*

-5

24-n§9§4 ORIGINAL
3)n tfje Supreme Court of ttje fHrnteb States
DANIEL E. HALL, PETITIONER FILED
V. NOV 0 7 2024
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
TWITTER INC., RESPONDENT SUPREME COURT, U.S.

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
CASE NO. 23-1555

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS

Daniel E. Hall
Petitioner, Pro Se
Aka. Sensa Verogna
393 Merrimack Street
Manchester, N.H. 03103
SensaVerogna@gmail.com

September 15, 2024

L'
 QUESTIONS

1. "How does the Supreme Court define and address instances of fraud
upon the court, the required duty to apply Local Rule 83.1(a), the
required procedure of voiding proceedings under Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) and
Rule 60(d) and what remedies are available to ensure justice is served
when such fraud is identified?"

2. "What are the implications of the Supreme Court’s decisions when the
required procedure of holding a hearing under Rule 201(e) are not
followed, and how does this impact the fairness and consistency of
judicial outcomes?"

3. "Under what circumstances does the Supreme Court consider issuing a

writ of mandamus to compel lower courts or public officials to act upon
the required procedure of noticing indisputable material facts under Rule
201(b), and what standards must be met to justify such extraordinary
relief?"

4. "Under what circumstances may the Supreme Court issue a writ of

mandamus to compel a lower court to accept jurisdiction, the required
application of notice pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2), statutory
entitlements proscribed in § 1981 and the state actor doctrine and what
are the broader implications for access to justice in such cases?"

5. "What standards does the Supreme Court apply when considering a writ
of mandamus to compel a judge to recuse themselves as proscribed in 28
U.S.C. § 455 and § 144, and how does this impact the integrity of judicial
proceedings?"

6. "Should the Supreme Court issue a writ of mandamus to compel the

lower court to conduct a hearing on the constitutionality of Section § 230,
given that the plaintiff* has sufficiently alleged potential violations of
constitutional rights and the lower court has not yet addressed these
claims?"

■ ■

II.
c

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF CONTENTS l

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 11

CITATIONS IV

I. JURISDICTION 1
II. STATEMENT OF CASE 2
III. FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND VOID JUDGMENTS 4
IV. ENTITLEMENTS of RULE 201...................................... 11
V. NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS UNDER § 1981 14
VI. NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS
UNDER STATE ACTOR DOCTRINE............................ ,21
VII. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY of 47 U.S.C. § 230............ .27
VIII. CONCLUSION.............................................................. 32
IX. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE................................ 40
APPENDIX I- COURT ORDERS EXHIBIT

Order of the First Circuit Appellate Court....... A

Order of the First Circuit Appellate Court....... B
Order of the District Court of New Hampshire C
Order of the First Circuit Appellate Court....... D

APPENDIX H- COURT FILINGS EXHIBIT

Appellant’s Brief in the First Circuit..... E

APPENDIX III- Declaration EXHIBIT
3- Twitter Motion to Dismiss................. 1
3.1- Twitter Memorandum of Law........ 2
10. Objection to Public Accommodation 3

I
10.1- Twitter Memorandum.......................................................................... 4
11. Objection to State Actor.......................................................................... 5
11.1 TWITTERS MEM TO STATE ACTOR................................................ 6
17. Twitter Obj to Motion for Default.......................................................... 7
17-1 — Twitter's MOL in Support of Objection to Motion for Def.............. 8
18. Twitter Obj to Motion to Default Judgment............................................ 9
18-2 — Twitter's MOL in Support of Objection to Motion for Def................. 10
21. Twitter Reply ISO Motion to Dismiss..................................................... 11
22. Twitter Reply Motion for Adm Pro Hac................................................. . 12
22-1 -- Twitter's Reply in Support of Motion for Admission Pro Hac......... 13
23. Twitter Inc.'s Motion to Strike Documents 19 and 20............................. 14
24. Twitter's MOL in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings-REDACTED 15
24-1 — Twitter's MOL in Support of Motion to Stay Proceedings................. 16
25. Twitter's Objection to Plf.'s Motion to Strike Twitter's Moti................... 17
26. Twitter Obj to Motion to Declare Public Forum..................................... 18
26-1 - Memo of Law in Support of Objection to Motion to Declare Tw..... 19
27. Twitter Obj to 15 Motion to Proceed Anon............................................. 20
37. Twitter Motion to Strike Document 35.................................................. 21
43. Twitter Inc.s Objection to Plaintiff s Motion for Reconsideration....... ,22
44. Twitter Reply Motion for Admission Pro Hac Vice................................. 23
50. Twitter Inc.'s Objection to Plaintiffs Motion for Judicial..................... ,24
51. Twitter Inc.'s Motion to Extend Time to Respond.................................. ,25
53. Twitter Inc.s Objection to Plaintiffs Request for Default......................... 26

/
Will v. United States :: 389 U.S. 90 (1967) 38
Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. (2016) 5,34

FIRST CIRCUIT

El Fenix de Puerto Rico v. The M/Y Johanny, 36 F.3d

136, 141 n.4 (1st Cir. 1994). 4,5
Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d 124, 128 (1st Cir.
2005) 15

Doe v.Brown Univ., 43 F.4th 195, 208 (1st Cir. 2022) 14

Educadores Puertorriquenos en Accion v.
Hernandez,367 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 2004); 15,20
McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 607
(1st Cir. 1979) 14
Ocasio-Hemandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 15 (1st
Cir. 2011) 16
Patel v. United States, Civil Action 24-10180-FDS, 3 (D.
Mass. Apr. 24, 2024). 15
Pina v. Children's Place, 740 F.3d 785, 796 (1st Cir.
2014), 17
Sammartano v. Palmas del Mar Properties, Inc., 161
F.3d96, 97 (1st Cir. 1998); 14

OTHER CIRCUITS

e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1543-46

(11th Cir. 1987) 5
Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,. 372 U.S. 58 (1963) 24
Calderon v. United States District Court 163 F.3d 530
(9th Cir. 1998); 14
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 368 (3d
Cir. 2008); 19
FAIR v. Rumsfeld (2004). 24

Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2004). 8

Kush v. Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 61 WASH. U. L. Q.
849(1983), 34
Missouri v. Biden, 83 F.4th 350 (5th Cir. 2023), 22
O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2023), ■ 22

IV.
See Lounds v. Lincare, Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th
Cir. 2015) ( 19

OTHER COURTS

Davis v. Colonial Freight Sys., Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-

674, 4 (E D. Tenn. Mar. 29, 2019); 6
e.g., Matter of Jindal for Pro Hac Vice Admission to
Virgin Islands Bar, 69 V.I. 942, 948-49 (V.I. 2018) 6
In re Elizabeth Serv., Case No. 3:20-bk-30003 (MFW),
12-13 (Bankr. D.V.I. Apr. 7, 2021), 7

CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

First Amendment 3,23,24, 26, 28-30

Fourteen Amendment 3,4, 8, 10, 35
Fifth Amendment 3,4, 8, 10, 35

RULES

Local Rule 83.1(a) 3,4, 6, 7, 10,32,33,35

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60 3, 5, 7, 8, 10,32, 34-35
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(4) 3, 11-13,33,36,
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 8 4, 7, 14, 15,20-27, 32,33,36,37
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59 5,8, 11,33,35
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 12 14

STATUTES

28 U.S.C. § 1254 1
28U.S.C. § 1291 1
42 U.S.C. § 1981 1,4, 14, 15,20,21,32,33,36,37
42 U.S.C. §2000a 1
28 U.S.C. “§ 455” and “§ 144”; 4,5,8, 10, 29, 32,33-35
47 U.S.C. §230
§ 1985(2)(clause i), 34,35
18 U.S.C. § 371, 9
18 U.S.C. § 1001 9
18 U.S.C. § 1503 9

OTHER CITATIONS

IV.
N.H.R.S.A. 311:7 7
Economic Value of Internet Intermediaries and the Role
of Liability Protections, NERA (June 5, 2017). 28

Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure:

Civil, § 2862, pp. 199-200 8
See Federalist Paper #47, James Madison. 26

IV.
L JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction through 28 U.S. Code § 1254 as relief is sought

for the 1st Circuit Courts (“1st Cir.”) July 10, 2024 (“Order”) (Appendix I, Exhibit

A) denying a rehearing or hearing en banc, which affirmed the 1st CIR’S May 28,

2024 (“Panel Order”) (Appendix I, Exhibit B), after a so-called de novo review,

affirming the decision of the “District Court” of New Hampshire, in Civil No. 20-

cv-536-SE, the [Doc. 139 Order] (Hall v. Twitter Inc. 20-CV-536-SE (D.N.H. May.

9,2023), (Appendix I, Exhibit C), and the [Dkt. 124 Order], See (Appendix I, Exhibit

D). See also, 28 U.S. Code § 1291; which denied Petitioner Daniel E. Hall’s

(“HALL”) claims against Twitter, Inc.,[l] which were brought under the federal

question jurisdiction or 42 U.S.C. “§ 1981”, 42 U.S.C. §2000a and Constitutional

grounds. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 138 (1803), (authority to compel

government officials to perform their duties).

Additionally, by charging thousands in fees, and collecting these fees from

HALL, the government has implicitly created a property interest and liberty interest

Page 1 of 40
(plus his constitutional claims) that this Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate.

Furthermore, HALL has exhausted all other available legal avenues before

resorting to this writ of mandamus. The petitioner has no other adequate means of

obtaining the requested relief, such as through a normal appeal process, as the 1st

Cir., using misinformation and a defendant friendly notice standard, failed to uphold

the law, has denied any hearing or rehearing, and has failed to articulate its reasoning

for their decisions which would enable a meaningful appellate review, and the relief

sought is not available in any other court. The petitioner will suffer irreparable harm

and injury of liberty and property that cannot be adequately remedied or

compensated through a monetary award or other legal remedy if the requested

mandamus relief is not granted. This is an urgent matter of great public importance

that requires immediate resolution as both lower courts have improperly declined to

exercise jurisdiction over this case and have improperly ruled that they lack

jurisdiction.

The 1st Cir. has a crystal clear legal duty to take the actions being sought as

they are non-discretionary and mandatory acts which entitle HALL a clear legal right

to have the 1st Cir. to perform these duties, which the court has unlawfully refused

to perform.

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Page 2 of 40
Petitioner Hall, seeks a writ of mandamus to compel the 1st Circuit Court to address

several legal and constitutional errors in his case against Twitter, Inc. (now X Corp.).

Hall's claims include that the lower courts failed to apply proper legal standards and

procedures, such as Local Rule 83.1(a), Rule 8, Rules 59 & 60, and judicial recusal

statutes (§ 455 and § 144). He argues that Twitter's attorneys practiced law without

proper admission, leading to biased and fraudulent court proceedings. Hall also

contends that 47 U.S.C. § 230 is unconstitutional as it infringes on his First

Amendment rights.

The reasons for granting the writ of mandamus are:

1. Fraud and Bias in Court Proceedings: Hall alleges that Twitter's attorneys
practiced law without proper admission to the bar, facilitated by illegal
policies of Magistrate Johnstone and other judges, leading to biased and
fraudulent court proceedings.
2. Failure to Apply Proper Legal Standards: Hall claims that the lower courts
failed to apply several mandatory legal standards and procedures, including:
o Local Rule 83.1 (a) regarding attorney admissions,
o Rule 8(a)(2) for notice pleading requirements,
o Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) and Rule 60(d) for void judgments and fraud on
the court.
o Judicial recusal statutes (§ 455 and § 144).
3. Denial of Constitutional Rights: Hall argues that his constitutional rights to
an unbiased tribunal, due process, and equal protection under the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments were violated.

