Divae Thomae Partem (hereafter cited as Commentaria), a commentary on Part I of
Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, specifically on questions 1-64 and 106-1 13. Page references
(with “a” and “b” indicating left and right column, respectively) will be to the printed
edition I have access to, that published in Lyons in 1622. The present reference, accord¬
ingly, is to Commentaria, p. 48a— b.
^As will become clear below, Molina numbers among the contingent effects of secon¬
dary (or created) causes not only those effects that result directly from the activity of
indeterministic secondary causes (for example, free choice) but also those effects that,
though they occur at a given time by a necessity of nature, have the activity of indeter¬
ministic secondary causes somewhere in their causal ancestry. This point is discussed more
fully in Section 2.7 of the Introduction.
^Molina is a bit careless here. As is clear from other places in Part IV (see, e.g..
Disputation 50, sec. 6), he does not mean to suggest that God freely decides which things
are able to exist and which things are not able to exist. Rather, to put it somewhat loosely, of
the things that are able to exist. He freely decides which ones will in fact exist and which
ones will in fact not exist.
 [89]
Disputation ^7

freedom that, in Disputation 2,^® we claimed to exist in insane people

and in children before they have attained that use of reason which
suffices for blame and merit, nonetheless it seems highly likely that in
brute animals there is a certain trace of freedom with regard to some of
their movements, so that it is within their power to move in one direction
or another. For when a beast, wearied by sitting for a long time, desires
to take a walk and is not attracted to any special place by a cognition of
and desire for some object located in that place, then it seems plainly to
be within its power to move in one direction or another. I would not,
however, attribute so great a trace of freedom to beasts that it might be
within their power not to move toward a certain object even if they were
aroused by a desire for the object preceded by a cognition of it, and even
if there were no cause, for example, fear of the stick or of some other
thing, holding them back. Still, anyone who does not wish to concede
even this trace of freedom to beasts should in no way regard the appeti¬
tive faculty of brute animals as the proximate source of any contingency.

6. Perhaps you will object that although freedom or its trace (if such
is to be posited) is in the appetitive faculty formally and in the way that a
thing is in its subject, nonetheless, in the way that a thing is in its source,
freedom is in the indifferent cognition and understanding that has to
precede a free act.^^ But this sort of cognition cannot exist in animals,

•ORabeneck, pp. 13-19, esp. p. 14, sec. 4, and pp. 17—19, sec. 12.
* 1 This objection derives from Francisco Zumel, In Primam Divae Thomae Partem Commen-
taria, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 2, appendix (Salamanca, 1590), pp. 41 ib-4i6a (hereafter cited as
Zumel, Commentaria). Zumel (1540-1607), the thirty-second general of the Order of Our
Lady of Mercy (Mercederians), was professor of moral philosophy at Salamanca in the last
two decades of the sixteenth century. He was one of Molina’s two main theological
antagonists (the other being the Dominican Domingo Bahez) and a key figure in the
ecclesiastical investigations into Molina’s theological opinions. Not to be outdone, Molina
launched his own counterattack against Zumel’s views. Disputation 53 below is, in fact, an
extended critique of Zumel’s account of divine predetermination and efficacious concur¬
rence. Also, in 1594 Molina authored a shorter response to the charges leveled by Zumel
against the Concordia. This response to Zumel is found in Friedrich Stegmiiller, “Neue
Molinaschriften,” Beitrdge zur Geschichte der Philosophic und Theologie des Mittelalters, band 32
(Munster, 1935), pp. 451-473 (hereafter cited as Stegmiiller).
The philosophical question at issue here is an interesting one that has not been widely
discussed in recent action theory: Is free choice an appetitive power common to human
beings and higher animals, with the main difference between them being that humans are
capable of entertaining and thus of willing or dissenting from or simply not willing
cognitively more sophisticated objects? (These objects are, I think, best taken to be states of
affairs.) Or is free choice instead a fundamentally cognitive power, namely, the power to
decide in favor of one or another contrary state of affairs entertained ‘indifferently’, and
then to mobilize, as it were, one’s appetitive apparatus in accordance with that decision.
One who takes the first view is likely not to balk at Molina’s ascription of a “trace” of
freedom to brute animals. Such creatures are on his view free to will or not to will (though
not to dissent from) very simple objects. On the other hand, one who takes the second view
is automatically committed, it would seem, to denying animals any sort of freedom, since
[90] Disputation

since it has to be a cognition that collates and compares one object with
another and distinguishes one object from another; but there can be no
such cognition in animals. Indeed, in order for a brute animal to be able
to direct its movement indifferently in one direction or another, it would
have to understand the end toward which it is striving as an end, and it
would have to comprehend each sort of appropriateness or inappropri¬
ateness involved in directing its movement in one direction rather than
another, and it would have to compare these sorts of appropriateness
with one another, and it would have to infer and deduce from this
comparison which sorts outweigh and overrule the others. Likewise, in
order for an animal to be truly indifferent as to getting up or holding
back for a while and remaining on the ground, or in order for it to be
truly indifferent as to taking a step or holding its foot back, it would have
to understand its acts and their negations, along with the sorts of htting-
ness and appropriateness which they have, and it would have to com¬
pare these with one another. But all this is completely alien to brute
animals.

7. The proper response, however, is that in order for someone to be

said to be endowed with that freedom of choice which suffices for merit
and mortal guilt, and for works of art and of human prudence, or for
works that must be done with moderation, it is by no means necessary
that he think of and deliberate about all the things mentioned in the
proposed objection every time he acts freely in any way whatsoever;
rather, what is necessary is that he be able to think of and deliberate about
all those things — more or less, since he might have been endowed with
more native insight and natural prudence, and he might have been
more versed in the tasks to be accomplished, and he might have acquired
more experiential knowledge and prohciency in the relevant matters. In
any case, it is not necessary that all those thoughts and deliberations
occur beforehand whenever human beings do something freely, with
respect to either the exercise or the species of the act. ^2

they are incapable of entertaining the negations of — or, in general, contraries of — the
objects presented to them cognitively. Zumel appears to hold a variant of the second view.
He concedes that free choice is an appetitive power, that is, that it has the will as its subject,
but contends that it is present in the will only because it “flows from” what he calls
“indifferent cognition.” That is, free choice is present in the will only if the sophisticated
cognitive abilities characteristic of human beings are present in the intellect.
i^This distinction between the exercise and the species of an act is important for
Molina’s discussion below of the freedom enjoyed by brute animals as well as for the theory
of action in general. Suppose that I am free with respect to both the exercise and species of
an act of willing an object A. Then, first of all, I may either positively will A or negatively
not will A. In the latter case there is no exercise of an act of willing and hence I need not
 Disputation ^7

[91]

Take those utterly dissolute people who care nothing for, nor even
think about, their own salvation or the law of God, but who are drawn
like brute animals to the pleasures of taste and touch. Surely, when they
consent immediately to some shameful object presented to them as
pleasurable, they do so without any comparisons or deliberations of the
sort in question. And yet as long as they could have thought of and
deliberated about those things and neglected to do so, this is enough for
them to be said to have willed the act freely (with respect to both its
exercise and species) and for mortal guilt to be imputed to them.^^
Again, when experienced or inexperienced people are headed some¬
where, and proceed more or less rapidly, and travel along one or an¬
other part of a road or rough terrain, and stop for a while or keep on
going farther, clearly, they do all of these things freely. And yet, as
experience itself testifies, they do not reflect on or deliberate about the
things mentioned in the above objection; instead, in order for them to be
acting freely it suffices that they have an awareness of the general area
through which they are passing, along with the innate freedom to walk
in one manner or another or to stop.
In the same way, when a brute animal arises from sleep and either
goes for a casual walk or sets off to look for food wherever it may appear,
it might walk along this or that path from among the infinitely many
forward paths it is able to walk along; it might move more or less quickly;
it might take the first step now or a little later; it might stop for a while or
keep on going. In order for all this to be the case, it seems sufficient that
the animal have an awareness of the general area it is able to traverse,
along with the innate trace of freedom which resides in its appetitive
faculty or (what is the same thing) along with its innate trace of domin-

conceive of or entertain as an object the negation of A, namely, not-A. Rather, I entertain

A, but simply do not exercise an act of willing with respect to it. Suppose, on the other
hand, that I do in fact exercise an act of willing. Then if I am free with respect to \he species
of the act, I may either will A or will not-A. So we can distinguish freedom with respect to
the exercise of an act of willing (that is, freedom to will or not will A) from freedom with
respect to the species of the act (that is, freedom to will A or will not-A). Notice that the
former does not entail the latter, since freedom with respect to the species of the act, but
not freedom with respect to its exercise alone, requires an ‘indifferent’ cognition of both A
and not-A as potential objects of a positive act of willing. Molina will accordingly insist
below that animals may have freedom with respect to the exercise of an act, for example,
willing or not willing to take a step in a given direction, even if they have no conception of
the negation or, in general, any contrary of the bodily movement that is the object of that
act of willing.
Molina does not mean to suggest here that the ability to deliberate about these things
is by itself a sufficient condition for the agent’s freely willing a given act. Obviously, there
are other necessary conditions as well. His point is simply that the cognitive prerequisites
for free action can, sometimes at least, be satisfied by the mere ability to deliberate about
such things.
 Disputation 4 7
[92]

ion over the acts in question. So it is up to the animal whether it takes one
path or another, or whether it traverses it more slowly or more quickly,
or whether it sets off now or a little later, or, last, whether it stops for a
while or keeps on going.
For when freedom or a trace of freedom is present in the appetitive
faculty, and when the object is not so strongly attractive that it necessi¬
tates this faculty by its character, then freedom or a trace of freedom is

by itself sufficient for the appetitive faculty’s not commanding a move¬

ment it is able to command — and thus a cognition of the negation of a
movement is not required in order for the faculty not to command the
movement. Nor is it necessary, in order for a human being or an
animal not to command a movement, that he will or desire not to com¬
mand it— this latter would require a cognition of the negation of the
movement; rather, it is enough that he be related merely negatively to
the movement by virtue of his not commanding it, as is possible. This
point has not been sufficiently attended to by some writers.
In the same way, when freedom or a trace of freedom is present, it is
because of that freedom or trace of freedom alone that, given one and
the same awareness of the object and of the path, a more or less rapid
movement may be commanded.
Moreover, each of the things which has thus far been claimed to
depend on the trace of freedom is more than sufficient for establishing
that the proximate source of some contingency lies in the appetitive
faculty of brute animals. This is manifestly obvious.

8. So in response to the objection it should be said, first of all, that

we, unlike Durandus, do not locate freedom in cognition rather than in
appetite; nor, again, do we posit as many judgments and commands in

i^Scholastic theories of action typically distinguish between elicited acts, that is, acts of
intellect and will which are not themselves “undertaken” (to use Roderick Chisholm’s apt
term), and commanded acts, which are the objects of elicited acts. The simplest examples of
commanded acts are elementary bodily movements. So, for instance, my willing to raise
my hand is, typically at least, an elicited act, whereas my raising my hand is sl commanded act.
A complete human action would characteristically include acts of both sorts. For a lucid
explanation of this distinction and others within the context of St. Thomas’s action theory,
see Alan Donagan, “Thomas Aquinas on Human Action,” pp. 642-654 in N. Kretzmann,
A. Kenny, and J. Pinborg, The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy (New York,
1982).
i^See n. 12 above. Being “related merely negatively” to the movement is not to will the
movement rather than to will the opposite of the movement.
*®The allusion here is to William Durand de Saint-Pourcain (c. 1270-1332), a French
Dominican who was bishop of Limoux, Puy, and Meaux at various times during the early
decades of the fourteenth century. In the Concordia Molina often refers to Durandus’s
commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences — though not, interestingly enough, given the
present citation, in Disputation 2, where he discusses the question of whether freedom
should be located in the will or the intellect.
 Disputation ^7
[93]

the cognitive faculty as others do. Instead, we believe that a simple

cognition of the object as pleasurable or as desirable in some other way
suffices by itself for an appetitive act, not only in the sentient appetite of
animals but also in the human and angelic wills. (We will say some¬
thing about this below, in the material on the sin of the angels; and we
have discussed it at greater length in Part I-II, q. 9, a. 1, where we
explained Aristotle’s view on this matter.) Finally, it should be said that
in order for animals to have a trace of freedom, it suffices that they have
a cognition of the general area through which they are able to travel by
walking or flying or swimming; likewise, it suffices that the cognition of
the object whose image attracts them not move them so strongly that by
its character the animal’s desire necessitates the exercise of the act — as
has been explained. Nor is it necessary that there be cognitions, com¬
parisons, and deliberations of the sort mentioned in the objection. This,
too, has been explained.

9. With these points thus established, let this be the second conclusion :
If you excluded the free choice of both human beings and angels, as well
as the sentient appetite of brute animals with respect to those acts
wherein there is found a trace of freedom, and if you posited the
universe with its present constitution and assumed that God did nothing
over and beyond the common course and order imposed on things, then
contingency would be taken away from all the effects of secondary
causes, and everything would have to happen by a kind of fatalistic
necessity.

^^The Scholastics commonly refer to the human will as an “intellective” or “rational”

appetite, in contrast to the merely “sentient” appetite found in animals. There are, of
course, competing accounts of the differences between the two sorts of appetite, and some
of these accounts conflict directly with Molina’s claim that animals have a trace of freedom.
For instance, in one place St. Thomas claims that a necessary feature of sentient appetite is
that the animal does not have dominion over its own appetitive inclinations, but is instead
intrinsically determined to act. See De Veritate, q. 22, a. 5, resp.
^^Molina’s discussion of the sin of the angels is found in Commentaria, q. 63, a. 2 and 3,
disp. unica, part 5, concl. 1, p. 620a; and his lectures on Part I— II of the Summa Theologiae
survive in manuscript form in the National Library at Lisbon (F.G. 2804). By the way, this
is just one of several references by Molina to Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae in which he does
not mention the work by name, but instead just mentions the relevant part of the Summa.
This is standard late Scholastic procedure.
In the place cited from the Commentaria Molina argues that one need not, in order to sin,
erroneously judge that the bad object willed is morally good or good simpliciter; rather, it is
sufficient merely that some sort of goodness, even if only usefulness or pleasure, be
perceived in the object or believed to be in it.
i^Molina holds that God continuously conserves all secondary (that is, created) agents
and concurs or cooperates with all their causal activity. And he further holds that God’s
conserving and concurring activity is in every instance a metaphysically necessary condi¬
tion for the secondary agent’s bringing about any effect at all. (See n. 22 below.) This is why
 Disputation ^ 7
[941

This conclusion is proved by the fact that, given the above assump¬
tions, every secondary cause will act by a necessity of nature, and any
cause which, given the constitution of this universe, is able to impede
another cause will in fact impede it. Therefore, whatever is going to
occur will occur in such a way that it is not able to issue from its causes in
any other way, and thus whatever is going to occur will occur by the
fatalistic and extrinsic necessity of its causes.

10. The third conclusion is this: Given the same constitution of the
universe and given that God does nothing over and beyond the common
course and order of things, the primary, though remote, source of con¬
tingency for the effects of all the secondary causes belonging to the
natural order is God’s will, which created the free choice of human
beings and angels and the sentient appetite of those beasts that seem to
be endowed with some sort of trace of freedom with respect to certain
acts; 20 on the other hand, the proximate and immediate source is the free
choice of human beings and angels, along with the sentient appetite of
beasts with respect to those acts in which beasts seem to have a trace of
freedom.
The hrst part, namely, that the divine will is the primary source, is
perfectly obvious, since if anything else is to count as a source of con¬
tingency, then it is necessary that it, in turn, have its existence from the
divine will, so that it is by all means necessary as well always to designate
the divine will as the primary source.
The second part is proved from the fact that since (i) the other
secondary causes act by a necessity of nature, and each of them is such
that, given that it is not impeded and given the circumstances that in fact
obtain, it is determined with respect to what it does or to that which
follows from it under those same circumstances, whereas (ii) only angelic

he adds the condition that God does “nothing over and beyond the common course and
order imposed on things.”
Notice, however, that since God’s conservation and concurrence are free acts on His part,
it might seem to follow that every future effect of secondary causes is a contingent effect.
For given the exact arrangement of causes that now obtains, God still has the power and
freedom not to concur with the secondary causes that will in fact bring about any given
future effect E at any given future time T. So for any such E and T, E's occurring at T is
now a contingent effect even if all the secondary causes of £ acting between now and T will
act by a necessity of nature. Such a result seems to undermine the sharp distinction
between necessary and contingent effects that Molina is trying to draw.
Molina’s response, I believe, is that since God’s genera/ (as opposed io particular) causal
influence does not by itself determine the nature of the effect, this influence should be
presupposed in an explication of what is to count as a necessary effect. This point is
discussed in Section 2.7 of the Introduction.
20 Molina does not mean to imply here that all the effects of secondary causes are
contingent effects, but only that God is the primary source of whatever contingency is
found in such effects.
 Disputation 4y
[95]

and human free choice, along with the sentient appetite of beasts (which
has a trace of freedom with respect to some acts), have it within their
power to do this or that in one or another way or to refrain entirely from
the activity that characteristically emanates from them, it follows that the
contingency of any effect that proceeds from secondary causes has one
of these three causes as its proximate source.

11. At this point it should be noted that it is one thing to say that
every contingent effect of secondary causes emanates proximately from
one of these three causes, and quite another thing to say that the
proximate source of the contingency of each such effect is one of these
three causes; for the hrst of these claims is false, and the second is true.
The reason is that most contingent effects emanate immediately from
natural causes, and yet the immediate source of their contingency is not
the natural cause itself, from which the effects proceed by a necessity of
nature, but is instead one of the three causes in question. For example,
the fact that this lamp by which I am writing is now emitting light from
itself is a contingent effect that was able not to exist; and even though
this effect proceeds by a necessity of nature from the lamp itself as from
a natural cause, the source of its contingency was not the lamp, but
rather the person who by his free choice lit the lamp, along with all the
free causes that cooperated in the production of this oil and of the other
things required for lighting the lamp. Hence, it is not only those effects
that result immediately from the three causes in question which are con¬
tingent; rather, the innumerable effects of natural causes resulting from
a combination of those three causes and the natural causes in this
universe are also contingent. Nor is contingency in the effects of natural
causes brought about only by variations arising in the effects of natural
causes because of the immediate influence of one of the three causes in
question; rather, contingency in these effects is also brought about by
any other variation that later arises from the immediate effects of these
three causes in any of the other effects of natural causes which are easily
altered when some circumstance is changed. 21

12. The proposed conclusion contained the qualification: “. . . given

that God does nothing beyond the common course and order imposed

21 What Molina has in mind here is well illustrated by his description, spelled out in
Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. 15, of the changes in the history of the world wrought by Adam’s
sin, as well as by the sins of his descendants. So there are future effects that (i) are
contingent with respect to the secondary causes now operative, since their causal history
involves free acts that are still future at the present moment, but which (ii) will occur by a
necessity of nature at some time after the last free act in their causal ancestry has occurred.
For more on this, see Section 2.7 of the Introduction.
 Disputation 4 7
[96]

on things.” The reason is that if God were either to do something of this

sort or to withhold the concurrence owed in some sense to natural
causes, then the contingency of the effects of natural causes would also
be traceable to the divine will as its immediate source. 22 Hence, the fact
that the Babylonian fire did not consume the three young men, whom it
would have consumed had it been left to its own nature, has to be
attributed to the divine will, which freely withheld its general concur¬
rence. 23 To be sure, since God is not wont to do such things except
because of the order of grace, that is, so that He might in this way draw
people to the faith or conhrm them more completely in the faith or
something similar, effects of this sort can properly be numbered among
those that pertain to the order of grace.

13. In this discussion we have not included among the sources of

contingency those effects in which, when commenting on Part I— II,
q. 13, a. 2, and on Book IV of Aristotle’s Physics, we claimed to hnd
contingency, of the sort found in the shattering of a vase full of water, by
which the water, if it were frozen and there were no external atmo¬
sphere, would rush out to fill the vacuum. 24 For in such a case, if the vase
were in all its parts uniform and of entirely equal resistance, then since
there would be no more reason it should shatter in this part rather than
that part — though it would necessarily have to shatter, lest there be a
vacuum — clearly, the fracture’s occurring in a given part will be said to
happen by chance or fortune and hence contingently. Now, someone
might contend that it is not correct to infer from the exact and total

uniformity of each of the vase’s parts that there is no more reason why in
such an event the vase should break in this part rather than that part. So
let us suppose that God by a special influence gives equal power of
resistance to the part or parts you claim the fracture should occur in;
from this it will now indeed follow that there is no more reason the vase

should break in this part rather than that part — since each part will have
received from God the same power of resistance. The same thing will be

22This is the first explicit mention of God’s general concurrence (concursus) in Part IV of
the Concordia. The standard Scholastic position is that God’s causal concurrence is, in
addition to creation and conservation, a necessary condition for any secondary cause’s
being able to produce any effect at all. There are, however, disagreements about the exact
nature of this causal concurrence. On Molina’s view God’s general concurrence is a causal
influence along with the secondary cause on the effect, whereas according to the Thomistic
account it is a causal influence on the secondary cause which moves it to bring about the
effect. See Concordia, Disputations 26—28 (Rabeneck, pp. 164—185), as well as Section 2.6
of the Introduction.
23See the third chapter of the Book of Daniel.

24 No commentary on Aristotle’s Physics is found among the extant writings of Molina’s

listed in Stegmiiller, pp. 10*— 21*.
 Disputation ^7 [97]

true of the snapping of a cord that is very slender and equally resistant in
each part, if its ends should be pulled apart in opposite directions with
an application of maximal force. Likewise, if a beast were presented with
two objects so well suited to and in keeping with its appetite that it was
equally attracted to both of them, then there would likewise be no more
reason it should be moved in one direction rather than the other by the
combined force of the desire, of the objects and of the other attendant
circumstances. In all these instances we claimed that effects would ema¬
nate from the causes in question, since in the proposed cases it would be
ridiculous to assert that the vase and the cord would not break, or that
the beast would not move. But since there is no more reason why the
fracture should occur at one point in the vase or cord rather than
another, or why the motion of the beast should follow the one path
rather than the other, we claimed that these effects would occur con¬
tingently in such a way that chance would prevail. Now because these
and other similar events do not seem to be able to occur naturally —
except perhaps in the case of the beast, which, since it seems to have a
trace of freedom of the sentient appetite, would thereby be able to move
in the direction it wanted to in such an event — we have not bothered to
include them with the other immediate sources of contingency.

14. The fourth conclusion: The contingency of effects that pertain to

the order of grace must be traced in part to the human and angelic wills
and in part to the divine will as its proximate and immediate source. For
such an effect emanates freely either from the divine will alone, as with
the incarnation of the Son of God and the infusion of certain habits and
gifts, or from a created will that the divine will is cooperating with and
helping by means of some special assistance. 26
This conclusion is obvious and requires no proof.

25 It is interesting to note here that Molina’s account of divine providence can easily
accommodate the prevalent contemporary scientihc view that there is genuine causal
indeterminism in nature. He creates the conceptual space for indeterministic natural
effects by holding that (i) they, like free actions, are not infallibly predetermined by God,
but also that (ii) God need not causally predetermine them in order to foreknow them with
certainty, since He can know them with certainty through something very much like the
middle knowledge that Molina attributes to Him regarding free actions. These points will
become clearer below in Disputations 49, 52, and 53. See Section 2.10 of the Introduction.
26 By special assistance Molina means the supernatural grace that empowers human
beings to bring about meritorious supernatural effects.
 Disputation 48

Whether All the Things That Exist, Have Existed,

and Will Exist in Time Are Present to God

from Eternity with Their Own Proper Existence

1 . Now that the contingency of things has been conhrmed, it has to

be explained how future contingents are known by God and how the
foreknowledge He has of them coheres with their contingency.
But before we resolve the question posed in this place by St. Thomasd
we will examine in the three disputations following this one the various
positions of the Doctors on these same issues. And in order that we

might be able to discuss St. Thomas’s position more expeditiously in the

next disputation, we must first of all examine the problem posed in the
title of this disputation.

2. As is patently evident both from the article in question and from

the many other places cited by Capreolus in book I, dist. 36, q. 1, and
dist. 38, q. 1,2 St. Thomas held that all the things that exist, have existed,
and will exist in the course of time are from eternity present to God in
His eternity with that very same actual existence that they have, have
had, and will have outside their causes in the course of time — so that the
things that come to exist successively in time exist all at once in eternity
with the existence by which they come to exist successively in time.^

^Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 13. See Disputation 47, n. 1. The “question posed” is
whether future contingents are known with certainty.
^Johannes Capreolus (c. 1380-1444) was the first of the three great Dominican com¬
mentators on Aquinas in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the other two being
Tommaso de Vio Caietanus (Cajetan) and Francisco Sylvestri Ferrariensis. (See n. 6
below.) Known as “the soul of St. Thomas,” Capreolus wrote the Libri Defensiorum Theo¬
logiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis, three books of philosophical and theological comments on St.
Thomas’s commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences.
^Here and in what follows I have translated the Latin esse existentiae by ‘actual existence’.
Two paragraphs hence, esse existentiae is contrasted with esse objectivum (or cognitum), that is,
to put it somewhat loosely, the sort of being a thing has as an object of thought.

[98]
 Disputation 48 [99]

For, as was shown in Part I, q. 10, a. 1, disp. 1,2, and 4,"^ eternity is in
itself a certain indivisible duration, a simultaneous whole having as a
unit an infinite durational latitude by virtue of which it coexists and
corresponds as a whole with the whole of time and as a whole with each
interval and point of time — not unlike the way in which the human soul
is wholly in the whole human body and wholly in each of its parts, and
the way in which the divine essence is wholly in the whole universe (and,
indeed, in the infinite space that we imagine as spreading out in all
directions beyond the universe) and wholly in each part and point of that
universe.^ It follows that the whole of time and whatever exists or
successively comes to exist in it coexists with and exists in the indivisible
now of eternity, before which there is nothing and after which there is
nothing, and in which there is found no before or after and no past or
future, but only an indivisible, simultaneously whole duration — as was
shown in Disputation 2, cited just above.

It is under this interpretation that St. Thomas’s position is defended

by Cajetan (in his commentary on this article), Capreolus (in the places
cited above) and Ferrariensis (in his commentary on Contra Gentes I,
chap. 66 and 67) and attacked by Scotus, Durandus, and others.^ For

"^Commentaria, pp. 736—765 and 78a— 79b.

^The Scholastics distinguish two ways in which something can be in a place: circumspec-
tively and definitively. A thing x is circumspectively in a place P only if (i) the whole of x is in the
whole of P and (ii) each proper part of P is such that a proper part of x is in it. Thus, the cup
on my desk is circumspectively in the place it occupies, and the same holds in general for

ordinary physical objects and the places they occupy. By contrast, x '\% definitively in P only if
(i) the whole of x is in the whole of P and (ii) each proper part of P is such that the whole of x
is in it. The Scholastics generally hold, for instance, that the rational soul is dehnitively in
its human body, that the body of Christ is definitively in the sacrament of the altar, and that
angels are able to be present to spatial locations dehnitively, though not circumspectively.
See, e.g., Ockham, Quodlibeta Septem IV, q. 21, pp. 400-403 in Joseph Wey, C.S.B., ed.,
Ockham: Opera Theologica, vol. 9 (St. Bonaventure, N.Y., 1980).
®As pointed out in n. 2 above, Capreolus, Cajetan, and Ferrariensis were the three
outstanding Dominican commentators on Aquinas in the hfteenth and sixteenth cen¬
turies. So it is natural for Molina to cite them here and in Disputation 49 when questions
arise about the proper interpretation of St. Thomas. Capreolus has already been intro¬
duced. Tommaso de Vio Caietanus (1469—1534) is generally recognized as the most
distinguished commentator on St. Thomas. Master general of the Dominicans from 1508
to 1518, Cajetan was an important Catholic hgure in the ecclesiastical turmoil at the very
beginning of the Reformation. He is most famous forr his work on analogy as a metaphys¬
ical notion and for his insightful and at times highly speculative commentary on Aquinas’s
Summa Theologiae. In fact, he was influential in the movement to replace Lombard’s
Sentences with the Summa Theologiae as the standard text that theology students had to
comment on in order to obtain their advanced degrees. Francisco Sylvestri Ferrariensis
(c. 1474-1528) taught at various Dominican houses of study before ending up at Bologna
in 1520. A leader, along with Cajetan, in the early sixteenth-century revival of Scholasti¬
cism, he was master general of the Dominicans from 1 525 until his death. He is best known
for his commentary on Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles (hereafter cited as Ferrariensis,
Contra Gentes).
[lOO] Disputation 48

this reason we have to repudiate Sylvester (in the Conflatus), Hervaeus

(in book I, dist. 38), and Hispalensis (in the same distinction, q. 1), who
maintain that St. Thomas should be interpreted as speaking not about
an actual existence that the things that come to exist successively in time
are supposed to have from eternity in eternity, but rather about an
objective or cognitive existence through which they are known in light of
that same actual existence that they will have in the course of time.^

3. This position of St. Thomas’s is attacked by Scotus (in book I, dist.

39), Durandus (in book I, dist. 38, q. 3), Gregory and Gabriel (in the
same distinction), Aureoli (in the place cited by Capreolus), and several
others.®^
First objection. That which does not exist is not able to coexist with
anything, since coexistence requires the existence of both terms. But
future things do not yet exist, nor have they existed. Therefore, they do
not coexist from eternity with either God or eternity, and hence they are
not present to God from eternity with their actual existence.

4. Second objection. Just as in God eternity embraces every time, so too

the immensity of the divine essence embraces or touches every place.
But God is not present to, nor does He coexist with, any place before that
place exists, as was explained in Part I, q. 8 and lo.^ Therefore, neither
will eternity be present to or coexist with any time before that time exists;

’Molina refers here to three lesser commentators on St. Thomas. Sylvestro Mazzolini
Prieras (1456-1523) was, like Cajetan, a Dominican deeply involved in Church affairs at
the beginning of the Reformation. His Conjiatus ex Sancto Thomae, referred to here by
Molina, is a commentary on Part I of the Summa Theologiae. Hervaeus Natalis (c. 1250—
1323), also a Dominican, was the leader of the French Thomist movement at the begin¬
ning of the fourteenth century. Molina here refers to Hervaeus’s commentary on the
Sentences. “Hispalensis” is a name used for the Spanish Dominican Didacus de Deza (1444-
1523), since he served as archbishop of Hispali (Seveille) from 1504 to 1523. He was the
author of Novarum Defensionum Doctrinae Angelici Doctoris Bead Thomae de Aquino super
Prinium
Sentences. Librum Sententiarum, a defense of St. Thomas’s commentary on book I of the

*^Durandus was introduced in Disputation 47, n. 16. Gregory a Rimini was born toward
the end of the thirteenth century and died in 1358. In 1357 he became superior general of
the Hermits of St. Augustine, having taught before that at Paris, Bologna, Padua, and
Perugia. Molina refers here to Gregory’s commentary on the Sentences. Gabriel Biel
(c. 1410-1495) was a German Scholastic, the most prominent of the fifteenth-century
nominalist theologians. Molina refers here to Gabriel’s Sentence commentary, titled Epi-
thoma Pariter et Collectorium Circa Quattuor Libros Sententiarum. Peter Aureoli (c. 1 280— 1322)
was a French theologian who won fame for his defense of the doctrine of the Immaculate
Conception. The archbishop of Aix-en-Provence from 1321 until his death, he is best
known for his Sentence commentary, referred to here, and for his commentary on the
literal sense of Sacred Scripture.
^Commentaria, pp. 66a— 70a and 73b-89a.
 Disputation 48 [101]

it follows from this that a future time that does not yet exist neither
coexists with nor is present to eternity, either now or from eternity.

5. Third objection. Things that are not able to coexist with each other
will not be able to coexist with some third thing, either. But past time and
future time are not able to coexist together with one other. Therefore,
they are not able to be present to God from eternity with their actual
existence, nor are they able to coexist with eternity.

6. Fourth objection. If the things that exist successively in time existed

together from eternity in eternity itself, then, since contradictories may
be true successively in time — for instance, the proposition ‘Adam exists’
was once true, and the proposition ‘Adam does not exist’ is now true —
contradictories would be true simultaneously in eternity. But that is
absurd.

7. Fifth objection. If the things that exist successively in time existed

together from eternity in eternity itself, then it would follow that the
nonexistence of a thing that is generated is not prior to the existence of
that same thing. Further, it would follow that the existence of one and
the same thing is produced before it is produced in time; and so it would
follow either that the thing is produced twice or else that it cannot be
produced in time — both of which are utterly absurd.

8. In order to understand the interpretation under which this doc¬

trine of St. Thomas’s can be defended, it should be noted that the verbs
that we use as copulas in propositions signify, in addition to their princi¬
pal significatum, a certain duration as the measure of the truth of those
propositions. For if the verb is present- tense, it consignifies present
duration; if past-tense, past duration; and if future-tense, future dura¬
tion.
Furthermore, present duration, which is the sort relevant to what we
are talking about here, can be of two types, namely, (i) the present time
or present moment of time, or (ii) eternity, which is always present.
Indeed, eternity cannot be a past or future duration, since of course
there cannot be any past or future in eternity taken in itself.
From this it follows that past-tense and future-tense verbs neither
signify nor are able to signify eternity as the measure of the truth of

*OThe notion of signification is being used here in an extended sense. When he refers to
the ‘principal significatum’ of the copula, Molina seems to have in mind not an entity of
any sort but simply the joining together of the subject and predicate.
[102] Disputation 48

propositions. Instead, they can signify only time, in which there can be
such a thing as the past and the future. Hence, the sense of the proposi¬
tions ‘Adam existed’ and ‘The Antichrist will exist’ is this: ‘Adam existed
in past time’ and ‘The Antichrist will exist in future time.’ By contrast,
present-tense verbs can signify as the measure of the truth of proposi¬
tions both (i) time or the moment of present time and (ii) the present

eternity. There can thus be two readings of the proposition ‘Adam

exists.’ One is this: ‘Adam exists in the duration of present time or of the
moment of present time’ — and the proposition is false on this reading.
The other reading is this: ‘Adam exists in the present duration that is
eternity.’ The proposition is true on this reading, since he exists in the
indivisible, to be sure, but inhnite now of eternity, which embraces all of
time and in which there exists whatever exists in time — though he exists
in eternity because of the existence that he had at the time at which he
existed. For if we imagine that in the indivisible now of His eternity,
which is beyond all time and embraces the whole of time, God Himself

forms the proposition ‘Adam exists in this, my now of eternity,’ we

understand clearly that this proposition is true.
And so, even though in ordinary usage we take present-tense proposi¬
tions to signify present time as opposed to past or future time, nonethe¬
less such propositions can be understood in both senses, especially when
the subject of discourse is, as it is for us now, the existence of things in
eternity.

9. Having laid this foundation, Cajetan (in his commentary on this

article) and Capreolus and Ferrariensis (in the places already cited)

claim that the following propositions can have two readings: ‘All things
coexist with God,’ ‘All things exist in eternity,’ ‘All things coexist simulta¬
neously with God or with eternity.’
On one reading the verbs ‘coexist’ and ‘exist’ signify present time, as
opposed to past or future time, and the propositions have this sense: ‘In
the present time (or, at the moment of present time) all things coexist
with God, exist in eternity, coexist simultaneously with God or with

eternity.’ And they contend that on this reading the propositions are
false, since in order for one thing to be correctly said to coexist with
another or to exist in another, it is required that both exist in the interval
consignihed by the copula of the proposition in which this is affirmed;
therefore, since future things do not exist either in the present time or at
the moment of present time, it follows that they do not at that time
coexist with God or with eternity, nor do they at that time exist in
eternity — as is quite clear from what we said in q. 10, a. 1, disp. 2.^^ If

^^Commentaria, pp. 74a— 76b.

 [103]

Disputation 48

you wish, you might also look at the arguments that Cajetan uses in this
place to reach the same conclusion. Those who attack St. Thomas’s
teaching seem to have interpreted the above propositions in the way just
explained.

10. But said propositions can have another sense, such that the verbs
in question consignify not the present time but an always present eter¬
nity. Here is the other sense: ‘In the now of eternity all things coexist
with God’; ‘In the now of eternity all things exist in eternity’; ‘In the now
of eternity all things coexist simultaneously with God or with eternity’ —
that is, they exist neither before nor after (since there is no such thing as
before eternity or after eternity), but rather they exist in that indivisible
and infinite now of eternity that embraces the whole of time. On this
reading the propositions are true, and it is in this way that they are
understood by St. Thomas and by Boethius in De Consolatione V, last
prose; ^2 ^nd it is as so understood that they appear frequently in the

writings of the saints, especially Augustine and Anselm.

11. It is in this same sense that the holy Fathers sometimes deny that
in God there is foreknowledge, properly speaking. For in the indivisible
now of eternity, which is the duration proper to the divine knowledge, all
things are present and coexist; and in this eternal now there is no before
or after, as though in some now of eternity it might be possible to know
things before they exist. So it follows that in God there is no fore¬
knowledge with regard to the existence of things in eternity — though in
relation to time there is, altogether properly speaking, foreknowledge in
God, since He knows things an infinitely long time before they exist. Nor
does the fact that things are produced afterward give rise to any alter¬
ation in the divine knowledge. It is in this way that Augustine is to be
understood in De Quaestionibus ad Simplicianum II, q. 2, when he says that

God’s knowledge with respect to things'that are future in time does not,
properly speaking, have the character of foreknowledge.*^ And it is in
this same way that Anselm is to be understood in De Casu Diaboli, chap.

21, when he says, “God’s foreknowledge is not properly called fore¬

knowledge; for someone to whom all things are always present does not
have foreknowledge of future things, but rather has knowledge of pres¬
ent things.” *4 The same goes for Boethius in De Consolatione V, last prose,

12 Molina refers here, of course, to Boethius’s De Consolatione Philosophiae.

40, 138. (Throughout I use the standard abbreviations PG and PL for Migne’s
Patrologia Graeca and Patrologia Latina, followed by volume and column numbers.)
^‘^PL 158, 353C. Here and in what follows I have made my own translations of passages
that Molina quotes from the Fathers, the saints, and the theologians. I have also, somewhat
more hesitantly, made my own translations of the scattered biblical passages quoted from
the Latin Vulgate.
[104] Disputation 48

when he claims that what can be properly said to be in God is not

foreknowledge, but rather providence.

12. I am surprised that Cajetan, in his commentary on this article,

credits himself with being the hrst to discover this way of defending St.

Thomas’s doctrine, since Capreolus before him (in the places already
cited) had defended it in the same way, and since the very same distinc¬
tion was hinted at by Richard (in Quodlibeta III, q. 1) and by others

among Cajetan’s predecessors.

13. Still, I should caution that the following propositions must not, it

seems, be conceded: ‘All things have existed from eternity in eternity,’ or

‘All things have coexisted from eternity simultaneously with God or with
eternity.’ For since the copulas of these propositions are past-tense, they
cannot signify, as the measure of the truth of these propositions, the
duration of eternity, in which there is no past; rather, they are able to sig¬
nify only the duration of past time. The following propositions, on the

other hand, can be conceded: ‘All things coexist from eternity with God,’
‘All things are from eternity present to God with their own actual exis¬
tence,’ ‘All things coexist from eternity simultaneously with God or with
eternity.’ For it is indeed the case that from eternity itself all things co¬
exist in the now of eternity and are present to God and to eternity. What’s
more, it is these latter propositions — and not those others above — which
St. Thomas uses in this place. The following proposition can also be

conceded: ‘From eternity it has always been true to say, “All things are
present to God or coexist with God.”’ For its sense is this: ‘At any past
time when the proposition “All things coexist with God” was put forth, it
was true, as long as the verb “coexist” consignihed the now of eternity.’

14. Response to the first objection. As for the first argument by the
opponents, given that the major premise is conceded, the minor prem¬
ise may be conceded as well if its meaning is that future things do not yet
exist in the present time and have not existed in the past. But then the
consequence should be denied, if its consequent is understood as saying
that future things do not coexist from eternity with either God or

eternity in the very now of eternity which is consignihed by the verb ‘co¬
exist.’ For even though future things neither exist at the present time

•^Richardus de Mediavilla (Richard of Middleton) (c. 1 249—1302) was a Franciscan who

taught at Paris from about 1 284 to 1 286. He endorsed the condemnations of Aristotelian-
ism promulgated at Paris in 1 277, but nonetheless proved to be a highly sympathetic critic
of Aquinas. Dubbed the “Solid Doctor” {Doctor Solidus), Richard is best known for his
commentary on the Sentences and for three series of Quodlibeta.
*®See sec. 3 above.
 [105]
Disputation 48

nor have existed in the past, they nonetheless exist in the indivisible now
of eternity which embraces the future time in which they will exist. On
the other hand, if in the consequent the verb ‘coexist’ signihes an interval
of time, so that its meaning is that future things coexist with neither God
nor eternity in real time or in the imaginary time that has elapsed from
eternity up until the present moment of time, then the consequence
should be conceded. For since those things did not exist in that interval
of time, they could not have coexisted in that interval with either God or
eternity. And it is in this sense that the conclusion seems to be under¬
stood by the objectors, even though St. Thomas did not teach the con¬
trary.

15. Response to the second objection. As for the second argument,

given that the major and minor premises are conceded, the first conse¬
quence should also be conceded. For since, in order for two things to
coexist, the existence of both of them is required, it certainly does
involve a contradiction for eternity to be present to or coexist with a
time, or for a time to be present to or coexist with eternity, before the time
exists either in itself (given that whatever is in time should be said to
coexist with eternity) or in eternity (given that whatever is in the now of
eternity, which embraces all of time, may be said to coexist with or be
present to eternity). Thus, as far as that which is further inferred is

concerned,^® if in the consequent the verb ‘coexist’ signifies a present

time — as opposed to past or future time — in which a future time might
coexist with eternity, then the second consequence should also be con¬
ceded. Nor does St. Thomas claim the contrary. If, however, the verb
signifies eternity itself, in which a time that is future in relation to the
moment of present time might coexist with and be present to that very
same eternity, then the second consequence should be denied — and this
whether the consequent in question is asserted now or at any other time,
real or imaginary, with respect to eternity. For in eternity consignified in
this way by the copula, since it embraces future time, that future time
coexists with and is present to that same eternity.

16. Response to the third objection. As for the third argument,^® the
major premise should be conceded if its sense is this: ‘Things that are not

*^See sec. 4 above.

i®The consequent of the first consequence is, ‘Neither will eternity be present to or
coexist with any time before that time exists.’ Molina apparently takes this proposition to
be the antecedent of a second consequence, one whose consequent is what he refers to here
as “that which is further inferred,” namely, ‘a future time that does not yet exist neither
coexists with nor is present to eternity, either now or in eternity.’
•^See sec. 5 above.
[io6] Disputation 48

able to coexist with each other in their own proper durations are not able
to coexist together with any third thing in those same durations, if those
durations are signified by the copula of the proposition in which the

things in question are said to coexist with that third thing.’ For, as has
been explained, past time and future time cannot coexist together with
God or eternity in any interval of time in which they cannot coexist with
each other. The major premise should be denied, however, if its sense is
this: ‘Things that are not able to coexist with each other in their own
proper durations are not able to coexist together with some third thing
in the duration of that third thing, even if that duration embraces the
durations of both of them and is signified by the copula of the proposi¬
tion in which they are said to coexist together with that third thing.’ For
past time and future time, which cannot coexist with each other at any
time, can coexist in eternity, which embraces both, together with God —
whose eternity is His proper duration — or also together with eternity
itself.

17. Response to the fourth objection. In response to the fourth argu-

ment,20 and also in order to understand which propositions with op¬
posed predicates are true and which are false when the copulas signify
the now of eternity, the following should be noted: Some propositions
with contradictory predicates are such that both are affirmative, for

example, ‘Socrates is sitting’ and ‘Socrates is nonsitting’; whereas others

are contradictories in the most proper sense, the one being affirmative

and the other negative, for example, ‘Socrates is sitting’ and ‘Socrates is
not sitting.’2i Now in both cases — as well as in any others in which
opposed predicates are attributed to the same thing — in order for there
to be an opposition when the copula consignifies a temporal now, it is
necessary that it consignify the same temporal now in both propositions.

^^See sec. 6 above.

21 Molina here draws upon the standard medieval distinction between negative proposi¬
tions and negative (or ‘infinite’) terms. Though it has an infinite predicate, a proposition of
the form ‘S is non-P’ is affirmative and hence is true only if there is something that its
subject term refers to, or in technical terminology, supposits for. So if there is nothing that
the subject term supposits for, then corresponding propositions of the forms ‘S is P' and ‘S
is non-P’ will both be false; it follows that they are not contradictories. On the other hand, a
proposition of the form ‘S is not P’ (or ‘It is not the case that S is P’) is a negative
proposition and thus is true if there is nothing its subject term supposits for. So corre¬
sponding propositions of the forms ‘S is P’ and ‘S is not P’ are contradictories. That is, it has
to be the case that exactly one of them is true and exactly one of them is false. For more on
the important distinction between propositional and terminal negation, see my “Ockham’s
Theory of Truth Conditions,” pp. 1—76 in A. J. Freddoso and H. Schuurman, trans.,
Ockham's Theory of Propositions: Part II of the Summa Logicae (Notre Dame, Ind., 1980), esp.
pp. 63—64. Also, see the passage from Aristotle referred to in n. 23 below.
 [107]
Disputation 48

For opposition has to do with the same thing, in the same respect and at
the same time. These points are obvious from the Dialectica.^^

18. With these points thus established, it should now be noted that
when propositions containing opposed predicates are both affirmative,
there is a distinction to be drawn. If the copulas consignify the same
temporal now, then the propositions cannot both be true; but if they
consignify the now of eternity, then the propositions can be true to¬
gether. The reason is that since (i) all the attributes that belong to a thing
at different times belong to it all at once in the now of eternity, and since
(ii) being a sitter and being a nonsitter can belong to Socrates at different
times, as can being sighted and being blind, and being cold and being
hot, it follows that all these things can be truly attributed to him all at
once if the copulas of the relevant propositions consignify the same now
of eternity. Thus, when the copulas consignify the now of eternity, then
affirmative propositions containing opposed predicates have no opposi¬
tion to each other. On the other hand, when propositions with the same
subject and predicate are such that the one is affirmative and the other
negative, then an opposition is found between them, regardless of
whether their copulas signify the same temporal now or the same now of
eternity. Hence, the propositions ‘Socrates is sitting’ and ‘Socrates is not
sitting’ are contradictories, regardless of whether the copulas signify the
same temporal now or the same eternal now. The explanation for this is
that a negation has the force of distributing what it negates, and so to say
‘Socrates is not sitting in eternity’ is the same as saying ‘Socrates is not
sitting in eternity in any respect, whether insofar as eternity corresponds
to this time or insofar as it corresponds to that time or to any other time.’
Therefore, as long as Socrates is sitting at some moment of time, ‘Soc¬
rates is sitting in eternity’ is true, whereas ‘Socrates is not sitting in
eternity’ is false. And so the following consequence is invalid: ‘Socrates is
not sitting at such-and-such a time; therefore he is not sitting in eternity.’

19. From what has been said you can easily see that the rule enunci¬
ated by Aristotle in De Inter pretatione II, chap. 1, namely, that a conse¬
quence by which a finite negative is inferred from an infinite affirmative
is valid, does not hold for propositions whose copulas consignify the now
of eternity, though it does hold for propositions that signify the temporal

22 Molina is apparently referring here to his own introduction to Aristotelian dialectics,

part of an early series of lectures on the whole of Aristotle’s Organon which he gave to a
group of religious and secular students from 1563 to 1567. The lectures are found in
manuscript form in the library of Evora, cod. 1 18-1-6, with the Dialectica coming just after
the opening notes on Porphyry’s Isagogue and just before the lectures on the Categories.
[io8] Disputation 48

now — and it is the latter propositions that Aristotle was speaking of in

that place. 23 The reason for this is as follows: The rule in question
derives its validity from the fact that contradictory predicates, for exam¬
ple, ‘sitting’ and ‘nonsitting’, cannot belong to the same subject at the
same instant of time, so that if ‘nonsitting’ is truly affirmed of Socrates at
some moment of time, then ‘sitting’ will be truly denied of him at that
same moment. But because contradictory predicates can be affirmed of
Socrates in the same now of eternity, since eternity corresponds to

different parts of time, the following consequence is invalid: ‘Socrates is

nonsitting in eternity; therefore he is not sitting in eternity.’^^

20. Now that these matters have been explicated, we should say in
response to the proposed argument that the two propositions in ques-
tion,25 which are true successively in time, are not contradictories, since
their copulas do not consignify the same temporal now, but instead
consignify different temporal nows — whereas in order for there to be a
contradiction it is necessary that they consignify the same time. On the
other hand, if they did consignify the same instant of time, then the
propositions would indeed be contradictories, but in that case they could

23 Aristotle, De Interpretatione, chap. 10, igb 23ff. In contrast to us moderns, the medi-
evals divide the De Interpretatione into two books, the first consisting of chapters 1—9 and
the second of chapters 10-14. Here the description ‘hnite negative’ refers to a negative
proposition with a positive or hnite predicate (for example, ‘Socrates is not sitting in
eternity’), whereas the description ‘inhnite affirmative’ refers to an affirmative proposition
with
n. 21 a above.
negative or inhnite predicate (for example, ‘Socrates is nonsitting in eternity’). See

24 From what Molina says here and just below we can reasonably infer that he accepts the

following principle: ‘If “S is P” is true at some time and “S is not P" is true at some other
time, then both “S is P" and “S is non-P” are true in eternity.’ It is interesting to apply this
principle to the predicate ‘being’ (‘exists’). On Molina’s view, ‘Socrates is a nonbeing,’
where the copula signihes the now of eternity, is true if Socrates exists at some times but
not at others. But one might object that this proposition is not only false but impossible.
For it obviously implies that Socrates is not a being and also implies, since it is affirmative,
that Socrates is a being. Molina’s response is that although ‘Socrates is a nonbeing’ is, for
the reasons given, impossible if its copula signihes the temporal now, things are otherwise if
its copula signihes the eternal now. For in that case ‘Socrates is a nonbeing’ does not imply
that Socrates is not a being, and hence is not an impossible proposition. We can under¬
stand this as follows: As an affirmative proposition, ‘Socrates is a nonbeing’ implies that
Socrates exists at the moment signihed by the copula, namely, the now of eternity. To be
sure, it also signihes that he is a nonbeing at that moment. But, as we have already seen,
Molina holds, apparently without inconsistency, that contrary predicates can be true of the
same substance at the same eternal moment (though not, of course, at the same temporal
moment).

My comments here should not be construed as a defense of Molina’s position; in fact, I

would freely admit that there are further complications that arise from these comments
and that thus remain to be dealt with. I only mean to suggest that the position is less
vulnerable to obvious objections than it might at first appear to be.
23 As is clear from sec. 4, the two propositions referred to here are ‘Adam exists’ and
‘Adam does not exist.’
 [109]

Disputation 48

not both be true. So if the proposed argument has to do with proposi¬

tions that consignify different moments of time and so are not contradic¬
tories, and if it is being claimed that the truth of both of them is
simultaneous in the now of eternity insofar as it embraces the different
times at which they are found to be successively true, then the whole
argument should be conceded and it does not contain anything absurd.
And it is in this sense alone that what Cajetan asserts in this place can be
true, namely, that there is nothing incongruous about two propositions
that contradict each other with respect to the temporal now both being
true in the same now of eternity; still, this is an improper way of putting
the point.26 On the other hand, if it were being claimed instead that even
if the copulas of the two propositions consignified the same now of
eternity, in which case they would be contradictories, the propositions
could still be true simultaneously in eternity, then the validity of the
argument would have to be denied. For the negative proposition would
be false in that case, since its meaning would be that Adam in no way
exists in eternity, even insofar as eternity corresponds to a time at which
he did exist; and this is patently false.

2 1 . Response to the fifth objection. As for the hfth argument,^'^ it should

be said that there is nothing absurd about the nonexistence of a thing
that is generated not being prior to the existence of that same thing in the
indivisible now of eternity in the way in which it is prior to its existence in
time. For eternity lacks a before and an after, and it is a simultaneous
whole. Still, the nonexistence of a thing that is generated exists in
eternity nonadequately^^ and only because eternity corresponds to a

^^Cajetan’s way of putting the point is “improper” because it suggests that the law of
noncontradiction does not apply in eternity. Molina insists that the two propositions are
not contradictories in time, but are instead related as ‘Adam exists at time T' and ‘Adam
does not exist at time T*,' where T is distinct from T*. Thus, the propositions true in
eternity are ‘Adam exists’ [‘Adam is a being’] and ‘Adam nonexists’ [‘Adam is a nonbeing’];
and these propositions, as explained above in n. 24, are not contradictories.
2'7See sec. 7 above.

2^1 have simply transposed the technical term non adequate into the English ‘nonade-
quately’. A thing x exists adequately in eternity only if x has eternity as its own primary and
proper duration, with the result that (i) x would still exist in eternity even if time did not
exist, and (ii) if time does exist, then x is present to every moment of it. Recall that for the
Christian Aristotelians time is a contingent being, because creation itself is contingent and
the existence of time depends on the existence of physical motion and hence of created
physical objects. According to the Scholastics, only God Himself exists adequately in eter¬
nity. (A Platonist would presumably hold that necessarily existing abstract entities also
exist adequately in eternity.) By contrast, things that are essentially time-bound exist
nonadequately in eternity, even if they are sempiternal or everlasting in time. For eternity is
not \he\r proper duration, and thus they would not exist in eternity if they did not exist in
time. In short, their existence in eternity is asymmetrically dependent on their existence in
time. See Section 3.2 of the Introduction for further discussion of this point.
[no] Disputation 48

time that exists before the thing is generated, whereas the existence of a
thing that has already been generated exists in that same eternity, once
again, nonadequately and only because eternity corresponds to a time at
which the thing is already said to have been generated. The response to
the second part of this argument is that the inference should be denied.
For the existence of a thing that is generated does not exist in eternity
prior to its existing in time, but rather exists in eternity simultaneously
with its existing in time. For just as the thing is not produced in the
duration of eternity by a production or by causes other than those by
which it is produced in time, so too neither does it exist in eternity with an
existence other than that with which it exists in time — nor does it exist in
eternity prior to its existing in time. Rather, by the very fact that it is
produced and exists in time, it coexists in the eternity with which time
coexists. Therefore, such a thing does not exist adequately in eternity,
but exists in eternity only because eternity corresponds to a time at which
the thing exists and only because eternity embraces the time in question
with its indivisible, to be sure, but infinite and simultaneously whole
durational latitude.
 Disputation 49

Whether Future Contingent Things Are Known by God

with Certainty because They Are Present to Him with Their
Own Existence, and Whether the Contingency of These Things
Might Thereby Be Reconciled with Divine Foreknowledge

1. In this place St. Thomas, following in the footsteps of Boethius,

De Consolatione V, last prose, embraces an affirmative answer to the
questions posed in the title. This answer is supported by the following
principles that he proposes, though not in the same order.
The first principle is this: Since eternity, being an indivisible and infinite
duration, exists as a simultaneous whole and encompasses the whole of
time, all the things that come into existence and exist successively in time
are present to God from eternity with that very same existence outside
their causes which they acquire successively in time. Therefore, since
divine cognition, like divine being, is measured by eternity, it follows

that from eternity God’s cognition extends simultaneously to all con¬

tingent things insofar as they are already present to Him in the duration
of eternity with that very same existence outside their causes which they
are going to have in the course of time.

2. The second principle is this: A contingent thing can be considered

in two ways. On the one hand, it can be considered insofar as it already
exists in itself outside its causes, in which case it is considered not as
future or as contingent with respect to either part, but as present and as
determined to one part. ^ And so considered, the thing can be the subject
of a certain and infallible cognition. For as long as Socrates is already
actually sitting, I visually perceive with certainty that he is sitting. Alter¬
natively, a contingent thing can be considered insofar as it still exists in

1 Throughout Part IV of the Concordia Molina refers to contradictory propositions or

states of affairs as “parts of a contradiction” or simply as “parts.” Accordingly, free choice is
said to be “contingent with respect to both parts”; and when the will chooses, it is said to
determine itself “to one part.”

[ill]
 Disputation ^9
[112]

its cause, in which case it is considered as future and contingent, not yet
determined to one part, since of course a contingent cause is indifferent
to opposites. Considered in this way, a contingent thing is not the subject
of any cognition that is certain and unable to be mistaken, and thus
anyone who knows a contingent effect merely in its cause has only
conjectural, and not certain, cognition of it. 2

3. From these two principles St. Thomas infers that since, as is clear
from the first principle, the divine intellect knows all future contingents,
not only as they exist in their causes but also as each of them is actually
present in itself to the divine gaze with its own actual existence outside its
causes, God knows all contingent things with a cognition that is certain,
even though each of them is a future contingent in time if thought of in
relation to its causes. And this is why he claims that the contingency of

things in time in relation to their causes is compatible with God’s infalli¬

ble and certain foreknowledge. He teaches the same thing in De Veritate,
q. 2, a. 12, and in Contra Gentes I, chap. 67.

4. Still, there is some doubt about whether it was on this ground

alone that St. Thomas claimed that in God there is certain and immuta¬
ble knowledge of future contingents, or whether he based this claim also
on the ground that in God there are ideas by means of which He would
know future things with certainty (at least after the free determination
of His will) even if they were not present to Him with their own exis¬
tence — a ground we will have to examine in more detail in the next
disputation and in the penultimate disputation. ^

5. Cajetan (in commenting on this article) and certain others among

St. Thomas’s disciples affirm the second opinion. St. Thomas lends them
support when he says in this article, “Hence, all the things that exist in
time are eternally present to God, not only because He has the natures of
things present to Himself, as some claim, but because His gaze extends
eternally to all things as they exist in their presentness. For by the

2 A ‘conjectural cognition’ {coniecturalis cognitio) is one that lacks certitude. More specifi¬
cally, a subject S’s cognition of a proposition/? in circumstances C is conjectural only if 5 is
able in C to be mistaken about whether or not p is true. It does not follow from this,
however, as the English term ‘conjectural’ might suggest, that such a cognition is a mere
guess. To the contrary, S’s believing/? in C, even if conjectural, might be more reasonable
than his not believing/? in C or at least more reasonable than his believing the negation of/?
in C.
3 Molina refers here to Disputations 50 and 52 below.

‘^Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 13, resp. Here I have translated rationes rerum as ‘the
natures of things’. Below I translate rationes idearurn as ‘ideal natures’.
 [113]

Disputation ^9

expression “the natures of things [that God has] present to Himself’ St.
Thomas seems to mean the ideas of things, as Cajetan (in this place) and
certain others maintain; and he seems to be asserting that the future
things that exist in time are indeed present to God as objects known with
certainty because He has the natures of things present to Himself — yet
not for this reason alone, but because His gaze extends to all of them as
present to Him with actual existence.

6. Nonetheless, there seem to be persuasive reasons for thinking

that St. Thomas held the contrary view.^ First of all, in the second
principle he distinguishes two states of a future contingent, the one
insofar as it already actually exists outside its causes, the other insofar as
it still exists in its cause; and he says that in the former state a future
contingent can be the subject of a cognition that is certain, but not so in
the latter state. Moreover, in De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12, corpus and ad 6, he
seems clearly to assert that even if the cognition in question is divine, a
contingent thing considered in the second state cannot be the subject of

a cognition that is certain. This is why he adds in this place, “Hence,

anyone who knows a contingent effect merely in its cause has only

conjectural, and not certain, cognition of it.” Second, if St. Thomas

believed that the ideal natures alone sufficed for God’s knowing future
things with certainty before they exist outside their causes in either time
or eternity, then (i) he would have explicated this at more length, and
(ii) he would have gone on to explain how God, by means of the ideal
natures, could know with certainty things that are within the power of
created free choice, and (iii) he would have made clear how freedom of
choice might then be reconciled with divine foreknowledge viewed in
this way, and (iv) he would not have taken such great pains (a) in
explaining the certitude of divine foreknowledge only on the basis of the
presence of things with their existence in eternity, and (b) in reconciling
the contingency of things with the certitude of foreknowledge just on
this basis alone. Third, if in the passage quoted a short time ago St.
Thomas had meant to assert that God has certain knowledge of future

contingents on both sorts of grounds, then he would have said, “Hence,

all the things that exist in time are eternally present to God, not only
because He has the natures of things present to Himself, as some claim,

but also because His gaze extends, etc.” For that would be a more
plausible indication that St. Thomas had intended to say that either sort
of ground is sufficient. Yet consider the following: (i) the assertion that

^The “contrary view” alluded to here is the position that it is simply because things are
present to God in eternity that He knows future contingents with certainty.
[114]
Disputation ^9

the ideal natures are a sufficient ground for knowing future contingents
with certainty is incompatible with the doctrine he propounded in the

second principle; and (ii) he did not say “but also because, etc.,” but
instead simply said “but because, etc.”; and, furthermore, (iii) there is a
legitimate explanation for the fact that in this passage he did not totally
exclude the ideal natures, namely, (a) in this passage he was speaking not
about the presence of just future contingent things but about the pres¬
ence of all the things that exist in time, many of which are necessary and
many of which have causes determined to produce them, though these
causes are able to be impeded, and (b) the ideal natures would suffice for
it to be the case that all the things that are necessary or have determined
causes are present with certainty to God with objective existence, espe¬
cially if all of them acted from a necessity of nature. Indeed, it was for
this reason not permissible to exclude the ideal natures, and this is why

St. Thomas said, “Hence all the things that exist in time are eternally
present to God, not only because He has the natures of things present to

Himself’ (as if to say, “for this explanation by itself would not suffice for
it to be the case that all things are present to Him even with objective

existence in such a way that He knows them with certainty”), “but

because His gaze, etc.” (as if to say, “this is a general explanation of how
all things are present to Him in such a way that He knows all of them,

even future contingents, with certainty”). Since, I say, all these things are
so, it is likely that St. Thomas in this place did not mean to claim that it is
also because of the ideal natures that God knows future contingents with
certainty.

7. But let me say what I think about this whole matter. First of all,
despite the arguments just adduced, I would not dare to claim that St.
Thomas, whom in all things I sincerely desire to have as a patron instead
of an adversary, believed that God knows future contingents with cer¬
tainty solely on the basis of the presence of things with actual existence.
Rather, if he were asked about this issue, he would, I believe, affirm the
contrary position.
I am moved to say this, first, because in Contra Gentes I, chap. 67, argu¬
ment 3, he proves that God knows future contingents from the fact that
just as a necessary effect is known with certainty from a necessary cause,
so too a contingent effect is known with certainty from a complete con¬
tingent cause, if the latter is unimpeded.® Therefore, since God knows

®The claim here is that if one knows all the secondary causes that, if unimpeded, will
contribute to a possible future effect E and also knows what all the possible impeding
causes are, then one knows with certainty whether or not E will occur.
Molina finds himself in an uncomfortable position here. On the one hand, he believes
 [>15]
Disputation ^9

not only the causes of contingent effects, but also the things by which
those causes are able to be impeded, it follows, says St. Thomas, that He
knows future contingents with certainty from their causes. It is true,
however, that Ferrariensis (in commenting on this passage) interprets
the argument as not applying to future contingents whose cause is free
choice, since obviously free choice, even when unimpeded, has it within
its power to produce or not to produce its effect or to produce this effect
rather than some alternative contrary effect; rather, he says, the argu¬
ment applies to future contingents which emanate from natural causes
that are determined by their very nature to produce given effects but are
contingent in the sense that they can be prevented from producing those

effects.*^
Second, I am moved by the fact that the position in question would
detract from the dignity of the divine knowledge — indeed, would be
dangerous from the point of view of the faith, to say no more. Yet I
cannot persuade myself that St. Thomas came to any conclusion that
would in any degree detract from the dignity of the divine knowledge or
that would not be fully in accord with the Catholic faith — especially
since (i) there is nothing that absolutely forces this judgment on me, and
since (ii) there are some not insignihcant indications to the contrary, and
since (hi) so many learned men maintain that it was also on the basis of
the ideal natures that St. Thomas asserted that God has certain knowl¬
edge of future contingents.

8. Therefore, let this be the first conclusion of the present disputation:

It is not simply because things exist outside their causes in eternity that
God knows future contingents with certainty; rather, before (in our way

the above claim to be false, since it fails in the case of future effects brought about with the
causal influence of freely acting secondary causes. For one may know that free choice is a
possible impeding cause with respect to E without knowing whether or not it will in fact
impede E in the relevant circumstances. The reason is that a freely acting agent, unlike an
agent acting by a necessity of nature, is both able to act and able not to act in those very
circumstances. So, like Ferrariensis, Molina is reluctant to attribute the above claim in all its
generality to St. Thomas. At best, it is true only in the case of an effect whose causal history
involves no created agents that act indeterministically. On the other hand, Molina is also
reluctant to attribute to St. Thomas the mistaken (in his eyes) alternative view that God’s
certitude regarding future contingents has its source merely in the fact that such things are
eternally present to God with their actual existence. This tension comes to a head in the
next paragraph.
“^Ferrariensis, Contra Gentes I, chap. 67, tertio. It is perhaps worth noting that given the
distinction between necessary and contingent effects presupposed in Disputation 47,
natural effects whose causal history involves no indeterministic created causes are necessary
rather than contingent effects. Here, however, Ferrariensis is treating them as a species of
contingent effects. See Section 2.7 of the Introduction for more on contingent effects.
 Disputation ^9
[ii6]

of conceiving it, but with a basis in reality)^ He creates anything at all, He

comprehends in Himself — because of the depth of His knowledge — all
the things which, as a result of all the secondary causes possible by virtue
of His omnipotence, would contingently or simply freely come to be on
the hypothesis that He should will to establish these or those orders of
things with these or those circumstances; and by the very fact that
through His free will He established in being that order of things and
causes which He in fact established. He comprehended in His very self
and in that decree of His all the things that were in fact freely or
contingently going to be or not going to be as a result of secondary

causes — and He comprehended this not only prior to anything’s exist¬

ing in time, but even prior (in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in

reality) to any created thing’s existing in the duration of eternity.^

9. This conclusion, as regards its first part (and, indeed, as regards

the other parts as well), is so certain that I would not hesitate to say that
its negation is dangerous from the point of view of the faith.
The first proof: It is clear from Sacred Scripture that the supreme God
has certain cognition of some future contingents that depend on human
free choice, but that neither have existed nor ever will exist in reality and
that hence do not exist in eternity either; therefore, it is not simply
because future contingents exist outside their causes in eternity that God
knows them with certainty.
The consequence is obvious, while the antecedent is proved as fol¬
lows: God knows that there would have been repentance in sackcloth
and ashes among the Tyronians and Sidonians on the hypothesis that
the wonders that were worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida should have

® Molina holds that even though there is no real succession among God’s cognitive and
volitional acts in eternity, still there is a basis in reality for our distinguishing and ordering
various acts of intellect and will on God’s part. See Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 20, last
paragraph, for Molina’s own explication of the phrase ‘in our way of conceiving it, but with
a basis in reality’.
^Molina’s most thorough discussion in Part IV of the notion of comprehension occurs in
Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 20. (See Section 2.3 of the Introduction for further discussion.)
Notice the contrast he draws here and later on between comprehending a thing in oneself or
in one's free volition or from oneself, on the one hand, and comprehending a thing in a way
that depends on that thing’s existing or being actual, on the other hand.
Also, Molina often speaks of something’s being the case on the hypothesis that God
should will to establish or create this or that order {ordo) of things (or order of things and
circumstances). What he has in mind is a set of created things partially ordered with
respect to time — or, to put it less technically, a succession of things, each of which bears
temporal relations to all of the others. God’s establishing an order of things does not, of
course, entail His producing by Himself each of the things that is a member of that order.
Recall that in Disputation 47 Molina distinguishes those things whose existence God
causes by Himself from those whose existence He causes together with secondary causes,
both secondary causes acting by a necessity of nature and secondary causes acting freely.
 [117]

Disputation ^9

been worked in Tyre and Sidon. This is clear from Matthew 11:21, “If
the wonders that have been worked among you had been worked in
Tyre and Sidon, they would long ago have repented in sackcloth and

ashes.” But because the hypothesis on which it was going to occur was
not in fact actualized, this repentance never did and never will exist in
reality — and yet it was a future contingent dependent on the free choice
of human beings. Likewise, in 1 Kings 23:10—12 David consulted the
Lord about whether Saul was going to descend upon Keilah, and the
Lord responded, “He will descend.” ^2 consulted again, about wheth¬
er the men of Keilah, who had received nothing but kindness from
David, were going to hand him and the men with him over into the

hands of Saul. And the Lord responded, “They will hand you over.”
Notice, God knew these two future contingents, which depended on
human choice, and He revealed them to David. Yet they never have
existed and never will exist in reality, and thus they do not exist in
eternity either. The antecedent is further confirmed by the fact that
God, foreseeing the sins into which the just would fall if they remained

*^1 assume throughout that the reader is or can easily become acquainted with the
context of the scriptural passages cited by Molina.
1 * Here and in sec. 1 1 below we have the first intimation in Part IV of the doctrine of
middle knowledge. (Molina does not actually use the term ‘middle knowledge’ until
Disputation 52, sec. 9; in sec. 13 below he characterizes the knowledge in question merely
as “a certain sort of natural knowledge.” See n. 16 below.)
Molina argues that the presence of things to God in eternity cannot be the sole basis for
God’s certitude regarding future contingents. For numbered among the future con¬
tingents are not only things that will in fact be but also things that would have been had certain
conditions obtained. The latter are called “conditioned future contingents.” (In Section
2.8 of the Introduction I treat conditioned future contingents as a species of conditional
future contingents, namely, the ones that have both false antecedents and false conse¬
quents.) Since conditioned future contingents have never existed and will never exist in
time, they do not exist in eternity either — and yet God knows them.
Two points of clarification are in order. First, we must distinguish conditioned future
contingents from things that are merely possible. Let S be the state of affairs of the
Tyronians’ and Sidonians’ repentance and conversion, and let H be the counterfactual
circumstance consisting in the wonders worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida being worked
in Tyre and Sidon. S on H and not-S on H are equally, Molina would insist, metaphysically
possible', but, in addition, S, but not not-S, would have obtained if H had obtained. So S is a
conditioned future contingent, whereas not-S is a mere possible relative to H.
Second, those who harbor ontological misgivings about merely possible beings or about
future beings should be assured that talk of mere possibles and of conditioned future
contingents can easily be transposed into more familiar talk about substances, properties,
propositions, and states of affairs. In fact, Molina’s own manner of speaking should be
taken to be neutral among various competing ontological accounts of the temporal and
alethic modalities.
12 1 Sam. 23:10—12. Molina, of course, uses the Vulgate rather than Hebrew titles for the
historical books of the Hebrew Scriptures. The Hebrew 1 and 2 Samuel correspond to the
Vulgate 1 and 2 Kings; the Hebrew 1 and 2 Kings correspond to the Vulgate 3 and 4
Kings; and the Hebrew 1 and 2 Chronicles correspond to the Vulgate 1 and 2 Para-
lipomenon.
 Disputation 4^
[118]

in this life for a long time, in His mercy often takes them from this
world — this according to Wisdom 4:11, “He was snatched away, lest
wickedness pervert his mind or deceit beguile his soul,” and a bit later at
4:14, “His soul was pleasing to God; because of this He hastened to lead
him out of the midst of iniquities.” Since, therefore, those sins were
numbered among the future contingents and were foreseen by God and
yet were never going to have existence in reality, it follows that it is not
simply because things exist in eternity that God knows future con¬
tingents with certainty.

10. I realize that Cornelius Jansen, along with Ambrose, reads this
last text as having to do with the translation of Enoch. But the common
interpretation — following Cyprian in De Immortalitate (near the end) as
well as in book IV of Ad Quirinum and Augustine in Letters 105 and 107
and in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chap. 14 — is that it has to do with
the translation of the just by death. See Lyranus and Dionysius Car-
thusianus on the same text.^^ Moreover, this interpretation comports
with what precedes and what follows in that chapter, and indeed with
the preceding chapter and the following chapter. Whoever wanted to
weaken the force of this evidence would have to expound “lest wicked-

^^For the biblical allusion to Enoch’s bodily transference to heaven, see Gen. 5:21-24.
Molina refers here to Cornelius (Gandavensis) Jansen (1510-1576), bishop of Ghent from
1568 until his death. One of the most influential Catholic exegetes of the sixteenth
century, he is especially noted for his commentaries on the Gospels. The reference here is
to Jansen’s Annotationes in Librum Sapientia. (Cornelius Gandavensis Jansen is not to be
confused with Cornelius Otto Jansen [1585—1638], whose writings provided a good part
of the inspiration for the Jansenist movement in western Europe in the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.)
St. Ambrose (d. 397) was, of course, the bishop of Milan at the time of St. Augustine’s
conversion. The references here are to Ambrose’s De Excessu Fratris Satyri I, n. 30 {PL 16,
1300A), to his commentary on the Psalms {PL 14, 1080C and 1 138D), and to Letter 38 {PL
16, 1097B).
*‘^St. Cyprian (d. 258), bishop of Carthage and martyr, was a highly educated scholar
who converted to Christianity some twelve years before his death. Molina’s first reference
here is evidently intended to be to Cyprian’s De Mortalitate (rather than De Immortalitate),
chap. 23 {PL 4, 599). This tract was written during a plague in Carthage, and in it Cyprian
urges his flock on toward self-sacrifice in the service of both Christians and non-Christians.
The second reference is to Cyprian’s Quirinum {Testimoniorum) III, chap. 58 {PL 4, 765).
The references to Augustine are found in PL 33, 889 and 984, and in PL 44, 979.
i^Nicholas of Lyra (Lyranus; c. 1270—1349) was a Franciscan Scripture scholar who
drew upon his mastery of Hebrew and intimate knowledge of the Jewish commentators on
the Old Testament in authoring a much used commentary on the whole Bible, titled
Postillae Perpetuae, sive Brevia Commentaria in Universa Biblica. In fact, this was the first such
commentary to find its way into print (Rome, 1471-72). Molina refers here to the com¬
mentary on the Book of Wisdom contained in that work.
Dionysius Carthusianus (1402/3—1471) was a German Carthusian monk renowned for
both his scholarship and his mystic piety. His collected works fill forty-two volumes. Molina
refers here to Dionysius’s Ennaratio in Librum Sapientia, chap. 4.
 [119]
Disputation ^9

ness . . as “lest perhaps wickedness pervert his mind” and “lest de¬
ceit . . as perhaps deceit beguile his soul” — as if both these things
were dubious and uncertain to God. Is there anyone who would not
recognize that such a reading of the text is forced, exotic, and absurd,
and who would not see that the legitimate reading is the one proposed in
common by Augustine (Letter 105, cited above) and the Doctors, name¬
ly, . . in order that wickedness not pervert his mind and in order that
deceit not beguile his soul, as God foresaw would happen . . . and so God
hastened to lead him out of the midst of iniquity, because his soul was

pleasing to Him”? What’s more, even if this passage is about the transla¬
tion of Enoch, the text still has to be explicated in the same way and so
corroborates our position.

1 1. The second proof: Through His natural knowledge God compre¬

hends Himself, and in Himself He comprehends all the things that exist
eminently in Him and thus the free choice of any creature whom He is
able to make through His omnipotence. Therefore, before any free
determination of His will, by virtue of the depth of His natural knowl¬
edge, by which He inhnitely surpasses each of the things He contains
eminently in Himself, He discerns what the free choice of any creature
would do by its own innate freedom, given the hypothesis that He
should create it in this or that order of things with these or those
circumstances or aids — even though the creature could, if it so willed,
refrain from acting or do the opposite, and even though if it was going to
do so, as it is able to freely, God would foresee that very act and not the
one that He in fact foresees would be performed by that creature. For it
would be insulting to the depth and perfection of the divine knowl¬
edge — and indeed impious and not at all compatible with so great a
comprehension of the free choice of each creature — to assert that God is

*^First, anything that God is able to create is thereby said to exist “eminently” in God.
Second, as pointed out in n. 11 above, Molina does not use the term ‘middle knowledge’
in Disputation 49. Instead, he employs the term ‘natural knowledge’ for any divine
knowledge that precedes (in our way of conceiving it) God’s free decision or free volition
with respect to which, if any, order of created things to establish. Given this usage, what
distinguishes God’s knowledge of conditional future contingents from the rest of His
natural knowledge is that it is metaphysically possible that He should have known truths
other than the ones He in fact knows about conditional future contingents. In other words,
truths about conditional future contingents are not metaphysically necessary truths, even
though God knows them prior to His act of will and thus has no control over them. So, at
least, claims Molina. The Banezians, by contrast, while also attributing to God knowledge
of conditional future contingents, insist that this knowledge, far from being natural in the
above sense, follows upon God’s act of will and hence isfree knowledge. All of this is explored
more deeply and with ever increasing sophistication as we proceed through Part IV of the
Concordia. Also, see Sections 2.8, 3.3, and 4. 1-4.3 of Introduction.
 Disputation ^9
[120]

ignorant of what I would have done by my freedom of choice (i) if He

had created me in some other order of things, or (ii) if, in this very order
of things in which He has created me. He had decided to confer on me
more or fewer aids than He in fact decided to give me, or (iii) if He had
granted me a longer life or handed me over to more serious temptations.
So it follows that even before He created anything by His free will. He
knew all future contingents with certainty through natural knowledge.
That is, through His natural knowledge He knew whether or not they
were going to be, not absolutely speaking but rather on the hypothesis that He
Himself should decide to create this or that order of things with these or
those circumstances; and from this it follows that by the very fact that He
freely chose the order of things which He in fact chose. He knew
absolutely and with certainty which contingent things were going to be
or not going to be; and He knew this in that very choice and decree of
His will, before (at least in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality)
anything emanated from that decree with its real existence in either time
or eternity. Therefore, God does not need the existence of those things
in His eternity in order to know them with certainty.
We have been forced to touch upon the whole foundation on the basis
of which we believe that God knows all future contingents with certainty,
and on the basis of which, if we do not fail, we will in the penultimate
disputation perspicuously reconcile freedom of choice and the con¬
tingency of things with divine foreknowledge.^^

12. The third proof: God does not get His knowledge from things, but
knows all things in Himself and from Himself; therefore, the existence of

things, whether in time or eternity, contributes nothing to God’s know¬

ing with certainty what is going to be or not going to be. For prior to any
existence on the part of the objects, God has within Himself the means
whereby He knows all things fully and perfectly; and this is why the
existence of created things contributes no perfection to the cognition He
has of them and does not cause any change in that cognition. In God,
then, intuitive cognition and abstractive cognition (or better, cognition of
simple intelligence) do not differ in any way.^® Rather, depending only on

i^The reference here is to Disputation 52 below.

*8 Molina here invokes a distinction elaborated in very different ways by Scotus and
Ockham. See Scotus, Quaestiones Quodlibetales VI and XIII, pp. 135—137 290—296 in
F. Alluntis, O.F.M., and A. B. Wolter, O.F.M., trans., John Duns Scotus: God and Creatures
(Princeton, N.J., 1975); and Ockham, Ordinatio I, prof, q. 1, pp. 30-38, 44-51, and 60—64
in G. Gal, O.F.M., and S. Brown, eds., Ockham: Opera Theologica, vol. 1 (St. Bonaventure,
N.Y., 1967). For present purposes it is sufficient to note that most Scholastics would insist,
pace Ockham, that intuitive cognition is a perfect or privileged sort of cognition which can
only have as its object something that is existent and present and which for this reason
 Disputation ^9
[121]

whether or not its object exists, one and the same cognition, equally
evident and equally perfect in its own right, is called either an intuitive
cognition or else a cognition of simple intelligence, as was shown in
article By contrast, since in us and in angels the evident cognition of
future contingents depends on their existence and on the experience by
which we cognitively apprehend that they exist in reality with their real
existence, it follows that experiential and intuitive cognition in angels
and in us is distinct in species from abstractive cognition and is much
more perfect than abstractive cognition. And thus it is that the existence
of the objects contributes to the perfection of a cognition fashioned by
angels and human beings, as was explained in that same article and
elsewhere.

13. The fourth proof: In God there is providence and predestination

with regard to future contingents. Therefore, there is a precognition by
which He foreknows with certainty, before anything exists, what is or is
not going to be on the hypothesis and condition that He should grant
this or that assistance or means, or arrange things in this way or some
other way. If this is not so, then how did He preordain and arrange
things by His providence, intending good contingent effects via both
natural and free causes while permitting evil contingent effects in order
that He might draw forth from them greater goods? Likewise, in what
sense was there a predestining of various freely acting causes in order
that they might achieve contingent effects and goals by these or those
means? If the craftsman did not know beforehand what shape the
artifact would later have to have, given that his hands and artistic tools
were to be applied in one or another way during its construction, then he
would not know how to use those means so that the artifact might turn
out the way he wanted it to. So, too, if, before God decided by the free
decree of His will to furnish the means and to arrange the things in the
way in which they have in fact been ordered. He did not foresee what
would happen given such an arrangement and order, then He would
most assuredly not know how to order things by that decree in the way

depends on the existence of its object; whereas abstractive cognition is further removed from
its object and can have as its object something that is not present or is even nonexistent.
Molina argues here that since God’s knowledge is perfect and yet not at all dependent on
the existence or presence of its objects, the distinction between these two types of cognition
or knowledge effectively collapses in God. What we have instead is a distinction between
God’s knowledge of existent things (knowledge of vision) and His knowledge of possibles
(knowledge of simple intelligence). But this distinction is not based on any intrinsic difference
between the two types of knowledge or cognition; rather, it is based simply on the act of
will by which God decides to create some things and not others.
^^Commentaria, q. 14, a. 9, pp. 158a- 159a.
 Disputation ^9
[122]

required for the ends. Instead, things would in their actual existence be
just as prone to turn out in one way as another, as though by chance and

beyond the scope of God’s antecedent knowledge, while God would find
out from their existence how they had turned out; but this is plainly the
height of absurdity and impiety, and should be so judged. Thus it
follows that before anything exists, God foreknows future contingents
with certainty. Indeed, before the free decree of His will He knows them
through a sort of natural knowledge and on the hypothesis that He
should will to create and arrange things in this or that way, whereas in
that free decree, which as a cause precedes the existence of future
contingents both in eternity and in time. He knows them absolutely and
without any hypothesis or condition. 20

14. The preceding argument can be confirmed by the fact that God
permits sins. Now someone is said to permit that which he (i) foresees as
going to be unless he prevents it, (ii) is able to prevent, and yet (iii) does
not will to prevent. Since, therefore, sins are numbered among the
future contingents, it follows that prior (at least in nature or, better, in
our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality) to their existing either in
time or in eternity, future contingents are known by God with certainty
on the hypothesis that He not will to prevent them. The proposed
conclusion will be corroborated still further by what we are about to say
in our discussion of the next conclusion.

15. The second conclusion: In the sense explained in the preceding

disputation, we can, to be sure, easily defend the claim that the proposi¬
tion ‘All the things that exist, have existed, or will exist in any interval of
time coexist with God or are present to God with their own actual

existence outside their causes’ is true at any time it is uttered vis-a-vis

eternity, as long as the copulas ‘coexist’ and ‘are’ consignify not the
temporal now at which they are uttered but the now of eternity, where
the now of eternity is taken not inadequately (that is, not insofar as it
corresponds just to this or that moment or interval of time) but adequately
(that is, insofar as it is an infinite duration embracing all of time, the past
as well as the future even now apprehended by thought); nonetheless, I
do not believe, nor is it to be conceded, that (i) the things that come to be
in time exist in eternity before they exist in time, or that (ii) they are
present to God in eternity with their own existence before they are
actually present in time, or that (iii) it is because things exist in eternity

20See nn. 11 and 16 above on Molina’s use of the term ‘natural knowledge’ in this
disputation.
 [123]
Disputation ^9

that God foreknows future contingents with certainty before they exist

in time. This is why the proposition ‘From eternity all things coexist with
God or are present to God with their own existence outside their causes,’
taken in the sense explained in the preceding disputation, contributes
nothing, as I see it, either toward establishing the certitude of the divine
foreknowledge concerning future contingents or toward reconciling the
contingency of things with divine foreknowledge.

16. I am moved to assert this for three reasons.^* First, apart from
the fact that, as was explained a little while ago, the existence of created
things contributes nothing at all to the knowledge God has of them, and

that God’s knowledge does not depend on their existence or acquire any
perfection or hence any certitude from their existence, it should not be
thought that the things that come to be successively in time exist in
eternity before they exist in time — as though it was because of some sort
of anticipation they have in eternity with respect to existence outside
their causes that they are known with certainty in eternity while they are
still future in time. Yet this is what would have had to be true in order for
it to be the case that it was because of the existence of things in eternity
that God foreknew them with certainty before they came to be in time.
But if this was the claim being made by Boethius, St. Thomas, and the
others who affirm on this basis that God knows future contingents with
certainty,22 then I frankly confess that I do not understand it, nor do I
think that there is any way in which it can be true. For given this view, it

would have to be conceded that when the copula ‘exist’ consignihes the
instant of present time, the following proposition is true: ‘The things
that will exist in the entire course of time already exist with their own

actual existence in eternity.’ For even though at the moment of time

when this proposition is uttered the things that are still future would not
yet exist in time, nonetheless at that very moment of time they would
exist in eternity by virtue of an anticipated existence by which things
exist in eternity before they come to exist in time. Yet, though many
seem to concede this and are accustomed to using this manner of speak¬
ing, I did not concede it in the preceding disputation, nor do I believe it
to be true. For the things that are produced successively in time have no
other causes by which they are produced with their actual existence in

21 The elaboration of these three reasons is spread out over the next four sections. The
hrst reason is discussed in secs. 16 and 17, the second reason in sec. 18, and the third
reason in sec. 19.
22 Molina here considers one way of interpreting the claim that God’s certitude with
respect to future contingents has its source in the presence of those things with their actual
existence in eternity. In n. 25 below I call it the “anticipation” thesis.
[124] Disputation ^9

eternity than those very same causes by which they are produced in
time; nor do these causes produce them in eternity by a different pro¬
duction or with a different existence than that very production by which,
and that very existence with which, they produce them in time. Likewise,
they do not produce them in eternity in the sense of conferring actual
existence on them within eternity, that is, within God Himself, who is His
eternity (for this claim would be stupid and impious). Rather, they
produce them in eternity in the sense that while they are producing
them in the duration of time, they are simultaneously bringing it about
that they exist in the duration of eternity. For since eternity is indivisible
and infinite, and hence coexists as a whole with the whole of time in such
a way as to coexist as a whole with each of its parts and points, it cannot
come about that a thing exists in time without also existing in the
duration of eternity. Since, I say, all these things are so, it follows that no
one should think that the infinite duration of eternity, which embraces
all of time, is a simultaneous whole in a sense that implies and renders it
true that future things exist in it outside their causes before they are
caused to exist in time. For that would be altogether unbelievable, and it
would be concocted without any need, and, as I will presently show, it
would obliterate freedom of choice and the contingency of things.
Rather, eternity is a simultaneous whole in the sense that it coexists as a
whole with the whole of time and with each part of it, but only when and
not before each of those parts exists in itself — not, of course, because of
any defect on the side of eternity, but because such a part of time does
not yet exist in its own right and absolutely.

17. Now, it is easy to show that our freedom of choice and the
contingency of things are completely destroyed if one asserts that be¬
cause eternity is a simultaneous whole, things exist in it before they exist
in time in such a way that (i) all the things that are future in time already
at the present moment exist in eternity — indeed, that from eternity they
exist in eternity outside their causes with their real existence — and that
(ii) they exist with so great a degree of constancy that this is the source of

God’s knowing with certainty the things that are contingently future in
time. For neither free choice nor any other cause would be able to bring
about a future effect without its being the case that the very same causes
were, in the very same way and by the very same action, going to bring
about at a future time what they had already brought about beforehand
in eternity; or else, if they were able to bring about some other effect,
then surely the effect that they will in fact bring about would not now
already exist in eternity with so great a degree of constancy that it would
not be able not to exist, and thus the certitude of God’s knowledge with
 [125]
Disputation ^9

respect to the things that will come to be contingently in time would not
be able to derive from their having this sort of existence in eternity.

18. My second reason (and perhaps it amounts to the same thing) is

that the things that will exist contingently in time after today are up until
today indifferent with regard to whether or not they exist in time as well
as in eternity. For instance, an act of my free choice which will exist
tomorrow is still able not to exist in time; otherwise, it would not be
contingently future in time. But since it does not exist in eternity except
by virtue of the existence that it is going to have in time, it is likewise
really able not to exist in eternity — or else it would not be contingently
future in time. Therefore, it is not because of the existence of this act in
eternity that the knowledge by which God knows that the act will exist
tomorrow has up until today a certitude containing absolutely no doubt;
the act, after all, is able not to exist in eternity. Therefore, it is not the

existence of things in eternity that is the source of God’s knowing with

certainty the things that are still contingently future in time.
For, assuming that the copulas consignify the now of eternity, when
we say that all things in time — present as well as past and future — have
existence simultaneously in eternity, this must be understood of eternity
taken adequately, that is, insofar as it corresponds to the whole of time.
For even though eternity exists and has existed up until the present day
insofar as it corresponds to the present instant and to all of past time,
nonetheless it does not yet exist as corresponding to future time. This is
not, of course, because eternity is lacking something that would make it
correspond to future time; instead, it is because the future time to which
it would correspond is not yet present.
An appropriate model is the center point of a circle in relation to the
circle drawn around it, which indivisible eternity and the time that
moves or runs its course around it are said to resemble. 23 For while the
circle is being drawn, the center point does not yet correspond to the
part still to be drawn, but corresponds only to the part already drawn.
And this is not because the center point is lacking something that is
required in order for it to correspond to the part still to be drawn; rather,
it is because what is lacking is that very part to which the center point, in
itself already existing as a whole, would correspond. But once the entire
circle has been drawn, the center corresponds to the whole circum¬
ference and to each of its parts. In the same way, as long as the whole of
time has not yet elapsed, indivisible eternity corresponds not to the
whole of time, but to the part that has elapsed. Therefore, just as the

23Scotus uses this same model in Ordinatio I, d. 39, q. 1-5.

[126]
Disputation ^9

center point is able never to correspond to a part of the circle that has not
yet been drawn, since that part might not be drawn in the future, so too
eternity is able not to correspond to the parts of real time that are still
future or to the things that will exist contingently in those future parts of
time, since real time might cease or, even if it endures, the things in
question might not exist in it, as indeed they are able not to exist.
From this it is clear that even though, when the copulas consignify the
now of eternity and eternity is taken adequately (that is, insofar as it will
correspond to the whole of time even now apprehended in thought), the

proposition ‘Whatever is future in time is present to God or exists in

eternity’ is absolutely true (for whatever exists in time, be it more things
or fewer, thereby necessarily exists in eternity, which embraces the
whole of time), nonetheless, if we are speaking of some particular thing

that is still contingently future in time, for example, a sin of Peter’s that
v/ill exist tomorrow, then the proposition ‘This sin is present to God or
exists in eternity’ is not absolutely true, but true only on the supposition
that the sin is going to exist in time.^^ For just as it is still able not to exist
in time, it is likewise able not to exist in eternity taken adequately.

19. Last, I am moved by the fact that if all the things that are future
in time were from eternity present to God outside their causes with their
own existence — and this because of some sort of anticipation in eternity,
an anticipation from which the divine foreknowledge might acquire
certitude about things that are still contingently future in time — then it
would follow that in our temporal present an actual infinity of things
exist outside their causes. They would not, to be sure, exist in the present
moment as in a measure of their real existence, but would instead exist
in that way in the now of eternity. Still, they would exist in our temporal
present as in a measure of their existing in that way in eternity; but it
seems altogether absurd to concede that in our temporal present there is
an actual infinity of things in eternity, and it seems to involve a contra¬
diction. 2^

24 By an ‘absolute’ truth Molina seems to mean a truth that is now unpreventable by

secondary causes and that hence (as he sees it) can provide the basis for an infallible
cognition on God’s part in eternity. A ‘conditional’ truth, on the other hand, is one that is
(still) preventable by secondary causes and that hence (as Molina sees it) cannot be the
foundation for an infallible cognition.
25This argument is at first sight a puzzling one. How, exactly, does it follow from the

“anticipation” thesis that there is an actual infinity of things even in the whole course of
time, to say nothing of a particular moment of time? The following passage from Commen-
taria, q. 14, a. 12, provides a clue:
“Second conclusion. The divine knowledge extends to infinitely many things not only
when it is considered according to its whole [possible] breadth but also insofar as it has the
character of a knowledge of vision. St. Thomas proves this from the fact that even though
 [127]
Disputation ^9

20. The foregoing renders clear what we asserted at the end of q. 14,

a. g, namely, that God’s knowledge of things that are still contingently

future in time does not, properly speaking, have the character of a
knowledge of vision until those things actually exist in time; rather, in the
meantime it has the character of a knowledge of simple intelligence, be¬
cause the things that are its objects do not yet exist. 26 But since the
proper duration of that knowledge is eternity, and because in eternity,
since it coexists with future time, those things will in the end be present,

God’s knowledge may simply be called a knowledge of vision in relation

to all the things that will exist in any interval of time; and in keeping with
the common opinion of the Doctors, we will occasionally refer to it as
such.

21. I want to bring to your attention this further point: In the early

commentaries on Ephesians 1:4, “As He chose us in [Christ] . . . ,”

Jerome says, “He declared us the elect, so that we were saints before the
world was made. This has to do with the foreknowledge of God, for
whom all future things have already been accomplished and to whom all

things are known before they come to be. ”2*7 When he says this, and even
when in the later commentaries on the same text he says, “For nothing is
new to Him in whose presence all things existed before they came to be,”
these words are to be understood as meaning not that things preexist
with their real existence, but rather that they preexist in objective exis¬
tence as clearly known. 28 For things that do not exist are said to exist
after a fashion in relation to the dWin^ power, which calls into existence,
or makes to exist, the things that do not exist as well as the things that do

there are not going to be infinitely many substances (since nothing will be generated after
the Judgment Day), still the mental acts of the blessed and of the damned will be multiplied
unto infinity; but God actually knows all of these acts simultaneously through the knowl¬
edge of vision” (pp. 159b— 160a).
So according to Molina and St. Thomas, an actual infinity of things — if not of sub¬
stances, then at least of mental accidents — will exist in the infinite stretch of future time,
and thus an actual infinity of things exists in eternity. Thus far there is no problem. But
Molina seems to reason further that if the “anticipation” thesis is true, then that very same
actual infinity of things exists at the present temporal moment, at least in a derivative sense.
For the friends of the anticipation thesis hold that all the things that ever have or ever will
exist in time now exist in eternity. But this, of course, conflicts with the standard Aristo¬
telian principle that it is impossible for an actual infinity of substances and/or accidents to
exist at any one moment of time.
^^Commentaria, p. 141a— b. For more on the distinction between God’s knowledge of
vision and His knowledge of simple intelligence, see n. 18 above.

and^"^PL
the 26, 446. St.
learned Jerome of(c.the
translator 345—419/20) was, of course, a great Doctor of the Church
Bible into Latin.
28The passage quoted here is actually from the late fourth- and early fifth-century
heretic Pelagius (c. 354— c. 418), Expositiones in XIII Epistolas Sancti Pauli {PL 30, 823D).
 Disputation 4^
[128]

exist; in the same way, since things that do not exist are not hidden from
God, but rather are known clearly by Him just as if they existed, they are
said by Jerome to preexist in the divine knowledge. This is why he adds to

the second of the above passages, “Not that, as certain heretics imagine,
separated souls preexisted in heaven . . And commenting on Eccle¬
siastes 1:10, “Is the word . . . ?” he says, “It should be said that because of
God’s foreknowledge and predestination all things that are going to be
have already been accomplished. ”29 Gyril affirms the same thing in
Thesaurus, book V, last chapter. ^9

22. Beyond this, Scotus proposes the following argument against

this same position of St. Thomas’s: Just as eternity is a simultaneous

whole and coexists with past and future time, so too the aeviternity of an
angel is a simultaneous whole and coexists with past and future time.^^
Therefore, just as it is because of the existence in eternity of those things
that are still contingently future in time that God knows future things
with certainty before they exist in time, so too because of the existence of
those same things in aeviternity an angel will foreknow them with cer¬
tainty before they exist in time. ^2

23. To this argument the disciples of St. Thomas have been wont to
reply that the two cases are not on a par, since the cognition of an angel is
not measured by aeviternity but rather by an instant of discrete time,

whereas God’s cognition is measured by eternity, in which the things

that are contingently future in time actually exist.^^ But since an angel

29The first of these passages is, again, from Pelagius (see n. 28 above), and the second is
indeed from Jerome, PL 23, 1020A.
^®St. Cyril of Alexandria (d. 444), Father and Doctor of the Church, is best known for his
staunch opposition to Nestorianism. The present reference is to his Thesaurus, assertio 15,
PG 75, 292ff. (Molina’s allusion to book V is based on the way the book is divided in the
edition printed at Paris in 1572.)
here translate aevum by the English ‘aeviternity’. Many Scholastics hold that just as
eternity is God’s proper duration and time is the proper duration of physical objects, so too
aeviternity is the proper duration of angels. Unlike eternity, aeviternity involves an or¬
dered series of ‘moments’, specifically a succession of discrete cognitive and volitional acts
on the part of an angel; unlike time, aeviternity is a discrete, as opposed to continuous, series
and does not depend for its existence on the motion of material substances.
32This argument is formulated very compactly here. It is meant to be a reductio ad
absurdum, with the absurd conclusion being that an angel can (without divine revelation)
foreknow future contingents with certainty. The standard Scholastic view is that angels by
nature know temporal things with certainty when and only when those things become
present in time.
3^The Thomists’ point here is that a single angelic cognition lasts not for the whole of
aeviternity, but only for one discrete moment within it, and so no discrete moment of this
sort is such that it coexists with all past and future time. Molina counters that it is at least
possible for an angel to have a single everlasting cognition. And besides, he continues, if
 [129]
Disputation ^9

could have a simultaneously whole cognition that coexisted as a whole

with aeviternity or that in relation to our time lasted as long as aeviter-
nity lasts, this does not seem to be the proper way for them to respond to
the argument — especially since if future things always coexist with aevi¬
ternity with their actual existence outside their causes in the way that
they coexist with eternity, then an angel, once its cognition is posited,
will indeed apprehend those things outside their causes already in aevi¬
ternity, and he will thus know them with certainty before they exist in
time, even if he knows them through a cognition whose duration is not
aeviternity, but the now of discrete time.

24. They could better respond as follows, however: Aeviternity has

durational breadth not from itself, but only by virtue of the fact that an
angel is conserved by God for a greater or lesser time; and thus whether
an angel coexists with future time depends not only on the future

existence of time but also on God’s conferring existence on that angel or

conserving him in future time. Eternity, on the other hand, has infinite
duration from itself (Both these points were explained in q. lo.)^^ And so
it follows that the two cases are not on a par, since things that are still
future in time do not at this temporal moment coexist with aeviternity in
the way that they coexist with eternity. This response has a place only if
we claim that eternity is of such a nature that it makes those things that
are future in time to preexist in itself — as must be claimed if the position
of Boethius and St. Thomas is to be defended in some way. For even if
such a nature were attributed to eternity, it would still be the case that it
should not be attributed to aeviternity in any way, for the reason we have
just given.

the Thomistic position on the existence of things in eternity is correct and can be extended
to aeviternity as well, then perhaps angels do not have to wait for future contingents to
become present in time in order to know them with certainty in aeviternity. Perhaps
instead they are able to survey all of aeviternity (and, derivatively, all of time) in just one
discrete cognition that does not last for all aeviternity.
^‘^Commentarm, q. 10, a. 5, disp. 1, pp. 81a— 85b.
 Disputation 50

Whether It Is through the Ideas That God Knows Future

Contingents with Certainty , and at the Same Time
the Views of Scotus and Durandus Are Examined

1. In book I, dist. 39, a. 2, q. 3d St. Bonaventure maintains that God

knows future contingents with certainty because He has in Himself ideas
of all things through which He knows all future things with certainty,
just as if He had those things present with their own existence. Cajetan

(in this place) and certain others among St. Thomas’s disciples ascribe
this same position to St. Thomas on the basis of the passage from this
article which we presented and considered in the preceding disputa¬
tion. 2 Cajetan even asserts that Scotus interpreted St. Thomas in the
same way; but in the place that will presently be cited Scotus meant
perhaps to argue only against St. Bonaventure and those others whom
St. Thomas in this article, without giving any names, claims to have held
the position in question.

2. Scotus argues against this position in book I, dist. 39, a. i.^ First
argument. The ideas in God do not represent the conjoining of the predi¬
cate with the subject of a contingent state of affairs, which, by the very
fact that it is contingent, is indifferent as to whether it obtains or not;
instead, they represent only the terms of such a state of affairs.^ But from
knowledge, however perfect, of the terms of a future contingent state of
affairs it is impossible to know with certainty which part of a contradic¬
tion is going to be true, since the terms are neither tied to nor opposed to
each other in such a way that it is possible to tell from their natures

^St. Bonaventure, Commentaria in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum I, d. 39, q. 3, a. 2.

2 Disputation 49, sec. 5.
^Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I, d. 39, a. 1.
^As before (see Disputation 47, n. 2), I translate the Latin complexio by the English ‘state
of affairs’, and I further assume that states of affairs can coherently be thought of as having
components (terms) and as bearing logical relations (for example, being the contradictory
of, being the contrary of, entailing, being entailed by) to other states of affairs.

[130]
 Disputation 50 [131]

whether the predicate agrees with the subject — as it is possible to tell

when a state of affairs is necessary. Therefore, the divine ideas by
themselves cannot be a sufficient explanation for God’s knowing future
contingents with certainty.

3. Second argument. The ideas exist and represent things to God prior
to any free act of the divine will; therefore, whatever they represent, they
represent merely naturally. But contingent states of affairs are known by
God freely and not naturally, since obviously if He had decided by His free
will not to create anything, then He would not have known as future any
of those contingent states of affairs which are in fact going to obtain.
Therefore, the ideas by themselves cannot be an explanation for know¬
ing future contingents with certainty.

4. Third argument. The ideas represent in the same way both future
contingent possibles that will never exist and future things that will exist
in some interval of time, since the fact that some contingent things are
going to be while others are not going to be has its source not in the

divine ideas but in God’s free will, which freely prearranged the causes
by which the things that are going to exist contingently were to be
produced, but which did not prearrange causes for other things that
could have existed and yet are not going to exist. Therefore, the divine
ideas by themselves cannot be a sufficient explanation for the fact that
future contingents are known by God with certainty.

5. Fourth argument. The fact that future contingents are going to

exist at one time rather than another stems not from the ideas but from

God’s free will, which decided to create things at one time rather than
another and to order them in this way rather than in some other way.
Therefore, the divine ideas by themselves cannot be a sufficient expla¬
nation for the fact that God knows future contingents.

6. Scotus agrees that the ideas (or, the divine essence known as the
primary object)^ are a sufficient explanation for the fact that through
His natural knowledge God knows (i) all the simples that can exist by
virtue of the divine omnipotence and (ii) all states of affairs, not just the
necessary ones but also the contingent ones — to be sure. He knows not
that the latter are going to obtain, but rather that they are able to obtain, so

^Scholastic theologians hold that the divine essence is the first or primary object of God’s
act of understanding, and that God knows other things by understanding Himself per¬
fectly as the cause of being for whatever else might exist. See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa Contra Gentiles I, chap. 47—49.
[132] Disputation 50

that through His natural knowledge He knows each state of affairs

which is indifferent to obtaining or not obtaining and hence He knows
that each such state of affairs is able to obtain and able not to obtain.® For
from the natures of the terms it is understood that the one term is able to
agree with the other, but not that it in fact agrees or fails to agree with the
other. Besides, even if a state of affairs is contingent, the fact that it is
contingent (and is thus both able to obtain and able not to obtain) is
nonetheless something necessary; but God knows all necessary truths
through His natural knowledge.^

7. Even though Scotus agrees with the others on the points just
mentioned, still, influenced by the arguments proposed above, he claims
that it is solely in the determination of His will that God knows which
part of each contradiction is going to turn out to be contingently true in
the future, and thus that it is solely in the free determination of His will
that He knows future contingents with certainty. And, indeed, there
would be no problem with Scotus’s position if future contingents in¬
cluded only (i) the things that are immediately caused by God, as are all the
things that were produced by God alone in the original establishment of
the world, and (ii) the things that are brought about by secondary causes
acting from a necessity of nature. But future contingents also include the
things that emanate from created free choice, as well as the subsequent
things that proximately or remotely emanate from or depend on those
three sources of contingency in the effects of secondary causes that we
explained in Disputation 47.® Now if (i) Scotus were claiming only that
all future contingents of this latter sort depend on the free determina¬
tion of the divine will to the extent that no such thing would be a positive
future contingent if God had not freely decided to create this world with
the order of things with which it has in fact been created, and if, further,
(ii) he were claiming for this reason that in order for any of these future
contingents to be known by God as absolutely future, God has to fore-

® Molina clearly thinks of states of affairs (complexiones) as built up out of simples

(simplicia) along with, presumably, logical operations such as composition of subject and
predicate, negation, and conjunction. Thus, to say that God “knows all the states of affairs”
is to say at least that God knows what all the various combinations are, and also that He
knows with respect to each such combination whether it is metaphysically necessary,
metaphysically impossible, or metaphysically contingent. See Section 2.3 of the Introduc¬
tion.

^Molina and Scotus hold with many others that a state of affairs has its metaphysical
modality by nature or necessarily. In the present context they maintain that any state of
affairs which is in fact metaphysically contingent (that is, able to obtain and able not to
obtain) is necessarily contingent. For more
the Introduction. on God’s natural knowledge, see Section 4.2 of

^Disputation 47, sec. 8.

 [•33]
Disputation 50

know the free determination of His own will, “in” which — as “in a part
of’ the explanation for His knowledge of it— He would know that thing,
then, once again, I would not feel that there is anything in Scotus’s
position which requires refutation. He wants to claim, however, that
even after we have posited the establishment of the whole world and
posited the presently existing order of things and causes, the determina¬
tion of angelic and human free choice to one or the other part of any
contradiction at any moment of time (for example, willing or not willing
this, or willing the contrary) results from the free determination of the
divine will, through which, as through a hrst cause, God decided from
eternity to concur with created free choice, whether by general or by
special concurrence, and to determine it in this or that way — as if it
depended solely on God’s free determination and on His mode of acting
in cooperation with secondary causes whether free choice and any other
secondary cause would act in this or that way or not act at all.^ This is the
position that we discussed at length and attacked in Disputation 35.^0
Thus, just as he located the whole source of contingency in God’s free
will alone and not at all in angelic and human free choice, even though
the latter is the proximate and immediate cause of contingency in rela¬
tion to some effects (as was explained in Disputation 47),*^ so too he
claimed that the free determination of the divine will is the whole
explanation and basis for the fact that God knows with certainty which
things are contingently future absolutely and in an unqualified way. But
from what was said in Disputations 35 and 47 among others, I take it to
be sufficiently obvious that this position of Scotus’s is more than dan¬
gerous from the point of view of the faith. For it destroys the freedom of
choice which in Disputation 23 we demonstrated from Sacred Scripture
and from experience itself, and it makes God the cause by which our free
choice is turned toward and determined to those sinful acts by which we
offend Him and break His law — all of which is incompatible with the
Catholic faith. 12
^Molina holds with other Scholastics that when God acts as a general cause concurring
with the acts of secondary (created) causes, His causal contribution does not determine the
exact nature of the effect produced. Rather, the nature of the effect is a function of the
natures of the secondary causes involved in the production of the effect. On the other
hand, when God acts as 2i particular cause. His causal contribution by itself determines the
nature of the effect. See Section 2.6 of the Introduction.
lORabeneck, pp. 218—222. For a brief account of the argument of Disputation 35, see
Disputation 47, n. 5.
** Disputation 47, sec. 9.
*2Rabeneck, pp. 134—154. In Disputation 23, which is divided into four parts, Molina
proposes a lengthy defense of the claim that human beings have free choice. He makes
use of all his resources, appealing to Sacred Scripture, to all the various elements of
Tradition (the Fathers, Doctors, conciliar decrees), and to arguments from reason and
experience as well.
[134] Disputation 50

8. A certain disciple of St. Thomas’s, differing only verbally from

Scotus, attributes this same position to St. Thomas. For he claims that
all the secondary causes of future contingents, causes among which he
includes even angelic and human free choice, are subject to the determi¬
nation and disposition of the divine will, which is the hrst cause and
confers on other causes not only being and power, but also the determi¬
nation to their particular effects. Because, therefore, contingent effects
are known with certainty in their complete and determinate and unim¬
peded causes no less than necessary effects are known with certainty in
their necessary causes, it follows, he claims, that in His essence, given the
free determination of His will by which He determines all contingent
causes to their effects, God knows all future contingents with certainty,
even if they emanate immediately from free choice — indeed. He
thereby knows not only the determination of all causes but also which of
those causes are or are not, by that very same determination, going to
impede the effects of other causes.