Page 3 of 40
 4. Unconstitutionality of 47 U.S.C. § 230: Hall contends that § 230 is
unconstitutional as it allows private entities to suppress free speech, which the
government itself is prohibited from doing under the First Amendment.
5. Exhaustion of Legal Remedies: See Jurisdiction.
6. Irreparable Harm: Hall claims that he will suffer irreparable harm and injury
to his liberty and property that cannot be adequately remedied through a
monetary award or other legal remedy if the requested mandamus relief is not
granted.
7. Public Importance: Hall emphasizes that this is an urgent matter of great
public importance requiring immediate resolution due to the lower courts'
improper refusal to exercise jurisdiction and uphold the law.
Based on these reasons, Hall requests the Supreme Court to void the lower court's

rulings, strike Twitter's motion to dismiss, and award him $500 million in damages.

IH. FRAUD UPON THE COURT AND VOID JUDGMENTS

HALL claims that Magistrate “JOHNSTONE”, wrote and applied her own

pro hac vice rules or policy, instead of L.R. 83.1(a), which allowed TWITTER

attorneys to practice before the court although they lacked the requirements of

eligibility and were not members of the bar, and that these special benefits continued

for a period of over 2 years, and covering 66 incidents, prior to HALL’S case being

filed in May of 2020. (See Appendix n, Exhibit E, f f 65-72, 76, 80), and that

JOHNSTONE, Judge BARBADORO, Judge LAPLANTE, and Judge DICLERICO,

allowed TWITTER attorney MRAZIK to practice law before the Court and file 66

motions even though he was not a member of the bar.

Page 4 of 40
 1

HALL claims that JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE both had knowledge of

the illegal policies and continued to apply these illegal policies in his case by

allowing SCWHARTZ to continue practicing law 25 times before the Court in his

case when she was not a member of the bar, (See iii Declaration, Exhibits 1-25), and

that ELLIOTT utilized the illegal policy when denying HALL’S motions for default,

strike, recusal and his Rule 59 and Rule 60 motions. See Appendix II, Exhibit G,

pge. 14-16.

HALL claims that ELLIOTT, MCAULIFFE, BARBADORO, LAPLANTE,

DICLERICO and head judge MCCAFFERTY participated in extra-judicial

proceedings in which each had the administrative duty to investigate, deliberate and

in fact voted in favor of re-hiring JOHNSTONE, utilizing the same material facts

contained within HALL’S case, to which ELLIOTT should have recused herself

having learned material facts extra-judicially. See Appendix II, Exhibit E, ]f 95-

100; Exhibit F, | f 15-17; See In re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955) and

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. (2016), (adjudicating a case where she was also

an investigator for the government). See, e.g., United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d

1532, 1543-46 (11th Cir. 1987) (recusal mandatory under § 455(b)(1) where trial

judge's activities had involved him in "disputed evidentiary facts"), cert, denied, 487

U.S. 1210, 108 S.Ct. 2857, 101 L.Ed.2d 894(1988). Sze El Fenix de Puerto Rico v.

Page 5 of 40
 r
TheM/YJohanny, 36 F.3d 136, 141 n.4(lstCir. 1994). See also, US Supreme Court,

Case 22-1987, Doc. 00117957469, Writ of Mandamus.

HALL claims that these filings under JOHNSTONE’S illegal policies

demonstrate a pattern of fraud and bias of the Court in favor of TWITTER, over an

extended period of time and through several cases, which is sufficient to raise a

reasonable inference of the appearance of actual or apparent bias or prejudice.

HALL claims that the substance of these 66 and 25 submittals, and

corresponding dockets, unequivocally prove that;

1. MRAZIK and SCHWARTZ were TWITTER’S attorneys and were not

members of the bar when they submitted substantial legal arguments to the

Court and were practicing unauthorized under the rules and on behalf of

TWITTER.

2. JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE and ELLIOTT each knowingly concealed

and continued to utilize the illegal policy which favored TWITTER, which

created a bias and unconstitutional tribunal for HALL.

Because L.R 83.1(a) required SCHWARTZ to be either previously admitted

to the bar of the court or to have been admitted pursuant to subsection (b), and

because TWITTER’S attorneys have, without question, violated this rule. See Davis

v. Colonial Freight Sys., Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-674, 4 (E.D. Term. Mar. 29, 2019);

See, e.g., Matter of Jindal for Pro Hac Vice Admission to Virgin Islands Bar, 69 V.I.

Page 6 of 40
942, 948-49 (V.I. 2018) (holding that an attorney engages in the unauthorized

practice of law when he/she commences work on a case before being admitted pro

hac vice); In re Elizabeth Serv., Case No. 3:20-bk-30003 (MFW), 12-13 (Bankr.

D.V.I. Apr. 7, 2021), HALL is entitled to have TWITTER’S motion to dismiss and

MOL (and 23 others) stricken from the record as SCHWARTZ submitted them when

she was not a member of the bar and was in violation of N.H.R.S.A. 311:7 and L.R.

83.1(a), and because the submittals were a part of the fraud upon the court scheme

where TWITTER attorneys and the six judges allowed TWITTER attorneys to

practice law in the court while not members of the Courts bar which satisfies the

standards of Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) (void) and Rule 60(d) (fraud on the court).

The indisputable fact is that SCHWARTZ was not a member of the courts bar

when she submitted the Motion to Dismiss and MOL (or the other 23) as she was

not accepted to the bar until August 18, 2020, almost 3 months after the submittal,

and did not even appear in the case until August 25, 2020, when she, for the first

time, signed a submittal to the court. See Dkt. 53, Local rule 83.6(a), Attached iii

Declaration, Exhibit 26.

The false narratives interjected by TWITTER and the District Court Judges,

that the local attorney, ECK, signed the motion to dismiss under the requirements of

Local Rule 83.2(b), or that SCHWARTZ wrote in parenthesis “(motion for pro hac

vice admission to be filed)” or “(motion for pro hac vice pending)” has no bearing

Page 7 of 40
on whether SCHWARTZ was a member of the bar when these submittals were made

on her behalf. See Appendix II, Exhibit E, pge. 26-33.