Now, he says, the term ‘idea’, taken in the full and complete sense,
does not refer to the divine essence by itself, that is, insofar as it is a
potential exemplar in imitation of which things are able to be produced —
in this latter sense there is an idea even of things that are able to exist by

the divine power and yet will never in fact exist. Rather, ‘idea’, taken in
the full and complete sense, refers to the divine essence insofar as it is an
actual exemplar in imitation of which something is in fact going to exist;
but the essence has this character because of the determination of the
divine will that is adjoined to it, a determination by which God from
eternity ordained the effects that were going to be produced in time, and
so it has this character only in relation to those effects that exist, have
existed, or will exist in some interval of time. Thus it is, he says, that here

by the phrase “natures of things,” that is, the ideas — which, according to
St. Thomas, God has before Himself from eternity and in which, he
claimed, God knows future contingents with certainty — St. Thomas did
not mean the divine essence by itself, that is, insofar as it is an exemplar
in imitation of which God is able to produce things if He should so will.
Rather, he meant the essence along with the free determination of the will, a
determination by virtue of which the essence is an actual exemplar and a
complete idea in relation to all the things that are in fact going to exist.

*^This oblique reference is to Molina’s chief theological nemesis, the Dominican Do¬
mingo Bahez (1528-1604), who taught at Salamanca from 1577 to 1600 and was active in
the official ecclesiastical inquiry into Molina’s writings. The arguments given here in secs. 8
and 9 are close paraphrases of Banez’s Commentaria in Primam Partem Summae Theologicae
Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, q. 14, a. 13, pp. 351—352 (hereafter cited as Bahez, Commentaria).
(The page numbers are taken from the edition prepared by Luis Urbano, O.P. (Madrid,
1934).) For a discussion of the Banezian position, see Section 3.3 of the Introduction.
 [135]

Disputation 50

9. But since, as we demonstrated at length against Scotus in the

places cited above, this determining of the human and angelic will and
of other secondary causes by the free determination and influence of the
divine will manifestly destroys freedom of choice with respect to their
acts in both angels and human beings, the author in question seeks
refuge in the distinction between the composed and divided sensesd'^
That is to say, he claims that even if contingent causes, as subject to the
determination of the first cause, are determined and complete with
respect to their operation and are thus unable in the composed sense not
to produce those of their effects to which they have been determined by
the divine will, nonetheless those causes are unqualifiedly and in the
divided sense contingent, indeterminate, and incomplete — and hence
their effects should without qualification be called contingent.
But I do not understand this very well. For if, having no idea of what
created free choice was going to do in its freedom, God by the free
eternal determination of His will and by His influence determines it to
whatever He wills, and if, as long as that determination and divine
influence remain, free choice is able to do nothing other than that to
which it is so determined, then I do not at all see in what sense it remains

distinction invoked here is a crucial one in modal logic and metaphysics. For a
standard medieval explication of it, see William of Ockham, Summa Logicae II, chap. 9-10,
pp. 108—1 15 in A. J. Freddoso and H. Schuurman, trans., Ockham’s Theory of Propositions
(Notre Dame, Ind., 1980).
A grasp of the distinction sufficient for present purposes can be had by considering the
proposition (P) ‘This white thing is able to be nonwhite,’ where, let us suppose the white
thing in question is a simple piece of wood painted white all over. (P) is false in the composed
sense, since so understood it is equivalent to (Q) ‘This proposition is possible: “This white
thing is nonwhite,’” which is obviously false. That is, when a proposition is taken in the
composed sense, its mode (in this case ‘possible’ or ‘able to be’) has as its scope the exact and
entire nonmodal counterpart of the original proposition. By contrast, if (P) is taken in the

divided sense, then it is equivalent to (R) ‘This proposition is possible: “A is nonwhite,’”

where ‘A’ is a proper name of the white piece of wood in question. And (R) is true, since A
can become nonwhite or, indeed, could have been nonwhite m the hrst place. So on this
reading the modal term has as its scope not the entire nonmodal counterpart of the
original proposition but only the predicate of that proposition.
In the case that Banez is discussing, the disputed proposition is something like
(S) ‘Causes C, . . . C^, which have been determined by God to produce effect E, are able not
to produce T.’ (S) is false in the composed sense, since so taken it is equivalent to (T) ‘This is
possible: “C, . . . C^, which have been determined by God to produce E, have not and will
not produce E.” ’ But (T) is obviously false, since God’s determination entails that E is
produced by the causes in question. Nonetheless, C, . . . could have existed, we assume,
without being so determined by God to produce E, just as A above could have existed
without being white. So (U) ‘This is possible: “C, . . . C„ have not and will not produce £” ’ is
true, and so (S) is true in the divided sense.
Molina, however, while admitting that (U) is true, denies here and elsewhere in Part IV
(see, e.g.. Disputation 53, pt. 2, secs. 6 and 19) that its truth is sufficient to establish the
claim that the causes in question are contingent in a sense strong enough to preserve free
choice. See nn. 15 and 16 below.
[136] Disputation 50

genuinely free to strive after what it wills, or by what standard of blame

or merit that which it brings about while so influenced and determined
by God can be imputed to it. For the fact that it would have been able to
do the opposite if by His free will God had willed the opposite and had
by His influence determined and turned it to the opposite — this fact
does not mean that our choice is free, but only that God has the freedom
to use our choice by moving it indifferently to contrary effects, as we
showed at length in Disputation 40 when discussing another similar
proposition. Therefore, if the author of this position is asserting only
the fact just mentioned, while at the same time maintaining that in the
divided sense our choice remains a contingent, indeterminate, and in¬
complete cause with respect to its own effects, then plainly, even if he
preserves in this choice a sort of spontaneity not unlike that which is
found in a mule being led by a halter in one or another direction, he

nonetheless destroys the choice’s freedom and without a doubt effects in

it a fatalistic necessity (once we posit foreknowledge and the determina¬
tion of the divine will, both of which exist from eternity).^®

10. The same author next considers the following objection against
himself: “The divine will does not determine a created will to sin; in¬
deed, it leaves it indifferent and free. But infallible cognition of a future
effect cannot be had on the basis of an indifferent and undetermined

cause. Therefore, God does not foreknow future sins with certainty.”

‘^Rabeneck, pp. 244-257, esp. pp. 254-255. In the place cited Molina is arguing
against the claim made by some Thomists that even if God’s grace is intrinsically efficacious
for the conversion of an adult 5, S is still able in the divided sense to resist that grace and
not to be converted. Molina counters that on this Thomist position 5 is able not to be
converted only in the sense in which a rock that I move is able not to be moved. In the latter
case, I am free not to move the rock, and so the rock is able in the divided sense not to be
moved; but there is not the least temptation to claim that the rock is free not to move or
that it has any active power to resist my moving it. So, too, Molina argues, 5 is able in the
divided sense not to be converted only because God is free not to grant him the efficacious
grace in question. But it no more follows from this that S is free to resist God’s grace than it
followed in the other example that the rock is free to resist my moving it. So, Molina
concludes, the Thomists’ account of efficacious grace (and of efficacious concurrence
generally) has not been shown to be compatible with the thesis that human beings have
free choice. For a similar discussion of this issue in Part IV, see Disputation 53, pt. 1 , sec. 7.
i^Molina here makes use of the common philosophical distinction between spontaneity
and freedom — or, as it is sometimes characterized, between the liberty of spontaneity and
the liberty of indifference. An agent 5’s acting in a given way at a time t is spontaneous if S
wants to or wills to act in that way at t. (A similar conditional holds for omissions.) Thus, a
well-trained mule might want to move in the direction in which it is led; again, a voraciously
hungry mule might want to walk in the direction of the hay that will appease its overwhelm¬
ing desire for food. In both cases the mule acts willingly or spontaneously, but in neither case,
it seems, is it free. For more on the prerequisites for freedom, see Section 2.9 of the
Introduction.
*’Banez, Commentaria, pp. 352—353.
 [137]

Disputation 50

Now he thinks that he has an adequate response to this objection

because, as he puts it, “a created will is inevitably going to fall short with
regard to any of the material elements of a virtue unless it is efficaciously
determined by the divine will to act well. Therefore, by the very fact that
God knows that His will has not determined a given created will to act
well with respect to the material element of, say, temperance. He knows
evidently that the created will in question is going to sin and to fall short
with respect to the material element of that virtue. And so other future
contingents God knows in their causes in the sense that those causes
have been determined by the first cause; but a culpable future evil He
knows in its cause in the sense that the cause has not been determined by the
first cause to act welly These are his words.

1 1 . But there are many things that are dissatisfying in this response.
First of all, he admits that free choice can exercise the actions by which
it sins without being determined beforehand by the divine will and
influence. Therefore, since these are natural actions and real effects,

why isn’t free choice likewise able to exercise other merely natural free
actions (such as willing to sit or to rise, or willing to walk in this or that
direction) without the previous determination and influence of the di¬
vine will? For because God is not wont to take away or restrict the innate
freedom of secondary causes or to furnish more assistance and influence
for natural actions than is necessary for them, it follows that free choice
determines itself when it is not antecedently determined by the divine will

i^Ibid., p. 353. The “material” element of an action consists of the physical and psycho¬
logical movements or acts involved in that action. The material element does not by itself
completely determine the species or form of the action, that is, what type of action it is.
Indeed, it is possible for a sin and a virtuous action to have exactly similar material
elements. For instance, my consenting to and engaging in the bodily movements involved
in uttering the word no might, given appropriately diverse circumstances, constitute a lie,
on the one hand, or an act of truth telling, on the other. (My intention, just insofar as it is a
mental act, may also be exactly similar in the two cases, though the object of that mental act
of intending will obviously be different in the two cases.) In Disputation 53, pt. 2, secs. 1 2
and 13, Molina makes the same point by citing the examples of materially identical acts of
sexual intercourse (the one extramarital, the other within marriage) and of materially
identical acts of engaging an enemy in combat (the one in an unjust war, the other in a just
war).
The implied distinction between the formal and the material elements of an action must,
however, be handled very carefully and is potentially misleading. Some Bahezians (though
not, apparently, Banez) claimed, for instance, that in a sinful action God concurs with and
thus determines the material element but not the formal element, and that since it is the
formal element that makes the act sinful, God does not determine sinful actions. Molina
responds in effect that the material and formal elements of an action are not separable in
such a facile way. If I do not control the material elements of my actions, he insists, then I
am not free not to sin when I do sin. For I sin precisely by freely determining myself to a
given material element in the appropriate circumstances.
[138] Disputation 50

but is instead left free to elicit or not to elicit an act or to act with respect
to one object rather than some other. Thus, it is not the case that God
knows the determination of future contingents of this sort in a determi¬
nation of His will by which He determines created free choice to its
effects.
This particular author will not, I believe, claim that God determines
created free choice to the action by which it sins, and yet that He does not
determine it to the formal element of a sin. For his words do not suggest
such a claim. Nor, again, does free choice determine itself to the formal
element of a sin in any way other than by freely determining itself to an
action that is a sin — it might, to be sure, will that the action in question
not have the character of a sin, if that should be possible. Finally, and
most important, the claim in question would be an error from the point
of view of the faith, as I believe I showed satisfactorily in Disputation

31.20
12. Second, he does not seem to admit that our will has the freedom
to refrain from exercising or the freedom not to exercise the virtuous acts
that it exercises, in the sense in which he does admit that it is free to
exercise or not to exercise di sinful act when it sins. Thus, he destroys our
merit and freedom with respect to a virtuous act, even as far as its
exercise is concerned. 21

13. Third, his principal thesis is extremely dissatisfying. For even if

we graciously conceded it in the case of human beings living after the fall
of the first parents (since from adolescence their senses are inclined
toward evil), what reason would we have to concede it in the case of
angels and in the case of human beings in the state of innocence, who
were able without difficulty to refrain from every sin and yet were also
able to sin by their innate freedom? 22 For if they had happened to sin of

*®See n. 18 above for a brief characterization of the distinction between the formal and
material elements of a sinful act.
20Rabeneck, pp. 193—197. In Disputation 31 Molina cites evidence from Scripture and
Tradition for the claim that God does not cause sins.
21 According to Molina, the very fact that Banez must tell a special causal story about
sinful acts in order to ensure that God is not morally responsible for them presupposes that
God, and not the human agent, is totally responsible for the both the species and exercise
of the virtuous actions performed by human beings.
22 According to Catholic doctrine, our hrst parents were, prior to their sin, endowed with
preternatural gifts that rendered them strongly disposed toward virtuous action and thus
made it very easy for them not to sin. An interesting philosophical question that arises here
is: How could they have sinned, given all these gifts? The medievals devoted a good deal of
effort to answering this question as well as the even more perplexing question of how the
fallen angels could have sinned, given the intellectual and moral excellences of the angelic
 [>39]

Disputation 50

their own accord, then, given the position of this Doctor, God would not
have known about it; but what could be more absurd than this? Further,
even if from the fact that God did not determine a created will to act well
it followed with certainty that it would sin, God would still not be certain
about whether it was going to sin by a sin of omission or of commission,
or about whether it was going to use this means rather than that means
in the act of sinning, or about whether it was going to sin with more or
less intensity and effort, or about whether it was going to continue in the
act of sinning for a longer or shorter time, and so on for the other
circumstances that are relevant to the seriousness of the fault and that
depend on free choice and thus with respect to which God did not
determine free choice. Hence, God would be ignorant of all these future
contingents.

14. Last, if created free choice, by the very fact that it is not effica¬
ciously determined by the divine will to act well, necessarily sins in such a
way that it is altogether certain and evident to God that it is going to sin,
and if from His eternity God decided, as He pleased, to determine or not
to determine free choice to act, then I ask: What freedom was there in
the angels when they sinned, or in us when we sin, such that if we did not
will to sin, then we would not sin? Likewise, in what sense is it true that
God has placed us in the hand of our own counsel, so that we might
strive after what we will?23 Again, what grievance will God have on
Judgment Day against the wicked, since they were unable not to sin as
long as God did not efficaciously incline and determine them to the
good, but rather solely by His own free will decided from eternity not so
to determine them? Most assuredly, if this position is accepted, then our

freedom of choice is altogether destroyed, and God’s justice with respect

to the wicked vanishes, and a manifest cruelty and wickedness is dis¬
cerned in God. That is why I regard this position as extremely dan¬
gerous from the point of view of the faith — just as we claimed above
about Scotus’s position as well.

15. Therefore, besides those things that we explicated in the hrst

conclusion of the preceding disputation, ^4 we should also affirm that
through the divine ideas (or, through the divine essence known as the
primary object) all contingent states of affairs are represented with

nature. See, e.g., St. Thomas Aquinas, De Mato, q. 14, a. 1—5, and q. 16, a. 1—6. Secular
analogs of these questions continue to exercise philosophers, as is evidenced hy the ample
contemporary philosophical literature on so-called ‘weakness of will’.
23This manner of expression is taken from Ecclus. 15:14-17.
24See Disputation 49, sec. 8.
[140] Disputation 50

certainty to God, who comprehends in the deepest and most eminent

way both His own essence and all things, each of which is contained in
that essence infinitely more perfectly than it is contained in itself. All
contingent states of affairs are, I repeat, represented to God naturally,
before any act or free determination of the divine will; and they are
represented not only as being possible but also as being future — not
absolutely future , but future under the condition and on the hypothesis that God
should decide to create this or that order of things and causes with these
or those circumstances. Once the determination of the divine will is

added, however — not a determination by which God determines cre¬

ated free choice to one or the other part of a contradiction (as Scotus and
the others maintain), but a determination by which, while leaving cre¬
ated choice free and altogether indifferent to strive after what it will. He
decides to create this or that order of things and of causes and of
circumstances, an order in which there exist these or thos^free causes —
once that determination is made, God knows all the contingent states of
affairs with certainty as being future and absolutely, and now without

any hypothesis or condition. 2^

And so we disagree with Scotus, because we hold that the explanation

for God’s knowing with certainty which part of any contradiction among
those contingent states of affairs dependent on created free choice is
going to obtain is not a determination of the divine will by which God
inclines and determines created free choice to one or the other part, but
is instead a free determination by which God decides to create free
choice in this or that order of things and circumstances. Nor do we
believe that this determination is by itself a sufficient explanation for

God’s knowing with certainty which part of each contradiction among

those states of affairs is going to obtain; rather, the sufficient explana¬
tion is the determination of the divine will along with God’s comprehen¬
sion in His essence of each created faculty of free choice through His
natural knowledge, a comprehension by means of which He knows with
certainty, before the determination of His will, what such-and-such a
faculty of free choice would do in its freedom on the hypothesis and
condition that God should create it and situate it in this particular order
of things — even though it could, if it so willed, do the opposite, and even

Here, again, Molina characterizes the knowledge of conditional future contingents as

natural knowledge. See Disputation 49, nn. 1 1 and 16.
26 Molina is careless here. Since the states of affairs in question come in pairs of contra¬
dictories, God cannot know all of them in the usual sense in which knowing a state of
affairs entails its actually obtaining. Clearly, the point Molina wants to make is that after
the free determination of His will, God knows with certainty all the unconditional (or
‘absolute’) future contingents that will in fact obtain.
 Disputation 50 [141]

though if it was going to do the opposite, as it is able to, then God would
have known this in His essence through that very same knowledge and
comprehension, and not what He in fact knows is going to be done by that
faculty of free choice.
And so, since positive contingent states of affairs which depend on
free choice cannot obtain in reality unless free choice is created, the fact
that God knows absolutely and unconditionally that they are going to
obtain depends, to be sure, on the free determination of His will, by
which He decides to create free choice at such-and-such a time with
such-and-such an order of things and circumstances. 28 But since the
faculty of choice thus created and situated in this order of things remains
free to turn itself toward one part or the other, God would most as¬
suredly not know determinately which part of a contradiction among
contingent states of affairs of this sort was going to obtain unless by the
depth, excellence, and perfection of His natural knowledge, through
which He comprehends all things in His essence in a certain most
eminent manner. He penetrated created free choice in such a way that
in it He perceived which part it would turn itself toward by its own innate
freedom — even though it could, if it so willed, incline itself toward the
opposite part, and even though if it was going to do so, as it is able to,
then God would discern this. Therefore, both of the elements just
mentioned29 are required in order for God to know this sort of thing
with certainty, and both elements belong to Him by virtue of the perfec¬
tion by which He is God and which is not only inhnite and immense, but
also unlimited in every aspect. It is by reason of this perfection that just

as it falls under God’s omnipotence to be able to bring into existence

creatures who are endowed with free choice and who have control over
their acts (as we discern by experience in our very own selves), so too it
falls under His immense and altogether unlimited knowledge, by which
He comprehends in the deepest and most eminent way whatever falls
under His omnipotence, to penetrate created free choice in such a way as to
discern and intuit with certainty which part it is going to turn itself to by
its own innate freedom.
And this is the foreknowledge of future contingents that the Fathers
and the light of nature itself teach us belongs to God. For God is such

the27The “comprehension”
Introduction. spoken of here is what I ca\\ supercomprehension in Section 4.4 of

28 By a “positive” state of affairs Molina seems to mean simply a state of affairs which
entails the existence of its subject. If there were no creatures, then the negative counter¬
parts of such states of affairs would nonetheless obtain — even though there would be no
such thing as created free choice.
29The two elements are God’s
and the free determination
(middle) knowledge of conditional future contingents
of His will.
[142] Disputation 50

that if this foreknowledge did not belong to Him, He would not be God.
Thus, in Dialogus Adversus Pelagianos III, Jerome says fittingly in the
person of Critus, “If you deny someone foreknowledge, you deny him
divinity as well.”^® And in De Civitate Dei V, chap. 9, Augustine says, “To
confess that there is a God and yet deny that He foreknows future things

is the most patent foolishness.”^ ^

16. In the sense just explained it is absolutely true that the ideas (or,
the divine essence known as the primary object) are the firm and certain
explanation for the fact that God, who comprehends in the deepest way
both Himself and the things that He contains eminently, knows future
contingents. Thus, besides St. Thomas in this place (if he in fact held this
position), it is also the case that St. Bonaventure and, in general, as many
as adopted this way of speaking held this very position, even if they did
not explicate the matter satisfactorily. Durandus affirms this same posi¬
tion explicitly in book I, dist. 38, q. 3,^2 where he claims that God knows
all future contingents with certainty in His essence as in the primary object
and cause of all things (though he does not think that the essence has the
character of an idea), since by the depth and perfection of His knowl¬
edge and of its object He intuits in that essence all the causes of future
contingents and the determination of those causes to the production of
their effects — the determination not only of the causes that are deter¬
mined by their very natures, as are those that act from a necessity of
nature, but also of the causes, such as angelic and human free choice,
which are indifferent and which turn themselves freely toward which¬
ever part they will. What’s more, God knows which of those causes are,
and which are not, going to impede one another. (Though Durandus
does not say so explicitly, all these things should be understood on the
hypothesis that God wills to create this or that order of things and
causes.)
Moreover, in and from the causes known in this way, future con¬
tingents are known with as much certainty as that with which necessary
effects are known from necessary causes. It follows that God knows all
future contingents with certainty in Himself as in a primary object, and
He also knows them with certainty in their own proper secondary causes
as in a secondary object.^^

30PL 23, 575B.

3iPL4i,i49.

32 Durandus, In Sententias Theologicas Petri Lombardi Commentariorum Libri Qiiattuor I,

d. 38, q. 3.
33That is, God knows future contingents primarily by knowing Himself as the first and
primary object. For He knows them as conditional future contingents in Himself and without
 [143]

Disputation 50

1 7. Response to the first argument. So in response to Scotus’s first argu¬

ment, the major premise should be denied. For on the hypothesis and
under the condition that God should will to create this or that order of
things, the divine ideas represent to God naturally, before any free
determination of His will, every future contingent state of affairs under
that hypothesis and condition. And this is so by virtue of the depth and
excellence of the divine intellect and the divine knowledge, and because
of the depth and excellence of the primary object over all the secondary
objects that are eminently contained in it.

18. Response to the second argument. As for the second argument,

assuming that the antecedent has been conceded, the first consequence
should also be conceded. However, in response to the minor premise
that is then added, we should reply that although it is not naturally but
freely that God knows contingent states of affairs as being future abso¬
lutely and without any condition or hypothesis, it is nonetheless not freely, but
rather by a knowledge thsii precedes any free act of the divine will, that
God knows these states of affairs as future on the hypothesis that He should
will to create this or that order of things and causes.

19. Response to the third argument. As for the third argument, assum¬
ing that the antecedent has been conceded, the consequence should be
conceded as well, provided that its consequent is taken to mean that the
divine ideas by themselves cannot be a sufficient explanation for the fact
that future contingents are known by God with certainty as absolutely
future. This latter sort of knowledge requires, in addition, a divine
precognition of the free volition by which God decides to create this or
that order of things. If the consequent is taken to mean, however, that

the ideas are an insufficient explanation for God’s knowing future con-

any dependence on their actual existence, and He knows in Himself that determination of
His will by which He creates such-and-such an order of things in such-and-such circurri-
stances. Still, given God’s knowledge of conditional future contingents. He also under¬
stands completely the secondary causes that He has created, so that He also knows
contingent effects in and from their contingent causes in the same way that He knows
necessary effects in and from their necessary causes.
3“* See sec. 2 above. The major premise is that the ideas do not represent the conjoining
of the terms of contingent states of affairs, but only the terms themselves.
3^See sec. 3 above. The first consequence is that if the ideas represent things to God
prior to the determination of His will, then they represent things merely naturally. The
minor premise is that God knows contingent states of affairs freely and not naturally.
36See sec. 4 above. The consequence is that if the ideas represent indifferently both
future contingent possibles that will be actual and other future contingent possibles that
will never be actual, then the ideas by themselves cannot be a sufficient explanation for
God’s knowing the actual future with certainty.
[144] Disputation 50

tingents with certainty not only as absolutely future but even as future on
the hypothesis and condition that He should will to create this or that order
of things, then the consequence should be denied. Nor in this regard is
there any difference between those future contingents that will exist in
some interval of time and those that were able to exist but never will
exist. For God knows of each of them in the same way that it was or was
not going to exist on the hypothesis and condition that He should have
decided to create one or another order of things different from the one
that He in fact created.

20. Response to the fourth argument. The fourth argument^'^ proves

conclusively that (i) the ideas by themselves are not a sufficient explana¬
tion for the fact that future contingents are known by God as being such
that they are going to exist at such-and-such a time absolutely and without
any condition, and that (ii) for foreknowledge of this latter sort it is also
required that there be knowledge of the determination of the divine will
to create the order of things which He has created in the interval of time
in which He created it— all of which we willingly concede.

37 See sec. 5 above.

 Disputation 51

Whether Freedom of Choice and the Contingency of Things

Are Correctly Reconciled with Divine Foreknowledge by the
Thesis That Whatever Is Going to Occur because of Innate
Freedom of Choice Is Such That God Will Bring It About
That from Eternity He Knew None Other than That Thing

1 . We must now examine the thesis by means of which a good many

thinkers reconcile our freedom of choice with divine foreknowledge and
predestination, and by virtue of which they think that these things
cohere well with one another. For they maintain that if, for instance,
Peter, who, let us assume, is going to sin at some moment of time, did not
sin at that time (which he is capable of because of his freedom), then God
would bring it about that He had never known that Peter was going to
sin, but that instead He had always known from eternity that Peter was
not going to sin. For, they say, since God knows each thing that is going
to be in the very mode in which it is going to occur. He will surely know
with necessary knowledge those things that are going to emanate from
their causes necessarily, whereas He will know with contingent or, better,
with free knowledge those things that are going to happen contingently.
And since in the case of future contingent events that depend on created
free choice, the fact that one part of a contradiction rather than the
other is going to obtain does not depend on the divine knowledge — as
though it was going to obtain because God foreknows that it will ob¬
tain — but instead depends on the freedom of choice by which the faculty
of choice turns itself to the one part or the other as it chooses, there is

without a doubt as much contingency in God’s knowledge, inasmuch as

it is knowledge of the one part of the contradiction rather than the other,
as there is in the event during the time in which it still exists in its cause.
Therefore, they say, even though it is necessary that whatever is going to
occur is such that God foreknows it and that whatever God foreknows as

future occurs accordingly, and even though because of this the proposi¬
tions ‘Everything foreknown by God will occur’ and ‘Whatever is going
to occur is such that God foreknows that it will occur in that way’ are
[146] Disputation 5 1

necessary in the composed sense, nevertheless, they say, just as it is not

necessary but altogether contingent that Peter is going to sin in the
future (for he is really able not to sin), so too neither is it in any way
necessary up until today that God foreknows that Peter is going to sin;
rather, this is altogether contingent and free, so that just as Peter is really
able not to sin, so too God is able, now and in the future, to bring it about
that He never foreknew that Peter was going to sin. Hence, they main¬
tain that the necessity of the above propositions in the composed sense is
founded on the necessity of the mutual entailment between the two

propositions ‘Something is foreknown by God to be such that it is going

to occur; therefore it is going to occur,’ and conversely; and it is not as if
up until today there is any necessity, even a necessity of immutability, in
the second term, namely, in the divine foreknowledge. For if Peter does
not sin, then without any change in His knowledge God will bring it
about that He foreknew nothing other than that Peter was not going to

sin. Thus, they maintain that the proposition ‘Peter’s sin, which is fore¬
known by God, is able not to occur’ is true in the divided sense, not only
because (i) if Peter were in fact not going to sin, as is entirely possible,
then God would never have foreknown his sin, but also because (ii) if he
does not sin, as is possible, God will at that moment bring it about that from
eternity He foreknew nothing other than that Peter was not going to

sin.i They use as an analog the proposition ‘Whatever is going to run is

necessarily going to move.’ In the composed sense this proposition is
true solely because of the necessity of the consequence ‘Something is
going to run; therefore it is going to move’ — even though there is no
necessity in either of the terms, and even though for this reason what¬
ever is going to run is able in the divided sense not to move. For that
which is going to run is able not to run as well as not to move in the
future.

2 . They reconcile free choice with predestination and reprobation in

the same way.^ For if someone who is reprobate does by his freedom, as

* Molina is perfectly willing to accept (i); indeed, he will insist on it. So if Peter, who is
going to sin tomorrow, were not going to sin tomorrow, then God would have known from
eternity that Peter was not going to sin tomorrow. What Molina objects to is the attempt to
explain the truth of (i) by the further claim (ii) that if Peter were not going to sin tomorrow,
God would at that time bring it about that He had known from eternity that Peter would not
sin tomorrow. On Molina’s own account, God’s free knowledge would be different in the
two cases because His middle knowledge would, antecedently to His act of will (in our way of
conceiving it), have been different from eternity in a way not dependent on His will. So (ii)
cannot on Molina’s view be a correct explanation for the fact that (i) is true. See Section 3.4
of the Introduction for further discussion.

^Since a person’s being predestinate (or reprobate) involves divine foreknowledge of

that person’s final state, predestination and reprobation pose as great a/?ri7w<2 facie threat to
 [147]

Disputation 5 1

he is really able to, the things necessary to attain eternal life, then God
will bring it about that from eternity he was predestinate and not repro¬
bate. And, conversely, if someone who is predestinate wills, as is possi¬
ble, not to do the things necessary to obtain eternal happiness, then God
will bring it about that from eternity he was reprobate and not predesti¬
nate. Therefore, they say, the propositions ‘Whoever is predestinate will
necessarily be saved’ and ‘Whoever is reprobate will necessarily be
damned’ are likewise true in the composed sense. But the propositions
‘Whoever is predestinate is able to be damned’ and ‘Whoever is repro¬
bate is able to be saved’ are true in the divided sense, not only because (i) if
someone who is predestinate were by his freedom going to do things by
which he would incur eternal damnation (as he is really able to, pre¬
destination notwithstanding), and if someone who is reprobate were
going to do things by which he would attain eternal life, then God from
His eternity would have neither predestined the hrst nor reprobated the
second, but also because (ii) God will at that time bring it about that the hrst
was never predestinate but was reprobate instead, and that the second
was never reprobate but was predestinate instead.

3. I am surprised at how many Doctors have embraced this position.

Among them are, in the hrst place, as many as insist that in God there is
power over the past even with respect to effects that have already
emanated in time from their causes. Included in this group are Altis-
siodorensis, Gilbert Porritanus, and certain Englishmen, as reported in
book I, dist. 42, q. 1, a. 2 by Gregory, who also leans toward their view.^

human freedom as does divine foreknowledge. Some might even be tempted to claim that
the threat is greater, since while predestination and reprobation presuppose deliberate
actions or omissions on the part of God’s will (for example, His electing some for eternal
life and His not electing others), the same is not true of foreknowledge as such. But as we
have begun to see and will continue to see, the predominant Scholastic view is that God’s
will is in some sense or other a cause of a// His free knowledge of the future. Disagreements
typically center on the question of what exactly that sense is.
For interestingly diverse accounts of predestination and reprobation from the thir¬
teenth and fourteenth centuries, see Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 6, a. 1—6; Scotus, Ordinatio I,
d. 41, q. unica; and Ockham, Ordinatio I, d. 41, q. unica.
^William of Auxerre (Altissiodorensis) (c. 1 150-1231) was a renowned master of theol¬
ogy at the University of Paris at the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the
thirteenth century. Deeply involved in the academic and ecclesiastical politics surrounding
the introduction of the Aristotelian corpus at Paris, he was best known for his commentary
on the Sentences, titled Summa Aurea in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum. Molina is apparently
referring here to Summa Aurea I, chap. 12, q. 6.
Gilbert de la Porree (c. 1075-1154) was a prominent twelfth-century theologian who
became bishop of Poitiers in 1 142. Here Molina has in mind Gilbert’s commentary on
Boethius’s De Trinitate (see PL 64, 1287).
The third reference here is to Gregory a Rimini’s commentary on the Sentences I, a. 2, ad
4. (For more on Gregory, see Disputation 48, n. 8.)
 Disputation 5 1
[148]

But we will be arguing against these people in q. 25, a. The position

in question is also embraced by St. Bonaventure (book I, dist. 40, pt. 2,
a. 1, q. 1), by Richard (dist. 38, q. 6), by Scotus (dist. 40, q. unica), by
Ockham and Gabriel (dist. 38, q. 1), by Gregory (book I, dist. 42, q. 2,
concl. 4) and the rest of the nominalists in general, by Sylvester {Con-
flatus, q. 22, a. 5), by Driedo {De Concordia Liberi Arbitrii et Praedestinationis
II, chaps. 2 and 3), by Albertus Pighius {De Libero Arbitrio VIII, chap. 1),
by Andreas a Vega {Concilium Tridentinum II, chap. 17, response to
the third objection, and XII, chap. 22), and by Antonius Cordubensis
{Quaestiones Theologicae I, q. 55, dubia 1 1 and 12).^

4. Certain of the Doctors just mentioned defend this position by

positing in God a power over the past even with respect to effects that
have already issued forth from their causes in time. However, Ockham,
Gabriel, Antonius Cordubensis, and some other nominalist Doctors

defend it by countenancing in God’s eternal act, that is, in the divine

knowledge and volition, a power over the past that is indeed not a power
by virtue of which the divine knowledge and volition are absolute or
extend to effects that have already issued from their causes, but is rather
a power by virtue of which the divine knowledge and volition (i) are

‘^Commentaria, pp. 354a-355b. It is important for dialectical reasons to keep in mind that
Molina is here dividing his opponents into two hroad camps: (a) thosejust mentioned, who
hold that God has absolute power over all past effects, and (b) those to be mentioned
presently, who attribute to God the more limited power to bring it about that He has always
(or, has from eternity) had correct beliefs about future contingents. For more on the
importance of this dialectical point, see n. 12 below.
® Unless otherwise indicated, all the books referred to here are commentaries on Lom¬
bard’s Sentences. Most of the authors cited here either need no introduction or have been
introduced in the notes to earlier disputations. But the last four mentioned are in all
likelihood wholly unfamiliar to most readers. Each was in fact a prominent sixteenth-
century Gatholic theologian who played a significant role in the Counter-Reformation and
had at least some influence at the Council of Trent.
Johannes Driedo (c. 1480-1535) was a Dutch theologian who taught at Louvain and
who was often cited in late sixteenth-century debates concerning grace and predestination.
Albertus Pigge (Pighius; c. 1490-1542) was a Dutch theologian and humanist whose
theological ideas were widely discussed at Trent and in part officially repudiated. In fact,
the work cited here by Molina was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books. Nonetheless,
Albertus was an able and acerbic defender of a very strong version of the doctrine of papal
infallibility, and his historical and systemic work on this topic had a great influence on
many Catholic theologians of the time, most notably Robert Bellarmine.
Andreas a Vega (1498—1549) was a Spanish Franciscan theologian who studied and
taught at Salamanca. At Trent he debated with the Dominican Dominic Soto over the
dogma of justification. The work Molina refers to here is a defense of Trent’s teaching on
Justification, the long title of which is Tridentini Decreti de Justificatione Expositio et Defensio
Libris XV Distincta.
Antonius Cordubensis (1485-1578) was a Spanish Franciscan theologian who took part
in the Council of Trent.
 [149]

Disputation 5 1

related just to future contingents as to objects that are known and either
willed or permitted, and (ii) are dependent on future contingents for
relations of this sort (which are relations of reason in the divine knowl¬
edge and volition).® For it is not because God foresees these things as
future that they are going to be; rather, it is because they are going to be,
by virtue of created free choice, that they are foreseen as future by God.

5. However, St. Bonaventure, Scotus, and others among the cited

Doctors defend this position with a far different line of reasoning and
one that has the appearance of being more plausible. For they maintain
that the free act of the divine will and, for the same reason, God’s free
knowledge concerning future contingents do not in themselves cross
over into the past, but are instead always issuing forth in that indivisible
now of eternity, which in itself never crosses over into the past or is
anticipated as future, but is an always present whole and as a whole

corresponds to present, past, and future time. Thus, they say, God’s free
act of will with respect to creatures and His free knowledge concerning
contingent things, even though they are conceived of and signified by us
as past by way of comparison with the time at which we exist, are
nonetheless in themselves present and issuing forth, and in God they are
emanating freely, and for this reason, while they are issuing forth, they
are able to correspond to this or to that part of a contradiction in light of
free choice. From this it follows that if a human being in time chooses
this particular part of a contradiction, then God in His eternity deter¬
mines the act of His will and knowledge in such a way that from eternity
His knowledge is of that very same part of the contradiction, so that it
was never of the other part, and vice versa. And this is so without any

change or variation in God’s knowledge, and without its being the case
that God begins to know anything. Instead, it involves His always fore¬
knowing from eternity whatever is going to exist in time, a foreknowl¬
edge that (i) accords with how human choice by its innate freedom wills

® Since the common Scholastic position is that God would not be absolutely perfect if
contingent real relations inhered in Him, He is said to be related to the created objects of
His willing and understanding only by relations of reason or intentional relations. This way of
putting it has the advantage of highlighting the fact that God’s willing and knowing are in
no way rendered more perfect by the actual existence of anything outside Himself. More
specifically, the mere fact that certain free creatures actually exist does not by itself give
God’s love for them a clearer focus or greater intensity than it otherwise would have, nor
does their mere existence by itself give God any greater insight into how those creatures
will use their freedom in the situations in which they will find themselves. Unlike us, God
does not have to love anything other than Himself in order to be perfect; instead. His act of
creating contingent beings is completely gratuitous. Again unlike us, God does not derive
His knowledge of created things from those things themselves, that is, by being causally
acted upon by them; instead. He knows them in and from Himself.
 Disputation 5 1
[>5°]

to determine itselt and that (ii) depends on this sort of determination.

From this it follows that, without any power over the past, there is now in
the divine knowledge as much contingency or, better, as much freedom
to be from eternity a knowledge indifferently of one or the other part of
a contradictory pair of future contingents as there is freedom in created
free choice with respect to whether such a part of the contradiction is or
is not going to obtain.

6. First argument. Now, this position can be argued for on the basis of

St. Augustine’s famous remark, “If you are not predestinate, then make
yourself predestinate.

7. Second argument. In Jeremiah 18:8 and 10 we read, “If that nation

repents from its evil, then I will also repent of the evil that I have
threatened to do it. . . . If it does evil in my eyes, so that it does not listen

to my voice, then I will repent of the good that I have promised to do it.”
But since in God there is no repenting that involves a change of will, it

follows that in this passage all that is being signihed is God’s freedom in
eternity, a freedom by virtue of which, when a human being freely turns
his choice to one or the other part of a contradiction as he chooses, then
God likewise freely wills for him a reward or punishment in light of that
choice.

8. Third argument. Given the contrary position, it would follow that

God did not freely create the world when He created it— which is
impious. The inference is proved from the fact that when the divine
volition to create the world at a certain time has been posited and the
time in question arrives, the world follows necessarily from that volition,
as long as the will remains so determined. Therefore, since God willed
from eternity to create the world at that point of time at which He
created it, it follows that if, when that point of time arrived. He was no
longer able to bring it about that He did not will from eternity to create
the world at that time, then at that time He created it necessarily and not
freely.

9. Fourth argument. Future contingents are really able not to be;

otherwise, they would not really be future contingents. Thus, they are
really able not to be such that God knows that they are going to occur. In
fact, it involves a contradiction for them to be so known by God and yet

^As Molina points out below in sec. 21, this remark is not as such found in Augustine’s
writings.
 Disputation 51 [i5>]

to turn out otherwise in reality;^ for in that case God would be mistaken
and the cognition in question would not be knowledge, since it is, of
course, part of the nature of knowledge that it be true and certain.
Therefore, if a human being does, as he is able to, the opposite of what
he is in fact going to do, God will not in that case know what He now
knows the person is going to do, but instead He will know the opposite.
But this will be so without any change or variation in the divine knowl¬
edge, since in God there is absolutely no change or shadow of alter¬
ation.^ Hence, if a human being does, as he is able to, the opposite of
that which he is going to do, then God will bring it about that from
eternity He knew not what He now knows, but the opposite.

10. Fifth argument. At the point of time at which he wills something, a

human being is able not to will that thing, as was shown in Disputation
24.^® Therefore, in the indivisible now of eternity, which is always
present, God is able not to will what He wills and not to know what He in
fact freely knows.

1 1 . Although this position sustains itself in the judgment of so many

Doctors, it can in no way be commended, since it is not sufficiently in
accord either with Sacred Scripture or with the depth, certitude, and
perfection of the divine knowledge. And many of the same Doctors who
accept it judge it to be quite troublesome; nor do these same Doctors, if
read attentively, seem to hold to it very hrmly. I believe that so many
have adopted this position for no other reason than that no alternative
way of reconciling free choice with foreknowledge and predestination
occurred to them, even though this position seems clearly to detract
from the certitude and perfection of the divine knowledge.

12. Therefore, with St. Thomas in this article (in the response to the
first objection, as well as in the other parts) we should say that it is now

have interpolated the Latin term for ‘contradiction’ here, since it has been omitted
from the text through a rather obvious oversight.
^This manner of expression is taken from James 1:17.
•ORabeneck, pp. 155—158. In Disputation 24 Molina defends the Scotistic view that a
human being 5 is, at the very moment t at which he wills something O, able not to will O. In the
second proof below (sec. 15) Molina draws a distinction between what is earlier in nature
and later in nature at one and the same moment of time. He then claims in effect that 5 is
able earlier in nature at t not to will O, whereas later in nature, but at the same moment of time, S
has already determined his will to O — and it is only “then” that 5 is no longer able at t not to
will O. The argument of Disputation 24 is aimed against Ockham’s thesis that if 5 wills O at
t, then 5 is not able at t not to will O ; the most that can be said is that 5 is able at t to bring it
about that immediately after t he does not will O. In general, Molina holds that a correct
account of divine or human action must be able to accommodate relations of natural (or,
equivalently, conceptual or logical) priority and posteriority within one and the same mo¬
ment of time or of eternity.
[152] Disputation 5 1

already so necessary that God knew from eternity each of the future
contingents which from eternity He knew was going to exist that He is
now no longer in any way able to bring it about that He did not know it,
since obviously there is no such thing as power over the past and since no
change or shadow of alteration can befall God. This same position was
held by Richard of St. Victor. ^ ^

13. Nor did St. Thomas teach the contrary in the response to the last
objection in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 3.
For he had produced the following argument of the sort in question
against the certitude of predestination, a certitude he defends in the

body of the article: “That which is able to be and able not to be does not
have any certitude. But God’s predestination with regard to someone’s
salvation is able to be and able not to be. For Just as He was from eternity
able to predestine and able not to predestine, so He is even now able to
predestine and able not to predestine, since in eternity there is no
difference among present, past, and future. Therefore, predestination
does not have certitude.”
He responds as follows: “It should be said that, speaking absolutely,
God is able to predestine and able not to predestine (or, able to have
predestined and able not to have predestined) any given person, since
the act of predestination, because it is measured by eternity, never fades
into the past. Just as it is never future; hence, it is always considered as
issuing forth freely from the will. Nevertheless, the thing in question is
rendered impossible on a supposition. For He is not able not to predestine
on the supposition that He has predestined, and conversely. For He cannot

be mutable. And so it does not follow that predestination can change.”

These are St. Thomas’s words.
From these words it is manifestly clear that all he is teaching is that if
God is viewed in the now of eternity, then naturally prior to His deter¬
mining His will to one part of the contradiction. He is able to predestine
and able not to predestine Peter, and for this reason it is true to say,
absolutely speaking, that He is able to predestine and able not to pre¬
destine Peter (or, able to have predestined and able not to have pre¬
destined Peter), since the act of predestination in eternity does not cross
over into the past; however, on the supposition — which is not merely
imagined to hold, but really does hold — that later in nature in that same
now of eternity God determines His will to predestine him, so that He

** Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) was a Scottish theologian who in the middle of the
twelfth century served as prior of the famous Augustinian abbey of St. Victor in Paris. He
is best known for his mystical theology, which profoundly influenced Bonaventure and
many others, and for his less influential but highly original theology of the Trinity.
 ['53]

Disputation 5 1

has already determined His will in eternity insofar as eternity corre¬

sponds to the whole of past time, it cannot come to be that He has not
predestined him, since no change can befall Godd^ There is plainly no
alternative interpretation of St. Thomas’s response which squares with
the words themselves and also with the rest of the teaching of that
article.

1 4. The first proof : This position of ours and of St. Thomas’s is proved
by the fact that if the free act of the divine will in eternity, insofar as
eternity corresponds to every moment of time, were freely issuing forth
in such a way that God is now able to bring it about that from eternity He
willed and knew none of those things that He freely willed and freely
knew, then it would follow that there is power over the past even with
respect to effects that already exist in time outside their causes. But those
opponents with whom we are now arguing do not accept this conse¬
quent, and below in q. 25 it will be shown to be false. Therefore, the
antecedent is also false.
The inference is proved as follows: Given the antecedent, the volition
by which God from eternity willed to create the world at the point of
time at which He created it would today be issuing forth freely in such a
way that God would be able to determine it to the opposite part and to
bring it about today that from eternity He willed never to create the
world. But if this is granted, it obviously follows that there is power over
the past with respect to effects that already exist in time outside their
causes. For since the free determination of the divine will to create the
world at that point of time at which He created it is the immediate and
total cause of its creation at that time, if God is able today to bring it about
that His free will was never from eternity determined to create the world
but was instead always determined not to create it, then He is able today
to bring it about that the creation of the world has never previously
occurred. For anyone who is able to bring it about that the total and
immediate cause of some effect never existed is also able to bring it about
that the effect itself never existed. For if a prior cause is removed in such
a way that it never existed, then straightaway it is also denied that there
existed a later effect that depends entirely on that cause and follows

i2As mentioned above in n. 10, Molina believes that a correct account of divine and
human action must be able to accommodate relations such as being naturally prior to and
being naturally posterior to within the same eternal or temporal moment.
^^Commentaria, q. 25, a. 4, pp. 354a-355b. Recall that Molina is here attacking only those
proponents of the position under discussion who explicitly disavow the thesis that God has
unlimited power over the past. (See n. 4 above.) So if he can show that their arguments in
defense of that position entail that there is such absolute power over past effects, then he
will have made an objection that they themselves will have to acknowledge as damaging.
[154] Disputation 57

from it. Nor will it be satisfactory to respond that in eternity, insofar as it

corresponds to every moment of time, the divine will is indeed free to
determine its act to the opposite part as long as no effect has yet issued
forth from it in time. This response, I repeat, is not satisfactory. In the
first place, what is prior does not depend upon what is posterior. There¬
fore, if, given the hypothesis that no effect has as yet issued forth from it,
the divine will in itself remained free to determine its act to the opposite
part and to bring it about that from that same eternity it had never been
determined to create the world, then it would likewise be able to bring
about that same thing even if its effect had already issued forth — and so
it would now be able to bring it about that the world has never existed.
Second, once its effect has issued forth, the divine will in the now of
eternity either is or is not more determined in itself to will to create the
world at the point of time at which it created it. If you say that it is not
more determined, then just as the divine will was able, before the occur¬
rence of the effect, to freely determine its act in such a way that there
would be a volition not to create the world, so too it will be able to do this
after the occurrence of the effect. On the other hand, if you say that it is
more determined, then it changes in itself because of the occurrence of
the effect, and it is subject to a shadow of alteration — which is absurd.
Moreover, contrary to what you said before, the volition will no longer
always be issuing forth freely with respect to both parts in eternity
insofar as eternity corresponds to each point and interval of time.

15. The second proof: From here we might argue as follows: As was
shown in Disputation 24 with regard to our will, (i) even though earlier in
nature at the same moment of time it is free and indifferent to turn and
determine itself toward either part, nonetheless later in nature at that
very same moment of time it has been freely determined to one of the
two parts, and (ii) after it has been so determined later in nature, then it
is unable, not only at later times but even at that very moment of time, to
bring it about that it turned itself toward the other part — for after it has
been determined to one part, it is not able not to be determined. This
very same thing should be said about the divine will in the now of eternity.
Even though earlier in nature in that now of eternity which embraces all
of time (or better, earlier in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in
reality) the divine will is free to determine its act to either part with
regard to those things that it freely decides, and even though for this
reason that act issues forth as free in eternity, nonetheless later in that
very eternity (that is, later in our way of conceiving it, but likewise with a

^‘^Rabeneck, pp. 155—158. See n. 10 above.

 [155]

Disputation 5/

basis in reality) that free act has issued forth as determined to one part of
the contradiction in accordance with God’s choice. But once the deter¬
mined act has thus issued forth {later in our way of conceiving it, but
simultaneously in that indivisible duration of eternity), it is not able not
thus to issue forth, since otherwise the possibility would be counte¬
nanced that a thing already brought about in a certain way has not been
brought about in that way, after it has once and for all been so brought
about — which manifestly involves a contradiction. And this is what St.
Thomas taught in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 3, in the response cited above to
the last objection, when he said that on the supposition, which is not
merely imagined, that in the now of eternity God has in fact determined
His free act in such a way that there is a predestination of Peter (as He
has in fact determined it). He is not able not to have predestined him,
since this involves a contradiction and could not now happen without
some change in God or shadow of alteration.
Let us, then, put the argument this way: In the case of those things
that are done freely in indivisible durations, their being done and their

having been done are simultaneous, as are the act’s freely issuing forth
toward either part of the contradiction and its having issued forth as
determined to one of the two parts. Clearly, then, even though in our
way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality, it was first the case that the act
of the divine will or knowledge regarding a particular contingent thing
that will exist tomorrow issued forth freely in such a way that God was
able to determine that act to either part, still this was simultaneous with

the act’s having issued forth as determined to one part — especially in view
of the fact that it could not issue forth otherwise than as determined to
one part, though in accord with the choice of Him who elicited the act.
Therefore, in eternity, insofar as it corresponds to yesterday and to the
infinite stretch of time that preceded yesterday, the act of the divine will
and knowledge has been determined to that part that is going to obtain
tomorrow; and a contingent thing of this sort which is going to exist
tomorrow was already then^^ related to the divine knowledge as some¬
thing actually known, and the knowledge was already then actual knowl¬
edge with a special relation of reason to that object. Therefore, if, when
created free choice determined itself, the divine will and intellect were
able to determine the volition and knowledge to the opposite part and to
bring it about that the first part of the contradiction was never willed or
known, then there would be power over the past, namely, the power to
eliminate the determination of the volition and knowledge which had

‘^The “then” refers, of course, to the now of eternity insofar as it corresponds to past
time.
[156]
Disputation 51

already existed before, and the power to eliminate the relation to such
an object, a relation that had also existed previously. This, however,
involves a contradiction, as will be shown in q. 25.^®

16. This same argument can be confirmed as follows: Since the

world has already issued forth from the divine will as from its proper
cause, and since it would not have been able to issue forth from it if the
will had not already been determined to the production of the world, it
clearly follows that the divine will was determined at least at that point in
time at which the world was established. Therefore, since it was not at
that point determined for the first time (because God was not able to
begin to will anything in time), it follows that it was determined in that
way from eternity. But after God has once freely determined His will to
one part of a contradiction. He is no longer able to bring it about that He
did not so determine it; otherwise. He would be able to bring it about
that a given thing has not been effected after it has already been ef¬
fected. Therefore, at no point of time before the creation of the world
was God able to bring it about that He did not decide from eternity to
create the world at the point of time at which He created it. And for the
same reason He was not able to bring it about that He did not know that
the world was going to exist at that point in time. Since, then, the same
argument applies to every other future contingent, it follows that at no
point of time is God able to bring it about that from eternity He knew the
contrary of what he now in fact knows about any future contingent.

17. The third proof: In eternity, insofar as it corresponds to this pres¬

ent time or to any past moment of time, either God sees with certainty,
because of the depth and perfection of His knowledge, which part

Peter’s free choice is going to turn itself toward tomorrow, or He does

not see this with certainty. The second answer cannot be given, since
then God would not foreknow future contingents — which is heretical,
contrary to the absolutely clear testimony of Scripture that we will cite in
the next disputation. But if the first answer is given, then it is toward

that part and not toward the opposite part that Peter’s free choice will
turn itself; otherwise, God did not see with certainty that Peter was by his
freedom going to turn himself toward that part. Therefore, it is never
going to be the case that he turns himself toward the opposite part, even
though he could do it if he so willed; and, consequently, God will never
bring it about on this account that from eternity He never knew what He
now knows.

^^Commentaria, pp. 354-355b. See n. 13 above.

*^See Disputation 52, sec. 8.
 [157]

Disputation 5 1

18. I will now indicate briefly in what way we differ from the authors
of the contrary position.
All of us agree that even after the positing of that free determination
of the divine will by which God resolved to create this order among the
things He decided to create, it is not the case that created free choice was
going to do this rather than the opposite because God foreknew it, but,
to the contrary, God foreknew it because free choice was going to do it by
its innate freedom — even though it was really able to do the opposite if it
so willed. Nonetheless, there is disagreement because, as was explained
in the two preceding disputations, we maintain that on account of the
depth and perfection of His intellect and of His essence as its primary
object, God knows with absolute certainty, in His own self and in the
secondary causes, what is going to happen contingently by virtue of the
freedom of those causes; yet He knows this in such a way that (i) the
opposite is able to occur, and that (ii) if it were going to occur, as it is
really able to, then from eternity God would have known this with
absolute certainty and not what He in fact knows. Thus, while the full
force of created free choice is preserved and while the contingency of
things remains altogether intact in the same way as if there were no
foreknowledge in God, God knows future contingents with absolute
certainty — not, to be sure, with a certainty that stems from the object,
which is in itself contingent and really able to turn out otherwise, but
rather with a certainty that flows from the depth and from the infinite
and unlimited perfection of the knower, who in Himself knows with
certainty an object that in its own right is uncertain and deceptive.^® It
follows that the contingency of things and freedom of choice with re¬
spect to the future are perfectly consistent with God’s certain knowledge
and will, a knowledge and will that are not only altogether unchange¬
able, but also fixed and stable to such a degree that it now already
involves a contradiction for God to have willed the contrary from eter¬
nity or to have known from eternity that the contrary was going to occur.
Our opponents, on the other hand, hold that freedom of choice and
the contingency of things accord with and are correctly reconciled with

*®Here and elsewhere Molina claims that God knows with certainty things, namely,
future contingents, which are in their oum right {secundum se) or in themselves {in se) uncer¬
tain. Clearly, Molina does not mean to imply that these objects are such that it is metaphys¬
ically impossible that they should be known with certainty. But then the question arises;
What can it mean to say that the objects are uncertain secundum se or in se} His point seems
to be that future contingents are still metaphysically or ontologically indeterminate, since at
present they have existence only in causes that are not yet determined to produce them.
This does not, however, impede God’s having epistemic certitude about them by virtue of
His (middle) knowledge and of the determination of His will. So God has epistemic
certitude about things that are metaphysically uncertain or indeterminate. See Section 4.4
of the Introduction.
[>58] Disputation 5 1

divine foreknowledge by virtue of the fact that if a thing is going to turn

out otherwise, then when it actually occurs, God Himself will bring it
about that from all eternity He foreknew none other than that very thing
that has occurred. But this is as if (i) God acquired knowledge of future
contingents from the very occurrence of the things, and as if (ii) before
the event there was no more certitude in the divine knowledge than
there is in an object that is still contingently future, and as if (iii) God’s
knowledge did not from eternity have in itself a fixed determination to
one part of a contradictory pair of future contingents before the thing
itself received that same determination in time when it was posited
outside its causes. Is there anyone who would not see, were he to weigh
the matter the least bit carefully in his mind, that all these things are
plainly and overtly incompatible with the altogether absolute perfection
of God’s knowledge, and that they manifestly destroy the certitude of
the divine knowledge and render God uncertain and perplexed about
the occurrence of things?

19. The fourth proof: Hence we can argue as follows: If the con¬
tingency of things had to be reconciled with divine foreknowledge by the
thesis that if (i) free choice does the one thing, God will bring it about
that He has never foreknown anything other than that very thing, and if
(ii), as is possible, free choice does the opposite, God will bring it about
that He never knew the first thing, then it would follow that God was not
able to foretell with certainty, through the prophets or the man Christ,
which things were going to occur contingently because of human free
choice, for example, the sin by which Peter was going to deny Christ
three times, and many others. But this is heretical, unless perhaps one
countenances power over the past even after an effect has already
existed in time outside its causes, and claims that if Peter, as was possible,
had not sinned, then God would have brought it about that the revela¬
tion in question, which had already been previously made, had not
occurred.
But it manifestly involves a contradiction for there to be power over
the past, especially after an effect has already existed in time outside its
causes. Almost all the authors against whom we are now arguing agree
with this point themselves, and the very same thing will be demonstrated
in q. 25.^^ What’s more, if such power over the past were posited, then
the certitude of the divine knowledge as well as of the revelations we
have about future things would be lost. For what certitude can there be
in any knowledge or revelation about which we can truly say that (i) God

^^Commentaria, pp. 354a-355b. See n. 13 above.

 [159]

Disputation 5/

is able to bring it about that no such thing has ever been known or
revealed, and that (ii) whether or not He is going to bring this about
depends on a future contingent event that is equally able to be and able
not to be, and hence that (iii) whether God will bring this about is now as
uncertain and contingent as it is contingent in reality as to whether
created free choice is by its freedom going to turn itself toward the one
or the other part? Indeed, if this opinion (or, better, this error) is ac¬
cepted, then Peter and the other Apostles, after having received Christ’s
revelation about the future denial, were no more certain prior to the
time of St. Peter’s sin that such a thing was going to occur than they
would have been had such a revelation never been made beforehand.
For whether God was going to bring it about in the future that this
revelation had not been made beforehand depended on the free and
uncertain determination of St. Peter’s will with respect to both parts.

20. Finally, if the way proposed by these Doctors for reconciling free
choice and the contingency of things with divine foreknowledge is ac¬
cepted, I do not see how there might be providence in God with respect
to future contingents that depend on free choice — if, that is to say,
depending on whether this or that part of a contradiction turns out to
obtain because of innate freedom of choice, God will bring it about that
from eternity He knew that this or that was going to occur. Hence, I do
not see how God has provided for this part of the contradiction from
eternity as one who foreknew this determinate part on the hypothesis
that He Himself should furnish these or those means or aids. As a result,
there is no room left for divine predestination or reprobation, if all
things still to come in the future are so uncertain to God that it is in light
of the part of the contradiction that is going to be actualized by free
choice that He is even now going to bring it about that from eternity He
foreknew that this or that human being would do this or that, and on this
basis bring it about that this or that person was predestinate or repro¬
bate. In addition, the number at this very time of the predestinate and of
the reprobate will also be uncertain, since it is in light of future events
that God is even now going to bring it about that from eternity He
predestined these people or those, more or fewer. But if this is so, then
why, when he came to the section on predestination and to the election
of some, given that others had not been so elected, did Paul exclaim in
Romans 1 1 133 , “O, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge
of God; how incomprehensible are His judgments and inscrutable His
ways!” Last, given the position under discussion, I do not see how God
would have foreknown the repentance of the Tyronians and Sidonians
rather than its opposite on the hypothesis that the wonders performed
[i6o] Disputation 5 1

in Bethsaida and Chorozain should have been performed in Tyre and

Sidon, since both parts depended on the free choice of the Tyronians
and Sidonians; rather, depending on whether free choice willed to turn
itself toward one or the other part, God was going to bring it about that
He had foreknown the one or the other from eternity.
Scripture certainly speaks far differently about the certitude and de¬
termination of the divine foreknowledge and predestination. For in

2 Timothy 2:19 Paul says, “God’s solid foundation stone stands firm, and
it bears this inscription: ‘The Lord knew those who are His own.’” We
will skip over the other passages from Scripture for now. Thus, too,

Augustine says in De Libero Arbitrio III, chap. 3, “Since God foreknows

our will, that which He foreknows is going to be. Therefore, our will is
going to be, because He foreknows the will. Nor can the will be if it does
not have power; therefore. He foreknows its power, too. Hence, it is not
the case that because of His foreknowledge my power is taken away; my
power is more certainly present because of it, since He whose fore¬
knowledge does not err foreknew that my power was going to be with
me. ”20 And in De Correptione et Gratia, chap. 7, he says, “As has often
been said, they are the elect who are called by design, who are also
predestined and foreknown. If any of them perishes, then God is mis¬
taken. But none of them perishes, since God does not err. If any of them
falls to human vice, then God is conquered. But none of them falls, since

God is in no way conquered. ”21 And in De Fide ad Petrum, chap. 33,

Fulgentius says, “Hold on most hrmly, and in no way doubt that all those
whom God by His gracious goodness made into vessels of mercy were
predestined by God before the creation of the world for adoption as sons
of God. And do not doubt that none of those whom God has predestined
for the kingdom of heaven is able to perish, and that no one whom He

has not predestined is in any way able to be saved. ”22 I will skip over the
other testimony from St. Augustine. Thus, without depreciating the
authority of so many preeminent men, I judge the position we have been
discussing to be insufficiently safe from the point of view of the faith.

2 1 . Response to the first argument. As for the first argument proposed

on behalf of that position at the beginning,23 it should be said that no

20f»L 32, 1275.

21^144,924.

22PL 65, 703. Fulgentius of Ruppe (467—533) was a North African bishop and theolo¬
gian — indeed, the outstanding theologian of the early sixth century. A onetime civil
servant, he decided to become a monk upon reading Augustine’s commentary on Psalm
36. The work cited here was at one time attributed to Augustine.
23 See sec. 6 above.
 Disputation 5 1 [161]

such thing is to be found in Augustine. Still, some want to infer it from

the closing words of Hypognosticon, book VI, where, after having said

many things about predestination, he adds, “As far as we are able, let us
exhort all people to good works; let us not bring hopelessness to anyone;
let us pray for one another; let us humble ourselves in the sight of God,

saying, ‘Thy will be done.’ It will be within His power to change the
judgment of damnation which we deserve, to prolong the undeserved

grace of predestination. ”24 But the remark cited in the argument is

wrongly inferred from these words, since the author of this work —
whoever it was — had many times before this taught the contrary in the
same book VI and in the other books. Instead, all he was claiming is that
the undeserved grace of predestination, that is, the grace that is the
effect of the predestination by which He predestined us from eternity,
will be within His power to prolong, that is, to give or, taking into
account the force of the word, to offer with an increase, namely, of
merits. But he is not claiming that by our prayers we are now able, as our
opponents maintain, to have it be the case that, though we were not
predestined from eternity, God will bring it about that we have been

predestined from eternity. This never entered Augustine’s mind.

22. Response to the second argument. As for the second argument, 25 it

should be replied that this as well as other similar texts of Scripture have
to do not with repenting taken in either of the two ways that the pro¬
posed argument deals with, but with repenting as the revocation or,
better, the nonexecution of a divine decree and volition — not an abso¬
lute decree, but rather a decree by which God ordained this or that under
some condition that He placed within the power of our will as aided by His

grace. Thus, the meaning of the passage is this: “I will also repent . . . ,”
that is to say, “I will not inflict the punishment that I resolved to inflict if
they did not repent.”

23. Response to the third argument. As for the third argument,26 the
inference should be denied. For in order that creation or any other of

God’s effects be said without qualification to be brought about freely by

God when it comes to exist in time, it is sufficient that it be brought about
by a will that in and from eternity was freely determined to produce such-
and-such an effect at such-and-such a point of time — even if, by reason

45, 1664. As Molina intimates, the authorship of this work is uncertain, though in
earlier times it was often attributed to Augustine.
25 See sec. 7 above.
26See sec. 8 above. The inference in question is that if the contrary position were true,
then God would have created the world by necessity rather than freely.
[162] Disputation 5 1

of the immutability of God, to whom any shadow of alteration is repug¬

nant, the effect is produced necessarily at that time because of a free and
eternal decree that is really produced in the divine mind. And this is
what St. Thomas taught in De Veritate, q. 6, art. 3, in the response, cited
above, to the last objection; 27 nor does the proof that is added in the
argument establish anything different. Therefore, it should be con¬
ceded that when the time arrived at which God from eternity decided to
create the world, God created it both freely and necessarily, though in
different respects. For He is said to create the world freely insofar as He
creates it by His free eternal will; whereas He is said to create it necessarily
because of the necessity of immutability which belongs to His will thus
freely determined from eternity.

24. Response to the fourth argument. As for the fourth argument,28

given that the antecedent is conceded, namely, that future contingents
are really able not to be, we should deny the consequence by which it was
inferred that they are really able not to be known by God. For all that
follows is that they would have been able not be known and not to have
been going to be known, if, as is possible, they had not been going to be.
For from eternity God would have discerned this with certainty, and in
that event He would from eternity have known this about the contingent
thing in question instead of what He now knows about it. But because
He discerned and foreknew with absolute certainty that what in fact will
occur was going to be. He is not able to bring it about that from eternity
He knew the contrary. Nor, given that God discerned and foreknew this
thing with such great certainty, is its opposite able to occur in the
composed sense, even though in the divided sense its opposite is without
qualification able to occur in the same way as if nothing had been

foreknown by God — and this notwithstanding God’s foreknowledge of

the thing, a foreknowledge that would not have existed if, because of
human free choice, the thing were not going to exist.

25. Response to the fifth argument. As for the fifth argument,29 given
that the antecedent is conceded, the inference should also be conceded
with respect to the indivisible now of eternity taken absolutely, but not
with respect to the now of eternity insofar as it corresponds to some

2^See sec. 13 above.

28See sec. 9 above.

29See sec. 10 above. The antecedent is that at the point of time at which a human being
wills something, he or she is able not to will it.
 ['63]
Disputation 5/

determinate point of time which was preceded always, for an inhnite stretch
of time, by the determination of the divine will and knowledge to the one
part of the contradiction. For once the determination of the will and
knowledge has been made, it involves a contradiction for God to bring it
about that from eternity He willed or knew the opposite — as has been
shown.
 Disputation 52

Whether in God There Is Knowledge of Future Contingents.

Also, the Way in Which Freedom of Choice and the
Contingency of Things Accord with This Knowledge

1 . Even though the things that are going to be said in this disputa¬
tion could have easily been gathered from what has already been said,
nonetheless, the present disputation must also be inserted in order that
certain arguments might be refuted and in order that the compatibility
of freedom of choice and the contingency of things with divine fore¬
knowledge might be grasped more clearly.

2. First argument. On behalf of the position that denies that there is

knowledge of future contingents in God, St. Thomas in this place argues
that from a necessary cause there issues forth a necessary effect. But

God’s knowledge is a cause of the future things that are known through
it, because, as was shown in article 8,^ God is a cause of things through
His knowledge; what’s more, that knowledge is necessary. Therefore,
everything that is known by it as future is going to happen necessarily,
and hence no knowledge of anything contingent can be found in God.

3. Second argument. Second, if a conditional is true and its antecedent

is absolutely necessary, then its consequent is likewise absolutely neces¬
sary; otherwise, in a valid consequence the antecedent could be true and
the consequent false — which is in no way to be admitted. But the condi¬
tional ‘If God knew that this was going to be, then it will so happen’ is
true, or else God’s knowledge would be false; and the antecedent is
absolutely necessary, both because it is eternal and because it is past-
tense and there is no power over the past. Therefore, the consequent

^Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 8. Molina’s brief commentary in the Concordia on this

article is found in Rabeneck, pp. 3-4.
[164]
 [165]
Disputation 52

will be absolutely necessary as well, and hence no future thing fore¬

known by God will be contingent.^

4. Third argument. Third, whatever is known by God is necessary,

since, of course, it is even the case that everything that is known by

human beings necessarily obtains, and God’s knowledge is more certain

than human knowledge. But no future contingent will obtain neces¬
sarily. Therefore, no future contingent can be known by God.

5. Fourth argument. Fourth, we ourselves can argue as follows: No

future thing foreknown by God is able not to occur. Therefore, nothing
foreknown by God is a future contingent. The consequence is obvious,
since a future contingent is nothing other than a thing that is indif¬
ferently able to occur and able not to occur. The antecedent, on the
other hand, is proved by the fact that if something that is foreknown by
God as going to occur were not to occur, then God would be actually
mistaken; therefore, if, while that knowledge remains, the thing were
able not to occur, then God would be able to be actually mistaken —
which, however, is impious and can in no way be true.^

6. Fifth argument. Fifth, the things signihed by future contingent

propositions are no less necessary if God’s knowledge of them is deter-
minately true than if the future-tense propositions that signify those
same things are themselves determinately true. But from the assump¬
tion that future contingent propositions are determinately true, Aris¬
totle {De Interpretatione I, last chapter)"^ concludes that it follows that the

^This argument is, potentially at least, very powerful. One standard response, now
usually identified as Ockhamistic, consists in an attempt to show that the antecedent —
‘God knew that this was going to be’ — is not necessary. See n. 57 below for a passage in
which St. Thomas tries to undermine such a response. St. Thomas’s own response consists
in trying to show that the necessity in question is simply the necessity of the present and
hence does not threaten free choice. Molina, in contrast, responds in effect that this
‘absolute’ necessity is not closed under entailment. (See secs. 32-34 below.) That is to say,
even if the consequence is valid and the antecedent is absolutely necessary, it does not
follow that the consequent is absolutely necessary as well. As Molina sees it, this is con-
hrmed by the fact that if the consequent were, contrary to fact, made false, then the
antecedent would never have been true. I discuss this response at length in Section 4.5 of
the Introduction.

^This conclusion is “impious” because according to traditional Christian belief, omni¬

science is not a contingent characteristic of God’s. Rather, it is part of God’s nature to be
omniscient, so that He is not even able to be mistaken about anything.
‘^De Interpretatione, chap. 9, 18b 26. (See Disputation 48, n. 23.) In his response to this
argument (sec. 37 below), Molina appears to equate a singular future-tense proposition’s
being determinately true with its being now such that its present-tense counterpart can no
[166] Disputation 52

things signified are necessarily going to happen and hence that our
deliberations are in vain. Therefore, if God’s knowledge of these same
things is determinately true, then it follows that everything happens
necessarily and nothing contingently, that our deliberations are in vain,
and that our freedom of choice is completely destroyed.

7. Sixth argument. Sixth, foreknowledge of future things destroys

freedom of choice. Therefore, freedom of choice and God’s foreknowl¬
edge regarding future contingents can in no way be compatible with
each other, and thus one of them will necessarily have to be denied. The
consequence is obvious, while the antecedent is proved from the fact
that given foreknowledge of future things, the following is a necessary

and perfectly valid consequence: ‘From eternity God foreknew that

Peter was going to sin tomorrow; therefore, Peter is going to sin tomor¬
row.’ For it is based on the certitude of the divine knowledge, which no
falsehood can in any way be adjoined to, and thus this consequence is as
necessary as it is certain that God cannot be mistaken in that knowledge.
But whoever does not have the power to negate the antecedent of a
necessary consequence does not have the power to negate the conse¬
quent either;^ otherwise, someone would be able to bring it about that in
a valid consequence the antecedent is true and the consequent false —
which is altogether inconsistent with the nature of a valid consequence.

Since, therefore, it is not within Peter’s power to bring it about that from
eternity God did not foreknow that sin of his which is going to exist
tomorrow, and since this is not within God’s power either, because there
is no power over the past, it follows that it likewise does not lie within

Peter’s power to bring it about that he is not going to sin tomorrow; and
from this it follows that given the foreknowledge that God in fact has, no
freedom of choice remains in Peter.

longer be prevented (at least by created causes) from being true in the future. In his
commentary on the De Interpretatione (see n. 27 below), he seems to imply that a future
contingent proposition can nonetheless be true now, though only indeterminately true, that
is, true, but not unpreventably so. So Molina does not appear to deny the law of bivalence
for future contingent propositions; indeed, much of what he says about God’s fore¬
knowledge clearly presupposes that bivalence holds for such propositions.
^“To negate” something simply means here to make it false (though not necessarily to
make it false after it has been true). The principle enunciated here is something like the
following: For any (metaphysically contingent) propositions/? and ^ and any agent S, if (\)p
entails q and (ii) 5 does not have the power to make/? false, then 5 does not have the power
to make q false. Molina rejects this argument, maintaining in effect that S can have the
power to make q false without having the power to make p false as long as it is also true that
if 5 were indeed going to make q false, then p would never have been true. (See sec. 38
below.) In essence, this is the same response that Molina makes to the second argument. I
discuss this point in Section 4.5 of the Introduction.
 [167]
Disputation 52

8. That there is foreknowledge of future contingents in God is abso¬

lutely obvious from the Sacred Writings, so much so that the contrary
position is not only irrational, as Augustine maintains in De Civitate Dei
V, chap. 9,^ but is also a manifest error from the point of view of the
faith.

Psalm 138:3—4,^ “You have understood my thoughts from afar; my

path and my portion You have scrutinized. And all my ways You have
foreseen. . . . You have known all things, the newest as well as the old.” In
Wisdom 8:8 this is said of the divine wisdom: “She knows the signs and
the wonders before they come to be, and the unfolding of the times and

of the ages.” Ecclesiasticus 23:28—29,^ “The eyes of the Lord are bright¬
er than the sun, observing all the ways of man and the depths of the
abyss, and looking into the hearts of men in their secret paths. For all

things were known to the Lord God before they were created.” And at
39:24-25,^ “The works of all flesh are before Him, and nothing what¬
ever is hidden from His eyes. From age to age He watches, and nothing

is surprising in His sight” — as though, that is to say, something might

happen which He had not foreseen beforehand. Isaiah 41:23, “An¬
nounce what is going to happen in the future, and we will know that you

are gods.” And at 48:5, “I revealed things to you beforehand; before

they happened I announced them to you, so that you would not say, ‘My
idols did these things, and my carved images and metal images decreed
them.’ ’’John 14:29, “And I have told you this now, before it happens, so
that when it has happened, you might believe.” Moreover, according to
Hebrews 4:13 God knows all contingent things when they come to be
and are already actual: “No creature is hidden from His sight. All things
are exposed and open to His eyes.” But He does not begin to know these
things when they are actual — since that would be for Him to change
from not knowing to knowing, and a shadow of alteration would plainly
befall God. Therefore, He knows future contingents before they exist.
Last, if there is no foreknowledge of future contingents in God, then
prophecy perishes and the greater part of Sacred Scripture is ruined —
which is manifestly inconsistent with the Catholic faith. Thus, in Ad-
versus Marcionem II Tertullian justihably says, “God’s foreknowledge has
as many witnesses as He has made prophets.”

6PL41, 149.
^Throughout Molina uses the Vulgate rather than the Hebrew numbers for the Psalms.
Thus, the present reference is to (Hebrew) Psalm 139. (The allusion should actually be to
verses 3—5.)
®The Vulgate 23:28-29 corresponds to 23:19-20 in more modern editions.
^The Vulgate 39:24—25 corresponds to 39: 19— 20 in more modern editions.
2, 290.
[i68] Disputation 52

g. Unless we want to wander about precariously in reconciling our

freedom of choice and the contingency of things with divine foreknowl¬
edge, it is necessary for us to distinguish three types of knowledge in God.
One type is purely natural knowledge, and accordingly could not have
been any different in God. Through this type of knowledge He knew all
the things to which the divine power extended either immediately or by
the mediation of secondary causes, including not only the natures of
individuals and the necessary states of affairs composed of them but also
the contingent states of affairs — through this knowledge He knew, to be
sure, not that the latter were or were not going to obtain determinately,
but rather that they were indifferently able to obtain and able not to
obtain, a feature that belongs to them necessarily and thus also falls
under God’s natural knowledge.
The second type is purely/r^^ knowledge, by which, after the free act of
His will, God knew absolutely and determinately, without any condition or
hypothesis, which ones from among all the contingent states of affairs
were in fact going to obtain and, likewise, which ones were not going to
obtain.
Finally, the third type is middle knowledge, by which, in virtue of the
most profound and inscrutable comprehension of each faculty of free
choice. He saw in His own essence what each such faculty would do with
its innate freedom were it to be placed in this or in that or, indeed, in
infinitely many orders of things — even though it would really be able, if
it so willed, to do the opposite, as is clear from what was said in Disputa¬
tions 49 and 50.12

10. Perhaps someone will ask if such middle knowledge should be

called free or if it should be called natural.
To this question it must be replied, first, that such knowledge should

in no way be called free, both because it is prior to any free act of God’s
will and also because it was not within God’s power to know through this
type of knowledge anything other than what He in fact knew. Second, it
should likewise not be said that this knowledge is natural in the sense of
being so innate to God that He could not have known the opposite of
that which He knows through it.i^ For if created free choice were going

Molina holds, then, that God knows a state of affairs/? through purely natural knowl¬
edge only if p is metaphysically necessary.
^2See esp. Disputation 49, sec. 1 1, and Disputation 50, sec. 15.
*^The following, then, are the marks of middle knowledge: (i) what God knows through
it He knows before (in our way of conceiving it) any free act of His will ; (ii) God has no control
over what He knows through it; and (iii) whatever God knows through it is such that it is
metaphysically possible that He should have known its contrary (though, of course, given
[ii], God does not have and never has had the power to bring it about that He knows the
contrary). See Sections 2.8 and 4. 2-4.3 Introduction.
 [169]
Disputation 52

to do the opposite, as indeed it can, then God would have known that very
thing through this same type of knowledge, and not what He in fact
knows. Therefore, it is no more natural for God to know through this
sort of knowledge one part of a contradiction that depends on created
free choice than it is for Him to know the opposite part.
Therefore, it should be said (i) that middle knowledge partly has the
character of natural knowledge, since it was prior to the free act of the
divine will and since God did not have the power to know anything else,
and (ii) that it partly has the character of free knowledge, since the fact
that it is knowledge of the one part rather than of the other derives from
the fact that free choice, on the hypothesis that it should be created in
one or another order of things, would do the one thing rather than the
other, even though it would indifferently be able to do either of them.
And this last point is surely demanded by the freedom of the created
will, a freedom that, even after divine foreknowledge has been posited,
is no Icssde fide than are that same foreknowledge and predestination, as
was shown at length in Disputation 23.'"^ This same point is very plainly
echoed by the testimony of the saints that we will soon refer to.^^ And it
is reechoed in the common opinion of theologians, which we in part
related in the preceding disputation and which we will discuss in a little
while.
Now lest this doctrine confound you at hrst glance, bear in mind that
all of the following theses very clearly agree with and cohere with one
another:

Nothing is within the power of a creature that is not also within God’s
power.
By His omnipotence God is able to influence our free choice in what¬
ever way He wants to, except toward sin — for that would involve a
contradiction, as was shown in Disputation 31.*^
Whatever God does by the mediation of secondary causes He is able to

•^Rabeneck, pp. 134-154 (see Disputation 50, n. 12). A doctrine that isdefide (literally,
of the faith) is one explicitly affirmed by the Church in a solemn manner (for example, in a
creed or conciliar decree).
*^See secs. 21—29 below.
*^See sec. 20 below and Disputation 51, sec. 18.
i^This thesis should apparently be interpreted as follows: Whatever effect is within a
creature’s power to bring about is also within God’s power to bring about, either by Himself
alone or by the mediation of secondary causes. The thesis requires further commentary,
however, since it is still not clear how to apply it to sinful actions. A further problem arises
if the proponent of middle knowledge claims that creatures have the power to make true
what God knows through His middle knowledge. But, as far as I know, Molina never
makes such a claim, and I for one see no reason why he should make such a claim. (For
more on this, see Sections 4.5 and 5.7 of the Introduction.)
*®Rabeneck, pp. 193-197.
[170] Disputation 52

bring about by Himself alone, unless it is implied in the effect that it

comes to be from a secondary caused^
God is able to permit sins, but not able to command them or to incite
or incline anyone to them.
Likewise, the fact that a being endowed with free choice would, were it
placed in a given order of things and circumstances, turn itself toward
one or the other part does not stem from God’s foreknowledge; to the
contrary, God foreknows it because the being endowed with free choice

would freely do that very thing. Nor does this fact stem from God’s
willing that the thing in question be done by that being. Rather, it stems
from the fact that the being would freely will to do that thing. From this
it follows with absolute clarity that the knowledge through which God,
before He decides to create a being endowed with free choice, foresees
what that being would do on the hypothesis that it should be placed in a
particular order of things — this knowledge depends on the fact that the
being would in its freedom do this or that, and not the other way around.
On the other hand, the knowledge by which God knows absolutely,
without any hypothesis, what is in fact going to happen because of created
free choice is always free knowledge in God, and such knowledge de¬
pends on the free determination of His will, a determination by which
He decides to create such-and-such a faculty of free choice in such-and-
such an order of things.

1 1 . Perhaps someone will ask whether this middle knowledge is to be

countenanced in any of the blessed in heaven, at least in the most holy
soul of Christ — so that just as God qua God, by discerning His own
essence, sees what would freely come to be through created free choice
on the hypothesis that free choice should be created in such-and-such an
order of things, so too this most holy soul, by intuiting the divine essence
by means of its beatific knowledge, sees what would come to be through
free choice, especially the free choice of a human being who has already
been produced by God. 20
It should be replied that knowledge of this sort is in no way to be

countenanced even in the very soul of Christ. The reason is that Christ’s
soul does not comprehend the divine essence. But this sort of knowledge

*^So, for instance, God cannot bring it about by Himself alone that the water is heated by
the fire, or that Michael freely raises his arm.
20The beatific knowledge had by the blessed in heaven is a special (supernatural)
intuition of the divine essence. Medieval theologians commonly attribute this same knowl¬
edge to Christ as a human being even during his life on earth. Since Molina has already
claimed that God’s middle knowledge is based on His discernment of His own essence, the
present question provides an opportunity for him to distinguish two different ways of
intuiting the divine essence and to develop a bit further the notion of comprehension. See
also Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 20.
 Disputation 52 [171]

concerning created things is attributed to God by Jerome, Augustine,

and the other Fathers because He is God and for this reason compre¬
hends each created faculty of choice in a certain absolutely profound
manner. For in order to see which part a free being will turn itself
toward, it is not sufficient that there be a comprehension of the being or
even that there be a comprehension that is greater than is the thing
comprehended. Rather, what is required is an absolutely profound and
absolutely preeminent comprehension, such as is found only in God with
respect to creatures.
This is why we likewise do not concede that through His natural or
middle knowledge (which we deny of Him in this regard) God sees,
before the determination of His will, which part He Himself going to
choose. 21 For in God the intellect does not surpass the divine essence and
will in depth and excellence in the way that it does far surpass created
essences and wills. Therefore, just as human beings and angels do not
know, before the determination of their own wills, which part they are
going to turn themselves toward, since their intellects do not surpass
their essence and will by an infinite degree, so too neither does God
know, before He determines His own will, which part it is going to be
turned toward.
Nor do I understand very well how complete freedom would be
preserved in God if, before the act of His will. He foreknew which part it
was going to be turned toward. For if such knowledge existed, then He
would in no way be able to choose the opposite part; thus, if He fore¬
knew before that determination which part His will was going to be
turned toward, then I do not see at what point He had the freedom to
choose the opposite part.

12. Now in order that you might understand this point better, notice
that it is one thing for a suppositum, because of its preeminence over an¬
other suppositum, to know through middle knowledge what is going to
be chosen by that other suppositum by virtue of its freedom; it is a far dif¬
ferent thing for one and the same suppositum to foreknow through middle
knowledge what it itself is freely going to choose. 22 For the fact that (i) the

21 It is important to remember that Molina is using the term ‘before’ nontemporally, so

that what he says here in no way implies that there is some time at which God does not yet
know what He Himself is going to choose to do.
22 For present purposes it is enough to take a suppositum to be an ultimate subject of
properties. The medievals distinguished between the notions of suppositum on the one
hand and substance (or individual nature) on the other mainly to accommodate the mystery
of the Incarnation (one suppositum having two natures) and the mystery of the Holy
Trinity (three supposita in one nature). (For more on this distinction, see my “Human
Nature, Potency and the Incarnation,” Faith and Philosophy 3 [1986]: 27—53.) Molina uses
‘suppositum’ here rather than ‘substance’ because one of the examples he uses below
involves Christ and thus invokes the distinction between suppositum and nature.
[172] Disputation 52

first suppositum, comprehending the other with an infinite excess,

knows through its middle knowledge, not freely but quasi-naturally,
what that other suppositum will embrace in its freedom on the hypoth¬
esis that it should be placed in such-and-such an order of things, and the
fact that (ii) it would likewise know whichever contrary part that very
same suppositum was going to choose if perchance it was freely going to
turn itself toward a contrary part, as it is really able to — clearly, none of
this implies anything astonishing or thus anything prejudicial to the
other suppositum’s freedom. But I do not see how one and the same
suppositum’s knowing, not freely but quasi-naturally, what it itself will
choose before it actually chooses it can be compatible with that same

suppositum’s freedom. For in the prior moment at which it knew this fact
quasi-naturally and not freely, it did not have the power to know the
contrary; in fact, since it knew the relevant part of the contradiction
quasi-naturally and not freely, it follows that as long as there is preexist¬
ing knowledge of this sort, then it involves a contradiction to will or to
have known the contrary. For in that case either God would be mistaken
or there would be something such that, after having known it. He would
never have known it— which involves a contradiction. This will be made
clearer by the things that are going to be said in Part 1 of the next

disputation. 23
And you should not object against me that Christ is the same sup¬
positum and that through his beatific knowledge he foreknew with
certainty which part his own will was freely going to turn itself toward —
and this without any prejudice to his freedom. You should not, I repeat,
raise this objection against me. For the knowledge in question was
communicated to his most holy soul not by himself as a human being but

by the whole Trinity; and surely, Christ’s freedom is no more impeded

by the fact that what Christ as a human being would freely choose with
his own will was made manifest to the human nature by the divine

nature than Peter’s freedom not to sin was impeded by the fact that
Christ revealed his future sin to him. For as far as the matter at hand is

concerned, there is no difference between (i) one nature’s knowing,

because of its depth and perfection, something about another nature

and revealing it to that nature and (ii) one suppositum’s likewise fore¬
knowing something about another suppositum and revealing it to that

suppositum. 24 What’s more, in the absence of an utterly compelling

23See Disputation 53, pt. 1, secs. 15-20.

24So foreknowledge of what Christ would freely decide by means of his own human will,
a foreknowledge proper to him by virtue of his having a divine nature, is revealed to him as
a human knower by his divine nature and thus becomes such that he knows it with his
human cognitive faculties. Molina’s claim is that this is exactly analogous to God’s reveal¬
ing to Peter something about Peter’s future behavior.
 [173]

Disputation 52

reason we should not extend to other things what, justifiably in light of

God’s infinite preeminence over the created faculty of choice, we are
necessarily forced to assert in order to safeguard the freedom of that
choice, a freedom that we experience and that is no less certain on the
basis of Sacred Scripture than is divine foreknowledge. But in the pres¬
ent case there is no such reason.

13. At this juncture it should be observed that it is one thing to claim

that God does not know through the knowledge that precedes the free
act of His will which part His own will or choice is freely going to
determine itself to, even though He does know through that same
knowledge which part each created faculty of choice would determine
itself to on the hypothesis that it should be placed in such-and-such an
order of things or circumstances from among the infinitely many such
orders in which it can be placed; it is a far different thing to claim that
God does not know which part His own free will would have determined
itself to on any hypothesis that did not obtain and yet could have ob¬
tained, so that He does not know, say, whether, if Adam had not sinned.
He would have willed the incarnation of the Word in a human nature
not susceptible to suffering.
I have never made this second claim, either in this disputation or
anywhere else; quite the opposite, it is the contrary claim that is implied
by the thrust of my doctrine. For even though (i) God does not know
through the knowledge that precedes the free determination of His will
which determinations of His will would have existed on hypotheses of
the sort in question, and even though (ii) there is thus in God no middle
knowledge concerning those determinations of His own will as there is
concerning the determination of any created faculty of free choice given
any hypothesis involving it, still He does know these determinations
through the free knowledge that follows upon the free act of His will. For
that free act regarding the things that are able to be done by God — an
act in itself infinite, unlimited, and lacking any shadow of alteration —
freely determined itself to one part of a contradiction with respect to all
possible objects at once, not only (i) by freely establishing those things
that He decided to bring about or to permit and by freely deciding not to
bring about or permit the rest, but also (ii) by freely deciding which
things He would have willed on any hypothesis that could have obtained
and did not obtain. Indeed, the act in question reflects an absolutely
complete and unlimited deliberation, made on the basis of both the
purely natural knowledge and also that knowledge, in the middle between

free knowledge and purely natural knowledge, which existed in God’s

intellect before (in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality) the act
of His will. And it would be absurd and repugnant to God’s absolute
[174] Disputation 52

perfection for Him to leave undeliberated anything having to do with

any part of a contradiction from among all those things that He was then
freely able to deliberate about — especially since in God there is no room
for deliberating afterward about something that He had left undelibe¬
rated, and since it is inconsistent with His supreme and unlimited per¬
fection that He should never be able to deliberate about it.
Therefore, through His free knowledge, which follows upon the act
of His will. He knows in that free determination of His will what He
would have willed in any circumstances and under any hypothesis that
could have obtained and did not obtain.
It is, instead, the first of the above claims that I am asserting, namely,
that God does not know, just by virtue of the knowledge xh^x. precedes the
act of His will, which part His own will is going to determine itself to with
regard to any object able to be created by Him, even though by virtue of
that same knowledge He does know, on the hypothesis that His will
should choose to determine itself to one or another order of things and
circumstances, what each created faculty of choice would in its freedom
will or do within that order. Now the reason for this is that while the

divine intellect and knowledge surpass in perfection by an infinite dis¬

tance each created faculty of choice which they contain eminently in
themselves and which for this reason they comprehend in a certain
inhnitely more eminent way than that in which it is knowable, they do
not likewise surpass the divine will in perfection or comprehend it in a
more eminent way than that in which it is knowable in itself. Yet, as has
been said, it is this sort of comprehension that is required in order to
know regarding free choice, before it determines itself, which part it is
going to determine itself to in its freedom under any given hypothesis.
It does not follow from this, however, that the knowledge in question
does not comprehend the divine will, since for comprehension it is
sufficient to know all the things that this will is able to determine itself to
and that it is able to will or to reject; but God does know all these things
regarding His own will through that knowledge, taken precisely as such,
before He is thought of as eliciting an act of will.
Likewise, from the fact that through this knowledge, taken precisely
as such, God does not know the determination of His own will, it does
not follow that this knowledge is imperfect. For just as (i) this knowledge
is not judged to be imperfect by reason of the fact that it is thought of as
not yet having the status of free knowledge, a status it acquires after the
determination of the divine will, and just as (ii) the will itself and God
Himself are not judged to be imperfect by reason of the fact that the act
of the divine will is thought of as not yet being in them, or even by reason
of the fact that the procession of the Holy Spirit is thought of as not yet
 [175]

Disputation 52

being in them — for there is no instant at which the one is found in God
without the other, but rather these are the conceptions of our intellect in
God, with a foundation in reality — so, too, neither can the knowledge we
are discussing be judged imperfect on such grounds. For, of course, it
is not the case that there are many knowledges in God; rather, there is
one absolutely simple knowledge that always has the added character of
difree knowledge by which God knows the free determinations of His
own will.

Nor is the following consequence valid: ‘Through that knowledge,

taken precisely as such, God does not know the free determinations of
His own will (or, God does not know the free determination of His own
will before He freely determines it); therefore, God does not know those
same determinations of His own will.’ For, as has been said. He knows
them by the very fact that He elicits the act of His will and freely
determines it— and this determination is simultaneous in reality with that
knowledge, though later in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality.
In the same way, we say of our own will that within the instant at which it
elicits a free act and determines itself to one part of a contradiction,
(i) earlier in nature it is free and indifferent as to whether it will determine
itself to one or the other part and (ii) later in nature it is determined and
elicits a determinate act.^s

14. There are those who contend that in future contingents, it is

always the case that the one part is determinately true from eternity
before it obtains and the other part determinately false, and that for this
reason the one part is by its nature knowable as determinately future and
the other part as determinately not future; and they maintain that since
whatever is by its nature knowable is such that God knows it naturally,
before any free act of His will, it follows that God knows before any free
act of His will not only (i) what will come to be on any hypothesis because

25 According to Roman Catholic teaching about the Trinity, the Son proceeds from the
Father and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. Whereas the former
procession involves only the divine act of knowing or understanding, the latter procession
involves the act of the divine will as well, though in this case the object of the divine will is a
necessary one (that is, one that God necessarily wills) and not a contingent one. So we can
consider God as having a certain sort of knowledge while not yet having an act of willing
with regard to any object, whether necessary or contingent. But, Molina insists here, the
fact that we can consider God in this incomplete or imperfect way does not justify the
imputation of any imperfection to God Himself. For there is never an instant at which
God’s act of willing does not exist. Likewise, there is no instant at which God does not know
the free determinations of His own will. Molina’s point is simply that such knowledge must
be thought of as conceptually posterior to God’s act of willing and thus must not be
thought of as being middle knowledge.
26See Disputation 51, n. 9.
[176] Disputation 52

of created free choice, but also (ii) what God Himself is freely going to
will later in nature (or, later in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in
reality). For the latter is likewise determinately true before it is decided
upon by God.

15. The claim that future contingents are by their nature deter¬
minately true, however, conflicts with the teaching of Aristotle and the
common opinion of the Doctors, as well as with the very nature of
contingent things, each of which is of its nature, by the very fact that it is
contingent, indifferent as to whether it obtains or does not obtain, as we
showed in commenting on De Interpretatione I, last chapter. 27 So this
foundation of theirs completely breaks down, and it goes beyond the
nature of those future contingents that depend on created choice that

God should know them; and God’s knowing them, as we have explained,
stems from His infinite and unlimited perfection, by which He compre¬
hends each created faculty of choice in a certain absolutely profound
and eminent way. Thus, since (i) this foundation of ours has no place in
God as far as the free determination of His own will is concerned, a will
that can in no way be surpassed in perfection, and since (ii), as we said a
little while ago, we should not extend to other things that which, in
relation to created free choice, we are forced by necessity to countenance
in God because of His absolutely eminent comprehension exceeding the
perfection of the object, clearly it should not be claimed that God knows
before the determination of His own will which part that will is going to
determine itself to, but it should rather be claimed that in that prior
instant the divine intellect only shows Him all the other things at once,
including those things that would come to be because of any creatable
faculty of choice on any hypothesis and within any order of things — so
that, given an absolutely comprehensive deliberation on the part of the
intellect, the will by its choice establishes and arranges all things, and,
consistently with the freedom of created choice, provides for all things,
and predestines those whom it wants to or, if you will, mercifully decides
to guide them to everlasting happiness.

16. Perhaps someone will object as follows: In order to know some¬

thing it is sufficient that there be a relation of proportionality between
the faculty and the object, in the sense, namely, that there be as much
ability to know in the faculty as there is being or knowability in the object;

Molina’s complete commentary on Aristotle’s De Interpretatione (written in 1563 and

1564) is found in manuscript form at Evora, cod. 118-1-6. A brief question on future
contingents from this commentary is found in Stegmiiller, pp. 1-9. See n. 4 above on
Molina’s use of the term ‘determinate^ true.’
 [177]

Disputation 52

therefore, whoever comprehends a given will is going to discern in it

which part it is going to determine itself to by its freedom; accordingly,
God will foreknow which part His own will is freely going to determine
itself to, and, in particular, the soul of Christ will by its beatific knowledge
foreknow which part its own human will and the wills of other human
beings are freely going to determine themselves to, since through this
knowledge it comprehends those wills in a deeper way than that in which
they are knowable by their very nature.

1 7. To this argument it should be replied that the antecedent is true

of those things that are knowable in the object by their very nature or
because of their being, 2® but it is not true of those things that are known
in a way exceeding their nature solely because of the eminence and
unlimited perfection of the knower — things such as the determination
of a free choice before it exists and, in general, future contingents before
they exist. For in order to know these things it is not sufficient that the
knowing faculty be equalized with the source of the contingency of those
things, or that there be a comprehension of this source; 29 instead, what
is required is an absolutely profound and preeminent comprehension of this
source, a comprehension such as is found in God alone with respect to
the free choice of all His creatures. Therefore, since this sort of middle
knowledge is not to be countenanced in the blessed in heaven, we
claimed in question 12, article 8 and elsewhere that the blessed in heaven
are unable to know with certainty those future contingents that depend
on created free choice simply on the basis of the vision of the divine
essence and on the basis of that determination of the divine will which

has to do with placing each person’s free choice in a given order of

things. ^9 And so we conjectured that the revelation of these things to the
blessed in heaven is accomplished by means of a displaying of the
knowledge that God has of them, or in some other way.

28 Here Molina accepts the assumption made in the objection thdilentitas (translated here
as ‘being’) is a property that a thing (whether substance or accident or essential part, that is,
matter or form) may possess to a greater or lesser degree than other things. Moreover, a
thing’s degree of entitas corresponds to its degree of intrinsic knowability. God, as the First
Being, is the most knowable intrinsically, whereas creatures have greater or lesser know-
ability and being to the extent that they bear a greater or lesser resemblance to God.
29The equalization (Latin: adequatio) referred to here is that alluded to in the objection,
namely, a correspondence between the knowing faculty’s intellective ability and the intrin¬
sic knowability of the object known.
30See Commentaria, pp. 121b- 140b. Molina’s point here is that by their beatihc knowl¬
edge the blessed in heaven know only that God has decided to allow given creatures to
exercise free choice in such-and-such circumstances. In order for them to know beyond
this just how these creatures will use their free choice, they need a further and special
revelation from God.
[178] Disputation 52

18. With these matters thus explicated, in view of the fact that, as has
been said repeatedly, among all the things created (i) some are from God
immediately, (ii) others come to be through the mediation of just those
secondary causes that act by a necessity of nature without any depen¬
dence on created free choice, and (iii) still others emanate from created
free choice or are able to undergo alteration because of it, God was, to
begin with, a cause, whether particular or universal, of all things of the
first and second types solely through His purely natural knowledge (the
first kind explained above) complemented by the free determination of
His will, a determination by which that knowledge was directed toward
the production of those effects in the way in question, as was explained
and proven in article 8.^^ For that knowledge alone has the character of
an art by which God knew the mode and manner of fashioning those
things in the way in question and of providing for each of them in such a
way that they might be fitted to their ends. But since an art is not
operative unless determined by the will of the artist, who commits to
execution what the art prescribes, it follows that, given the addition of
the divine volition by which God freely willed that those things should

exist, God’s natural knowledge was a remote (in our way of conceiving it)
cause of those things, whereas the free determination of the divine will
was a proximate and sufficient cause. But even though human and
angelic free choice are things of the first type, still, because God created
them both in order that, placed in the hand of their own counsel, they
would be able either to attain both their natural end and also, with God’s
help, their supernatural end, or to turn themselves away from both ends
by their own choice, it clearly follows that in order for God (i) to be a
cause, sometimes only a universal cause but sometimes a particular
cause as well, of things of the third type, which depend on free choice,
and in order for Him (ii) to be able to exercise the appropriate provi¬
dence over free choice with regard to both sorts of ends, sometimes by
disciplining a human being through various events, sometimes by toler¬
ating and permitting his failures, sometimes by calling him and aiding
him and moving him toward the good, and finally, in order for Him
(iii) to be able to predestine certain human beings or angels and to
ordain all things to their proper ends, besides His purely natural knowl¬
edge (the hrst kind explained above), it was also necessary for Him to
have that middle knowledge through which, on the hypothesis that He
should will to bring about this or that order of things. He foresaw with
certainty all that would come to be because of angelic and human free
choice in each one of those orders of things. Therefore, God is a cause —

^iRabeneck, pp. 3—4.

 [>79]

Disputation 52

sometimes universal, sometimes particular — of things of the third type;

specihcally, He is a cause remotely (in our way of conceiving it) through
the two types of knowledge just explained, while He is a proximately
through the determination of His will, a determination by which, while
deciding to place human beings and angels in that order of things in
which He placed them. He simultaneously decided to cooperate with
their free choice in this or that way. But you should not infer that He is in
any way a cause of sins; for as far as their fault and defectiveness are
concerned, sins are traced back to created free choice alone as to their
cause. This was shown in Disputation 31.^^
On the other hand, the free knowledge by which God, after the deter¬
mination of His will, knew absolutely and without any hypothesis which
effects of each of these three types were going to occur, is in no way a
cause of things. For that knowledge comes after the free determination

of God’s will, a determination by which the whole notion of a cause and

principle of immediate operation is satished on God’s part.

19. From these remarks it can easily be seen that even though God
acquires no knowledge from things but instead knows and comprehends
everything He knows in His own essence and in the free determination
of His own will, nonetheless it is not because He knows that something is
going to be that that thing is going to be. Just the opposite, it is because
the thing will come to be from its causes that He knows that it is going
to be.

For since things of the first type will come to be solely from God’s free
will as from their immediate and total cause, it follows that it is through
free knowledge, which \s posterior to the determination of the will in God,
that God knows in the very determination of His will, as in the cause of
their coming to be, that those things will come to be. But it is not the case,
conversely, that those things will come to be because He knows that they
will come to be, since the fact that they will come to be by virtue of the
free determination of the divine will h prior (in our way of conceiving it,

with a basis in reality) to God’s knowing this fact on the basis of that very
same determination.

Again, since it is partly because of God’s free will, by which He decided

to create secondary causes immediately and to concur with them as a
universal cause, and partly because of the necessary action of those
secondary causes themselves that things of the second type will come to
be in such a way that no other cause is powerful enough to impede
effects of this sort, it surely follows that (given the preexistence of the

32Rabeneck, pp. 193-197.

[i8o] Disputation 52

natural knowledge by which God foresees that things of this type will
necessarily come to be on the hypothesis that He should will to create
their causes) in the determination of His will, by which He decided to
create these things, God foreknew absolutely and without any hypoth¬
esis, through the free knowledge that followed upon this determination,
that these effects were going to exist. And He foreknew this because
these things would come to be from these causes; and it was not the case,
conversely, that they would come to be from these causes because God
knew that they would come to be.
Finally, since (i), given the cooperation of other secondary causes as

well as God’s cooperation (partly as a universal cause, partly as a particu¬

lar cause), things of the third type will, by virtue of created free choice or
with dependence on it, come to be in such a way that they are able not to
be, while (ii) through His natural knowledge and through that knowl¬
edge that lies between purely natural knowledge and free knowledge
God foresaw that these things were going to be because of free choice on
the hypothesis that He should will to create human beings and angels in
the order of things in which He in fact placed them, it follows that in the
free determination of the will by which He decided so to create them. He
knew through His free knowledge, a knowledge follows upon that
determination, that those things were going to be. For it was because of
freedom of choice that they were going to come to be in that way, but it
was not the case, conversely, that they will come to be or have come to be
because He foreknew that they would come to be.

20. This last point we have made is in fact affirmed as well by all
those Doctors whom we cited in the preceding disputation. For as long
as they assert that when free choice by its innate freedom indifferently
chooses this or its opposite, then God will bring it about that from
eternity He foreknew nothing else, they are obviously teaching not that
things will come to be because God foreknows that they will, but rather
just the opposite. The rest of the Scholastic Doctors seem to share this
view — though, to tell the truth, in article 8 above, response to the first
objection, St. Thomas seems to intimate the contrary position when he
expounds and tries to read the contrary sense into the text from Origen
which is going to be cited shortly, a text in which Origen is clearly
advocating the same position.

®^See Disputation 51, sec. 3.

^'^St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 8, ad 1 . See sec. 22 below for the passage from
Origen. St. Thomas’s comment is as follows: “As for the first argument, the response is that
Origen was thinking of the sort of knowledge which does not fall under the concept of a
cause unless it is accompanied by an act of will, as has been said. But his claim that God
 Disputation 52 [181]

21. The common opinion of the holy Fathers clearly affirms the
same thing.
In Expositiones Quaestionum a Gentibus Christianis Propositarum, q. 58,
while discussing Judas’s betrayal and God’s foreknowledge, Justin Mar¬
tyr says, “Foreknowledge is not a cause of that which is going to be, but
rather that which is going to be is a cause of foreknowledge. For that
which is going to be does not ensue upon foreknowledge, but rather
foreknowledge ensues upon that which is going to be. So it follows that
Christ is not a cause of the betrayal, but rather the betrayal is a cause of

the Lord’s foreknowledge.”^^ He says that the same thing holds for
foreknowledge of the sin of the angels and of the first parents. So he is
speaking not only about the foreknowledge that Christ has as a human
being, since this foreknowledge did not exist before the sins of the angels
and the first parents, but also about the foreknowledge that God has as

God. He is not, however, using the term ‘cause’ to stand for a real cause;
for the things are not a cause of Christ’s foreknowledge, since neither
the uncreated foreknowledge that he has insofar as he is God nor the
created foreknowledge of future contingents with which he was en¬
dowed as a human being devolve from the things themselves. Instead,
he is talking about the explanation of why this foreknowledge exists, since
the relation of reason which the divine knowledge bears to the things
that it knew were going to exist depends on the fact that those things
would come to be from their causes, as has been explained.

22. In book 7 of his commentary on the epistle to the Romans, while

commenting on Romans 8 [8:30], “Whom He foreknew and predes¬

tined,” Origen likewise says, “It is not because God knows that some¬
thing is going to be that that thing is going to be, but rather it is because it
is going to be that it is known by God before it comes to be. For even if we
imagine for the sake of argument that God does not foreknow anything,
it was without a doubt going to happen that, say, Judas became a traitor,
and this in just the way the prophets foretold it would happen. There-

foreknows things because they are future should be understood in terms of a cause of
logical inference and not a cause of existing. For it follows that if something is future, then
God foreknows it; but the future things are not the cause of God’s knowledge.”
35PG 6, 1300C.
3® Molina here is careful to dissociate himself from the view that God finds out about
created things by looking at them rather than by looking into Himself, as it were. (Iron¬
ically, the model of divine knowledge repudiated here is at least suggested by Aquinas’s
claim that God knows what is future to us in a way analogous to that in which someone
perched at the top of a hill might see all the travelers on the road.) God knows that such-
and-such will happen because it will so happen, but, Molina insists, it does not follow that
God acquires such knowledge from the things themselves or that the things themselves act
as efficient causes of God’s knowledge of them.
[182]
Disputation 52

fore, it was not because the prophets foretold it that Judas became a
traitor, but rather it was because he was going to be a traitor that the
prophets foretold the things that he was going to do by his wicked
designs, even though Judas most certainly had it within his power to be
like Peter and John if he had so willed; but he chose the desire for money
over the glory of apostolic companionship, and the prophets, foreseeing
this choice of his, handed it down in their books. Moreover, in order that

you might understand that the cause of each person’s salvation is to be

found not in God’s foreknowledge but in that person’s intentions and
actions, notice that Paul tormented his body and subjected it to servitude
because he feared that, after having preached to others, he himself
might perhaps become reprobate.

23. In Dialogus adversus Manichaeos Damascene says, “From this it is

clear that foreknowledge was not in the least a cause of the devil’s
becoming evil. For a physician, when he foresees a future illness, does
not cause that illness. To the contrary, the real cause of the illness
consists in a perverse and immoderate way of life. For its part, the
physician’s foreknowledge is a sign of his erudition, whereas the cause of
the foreknowledge is the fact that things were going to turn out that

24. In homily 60 on Matthew, while commenting on Matthew 18:7,

“Woe to the world because of scandals,” Chrysostom says, “It is not
because he foretold the future scandals that they will occur; rather, it is
because they will occur in their entirety that he foretold them. For they
would not occur if worthless and pestiferous human beings did not will
to contrive them; but if they had not been going to occur, then neither
would he have foretold that they would occur. They were going to occur,
however, since there were many deeply sick people who did not will not
to act maliciously, and he foretold that this would happen. ‘But if these
people had been cured,’ someone will object, ‘and if there were no one
who would create scandals, then wouldn’t his words be convicted of
falsity?’ Certainly, if everyone had willed to be cured and to be made
well, then he would not have said, ‘It is inevitable that scandals will
come.’ But because he foresaw that these people would willingly become
incurable, he foretold that the scandals would come in their entirety.

14, 1126C-D.
38PG 94, I544B.
39PG 58, 574f
 [183]
Disputation 52

25. While commenting on Isaiah 16:13, “This is the word the Lord
spoke against Moab,” Jerome says, “God’s foreknowledge is not a cause
of the desolation, but rather the future desolation is foreknown to God’s
majesty.”^® And at the beginning of Jeremiah 26 [26:3], he says, “It is
not because God knows some future thing that that thing is going to be;
rather, it is because it is going to be that God knows it, since He is one

who foreknows future things.”"^ ^ Likewise, in commenting on Ezekiel

2:4, “And you will say to them, etc.,” he says, “It is not the case that
because He knows that those things are going to occur, it is necessary for
us to do what He foreknows; rather. He knew as future what we are

going to do by our own will. For He is God. ”^2 Again, in Dialogus adversus
Pelagianos III: “It is not the case that Adam sinned because God had
known that this would happen; rather, God, because He is God, fore¬
knew what Adam was going to do by his own will.”'^^

26. In De Civitate Dei V, chap. 10, Augustine says, “For it is not the
case that a human being sins because God foreknew that he would sin.
Indeed, there is no doubt that he sins, when he sins; for He whose
foreknowledge cannot be mistaken did not foreknow fate or fortune or
anything else — rather, he foreknew that he would sin. If he wills not to
sin, then he does not sin at all. But if he is going to will not to sin, then
God likewise foreknew this.”'^'^ And in De Praedestinatione et Gratia, chap.
15, the author of that work says, “If it is claimed that Pharaoh was not at
that time able to change because God had foreknown that he was not

going to change, the reply will be that God’s foreknowledge does not
force a human being to be such as God foreknew he would be, but rather
it foreknows that he is going to be such as he will be, even though God

does not make him be that way.”'^^

27. In book 9 of his commentary on John, chap. 10, Cyril says, “It is
because some people were willingly going to act in this way that the

prescient Holy Spirit foretold that these things would happen.”'^®

28. In sermon 16, Leo I says, “The Lord does not incite the wicked
hands of madmen against Himself, but He does allow it. Nor by fore¬
knowing what is going to happen does He force it to happen.