Because JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE and ELLIOTT failed to maintain any

ethical standards and avoid engaging in behavior that violates ethical rules; and were

disqualified under § 144 and § 455; failed in their duties to comply with § 144 and

§455 and recuse themselves in a case which compromised their impartiality, HALL

is entitled to a void judgment under Rule 59, Rule 60(d) (fraud on the court) and

Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) (void); and pertinent case law. See Exhibit E, 65-79; See

Exhibit F, pge. 18-20; Liljeberg v. Health Services Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847,

850-51 (1988). See Johnson v. Carroll, 369 F.3d 253, 260 (3d Cir. 2004). (where the

appearance of partiality exists, recusal is required). Liteky v United States, at 510

U.S. at 548, 114 S.Ct. at 1153-54.

The Court, through the actions of these three Judges, acted in a manner

inconsistent with due process of law and equal protections, and therefore it’s

judgments are void. See Wright and Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil, §

2862, pp. 199-200. As a matter of law HALL is entitled to an unbiased judge under

the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the statutory

entitlements proscribed in § 455; § 144 and Rule 60(d) (fraud on the court) and Rule

60(b)(4) or (6) (void).

Page 8 of 40
 Instead of following the Code of Conduct for United States Judges

promulgated by the Judicial Conference of the United States requiring judges to

"disclose on the record information that the judge believes the parties or their

lawyers might consider relevant to the question of disqualification, even if the judge

believes there is no actual basis for disqualification," or upholding or protecting

HALL’S numerous rights, JOHNSTONE, and every judge that has followed,

instead, knowingly and willfully- together, and in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371,

concealed by scheme or device, the material facts of JOHNSTONE’S illegal policy

in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001, and corruptly endeavored to influence, obstruct, or

impede the due administration of justice in HALL’S case in violation of 18 U.S.C.

§ 1503, and all while utilizing the court’s machinery.

While HALL was focused on the illegality of the motion to dismiss and MOL,

TWITTER through its attorneys, in an effort to further conceal the fraud, the bias of

the Court and to give the appearance that SCHWARTZ’S initial motion was legal,

continued to file motions in the same manner of using a [notation/no signature] as

was used by MRAZIK in previous TWITTER cases as was used with

SCHWARTZ’S motion to dismiss, and JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE continued

to allow the illegal policy [notations/no signature] to continue so that it would appear

that nothing was out of the ordinary and to give the appearance that SCHWARTZ’S

initial motion to dismiss and MOL were within the rules of the Court. The end of the

Page 9 of 40
initial fraud was that after she was admitted to the bar of the Court, SCHWARTZ

now signed the submittals which is not a requirement as local council is responsible

for signing any submittal to the court.

Further evidence of the Courts’ and presiding judges involvement in this

fraud, is the fact that even after HALL’S initial protest that TWITTER’S Motion to

Dismiss should be stricken and therefore defaulted, both JOHNSTONE and

MCAULIFFE allowed SCHWARTZ to continue using JOHNSTONE’S illegal

policy to file motions, briefs, etc. and practice law on behalf of TWITTER when she

had yet to be admitted to the bar. See Attached iii Declaration.

JOHNSTONE, MCAULLIFFE and ELLIOTT, having not provided the

required mandatory procedure of recusing a judge for bias under §'455 and § 144,

or Rule 60, and the required mandatory procedure and duty to apply L.R 83.1(a)

evenly and to protect all parties, and by further concealing JOHNSTONE’S illegal

policy, and by failing to perform the required duty to uphold and protect HALL’S

Constitution rights, of an unbiased judge under the Fifth and Fourteenth

Amendments and the statutory entitlements proscribed in § 455, § 144, Rule 60(d)

(fraud on the court) and Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) (void), both the Panel Order and Order

fail to protect HALL’s entitled rights to an unbiased judge and due process under the

Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and the statutory

entitlements proscribed within those statutes, and therefore should be compelled to

Page 10 of 40
void, in full, any orders by JOHNSTONE and MCAULIFFE and ELLIOTT as each

utilized the illegal policy when denying HALL’S motions for default, strike, and was

utilized by ELLIOTT when addressing HALL’S motion for recusal and his both

Rule 59 and 60 motions. Appendix II, Exhibit E, pge. 28-29, Exhibit G, pge. 14-16.

IV. ENTITLEMENTS of RULE 201

Relevantly, the Panel Order states;

“Plaintiffs multiple motions to take judicial notice are resolved as

follows; we have reviewed the submitted documents and have taken
judicial notice of any proffered materials to the extent they are
relevant and appropriate for consideration for the purposes of this
appeal.”

HALL is entitled to a Rule 201 hearing as HALL fulfilled the requirements of

201(e), in requesting a hearing, and that a hearing is a required mandatory procedure

under Rule 201(e). See (Dkt. 00118041810) (“JN-I”); (Dkt. 00118041810) (“JN-

I”); (Dkt. 00118070078) (“JN-III”); (Doc. 00118091413) (“Motion”); Attached

Appendix, Exhibit G, pge. 16; Exhibit H, f ^ 4-9, TWITTER’S non-dispute record),

HALL is entitled to a Rule 201 judicial notice of public court records material

to JOHNSTONE’S illegal policy and the Article III Commission to re-hire her, as

HALL fulfilled the requirements of; 201(c)(2) in providing the court with the

necessary information, 201(b)(1) as they are records within this district, and

201(b)(2), as records to which TWITTER does not dispute. See JN-I.

Page 11 of 40
 HALL is entitled to a Rule 201 judicial notice of undisputed material facts of

JOHNSTONE’S illegal policy and the Article III Commission to re-hire her, as

HALL fulfilled the requirements of; 201(b)(2), in providing the court with the

necessary information, and 201(b), in that TWITTER did not oppose or contest any

of these material facts directly or dispute the accuracy or truth of the statements, or

otherwise create a dispute within the meaning of the law in the District Court

proceedings, and only generally opposed to noticing the truth of the substance of

those filings in the appeal proceedings. See JN-I, Exhibit H.

HALL is entitled to a Rule 201 judicial notice of undisputed material facts of

congressional testimony made by then CEO, Jack Dorsey, as well as formal

statements made by Members of the US Congress, as HALL fulfilled the

requirements of; 201 (b)(2), in providing the court with the necessary information,

and 201(b), in that TWITTER did not oppose or contest any of these material facts

directly or dispute the accuracy or truth of the statements, or otherwise create a

dispute within the meaning of the law in the District Court, and only generally

opposed to noticing the truth of the substance of those filings in the appeal

proceedings. See JN-II, H.

HALL is entitled to a Rule 201 judicial notice of undisputed material facts of

now owner Elon Musk’s public statements made while the appeal was pending, as

HALL fulfilled the requirements of; 201(b)(2), in providing the court with the

Page 12 of 40
necessary information, and 201(b), in that TWITTER failed to demonstrate clear or

obvious hearsay error and only mentions Musk’s public admissions as hearsay only

in passing and without providing any evidence to support it.. See JN-III, Exhibit H.

HALL has satisfied the indisputability requirements of Rule 201(b) and (e)

and therefore, the 1st Cir. has clearly failed to fulfill (1) the required mandatory

procedure of holding a hearing under Rule 201(e), (2) a mandatory duty of noticing

indisputable material facts under Rule 201(b), which exceeded their statutory

authority in giving TWITTER relief to which it is not entitled, because it failed to

create a dispute these material facts within the meaning of the law, and should be

compelled to take judicial notice of these undisputed facts under Rule 201(c)(2), and

as a juror, accept these [noticed] facts as conclusive under Rule 201(f). S tcRivera-

Torres v. Ortiz Velez,341 F.3d 86, 100-01 (1st Cir. 2003). Given the undisputed facts

recited in HALL’S Judicial Notice(s), a sufficient basis exists for judicial notice

under Rule 201(b)(2).” U.S. v. Gilbert, 94 F. Supp. 2d 157, 162 (D. Mass. 2000),

and the 1st Cir. should be compelled to notice the records themselves and the material

facts submitted by HALL, as he is entitled due process and equal protections under

the law. See Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U. S. 545, 380 U. S. 552 (1965); Grannis v.

Ordean, 234 U. S. 385, 234 U. S. 394 (1914), (Requirement of due process and to

be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.")

Page 13 of 40
 The 1st Cir. has made clear that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not

permit defendants to "sandbag" the plaintiff by withholding defenses until after a

judgment has been entered against them. Calderon v. United States District Court

163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998); McPhail v. Municipality of Culebra, 598 F.2d 603, 607

(1st Cir. 1979) ("A party may not 'sandbag' his case by presenting one theory to the

trial court and then arguing for another on appeal."). Sammartano v. Palmas del Mar

Properties, Inc., 161 F.3d 96, 97 (1st Cir. 1998); Rule 12(h) states that certain

defenses, if not raised in the initial responsive pleading, are "waived." TWITTER

cannot simply raise new defenses through post-judgment motions, as that would

undermine the finality of the original judgment.

V. NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS UNDER § 1981

The 1st CIR. Panel Order relevantly concluded that;

“plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to make out a plausible claim

that Twitter suspended his account on the basis of race” ... See Doe v.
Brown Univ., 43 F.4th 195,208 (IstCir. 2022) (explaining that a § 1981
claim requires proof of an intent to discriminate on the basis of race);

First, Brown Univ. does not overrule Swierkiewicz, Rodriguez-Reyes or its

progeny, [2] which require only a notice pleading standard under Fed. Rule 8(a) and

not a heightened pleading standard. Brown simply states that “intent”, among other

[2] (cleaned-up), See Exhibit E, f | 11-25). See also, Exhibit G, pge. 2-6 (intent),
pges 6-11 (plausibility); Swierkiewicz v. SoremaN.A.,534 U.S. 506, 122 S.Ct. 992,

Page 14 of 40
things, must be shown in order to succeed in a § 1981 claim, and speaks nothing to

the pleading standards in civil rights actions at the motion to dismiss stage of the

proceeding. While Swierkiewicz involved Title VII and ADEA claims, its reasoning

likely extends to HALL’S § 1981 claims as well.[3] Additionally, the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework for proving intent does not apply at the pleading

stage. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly: 550 U.S. 544 (2007), quoting McDonnell

Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U. S. 792 (1973).

Second, the plausibility requirement under Rule 8(a)(2), “simply calls for

enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of

illegal conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citation omitted). Patel v. United States, Civil Action 24-

10180-FDS, 3 (D. Mass. Apr. 24,2024). See Rule 8(a)(2); arguments, Exhibit E, pge

4-18. (Exhibit F, pge. 5-11), Additionally, in Twombly, the Court notes that

Swierkiewicz reaffirmed that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure only require

[2] Continued... 152 L.Ed.2d 1 (2002); Educadores Puertorriquenos en Action v.

Hernandez,367 F.3d 61, 62 (1st Cir. 2004); See Cepero-Rivera v. Fagundo, 414 F.3d
124, 128 (1st Cir. 2005).
[3] See Complaint, at “Dkt. 1” or “Compl.” or Dkt. 1.6 Electronic Version.

Page 15 of 40
"notice pleading," not a heightened fact-pleading standard. Plaintiffs do not have to

plead facts establishing each element of a prima facie case, including intent. This

Court reversed on the ground that the Court of Appeals had impermissibly applied

what amounted to a heightened pleading requirement by insisting that Swierkiewicz

allege “specific facts” beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds

showing entitlement to relief. Id., at 508.

Like Swierkiewicz’s pleadings, HALL’S Complaint details the events leading

to his contract being terminated, has provided relevant dates of statements made by

TWITTER’S Workforce and at least some of the relevant persons involved with his

contract termination, such as engineers who built or maintained TWITTER’S

algorithms or from the CEO’s and workers who enforced TWITTER’S so-called

health policy. These are factual assertions that must, at the pleading stage, be given

credence. See Ocasio-Hemandez v. Fortuno-Burset, 640 F.3d 15 (1st Cir. 2011)

(holding similar allegations to be factual, not conclusory). The Complaint also

alleges that TWITTER and its Workforce;

1. built, designed, created and implemented algorithms and policies to

address and deal with White Supremacy users on their platfonn.