24, 173C.
24, 844B.
42PL 25, 33B.
23, 575C.
44PL41, 15
3.
«PL45, 1675.
‘^^PG 74, 132B.
47PL 54, 369C.
[.84] Disputation 52

29. From what has been said in this disputation and in the preceding
disputations it is sufficiently clear, I believe, how our freedom of choice
and the contingency of things cohere with divine foreknowledge.
For (i) the things that issue forth from our choice or depend on it are
not going to happen because they are foreknown by God as going to
happen, but, to the contrary, they are foreknown by God as going to
happen in this or that way because they are so going to happen by virtue
of our freedom of choice — though if they were going to happen in a
contrary way, as they are able to, then from eternity they would be fore¬
known as going to happen in that contrary way instead of in the way they
are in fact foreknown as going to happen — and, indeed, (ii) the knowl¬
edge by which God knew absolutely that such-and-such things would
come to be is not a cause of the things, but rather, once the order of
things that we see has been posited by the free determination of the
divine will, then (as Origen and the other Fathers observe) the effects
will issue forth from their causes — naturally from natural causes, freely
and contingently with respect to both parts from free causes — just as if
God had no foreknowledge of future events. From this it clearly follows
that no prejudice at all is done to freedom of choice or to the con¬
tingency of things by God’s foreknowledge, a foreknowledge through
which, because of the infinite and wholly unlimited perfection and
acumen of His intellect. He sees with certainty what the free causes
placed in any order of things will do, even though they could really, if
they so willed, do the contrary; rather, even though that knowledge
exists, freedom of choice and the contingency of things with respect to
both parts remain intact, just as if there were no foreknowledge. In
addition to Boethius in De Consolatione V, last prose, and many others,
Augustine teaches the same thing excellently while arguing with Evo-
dius in De Libero Arbitrio III, chap. 4.^® For when Evodius asks Augustine
how God’s foreknowledge and human free choice fit together, given that
what God foreknows as future must by all means necessarily occur,

Augustine responds: “‘Why does it seem to you that our free choice
conflicts with God’s foreknowledge? Is it because it is foreknowledge, or
because it is God’s foreknowledge?’ Evodius: ‘Mainly because it is God’s
foreknowledge.’ Augustine: ‘What, then, if you foreknew that someone
was going to sin, wouldn’t it be necessary that he sin?’ Evodius: ‘Indeed it
would be necessary that he sin. For I would have no foreknowledge

unless I foreknew things that are certain.’ Augustine: ‘Then it is not

because it is God’s foreknowledge that the things He foreknows will
necessarily come to be, but it is only because it is foreknowledge, which

32, 1276.
 [185]
Disputation 52

would surely not exist at all if He did not foreknow things that are
certain.’ Evodius: ‘I agree. But what’s the point of these remarks?’ Then
Augustine: ‘It’s that, unless I am mistaken, you would not directly force
someone to sin whom you foreknew was going to sin; nor would your
foreknowledge force him to sin, even though he was without a doubt
going to sin; for otherwise you would not really foreknow it as future.
And so, just as the two things are not opposed to each other, with the
result that by your foreknowledge you knew what the other was freely
going to do, so too God foresees those who are going to sin of their own
will without compelling anyone to sin. Why, then, should He not be a
just judge of those things that He foresees but does not force anyone to
do? For just as you do not by your memory force past things to have been
done, so neither does God by His foreknowledge force future things to
be done. And just as you remember things that you have done even
though it is not the case that you have done all the things that you
remember, so too God foreknows all the things of which He is the author
even though it is not the case that He is the author of all the things that
He foreknows. Rather, He is a just judge of things that He is not the evil
author of. From this you should now see with what justice God punishes
sins, since He did not bring about the things He foreknew were going to
be. For if, because He foresees sins. He ought not to condemn sinners,
then neither should He give rewards to those who act righteously, since
He likewise foresaw just as well that they would act righteously. In fact,
we should say that it is by virtue of His foreknowledge that no future
thing is hidden from Him, and that it is by virtue of His justice that sin,
because it is committed willingly, does not go unpunished by His judg¬
ment, since His foreknowledge does not force it to be committed.’”
These are Augustine’s words.

30. What’s more, on the basis of what has been said so far we should
caution that although theologians are absolutely correct in claiming that
even if it is known that Peter will sin tomorrow, Peter is able in the
divided sense, though not in the composed sense, not to sin, still with
regard to these two senses there are two grievous errors that have to be
avoided.
The first error, which has to do with the divided sense, we have
already impugned in the preceding disputation, namely, we should
not believe that the explanation for Peter’s being able in the divided
sense not to sin is that whatever he does freely in the future is such that
God will likewise freely bring it about in the future that from eternity He

“^^See Disputation 51, secs. 1, 2, and 14-17.

[i86] Disputation 52

knew none other than that same thing. For this is to destroy the certitude
and determinateness of the divine knowledge regarding future con¬
tingents before they come to be, something that is obviously incompat¬
ible with the excellence of the divine knowledge and is such that utter
absurdities follow from it, as was shown above in the same place. For this
reason it must be acknowledged that the firm foundation was already in

place from eternity: “The Lord knew His own” [2 Tim. 2:19].
The second error has to do with the composed sense, namely, we
should not claim that because the divine foreknowledge already exists
beforehand, Peter is in reality not able not to sin, as if because of the
preexisting divine knowledge he has lost something of his freedom and
power not to sin in reality should he so will. For I would not hesitate to
call this sort of interpretation an error from the point of view of the
faith. Indeed, even though that knowledge did exist beforehand, it was
just as truly within his power not to sin as it would have been had that
knowledge not existed, and he was just as truly able to refrain from the
act in light of which he was foreknown to be a future sinner as he would
have been had that knowledge not existed, as has been explained; thus
this interpretation is not the one that the theologians have in mind.
Rather, they are claiming, absolutely correctly, that given the divine
knowledge, Peter is not able in the composed sense not to sin, because

these two things, namely, Peter’s being such that he is not going to sin
and God’s knowing that he is going to sin, cannot both obtain together.
But if, as is now truly possible, he were not going to sin, then that
knowledge would not have existed in God, and so that knowledge, which
would not have existed if, as is possible, Peter were not going to sin, does

not in any way prevent Peter’s now being able in the divided sense not to
sin, in just the way he would have been able not to sin had such knowl¬
edge not existed beforehand.

3 1 . Response to the first argument. As for the first argument proposed

at the beginning,^^ first of all, regarding the major premise, it should be
said that this premise is true if it is understood as having to do with a
cause that is both (i) a total cause, absolutely speaking (and not total merely
within some order of causes — namely, universal causes — as was ex¬
plained in Disputation 26),^^ and (ii) a necessary cause that not only exists
necessarily but also acts necessarily; for from such a cause there issues

^^See sec. 2 above. The major premise is that from a necessary cause there issues forth a
necessary effect.
^•See Rabeneck, pp. 164—170. According to Molina, God is a total universal (or general)
cause of any effect that is produced by secondary causes. His point here is that in order for
the first premise to be true with respect to God’s causal activity in a particular case, God
must be acting not as a universal cause but as a total particular cause, determining by
Himself the exact nature of the effect.
 [187]

Disputation 52

forth a necessary effect. As far as the hrst part of the minor is con¬
cerned, ^2 however, if it has to do with God’s free knowledge, through
which future contingents are known by Him absolutely and without any
hypothesis, then it should be denied that that knowledge is a cause of
future contingents, as is sufficiently clear from what has been said in this
article and in article 8.^^ On the other hand, if the premise has to do with
God’s natural knowledge and with that other middle knowledge, through
which, before any free act of His own. He knows future contingents not
as absolutely future, but as future on the hypothesis that He should will to
create this or that order of things in which these or those creatures are
endowed with free choice, then it will have to be conceded that God’s
knowledge is a cause of future contingents. It is not a total cause, how¬
ever, since the faculty of choice itself is part of the whole cause of those
future contingents that depend on created free choice — a part by virtue
of which it is not only the case that there are or are not future con¬
tingents, but also the case that there are these rather than those. Now as
far as the last part of the minor is concerned,^^ we should say the
following: Even though, after knowledge of this sort has once been
conceived to exist, it is a knowledge that is necessary as regards both the
part that is natural in God and the part that would be different in God if, as
is possible, created free choice were by its innate freedom going to turn
itself to the opposite part, still such knowledge does not produce future
contingents necessarily, but rather produces them in a way that depends
on both the free determination of the divine will and the free election of
created choice, an election by which it embraces this rather than that
part of a contradiction. But the effects acquire contingency from this
sort of free determination of the parts of the one total cause, despite the
necessity of the foresaid knowledge — as St. Thomas taught in this place
in the response to the first objection.

32. Response to the second argument. For the response to the second
argument^® it should be noted that a proposition that is merely con-

^2The first part of the minor premise is this; ‘But God’s knowledge is a cause of the
future things known through it.’
Molina refers here to the whole of the Concordia up to this very place, “this article’’
being article 13 of question 14 of Summa Theologiae I. His brief commentary on article 8
appears in Rabeneck, pp. 3-4.
5^The last part of the minor premise is that God’s knowledge is necessary.
^^St. Thomas says: “As for the first argument, it should be said that even if a highest
cause is necessary, its effect can still be contingent by virtue of a contingent proximate
cause. For example, the sprouting of a plant is contingent by virtue of its proximate cause,
even though the motion of the sun, which is a first cause, is necessary. And, similarly, the
things known by God are contingent by virtue of the proximate causes, even though God’s
knowledge, which is a first cause, is necessary.’’
56 See sec. 3 above.
[i88] Disputation 52

tingent if we consider the natures of the terms and the causes or princi¬
ple from which the joining of the predicate with the subject emanated, at
times becomes absolutely necessary because of some condition — not, to be
sure, a condition that is imagined to be in it or that, though it is able to be
in it and able not to be in it, is nonetheless hypothesized to be in it, but
rather a condition that is already actually in it in such a way that its being
removed involves a contradiction. For although the hrst two types of
conditions only make for a necessity that is relative and hypothetical — in
the way in which it is necessary that a horse have wings ^it is flying, or in
the way in which everything that exists is such that, on the hypothesis that it
exists, it is necessary that it exist — nonetheless, the third type of condi¬
tion makes for an absolute necessity distinct from any relative or purely
hypothetical necessity. Thus, in this sense, even though it was absolutely
contingent that Adam existed (for he was freely produced by God), still
by the very fact that he has really existed, his having existed is now at the
present time necessary in such a way that his not having existed involves
a contradiction; for the fact that he existed can no longer be negated or
prevented in any way. In the same way, even though it was likewise
contingent that God foreknows that the Antichrist is going to sin at such-
and-such a point in time (since if, as will be possible, he were not going to
sin, then God would not have foreknown that he is going to), neverthe¬
less, by the very fact that from eternity He did foresee this sin as future, it
now involves a contradiction for Him not to have foreknown it, both
because there is no power over the past and also because no change can
befall God. St. Thomas should be interpreted as talking about this sort of
absolute necessity in this place in the response to the second objection,
when he says that this and similar true propositions about the past are
absolutely necessary.

5^St. Thomas’s exact words are: “As for the second argument, it should be said that some
claim that the antecedent ‘God knew that this contingent thing was going to be’ is not
necessary but contingent; for even though it is past-tense, it nonetheless connotes a
relation to a future thing. But this does not take away its necessity; for that which had a
relation to a future thing is necessarily such that it had it, even though the future thing
sometimes does not follow.

“Now others claim that the antecedent in question is contingent because it is composed
of something necessary and something contingent, in the same way that the dictum ‘that
Socrates is a white man’ is contingent. But this does not help, either; for when one says,
‘God knew that something is a future contingent,’ the contingent thing is posited here only
as the object of the verb and not as the principal part of the proposition; hence, its
contingency or necessity is irrelevant to the question of whether the proposition is neces¬
sary or contingent, true or false. For it can be just as true that I have said that a man is a
donkey as that I have said that Socrates is running or that God exists; and the same thing
holds for the modes ‘necessary’ and ‘contingent’.
“So it has to be said that the antecedent is absolutely necessary.’’
 [•89]

Disputation 52

33. Second, and this is also clearly enough implied by what has been
said, one should notice what is peculiar to God’s knowledge of those
contingent things that depend on created choice, namely, that by virtue
of the acumen and absolute perfection of His intellect God foreknew
what was going to happen because it was going to happen that way on
account of the faculty of choice itself by virtue of its innate freedom, and
if, as is possible, the opposite were going to happen, then God would
have foreknown it instead. Thus, what was in itself uncertain He knew
with certainty, a certainty that stemmed not from the object, but from
the acumen and absolute perfection of His intellect, though with depen¬
dence on the fact that things were going to happen that way because of
the faculty of choice itself.

34. With these points established, we should deny the major prem¬
ise^® for any case in which (i) the antecedent is absolutely necessary only
with the necessity just explained, and (ii) the knowledge in question
(a) has been formed with dependence on the fact that the thing was
going to happen freely or contingently, and (b) would have been formed
in the contrary way if, as is possible, the thing were going to happen in
the contrary way, and (c) has its certainty not from the object but solely
from the acumen and immense perfection of the knower. For in such a
case, even if (i) the conditional is necessary (because in the composed
sense these two things cannot both obtain, namely, that God foreknows
something to be future and that the thing does not turn out that way),
and even if (ii) the antecedent is necessary in the sense in question
(because it is past-tense and because no shadow of alteration can befall
God), nonetheless the consequent can be purely contingent. In response

to the proof of the major, where the inference is drawn that “otherwise
in a valid consequence the antecedent could be true and the consequent

false,” it should be denied that this follows. For if, as is possible, the
opposite of the consequent were going to obtain, then the antecedent
would never have obtained beforehand — an antecedent that was con¬
ceived in the way it was by the acumen and perfection of the divine
intellect because the thing was going to turn out that way, even though it
could have turned out otherwise. Therefore, it would never be the case
that the antecedent is true and the consequent false. From this it follows
that if the truth of the antecedent is posited (as is in fact the case), then
the consequent is necessary only with a necessity of the consequence, by
which it is validly inferred from that antecedent, and not with a necessity

58The major premise is that if a conditional is true and its antecedent is absolutely
necessary, then its consequent is likewise absolutely necessary.
[190]
Disputation 52

of the consequent, since the condition in question does not render the
consequent absolutely necessary in the way that it does render the antece¬
dent absolutely necessary. The consequent is not affected by it in any
way, but is instead unqualihedly able to obtain and able not to obtain; if,
however, it were not going to obtain, as is possible, then the antecedent
would never have obtained beforehand, and, accordingly, the condition
in question, which has its source solely in the divine acumen and perfec¬
tion, would not be found in the antecedent.

35. Response to the third argument. As for the third argument,^^ the
major premise should be conceded if it has to do with the necessity of the

consequence, since the following consequence is necessary: ‘God knows

that this or that is going to be; therefore, it is going to be.’ But if it has to
do with the necessity of the consequent, as if to say that it is necessarily true
that the thing known by God to be future is necessary or certain in itself,
then the major premise should be denied. Now as far as the proof is
concerned,^® the inference should be denied if it is understood as having
to do with the necessity of the consequent, in which case it would have

the following sense: ‘Everything that is known by human beings is

necessary with a necessity of the consequent, or is at least certain in itself

(taking the term “knowledge” in the broader sense, so as also to include

that certain cognition of contingent propositions that is verified by sense
experience); therefore, everything that is known by God as future will
also be necessary with a necessity of the consequent, or will at least be

certain in itself — especially since God’s knowledge is much more certain

than ours.’ Now the reason this inference should be denied is that our
knowledge gets no certitude from the perspicacity and depth of the
knower over and beyond the things known, as it would if we perceived
things with more certainty than the things have in themselves and of
their nature. For this reason, the certitude of our knowledge depends on
the necessity or certitude of the objects in their own right, nor can there
be more certainty in our knowledge than is found in the objects them¬
selves. On the other hand, because of the acumen and depth of the
knower, who sees with certainty what is going to happen in an object that
in its own right is uncertain, the divine knowledge has more certitude in
itself than there is certitude in the objects. And this is the reason we posit
knowledge of future contingents only in God and not in human beings,
as was said in question 1 of the First Part.®^ So the fact that God’s

®^See sec. 4 above. The major premise is that whatever is known by God is necessary.
60The proof is: “since, of course, it is even the case that everything which is known by
human beings necessarily obtains, and God’s knowledge is more certain than human
knowledge.”
^^Commentaria, pp. 2b— 36a. Also, see Disputation 51, n. 18.
 Disputation 52 [191]

knowledge is more certain than human knowledge works to the advan¬

tage of our position. For from this fact it obviously follows that even if we
cannot have knowledge except of an object that is already certain in
itself, there is no corresponding reason God cannot have knowledge
except of an object of this sort. For future contingents of the kind in
question are objects that are uncertain in themselves, and yet because of
the depth and eminence of Flis intellect God knows them with absolute
certainty and hence has an absolutely unique knowledge of them which
exceeds their nature. This is why the kingly Prophet, who by means of
the gift of prophecy had received a revelation of some of them, said as he

addressed God in Psalm 50:8, “The uncertain and hidden things of Your
wisdom You have made manifest to me.”®^ He said “uncertain” in order
to express the essence and nature of the things revealed, and he added
“of Your wisdom” because of the utterly certain and altogether infallible
cognition of those things by virtue of the depth, eminence, and infinite
perfection of the divine intellect. I realize that the Hebrew text does not

have these two adjectives, but only one that means “hidden and con¬
cealed,” and so, given the Hebrew text, “uncertain” has to be understood
here as “uncertain to us, whether or not they are also uncertain in
themselves.'' Notwithstanding, “in themselves” is the true teaching that I
have proposed in this matter. And this same teaching is not insignifi¬
cantly corroborated by the fact that the Septuagint translators rendered
the above text in this way and by the fact that the Vulgate edition goes

along with them.^^

®2This reference is to Hebrew Psalm 51:8. Some modern translations render this verse
in a way that makes it useless for Molina’s purposes here. For instance, the New American
Bible renders the relevant part of the verse as follows: “and in my inmost being you teach
me wisdom.”
63The Vulgate is the Latin translation of the Scriptures first made by St. Jerome in the
fourth century. Molina is using the Clementine edition published at Rome in 1592. The
Septuagint is a translation of the Hebrew Scriptures into Greek made in Egypt in the third
and second centuries b.c. A popular legend had it that the translation was completed in
seventy-two days by seventy-two translators.
Molina is obviously concerned here with the charge that this passage from Psalm 51
undercuts his view that a future contingent is uncertain in itself (rather than simply to us)
and thus corroborates the Banezian claim that future contingents are certain to God only
because God predetermines them. We find him again addressing this issue in the Appen¬
dix to the Concordia, sec. 36 (Rabeneck, pp. 366-367), where he has this to say:
“From this you can see that the kingly prophet did not contradict me when he called
uncertain that which was known by the divine wisdom. Rather, he was expressing our
position succinctly when, talking of those things that depended on human freedom in the
future, he said, ‘The uncertain and hidden things of Your wisdom You have made
manifest to me.’ For when he said ‘uncertain,’ he was expressing what the object is in itself
and of itself; whereas when he added ‘of Your wisdom,’ he meant the depth and unlimited
perfection of the divine intellect — perfection of such a degree that with respect to some¬
thing uncertain it could have divine knowledge, the distinguishing feature of which is
certitude. But since the knowledge by which God, after the decree of His will, already knew
[192]
Disputation 52

36. Response to the fourth argument. As for the fourth argument,®^ if

the antecedent ‘No future thing foreknown by God is able not to occur’ is
taken in the composed sense, then, even though the antecedent may be
conceded, the consequence should be denied. And in response to the
proof,®^ it should be said that in order for something to be a future
contingent absolutely speaking, it is sufficient that it be in the divided
sense able to be and able not to be, since if it were not going to be (as is

really possible, God’s foreknowledge notwithstanding), then that divine

foreknowledge with which its nonoccurrence is incompatible would not
have existed beforehand. On the other hand, if that same antecedent is
taken in the divided sense, then it should be denied. Next, in response to

the proof that goes ‘If something that is foreknown by God as being such
that it will occur were not going to occur, then God would really be
mistaken; therefore, if, while that knowledge remained, the thing were

able not to occur, then God would really be able to be mistaken,’ it should
be said, hrst of all, that if both the antecedent and the consequent are
taken in the composed sense, then the proof should be conceded, for
this antecedent and consequent are of no use in proving that other
antecedent®^ in the divided sense, and we are not claiming that, given the
knowledge, the thing is able not to occur in the composed sense. But since
we are claiming (i) that the foreknowledge that actually exists does not in
any way prevent the thing from being able to turn out otherwise, and so
(ii) that despite the knowledge it is able in the divided sense not to occur
(for if it were not going to occur, as is really possible, then such fore¬
knowledge would never have existed beforehand), it follows that, with
the antecedent of the proof having been conceded, then the conse¬
quence should be denied, since the thing’s being such that it will occur in
just the way it is foreknown coheres straightforwardly with its being
really able not to occur; for if, as is really possible, it were not going to
occur in that way, then God would never have foreknown that it was
going to occur. Therefore, the divine foreknowledge in question is

absolutely and without any hypotheses what was going to occur, came after all the causing
of things on God’s part was completed (a causing that is completed by such a decree), this
knowledge is clearly not a cause of things. And the certitude of this knowledge depends on
both the decree of the divine will and the certitude of middle knowledge.”
^'^See sec. 5 above.
^^The proof is that a future contingent is nothing other than a thing that is indifferently
able to occur and able not to occur.

®^The “other” antecedent is that no future thing foreknown by God is able not to occur.
Molina has already claimed that this antecedent is false if taken in the divided sense, but he
now claims that this is the only sense that is of use to the argument. At best, the proof
establishes only the composed sense, which is equivalent to (A) ‘It is impossible that
something
nimity. foreknown by God never occur.’ Molina, of course, can accept (A) with equa¬
 [193]

Disputation 52

indeed incompatible with the thing’s turning out otherwise, but it is

perfectly compatible with the thing’s merely being able to turn out other¬
wise. Still, if it were going to turn out otherwise, then that foreknowl¬
edge would not have existed. For it is a foreknowledge that imposes no
necessity or certitude of the consequent on future things, but rather leaves
them as uncertain in themselves and in relation to their causes as they
would be if there were no such foreknowledge.

37. Response to the fifth argument. As for the hfth argument,^'^ the
major premise should be denied. The reason is the same as that which
we gave in response to the third argument. For since our knowledge and
cognition do not have more certitude than there is certitude in the object
considered in its own right, it follows that if we were to have certain
knowledge of future contingents and if propositions about those same
things were determinately true, then that would be because the things in
themselves were certainly and determinately going to be — something
that could be the case for no other reason than that the things in
themselves were necessary with a necessity of the consequent.®^ How¬
ever, as has been repeatedly explained, because of the acumen and

perfection of the knower, God’s knowledge of future contingents, which

have no certitude from themselves or from their causes, is absolutely certain.
Thus, from the fact that future contingents are known by God with
certainty it does not follow that they are going to occur necessarily in
reality — in the way that this would follow if our cognition of those things
were certain or if the propositions we form about those things were
determinately true.

38. Response to the sixth argument. As for the sixth argument,®^ the
antecedent should be denied. As for the proof, the major may be con¬
ceded, that is, we may concede that the following consequence is neces¬
sary and perfectly valid: ‘From eternity God foreknew that Peter was
going to sin tomorrow; therefore, Peter is going to sin tomorrow.’ But
the minor should be denied if it has the following sense: ‘Whoever does
not have the power to negate the antecedent of a valid consequence does
not have the power to negate (that is, not to posit) a consequent that it

®^See sec. 6 above. The major premise is that things signified by future contingent
propositions are no less necessary if God’s knowledge of them is determinately true than if
the future-tense propositions that signify those same things are themselves determinately
true.

^®As was pointed out in n. 4 above, Molina here seems to equate a proposition’s being
determinately true with its being now unpreventable by any secondary causes.
®^See sec. 7 above. The antecedent is that foreknowledge of future things destroys
freedom of choice.
[>94] Disputation 52

follows from the antecedent must be posited.’ (It is only as taken in this
sense that the minor premise is of any use to the argument, since for
Peter not to sin tomorrow in the way foreknown by God is not for Peter to
negate anything, but is rather for him not to posit the sin that it necessarily
follows from the antecedent must be posited.) This premise should be
denied, because if the consequent were not going to be posited, as it
possibly will not be, then God would never have foreknown that Peter
was going to sin, and thus the antecedent would not have obtained.
Therefore, even though it is no longer within the power of either Peter
or God Himself to bring it about that there was no such foreknowledge in

God, it is nonetheless within Peter’s power at present to do something

(that is, not sin) which is such that if, as he is able to, he were to do it, then
that antecedent would never have obtained. Therefore, it does not

follow from Peter’s power not to sin that in a valid consequence there can
be a true antecedent and a false consequent, since if he were not going to
sin, as is possible, then the antecedent in question would never have
obtained at all.

39. I think it is sufficiently clear from what we have said thus far that
(i) our freedom of choice and the contingency of things is perfectly
compatible with divine foreknowledge, and that (ii) such foreknowledge
in no way prevents it from being the case that with the help of God, who
will always furnish as much help as each person needs, it is within our
power to avoid all mortal sins, to recover from them after a lapse, and in
the end either to attain or to lose eternal life, and that (iii) if we do not
attain eternal life, then we ourselves are to blame in just the way we
would be if there were in God no foreknowledge of future things.
Now, God foreknows those things that are relevant to our salvation or
damnation in the same way that He foreknows those things that are
relevant to other future contingent effects; nor do the former acquire
any more necessity from the divine foreknowledge than the latter. Sure¬
ly, a farmer would be considered crazy if, worried about God’s fore¬
knowledge, he became remiss in sowing his seed and if for this reason,
lured by the idea that God foreknows everything from eternity and that
things are going to occur just as He foreknew they would, he did not
plant his seed or was going to plant less than he otherwise would have.
For since the foreknowledge neither helps nor hinders him, he shall
reap as he has sown. (The more seed he has planted, the more he will
reap; but if he has planted nothing, then he will harvest nothing — a
situation he ought afterward to attribute not to God’s foreknowledge but
to his own stupidity and negligence.) So, too, we should regard as much
more insane someone who, worried about God’s foreknowledge and
 [195]

Disputation 52

lured by a similar line of reasoning, became more remiss and lax in

acting righteously, in restraining his drives, in overcoming temptation,
and in doing those things that are required in order to attain a greater
reward of beatitude; nor should he afterward blame God’s foreknowl¬
edge and predestination, but rather he should blame himself — espe¬
cially since, whereas the farmer’s labor might be wasted because of
adverse weather or chance events, this man by contrast can be deprived
of the fruits of his labor by no cause other than his own will. Indeed, he
will find that the more strongly he binds himself in obedience to God,
the more prepared and prompt God always is to bestow more gifts.
The example that has been used concerning the farmer could also
have been adapted to the sick man who, relying on the fact that God
foreknows the future, decides not to avail himself of the cure for his
illness; and to the soldier who, lured by the same idea, goes into battle
unprotected by any weapons; and to infinitely many other cases.
Therefore, with not a worry at all about the divine foreknowledge, let
us, in accord with the advice of St. Peter [2 Pet. 1 : 10], busy ourselves so
that by good works we might do what we are called to do. For just as the
devil, who has understood far better than we have that God foreknows
all things, caring not a bit about the divine foreknowledge, leaves no
stone unturned and carefully roams about and circles the earth, seeking

whom he might devour,'^® so too let us, freed from every care about the
divine foreknowledge, diligently work out our salvation, relying on

God’s help; for in this way it will come to pass that without any doubt we
will attain eternal happiness. And in this regard it should be sufficient
for each of us to keep in mind that God is God, that is, infinite wisdom,
goodness, etc., in order that in these matters, which are beyond the

understanding of many, we might commit ourselves firmly to God’s

goodness and providence and busy ourselves to the extent of our power

with those things that it is our responsibility, with God’s help, to look
after most diligently.

’^The wording here parallels 1 Pet. 5:8.

 Disputation 53

On Predeterminations, and Where the Certitude

of God’s Knowledge of Future Contingents Comes From

In Order That This Disputation Might Be More Perspicuous,

and Lest It Engender Annoyance because of Its Length,
It Will Be Divided into Four Parts.

Part I
The Position of Others on Both the Topics
Mentioned in the Title

1. There are those who, in order to propound and defend, with

respect to all the nonevil acts of free choice, divine predeterminations of
a sort that completely destroy freedom of choice with respect to those
acts, argue against and try with all their might to resist the middle
knowledge that we established in the preceding and other earlier dis¬
putations and that we deduced from their own principles and corrobo¬
rated with the testimony of the Scriptures, the holy Fathers, and even
the Scholastics (though they do not call such knowledge by that name).^

2 . For they maintain^ that all things in general (with the exception of
sinful acts) are such that it depends solely on the free predetermination
of the divine will whether they are with certainty going to be or are with
certainty not going to be.

* Disputation 53 initially appeared in the second edition of the Concordia (1595) as a

response to criticisms of the first edition version of Part IV, and most especially as a
response to the criticisms set forth by Francisco Zumel in his In Primam Divae Thomae
Partem Commentaria (Salamanca, 1590). (See Disputation 47, n. 10.) In several of the notes
below I cite those parts of Zumel’s text which parallel Molina’s characterizations of the
position of “those who disagree with us.” These references are due to Rabeneck.
^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica, concl. 1 and 2, pp. 36off.

[196]
 [•97]

Part I

And so they claim, further, that just as, with respect to all the things
that emanate immediately from Him alone as well as with respect to
those things that afterward issue forth from the hrst things merely by a
necessity of nature, God has nothing but (i) purely natural knowledge,
which precedes the free act of the divine will, and (ii) purely free knowl¬
edge, which follows upon that same act, so too the same thing holds for
those future contingents whose proximate source of contingency is
created free choice, as long as they are not moral evils.
Now the things that are produced immediately by God alone or that
afterward issue forth from just those hrst things by a necessity of nature
are, before the free act of the divine will, only known purely naturally as
merely possible, whereas after the divine predetermination or free act of
the divine will by which God decides to produce just those hrst things or
to cooperate with them by His general concurrence in the production of
the other things that emanate from them thereafter, they are freely
known with certainty as future in that very predetermination or free act
of will; so, too, they claim, all the things that depend on created free
choice, both angelic and human, and that are not morally evil — whether
God cooperates in their production with special and supernatural assis¬
tance or only with general assistance — are known by purely natural
knowledge alone prior to the divine predetermination or free act of the
divine will by which He decides to create free choice, to situate it within
such-and-such an order of things and circumstances, to assist it naturally
or supernaturally in such-and-such a way, and to cooperate with it. But
they are not known in any way, even under a hypothesis, through that
middle knowledge posited by us, a knowledge that, they contend, could
not have existed in God. Rather, by the very fact that He predetermined
all the things just enumerated, in and from this predetermination alone
He knew with certainty through His free knowledge that they were going

to be, since this volition or predetermination of God’s so to cooperate

with created free choice is a divine volition that is efficacious in such a way
that each of those future contingents follows upon it, and the concur¬
rence, whether natural or supernatural, by which He decides for His
part so to cooperate in time is an efficacious concurrence, and hence, given
the existence of such a divine predetermination, the effect is not able in
the composed sense not to follow — though they add that in the divided
sense it is able not to follow.

So these authors^ not only divide God’s supernatural aids into those
that are intrinsically and by their nature efficacious for moving a created

^Ibid., q. 23, a. 3, disp. 7, concl. 1 , p. 669, and disp. 8, pp. 674ff. This paragraph contains
a response to comments made by Molina against Banez in Disputation 50, sec. 13.
 Disputation 55
[198]

faculty of choice and those that by their nature are inefficacious for this,

but they also divide in the same way God’s natural aids and concurrences
with regard to the nonevil acts of free choice. And so they maintain that
when God’s efficacious assistance or concurrence is present, then the
consent and nonevil effect of free choice to which God is moving the
faculty of choice follows with certainty, whereas when it is absent, then
the effect is with certainty not going to follow, even if an assistance or
concurrence that is intrinsically inefficacious is present. Indeed, they
claim that what follows is an act of free choice that is only as intense as
was the efficacious assistance or concurrence by which the faculty of
choice was moved by God to such an act, so that all the certitude that the
act is going to occur here and now, as well as all the certitude that it will
be just so intense or just so languid, stems from the character of the
concurrence by which God moves the faculty of choice and cooperates
with it.

Accordingly, they go on to assert^ that all the certitude of the divine

knowledge regarding whether or not these future contingents are going
to be depends solely on the predetermination by which God decides to
cooperate in this or that way with free choice and to move it to nonevil
acts. For if He decides to move it by an assistance that is intrinsically
efficacious, then it will certainly and inevitably consent and elicit the act,
since a divine volition of this sort is efficacious for the occurrence of such
an act and hence cannot be frustrated. If, on the other hand. He decides
not to move free choice in this way, then, even if He should decide to
move it by an assistance that is not intrinsically efficacious, it will cer¬
tainly and inevitably not consent or elicit the act, since this sort of volition

is inefficacious with respect to the act’s occurring thereafter. So given

just God’s natural knowledge, by which He knew all the things that were
possible by virtue of created choice, by the very fact that God predeter¬
mined or decided from eternity to cooperate in this or that way in time
and to move or determine the faculty of choice efficaciously (that is, with
an assistance or concurrence that is of its very self efficacious). He knew
certainly and infallibly, in and from that very predetermination, which
nonevil acts of free choice were going to occur — and He knew this
without any sort of middle knowledge by which He might foresee what would
happen on the hypothesis that He should decide to move and assist free
choice in that way. For by the very fact that He decides to move it in that
way and to determine it to an act, free choice is in the composed sense
not able not to elicit such an act; and the fact that the motion and
concurrence that God will furnish in time are efficacious does not in any

“^Ibid., q. 14, a. 13, disp. 7, pp. 45off.

 [199]

Part I

way depend on free choice, as though it were within the power of free choice
to render this concurrence efficacious or inefficacious by freely consent¬
ing to it or not consenting to it.^

3. Consequently, in addition to what has been said thus far, they

claim further that before (in our way of conceiving it) God’s eternal
predestination there is in God an election of some persons for eternal
happiness through an absolute and efficacious volition, prior to any
foreknowledge of the circumstances and future use of free choice, even
under a future hypothesis; and likewise there is a rejection of other
persons by a similarly absolute volition.® Now they maintain that the
predestination of an adult is accomplished in a predetermination or
volition to confer efficacious aids, aids by means of which the created
faculty of choice is determined in such a way that it performs its works
with certainty (the certitude arising antecedently from the character of
the aids) and perseveres in those of its works through which it attains
eternal life. Thus, they tracer// the certitude that there will be such good
use of free choice, and hence all the certitude that these good works will
occur and be persevered in until death, back to the efficaciousness of the

aids and, consequently, back to God’s predetermination or, if you will,

God’s eternal, absolute, and efficacious volition to confer these aids in
time. And this is the source, they maintain, of all the certitude and
infallibility of the free knowledge by which God knows, after that pre¬
determination, that those good works are going to occur and that there
is going to be a good use of free choice; and this certitude does not in

^Molina’s view is that one and the same instance of divine concurrence (whether natural
or supernatural) with respect to an agent 5’s freely performing a morally good action A is
by its nature capable of being efficacious and also capable of being inefficacious. More
precisely, such concurrence is rendered efficacious or inefficacious extrinsically , by 5’s own
choice as to whether or not to perform A. Thus, this sort of divine aid is not intrinsically
efficacious or intrinsically inefficacious, but is compatible both with 5’s freely performing A
and with 5’s freely refraining from performing A. It follows that God cannot know what 5
will do simply on the basis of His predetermination to grant the concurrence in question to
5. He must also know what 5 would freely do were such concurrence to be granted — and
this, of course, is where middle knowledge enters the picture. In sec. 3 below the same
point is applied to predestination and reprobation in general and not just to individual
actions. See Sections 2. 8-2. 9 of the Introduction.
^Election is related to predestination as the intending of an end is related to the choosing
of means to that end. So in election God wills for certain individuals the glory of beatitude
and in predestination He wills for them the means to this glory, namely, grace.
On Molina’s view election and predestination are both willed in light of God’s middle
knowledge. This position, however, is optional for one who posits middle knowledge.
Suarez, for instance, seems to have held with the Thomists that God elects individuals
prior to (in our way of conceiving it) and independently of any knowledge of their use of
free choice. Middle knowledge enters the picture only when God, in predestining the elect,
chooses means that He knows through His middle knowledge will be efficacious.
 Disputation 5 5
[200]

addition have its source in any kind of middle knowledge by which,

because of the depth of His intellect, God might, before that predetermina¬
tion, see what would be done by the faculty of choice assisted by the aids

in question — as though (i) despite God’s deciding for His part to help
out in this way, the opposite might be able to occur because of created
choice and as though (ii) if this were going to happen, then God would
have foreknown it. For because they deny that free choice is in the
composed sense able to do the opposite when it is assisted by these aids

or while that eternal predetermination of God’s is in effect, they conse¬

quently deny that there is such a thing as a middle knowledge by which
God might have been able to know indifferently that the one thing or the
other was going to occur, solely because of the freedom of created
choice, on the hypothesis that He for His part should will to assist it in
the way in question.

4. In accord with these same principles, they also teach"^ that every
nonevil act or effect of free choice is individually provided for by God in
such a way that it will certainly and inevitably occur in the particular way
in which it occurs solely because of the order of divine providence or
predetermination; and they are irritated by those who affirm the con¬
trary. For these authors contend that (i) no act of this sort — even if it is
purely natural, and indifferent in itself with respect to being morally
good, and extremely easy to perform — is able to occur without an intrin¬
sically efficacious concurrence on God’s part, a concurrence by which
the faculty of choice is premoved and determined to perform the act,

and that (ii) when this concurrence and premotion of God’s are present,
the faculty of choice is not able in the composed sense not to consent or
not to perform the act.® And this is why they claim that since God from
eternity provides for each such act or effect of free choice by resolving
beforehand to contribute this sort of efficacious premotion and determi¬
nation of free choice, each of these acts is certain and inevitable because
of such a predetermination or, if you will, because of the order of divine
providence.

'^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 22, a. 4, disp. unica, concl. 2 and 3, pp. 607-608.

® According to the Thomists, divine concurrence is an action of God’s directly upon the
created agent (directly upon the creature’s will in the case of free actions). This action of
God’s is said to move the created agent prior to and as a necessary condition of that agent’s
then moving (that is, acting) in its characteristic way to bring about the effect in question.
Hence the term ‘premotion’. In contrast, Molina holds that divine concurrence is an action
of God’s along with (rather than upon) the created agent to bring about the effect. That is,
the effect produced, rather than the agent, is the direct or immediate terminus of God’s
action, just as it is the direct or immediate terminus of the created agent’s action. For
Molina’s own discussion of the differences between his understanding of concurrence and
St. Thomas’s, see Disputation 26 (Rabeneck, pp. 164-170).
 Part I
[201]

5. The same authors^ pose the question of whether God knows that
those contingent things would have existed which never will exist but
which Scripture tells us would have existed on some condition that
neither has obtained nor will obtain; such things these authors accord¬
ingly call conditioned future contingents. Numbered among them are the
things we made mention of in Disputation 49,^^ namely, (i) the repen¬
tance of the Tyronians and Sidonians, on the condition that the wonders
worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida had been worked in their presence;

(ii) the descent of Saul into Keilah and David’s being given over into the
hands of Saul, on the condition that David not flee from that place; and
(iii) the future lapse of certain of the righteous into mortal sin, on the
condition that God had not mercifully taken them by premature death
from this iniquitous world.

6. Now, having rejected as dangerous the position of those who deny

that God knows that these things would have existed on a condition or
hypothesis, these authors rightly defend the contrary position. They
add, however, that since these things were never going to exist, God
knows them only as possible, in just the way He also knows the other
things that are able to exist and yet never will. For they refuse to
countenance a middle ground between what is absolutely future and what
is merely possible — and they do this in order to avoid middle knowledge.
And yet in the matter under discussion, unless they want to fall into the
dangerous position of those others who reject and clearly want to resist
the words of Christ in Matthew 1 1 , they have to countenance such a
middle ground, that is, a conditional future that comes closer to the
absolute future than it would if it were not future on the given condition,
but were instead merely possible on that condition.^* For since (i) the
repentance of the Tyronians and Sidonians and the repentance of the
inhabitants of Chorozain and Bethsaida were both equally possible, and
since (ii) on the hypothesis that the same wonders should be performed
in both regions, Christ asserted that the repentance of the Tyronians
and Sidonians would have occurred, even though the repentance of the

®Zumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 8, concl. 2 and 3, pp. 455ff.

i^See Disputation 49, sec. 9.
Matt. 11:20—24. The text goes as follows (New American Bible translation): “He
began to reproach the towns where most of his miracles had been worked, with their
failure to reform: ‘It will go ill with you, Chorozain! And just as ill with you, Bethsaida! If
the miracles worked in you had taken place in Tyre and Sidon, they would have reformed
in sackcloth and ashes long ago. I assure you, it will go easier for Tyre and Sidon than for
you on the day of judgment. As for you, Capernaum, “Are you to be exalted to the skies?
You shall go down to the realm of death!” If the miracles worked in you had taken place in
Sodom, it would be standing today. I assure you, it will go easier for Sodom than for you on

the day of judgment.’”

[202]
Disputation 5 5

inhabitants of Chorozain and Bethsaida did not occur on that very same
hypothesis, but instead merely remained in the realm of something po5«-
hle, it clearly follows that they have to countenance the middle ground
that we are pointing to between what h future absolutely and what is merely
possible. For it was because there was going to be less hardness of heart
and culpability of choice among the Tyronians and Sidonians, given that
hypothesis, than there was guilt and hardness of heart among the inhab¬
itants of Chorozain and Bethsaida that Christ on that score preferred
the Tyronians and Sidonians to the inhabitants of Chorozain and Beth¬
saida, and said that it was going to be easier for the former than for the
latter on the day of judgment. I claimed that such a middle ground has
to be countenanced unless they want to fall into the dangerous position
that they reject, since the proponents of that dangerous position were
most assuredly not denying that God knows conditioned future things of
this sort as things that dvre possible , but rather only that He knows them as
things midway between those that are absolutely future and those that are
merely possible because of the faculty of choice. That is, they were denying
not that He knows them as absolutely future but that He knows them as
conditionally future, that is, future on a hypothesis that will never obtain.

7. Notice at this point that since the authors with whom we disagree
trace all the certitude that contingent things will occur back to effica¬
cious concurrence or assistance and thus back to God’s predetermina¬
tion to confer it, whereas, on the other hand, the wonders that were
worked at Chorozain and Bethsaida were not by themselves alone an in¬
trinsically efficacious assistance, given that the inhabitants of those
places were not converted by them, it follows that these authors believe
and (if you ponder their words) are claiming that (i) on the hypothesis in
question, taken by itself, the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon would not
have been converted either, but rather that (ii) they would have been
converted only if God had simultaneously predetermined to confer
efficacious assistance on them, assistance such that had He likewise pre¬
determined to confer it on the inhabitants of Chorozain and Bethsaida,
then they too would have been converted. Hence, you see that in order
to avoid middle knowledge and to provide a ground for intrinsically
efficacious concurrences or aids, as well as predeterminations of the sort

just explicated, they weaken and distort these words of Christ’s in Mat¬
thew 1 1 . For if, on the hypothesis that those very wonders should have
been worked in Tyre and Sidon, the Tyronians and Sidonians would not
have been converted unless God had, in addition, predetermined to
confer on them some other assistance, intrinsically efficacious, which was
not in fact conferred on them and with which the people of Chorozain
 [203]
Part I

and Bethsaida would have been converted had it likewise been predeter¬
mined for them — if this is so, then, I ask, what is it that Christ is
reproaching the people of Chorozain and Bethsaida for, given that
(i) the Tyronians and Sidonians need no less assistance than those peo¬
ple need in order to be converted, and given that (ii), according to the
position of these doctors, both groups, taken in themselves, are equally
likely to be converted or not to be converted, and given that (iii) their
being converted or not being converted depends no more on the free
choice of the one group than on that of the other? In fact, however, the

correct interpretation of Christ’s words is the one we proposed in Dis¬

putation 40, where we showed that the assistance of grace is not effica¬
cious or inefficacious by its very nature, but rather that its being efficacious
or inefficacious depends on whether or not the faculty of choice that is
moved and stirred by it wills to consent to and cooperate with it— as the
Council of Trent clearly taughtd2

8. Now even though both things are necessary for our conversion,
namely, that (i) God stir and move our faculty of choice by the assistance
of supervening grace and that (ii) the faculty of choice consent and
cooperate, still, since God is always generously ready to stir and move us
by the assistance of grace if we do not stand in His way, and since
miracles worked in our presence have the greatest power to move us to
consent (as we showed in the same place), it follows that Christ, who is
prepared to help everyone through
the assistance of prevenient and
cooperating grace, justifiably reproached the inhabitants of Chorozain
and Bethsaidad^ For although so many signs and wonders had been
worked in their presence, they willed for their part not to give their
consent to repentance and conversion, a repentance and conversion to
which the Tyronians and Sidonians would have given their consent, had
those very same signs been worked in their presence.

g. After having read our works, the authors with whom we dis¬
agreed'^ now propose yet a second way in which God knows infallibly and
^^Disputation 40 is found in Rabeneck, pp. 244—257. The passage cited from Trent
appears in session 6, Decretum de iustificatione , found in H. Denzinger and A. Schdnmetzer,
Enchiridion Symbolorum, 9,26. ed. (Freiburg, 1963), 1520-1583 (new numbering), pp. 368-
381 (hereafter cited as Denzinger).
Prevenient grace and cooperating grace are two types of actual (as opposed to habitual)
grace. Prevenient grace is a supernatural influence on the will, disposing it toward consent
to a good action, whereas cooperating grace is God’s supernatural concurrence with the
action. As one might expect, the differences between the Banezian and Molinist accounts
of God’s general concurrence surface again in their accounts of cooperating grace.
I'^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 8, concl. 5, pp. 458-459; q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica,
concl. 2, p. 361, and concl. 5, p. 364.
 Disputation 54
[204]

with certainty which contingent things are going to exist and which are
not — a way different from that, explicated above, according to which
God individually predetermines the acts of created free choice through
an efficacious concurrence or assistance. They propose this second way,
even though they do not use it in the development of their theory, but
instead adhere solely to the first way, which they had heretofore taught
exclusively and in accordance with which they had propounded the rest
of their teaching.

10. They claim that (i) by the comprehension of His essence, in

which, as in a primary object. He comprehends all the other things in a
way that is most eminent and far more excellent than that in which they
exist in themselves (just as we ourselves were claiming), God knows all
the things that are in fact going to exist because of created choice on the
hypothesis that He should decide to create it in such-and-such an order
of things and circumstances, intending that it should do these particular
things and permitting it to do those particular things, and yet that
(ii) God does not determine the will itself in particular, but rather leaves it
free to refrain from acting or to turn itself toward one or the other part.
They add, however, that God knows this through natural knowledge in
His essence and in the ideas, which naturally represent to God, not only
in possible existence but in future existence as well, all the things that are
going to exist because of created free choice. For, they say, since (i) on
the hypothesis that the faculty of choice should be created and situated
in this or that order of things and circumstances, one part of each
contradictory pair of future contingents that are within its power is
going to obtain, and since (ii) the idea by which that part is naturally
represented to the divine intellect does not begin to exist in God in time,
one has to acknowledge that such an idea exists in God from eternity,
before the free act of His will. For all things, including future con¬
tingents in their future existence, exist eminently in the essence itself
insofar as the essence is prior to (in our way of conceiving it) that act.^^

11. Even though all these points have, with a few changes, been
plucked from our own doctrine, still, they are far removed from it, as
their authors rightly affirm. Indeed, to the extent that these points
deviate from our doctrine, they seem designed to circumvent our middle

•^Sometimes the cause of an effect is both nonunivocal (that is, different in species from
the effect) and of a metaphysically higher species than the effect. In such a case, before its
production the effect is said to exist eminently (that is, in a higher way) in its cause. Thus,
creatures
them into are said to exist eminently in the divine essence before God’s free act of willing
existence.
 [205]
Part I

knowledge and thereby to do away completely with the freedom of

choice that these authors appeared to be affirming when they (i) aban¬
doned predeterminations via an efficacious concurrence on God’s part
which would determine each act individually, and hence (ii) left the
faculty of choice free to turn itself toward whichever part it might
choose.

12. This new doctrine, first of all, seems to allege that one part of a
contradiction concerning those future contingents dependent on our
free choice is determinately true before the future contingents exist, and
thus that this part is naturally represented as determinately future in an
idea or, if you will, in the divine essence — a claim that we rejected in the
preceding disputation as contrary to the teaching of Aristotle and to the
common position of the Doctors, and as incompatible with the very
nature of future contingents, which are, as such, indifferent, so that
each of them might exist or might not exist, as we showed in our
commentary on the De Interpretatione, book 1, last chapter. Nor is it
possible to understand how it might be the case both that (i) one part of a
contradiction is determinately going to obtain because of free choice
itself and also that (ii) the faculty of choice is free to posit in reality either
part indifferently.

13. Next, one might argue as follows: Take the divine idea that,
because choice by its freedom is going to turn itself toward the one part
of the contradiction, represents this part as future by virtue of the
created faculty of choice on the hypothesis that it should be created in
such an order of things and circumstances. Now either (i) that idea
would represent the opposite part if the faculty of choice, as it is able to,
were by that same freedom going to turn itself toward the opposite part
or (ii) it would not represent the opposite part, but is instead an idea that
represents the first part altogether naturally, as it would if it were in no
way able to represent the opposite part and if the faculty of choice were
thus determined to that first part.

If you posit the first alternative,^'^ then, since the nature of a divine
idea is the same as the nature of the divine knowledge that corresponds
to that idea, you are actually countenancing the middle knowledge
which you shrink from and so often repudiate and without which our
freedom of choice cannot be preserved intact. For just as that idea is able

i®See Disputation 52, n. 27.

I’^The first alternative is that the idea in question would have represented the opposite
part of the contradiction if the will were going to turn itself to that part.
 Disputation 55
[206]

to represent the contrary and would in fact have represented it if, as is

possible, the contrary were going to obtain because of created choice, so
too through the knowledge that corresponds to that idea and that pre¬
cedes the free act of His will God would have known the contrary, even
though that knowledge is still natural in God as opposed to free — grant¬
ing, however, that it is nonnatural when contrasted with the knowledge
that is so innate in God that what is known through it is such that its
contrary is neither able to obtain nor able to be known by God through
that knowledge.
Suppose, on the other hand, that you posit the second alternative,

namely, that the idea of, say, Peter’s consent to fornication represents
this consent naturally to God as future, as though it were altogether
innate to God to represent it in such a way that the representation in

question is not at all able not to exist, with the result that Peter’s choice is
determined to that consent and that the consent is not able not to occur

in the future. In what sense, I ask, are you preserving Peter’s freedom
not to sin? What’s more, exactly the same point applies to the rest of his
free actions.

14. Beyond this, the opinion under discussion is unsatisfactory in

that it posits in God ideas that represent things in their future existence
before the free act of the divine will. For an idea represents the thing of
which it is an idea only \n possible existence; and it represents the way in
which such a thing can come to be and its very coming to be or existence
only diS possible and as a way in which the thing is able, in an exercised act,
to be posited in existence. Now, things follow with their actual existence

from the artist’s knowledge as determined by the same artist’s freely willing
that the thing be committed to execution in accord with the idea and
knowledge; and so none of the things in question is known as future

except in the free volition of the artist, though before the artist’s free
volition they are known 2iS future on the hypothesis that the artist should will
to commit them to execution. But when things depend on two free
artists, in the way that the things that come to be from the created choice
of angels and human beings depend both (i) on God, who creates the
faculty of choice in this or that order of things and decides to cooperate
with it in this or that way, and at the same time (ii) on the influence of
created choice, then surely in order for the things to be known as future
on a hypothesis, it is necessary that the free determination of both wills be
posited. But God knows the determination of a created faculty of choice
before it exists because of the infinite and unlimited perfection of His
intellect and because of the preeminent comprehension by which He
comprehends that faculty in His essence in a way far deeper than that in
 [207]
Part I

which it exists in itself; and thus on the hypothesis that He should will to
situate it in such-and-such an order of things and circumstances, He
knows which part it will in its freedom turn itself toward. I should also
caution that since the being and the existence of the things in question
are altogether the same whether the things are apprehended as possible
or as actually existing, it is not required, in order to comprehend a thing,
that everything falling within its power be known in future existence. For
if that were so, then God — not just if He had decided not to create
anything, but even now — would not comprehend Himself, since He is
not able to know in future existence everything that falls under His
omnipotence. So in order to comprehend a thing it is sufficient that
everything that it is able to produce, along with the existence of each of

those things, be known 'm possible existence, as has been said elsewhere in
the commentary on the First Part.^^

15. The same authors*^ propose yet a third way in which God, even
before the free act of His will, knows with certainty which contingent
things are going to exist. For, they claim, since at that prior moment God
comprehends His own essence, power, and will through the knowledge
that precedes His act of will. He surely knows at that prior moment what
His will is going to determine itself to, and thus He knows which con¬
tingent things are actually going to exist and which ones would exist on
the hypothesis that He should decide to determine His will in some
other way. But this is to know not only actual future contingents but also
conditioned future contingents, such as the repentance of the Tyronians
and Sidonians, and the descent of Saul into Keilah and David’s being
given over into the hands of Saul.

16. They argue for this proposal as follows: The divine will is, as it
were, guided to such an extent by the divine intellect and by the eternal
natures^® belonging to God’s infinite wisdom that all things, even as far
as their future existence is concerned, are contained in and shine forth
in the ideas of God, the supreme artist. So even though things that are
contingently future do not have the stability to be actually future before
the free decree of the divine will and cannot be known as actually future

*®See Commentaria, q. 12, a. 7 and 8, pp. 120b— 140b. Also, see sec. 20 below. Molina’s
point above is that since many pairs of contingent states of affairs which are within God’s
power to effect are by their very nature incompossible with one another, He cannot know
all such states of affairs as future. But it hardly follows from this that God does not
comprehend all such states of affairs or all the individuals involved in them.
i^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 13, disp. 8, concl. 6, pp. 459ff.; q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica,
concl. 2, p. 362.
20The Latin term here is rationes aeternae. See Disputation 49, secs. 5 and 6, and n. 4.
 Disputation 5 5
[208]

except by being related to such a decree, nonetheless, to the extent that

(i) at that prior moment they are contained in and shine forth in the ideal
natures and that (ii) such a decree, which occurs later in our way of
conceiving it, is comprehended and seen as future, surely at that prior
moment it is known which contingent things are actually going to exist
by virtue of that same decree or, if you will, free determination of the
divine will. For if the determination of the will were not known in that
prior moment, and if it thus were not known which contingent things
would actually come to exist by virtue of such a determination, then at

that prior moment God’s knowledge would not be comprehensive, abso¬

lutely universal and absolutely perfect, since there would be something

hidden at that moment from God’s knowledge which He would later

come to know. But no such thing may be affirmed of the divine knowl¬
edge in that prior moment.

17. In the hrst place, those who talk this way cannot, by appealing to
the decree of the divine will and to the fact that future contingents
depend on that decree, deny that God has middle knowledge of future
contingents, unless they want to deny that there is freedom of choice in
God with respect to His decree. For clearly there could not have been in
God any sort of knowledge through which He knew, before the decree of
His will, what that decree would determine itself to and hence which
contingent things were going to exist because of that decree. For that
decree was able to determine itself to other things or to decide to create
nothing at all; but if that had been going to happen, as was possible, then
the knowledge in question would not have existed in God. It follows that
even if the knowledge of the determination of His decree as well as of the
future things that depend on it was natural in God, as opposed to free, in
that it preceded the act of His will, still it was not so innate in God that it
was not able not to have existed; and so the knowledge in question is
middle knowledge, which the authors whom we disagree with deny exists
in God before the free act of His will. And notice that since this knowl¬
edge not only precedes any act of the divine will, but is also a cognition
by which the will is, as it were, illuminated and guided in its willing, it
follows that as long as an object is being shown to God through this
knowledge — whether it is an object to which His will can be moved only
naturally or an object or objects to which it can be moved freely — the
knowledge in question can in no way be free, but must instead be al¬
together natural, as opposed to free.^^

2iAs was pointed out in Disputation 52, n. 25, God wills some things necessarily or
naturally (for example, love of self, the generation of the Son, the spiration of the Holy
 [209]
Part I

18. Second, this position is unsatisfactory in that it claims that in a

divine idea there is a representation of future contingents in their future
existence. For, as was said above, both the nature of those things and
their existence are represented and known through an idea only as
possible and only with respect to the way in which the things are able to be
posited in existence — and not as future, since this depends on the deter¬
mination of the artist’s will, a determination that is posterior to the idea
and to the representation via the idea. 22 Nor can the determination of
the divine will be represented in an idea, both because (i) there are ideas
only of creatures and not of the divine will or its determination, and also
because (ii) the divine will is in itself indifferent and free to determine
itself to whichever part it chooses, and, accordingly, before that determi¬
nation there neither is nor can be anything in God that shows which part
His will is going to determine itself to. And since there is no nature
superior to God that might contain Him in an absolutely eminent way, as
He Himself contains every created faculty of choice in an absolutely
eminent way, it is most certainly not the case that just as, because of the
infinite excess of His cognition over and beyond the being and perfec¬
tion of any created faculty of choice and because of the absolutely
eminent way in which He comprehends it. He knows which part a
created faculty of choice is going to turn itself toward by its freedom, so
too He or some other being knows, before the determination of His will,
which part He is going to turn Himself toward. Nor is this required in
order for Him to be said to comprehend Himself in that prior moment,
since in order for Him to comprehend Himself it is sufficient that He see
all the things to which His power. His intellect, and His will can extend,
and thus it is sufficient that He see in His will all the parts to which it is
able to determine itself with respect to any given object. For He does not
cease to comprehend Himself by virtue of the fact that there are many
determinations He does not now know Himself to have had with respect
to various objects, determinations such that He could have had them and
would have known them if He had had them — for He knows that all
those determinations were possible and were future on the condition that He
should have willed to determine Himself to them. And, in the same way.
He does not cease to comprehend Himself in that prior moment by

Spirit), and other things freely (for example, the existence of creatures). Molina’s point here
is that God’s knowledge of the possible objects of His will must in either sort of case precede
the act of His will if it is to guide that act. So the knowledge in question cannot, contrary to
the claims of Molina’s opponents, be a free knowledge of the divine decree or of future
contingents.
22 See sec. 14 above. Here have I translated the Latin entitas as ‘nature’ rather than
‘being’. (See Disputation 52, n. 28.) The reason is that here it is contrasted with existence
and hence signifies the content, as it were, of a kind-concept.
 Disputation 5 5
[210]

virtue of the fact that before His determination He does not know which
part He is going to determine Himself to. For He sees all the things to
which He can determine Himself and He sees that all those things are
within the range of His power or choice, a power and choice that are
known as free and as not in the least determined at that moment to one
part with respect to every creatable object.

19. Further, as we were saying in the preceding disputation, I do

not see how it can be the case both that (i) God knows, before the
determina.tion of His will, which part it is going to determine itself to and
yet that (ii) afterward it determines itself to that part freely and not
necessarily. For such a cognition would be infallible and certain, because

it is God’s, and it would be natural as opposed to free, as was shown above;

for it would precede any free act on the part of the divine will, and it
would be a cognitive act by which the divine will is, as it were, illuminated
and guided in its first volition, and thus an act that cannot be free or
commanded by the will, but is instead necessary. But I do not under¬
stand how it could possibly be the case that one and the same sup-
positum first knows, by means of this sort of certain and natural cogni¬
tion, the future determination of its own will, and yet later determines
itself to that part freely and not necessarily. And thus I do not under¬
stand how it would not be the case that all things happen by a necessity of
nature, given that they emanate from and depend on such a cognition
and such a determination of the will.

20. In response to the argument for the contrary opinion,^^ it should

be said that in order for the divine will to be guided, as it were, by the
divine intellect and by the ideal natures in its willing, it is not necessary
either that the ideas represent things in their future existence or that the
cognition had by the divine intellect know them in their future existence.
Rather, it is sufficient that the ideas represent the things and that the
cognition knows them in possible existence and as regards the way in
which they are able to be produced. Hence, it should be denied that there
is any other way in which future things shine forth or are represented in
the divine ideas, or any other way in which they are known in that prior
moment by the divine knowledge.
Now, as for what is added concerning the comprehension of the
decree in question at that prior moment and concerning the compre¬
hensiveness, universality, and perfection of the divine knowledge at that

23See Disputation 52, secs. 1 iff.

24 See sec. 14 above.
 Part I
[211]

same prior moment, the following should be said: In order that some¬
thing be comprehended it is not necessary that it be known as future —
for otherwise God would not comprehend things that will never exist —
but rather it is sufficient that all i\\Q possible modes of the thing be known;
and this is what God knows concerning His own free decree at that prior
moment. For in knowing each of its future or nonfuture modes in that
same now of eternity, He knows all the power, nature, and perfection of
the thing in question, as well as all the modes in which He can determine
it, just as later (in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality) He will
have decided to determine or not to determine those modes. This is
sufficient for the comprehension of the thing, especially in view of the
status it has when it is considered as prior to (in our way of conceiving it)

the decree’s issuing forth within God. For just as it is not at all absurd for
God, as viewed in that prior moment (in our way of conceiving it) to be
understood as not yet having that decree or act of will — not only insofar
as that act has the character of a free act, but even insofar as it has the
character of the natural act by which God loves Himself^^ — so too for
even stronger reasons it is not at all absurd for His knowledge to be
understood as not yet having at that moment the character of a free
knowledge or cognition concerning which part the decree will freely
determine itself to, but only as having the character of a knowledge or
cognition concerning which parts it is freely able to determine itself to.
This is so especially because the fact that the decree in question will
determine itself to this or that part adds to the decree only a relation of
reason, as will become clear from what is going to be said in the course of
this First Part — a relation that is also such that it is known in that prior
moment as something possible and future, not as absolutely future but
rather as future if the will should decide to determine itself to the part in

question. 26
Notice at this point that, in the matter we are now discussing, “priority
in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in reality” is not priority in the
sense that there actually is an instant of either nature or time in which
the one thing exists and the other does not, as Scotus holds and as will be
shown to be false in the course of this First Part.27 Rather, this priority is
posited only in view of the fact that because of the dependence that an
act of will has on the intellect’s knowledge, and not vice versa, the one
thing is conceived by us as presupposed when the other thing is still not
yet conceived. And yet the two are always conjoined in reality — indeed.

25See n. 21 above, and Disputation 52, n. 25.

^^Commentaria, q. 14, a. 15, pp. 236b— 238a.
27Ibid., q. 23, a. 4 and 5, disp. 1, memb. 8, pp. 3i4a-3i5b.
 Disputation 55
[212]

the acts of the divine intellect and will and the rest of the attributes
mutually include one another, as will be explained in the material on the
most Holy Trinity. 28 Therefore, just as, despite the fact that the at¬
tributes are conceived by us separately from one another, it is by no
means the case that in reality the one lacks the perfection of the other, so
too in the case at hand, despite the fact that the divine knowledge, to the
extent that it is a prerequisite for the act of the will, is conceived of by us
as not yet having adjoined to it a knowledge of the determination of that
same act, it does not follow that there is in reality a moment when it exists
without that knowledge — as though there were in reality a moment at
which God’s knowledge is natural without simultaneously having the
added character of being/r^^ knowledge.

21. In order that our argument might be fully satisfactory it must be

added that the divine knowledge is not rendered more universal or more
perfect by the fact that something future is known through it; otherwise,
a certain perfection or universality of knowledge would be lacking in
God by reason of the fact that (i) many things are not going to exist
which are such that He could have decided that they should exist, and
that (ii) if He had so decided. He would now know that they are going to
exist, even though He does not in fact now know that they are going to
exist. Therefore, since God knows these nonfuture things as possible
and as future on the condition that He should have willed that they exist, it
is neither a distinct perfection nor a greater perfection in God for Him to
know something as future than it is for Him to know it as possible and as
future on the condition that He should will or should have willed to

create it. Hence, it follows that there is no less perfection and univer¬
sality in God’s knowledge if He knows a thing as absolutely future than if
He instead knows it as possible and as future on a condition. Moreover,

God’s natural knowledge always has the free knowledge adjoined to it in

reality, as has been said, even though the one type of knowledge is able
to be conceived by us as existing before the other and without the other.

Part 2

The Foregoing Position Is Attacked

1 . The authors of the position set forth in the preceding part neither
can reject nor seem to reject middle knowledge in God with respect to
the morally evil acts of the created faculty of choice.

28Ibid., qq. 27-44, pp. 3593-5 14b.

 [213]
Part 2

2. For, first of all, with respect to such acts they do not posit an

efficacious concurrence on God’s part. Rather, they correctly attribute the

fact that these acts result to the proper determination and influence of
free choice itself, a determination and influence by which free choice in

its freedom channels God’s general concurrence to these acts, the gen¬
eral concurrence being in itself indifferent as to whether these acts or
others, far different from them, should follow; and for this reason these
authors agree with us in attributing sins, even taken materially,^ not to
God, who contributes His general concurrence, but rather to the faculty
of choice itself as their proper and particular cause. This is clear from
the things we reported in the preceding part and in Disputation 27.^
Indeed, for morally evil acts they do not posit a divine general concur¬
rence on the cause, that is, a concurrence by which God moves the cause
and applies it to its operation, but instead they posit only a general
concurrence along with the cause directly on the effect, as was reported in
Disputation 27.^

3. Second, as we saw in the preceding part, with respect to those

same acts they do not posit divine predeterminations, since God does not
determine the created faculty of choice to those acts, but instead the
faculty of choice determines itself to them in its own freedom and
wickedness."^

4. Third, in the preceding disputation we supported middle knowl¬

edge with passages from the holy Fathers, where they teach that our acts
of choice were not going to occur because God foreknew that they would
occur, but that, to the contrary, it was because they were going to occur
through freedom of choice that God foreknew them; now the authors
with whom we disagree interpret this testimony as having to do with
sinful acts, which alone they judge it to be true of, since God does not
predetermine such acts, nor does He move or determine the faculty of
choice to them.^ But it is different with nonevil free acts, which, they
claim, occur because they are predetermined by God and which are such
that it is because of that predetermination alone that it is certain they will
occur — and not because of any sort of middle knowledge, through which
such things might, by virtue of the depth of the divine intellect and
without any other predetermination, be foreknown as certainly future

•See Disputation 50, n. 18, for a brief discussion of the material element of sins.
2See Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 2; also, see Disputation 27, secs. 2-3 (Rabeneck, p. 171).
^Rabeneck, p. 171. Also, see Disputation 47, n. 22, and Disputation 53, pt. 1, n. 8.
^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 22, a. 4, disp. unica, concl. 4, p. 610.
^Ibid., q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica, concl. 6, p. 365.
 Disputation 5 5
[214]

on the hypothesis that the faculty of choice should be created and should
be placed in a given order of things and circumstances.

5. Thus, (i) the knowledge by which God foresaw which sins were
going to occur through which created faculty of choice is certain knowl¬
edge; and (ii) these authors cannot attribute the certitude of this knowl¬
edge to the predetermination of the divine will or to a determination by
which the divine will directs the created faculty of choice toward evil acts,
as is clear from the things that have been recounted from their theory;
and (iii) there is nothing else that this certainty can be traced to other
than the certainty of middle knowledge, a knowledge through which
(a) because of the depth of His intellect and His absolutely eminent
comprehension of the created faculty of choice, God knew with certainty
in His essence something that in itself was uncertain and contingent
vis-a-vis both parts, namely, which part the faculty of choice was by its
freedom going to turn itself toward on the hypothesis that it should be
situated in this or that order of things and circumstances, and through
which (b) He would have known the contrary if the faculty of choice, as it
is able to, was going to withhold its consent to the sin or was going to
elicit its dissent. Since all this is so, it surely follows that these authors
appear to countenance middle knowledge with respect to sinful acts —
and this is attested to by many of the claims they make when they discuss
sinful acts.

6. Perhaps, however, they, like those with whom we took issue in

Disputation 50,® want to trace the certitude of the knowledge by which
God knows which sins will occur back to the certainty and inevitability
that a created will, by the very fact that it is not efficaciously determined
by the divine will to act well, is going to sin with regard to the material
element of any given virtue — as though in predetermining which non¬
evil acts created free choice is going to be determined to by an intrin¬
sically efficacious concurrence or assistance, God sees with certainty
(where the certainty stems from the object itself) both which nonevil acts
are going to occur and also which sins are going to occur, whether by
commission or omission, and with what degree of intensity or lassitude
they will be elicited, and at what point in time, and with what other
circumstances. It is as though the will were by that very fact unable to
avoid the sins, but were instead, given that predetermination with re¬
spect to just the nonevil acts, determined in itself to perpetrate all these
other things by commission or omission in a way contrary to right reason

®See Disputation 50, secs. loff.

 [215]
Part 2

and to the law of God. Again, it is as though it were the condition and
intrinsic nature of each created faculty of choice, whether angelic or
human, that at whatever moment of time and in whatever order of
things and under whatever circumstances it might be situated — even if it
is in the state of sanctifying grace, as were the angels and the first parents
before their sin'^ — it will in that situation perpetrate all these things by
commission or omission in opposition to right reason and the law of
God, and it will perpetrate the things that it is then able to perpetrate by
omission or commission with as much intensity as it can, unless God
impedes it and draws it back thence toward nonevil acts through a
determination via efficacious concurrence. It would thus have to be said
that (i) every created faculty of choice is led spontaneously, to be sure,
but by a necessity of nature into all the sins that it is able to commit and
that (ii) it fails to fall into them only to the extent that it is subsequently
drawn back and inhibited from committing sins by an assistance that is
efficacious for eliciting nonevil acts. Indeed, all these points are neces¬
sary for preserving the certitude of God’s knowledge of future sins on
the theory in question. For if (i) free choice is not, through an innate
propensity, carried by a necessity of nature into every kind of sin that it is
able to perpetrate by commission or omission at any given instant and
under any given circumstances, but if instead (ii) it has the power to
refrain from a given sin, or to elicit the sinful act with more lassitude or
more intensity, or to change any of the other circumstances, then clear¬
ly, given this theory alone, God will not know infallibly and with cer¬
tainty which sins are going to occur, or what sort of sins they will be, or
how grave they will be. This is abundantly self-evident. Look at the
objections we raised against this view in Disputation 50.^
If, on the one hand, (i) God knows with certainty all the future nonevil
acts of the created faculty of choice by reason of the fact that in the order
of things which He decided to create He predetermined by His own free
will alone to confer a concurrence, intrinsically efficacious for those acts,
in the absence of which the faculty of choice is not able to elicit them and
in the presence of which it is not able not to elicit them, while, on the
other hand, (ii) He knows all future sins with certainty because by the
very fact that He decided not to confer more or different efficacious
concurrences for nonevil acts, the faculty of choice itself is certainly and

^Molina stresses here that the theory under discussion in this section is 2i global theory
meant to apply to all evil acts, even those evil acts that, like the sin of the first parents, are
original or primordial and hence in no way influenced by a strong inclination toward evil
of the sort endemic to human nature after the Fall. I should also mention that I have here

rendered the Latin gratia gratum faciens as ‘sanctifying grace’.

®See Disputation 50, secs. 10 and 13-14.
 Disputation 55
[216]

inevitably going to fall into those sins in just the way they will occur and
with Just the circumstances with which they will occur in the course of
time, so that, given that predetermination to nonevil acts, it is not within
the power of the faculty of choice to avoid those sins — given all this, I do
not understand how freedom of choice, whether with respect to good
acts or bad acts or even indifferent acts, can endure intact, or how a
fatalistic necessity with regard to all these things can be avoided, or,
again, how the other very serious absurdities that we deduced from this
theory in Disputation 50 would not follow from it; and consequently, I
do not see why the theory we are arguing against should not be called a
manifest error from the point of view of the faith. ^ To be sure, spon¬
taneity and voluntariness of the sort that the Lutherans recognize in our
faculty of choice and that is found in brute animals remains intact, since
(i) the faculty of choice will consent to nonevil acts without coercion and
cooperate with a concurrence that is intrinsically efficacious for agreeably
moving it to elicit such acts, and since (ii) it falls into sins by its own innate
propensity in the absence of a concurrence, efficacious for nonevil acts, by
which it might be restrained and inhibited from sinning. Nevertheless, I
do not understand how in that case it remains within its power not to
consent to and not to cooperate with the concurrence that is efficacious
for a nonevil act — a condition that is required for there to be any sort of
freedom or moral good or merit. Nor do I understand how, in the
absence of a concurrence that is efficacious for a nonevil act, the faculty
of choice is able to refrain from sinning — a condition that is required for
there to be any sort of freedom to sin and even for there to be such a
thing as sin itself. And hence the claim that there is sin in such a case
involves a contradiction.
In fact, I do not understand why our sins would not have to be
attributed to God as the author of nature who has conferred upon the
created faculty of choice a propensity toward those sins. For just as (i) the
acts and effects of those agents that act by a necessity of nature are
attributed to God because of the propensities and powers that He con¬
fers upon them, and just as (ii) for this reason the works of nature are
called by philosophers the works of intelligence and hence of God, so too
our sinful acts would have to be attributed to God as the author of nature

^Here and elsewhere Molina uses terms such as ‘error’, ‘erroneous’, ‘dangerous’, and
‘unsafe’ as semitechnical terms of theological censure. Such terms as used in official
Church proclamations are intended to indicate reservations about theological opinions
that are not straightforwardly heretical but that nonetheless lean too far in that direction.
But the precise meaning and ordering of such terms (as well as of their positive mirror
images) is itself the subject of theological inquiry. For an interesting treatment of some of
the issues involved, especially as they redound upon the post-Tridentine period, see John
Cahill, O.P., The Development of the Theological Censures After the Council of Trent (i ^6^—iyog)
(Fribourg, Switzerland, 1955).
 [217]
Part 2

who instills in the created faculty of choice this propensity toward com¬
mitting sins.
Now to say that it is in the divided sense that the faculty of choice retains
the power not to elicit a nonevil act and not to sin, since (i) if God had not
predetermined to confer efficacious concurrence, then the faculty of
choice would not elicit a nonevil act, and since (ii) if He were to confer a
concurrence that is efficacious for a nonevil act, then the faculty of
choice would not sin — to say this is clearly not to establish that there is
freedom in the created faculty of choice, but only to establish that there is
freedom in God to move or not to move the faculty of choice toward a
nonevil act, and to restrain it or not to restrain it from sinning, just as,
when a beast of burden is being led in one direction or another by a
halter, the freedom is not in the beast, but is instead in the human being
who is leading the beast in the one direction or the other, as was said in
Disputation 50 and elsewhere.^®

7. Now, if someone claims that all the sins that are going to occur
because of any created faculty of choice are known by God with certainty
within that free determination of His will by which He decides to permit
them, since in the composed sense it is impossible that God should have
decided to permit a given sin and yet that the sin not occur — if, I say,
someone makes this claim, he should pay attention to the fact that the
permission of sin, as will be explained later in this work, ^ ^ presupposes that
(i) the sin will occur because of the created faculty of choice on the
condition that it be placed in such-and-such an order of things and
circumstances, and that (ii) God foresees that the sin will occur unless the
faculty of choice is assisted by stronger or different aids, and that (iii) God
is able to prevent it. Now, willing to permit such a sin is nothing other than
not willing, given all the presuppositions in question, to confer those other
aids by which the sin would be prevented, and, likewise, the permission
itself is nothing other than not conferring in time the aids by which the sin
would be prevented. For one is said to permit that which is such that,
even though he sees that it will otherwise occur and that he is able to
prevent it, nonetheless he does not prevent it, but instead allows it to
happen. Therefore, since willing to permit a sin presupposes foreknowing
that through the faculty of choice the sin will freely occur unless it is
prevented by other aids, it is because of that foreknowledge that it is
impossible in the composed sense that God should will to permit it and
yet that it not occur. ^2

i^See Disputation 50, sec. g.

^^Commentaria, q. 19, a. 12, pp. 27ia-272a: and q. 23, a. 3, pp. 29ia-294a.
i^This line of reasoning amounts to an elaboration of the argument found in Disputa¬
tion 49, sec. 14.
 Disputation 55
[218]

8. But as regards the source of the certitude of the foreknowledge

that precedes God’s freely willing to permit a sin, we must still ask, in
turn, whether this certitude stems from the fact that the faculty of choice
is of itself inclined toward sinning in such a way that (i) unless it is in¬
hibited and held back from sinning by an efficacious assistance through
which it is drawn toward a nonevil act, it will be led by a necessity of
nature toward the sin, and in such a way that (ii) it is thus because of the
very nature of the object that God knows with certainty that the sin will
occur — as the theory that we have heretofore been taking issue with was
maintaining, to the quite obvious destruction of the freedom of the
created faculty of choice. Or is it not rather that this certitude stems from
the fact that, because of the depth of His intellect and because of His
absolutely eminent penetration of the created faculty of choice, (i) God
knows, in a way surpassing the nature of the object, that the sin will occur
because of freedom of choice and (ii) He would know the contrary if, as
is possible, it were going to occur because of that same freedom of
choice — which latter explanation amounts to positing middle knowl¬
edge in God with respect to those future contingents that depend on the
created faculty of choice.

9. So the authors with whom we disagree do not join with the Luther¬
ans and other heretics in positing predeterminations or divine motions
and determinations by which, via efficacious concurrence, God moves
and determines the created faculty of choice toward sinful acts, with the
result that it is in these determinations that He is able to know with
certainty which sins are going to occur because of created faculties of
choice. Nor, likewise, do they seem to trace the certitude of that same
foreknowledge back to the certitude and inevitability that a created will is
going to sin unless God holds it back and inhibits it from sinning by a
concurrence that is efficacious for nonevil acts — as though the will were
so inclined toward sins that it is led into them by a necessity of nature
unless it is held back from elsewhere. For this position would be an error
from the point of view of the faith. And there is nothing else that this
certitude can be traced back to other than the certitude of middle
knowledge, a knowledge by which God, because of the depth of His
intellect and His absolutely eminent comprehension of the created fac¬
ulty of choice, knew with certainty in His essence which sins each created
faculty of choice was by its freedom going to fall into on the hypothesis
that it should be placed in such-and-such an order of things and circum¬
stances — even though (i) on that same hypothesis it would really be able
not to fall into them, and (ii) if this were going to happen, God would have
foreknown it and not that other thing. Since all this is so, we should, it
 [219]
Part 2

seems clear, affirm that these authors do not deny middle knowledge in
God with respect to future sins, especially in view of the fact that when
they chance into a discussion of sins, they speak in a manner well suited
to middle knowledge and propound views that cannot survive without
middle knowledge, as was noted to some extent above — even though, to
be truthful, they sometimes seem to suggest the view that we argued
against in Disputation 50, and they take refuge in the permission of sins
and claim that this alone, without any previous middle knowledge, is the

reason God’s knowledge regarding future sins is certaind^

10. Meanwhile, however, let me point out that if they countenance

middle knowledge with respect to sins, then it is unjust of them to attack

it in general. What’s more, as long as they talk about conditioned future

contingents and correctly concede that God has certain knowledge of
them, it is unjust of them, in order to salvage the certitude of all the
things they enumerate, to resort to divine predeterminations that would
have existed if the conditions in question had obtained — as though it
were in those predeterminations that the things are foreknown with cer¬
tainty as future on such conditions. For Saul’s descending into Keilah to
capture and kill David, if David should remain in Keilah, was a mortal

sin on Saul’s part; likewise, the handing over of an innocent David, from
whom they had received only good treatment, would seem to be a mortal
sin on the part of the people of Keilah; and last, the sins into which the
just would have fallen had they not been taken prematurely by death
were also mortal sins. Thus, God could not have predetermined any of
these things, nor could He have efficaciously moved and determined the
created faculty of choice toward them in such a way that He might be
able to know them with certainty as future in and by such predetermina¬
tions. Rather, what He had was the certitude of middle knowledge
regarding sins, on the hypothesis that the relevant conditions should be
fulfilled.

1 1. Again, in the preceding part it was shown that in the case of the

repentance of the Tyronians and Sidonians, Christ’s words are mani¬

festly weakened and distorted by an appeal, not to the certitude of
middle knowledge, but rather to the predetermination via intrinsically
efficacious assistance that would have existed if the wonders that were
worked in Chorozain and Bethsaida had been worked in Tyre and

Sidon.^"^ So it follows that in general God’s certitude that all the condi-

^^See Disputation 50, secs. loff.

‘“^See Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 7.
 Disputation 53
[220]

tioned contingent things would have occurred is the certitude of middle

knowledge, and not the certitude of a predetermination by which the
created faculty of choice would have been determined by God to those
things via efficacious concurrence had such-and-such conditions ob¬
tained.

12. But now let us turn our attention to the nonevil acts of free

choice. Surely, if, without God’s predetermination and intrinsically effi¬

cacious concurrence, a created faculty of choice is able to exercise all the
sinful acts it in fact exercises, even though some of them might involve
great difficulty — as, among many other examples, advancing on the
enemy and scaling the walls when the war is unjust and there is much
danger and strong natural fear — then I do not understand why, in the
absence of that same efficacious assistance and predetermination and in
the presence of only a general concurrence directly upon the acts and
effects (the sort of concurrence by which God concurs with sinful acts,
according to the theory of those with whom we disagree), the faculty of
choice would not be able to elicit indifferent acts or even morally good
acts that are not difficult but rather delightful and pleasurable, for
example, willing to go to sleep or to eat when one is able to do so without
sinning and when both things are pleasurable; having sexual inter¬
course with one’s wife; willing to go for a walk or to play for the sake of
reviving of one’s spirits; and doing many other similar things. For it
would be ridiculous to deny this, especially since (i) God does not restrict
or limit the innate freedom of secondary causes when what is going to be

done is not evil but is instead good, and since (ii) God’s concurrences
should not be multiplied or increased without necessity, especially with

respect to acts and effects that are purely natural. What’s more, it is truly
remarkable if, when men are warring among themselves, those for

whom the war is unjust are fighting without God’s predetermination and
efficacious concurrence, whereas those who are not fighting illicitly need

God’s predetermination and efficacious concurrence in order to resist

and fight. Therefore, if the created faculty of choice is able to exercise

acts of this sort without God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence and

predetermination, and if it is able to alter these acts with regard to many
of their circumstances (for example, to begin or end them now rather
than earlier or later, to elicit them more intensely or more languidly, to
walk in one or another direction and do it more quickly or more slowly,
and so on for the other circumstances), then clearly the fact that it is with
certainty that God foreknows these acts as absolutely future and fore¬
knows that they will occur with these rather than with some other
circumstances cannot be traced back to the certitude of any predeter-
 Part 2 [221]

mination or of any determination of the faculty of choice by God’s

intrinsically efficacious concurrence. Rather, this fact has to be traced
back to the certitude of the middle knowledge through which (i) God,
because of the depth of His intellect, knew with certainty which part and
which circumstances the created faculty of choice would by its freedom
turn itself toward on the hypothesis that He should will to create it and
place it in that order of things and circumstances in which He has in fact
placed it, and through which (ii) He would have known not this, but
something far different, if because of that same freedom of choice
something different had been going to occur on that same hypothesis.

13. We can confirm this particular point as follows: In Disputation

33 we showed that numerically one and the same act in the natural order,
elicited here and now, is indifferently able to be morally good or morally
evil with the alteration of just a single circumstance that does not change
the identity of that act within the natural order. For instance, numer¬
ically the same act of consent, here and now, to intercourse with this
woman is indifferently able to be either an act of conjugal chastity, if a
marriage contract has at some time preceded it, or an act of fornication
and of sin, if such a contract has not preceded it. We also showed that
when that act is produced in the natural order by the influence of the
secondary cause and of God, then a formal notion in the moral order,
whether it is of a virtue or of a vice, results without any additional
influence on the part of God or of the secondary cause. Therefore, if,
when a marriage contract has not preceded it, that act, since it is an act of
sin, is produced without an efficacious concurrence by which God might
premove and determine the faculty of choice, but is rather produced
only with Wis, general influence on the act, an influence that is indifferent
as to whether that act or its contrary should follow, then surely that act

i^See Disputation 33, sec. 5 (Rabeneck, p. 205). Molina’s point here is intuitively
plausible, though difficult to state in a simple and uncontroversial manner. He assumes
that an action (or, in technical terminology, the ‘substance’ of an action) is distinct from at
least some of the action’s circumstances, so that the very same action that in fact occurred in,
say, circumstances C might have occurred in circumstances C* (where C is distinct from
C*). The example he uses is an apt one, since we can easily imagine that the two situations
depicted are exactly the same in every respect (including the agent’s intentions, delibera¬
tions, and other psychological acts and states) except for a certain historical circumstance,
namely, the making of a marriage contract. According to Molina, the very same act of
consent to sexual intercourse could occur in either of the two situations. Thus it would be
awkward to claim that the act requires a divine predetermination of the sort under dispute
in the one case and not in the other. Yet this is just what Molina’s opponents are forced to
claim, given that the act is virtuous in the one case and vicious in the other. For they treat
good and bad acts asymmetrically. It goes without saying, of course, that this distinction
between the ‘substance’ of an act and its circumstances has to be fleshed out more clearly
and carefully. See Section 3.3 of the Introduction.
 Disputation 55
[222]

will be produced without God’s efficacious concurrence when a mar¬

riage contract has preceded it and when the consent is an act of conjugal
chastity. Thus, it is not because of any predetermination or any effica¬
cious concurrence that God foreknows with certainty that this good act is
going to occur. Rather, He knows this with the certitude of middle
knowledge, a certitude that arises from the depth and eminence of the
knower, who sees with certainty that which in itself is uncertain.

14. It is surely surprising that predeterminations and intrinsically

efficacious concurrences are extended by these authors to all nonevil
acts, even natural ones. For there are those who posit them just for
supernatural acts — not, indeed, for the acts performed by angels or by
human beings in the state of innocence, but only for those acts per¬
formed by human beings with a fallen nature; and they incorrectly
assert that this is the grace of Christ.

15. Again, if the authors with whom we disagree countenance mid¬

dle knowledge with respect to sinful acts, in accordance with what was
said above, then surely, since many other things that have been and will
be done by human choice, from the beginning of the world right up to its
consummation, depend on sinful acts, God did not know these other
things as absolutely future with certainty, unless it was with the certitude
of middle knowledge, by which He foresaw that, on the hypothesis that
such-and-such sins would be committed by the created faculty of choice,
such-and-such other things would occur that otherwise would not have
occurred.

The minor premise, namely, that many things that are done by hu¬
man choice depend on sinful acts and would not have occurred unless
sinful acts had preceded them, is proved as follows: The fact that Eve
was tempted and seduced depended on the sin of the angels; for if the
angels had not sinned, then there would have been no demons to tempt
and seduce Eve. Likewise, the fact that Adam fell into the sin that
infected and corrupted the human race depended on the temptation
and sin of Eve. Now that original justice had been lost, the sin of Adam
led, in turn, to a tremendous difference with regard to both sins and

*®From Molina’s point of view, the reason this assertion is incorrect is that predeter¬
minations of the sort in question, executed causally by intrinsically efficacious concur¬
rences, would obliterate genuine human freedom. He would, of course, agree that the
grace of Christ empowers us and incites us to perform good actions with supernatural
effects (for example, actions that contribute to our meriting eternal life). But he would
insist that the operation of this grace must be understood in such a way as to be compatible
with genuine human freedom.
good works in the whole human race; further, since (i) the generations
of human beings were to have a far different history, and since (ii) the
human beings who were to exist were not the same ones who would have
existed in the state of innocence (as will be explained in its proper
place), 1 and since (iii) there was to be a marked change in the circum¬
stances regarding place of habitation, length of life, and much else, it
turned out that far different things, both for good and for evil, would be
done by different human beings after the fall of the human race and
right up to the end of the world than would have been done otherwise.

Likewise, many things depended on the sins of Adam’s descendants. For

instance, the death of Christ, the redemption of the human race, and all
the things that followed therefrom depended on the sins of the Jews; the
crowns of the martyrs depended on the sins of tyrants; acts of adultery,
sacrilege, and incest, as well as other acts of fornication, led to the
procreation of all those who were generated by such acts of fornication,
and thus led to the doing of all those things, both good and evil, that
were going to be done by the free choice of those so procreated; again,
unjust wars and other homicides led to its being the case that all those
things were never done that would have been done by the faculty of
choice of those so killed, and the same goes for all the things that would
have been done by the faculty of choice of those who would have been
procreated by the people who were killed in this way; and so on for the
many other things that were dependent on the sins of human beings,
both as regards their existence or nonexistence and as regards nu¬
merous variations in their circumstances. For because of battles, unjust
litigations, inordinate diversions, and other heinous deeds it often hap¬
pens that (i) due to the lack of a dowry many women do not marry at all
or do not marry those with whom they would otherwise have contracted
marriage, and that (ii) many people migrate from one place to another,
with the result that there is a considerable variation in the generations of
human beings. In addition, many other things vary because of these and
other similar circumstances. Thus it follows that many of xh^good things
that were going to occur because of the human faculty of choice from
the beginning of the world up to its consummation would not have been
known with certainty by God as absolutely future except because of
middle knowledge, a knowledge through which He knew that the^im on
which those things depended were going to occur, on the hypothesis
that the order of things which was in fact produced at the beginning
should be produced by Him.

•'^See De Opere Sex Dierum, disp. 3off., in Commentaria, pp. 706b— 710b.
 Disputation 5 5
[224]

1 6. But let us reflect in general on the sort of predeterminations that

the authors with whom we disagree posit via an efficacious concurrence
by which God moves, applies, and determines the faculty of choice to all
its nonevil acts. And to prepare for the first argument, I claim that in
order for an act to have the character of a sin it is not sufficient that it be

spontaneous in the way in which the acts of brute animals are spontane¬
ous, but rather it is necessary that the act be free with the freedom of
contrariety or contradiction, as they call it, so that when the faculty of
choice consents to the act, it has the power not to consent to it, given all
the circumstances obtaining at that time; otherwise, if, given those cir¬
cumstances, the faculty of choice were not able not to consent, then it
would not sin by consenting at that time, since no one sins in, or is
deserving of punishment for, anything that he is unable to avoid. Now if

it was at a previous time within the person’s power to remove an accom¬

panying circumstance by reason of which it is not now within his power
not to consent (as when someone has freely gotten drunk, knowing that
when drunk he is wont to kill others), then that person sinned, to be
sure, when he got drunk, not only because he deprived himself of the
use of reason by his intemperance, but also because he committed the
sin of homicide by exposing himself to the danger of unjustifiably killing
others — and this whether or not a homicide actually ensued afterward;
but he did not commit a sin when, already inebriated, he perpetrated the
killing, since at that time it was no longer within his power not to kill.
And the freedom just explicated, which, as the light of reason teaches, is
absolutely required in order for there to be any sin at all, is what
Augustine called voluntariness and what he accordingly held to be neces¬
sary in order for there to be a sin, so that if something was not voluntary,
then straightaway, without any argument, he would claim that it was not

a sin.i®

1 7. Given this, I construct the following line of argument: Just as, in

order for an act to be a 5m it is not sufficient that it be spontaneous, but is
instead necessary that it be free in such a way that, when the faculty of
choice consents to it, it has the power not to consent to it, given all the
surrounding circumstances obtaining at that time, so too in order for
there to be merit or for an act to be morally good — indeed, even in order
for there to be a free act that is indifferent to moral good and evil — it is
necessary that when the act is elicited by the faculty of choice, it be within

Perhaps it is worth noting here that Aquinas uses the term ‘voluntary’ somewhat more
inclusively, so that it is applicable, in at least an extended sense, to many of the acts of brute
animals. See Summa Theologiae I— II, q. 6, a. 1 and 2.
 [225]
Part 2

the faculty’s power not to elicit it, given all the circumstances obtaining
at that time. This, of course, is the freedom which is called the freedom of
contradiction, and which is the very least that has to be present for an act
to be called free, even if the act is only indifferent with regard to moral
good and evil; and this is the freedom in the absence of which, as all
Catholics confess, there can be no such thing as the morally good or the
meritorious. Indeed, it is by reason of this sort of freedom that (i) we are
in control of our acts, and that (ii) if our acts are meritorious, we are, in
return for them, deserving of the everlasting reward, praise, and honor
with which the eternal Father, by the act of His will and the judgment of
His intellect, will unceasingly honor, for all eternity in the presence of all
His saints, those who have served Christ in this life; for He is greatly
pleased with and approves of their having freely discharged those obli¬
gations that it was within their power not to discharge. Indeed, this is the
freedom in light of which our faculty of choice is called free, as was
explained in Disputation 2; for when our acts lack this sort of freedom,
then even if they are spontaneous, they are nonetheless called natural
and not free, as Catholics all concur.
Now after so long and so extensively elaborated and corroborated a
major premise, let us add the following minor premise: But if God has
predetermined all nonevil acts of the created faculty of choice in such a
way that He has decided to move and determine the faculty of choice to
those acts by an intrinsically efficacious concurrence, in the absence of
which the faculty of choice is not able to elicit those acts and in the
presence of which it is not able not to elicit them, then the freedom of
choice just explicated is manifestly destroyed with respect to those acts.
Therefore, this opinion is dangerous from the point of view of the
faith — indeed, I would call it a manifest error.
The minor premise is proved as follows: At the instant at which the
faculty of choice elicits those acts, it is not able not to elicit them;
otherwise, the concurrence by which the will is moved to them would not
be intrinsically efficacious, but, instead, its being or not being efficacious
would depend on whether or not the faculty of choice at that moment
willed to consent to and to cooperate with the concurrence — and thus
the sort of predetermination that these authors are trying to introduce

agent 5 has freedom of contradiction with respect to an object A at a time f if 5 is at i

able to will A and able not to will A. But to have freedom of contrariety with respect to A at t,
S must in addition be able to will not-A, that is, the contrary of A. So freedom of contrariety
entails freedom of contradiction, but not vice versa. What’s more, freedom of contrariety
implies a power to resist the object in question positively (by willing its opposite), and not
just a power to resist it negatively (by refraining from willing it or its opposite). This
distinction is the same as that between freedom with respect to the exercise of an act and
freedom with respect to the species of an act. See Disputation 47, n. 12.
 Disputation 55
[226]

would perish, and along with it the certitude, based on such a predeter¬
mination, with which God knows that contingent things of the kind in
question are absolutely future. Nor would any alternative basis for this
certitude remain besides the certitude of a middle knowledge that pre¬
cedes the other, absolute, knowledge and through which God, because
of the eminence and depth of His intellect, foresaw which part the
created faculty of choice would in its freedom turn itself toward on the
hypothesis that He should will for His part to situate it in such an order
of things, circumstances, and aids — even though it could have done the
opposite, and even though, if it had been going to turn itself toward the
opposite part, then God would have known this and not the other thing.

18. Nor in this case — unlike when we were talking before about the
man who killed while he was drunk — is there any room for an appeal to
some circumstance that was able not to obtain because of the created
faculty of choice and by reason of which the faculty was rendered unable

not to elicit the act in question. For (i) the movement caused by God’s
efficacious concurrence, a movement by reason of which the faculty of
choice is, on the theory of these authors, rendered incapable of not
cooperating and not consenting, does not, on the theory of these same
authors, depend on the created faculty of choice, but instead depends
only on the free will of God, who willed to confer it, and also (ii) merit and
freedom would not be present at the time when the nonevil or meri¬
torious act of choice is elicited, but instead would have been present at the
time when the circumstance in question was posited by the created
faculty of choice, which was at that time able not to posit that circum¬
stance.

19. In the case under discussion there is likewise no room for re¬
course to the divided sense, the sense in which these authors claim that the
faculty of choice is able not to elicit the act, and which they claim to be

sufficient for the act’s being free and meritorious. For in the case under
discussion they cannot understand the divided sense otherwise than as

follows: ‘If from eternity God had not decided to move the faculty of
choice by an intrinsically efficacious concurrence, and if, at the time
when the act is elicited. He were not to move the faculty of choice by that
same efficacious concurrence, than at that time the faculty of choice
would be able not to elicit the act.’ But then it would be able not to elicit the
act only insofar as, according to their own theory, it would not be able to
elicit it, since they had claimed that in the absence of efficacious concur¬
rence it is not able to elicit the act. And so they never allow for an event
or an instant in which, given all the surrounding circumstances obtain-
 [227]
Part 2

ing at the time in question, the faculty of choice has the power indif¬
ferently to elicit the act or not to elicit it; but this is what is required if the
act is to be free and meritorious, as has been explained.
Nor does a divided and composed sense of this sort preserve freedom
in the created faculty of choice itself in such a way that it has the power
indifferently to elicit or not to elicit the act, but instead it only preserves
freedom in God, a freedom by which He is indifferently (i) able to confer
on the faculty of choice an efficacious concurrence by virtue of which it is
going to elicit the act in such a way that it does not retain the power not
to elicit it, and also (ii) able not to confer that same efficacious concur¬
rence on the faculty of choice, in which case it is not going to elicit the
act, because it does not retain the power to elicit it. But if this were
sufficient for freedom of choice, then there would truly be freedom of
choice in brute animals, since God is equally able to confer or not to
confer efficacious concurrence on them with respect to their spontane¬
ous acts. And when He does confer it on them and they do elicit the act,
then, similarly, in the divided sense, if He were not to confer it on them,
they would be able not to elicit such an act; and when He does not confer
it on them and they do not elicit the act, then, similarly, in the divided
sense they would be able to elicit the act if He were to confer an effica¬
cious concurrence on them with respect to eliciting the act.
Now in order for there to be room for a divided and composed sense
that does not destroy freedom of choice, it is necessary that the faculty of
choice itself be really able by itself to elicit or not to elicit the act, even
when there exists something which the one part of the contradiction
does not cohere with and hence which that part is incompossible with in
the composed sense. For clearly the something in question preexists
because, by virtue of freedom of choice, the part of the contradiction
that it does not cohere with is not going to obtain; yet if this part of the
contradiction were going to obtain, as is possible despite that thing, then
that thing would never have existed — as was explained in the preceding
disputation with regard to God’s knowledge of the contingent things
that depend on our faculty of choice. 20

20. When the authors with whom we disagree, pressed by argu¬

ments, clearly see that, given their predeterminations, freedom of choice
is scarcely defensible, they are wont in the matter under dispute to flee
toward the less secure “anchor of ignorance,” claiming that, instead of

20The “something” in question alluded to in this paragraph is, of course, God’s fore¬
knowledge of those future contingents that will in fact obtain. This particular fore¬
knowledge would not have existed if it had not been the case that just those future
contingents were going to obtain.
 Disputation 55
[228]

rejecting predeterminations, it is better to join Cajetan in confessing that

we are ignorant of the way in which freedom of choice hts together with
foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and re probation. 21 Yet, on
the one hand, predeterminations of the sort they conjure up have a basis
neither in Sacred Scripture or Tradition nor in the councils or the holy
Fathers; to the contrary, such predeterminations manifestly subvert
freedom of choice, are incompatible with the Scriptures and the dehned
teachings of the Church, and are advocated by very few Scholastics.
(Indeed, thirty years ago they were unknown by that name among the
Scholastics.) On the other hand, if we speak straightforwardly about
foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and reprobation without
such predeterminations, then freedom of choice coheres extremely well
with these things. It follows that there is absolutely no reason we Catho¬
lics should take refuge in ignorance in such a public way, with no small
disgrace on our part and with a lessening of the reputation of the dogmas
of the faith in the eyes of unbelievers, especially since neither the holy
Fathers, nor St. Thomas, nor any others among the leading Scholastics
flee to such a refuge.

21. Further, the authors with whom we disagree, in order that they
might persist in their predeterminations, contemptuously call the free¬
dom explicated above, which is clearly de fide (as was shown at length in
Disputation 23), “I know not what freedom. ”22 I leave it to others to
judge how safely and with how much reverence for what the faith
teaches this was said.

22. Also, it matters little to them that on the basis of the certitude of
middle knowledge we have so plainly reconciled this same freedom with
foreknowledge, providence, predestination, and reprobation. 23 In fact,
they insist that middle knowledge should be rejected precisely because
all these things come into harmony so plainly and easily on the basis of it,
whereas the holy Fathers labored greatly in reconciling them with one
another and always thought of the exact reconciliation of freedom of
choice with these four things and with divine grace as one of the most
difficult of tasks. But, surely, since truth agrees with truth, whereas truth
will not easily harmonize with falsehood, the fact that these four things
cohere so easily and perspicuously with freedom of choice on the basis of
middle foreknowledge is a manifest sign that we have propounded a

2iZumel, Commentaria, q. 19, a. 8, disp. 1, p. 559b.

22Ibid., q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica, concl. 2, p. 360b.
23Ibid., p. 362b.
 [229]
Part 2

comprehensive and legitimate way of reconciling all of them. Now if, in

this way of ours of reconciling all these things, we deviated even a little
from the dogmas of the faith, or from the intent of the holy Fathers or
the Catholic Doctors, or from their undoubted opinions, then our way of
reconciling these things could indeed be justihably viewed with suspi¬
cion. But the fact is that having studied their works closely and having
been enlightened by so many disputations and by the outstanding writ¬
ings and discoveries of others, we have laid out just a little more clearly
the foundation on which all these things cohere with one another and on
which all the difficulties are easily resolved. And thirty years ago in
private and public disputations, and twenty years ago in our commen¬
taries on the First Part, we proposed this foundation under the name of
natural knowledge, since it is not free knowledge in God and since it
precedes every free act of the divine will. Most recently, however, in this
our Concordia, we have propounded the same foundation more exactly
than ever before under the name of middle knowledge. Surely, no one
can justihably blame me for this, especially because (i) even though (and
I am mindful of this) the holy Fathers did not use the distinction be¬
tween free and natural knowledge in God in those very terms, and even
though, likewise, they did not distinguish a middle knowledge between
free and purely natural knowledge, still by unanimous consent they taught
that those future contingents that depend on our faculty of choice are
not going to exist because God foreknows that they are going to exist,
but rather that God, because He is God, that is, because of the depth of
His intellect surpassing their nature, knew that they were going to exist
because they were so going to exist through freedom of choice, as we
asserted in the preceding disputation, and also because (ii) these same
Fathers taught by unanimous consent that on this same foundation our
freedom of choice coheres with divine foreknowledge, if you consult the
passages cited in the preceding disputation as well as in Disputation 23
and elsewhere. 24 And this, plainly, is nothing other than to affirm
middle knowledge — at least in fact, if not in our very words.

23. Nor is the response of the authors with whom we disagree satis¬
factory, namely, that these passages should be interpreted as having to
do just with the sinful acts of the created faculty of choice, and not with its
nonevil acts.25
For, hrst of all, if they have to countenance middle knowledge in God

24See Disputation 52, secs. 21-29. Also, see Disputation 23, pt. 4 (Rabeneck, pp. 140-
154)-
25See sec. 4 above.
 Disputation 5 5
[230]

with respect to the sinful acts of the created faculty of choice, given that
they do not want to claim that it is led into sins by a necessity of nature,
and given that, as was said above, they do not want to subvert freedom of
choice completely, then why do they not extend this middle knowledge,
which they already countenance in God, so that it might be had with
respect to all the acts that are produced freely by the faculty of choice in
such a way that it has the power not to produce them? For, as was shown
by argument a short while ago, there is no other way that this freedom
can be preserved in the faculty of choice.
Next, when the holy Fathers speak in this way, not only (i) are they
talking in general about future contingents (as the authors with whom we
disagree concede), even when they use examples involving sins because
the train of argument requires it and because their point is more easily
understood and explained in the case of sins than in the case of other
acts, but also (ii) they sometimes talk specifically about good and meri¬
torious acts.
For example, in the passage referred to in the preceding disputation
Justin Martyr is plainly speaking of future contingents in general.^^ He is
doing the same thing in the passages alluded to in Disputation 23, where
he expressly talks about good acts as well. 27 And in Responsiones ad Chris¬
tianas de Quibusdam Quaestionibus Necessariis, response to question 8, he

says, among other things, “Thus, the cause of our virtue and vice is not
God, but rather our own intention and will,” as we related in the same
place. 28 Whence you see that, to the extent that acts of virtue freely
depend on our faculty of choice, Justin Martyr attributes them to that
faculty itself as to a free cause that was able to produce them and able not
to produce them — and not to the divine foreknowledge by which they
were foreknown as going to occur.
Likewise, in the passage cited in the preceding disputation Origen is
clearly speaking of future contingents as comprising evil acts and also
good and meritorious acts. 29 And near the end he says, “In order that
you might understand that the cause of each person’s salvation is to be
found not in God’s foreknowledge but in that person’s intentions and
actions, notice that Paul . . .”^9 Clearly, intention or choice is not a cause
of salvation except through good acts, among which are numbered
tormenting the body and subjecting it to servitude, which Origen men-

26See Disputation 52, sec. 21.

27See Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 2 (Rabeneck, pp. 140-141). The references to Justin

Martyr’s works include PG 6, 456B— C, 714B, 798B-D, and 1257B-C.

28PG 6, 1257C. This passage is cited in Rabeneck, p. 141.
soibid. Disputation k2, sec. 22.
29See
 Part 2
[231]

tions in this place because of Paul. Likewise, Origen is speaking m

in the other passages quoted in Disputation 23, and he proposes as many
examples of virtues as of vices that are within the power of the faculty of
choice.

Although the passage from Damascene cited in the preceding dis¬

putation deals only with the sin of the devil, it is quite clear from the
other passages we cited from this Father in Disputation 23 that he would
say the same thing about the good acts of the faculty of choice. ^2
Though the passage from Chrysostom has to do with sins, it is none¬
theless evident from this same passage and from those others we quoted
from this Father in Disputation 23, part 4, that he would say the same
thing about virtuous acts, not to mention indifferent ones.^^
In the second and third of the passages cited in the preceding disputa¬
tion, Jerome is without a doubt speaking in general, and it is clear from
the other passages of his cited in Disputation 23, part 4, that he thought
the same thing about virtuous acts.^^
In the passage referred to in the preceding disputation, Cyril of
Alexandria is also speaking in general, and it is manifest from the pas¬
sages we quoted from this Father in the above-cited part 4 that he held
the same view with regard to both virtuous and vicious acts.^^
Furthermore, it is clear from the passages cited in the preceding
disputation that Augustine held one and the same view with respect to
both virtuous and vicious acts.^^ For he speaks in the same way about the
foreknowledge of an act of consenting to a sin and about the fore¬
knowledge of an act of dissenting that is a good act. And in that splendid
passage from De Libero Arbitrio III, chap. 4, where he reconciles freedom
of choice with foreknowledge on the same foundation as we do, he
clearly reconciles them in one and the same way when the act that is

See Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 6 (Rabeneck, p. 143). The references to Origen include
PG 11,1 18B-C, 250A, 860B, and 1033A; and PG 13, 196B.
32See Disputation 52, sec. 23. Also, see Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 1 2 (Rabeneck, pp. 145—
146).
33See Disputation 52, sec. 24. Also, see Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 14 (Rabeneck, pp. 147-
148), where the references to Chrysostom include PG 48, 984; PG 49, 377; PG 53, 158—
159 and 169-170; PG 55, 133, 345, and 436; PG 57, 362; PG 58, 573ff.; PG 59, 73-75 and
257f.; PG 61, 117; PG 62, 209, 586, and 647; and PG 63, 99!.
34 See Disputation 52, sec. 25. Also, see Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 30 (Rabeneck, p. 153),
where the references to Jerome include PL 22, 383, 393, 511, and 1158; PL 23, 428D,
429A, 505D, and 581B; PL 24, 796C-D; PL 25, 37A and 138B; and PL 26, 157A, 157C,
and 642D.
33See Disputation 52, sec. 27. Also, see Disputation 53, pt. 4, sec. 30 (Rabeneck, p. 153),
where the references to Cyril include PG 68, 145D; PG 73, 553C and 632A; PG 74, 129B;
PG 76, 620D— 621C and 937C-940B.
36See Disputation 52, sec. 26.
 Disputation 5 5
[232]

foreknown is going to be good and when it is going to be evil.^^ Hence, in

the end he concludes, “For if, because He foresees sins. He ought not to
condemn sinners, then neither should He give rewards to those who act
righteously, since He likewise foresaw just as well that they would act
righteously.” The same thing is also clear from the other passages from
this Father that we have referred to many times, in the above-cited part 4
as well as in other places.^®
The same thing is clear from the rest of the passages (if each is
pondered carefully) taken from the other Fathers, passages with which
we extensively conhrmed in the above-cited part 4 that there is freedom
of choice with regard to both good and evil.

24. Now let us return to that from which we digressed and propose a
second argument for rejecting predeterminations of the sort that they
conjure up: If (i) before predestination there was an election of some for
beatitude through an absolute and efficacious volition on God’s part,
prior to any foreknowledge of the circumstances and use of free choice,
even under a future hypothesis, and if likewise (ii) there was a rejection
of others by a similarly efficacious volition, and if, further, (iii) the
predestination of adults was fixed in a predetermination to confer on
them the efficacious assistance by which their faculties of choice would
be so determined that they would with certainty (where the certitude
stems from the character of the assistance) perform and persevere in
those works by which predestinate adults attain eternal life, whereas
(iv) the others on whom God did not decide to confer similar assistance
have by that very fact remained outside the number of the predestinate,
then it would follow, first of all, that a predestinate adult’s faculty of
choice does not retain the power to turn away from beatitude or, like¬
wise, from any of the particular means through which it will arrive at
beatitude. This, I have no doubt, is an error from the point of view of the
faith.