Compl. TI 85; interjected race. Compl. 47; algorithms are bias. Compl.

If 55; “algorithms” are going to ban a way of talking. Compl. ^f 49;

something we’re working on.” Compl. f 66; algorithmic solution to

Page 16 of 40
 White supremacy. Compl. 85; Section 230 “is the thing that enables

us to increase the health in the first place”. Dorcey, Compl. Exhibit Q,

2397; “what CDA 230 protects us to do is to actually enforce these

actions Dorcey, Compl. Exhibit Q, 2607;

2. took action by limiting, locking or suspending White users’ contracts

for reasons such as abuse, hate and White nationalism. Compl. ^ 24; en

masse.” Compl. 55; new algorithm surfacing 50% of tweets. Dorsey

Testimony; Dorcey testimony, Compl. Exhibit Q; banned prominent

whites. Compl. ^ 25, Exh. J;

3. previously implemented shadow banning policies that targeted a group

of largely White users. Compl. Tf 34; shadow banned large group of

Whites in the past. Compl. ^ 3; content review agent admits to being

anti-Trump and banning Trump supporters. Compl. 50; for years.

Compl. Tf 28; while lying to the public about its actions. Compl. ^ 72;

TWITTER’S general council, lied. Compl. 33;

The Complaint also alleges volumes of comparator proof of intent, Pina v.

Children's Place, 740 F.3d 785, 796 (1st Cir. 2014), that TWITTER and its

Workforce;

1. continues to make its services available to and has not removed

offensive tweets, locked or banned the user contracts of Blue Checker’s

Page 17 of 40
 with over 50 million followers, to post derogatory and discriminatory

speech against whites. Compl. 40 EXHIBIT L. (74 tweets illustrating

blue check users posting racist comments against White people, most

years old which have been promoted to over 50 million users and have

never been taken down).

2. continues to make its services available to and has not banned the

contracts or the benefits of a contract of similarly situated non-white

users. Compl. 44, Compl. Exhibit N, (22 tweets illustrating what appear

to be non-white users posting the same words as HALL did, but whose

tweets were not removed and their accounts not banned as HALL’S).

3. still makes its services available to and has not banned the contracts of

similarly situated users outside HALL’S protected class from posting

violative tweets using similar words such as HALL used. Compl. 44,

45, Exhibits N and O, (which includes 10 tweets illustrating what

appear to be non-white users posting the same words as HALL did, but

whose tweets were not removed and their accounts not banned as

HALL’S).

HALL’S Complaint provides facts which demonstrate a consistent pattern of

conduct or decision-making by TWITTER’S Workforce that have

disproportionately impacted individuals of the White race. It also depicts the

Page 18 of 40
- i<

departures from normal procedures or policies that suggest racial considerations

played a role, when it continuously allows Non-whites to post virtually the same

words as HALL, and not suffer the same consequences as HALL, who is White.

The Complaint also provides comparative evidence showing more favorable

treatment of individuals outside the HALL’S protected class and TWITTER’S

Workforce’s pervasive bias or the perception of bias towards a predominantly white

groups. See Appendix II, Exhibit E, pges. 4-14. See Compl. Exhibits J-N.

These many witness statements and reports of and by TWITTER’S Workforce

corroborate HALL’S claims of racial discrimination and provide an unbiased

account of the events that occurred. The use of such witness statements are a

powerful way to substantiate the factual allegations in HALL’S Complaint, to which

the reliability and admissibility of members of the Workforces’ statements has never

been challenged. These are not conclusionary or bald assertions but actual facts

described by those within TWITTER’S Workforce.

Evidence of such remarks or comments is nevertheless important in an intent

case, and can help to establish circumstantial or indirect evidence of intent. Doe v.

C.A.R.S. Prot. Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 368 (3d Cir. 2008); See Pounds v. Lincare,

Inc., 812 F.3d 1208, 1224 (10th Cir. 2015) (Stray remarks can prove to be invaluable

insights into biases at every level of consciousness that may be rife but invisible

within the workplace.”).

Page 19 of 40
 HALL’S Complaint gives TWITTER more than fair notice of his claims and

the grounds upon which they rest under any reasonable standard of Rule 8(a)(2). The

Complaint addresses the what (discrimination of contract and public place of

accommodation), who (by TWITTER’S Workforce), when (from 2018-2019),

where (from TWITTER’S public forum), and why (because of his race and

behaviors of his race) of his claims and is entitled to a proceeding under § 1981.

In sum, Swierkiewicz, Rodriguez-Reyes or its progeny do not require intent to

be pled at the motion to dismiss stage and HALL’S claim are sufficient under the

standards of § 1981 and comply with Rule 8's minimal “who did what to whom,

when, where, and why” requirements.” Educadores, 61, 62. TWITTER has not once

claimed it has not been afforded both adequate notice of any of HALL’S claims

asserted against them and a meaningful opportunity to mount a defense.

The 1st Cir. failed to accept the statements by TWITTER’S owners and

Workforce employees as true for purposes of the motion to dismiss and improperly

required HALL to plead or prove intent. The 1st Cir. therefore impermissibly applied

the wrong standard in what amounted to a heightened pleading requirement by

insisting that HALL failed to allege “facts sufficient to make out a plausible claim”

and beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement

to relief under Rule 8.

Page 20 of 40
 Since there is no federal statute or specific Federal Rule of Civil Procedure

mandating a heightened pleading standard for civil rights actions such as the racial

discrimination claims at issue in the appeal, the 1st CIR. should be compelled to

apply the notice pleading standard, and not the heightened pleading standard of

requiring intent or that HALL prove his entire case through his Complaint at the

motion to dismiss stage and beyond the requirements of Rule 8.

Having rested its decision on requiring “intent” to be pled at the motion to

dismiss stage, and requiring HALL to plead beyond the requirements of Rule 8, the

1st Cir. plainly acted beyond its "jurisdiction" as prior Supreme Court decisions have

interpreted the term intent and the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, for a §

1981 claim which does not require intent to be pled within the complaint and requires

no heightened pleading standards.