25. For in that case a predestinate person’s freedom of choice with

regard to the means to beatitude is destroyed, and as a result the notion
of the proper merits through which one progresses toward that beati¬
tude and arrives at it is also destroyed — which is clearly heretical.
Now the inference is proved as follows: If, with respect to each of the
particular means through which someone is going to attain eternal life

3'^See Disputation 52, sec. 29.

^®See Disputation 23, pt. 4, sec. 17 (Rabeneck, pp. 150—151), where the references to
Augustine include PL 32, 595-599> 12391!., 1269-1275, 1295, and 1307; PL 33, 677 and
971; PL 34, 176; PL 35, i777f. and 1842; PL 37, 1938; PL 38, 902-903; PL 39, 2162 and
2211; PL 40, 685 and 814; PL 42, 121, 538, 541, and 1 152.
 [233]
Part 2

(either as a proximate or a remote disposition to grace or as a meriting of

eternal life or of an increase in grace), you claim that such a predesti¬
nate person’s faculty of choice really does have the power either not to
consent to that means or to impede it by previous sin or destroy it by
subsequent sin, with the result that the person does not attain eternal life
via that means, then it follows that the assistance that God prepared for
him and decided to confer on him was not intrinsically efficacious for the
existence and perseverance of that means until death, contrary to what
you were maintaining and asserting; instead, its being efficacious for
both these things depends on the faculty of choice’s willing or not willing
to consent to it and, similarly, on its willing or not willing to fall into sin.
In addition, it follows that it is not certain, just on the basis of God’s
predetermination to confer this assistance on His part, that those means
will exist; instead, that those means should exist with certainty depends
as well on the middle foreknowledge through which, because of the
depth of His intellect. He foresaw what would occur because of the
freedom of such a faculty of choice on the hypothesis that He should
decide to furnish this assistance — even though the contrary could have
occurred, and even though if the contrary had been going to occur, then
God would have foreknown it and not that other thing. You, on the
other hand, maintain and affirm just the opposite with your predeter¬
minations. Therefore, either you are going to claim that the certitude of
the means of predestination does not arise solely from the predeter¬
mination and from the character of the assistance, but instead depends
on the certitude of middle knowledge, or else you are going to say that
the predestinate person is not free in such a way that he is able to turn
away from beatitude and from the means by which he will attain beati¬
tude. Nor, as we showed quite clearly in the preceding argument, is
there any room in this matter for an appeal to the divided sense, namely,
by claiming that it is sufficient for this sort of freedom that the person
would have been able to turn away in the event that God had not decided
to confer such assistance on him.

26. Next, from this same account of predestination and predeter¬

minations it would follow that it is not within the power of those adults
who have not been predestined to attain beatitude or to perform any of

390n the Catholic view, God predestines some for eternal life and wills to provide these
persons (as well as the reprobate) with the means necessary to attain eternal life within the
economy of salvation that He has contingently established. These “means” include the
various forms of supernatural assistance which God bestows on us and which empower us,
prompt us, and otherwise help us to perform meritorious acts. According to Molina, the
certainty of predestination entails God’s foreknowing with certainty, via His middle knowl¬
edge, just how the predestinate will freely respond to this assistance in the relevant
circumstances.
 Disputation 55
[234]

those good acts that are necessary for beatitude and that they are not in
fact going to perform; nor, indeed, is it even within their power to
perform any nonevil or indifferent act that they are not in fact going to
perform. Thus it would follow further that with respect to the sins they
will commit they do not have the freedom of contrariety, but only the
freedom of contradiction. That is, they have the freedom not to consent
to those acts, but not the freedom to dissent from them and to resist
them. Now, is there anyone who doubts that these claims contain an
error from the point of view of the faith?

27. The inference is proved as follows: According to the position of

those with whom we disagree, no one who is not numbered among the
predestinate is able, without God’s efficacious assistance, to perform an
act required for beatitude which he is not in fact going to perform; nor,
likewise, is he able, without God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence,
to perform any other nonevil act that, again, he is not in fact going to
perform. But, given this account of predestination and predetermina¬
tions, God decided not to confer such assistance or concurrence on any
of these people with respect to such acts. Therefore, it does not remain
within the power or choice of any of them to exercise any such acts that
they are not in fact going to exercise, and hence neither does it remain
within their power to attain beatitude, because without such acts they
neither are going to nor are able to attain it. Now, since dissenting from
and resisting a sin is not only a nonevil act of will but a morally good act as
well, it clearly follows that when they consented to the sins, they did not,
according to the theory of these same authors, retain the power to
dissent from them; for without God’s efficacious concurrence they were
not able to dissent, even though if they had had that concurrence, then
they would in fact have dissented and not sinned — otherwise, the con¬
currence would not be efficacious. Therefore, all the things that have
been said follow clearly from the account of predestination and pre¬
determinations that these authors try to propound and defend.

28. Indeed, it likewise follows that God has not left it within the
choice and power of predestinate people to exercise more nonevil or
meritorious acts than those that they will in fact exercise, or to exercise
different such acts; likewise, it follows that He has not given them the
freedom of contrariety to dissent from and resist the sins into which they
will fall, but has given them only the freedom of contradiction, since

n. 19 above for a brief characterization of the distinction between the freedom of

contradiction and the freedom of contrariety.
 [235]
Part 2

with respect to all those acts He decided not to confer on them intrin¬
sically efficacious concurrence, a concurrence in the absence of which
they are not able to elicit those acts and in the presence of which they are
not able not to elicit them. In fact, given this position, there is quite
clearly room for the error of those monks who used to claim that no one
should be reproached for not doing good, but that instead all should
petition God to confer on them the efficacious grace or assistance by
means of which they might act well. This error was discussed in Disputa¬
tion 1.^1
Nor will the authors with whom we disagree appease us if they re¬
spond that (i) it is the fault of the nonpredestinate that they do not
dispose themselves to receive God’s efficacious concurrence, with which
they would be able to exercise the acts whereby they might attain beati¬
tude and would be empowered to dissent from and resist the sins into
which they will fall, and that (ii) God is always prepared to assist them
efficaciously if they do not stand in His way. These authors will not, I
repeat, appease us if they say this. For, first of all, according to their
theory, God, without having any foreknowledge or idea of the circumstances or
future use of free choice, decided or predetermined from eternity to bestow
intrinsically efficacious concurrence with respect to these particular acts
on some people but not in like manner on others; therefore, on their
theory this was not left to depend on the created faculty of choice or on
the free disposition of that faculty with respect to both parts — unless
these authors want to contradict themselves. Second, a disposition of the
sort in question cannot be understood except as involving some act or
cooperation on the part of free choice. But on their theory the faculty of
choice cannot have this sort of cooperation without God’s antecedent
efficacious assistance or concurrence, a concurrence in the presence of
which the cooperation is not able nou to be elicited and in the absence of
which it is not able to be elicited. Third, whatever this disposition might
be in the final analysis — even if it is a disposition not to consent to a sin
by not eliciting any act whatsoever, but by instead refraining from acting
and being related negatively to acting^^ — clearly, if God’s conferring or
not conferring efficacious concurrence depends on such a disposition,
then just as without middle knowledge there cannot be any certitude
about whether that disposition is or is not going to exist through created

'^^See Disputation 1, sec. 15 (Rabeneck, p. 11).

^2 Here Molina is arguing that even if the disposition in question involves no positive act
of free choice (that is, the sort of act which would obviously require a divine predetermina¬
tion on his opponents’ view), but instead involves only a refraining from acting, still, if this
refraining is free, then God must have middle knowledge in order to foreknow it with
certainty.
 Disputation 55
[236]

choice, so too the question of whether such efficacious concurrence is

going to be conferred and whether God has predetermined to confer it
was also dependent on the certitude of the middle knowledge that pre¬
ceded that predetermination and without which there would have been
no such predetermination. And so these authors stumble into the mid¬
dle knowledge that they deny in God and that they assiduously flee
from; and they are forced to concede that predestination and reproba¬
tion have not been accomplished without prior middle knowledge of
what they designate as a disposition for God’s efficacious concurrence.

29. In fact, if the method of predestining some adults and not others
was the one that has been gleaned from the theory of these authors with
their predeterminations, then I do not see in what sense it is true that
God wills all human beings to be saved if they themselves do not prevent
it, or in what sense it is true and not fictitious that all human beings
without exception have been created by God for eternal life. Nor do I see
how God could justifiably reproach the nonpredestinate for not living in
a pious and holy manner and for not attaining eternal life; indeed, I do
not see how it is true that God has placed human beings in the hand of
their own counsel, so that they might direct their actions as they will. To
the contrary, given this method of predestination and predetermina¬
tions, the freedom of the created faculty of choice perishes, and the
Justice and goodness of God with respect to the reprobate are greatly
obfuscated and obscured. Thus, this theory is neither pious nor in any
way safe from the point of view of the faith.

30. We might also propose this third argument: The assistance

through which we are helped by God toward justification is not effica¬
cious intrinsically and by its nature; rather, its being efficacious depends
on the free consent of the faculty of choice, a consent that the will is able
not to give despite that assistance — indeed, when it consents, it is able to
dissent, as the Council of Trent (sess. 6, chap. 5, and canon 4) clearly
teaches'^^ and as we have proved quite extensively in other places and
especially in Disputation 40 and in the Appendix (response to the third
objection). Likewise, when it consents to the assistance of grace, it is
able in its freedom to cooperate and consent more intensely or more
languidly, and with greater or lesser effort, and hence it is able to elicit a
more intense or more languid act, as was shown in Disputation 39.^^

Denzinger, 1525, p. 370, and 1554, p. 378.

‘*'*See Disputation 40, sec. 12 (Rabeneck, pp. 248-249). Also, see the Appendix to the
Concordia, sec. 55!!. (Rabeneck, pp. 644ft.).
^^See Disputation 39, sec. 4 (Rabeneck, p. 242).
 [237]

Part 2

Thus, both of the following things should be conceded all the more
concerning the concurrence by which God concurs with the nonevil
natural acts of free choice, namely, (i) that this concurrence is not
intrinsically efficacious, but rather, despite the concurrence, the faculty
of choice, when it consents to and elicits those acts, is able not to consent
to and not to elicit them, so that its innate freedom is not taken away
from it by God’s concurrence and assistance; and, likewise, (ii) that when
the faculty of choice elicits acts, it is able to enter into them with more or
less effort, and hence is able in its freedom to produce more intense or
more languid acts, just as all the Doctors hold concerning the natural
acts of free choice. Thus are destroyed predeterminations of the sort
that the authors of the contrary position try to introduce via God’s
intrinsically efficacious concurrence with respect to all the nonevil acts of
free choice; in fact, such predeterminations are extremely dangerous
from the point of view of the faith. And destroyed along with these
predeterminations is that certitude, which would be based solely on
these predeterminations, of God’s foreknowledge of the future con¬
tingents that depend on free choice; and we must of necessity have
recourse to the certitude of the middle knowledge by which God, be¬
cause of the depth of His intellect and because of His absolutely eminent
penetration of the created faculty of choice, knew, with a certainty
surpassing the nature of the object, which part it would turn itself
toward, and with what degree of intensity, on the hypothesis that it
should be assisted by such-and-such aids in such-and-such an order of
things and circumstances.

3 1 . This argument is, in my judgment, effectively confirmed for the

case of human beings by the definitions cited from the Gouncil of Trent,
since the authors in question neither deny nor are able to deny that in
those places the council teaches that our faculty of choice, when moved
and stirred by prevenient grace, is able to elicit the consent by which it
consents to that grace in such a way that when it elicits it, it is able not to
elicit it— indeed, it is even able to dissent from it at that moment if it so
wills; they, on the other hand, maintain that this consent is prior to the
conversion, and they claim that the conversion requires, over and be¬
yond prevenient grace, the distinct efficacious assistance of cooperating
grace, by which the conversion is completed.^®
On this basis I propose the following argument: This prior consent is
a nonevil act of free choice, since it is not evil to consent in this way to

Disputation 53, pt. 4, secs. 11-12, Molina discusses more fully what is involved in
the conversion of a sinner to faith or repentance.
 Disputation 55
[238]

prevenient grace. Therefore, there is a nonevil act of free choice which

was elicited without efficacious concurrence in such a way that when it
was elicited, it was able not to be elicited — indeed, the contrary dissent
was able to be elicited. Therefore, God did not foreknow this act with
certainty merely on the basis of a predetermination by which He pre¬
determined it via His efficacious concurrence, but rather He foreknew it
with certainty by virtue of the fact that because of the depth of His
intellect He saw, through His middle knowledge, which part the faculty
of choice would turn itself toward on the hypothesis that He should
premove and stir it in this way by prevenient grace; and so these authors
are mistaken in claiming that the entire certitude of God’s foreknowl¬
edge with respect to all the nonevil acts of free choice in general has its
source in the predetermination of those acts via efficacious concur¬
rence, and not in any middle knowledge.
And when these authors wish to defend (i) the claim that it is the fault
of those who are reprobate that they are not converted and do not attain
eternal life, or (ii) the claim that God does not desert anyone in such a
way that He is not always prepared on His part to confer sufficient
assistance on him, and that it is the sinner’s own fault that he does not
accept that assistance, or (iii) other claims similar to these, they often¬
times are wont to appeal to something that precedes the efficacious assis¬
tance, something that depends indifferently on the created faculty of
choice for its existence or nonexistence. So remember that you should
insist at that point that the existence or nonexistence of the thing in
question does not depend on any predetermination, and that there is no
certitude, except from God’s middle knowledge, about which part this thing is
going to be channeled to by the created faculty of choice. At the same
time, you should also remember that the authors with whom we disagree
trace all the certitude of every nonevil act of free choice in general, with
absolutely no exceptions, to the certitude of predeterminations via a con¬
currence on God’s part that is intrinsically efficacious with respect to
those acts. So you should carefully observe whether they always speak in
a way consistent with this theory, or whether they do not instead make
covert exceptions when it is necessary to defend these other claims.
Part 3

The Extent to Which Predeterminations Should Be Countenanced

1 . Now that we have ruled out the predeterminations favored by the

authors with whom we disagree, we have to make clear which predeter¬
minations on God’s part are required in order for all created things to
 Part 3
[239]

exist, and also in order for them to be universally subject to His divine
providence.
Now, in order to do this better, we should note that among created
things there are some whose proximate source of contingency is God's
faculty of choice alone. ^ These include both (i) the things that are produced
immediately by God alone and do not depend on any other source of
contingency, as was the case with all the things that were produced by
God in the hrst establishment of things, and also (ii) the things that
thereafter have emanated from those hrst things just by a necessity of
nature, without any dependence on any other source of contingency.

2. If the discussion has to do with all future contingents of this sort,

before they exist in reality, then we agree that they all depend just on the
predetermination by which God through an absolute volition decided
from eternity to produce some of them directly and not to withhold that
concurrence of His which was necessary in order for the rest of them to
be derived thereafter from those hrst things. We also agree that all the
certitude of the knowledge by which God knew, before they existed, that
these things were going to exist depends just on that predetermination.
Further, we agree that with respect to future contingents of this sort just
two types of knowledge have to be distinguished in God, namely, (i) free
knowledge, by which, after that free predetermination of His, He knew
those things as absolutely future, and (ii) purely natural knowledge, by
which, before that determination. He knew them as possible by virtue of
His omnipotence and, in addition, knew them as future on the hypothesis
that He should will to produce some of them and, once they were so
produced, will not to withhold the concurrence required for them to act.
Clearly, no one can deny that there is in God this type of conditional
knowledge with regard to future contingents of the sort in question.
Nor, likewise, can one deny that this knowledge is purely natural, since
on the hypothesis in question it is altogether necessary that those things
exist. We do, however, differ from the authors with whom we disagree
on this point: We claim that God’s general concurrence with the things
He produced directly, in order that the other things might be derived
from them, is not an influence of God’s on the cause, so that the cause
might act after having first been moved and applied to its act by that
influence, but is instead an influence along with the cause directly on the
effect — as was explained in Disputations 25 and following.^

*See Disputation 47, sec. 4.

2See Rabeneck, pp. isgff. According to the Thomists, God ‘premoves’ the secondary
cause and ‘applies’ it (or its power) to its proper operation in a way analogous to that in
 Disputation 55
[240]

3. The reward for this labor is that we may now distinguish for the
sake of clarity a sort of middle genus of things between the foregoing
things and the things we will be speaking of in a moment, that is, a
middle genus comprising those things that (i) are indeed produced
directly by God, even though a human or angelic intellect or will may
concur in the production of some of them, not as a free faculty but only
insofar as it is operating by a necessity of nature, and yet that (ii) depend
on some other source of contingency besides God for their subject or for
something else.^ The following are examples: the raising up of Lazarus;
the granting of sight to the man born blind; the calling of Paul while he
was traveling to Damascus (not just the external calling, but also the
internal calling via an antecedent illumination and movement of the will

prior to Paul’s eliciting any free act of assent); and other similar occur¬
rences in the internal calling of others to faith or repentance.^ For even
though the actual existence of Lazarus, along with the rest of the things
that accrued to him up to the instant at which he was raised by Christ,
had, in addition to God, other sources for their existing contingently in
such-and-such a way — and the same holds for the man born blind and
for Paul, the former up to the moment at which he received sight, the
latter up to the moment at which he was called to faith and repentance —
nonetheless, the raising up of Lazarus, the receiving of sight by the man
born blind and the calling of Paul had, presupposing all those other
things, no source for their existence other than the free will of God, by
which alone they were produced. For this reason, if we are speaking of
just these things, before they existed, presupposing those other things,
then the same claim should be made as was made about the sort of future
contingents explicated in the first place above, namely, that they depend
only on that free predetermination of God’s by which He decided from
eternity to bring them about in this way in time. Similarly, it should be
said that the certitude of the knowledge through which God on that basis
knew these things as absolutely future also depends solely on that same
predetermination; but there is a difference to the extent that these

which a craftsman moves and applies tools to their characteristic operation. (See Disputa¬
tion 53, pt. 1 , n. 7.) St. Thomas himself also uses the interestingly different example of the
cook applying the fire to the food to be cooked.
The relevant texts in St. Thomas’s works include Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 5; Summa
Contra Gentiles III, chaps. 67 and 70; and De Potentia Dei, q. 3, a. 7. Molina discusses the
issues involved at some length in Disputations 25—28 (Rabeneck, pp. 159—185).
^The things in question here are miraculous occurrences that are brought about by God
alone but take place within a historical context that is itself at least in part the result of the
free choices of created agents. Compare Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. 15, where Molina
speculates about how sinful free choices have affected the subsequent history of the world.
See Section 2.7 of the Introduction.
“^The story of the raising of Lazarus from the dead is found in John 1 1 , and the story of
the man born blind is found in John 9. Paul’s conversion is recounted in Acts 9.
 Part 5

[241]

things presuppose for their existence those other things that depend in
many ways on the created will; for with regard to the certitude of the
knowledge through which God knew the things in question on this latter
basis as absolutely future, we should say the same thing as we will
presently say concerning the certitude of His knowledge of things of the
third type.^

4. The third genus comprises those things whose proximate source of

contingency is created free choice, regardless of whether they depend on
it proximately or remotely for their existence.^
Now, in view of the fact that once we have explicated divine predeter¬
minations with respect to the human actions of our faculty of choice in
the state oi fallen nature, we can easily understand both (i) the predeter¬
minations required for the actions of angels and of human beings in the
state of innocence, whose freedom was greater than ours, and also (ii) the
extent to which the things that depend mediately on the created faculty of
choice are dependent on divine predeterminations, we will be discussing
divine predeterminations just with regard to our human actions.

5. As we said in the Appendix, response to the second objection (and

this is relevant to the present discussion), we are able to distinguish three
types of human actions.^ The hrst type includes indifferent actions or
actions that, even if they are morally good, nonetheless involve so little
difficulty that they can be performed with just God’s general concur¬
rence. The second type consists of those actions that are supernatural or
that involve so much difficulty that they require God’s particular assis¬
tance.® The third type includes those actions that are sinful. In the

^So there are two ways of considering the certitude of God’s foreknowledge of the fact
that Lazarus was going to be raised from the dead. On the one hand, God is the sole cause
of the precise effect in question (the raising of Lazarus), and so the certitude of His
foreknowledge of it stems solely from His predetermination to raise Lazarus up. On the
other hand, God has predetermined to raise Lazarus up within a historical context whose
causal ancestry involves many human free choices, and so God needs middle knowledge in
order to know with certainty that just those circumstances will obtain and hence in order to
know with certainty that Lazarus will be raised up in just those circumstances. The proximate
source of the contingency of Lazarus’s being raised up is God’s will alone, whereas the
proximate source of the contingency of many of the circumstances surrounding the
resuscitation of Lazarus is human free choice.

®See Disputation 47, sec. 11, for Molina’s careful distinction between the proximate
source of a contingent effect’s existence and the proximate source of a contingent effect’s
contingency.
"^See Appendix, response to the second objection, in Rabeneck, pp. 625—642, esp. pp.
631-636.
®God’s concurrence is C2\\ed general when it does not by itself determine the exact nature
of the effect. God' particular assistance consists of prevenient and cooperating graces. See
Disputation 53, pt. 1, n. 13.
 Disputation 5 5
[242]

Appendix we used as examples of all three types acts of speaking com¬

manded by free choice, and we will continue to use this sort of example
here as well.

6. Now we must assume that in an account of divine predetermina¬

tions it cannot be denied that prior to any free act of the divine will, and
hence prior to any predetermination, there existed in the divine intellect
a nonfree knowledge through which God knew not only (i) all the things
that were able to exist because of His omnipotence (either directly
through Him alone or via the mediation of secondary causes), but also
(ii) all the things that would come to be through any created faculty of
choice and, in general, through any other agent, on any hypothesis or
given any predetermination on His part. For no one can deny that this
knowledge exists in God, even though there could be disagreement
about whether this sort of knowledge of all objects, a knowledge condi¬
tioned on predeterminations, h purely natural to God (as it is, we claimed
above, when it is a knowledge of created things of the hrst type), or
whether, with respect to those things that depend mediately or imme¬
diately on the created faculty of choice, it has in God the character, not
oi natural knowledge, but instead of a middle knowledge that was able not
to exist if the faculty of choice by its freedom had been going to do the
opposite on the hypothesis in question. In fact, the authors with whom
we disagree seem to imply that this knowledge is purely natural with
respect to all the things whose predeterminations they posit in God; for
they claim that God’s predetermination and concurrence direct the
faculty of choice to those things and that the faculty of choice is not able
in the composed sense to do the opposite. This seems to be the type of
knowledge they posit in God with respect to conditioned future con¬
tingents, according to the points that were cited from their position in
Part 1 but they do not explain clearly what they think about sinful acts
(with regard to which they reject divine predeterminations), though in
the two preceding parts we explained by way of conjecture what they
appear to think about such acts.

7. With this point thus established, it follows that with respect to a

human action of the first type — for example, an indifferent act of speak¬
ing which will occur tomorrow on Peter’s part or the same act now
rendered morally good by its relation to wholesome diversion in accor¬
dance with the virtues of affability and congeniality — it is necessary that
such an act be preceded from eternity by the following predetermina-

®See Disputation 53, pt. i, sec. 2.

 Part 5
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tions on God’s part: (i) a volition to create the whole order of things all
the way up to Peter, and to concur with each secondary cause, whether
free or natural, which existed in the series extending from the beginning
of the world all the way up to the begetting of Peter; (ii) a volition to

create Peter’s soul and to infuse it into his body, and to cooperate
together with all the causes that directly concur to generate Peter; and
thus (iii) a volition to confer on Peter, in part by Himself directly and in
part via the mediation of secondary causes, free choice and the rest of
the powers required for speaking as well as for other things; likewise,
(iv) a volition to concur in the production of all those things that were
required up until Peter would arrive at the instant of the speaking with
all the circumstances then obtaining; finally, (v) a volition not to deny
Peter His general concurrence for speaking in that manner, should
Peter in his freedom will thus to speak, but always to assist him by means
of that concurrence in such a way that if Peter should will to speak or to
exercise some other operation. He would aid him in the same way, and
thus (vi) a volition to confer that concurrence on him because He saw
that in his freedom Peter would speak.
Now according to our position, this concurrence is not a motion of

God’s on the faculty of choice by which He moves, applies, and deter¬

mines it either to precisely that act of speaking or even to some act of
speaking or other; instead, it is an influence along with the faculty of
choice, an influence that depends for its existence on the influence and
cooperation of that faculty itself, in the way that, as was explained in

Disputation 40, a habit’s influence on and cooperation with a faculty for

acting depends on the cooperation of that faculty. But in the proposed
case, just as this general concurrence depends for its existence on the
influence and cooperation of the faculty of choice, so too, reciprocally,
the influence of the faculty of choice depends for its existence on the
general concurrence, as was explained at length in both regards in
Disputation 25.^^ Likewise, this general concurrence is intrinsically in¬
different as to whether it is followed by a volition to speak or a volition
not to speak, or by any other act of the faculty of choice; and it is by the
faculty of choice itself, as a particular cause, that this general concur¬
rence is channeled to a specific type of act. *2
Look at the divine predeterminations that this indifferent or morally

good act of speaking of Peter’s which will occur tomorrow depends

upon. Clearly, despite these predeterminations and God’s general con-

^oSee Disputation 40, sec. 5 (Rabeneck, pp. 244-245).

i*See Disputation 25, sec. 14 (Rabeneck, pp. 162-163).
12 Literally, God’s general concurrence is thereby directed to a species (Latin; species) of
act.
 Disputation 55
[244]

currence, Peter remains free, and at the designated instant he can will to
speak or will not to speak; in the same way, he can will to speak zealously
or, by misusing his will and the general concurrence and the other gifts
of God, he can will to speak for an evil purpose or perversely; or he can
will to apply himself toward performing some other, far different, act.
All this must be conceded, unless, by a patent error from the point of
view of the faith, we want to deprive Peter of his freedom of choice and
deprive his act of its moral goodness and merit, assuming that it was
performed in the state of grace.
But because this zealous act of speaking is included in the end for
which God predetermined to give Peter free choice as well as His general
concurrence and all the other gifts listed above, it is clear that God,

foreseeing that the act in question would occur by Peter’s freedom on

the hypothesis that He should will to predetermine all those things,
intended this particular act and, in accord with His well-pleased will,^^
willed it to exist by means of (i) the predetermination itself, and thus by
means of (ii) His providence with respect to that effect, a providence
carried out via the predetermination, and, likewise, by means of (iii) the

gifts themselves — always with a dependence on Peter’s free cooperation,

which God foresaw to be forthcoming.

'^According to St. Thomas {De Veritate, q. 23, a. 3 and 4), talk of God’s well-pleased will
(literally, voluntas beneplaciti, the will of one well pleased) is proper and literal talk of what
God wills. The well-pleased will is divided into God’s antecedent will or volition and God’s
consequent will or volition. St. Thomas characterizes this distinction as follows:
“That which God has ordained for creatures, to the extent that it is from Himself, is said
to be willed by Him through a sort of primary intention or antecedent volition. But when a
creature is kept from this end because of its own defectiveness, God still brings to fulfill¬
ment in it the goodness of which it is capable — and this through a sort of secondary
intention or consequent volition.
“Therefore, since God has made all human beings for beatitude. He is said to will the
salvation of all through His antecedent will. But because there are those who resist their
salvation, those whom, because of their own defectiveness, the order of His wisdom does
not allow to attain salvation, in them He brings to fulfillment in a different way that which
pertains to His goodness, namely, by condemning them through His justice — so that while
they are falling short of the primary order of His will, they are slipping into the secondary
order, and while they are failing to fulfill God’s will, God’s will is being fulfilled in them.’’
{De Veritate, q. 23, a. 3, corpus.)
St. Thomas hastens to add that God in no way — either antecedently or consequently —
wills or intends sins by His well-pleased will. Instead, He meveXy permits them.
God’s well-pleased will is contrasted with Hi?, signified will. Talk of the latter is, according
to St. Thomas, figurative (and not literal) talk of God’s will. Such talk is based on certain
correlations between willing and acting commonly found among human beings. For
instance, just as what we prohibit is a sign of what we will the opposite of, so too with God.
The five signs of God’s will dir prohibition, precept, counsel, operation, and permission. As noted
above, what God permits is not something that He literally wills. Still, we often figuratively
assign to a person’s will what he merely permits. And so too we often say “It is God’s will”
when speaking of tragic events, whether the tragedy is moral or merely physical.
 Part 5
[245]

Further, God’s intending and willing in the way just noted, by means
of His predeterminations and providence, all our good acts in particular,
even the supernatural ones, and indeed every nonevil effect of secondary
causes — this is what the Fathers call God’s “predestining” and “pre¬
determining” those effects. Thus in the epistolatory decree to Peter of
Antioch, Leo IX says, “I believe that God predestined only good things,
but that He foreknew both good and evil things.” And Augustine (or
whoever else the author of this work is) says in De Articulis Sibi Falso

Impositis, article 10, “We must detest and abominate the opinion that
holds that God is the author of every evil volition or bad action — God,
whose predestination is nowhere outside the bounds of goodness, no¬
where outside the bounds of Justice. For all the ways of the Lord are
mercy and truth (Ps. 24:10). For the holy Divinity knew not to provide
for but to condemn acts of adultery on the part of married women and
the seductions of virgins; He knew not to arrange them, but to punish

them. Thus God’s predestination did not incite or induce or set in

motion the lapses of those who go to ruin or the malice of the iniquitous
or the excessive desires of sinners; rather. He plainly predestined that
judgment of His by which He is going to repay each in accord with what

he has done, whether good or evil.”^^

8. As far as human actions of the second type are concerned, let us

take as our example an action that is supernatural and extremely difficult,
namely, a confession of faith under torture all the way up to the end of

one’s life, a confession that makes the person in question a martyr; and
let us assume that this confession is elicited from an unbeliever, who is
justified through it.
Clearly, for an action of this sort it is not only necessary that there
should exist all the divine predeterminations spoken of above with
reference to the aforementioned indifferent or morally good action, but
it is also required that there be a predetermination to call, assist, and
comfort the man at the time in question by means of the extraordinary

aids of prevenient and cooperating grace, without which the man’s

faculty of choice would be unable to persevere. Still, these and the
aforementioned predeterminations and aids leave him able, at the in¬
stant at which he is converted, not only not to be converted but even to
dissent from the faith and to repudiate it; and they leave him able
afterward, as long as his torments last, all the way up to the end of his
life, to succumb and to repudiate the faith. Nor, in accord with what was

143, 772C.
51, i82f. The scriptural reference is to Hebrew Psalm 25.
 Disputation 55
[246]

said in the preceding part and in other places, do we doubt that this
opinion is de otherwise, such a conversion to the faith and such
perseverance in confessing it would not be meritorious — indeed, they
would not even constitute a morally good act, since there can be neither
merit nor moral goodness in any act unless there is freedom, whether of
contrariety or of contradiction, with respect to the opposite.
But since God foresaw that, because of the man’s freedom, this con¬
fession and perseverance right up to the end of life would occur on the
hypothesis that He should will to predetermine and assist him in this
way, clearly. He specifically intended that the confession and persever¬
ance should exist because of those aids and because of that predetermi¬
nation or order of His providence, a providence that is fulfilled by that
predetermination with respect to the effect in question; and through the
volition of His well-pleased will He willed this act, greatly pleased that it
was going to occur in that way because of His gifts together with the free
volition of the faculty of choice. And it is for this reason that He is said to
have predestined and predetermined this action, as was said above
concerning morally good actions.
What has been said about this sort of supernatural and extremely
difficult operation of our faculty of choice should also be taken to apply

to the other operations for which God’s particular assistance is required;

for the predetermination to confer such assistance in no way deprives
the faculty of choice of its freedom not to elicit the action in question or
even of its freedom to dissent from it— as the Gouncil of Trent taught in
session 6, chapter 5, canon

9. Finally, as regards sinful human actions, included among which

was Peter’s threefold denial, the authors with whom we disagree cor¬
rectly claim that such actions have not been predetermined by God; still,
one should not give the explanation of this point that they give, namely,
that God does not apply or direct the faculty of choice to such actions by
His efficacious concurrence — as though He does direct it to good actions
by His efficacious concurrence. Instead, one should say that even though
God decided to confer on the sinner the faculty of free choice along with
His general concurrence and the other things necessary for eliciting
these acts. He did not intend them, but rather resolved to confer all these
things for a far different end, whereas it is the sinner himself who in his
freedom misuses all these things in order to exercise the acts in question.

‘®See Disputation 53, pt. 2, sec. i2ff. For a brief characterization of what makes a
doctrine de fide, see Disputation 52, n. 14.
*^See Denzinger, 1554, p. 378.
‘^For the gospel accounts of Peter’s denial of Christ, see Matt. 27:69-75, Mark 15:66-
72, Luke 22:54-62, John 18:15—18 and 25—27.
 Part 5
[247]

Now, even though it should be said that God has not predestined or
predetermined evil actions, it should nonetheless be affirmed that cer¬
tain predeterminations on God’s part were necessary in order for those
actions to be able to exist in reality through the created faculty of choice.

Thus, if we are speaking of Peter’s threefold denial, all those predeter¬

minations were necessary which we claimed above to be necessary for
eliciting an indifferent act at the very moment at which Peter denied

Christ — including God’s predetermination to grant (or not to deny)

Peter His general concurrence. Furthermore, it was likewise necessary
for there to be a predetermination to permit Peter, for the sake of the
excellent end that God Himself intended by this permission, to perform
the evil action that He foresaw would occur under those circumstances

because of Peter’s free choice — that is, a predetermination not to alter

the circumstances or to confer on Peter other aids in the presence of
which he would not lapse into that denial because of the same freedom
of choice.

10. Notice, we have laid out all the predeterminations required for

all positive
source of future contingents between
the difference in general.'^^ Now thebriefly
us and consider
authors the entire
with whom we

disagree. They claim that God’s eternal predeterminations, along with

the concurrences by means of which He decided through those pre¬
determinations to concur in time with each created faculty of choice in
order to produce all the nonevil acts, direct the faculty of choice to those
acts in such a way that it does not retain the power not to elicit them; for
they insist that each such concurrence is intrinsically efficacious, and that
its efficacy does not in any way depend on the faculty of choice. Thus, as a
result, they insist that all the certitude of the divine foreknowledge by
which God knew all those acts as absolutely future depends only on the
predeterminations by virtue of which those acts are going to be elicited

'^An interesting question lurking in the background here is whether, necessarily, each
sin is such that God could have prevented it simply by increasing the intensity of His
prevenient and cooperating aids, so that the person in question would freely refrain from
sinning. According to the negative response, there are (or could be) true counterfactual
conditionals expressed by sentences of the following form; ‘Person 5 would still have freely
sinned at time T no matter how much supernatural assistance God had given him at T.'
20By a positive future contingent Molina means an affirmative future contingent propo¬
sition expressed by a sentence of the form ‘It will be the case that S is P,' where 5 and P are
place holders for the subject-term and predicate-term, respectively. Such propositions, as
affirmative, entail the future existence of the things referred to by the subject-terms. By
contrast, a negative future contingent proposition, for example, one expressed by a sen¬
tence of the form ‘It is not the case that it will be the case that 5 is P,' is true if the thing
purportedly referred to by the subject-term will never exist. It should be clear that a
complete set of predeterminations with respect to positive future contingents would also
fix the truth-value of every negative future contingent.
 Disputation 55
[248]

by the created faculty of choice not only infallibly but also inevitably. 21
Thus again, they consequently deny that any middle knowledge is to be
countenanced in God with regard to those acts — and, indeed, given their
principles, middle knowledge certainly should be denied, since, as was

said above, the knowledge by which, before any free act of God’s will,
these things would be foreknown by Him as future on the hypothesis of
those predeterminations would be altogether natural in God. 22 And for
this reason they claim that the knowledge by which God knew conditioned
future contingents, for example, that there would have been repentance
among the Tyronians and Sidonians on the hypothesis that the wonders
performed in Ghorozain and Bethsaida should have been performed
among them, is purely natural in relation to the predetermination that
would have existed in that case. We, on the other hand, believe that it is an
error from the point of view of the faith to posit divine predetermina¬
tions and concurrences of a sort that do not leave it within the power of
the faculty of choice, at the instant when it elicits a nonevil act, not to elicit
it or even to dissent from it if it so chooses; and as a result we claim that all
the certitude of the divine knowledge by which God foreknew both the
good and the evil acts of the created faculty of choice as absolutely future
does not have its source just in the predeterminations to confer aids and
concurrences, since the faculty of choice is able to turn itself toward the
contrary part despite those predeterminations. Rather, it has its source
in the middle knowledge by which (i), before any act of His will, God
knew which part the faculty of choice in its freedom would turn itself
toward on the hypothesis that He should will to grant it those aids and
concurrences, and by which (ii) He would have known the contrary, if the
faculty of choice were through that same freedom going to turn itself
toward the contrary part. And it is through this same knowledge, we
claim, that God knew with certainty all those future things that the

authors of the opposed position call “conditioned.”

We claim that the certitude of this middle knowledge has its source, in
turn, in the depth and unlimited perfection of the divine intellect, a
perfection by which God knows with certainty what is in itself uncertain,
and this because of an absolutely eminent comprehension, in His divine
essence, of every faculty of choice that He is able to create by His
omnipotence.

1 1 . Last, observe that middle knowledge is indeed in God before any

free act of His will, and that it is a knowledge of all effects in general, not

21 The term ‘infallibly’ here should be understood as having epistemic import and as
characterizing God’s knowledge, whereas the term ‘inevitably’ should be understood as
having metaphysical import and as characterizing the things of which God has knowledge.
22See sec. 6 above.
 Part 5
[249]

only (i) of those effects that are in fact going to exist because of the
faculties of choice that He has decided to create within the order of
things and circumstances that He chose to establish, but also (ii) of those
effects that would have been going to exist (whether because of these
very same faculties of choice or because of the inhnitely many others
that He could have created) if any of the circumstances had been altered
within the order of things He chose to establish or if any other order of
things had existed from among the infinity upon infinity of orders of
things that He could have created; and yet notice that this middle
knowledge is a knowledge of all those effects in such a way that it is a
knowledge of none of them except on the hypothesis of a predetermination
of the divine will to choose to establish this or that order of things and to
provide for and assist the order of things in question (or its means and
circumstances) in this or that way. But since it is through such a pre¬
determination that the notion of divine providence with respect to each
of these effects is satisfied, it most assuredly follows that through His
middle knowledge, prior to any act of His will, God foresaw nothing
except on the hypothesis and under the condition that He should will to
provide for the effect in question in this or that way. Thus it is not the
case that middle knowledge of this sort destroys or impedes divine
providence; to the contrary, it is an illumination and cognition that is a
precondition in God, on the part of His intellect, for an absolutely perfect
and exact providence. For through this knowledge and cognition, be¬
fore He establishes anything by His will, and thus before He provides for
anything having to do with the created faculty of choice in keeping with
the free nature of that faculty. He foresees what is going to occur
because of it— not absolutely, but rather on the hypothesis and condition that
He should provide for it in this or that way. Thus, at that prior instant,
before God predetermines or establishes anything by His will, the notion
of providence is not yet satisfied in God with respect to either the created
faculty of choice or anything else, since at that instant there is still
lacking something that is required on the part of His will for the notion
of providence. So, too, nothing is at that instant known as absolutely and
simply future, but only as future under the condition that God should will to
determine and provide for things in this or that way.

12. Gonsider now the difference between us and the authors with

whom we disagree on the matter of God’s providence regarding those

things that depend immediately on the created faculty of choice. 23 They
rightly insist that God has providence over each particular nonevil act of

23For a general discussion of the doctrine of providence, see Sections 1.2- 1.3 of the
Introduction.
 Disputation 5 5
[250]

created free choice, and that He intends those acts, and that they are the
effects of that same providence; however, they think that He intends
them and is a cause of them by His providence in virtue of the fact that
(i) He decided from eternity to move and determine the created faculty
of choice to those acts by an assistance or concurrence that is intrinsically
efficacious, and by virtue of the fact that (ii) in time He in fact moves the
faculty of choice by that very same efficacious assistance in such a way
that it does not remain within the power of the faculty, placed under that
predetermination and concurrence, not to exercise those acts. As a
result, they go on to assert that those acts are certain and infallible solely
because of the order of divine providence.

13. We, on the other hand, having no doubt that this sort of pre¬
determination and intrinsically efficacious gjncurrence completely de¬
stroys freedom of choice with respect to those acts and thus involves an
error from the point of view of the faith, claim, hrst of all, that through
His wisdom God provides for each thing in accordance with its nature
and, for this reason, provides for free beings with respect to their free
effects, whether these effects are natural or supernatural, in a way that
always preserves their freedom of choice, that is, by leaving it within
their power, at the very moment at which they produce those effects and
despite all the circumstances obtaining at that moment, not to produce
those effects and, indeed, if they so will, to produce contrary effects — so
that they are the masters of their own actions, and they are ht for virtue
and vice, praise and blame, reward and punishment.

14. Second, we claim that God intends those acts and that they are
particular effects of His providence; 24 for all the causes by which they are
individually produced and by virtue of which God through His middle
knowledge foresaw that they would be produced on the hypothesis that
He should will to arrange the universe in such-and-such a way or to
provide for the things in it in such-and-such a way — all these causes are,
of course, the means and effects of His providence, conferred by that
same eternal predetermination and providence of His in order to pro¬
duce these and other similar acts. Yet, clearly, among these causes and
means is included and numbered the faculty of choice itself, conferred
by God on angels and human beings through that same providence of
His for those acts, but with the power not to produce them — even

24 It is important to remember that Molina is speaking here just of the nonevil acts of
created free choice. God does not intend evil acts; rather, He permits them while intending
the good to which He can turn them despite their nature.
 Part 5

[25*]

though there preexisted in God a knowledge by which He saw that the

faculty of choice would in fact produce them on the hypothesis that He
should will to place it in this order of things and aids and circumstances.
Therefore, the created faculty of choice is counted among the means
through which God by His providence intends those acts and by virtue
of which He is a cause of those things in particular when they actually
come to be — the created faculty of choice, which really has the power
not to produce them, if it so chooses. It surely follows that those acts
would be neither certain nor infallible solely because of the means of
divine providence if you were to rule out middle knowledge, a knowledge by
which God, because of the depth of His intellect and in a way surpassing
the nature of the object, foresaw that, because of freedom of choice,
those acts would come to be from those same means and from the order
of divine providence.

15. Third, we claim that since (as has been explained thus far) these
same acts depend simultaneously both on freedom of choice and on
God, who by His eternal predetermination or providence wills to bestow
the faculty of choice as well as all the other means that are required for
or even facilitate those acts, it clearly follows that whereas God foresaw
through His middle knowledge that those acts would occur because of
freedom of choice on the hypothesis that He should will to predeter¬
mine and provide for things in the way appropriate to produce the acts,
by the very fact that He later (in our way of conceiving it, with a basis in
reality) did so predetermine and provide for them. He thereby willed by
an absolute volition that they should be as He foresaw they would be,
well pleased that those acts should be dependent both on His own pre¬
determination and providence itself and also on freedom of choice — as
on two causes that were necessary for the existence of those acts in such a
way that if the latter of the two was absent by its own freedom, then the
acts would not occur.

16. Fourth, we claim that since (i) it is not only our good acts that
depend, in the way explained above, on our faculty of choice, but also
our evil acts that depend on that same freedom of choice, whereas
(ii) God does not provide for all human beings and angels equally or in
the same way, with regard to either supernatural or natural gifts, but
rather decides to distribute the gifts of His mercy as He pleases, though
no one is ever deprived of what is necessary, it clearly follows that for an

absolutely perfect providence on God’s part there had to be (as we were

saying in the preceding disputation) a middle knowledge through which
God, foreseeing what would occur through any creature’s faculty of
 Disputation 55
[252]

choice on any hypothesis and in any turn of events among things, was
able, from eternity and without any shadow of alteration in the course of
time itself, to predestine what he pleased on the part of those creatures
whom He should decide to create, while preserving their freedom; and
He was able to provide for all free creatures with respect to each event in
accordance with His wisdom and the pleasure of His will, deciding (i) to
prepare the way for their acts by various means and aids, (ii) to discipline
them in various ways, (iii) to permit and tolerate their failures and sins,
(iv) to call them to faith and repentance, (v) to confirm them, now called
and justified, in goodness, and (vi) to do many other things with respect
to them.

17. Finally, we claim that dWgood things, whether produced by causes

acting from a necessity of nature or by free causes, depend on divine
predetermination (of the sort we have just explicated) and providence in
such a way that each is specifically intended by God through His predeter¬
mination and providence, whereas the evil acts of the created faculty of
choice are subject as well to divine predetermination and providence to
the extent that the causes from which they emanate and the general
concurrence on God’s part required to elicit them are granted through
divine predetermination and providence — though not in order that these
particular acts should emanate from them, but rather in order that other,
far different, acts might come to be, and in order that the innate freedom of
the things endowed with a faculty of choice might be preserved for their
maximum benefit; in addition, evil acts are subject to that same divine
predetermination and providence to the extent that they cannot exist in
particular unless God by His ^roVidence permits them in particular for the
sake of some greater good. It clearly follows that all things without
exception are individually subject to God’s providence and will, which
intends certain of them as particulars and permits the rest as particulars.
Thus, the leaf hanging from the tree does not fall, nor does either of the
two sparrows sold for a farthing fall to the ground, nor does anything
else whatever happen without God’s providence and will either intending
it as a particular or permitting it as a particular. This is the greatest
consolation of the righteous, who place all their hope in God and rest
comfortably in the shadow of the wings of His providence, desiring that
in both prosperity and adversity God’s will with regard to them might
always be fulfilled. 26

25See Matt. 10:29.

26The image of the believer being under the shadow of God’s wings is found in the
following Psalms (Hebrew numbering): 17:8, 36:8, 57:2, and 63:7.
 Part 4
[253]

18. From what has been said you can easily see just how false the
frequent charge made against me is, namely, that because I posit in God
a middle knowledge by which He foresaw what the created faculty of
choice would do on the hypothesis that it should be placed in this or that
order of things and circumstances and aids, I am thereby claiming that
there is only general, and not particular, providence with respect to those
things that depend on the created faculty of choice. Nor do those who
make this charge against me pay attention to the fact that included in the
very being endowed with free choice and in the order of things and
circumstances and aids are all the means of divine providence through
which God intends in particular all the good things that He foresees are
going to exist because of the freedom of such a created faculty of choice.
But since I am not concerned with what anyone reports about me — for
what I myself have said can easily be ascertained by anyone who reads
the hrst edition of our Concordia or this second edition — I will purposely
disregard the many opinions that are falsely referred to as mine; in
addition, there are many other opinions that I hnd it unnecessary to

apologize for.27
Part 4

Some Objections Are Answered

1. First objection. The authors of the contrary position argue, hrst, as

follows:^ “If God had decided not to create anything at all, then there
would be only natural knowledge in God, knowledge through which He
would comprehend Himself and in Himself all possible beings, both
natural and free. But His decision to create things results only in there
being free knowledge in God, knowledge through which He knows
which things are going to exist because of that free decision. Therefore,
there is in God no distinct third genus of knowledge, namely, middle
knowledge.

2. “This is conhrmed by the fact that either (i) God’s knowledge is

thought of in relation to possible things, before they are brought into
existence by an act of the divine will, and viewed in this way it is natural in
God; or (ii) it is thought of in relation to the things that are going to exist

2'7This somewhat plaintive plea for the reader’s sympathy is reflective of Molina’s
difficulties with those who accused him of holding unorthodox views. Such charges deeply
troubled him, since he was convinced not only that his own views were orthodox but that
his opponents’ views were erroneous from the point of view of the faith.
'Zumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica, concl. 2, p. 361.
 Disputation 55
[254]

in various intervals of time after the free determination of the divine will,
and in that case it is free knowledge. Thus, there is no third kind of

knowledge in God.”

3. Response. As far as the argument is concerned, the major premise

should be denied. For besides the purely natural knowledge by which all
those things would be known as merely possible beings, there would also
be middle knowledge, by which (i) God would know, with respect to any
contradictory pair of future contingents dependent on the created fac¬
ulty of choice, which part is going to be true — not absolutely, but rather
on the hypothesis that He should will to establish this or that order of
things — and by which (ii) He would know the contradictory if the con¬
tradictory were going to be true because of the created faculty of choice
on that same hypothesis. This has already been demonstrated, and our
opponents themselves are constrained to acknowledge the same point
with regard to the sins that would occur on the hypothesis in question
because of the created faculty of choice — unless either (i) they want to
assert that God is ignorant of the sins that would occur on that hypoth¬
esis, or (ii) they want to claim that, given that hypothesis, the faculty of
choice would commit those sins by a necessity of nature — a claim that
was attacked at length in Part 2.2 Notice that even if God had decided not
to create anything, there would still have existed in Wim free knowledge
through which He would have known that none of those things that He
could have created was going to exist; for just as He would have freely
decided not to create, so too He would freely know that nothing that He
could have decided to create but did not decide to create was going to
exist. Our opponents, though, are talking about free knowledge of
positive things. 3

4. As for the conhrmation, it should be replied that there is a third

way of thinking of God’s knowledge, namely, in relation to things that

are future, not absolutely but rather on the hypothesis that God Himself
should will to create this or that order of things; for what is future in this
way on a hypothesis occupies a sort of middle ground between what is

2See Disputation 53, pt. 2, secs. 1 — 1 1.

3 Molina’s point here presupposes that necessarily, for any contradictory pair of future
contingent propositions, exactly one is true and exactly one is false. So even if God had
decided not to create anything. He would still have known a full complement of future
contingent propositions and hence would still have had/rcc knowledge. In such a case,
however, each of the future contingent propositions He knew would be negative and
hence such that it does not entail the existence of any creature at any time. See Disputation
53, pt. 3, n. 20, for more on the distinction between positive and negative future con¬
tingents.
 Part 4
[255]

merely possible and what is absolutely future, as was explained in Part 1 But

God’s knowledge, thus viewed in relation to things that would occur on

the hypothesis in question because of created free choice, is middle
knowledge. For even though it is not free in God, still God would have
known the contradictory if, as could have been the case on the very same
hypothesis, the contradictory were going to be true.

5. Second objection. They argue, second, as follows:^ “If God’s pre¬

determination to confer intrinsically efficacious concurrence for a good
act of the will and also the intrinsically efficacious concurrence itself were
such that they should not be posited, this would be because, by effica¬
ciously determining the will to one act, they destroy the will’s freedom
with respect to the opposite, and thus the will would elicit that act
necessarily rather than freely, with the result that the moral goodness
and merit of the act would perish. From the fact that the will is deter¬
mined to one act when it acts, however, it does not follow that it is not act¬
ing freely. Therefore, it is unreasonable to reject on these grounds either
the divine predetermination to confer intrinsically efficacious concur¬
rence or the intrinsically efficacious concurrence itself. The minor prem¬
ise is proved by the fact that, even in the opinion of those who do not
countenance predeterminations or efficacious concurrences of the sort
in question, when the will acts freely, it has already determined itself to
one part of a contradiction — indeed, it acts because it has determined
itself. Yet this does not prevent it from acting freely. Therefore, from the
fact that the will has been determined to one act when it acts, it does not

follow that it is not acting freely.”

6. Response. In response to the major premise of this argument, it

should be said that the reason these predeterminations and intrinsically
efficacious concurrences ought not to be countenanced is that those who
posit them claim that (i) when they are absent, the will is not able to elicit
the good act in question, and that (ii) when they are present, the will is
not able not to elicit the act, and further that (iii) their presence or
absence does not depend on the will that is supposed to elicit the act, but

depends instead solely on God’s freely predetermining or not predeter¬

mining the act from eternity. Given these conditions, the will itself never
retains the power to determine or not to determine itself indifferently,
or to determine itself to one or the other part; yet such power is abso-

“^See Disputation 53, pt. 1, sec. 6.

^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 23, a. 3, disp. 8, p. 676a; and q. 19, a. 8, disp. 1, notabile 2,
p. 560a— b.
 Disputation 5 5
[256]

lutely necessary for there to be true freedom. Now, the claim that, given
these conditions, this power would never exist in the will is obvious, since
at an instant when that concurrence is not present, the will is not able to

determine itself to elicit the act, nor is it then within the will’s power to do
anything such that were the will to do it, then that concurrence would be
present. For in that case the concurrence and predetermination would

depend not only on God’s free will but also on what the created will was in
its freedom going to do or not going to do, as foreknown by God
through middle knowledge. On the other hand, at an instant when that
efficacious concurrence is present, the will is not able not to be deter¬
mined to elicit the act; for if at such an instant the will had the power not
to determine itself, then it would be able to render such a concurrence
inefficacious, and thus it would depend on the will whether the concur¬
rence was efficacious or inefficacious.
So given that the major premise of the proposed argument has been
conceded, if that premise has to do with the kind of determination I have

just explained, that is, the kind that destroys the will’s freedom with
respect to the act and along with it the moral goodness and merit of the
act, then the minor premise should be denied, as long as it likewise has to
do with the same kind of determination to one act.
Now, as far as the proof is concerned, it should be denied that when
the will acts freely, it has determined itself naturally prior to its acting.®
Quite the opposite, it is in fact by acting freely that it determines itself to
its act, and earlier in nature at the same moment it was indifferent as to
whether it was going to determine itself to act or not to act, or to act with
respect to this object rather than that one, or to will it rather than reject
it— and this prior to its determinately acting or determinately not acting,
and prior to its determinately eliciting a volition with respect to this or
that object or a volition with respect to its opposite, as was shown in
Disputation 24.^ Indeed, the will acts freely or determines itself freely to
an act by virtue of the fact that (i) earlier in nature it is indifferent as to
whether it is going to determine itself or not determine itself in a given
way, and thus that (ii) when it determines itself, it is able not to deter¬
mine itself. But after the will is thought of as already determined to one
object at a given moment, then a contradiction is involved in its not

6 Molina denies here that the determination of the will is prior, even in some non¬
temporal sense, to the will’s free act. As he goes on to explain, he does believe that the very
instant at which an act of will occurs can be divided into a “naturally” prior and posterior.
But even so, the determination of the will, which occurs naturally posterior to the will’s
being indifferent with respect to both parts, is just identical with the act of the will. So there
is no room on Molina’s view for any (divine or human) /predetermination of the will.
^Rabeneck, pp. 155—158.
 Part 4
[257]

having determined itself at that moment, and thus it is no longer free

not to determine itself in that way — and this, as was explained in the
disputation just cited, is what Aristotle and Boethius meant by the
familiar formula, “What is, when it is, is not able not to be.”^

7. Third objection. Third, they argue as follows:^ “Even though, when

an efficacious willing of an end exists, the will is not able in the composed
sense not to will the means necessary for that end, still this does not
destroy the freedom and moral goodness, or even the merit, of the
willing of such a means. For instance, when an efficacious willing of
eternal happiness exists in a wayfarer, and when there occurs on his
part an act of obedience to some precept that obliges under pain of
moral guilt, then even though he is not able in the composed sense not to
will that act of obedience (since it is a means absolutely necessary for
attaining beatitude), nonetheless this does not prevent that act of willing
from being free, morally good, and meritorious. Therefore, the fact that
when there is a divine predetermination to confer efficacious concur¬
rence on someone with respect to some good act, such a person is in the
composed sense not able not to elicit that act — this fact will in no way
prevent such an act from being free and morally good, or even meri¬
torious, if it is elicited by someone who is in the state of grace.”