VI. NOTICE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS UNDER STATE ACTOR

DOCTRINE

The 1st CIR. Panel Order concluded, relevantly, that;

“plaintiff failed to plead facts sufficient to make out a plausible claim

that Twitter is a state actor for constitutional purposes under the
circumstances of this case.... See Manhattan Comm. Access Corp. v.
Halleck, 587 U.S. 802 (2019) (requirements for a private entity to be
deemed a state actor). See Appendix II, Exhibit G, pge. 11-14.

First, Manhattan clearly is limited and Second, HALL’S claims to not even

contemplate that the Court consider that TWITTER was a state actor simply because

it operates an online platform which amounts to a clear error. Third, HALL’S

Page 21 of 40
allegations that TWITTER was acting as a state actor clearly surpass the

requirements of Rule 8.

In only considering the limited question of whether TWITTER’S private

forum may be considered a state actor under Manhattan, the Panel Order is clearly

limited, incomplete and incompatible here as contemplates only whether “a private

entity who provides a forum for speech is not transformed by that fact alone into a

state actor.” Manhattan, at 1921, 1930. In only considering this limited question, the

1st Cir. failed to perform or consider HALL’S claims that the exclusivity of the

function test, the nature and degree of government the involvement and delegation

of public function, traditional public function, enabling legislation, the

public/private nature of TWITTER’S involvement, the nexus test, the symbiotic

relationship test, and the fact that having invoked § 230 legal defenses, which

TWITTER concedes, that TWITTER is not purely private. HALL attempted to bring

this to the 1st Cir.’s attention through motion, which indicated that such tests

contained within cases such as Missouri v. Biden, 83 F.4th 350 (5th Cir. 2023), (mis­

stated as, Missouri et al. v. Biden et al., No. 23-30445, Dkt. No. 238-1), (Dkt.

00118066991). O’Handley v. Weber, 62 F.4th 1145 (9th Cir. 2023), would be more

appropriate for this case.

As stated above, the plausibility requirement “simply calls for enough fact to

raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” of illegal

Page 22 of 40
conduct. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556. “A claim has facial plausibility when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft, 662,

678. In pleading a constitutional claim under the First Amendment against a private

actor, alleging the private actor was a "state actor," a plaintiff must only plead the

specific speech or expressive conduct that was allegedly infringed upon, as well as

the particular government action or policy that violated the plaintiffs First

Amendment rights, and details about the time, place, and manner of the alleged

constitutional violation, as well as the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff. See

Rule 8.

HALL has pled that § 230 is unconstitutional by infringing free speech and

expression, and that Congress ceded its sovereign duty to protect and police free

speech to private companies like TWITTER, and by combination of entwinement of

§230 itself and by further pressuring and coercing actions by members of Congress,

TWITTER was engaged in "state action" or was a "state actor" under the First

Amendment by implementing back room racial discrimination policies in an effort

to remove White Supremists and White Nationalists from its platform, which banned

HALL’S speech and contract, which is conduct fairly attributable to the State, to

which HALL was a victim. See Appendix II, Exhibit E, pgs. 16-26; Exhibit F, pgs.

11-14.

Page 23 of 40
 In pleading that TWITTER was performing a traditionally exclusive public

function, that § 230 creates a symbiotic relationship or nexus between TWITTER

and Congress, that TWITTER was coerced or significantly encouraged by members

of Congress, See Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,. 372 U.S. 68 (1963) and that

TWITTER willfully participated in joint activity with Congress, [4] HALL’S

Complaint states a clear and plausible narrative of the alleged First Amendment

violation in that in the time

prior to HALL’S speech being banned, and through the leverage created by § 230,

Congress members further coerced or threatened TWITTER to remove White

Supremists and White Nationalists from its platform or suffer consequences.

TWITTER, through its anti-white Workforce did in fact create bias algorithms which

targeted White users, which led to hundreds of thousands of whites to suffer

consequences by being banned from TWITTER’S platform of the basis of White

speech or White behaviors. See Exhibit E, pgs. 16-26; Exhibit F, pgs. 11-14. Exhibit

G, pgs. 11-14.

It is plausible that in knowing the power of § 230 has over online platforms,

Congress members utilized this power to facilitate private racial discrimination of

White Nationalists or White Supremists which is antithetical to the principles of

equal rights and civil liberties enshrined in the Constitution. Congress's pressure

[4] Twitter’s first defense was § 230. Exhibit G, pg. 12.

Page 24 of 40
tactics became "tantamount to a command." FAIR v. Rumsfeld (2004).

Additionally important here would be the thread ng statements to repeal § 230

by prominent members of Congress by removing immunity if platforms didn’t do

what these members thought was the right thing, and remove White Nationalists and

White Supremists from their platforms. Now, with § 230 heavily entrenched and

fully embraced by each branch of government, government officials can flip a switch

and ban large groups of speech or certain expressions on a massive scale, such as

Congress did in 2018-2019 when it pressured platforms to remove, what they

themselves considered to be, bullying or hateful speech by White Nationalists, White

Supremists, to which TWITTER obliged when it removed hundreds of thousands of

users, including HALL, in 2019 from its platform for the same reason, this type of

government influence and directive, enabled by the legal framework of § 230,

amounts to an unconstitutional condition - the government is granting legal benefits

(§ 230 protections) while enticing, coercing and demanding that platforms expand

the limits of § 230, and to engage in censorship the government cannot mandate.

Here, Congress Members acted as judge, jury and utilized TWITTER as their

executioner, as White Nationalists and White Supremists views did not align with

their own personal views. These actions obliterate the separation of powers which

are the fundamental principles of the U.S. Constitution as Congress cannot

Page 25 of 40
unilaterally prosecute or punish individuals through third party private actors. See

Federalist Paper #47, James Madison.

In cases like Murthy v. Missouri, the reasonable standard is that the executive

(regardless of hierarchy position) may assert a compelling interest in executing laws

or responding to emergencies. Justifications may be broader, particularly in matters

of national security or public safety such as adolescent suicide games on platforms.