8. Response. As for this argument, given that the antecedent has been
conceded, the consequence should be denied. For in the first case each of
those acts that cannot in the composed sense exist at the same time is
within the power of the wayfarer’s free will, so that when he wills his
occurrent act of obedience to such a precept, he is able not to will it and
thereby able at the same time to refrain from efficaciously willing the
end; and thus he retains true freedom or indifference with respect to
both parts, as far as obedience to such a precept is concerned. In the
second case, however, if a predetermination and intrinsically efficacious
divine concurrence of the type in question are admitted, then he does
not retain the freedom to elicit or not to elicit that good act, as was shown
in the preceding argument and quite often in the ones before that.

®See Disputation 24, sec. 4 (Rabeneck, p. 155). The passage from Aristotle is found inD^
Interpretatione , chap. 9 (19b 23), and the passage from Boethius is found in De Consolatione
Philosophiae V, prose 6 {PL 63, 86 iC).
^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 19, a. 8, disp. 1, ad 3, p. 564a-b.
i^The Latin term viator (literally, traveler) is used to designate a human being who is still
in this life as opposed to the afterlife. Hence, such a person is a wayfarer, a pilgrim,
someone still ‘on the way’ {in via) to a heavenly homeland. Below Molina discusses Christ’s
condition as a wayfarer, that is, in the time between his conception and his death and
resurrection.
 Disputation 55
[258]

9. Fourth objection. Fourth, they argue like this: ^ ' “If an exceptionally
prudent general or head of a household were able to provide for his
army or his household by prearranging each and every thing and par¬
ticular means for the attainment of victory or for the just governance of
the household, then he would certainly do so, and therein his great
providence and wisdom would shine forth; if, on the other hand, he
does not do this, it is because he is unable to. But God can very easily
provide for all things in this way, and freedom is not on this account
taken away from the created faculty of choice. Therefore, He provides
for things by predetermining all of them individually.”

10. Response. This argument should be accepted as a whole if it is

meant to assert only that in God there is providence with regard to all
things individually. Nor in that case does the argument impugn our
position, since we posit in God a providence with regard to each individ¬
ual thing; the good things He intends individually and the evil things He
permits individually, as was shown in the preceding part. ^ 2 if however,
the argument is meant to assert that God provides for individual things
and means in such a way that He intends each of them by a predeter¬
mination via intrinsically efficacious concurrence, then, given that the
major premise and the first part of the minor have been conceded, the
last part of the minor should be denied, namely, that this kind of
predetermination does not take away freedom from the created faculty
of choice; for the contrary has already been proven. Next, the conse¬
quence itself should be denied, since the cases are altogether dissimilar.
For victory and the just governance of a household so that no rebellion
afflicts it— these are the goals of the general and of the head of the
household, goals that they intend and that they would always bring about
if they were able to. By contrast, however, the natural and supernatural
ends in the service of which God provides for free creatures are not God’s
ends, but rather the ends of the very creatures themselves, proffered to
them in such a way that God leaves it within their power to attain those
ends or not to attain them — so that the means to those ends might thus
result in merit, praise, and honor for them and so that the ends them¬
selves might result in a reward. And for this reason it was expedient for
God to provide for those creatures not by means of efficacious concur¬
rences, but instead by means of concurrences that are such that it is up to
those very creatures endowed with free choice to render them effica¬
cious or inefficacious with respect to the works in question.

JiZumel, Commentaria, q. 22, a. 4, disp. unica, concl. 3, p. 608b.

i^See Disputation 53, pt. 3, secs. 13—18.
 Part 4
[259]

1 1. Fifth objection. Fifth, they argue as follows: “Many things that

come to exist could not have existed without being individually pre¬
determined by God’s efficacious will. Therefore, a predetermination on
God’s part has to be acknowledged. The consequence is manifest, while
the antecedent is obvious from all those things that occur beyond the
common course of the universe, for example, the miraculous calling and
conversion of Paul in the very act of persecuting Christ and the Church;
the things that befell Joseph when he was looked upon with hatred,
when he was tossed naked into the well and sold by his brothers, when he
was afterward thrown into jail though innocent, and in the end raised to
such great glory — along with the other things that happened to him,
especially since in all of them he prehgured Christ.*"^ Clearly, none of
these things could have occurred without God’s special design or with¬
out the predetermination of His efficacious will. Another example was
the astonishing feat of the two brothers Perez and Zerah, who during
their delivery at birth acted in such a way that the one put his hand out
first, at which moment the midwife tied a scarlet thread to it and said,
‘This one will be born hrst’; but when the hrst brother had drawn back
his hand, the other one came out.^^ We can say the same thing about
Esau and Jacob, when the younger was chosen in preference to the
elder, and when, not because of their works but because of the one who

was doing the calling, it was said, ‘For the elder will serve the younger.’
And the same thing holds for many other similar occurrences.”

12. Response. As far as this argument is concerned, the antecedent

should be conceded not only for those things that are accomplished by
God miraculously beyond the common course of the universe, but also for
those things that are done directly by God alone — at least in the measure to
which they have God alone as the source of their contingency, as was
explained at the beginning of the preceding part.^^ For with respect to
things of this sort we countenance predeterminations via God’s effica¬
cious will and via an efficacious concurrence on God’s part for produc¬
ing them, as was said in the same place. Thus, if the consequent has to do
only with the predetermination of things of this sort, then the conse¬
quence should also be conceded; but if it also has to do with the same

i^Zumel, Commentaria, q. 22, a. 4, disp. unica, concl. 2, p. 607b.

^‘^The story of Paul’s conversion is recounted at Acts 9:1 — 19, 22:3—16, and 26:2—18.
The story of Joseph occupies the last fourteen chapters of the Book of Genesis (37—50).
‘^Gen. 38:27-30.
i^The relevant biblical passages are Gen. 25:23 and Rom. 9:10-13, where St. Paul
remarks that the election of Jacob over Esau was God’s doing alone and thus not the result
of Jacob’s merits.
‘"^See Disputation 53, pt. 3, secs. 1-4.
 Disputation 55
[260]

kind of predetermination of the things that depend on the created

faculty of choice or of those other things to the extent that they depend
for their subject or for something else on the created faculty of choice (in
the sense explained in the preceding part), then the consequence should
be deniedd® As for the examples by which the antecedent is supported,
it should be said with regard to the first one that (i) the miraculous
calling of Paul, both external and internal, was indeed predetermined by
God via His efficacious will and concurrence, and yet that (ii) Paul’s
consent to this same calling and thus Paul’s conversion, to the extent that
it depended on his free consent, were not predetermined in that way, as
will be obvious from the response to the next objection. As for the

second example, it should be said that Joseph’s dreams, as well as the

other aids by which God specially assisted the occurrence of many of the
things that happened to Joseph, were indeed predetermined by God in

the manner in question; however, his brothers’ hatred and persecution

of him, his being thrown into the well, his being sold, the false testimony

of Potiphar’s wife, and her tempting him into adultery — these things,
since they were mortal sins, were not predetermined by God in the way
in question, as those with whom we disagree themselves admit. Rather,
since God foresaw that because of the wickedness of the brothers and of

Potiphar’s wife these things would occur on the hypothesis that He

should for His part will to establish that whole order of things and
circumstances. He decided only to permit them. Again, the remaining,
nonevil things that happened to Joseph, to the extent that they de¬
pended on the created faculty of choice, were predetermined by God
not in the manner claimed by the authors with whom we disagree, but
rather in the manner we explicated in the preceding part. As for the
third example, the things that happened miraculously in that instance
were predetermined by God in the way in question. Likewise, the inter¬
nal movement by which the midwife seems to have been induced by God
to tie the scarlet thread on the one who put his hand out hrst, seems to
have been predetermined by God.^^ Concerning the fourth example,
the eternal preference or election by which Jacob was chosen over Esau

came from God’s free will alone. But even though the election was not
based on foreseen works, still it was not made without foreknowledge of
the works that were going to occur through the faculty of choice of both

*®Ibid. To use Molina’s example, God’s internal calling of Paul presupposed the exis¬
tence of Paul as the metaphysical subject of the change that God was bringing about in
him; yet Paul’s existence depended on a multitude of previous free human choices.
*®By an “internal movement’’ (Latin: motio interna) Molina means a movement of the will
by God.
 Part 4

[261]

men, given the relevant order of things, circumstances, and aids. 20 Now,
among the things that occurred in the carrying out of that election, some
were predetermined by God in the manner claimed by the authors with
whom we disagree, and the rest were predetermined in the manner we
explicated in the preceding part — just as was said above about the other
examples.

13. Sixth objection. They argue, sixth, as follows: 21 “The conversions

of Paul, of Mary Magdalene, and of the thief hanging on the cross were

all accomplished through God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence or

assistance, and they were predetermined by God from eternity to occur
by means of such assistance; and the free choice of Paul, Magdalene, and
the thief consented to predeterminations of this sort. Therefore, pre¬
determinations via God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence have to be
countenanced, and at the same time it must be admitted that this concur¬

rence is in no way prejudicial to our freedom of choice.”

14. Response. As far as this argument is concerned, it should be

denied that the conversions in question were accomplished through an

assistance on God’s part that was intrinsically efficacious in such a way

that the faculties of choice of Paul, Magdalene, and the thief, having
once been overtaken and moved and stirred by that most powerful
assistance, did not have the power not to consent despite such assistance.
This denial is in keeping with what the Council of Trent decreed,
without any exceptions, about the assistance of grace in the conversion
of sinners. 22 Thus, it was up to the free will of Paul, Magdalene, and the
thief whether or not it was going to follow from that assistance that their
faculties of choice would be moved to consent to or to cooperate with
that same assistance in order to bring about contrition and conversion.

20Though Molina affirms the orthodox belief that God’s election of Jacob over Esau is
not based on or caused by Jacob’s good works or merits, he nonetheless insists that God
chose Jacob only with full (middle) knowledge of how Jacob would freely respond under
the hypothesis that he should be chosen and given the various graces in question. Molina is
trying to avoid the position according to which God first chose Jacob over Esau and only
afterward (in our way of conceiving it) predetermined Jacob’s positive response to that
election. On Molina’s own account, by contrast, God chose Jacob as one who would
respond freely in such-and-such a way to such-and-such graces. This is the key to Molina’s
understanding of the doctrines of predestination and reprobation. See esp. Concordia,
q. 23, a. 4 and 5, disp. 1, pt. 11 (Rabeneck, pp. 539-563).
2iZumel, Commentaria, q. 14, a. 1, disp. unica, concl. 3, p. 363a— b; and q. 23, a. 3, disp. 8,
prop. 3, p. 679b.
22Council of Trent, sess. 6, chap. 5 and canon 4 (in Denzinger, 1525, p. 370, and 1554,
p. 378).
 Disputation 5 5
[262]

and thus whether or not that assistance was going to be efficacious for
this purpose. For they had it within their power to render the assistance
inefficacious by not consenting to it and by not cooperating with it, if
they should so choose.
Now, in order that you might understand this better, notice that
nothing less than the clear vision of God necessitates the will with regard
to the exercise of an act;^^ rather, the will always remains free instead to
exercise or not to exercise the act, though the greater the good perceived
in the object and the more the will is drawn to it and the less resistance it
offers to it, the more easily and more frequently the will by its own
freedom is wont to determine itself to a desire or act regarding such an
object — always, however, with the freedom to refrain from the act, since
there is nothing that necessitates it as far as the exercise of the act is
concerned. And this is the freedom that suffices for merit, as long as the
act is morally good in itself and is elicited by someone in the state of
grace. Now, when a human being is addicted to the things of this world,
then the greater the temporal good proffered to him and the less the
difficulty involved in obtaining it, the more easily and frequently he is
wont to elicit a volition for it without any hesitation. Thus, no prudent
person doubts that if he were offered many thousands in gold, to be had
for free, or if he were offered a kingdom or control of the world, he
would immediately elicit a volition; and yet he would elicit itfreely as far
as its exercise is concerned, so that if his striving after the object in
question involved at least a venial sin, he would truly sin — which would
not be true if he were unable to refrain from the act. In exactly the same
way, a sinner can be internally illuminated by God with so great a light to
acknowledge his own wicked deeds and the penalties they impose on
him and ultimately the goodness of God and the ingratitude shown

Him, and the sinner’s will (including its sentient part) can be imbued
with so great a rapture and delight and so stirred toward contrition and
love that we must unreservedly believe that he would unhesitatingly
elicit his consent; and yet he would always have the freedom to refrain
from doing this if he so willed — even though he would rarely or never
withhold his consent in the face of so great an illumination and such
powerful assistance, especially if there was at the same time some external

sign inducing him to the same act, as, for example, the heavenly light’s
surrounding Paul, and his falling to the ground, and Christ’s appearing
to him and saying, “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute me? It is hard for

23That is, no human being can reject God if he or she has a clear and immediate
cognition of God. Molina later alludes to the fact that the blessed in heaven, given their
beatific vision of God, are not free to reject God or to sin against Him.
 Part 4
[263]

you to kick against the goad” [Acts 9:4-5]. Now, the conversions of Paul,
Magdalene, and the thief on the cross were, it appears, of just this type.
We should not, however, use the example of these three people as a
measure of those other conversions that occur daily in the Church
through ordinary assistance and with far greater difficulty on the part of

the people who are converted. What’s more, assuming equal assistance
on God’s part, the conversions of Paul, Magdalene, and the thief could
have been more or less intense, if their faculties of choice had cooper¬
ated more or less intensely with God’s assistance. This is what Christ
seems to have been praising in Magdalene when he said, “Many sins are
forgiven her, because she has loved much” [Luke 7:47]. Also, notice
that, as we showed in Part I— II, question 10, no particular object is
necessarily desired in this life, as regards the species of the act, with such
a pervasive necessity that it cannot sometimes (even if rarely) be rejected
through a negative volition because of some evil that is able to be
conjoined to it.24 Therefore, despite the assistance in question, it was
within the power of Paul, Magdalene, and the thief to will not to be
converted — and this because of the great difficulty involved in keeping
themselves free from mortal sin throughout their entire lives, as they
had to resolve to do in order for there to be genuine contrition, even if a
mortal sin would very rarely or never occur in the face of assistance of
such a quality and quantity. So it follows that even in these conversions
the decree of the Council of Trent has a place, when it states that a

human being’s faculty of choice, though moved and stirred by God

toward justification through the assistance of His grace, is able to dissent
if it so chooses. 25

15. Seventh objection. They argue, seventh, as follows: 26 “Each of the

meritorious acts of the Most Blessed Virgin and of the others who were
confirmed in grace — especially those acts by which they fulfilled precepts
and those acts that they were obliged to elicit under pain of mortal guilt
or loss of grace — each of those acts was predetermined by God through
an intrinsically efficacious concurrence or assistance. 27 Nor did this

24Molina’s commentary on Part I— II of Aquinas’s Summa Theologiae, a commentary that

dates from 1568—70, is found in manuscript form in the National Library at Lisbon,
Fundo Geral cod. 2804.
^^Council of Trent, sess. 6, canon 4 (in Denzinger, 1554, p. 378).
2® Zumel, Commmteria, q. 14, a. i,disp. unica, concl. 3, p. 363b; q. 19, a. 8,disp. i,concl.
4, p. 562b; and q. 23, a. 3, disp. 8, prop. 1, p. 676a.
27 A person 5 is conhrmed in grace at a time t if and only if (i) S is in the state of grace at t
and (ii) S will always be in the state of grace (and hence will never fall into mortal sin) after t.
According to Catholic doctrine, the Blessed Virgin was not only conhrmed in grace from
the time of her conception but, in addition, avoided even venial sin throughout her life.
 Disputation 55
[264]

detract from the freedom of those acts, since even though these people
were not able in the composed sense not to elicit the acts (because it involves
a contradiction for someone to be conhrmed in grace and yet not to elicit
an act that he is obliged to elicit under pain of mortal guilt), still, in order
for them to be said to have elicited the acts freely and in order for them
to be able to gain merit by those acts, it is sufficient that they were able in
the divided sense not to elicit them. Therefore, predeterminations via

God’s intrinsically efficacious concurrence have to be countenanced.

Nor is freedom of choice impaired by the fact that, as long as such a
predetermination is in force, the predetermined act is not able in the
composed sense not to be elicited; for it is sufficient that the act be able in
the divided sense not to be elicited.”

16. Response. As far as this argument is concerned, even though it

should be conceded that the acts in question were predetermined in the
sense we explicated in the preceding part, it should nonetheless be
denied that they were predetermined through an intrinsically effica¬
cious assistance, as the argument claims. For despite God’s concurrence
and the assistance of grace, it was always within the power of the Blessed
Virgin and of the others confirmed in grace not to elicit those acts, and it
was always within their power to render such assistance or concurrence
fruitless — even at the moment at which they elicited the acts and even
under the influence of the assistance by which they elicited them; other¬
wise, they would not have gained merit by means of the acts elicited at
that moment or under the influence of that assistance. Nor should the
Blessed Virgin and the others confirmed in grace be denied the honor,

among other things, of the just man who “could have sinned and yet did
not sin, who could have done evil deeds and yet did not” [Ecclus. 31:10].
Now, confirmation in grace involves God’s deciding to confer on
someone, during the entire course of his life, grace and assistance by
which He foresaw that the person in question would never fall by his
freedom into mortal sin, even though he was able so to fall despite that

grace and assistance. It also involves God’s making it manifest that He

has decided to protect the person in this way. Likewise, for the Blessed
Virgin to be preserved from every sin, even venial sin, is nothing other
than for God to bestow on her and to have decided from eternity to
bestow on her, during the entire course of her life, grace and gifts and
aids by which He foresaw that she would not fall by her freedom even
into venial sin — though, despite those same aids and gifts, she could fall
by that same freedom if she so willed. And so God’s certitude that a
person confirmed in grace will not sin mortally or thus fall out of grace
for the whole course of his life from the point at which he is said to be
 Part 4
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confirmed in grace — this certitude is traced back to the certitude of the

divine foreknowledge by which He foresaw that this would happen,
given the grace and aids in question, because of the freedom of choice of
the person so confirmed; and it is not traced back to an intrinsic efficacy
on the part of the divine assistance — as though it were not the case that
the person in question was able to fall into mortal sin despite that
assistance, and as though the question of whether or not that assistance
would be efficacious for that effect did not depend on the innate free¬
dom of the person so conhrmed in grace to will or to refuse to cooperate
with or consent to that assistance. Therefore, the fact that St. Peter, from
the day of Pentecost onward, fell under the concept of a human being
conhrmed in grace depended both on the fact that (i) God willed to
confer on him the plenitude of grace and assistance which He had
decided from eternity to confer on him from that time onward, and also
on the fact that (ii) God foresaw that St. Peter, given the grace and
assistance in question, would not in his freedom lapse into mortal sin for
the rest of his life. But it was not because God foreknew this second fact
that it was going to obtain; to the contrary, it was foreknown because it
was going to obtain by virtue of the freedom of St. Peter as fortihed by
those gifts. Clearly, therefore, the fact that one conhrmed in grace is not
able in the composed sense not to fulhll the precepts that bind under
pain of mortal guilt does not take away any freedom at all from the one
conhrmed in grace; thus, such a person is able not to fulhll those
precepts if he so chooses. For if one of those precepts were such that he
was not going to fulhll it, as indeed is possible despite the divine fore¬
knowledge in question, then such foreknowledge would never have
existed in God; and thus St. Peter did not fall under the concept of one
conhrmed in grace simply by virtue of the fact that God had decided
from eternity to confer on him that plenitude of grace and those aids.

17. Eighth objection. Last, they argue as follows: 28 “The acts of Christ
the Lord were predetermined by God through intrinsically efficacious

assistance, especially that act by which he fulhlled the Father’s command

concerning the redemption of the human race by his own death. For
Christ, since he was at the same time God, was in no way able to sin, and
hence was not able not to elicit the act by which he was to fulhll that
command. And yet he elicited that act freely; otherwise, he would not
have merited anything by it, and, consequently, he would not have
redeemed the human race by it— which is heretical. Therefore, the
necessity in the composed sense of eliciting some act — whether because the

28 See n. 26 above.
 Disputation 55
[266]

act is predetermined via efficacious concurrence, or because through it a

command is fulfilled and it is elicited by someone who, since he is at the
same time God and man, is in no way able to sin — this necessity does not
absolutely destroy either the act’s freedom or its merit. For it is enough
that the act should be free in the divided sense, as it was in the case of
Christ. It follows from this that predeterminations via intrinsically effi¬
cacious assistance should not be ruled out on the grounds that they take
away freedom from the acts, since it is sufficient for freedom that a
predetermined act be able in the divided sense not to be elicited, as has to
be affirmed of that act of Christ’s.”

18. Response. This argument forces us to explain, outside its proper

place, (i) in what sense it involved a contradiction for Christ to sin while
he was a wayfarer, and (ii) how it was that he had during that same time
the freedom to fail to perform an act whose omission would have been
blameworthy in Christ, and thus (iii) how he gained merit both by

fulfilling the rest of the commands, according to John 15:10,“. . .just as

I too have observed the commandments of my Father, and I remain in

His love,” and also by fulfilling in particular the command of the Father
having to do with the death he had to undergo for the redemption of the

human race, according to John 10:18, where he says of his death, “This
commandment I have received from my Father,” and according to John
14:31, where he says of his passion and death, “I do as my Father has
commanded me; arise, let us go,” and according to Philippians 2:8, “He
humbled himself, becoming obedient unto death, even to the death of

the cross,” and according to Hebrews 5:8, “Though he was the Son of
God, he learned obedience from the things that he suffered.”

19. Now, in order that this might be understood better, it should be

noted that what is owed to the human nature assumed by the Word by
reason of the assumption or grace of union is far different from what
belongs to it because of the mere assumption, excluding all the other
gifts that are owed to it by reason of the grace of union. 29 For the Word
as Word has no causal effect at all on the assumed human nature, but
instead merely terminates the dependence of that nature without any

29 Molina is here trying to establish some conceptual space between what follows as a
matter of metaphysical necessity from the fact that a human nature is assumed by a divine
person and what follows as a matter of what might be called natural propriety from such an
assumption. He will argue below that some gifts that follow from the grace of union by a
quasi-natural necessity or propriety can be and are miraculously withheld from Christ
before his death, and this allows Christ to have genuine freedom to obey or disobey,
through the operations of his human nature, the commands of his Father.
 Part 4
[267]

causality at all; whereas the hypostatic union has as its efficient cause the
whole Trinity as one God, through a causal influence on the humanity by
which the humanity’s very own esse is supernaturally conferred on it—
though with a dependence on the suppositum of the Word, which is why
the humanity is united to the divine Word.^® Thus, clearly, the assumed
nature has no powers,jW by virtue of this union, over and beyond those
it would have if, left to itself, it were to subsist on its own or in its own
proper suppositum.

20. For in the sacrament of the altar, at the moment of time at which
the transubstantiation of the bread into the Body of Christ takes place,
the accidents that were in the substance of the bread come to exist in

themselves through the supernatural influence of the whole Trinity —

not in the sense that the accidents acquire a new esse, but rather in the
sense that the very same esse now becomes independent of a subject, in a
way surpassing the nature of the accidents, through a new causal influ¬
ence in the genus of efficient causality, an influence by which (i) the
accidents are actualized in themselves and (ii) the material causality of
the subject, a causality otherwise necessary for the accidents to exist, is
replaced and compensated for. In the same way, since an individual
human nature is intrinsically such that it subsists in itself and is a sup¬
positum if left to itself, so that it requires nothing else to support and
sustain it, clearly it surpasses its nature that it should, through a new
influence on it by the whole Trinity, be made dependent on the distinct
suppositum of the Word, to which it is united in the sense of existing in it
and being sustained by it; nonetheless, it becomes dependent in this
manner not because the Trinity confers a different esse on it by means of
that influence, but rather because it confers the very same esse, which is
now made weaker in itself, as it were, so that it requires a distinct
suppositum by which it might be sustained in a far more felicitous and
dignified way than it would be if it subsisted in itself or in its own proper
suppositum.

In every other case an individual human nature is itself a suppositum or ultimate

subject of characteristics. In the case of Christ, however, the Word (that is, the Second
Person of the Blessed Trinity) is the suppositum for the assumed human nature. St.
Thomas elucidates this point by claiming that the assumed nature lacks its own proper
substantival esse or being. Molina’s somewhat different elucidation makes use of the
distinction between a thing’s esse being dependent on something distinct from it and that
same esse's being independent of any other thing. For more on the metaphysics of the
Incarnation, along with references to pertinent medieval texts, see my “Logic, Ontology
and Ockham’s Christology,” New Scholasticism 57 (1983): 293-330, and “Human Nature,
Potency and the Incarnation,’’ Faith and Philosophy 3 (1986): 27—53.
31 Molina assumes that each entity has its own esse or being and that this being is neither
intrinsically independent nor intrinsically dependent, but can instead be made either inde-
 Disputation 55
[268]

2 1 . From this it will now be easy to see that (i) the human nature, to
be sure, acquires the grace of union as a result of its assumption by the
divine Word, that is, it has the Word as its suppositum, but that (ii) just
as the human nature by that very fact imparts to the Word the being
of this man who is at the same time truly God, so in turn it receives from
the Word an infinite dignity by reason of which the works performed
through it are of infinite merit and glory. But even though the human
nature acquires this grace of union through the assumption, and even
though this grace is the source and origin of the fact that the human
nature is owed all the gifts that befit a man who is at the same time the
only begotten of the Father, still, if we prescind from the gifts, the nature
does not have greater powers than it would have were it left to itself to
subsist in itself or in its own proper suppositum. Therefore, just as,
despite the assumption, it would be able to die were it left to its own
nature, as it died in Christ, and just as it would be able to suffer the rest
of the tribulations and miseries that other mortals suffer, so too it would
be able to have the natural movements of sensuality, as well as the
intense emotions and the rebellions against reason that others experi¬
ence (more or less, depending on the sort of temperament with which it
had been endowed); and it would also have natural freedom of choice,
by which it would be able to resist and to consent, just as if it subsisted in
itself or in its own proper suppositum. Thus, just as (i) the human nature
in Christ stands in need of the light of glory in order to see the divine
essence and in order for its soul to be beatified, and just as (ii) the human
nature also needs the glory of the body, or the gifts that flow from the
glory of the soul over into the body from the moment of the resurrection
onward, in order to be immortal and impassible and in order to have the
rest of the characteristics that belong to glorified bodies, so too in order
for the intense emotions and movements against reason not to have
risen up against reason in its sentient part while it was still a wayfarer,
that nature needed a plenitude of habitual grace and virtues, and it
needed gifts such as original justice in its sentient part — gifts by which
that sentient part might be restrained and kept within the bounds of
duty. And the same holds for the other gifts required for other func¬
tions and ends.

pendent or dependent by divine fiat. In the Eucharist the sensible accidents of the bread
and wine first have dependent being of the sort characteristic of accidents and then by a
special act of God miraculously come to have independent being, since after the consecra¬
tion of the bread and wine there is no longer any subject or suppositum for them to inhere
in. In the Incarnation an individual human nature, which would have had independent
being if left to itself, comes to have that very same being as dependent instead.
32The “glory of the soul” is the immediate effect of the soul’s beatific vision of God.
Molina’s claim here is that neither this glory nor the resultant glory of the body follows by
 Part 4 [269]

2 2 . Finally, observe that even though by reason of the grace of union

all those things were owed to Christ or to his humanity that he had after
the Resurrection, nonetheless, since (i) the Incarnation was by the same
token arranged by God in order that Christ might by his merits and
death redeem the human race, and in order that by his most holy and
perfect life he might furnish mortals with an especially shining example,
an example by which they would be instructed in every kind of virtue
and perfection, and by which they would be strongly stimulated and
impelled toward imitating him, and since (ii) it was more glorious for
Christ to gain the glory and exaltation of the body by his own proper
merits than for him to have had this glory immediately from the very
beginning, it follows that even though from the moment of his concep¬
tion, when the Holy Spirit fashioned that most sacred body in the womb
of the Virgin, he acquired an absolutely perfect constitution, and even
though his soul saw the divine essence, and even though the whole of
Christ, body and soul, was hlled with those habits and gifts that did not
conflict with the purposes of the Incarnation explained above or with his
status of being simultaneously a wayfarer and a comprehender of the
divine essence, nonetheless he did not receive the glory of the body until
the Resurrection. Nor was it just this bodily glory that God miraculously
prevented from arising out of the glory of the soul; but at the same time
the vision of the divine essence, along with the beatific love and enjoy¬
ment, was also communicated by God to the human nature in such a way
that by preventing (in a manner surpassing the nature of these goods)
the effects that ought to have resulted from them by a necessity of

nature. He left Christ’s will susceptible to anguish and sadness and

hence free to fulfill or not to fulfill the precepts that bound him under
pain of guilt — just as if the glory of the soul had not existed in Christ.
For it was necessary that this be so in order that he might be able to gain
merit and redeem the human race by his most innocent life and death,
and in order that he might be able to bequeath to mortals with such great
honor and glory the especially shining example of his life and to attain
the glory and exaltation of the body. In fact, the dual status of wayfarer
and comprehender is attributed to Christ from the moment of his
conception in the womb of the Virgin up to his expiration on the cross

metaphysical necessity merely from the human nature’s being assumed by a divine person.
All that follows is a strong inclination toward such glory, an inclination that may be
impeded in the same way that the natural causal inclinations of ordinary material sub¬
stances may be impeded. The same holds for other gifts, such as “original justice” of the
sort that characterized the first parents before their sin. All such gifts and special graces
are, to be sure, “owed” to the assumed nature because of their quasi-natural connection to
the grace of union. But some of them may be miraculously impeded and withheld for
other reasons — and this is what Molina claims to have happened in the case of Christ.
 Disputation 5 5
[270]

precisely because the glory of the soul was held back in such a way that
Christ’s will was free to fulfill or not to fulfill the commandments in
question, just as if he had not had that glory, but had instead been a
mere wayfarer.

23. We may now formulate a response to the objection in accor¬

dance with the points just explicated. If Christ is thought of as having
those things that are owed to his nature by reason of the grace of union,
then it must be claimed that Christ was in no way able to sin — as
Augustine affirms in De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chap. 15, in Enchiri¬
dion, chap. 40, and frequently in other places, and as the rest of the
Fathers generally affirm as well.^^ For it was owed to Christ’s humanity
that it should in no way be permitted by God to sin, and it was altogether
abominable and improper that the Word should sin, even through the
assumed nature. Therefore, just as it involves a contradiction for God to
lie — not, to be sure, because God lacks the power to form those sounds
that, if they were uttered, would constitute a lie, but rather because for
God to lie is altogether unseemly and incompatible with His infinite
goodness — so, too, it involves a contradiction for Christ to sin, not
because Christ as a wayfarer lacks the ability to transgress commands,
but rather because it is impossible for God to permit it, and because it is
incompatible with the infinite goodness of the divine Word that he
should sin, even through his assumed nature, and thus that God should
permit it. Therefore, it pertained to divine providence to arrange things

in such a way that while Christ’s freedom was preserved, a freedom

required for merit and for the purposes explained above, he would in no
way sin; and this is in fact what happened. Hence, it is also the case, in
keeping with what was said in response to the last objection, that Christ
was not able in the composed sense to sin, since he was the most exalted of
those confirmed in grace and goodness, having received far more excel¬
lent gifts and supports than even his most holy mother. Now in the
composed sense it involves a contradiction for someone confirmed in grace
and goodness to sin — though not in the divided sense and absolutely,
since if he were going to sin, as he is able to despite the gifts, then (i) God
would not foreknow that he was in his freedom not going to sin, given
those gifts, and thus (ii) he would not fall under the concept of one
confirmed in grace and goodness, as was explained in the response to
the preceding argument.
But suppose that Christ is thought of insofar as he was a wayfarer and
insofar as the glory of the soul was suspended for the purposes ex-

44, 982, and PL 40, 252.

 Part 4

[271]

plained above, that is, lest that glory take away Christ’s freedom to
transgress commands in the way that it takes away the freedom of those
other beatified persons who are not at the same time wayfarers;^'* and
suppose that he is thought of as having submitted to death with the
greatest difficulty and grief, and as having performed other laborious
and difficult tasks for the salvation of the human race, as is attested to by

Luke 12:50, “There is a baptism by which I have to be baptized, and

what straits I am in until it is accomplished,” and by Matthew 26:37—39,
“He began to grow sorrowful and to be sad [Mark 14:33 has: “He began
to be fearful and weary”]. And he said to them ‘My soul is sorrowful until
death. Stay here and keep watch with me.’ And he fell on his face
praying, and said, ‘My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me;
still, not as I will, but as You will.’ ” And his agony and sadness were so
great that, as Luke 22:42 says, his sweat “became like drops of blood,
trickling down to the ground.” The same thing is corroborated by He¬
brews 4:15, “For we do not have a high priest who cannot have compas¬
sion on our infirmities, but one who in all things was tempted in a similar

way [that is, as if he were one of us] without sin,” and by Matthew 27:46,
“My God, my God why have you forsaken me?” If, I repeat, Ghrist is
thought of in this manner, then clearly, despite the other authorities
that were cited above, Christ really did have the freedom not to do those
things that he was obligated by precept to do; and yet he was certain that,
even though his nature resisted very strongly, he would in his freedom
fulfill all those commands as completely and perfectly as possible, and
that he would be helped toward this end by the most powerful gifts and
aids.

It follows that Christ’s death was not only spontaneous but also abso¬
lutely free with the freedom of contradiction or even of contrariety, and
at the same time it was commanded of him — nor does the one point
conflict with the other. Indeed, Christ taught both of these points at

John 10:17—18 when he said, “This is why the Father loves me, because I
lay down my life. No one takes it from me, but rather I lay it down by
myself. I have the power to lay it down and I have the power to take it up

again. This commandment I have received from my Father.”

It also follows that Christ’s death was especially laborious and difficult,
since his nature was horrified by it and resisted it as much as possible, as

is clear from the passages already cited and also from Romans 15:3, “For
Christ did not please himself, but as it is written, ‘The reproaches of
those who reproached you fell upon me.’ ” And yet, because of the gifts

Molina refers here to the blessed in heaven, who are no longer free to reject God, since
they lack the power to reject Him.
 Disputation 55
[272]

and the assistance by which Christ was supported, and because of the
incredible magnitude and fervor of the love that he extended to God
and to his neighbors, he was at the same time absolutely willing — this
according to Matthew 26:41, “The spirit is willing, but the flesh is weak,”
and Psalm 18:6, “He has rejoiced, like a giant, to run the course,” that is,
the task of the passion and death by which he hnished the course.
Finally, it follows that Christ’s death and his other works were in every
way absolutely perfect and complete, the sort of works that were htting
for a redeemer, both as far as our advantage and example are concerned
and as regards his own highest (in both quality and quantity) praise and
honor.

24. Therefore, as far as the form of the argument is concerned, it

should be denied that Christ’s acts — even that act by which he fulhlled
the Father’s command regarding the redemption of the human race by
his death — were predetermined by God through intrinsically efficacious
assistance, as though in the presence of this assistance Christ did not
have the power not to elicit those acts despite such assistance; for this

would be to take away Christ’s freedom at the moment of time at which

he elicited those acts, and hence to take away their merit.
As for the proof, it has already been explained that it is not because of
the efficacy of the assistance but rather because of those other two things
that Christ was not able in the composed sense to sin and hence not able in
the composed sense not to elicit those acts;^^ and this does not deprive
Christ of his freedom in the divided sense or absolutely, with the result that
he was able not to elicit those acts at the very moment at which he elicited
them.
Now, from what has been said it is sufficiently clear that the rest of the
things added in the argument do not prove that divine predetermina¬
tions via efficacious assistance have to be countenanced, since assistance
of this sort absolutely deprives the faculty of choice of the one on whom
it is bestowed of its freedom at the moment at which it elicits the act.
Nor is it the case that a divided sense of the sort intended by those who
posit such predeterminations leaves intact the freedom of a faculty of
choice which is aided by intrinsically efficacious assistance. Rather, such
a divided sense merely places in God the freedom to confer or not to
confer such assistance, and thus the freedom to bring it about that the

35The two things referred to here seem to be (i) God’s being unable to permit Christ to
sin and (ii) its being incompatible with the infinite goodness of the divine Word that he
should sin even through the operations of his human nature. But it may be that Molina is
counting (i) and (ii) together as one thing and that the second thing is the fact that Christ is
confirmed in grace, indeed is the most illustrious of those who are confirmed in grace.
 Part 4
[273]

faculty of choice elicits or does not elicit such an act, as was explained
above; but this is not so with that divided sense that stands opposed to
the composed sense in which Christ, because of the other two grounds,
was not able to sin or to desist from eliciting an act to which he was
obliged by a commandment, as we have explained.^®

^®See n. 35 on the two grounds referred to here. One general comment on Molina’s
discussion of Christ’s freedom to sin: Although I have not treated this topic in the
Introduction and am not entirely comfortable with Molina’s stated views, I am convinced
that what Molina says here is worth taking seriously, both philosophically (because of its
implications for the analysis of freedom) and theologically (because it addresses in a
creative and yet straightforward fashion one of the thorniest problems of traditional
Christology).
where. I hope to discuss Molina’s treatment of this problem in more depth else¬
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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Works from the Patristic Era Cited by Molina in Part IV

Ambrose, Saint. De Excessu Fratris Sui Satyri, book i .

- . Enarratio in 12 Psalmos Davidicos, Psalms 40 and 45.
- . Epistola y8.
Augustine of Hippo, Saint. De Civitate Dei, book 5, chaps. 9 and 10.
- . De Correptione et Gratia, chap. 7.
- . De Libero Arbitrio, book 3, chaps. 3, 4, and 10.
- . De Praedestinatione Sanctorum, chap. 14.
- . Epistolae 105 and 107.
- . Hypognosticon, book 6.
- . Quaestiones ad Simplicianum, book 1, q. 2.
Cyprian, Saint. Ad Quirinum, book 3, chap. 58.
- . De Mortalitate, chap. 23.
Cyril of Alexandria, Saint. In lohannem 13:18.
- . Thesaurus, assertion 15.
Fulgentius of Ruppe. De Fide ad Petrum, chap. 35.
Jerome, Saint. Dialogus adversus Pelagianos, book 3.
- . In Ezechielem, book 1 .
- . In Isaiam, book 5.
- . In leremiam, book 5.
John Chrysostom, Saint. In Matthaeum, homily 59.
John Damascene, Saint. Dialogus adversus Manichaeos, no. 37.
Justin Martyr, Saint. Expositiones Quaestionum a Gentibus Christianis Propositarum,

q- 58.
- . Responsiones ad Christianos de Quibusdam Quaestionibus Necessariis, q. 8.
Origen. In Epistolam ad Roman, book 7.
Pelagius. Expositiones in XIII Epistolas Sancti Pauli: In Ephesios, chap. 1.
Pope St. Leo I. Sermo 67.
Tertullian. Adversus Marcionem, book 2.

[275]
 Bibliography
[276]

Other Works Cited by Molina in Part IV

Aquinas, Saint Thomas. De Veritate, q. 2, a. 12; q. 6, a. 3.

- . Summa Contra Gentiles I, chap. 67.
- . Summa Theologiae I, q. 14, a. 8 and 13.
Aureoli, Peter. Commentaria in Primum Librum Sententiarum, dist. 38 and 39.
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 INDEX OF NAMES

Adams, Marilyn McCord, 44

Cyprian, St., 1 18
Adams, Robert M., 6, 50, 52, 62, 68-69, Cyril of Alexandria, St., 128, 183, 231
79
Ambrose, St., 118 Davis, Stephen, 3-4, 6
Anselm of Canterbury, St., 103 Deza, Didacus de (Hispalensis), 100
Aquinas, St. Thomas, 3—8, 16—18, 30- Donagan, Alan, 25, 92
36, 41-42, 56, 65, 69, 78, 85, 88, 92- Driedo, Johannes, 148
Dummett, Michael, 75
93, 98-105, 111-115, 123, 126-131,
134. 139. 142, 147. 151-153. 155. 162, Durandus, William, 92, 99-100, 142
164-165, 180-181, 187-188, 200,
224, 228, 240, 244, 263, 267 Edidin, Aron, 60-61
Aristotle, 8, 57, 93, 96, 106-108, 165,
176, 205, 257 Farrelly, Dom M. John, 8
Augustine of Hippo, St., 65, 103, 1 18- 102, 1 15 Francisco Sylvestri, 98-99,
Ferrariensis,
119, 142, 150, 160-161, 167, 171,
183-185, 224, 231-232, 245, 270 Fischer, John Martin, 6, 26, 45
Aureoli, Peter, 100 Flint, Thomas, 49—51, 76
Auxerre,
147 William of (Altissiodorensis), Frankfurt, Harry, 26
Fulgentius ofRuppe, 160

Bahez, Domingo, 4, 8, 36-43, 89, 134- Garrigou-Lagrange, Reginald, 23, 34, 36,
.139. 197 41—42, 62, 64-70
Biel, Gabriel, 100, 148 Geach, Peter, 6, 44, 57, 86
Billot, Louis, 38
Bilynskyj, Stephen, 86 Harre, Rom, 86
Boethius, 32-33, 103, 111, 123, 129, Hasker, William, 2, 6, 31, 62, 75-78
Hoffman, Joshua, 44
147, 184, 257
Bonaventure, St., 130, 142, 148-149
Burrell, David, 3 1 James, William, 44
Jansen, Cornelius (Gandavensis), 1 18
Cahill, John, 216 Jansen, Cornelius Otto, 1 18
Cajetan (Tommaso de Vio), 30, 98-99, Jerome, St., 127-128, 142, 171, 183,
102—104, 109, 112, 130, 228 191, 231
Capreolus, Johannes, 98—100, 102, 104 John Chrysostom, St., 182, 231
Carthusianus, Dionysius, 1 18 John Damascene, St., 3, 182, 231
Cordubensis, Antonius, 148 Justin Martyr, St., 181, 230
[282] Index of Names

Kenny, Anthony, 62—64, 74-75 Prieras, Sylvestro Mazzolini, 100, 148

Kretzmann, Norman, 8, 31, 86
Rabeneck, Johann, 3, 85
Leo I, St., 183 Richard of St. Victor, 152
Leo IX, St., 245 Rimini, Gregory of, 100, 147—148
Rosenkrantz, Gary, 44
Lewis, David, 50, 74
Lonergan, Bernard, 8-9 Ross, James, 8
Loux, Michael, 10
Lucas, J. R., 6 Scotus, John Duns, 69, 87, 99-100, 120
Lyra, Nicholas of (Lyranus), 118 125, 128, 130-135, 139-140, 143,
147-149.
Smith, 211 25
Gerard,
Madden, Edward, 86
Maritain, Jacques, 8 Soto, Dominic, 148
Stalnaker, Robert, 50, 74
Middleton, Richard of, 104, 148
Stegmiiller, Friedrich, 89, 96
Natalis, Hervaeus, too Stump, Eleonore, 31
Normore, Calvin, 8, 60-61, 79-80 Suarez, Francisco, 52, 78-79, 199
Swinburne, Richard, 6
Ockham, William of, 6, 99, 120, 135,
Tertullian, 167
147, 148, 151
Origen, 180-182, 184, 230-231
Vega, Andreas a, 148
Pegis, Anton, 25
Widerker, David, 76
Pelagius, 127-128
Pigge, Albertus (Pighius), 148 Wolterstorff, Nicholas, 31
Plantinga, Alvin, 49, 59—60, 69
Pontifex, Mark, 8 Zumel, Francisco, 40, 89, 196—205, 207
Porree, Gilbert de la, 147 208, 213, 228, 253-266
 INDEX OF SUBJECTS

Absolute future contingents. See Future 36-37, 48-49, 54, 67, 88, 93-96,
contingents 116, 132-137, 142, 157, 168, 178-
Abstractive vs. intuitive cognition, 1 20— 179, 186, 220, 243
121 See also Freedom
Acts of will: Commanded acts. See Acts of will
commanded, 25—26, 92 Compatibilism, 24—28, 77
elicited, 25—26, 92 See also Freedom
Aeviternity, 31, 128—129 Composed (vs. divided) sense of a modal
Antirealism:
proposition, 135, 146-147, 162, 185-
with respect to absolute future con¬ 186, 189, 192, 197-198, 200, 217, 257,
163
tingents, 70-71 264-265, 270-272
with respect to conditional future con¬ Comprehension, 12, 51, 119, 140-142,
tingents, 69-71 1 70- 1 77, 206—207, 209-2 1 1
Arguments for the incompatibility of See also Supercomprehension
foreknowledge and freedom, 55—56, Concomitance theory, 42-46, 81, 145-
164—166
Asymmetry thesis, 64-65 Concurrence, God’s general:
disagreement over, 18—19, 96, 199—
Banezianism, 4, 8, 18, 23-28, 34-43, 46, 200, 239-240
48-50, 62, 64-68, 77, 81, 87, 134, 137, efficacious, 18, 23, 28, 36-42, 77, 87,
136, 197-203, 213-228, 234-238,
246-247, 250, 255-266
Causal indeterminism in nature, 28—29, inefficacious (merely sufficient), 18, 36,
198
96-97
Causation (efficient), nature of, 14-15, as pervasive divine activity, 17—20, 93—
86
94, 96, 132-133,
220-221, 239-244,197, 200, 213,
Cause: 247
See also Cause
first (primary), 16, 134-135. i37
general (universal), 17-19, 65, 85, 93- Conditional excluded middle, 50—5 1 , 80
94, 132, 178-180, 186, 197, 213, Conditional future contingents:
220-221, 239-244, 247 and freedom, 75—78
natural vs. free, 28-29, 86, 184 ground for, 68-75
necessary, 114-115, 164, 186-187 knowledge of, 51—53, 78-80
particular, 17-19, 132, 178-180, 186, See also Future contingents
241 Conditioned future contingents. See Fu¬
secondary (creaturely), 16-24, 28-29, ture contingents

[283]
[284] Index of Subjects

Conservation, divine, 16-20, 88, 93-94 98-1 16, 122—127

Contingency: irrelevance of, 35, 120—127
sources of, 19-21,85-97, 132-133, as the proper durational measure of
238-241 divine being, 31, 99-100
two senses of, 85—87
See also Contingent effects, categories
Free knowledge. See Knowledge, God’s
of; Modality Freedom (free choice):
Contingent effects, categories of, 20-23, as an appetitive rather than cognitive
88, 93-97, 178-180, 238-241 power, 89—90
See also Effects Banezian account of, 24-28, 37
Counterfactuals of freedom, 29, 75-76 in brute animals, 87-93
See also Conditional future contingents cognitive prerequisites for, 25, 89-93
Creation ex nihilo, 16—17, 19—20, 88, 93— of contradiction, 25, 224-226, 234,
246, 271
94, 161-162
Creation situations:
of contrariety, 25, 224-226, 234, 246,
Banezian, 37-39, 48-49
Molinist, 47-51 and271foreknowledge, 5—7, 53—62, 164-
166, 178-195
Decrees, divine: and middle knowledge, 75-78
antecedent, 42-44, 49, 54 Molinist account of, 24-28, 36, 88-95
concomitant, 42-44 with respect to the exercise of an act,
as expressing intention or permission,
90-91, 225, 262
3. 35-36, 42-43, 49, 54, 192, 207- with respect to the species of an act,
21 1 90-91, 225
See also Predeterminations Future contingents:
Deterministic natural tendency, 15, 19, absolute, 21-24, 35, 38, 47, 66, 70-72,
41, 70
Divided (vs. composed) sense of a modal conditional,
78, 140 21—24, 29, 36—38, 45, 47—
proposition, 135—136, 146—147, 162, 53.66-79, 117, 119, 141-143
185-186, 192, 197, 217, 233, 264, 266, conditioned, 21—24, 34, 78, 116-118,
270-272, 201—202, 207, 219-220, 242, 248
Divine ideas (ideal natures), 10, 112-114,
130-133. 139-144. 203-209
^74
Geachian theory of freedom and fore¬
knowledge, 57-61
Effects: God:
considered as existing in their causes, comprehensiveness of deliberation and
111-113,145
creative act of willing in, 38, 173-
considered as existing outside their
causes, 30, 98, 1 1 1-115, 123-124, ordering of cognitive and volitional
158 acts in, 3, 1 15-1 16, 171, 174-175,
contingent, 19-24, 36-38, 85-88, 94-
209-212
16-19
97. 111-113, 121, 134 as hrst determining Being, 66-67
necessary, 19-21 as paradigmatic indeterministic cause,
See also Contingent effects, categories
of
Elicited acts. See Acts of will as perfect artisan or craftsman, 2-4,
121 — 122, 178, 206—207, 209
Esse, 267
as pure actuality lacking passivity, 5-6,
Eternal vs. temporal present, 10, 30-34, 66-68
101 — 1 10, 122—127
See also Concurrence, God’s general;
See also Eternity
Decrees, divine; Eternity; Knowl¬
Eternity:
adequate vs. nonadequate existence in, edge, God’s; Omnipresence; Order¬
ing relations within the same
31-32, 109-110 moment of time; Permission of evil;
common Scholastic account of, 30-32 Predestination ; Predeterminations ;
existence of created things in, 30—34,
Providence, divine; Will, God’s
 [285]
Index of Subjects

Grace: Liberty of indifference, 136

actual, 37, 64-65, 85, 87 Liberty of spontaneity, 136, 216
confirmation in, 263-265, 270
cooperating, 37, 50, 203, 237, 245, 247
Modality:
Middle knowledge. See Knowledge, God’s
efficacious,
235 38-42, 77, 87, 136, 203,
metaphysical, 10-13
habitual (sanctifying), 203, 215, 268 natural (causal), 14-16, 24-28
merely sufficient, 37, 39
temporal (accidental), 13-14, 55-62,
247
prevenient, 37, 50, 203, 237-238, 245, 164-165, 188-190
t
of union, 266—270 Natural knowledge. See Knowledge,

Impeccability of Christ, 266-273 Natural necessity (necessity of nature).

Incarnation, 266—273 See Modality
Infallibility of Church teaching on faith God’s effects. See Effects
Necessary
and morals, 61
Necessity. See Modality
Intuitive vs. abstractive cognition, 120-
121 Negation, propositional vs. terminal,
106-108

Knowledge, God’s: Objective vs. real existence, 30, 100, 1 14

as a cause of things, 3—5
Occasionalism, 14, 17—18
of evil or sinful contingent effects, 38—
Ockhamism, 6, 57, 59-61, 148-149
42, 133, 136-139, 212-223, 246-
247, 252 Omnipresence:
free, 12, 23-24, 38, 47, 53, 119, 131, spatial, 31, 100
145-147. 149. 168-170, 173, 175, temporal, 31— 34, 100-110, 122-129
179-180, 187, 197, 206, 208, 210, Ordering relations within the same mo¬
ment of time, 151-156, 175, 256-257
212,229,239,253-255
of future contingents according to St.
Thomas, 7-8, 30-36, 111 — 115 Permission of evil, 3-4, 38-40, 43-45,
of His own free act of will, 171-177, 49, 121-122, 170, 178, 204, 217-218,
207—2 1 1 246-247, 251—252, 258, 260
as intuitive vs. inferential, 34 Petitionary prayer, 61-62
middle, 13, 23-24, 29, 46-62, 66-68, Possible-worlds semantics for subjunctive
conditionals, 74-75
79-80, 117, 119, 141, 157, 168-180,
187, 192, 196-205, 208, 212-214, Power over the past, 44-46, 54, 59-61,
218-223, 228-230, 233, 235-237, 78, 147-149, 153-159, 164-165, 188
242, 248-256 Predestination, 66, 121-122, 146-147,
natural, 11-12, 23-24, 37-38, 47, 54, 151-153. 155. 159-161, 169, 178, 195,
199, 228, 232-237, 245
Predeterminations:
16 17 17 17 18 18 19
199, 20 1, 20 3, 20 8, 21 0, 21 7, 22 7- Bahezian account of and Molina’s crit¬
8, 4, 6, 8, 0, 2, 9,
23 24 24 25 icisms, 36-42, 191, 196-214, 218-
9, 2, 8,
postvolitional, 4, 12,3-223-24 229, 232-238, 259-261, 271
5 Molinist account of, 43, 238-253
pre volitional, 3-5, 11, 4 13, 22-24, 34-
See also Providence, divine
38, 47-54
Premotion, 18, 200, 221
reconciliation of with free choice, 5-7,
53-62, 151, 157-158, 164-166, Principle of predilection, 65-66
Probability:
178-195.227-229
epistemic, 72-74, 79
of simple intelligence (abstractive),
metaphysical, 71—74
of vision, 3-4, 53-54, 121, 127 158-159 problem of, 45-46, 60-62,
Prophecy,
127

Libertarianism, 24-28, 77-78 Providence, divine, 1-9, 35-36, 42-45,

See also Freedom
49-50. 80-81, 104, 121-122, 159—
[286] Index of Subjects

Providence, divine, {continued) Supercomprehension, 51-53, 79, 141

160, 178, 195, 200, 228, 239, 244-253, See also Comprehension
258, 270 Suppositum, 171-172, 210, 267-268
See also Predeterminations
Terms of theological censure, 216
Thomistic theories of freedom and fore¬
Real (actual) vs. objective (cognitive) exis¬ knowledge, 6-8, 56-57,61, 111-115
Time:
tence, 30, too, 113-115, 120-124,
126-127 122-129
God’s relation to, 31-34, 100-110,
Relations of reason, 149, 155-156, 211
Reprobation. See Predestination of
as the proper durational measure
physical creatures, 3 1
Sacred167Scripture: See abo Aeviternity; Eternity
evidence for divine foreknowledge in, Transubstantiation, 267

inspiration of, 6 1 antecedent, 3, 244

Molina’s use of, 62-64 l, seq
Wilcon ’s: t,
Goduen
Sinful action, material vs. formal element 3, 244
of, 137
permissive, 244
well-pleased, 244
tive, 99
Spatial location, circumspective vs. defini¬
See also Decrees, divine
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Molina, Luis de, 1535—1600.

On divine foreknowledge.

Translation of: Concordia liberi arbitrii cum gratiae donis. Part 4.

Bibliography: p.
Includes indexes.

1. Providence and government of God — Early works to 1800. 2. Predestina¬

tion — Early works to 1800. 3. Free will and determinism — Early works to 1800.
1. Freddoso, Alfred J. 11.
BT95.M6513 1988 231'. 4 88—3887
ISBN 0-8014—2131-4 (alk. paper)
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