Now when Congress legislates, it typically needs to demonstrate a compelling

interest to justify regulations, such as an emergency, particularly when infringing on

rights (e.g., free speech), the standard for legislative action is often strict scrutiny.

And unlike the Executive branch who may assert emergency powers, Congress

would have act legislatively first, before censoring any speech.

The line drawn in this case is whether members of Congress have these same

broad powers as Executives to regulate speech through third party platforms, in non-

emergency circumstances. And the answer is no, they do not. Certainly Congress

has the powers to regulate speech as they have (improperly) done with § 230, but

must do so within the constraints of the First Amendment. But Congress does not

have the power to individually censor speech, or to coerce platforms to sensor speech

or certain groups of people they feel should be censored, and also lacks a legitimate

compelling interest because their constitutional powers and § 230 only take them so

far, and lack any compelling interest in censoring White users speech, bullying,

Page 26 of 40
f

spreading misinformation or disinformation, fostering discord or sowing division, as

these types of speech are not considered crimes in the U.S. at the federal level.

Congress Members only have the constitutional authority to legislate and therefore

lack a legitimate compelling interest in having any speech censored unless the act is

done through a legislative action.

Having rested its decision on a false narrative that HALL’S constitutional and

state actor claims contemplate that TWITTER is a state actor simply because it

operates a private platform and by requiring a heightened application of beyond the

notice pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2) at the motion to dismiss stage, the

1st Cir. plainly acted beyond its "jurisdiction" as prior Supreme Court decisions have

interpreted the term state actor and the notice pleading requirements of Rule 8(a)(2)

for a state actor claim which requires no heightened pleading standards.

VII. UNCONSTITUTIONALITY of 47 U.S.C. § 230.

The U.S. Constitution is the supreme law of the land. All Federal courts have

the authority, duty and responsibility to ensure that laws passed by the legislative

and executive branches do not violate the Constitution. Federal courts, particularly

the Supreme Court, also have the power of judicial review. This allows them to

review the constitutionality of statutes and other government actions, and to

invalidate those they find to be unconstitutional. As part of the judicial branch,

federal judges take an oath to "support and defend the Constitution of the United

Page 27 of 40
• I fl

States." This creates a duty to strike down laws that are in conflict with the

Constitution.

The First Amendment prohibits the government from abridging the freedom

of speech. "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of speech.”

The Supreme Court has also established the "unconstitutional conditions"

doctrine, which holds that the government cannot grant a benefit or privilege to a

private entity on the condition that the entity relinquishes a constitutional right.

Extending this principle, courts have ruled that the government cannot empower

private parties to do what the government itself is constitutionally prohibited from

doing. See Marsh v. Alabama (1946), (town performing a public function, and thus

could not engage in censorship that would be unconstitutional for the government to

do directly).

It is paradoxical that § 230, which is often framed as a pro-free speech law,

provides legal protections [5] for platforms to remove certain types of speech. § 230

grants platforms broad legal immunity from liability for content moderation

decisions, § 230(c)(1) including the removal of speech that the platforms deem

"obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise

[5] Rather than a one-time gift, Section 230 is, in effect, an annuity. A 2017 Internet
Association study placed the value of Section 230 and the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act at $40 billion annually. See Economic Value of Internet
Intermediaries and the Role of Liability Protections, NERA (June 5, 2017).

Page 28 of 40
» . t) «

objectionable." § 230(c)(2) By defining certain categories of speech as

"objectionable" and providing liability protections for removing that type of content,

§230 places parameters around permissible content moderation practices. This gives

platforms a strong legal incentive and protection to aggressively moderate and

remove content, e.g., to engage in the suppression of free speech, even if that content

may be protected speech under the First Amendment. In return, the government gets

a more sanitized and controlled online environment, with fewer instances of the

types of speech or content that the government or lawmakers may find objectionable

or problematic.

So through § 230, the government is, in effect, trading platfonn immunity for

the suppression of certain types of speech in the tech industry and establishes the

right to suppress speech which is on internet platforms as a basic federal policy, and

amounting to - a quid pro quo arrangement where the government provides legal

protections in exchange for private entities doing the "dirty work" of content

removal. The government is indirectly supporting the ability of private entities to

suppress certain types of speech, even if the government is not directly compelling

the removal of that speech. This is a blatant end-run around the First Amendment.

In passing § 230, Congress engages in censorship by proxy by inducing,

encouraging, or promoting “private persons to accomplish what it is constitutionally

forbidden from accomplishing.” See Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 465

Page 29 of 40
t 4 |.|

(1973); Bidem v. Knight First Amendment Inst, at Columbia Univ., 141 S. Ct. 1220,

1226 (2021) (“government cannot accomplish through threats of adverse

government action what the Constitution prohibits it from doing directly.”). § 230

amounts to the law "dictating" or shaping content moderation to a degree, even if it

doesn't mandate specific takedown decisions, it clearly creates a framework that

empowers and incentivizes platforms' content policies to sensor certain speech. The

government’s influence over a private entity in suppressing speech constitutes a

backdoor censorship which violated and continues to violate HALL’S First

Amendment rights to speech and expression.

As § 230 is an unconstitutional delegation of the government's power to

restrict speech, undermines fundamental free speech protections, and infringes

HALL’S free speech and free expression, the 1st. Cir. failed in its duty to defend the

Constitution of the United States and the freedom of speech and expression and

should be compelled to invalidate and strike down § 230 as it is clearly

unconstitutional.

A State may not interfere with private actors’ speech to advance its own vision

of ideological balance. States (and their citizens) are of course right to want an

expressive realm in which the public has access to a wide range of views. But the

way the First Amendment achieves that goal is by preventing the government from

“tilt[ing] public debate in a preferred direction,” See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564

Page 30 of 40
*' I

U. S. 552, 578-579, not by licensing the government to stop private actors from

speaking as they wish and preferring some views over others. A State cannot

prohibit speech to rebalance the speech market. (See arguments, Appendix II,

Exhibit F, pge. 6), That unadorned interest is not “unrelated to the suppression of

free expression.” Moody v. NetChoice, LLC andNetChoice, LLC v. Paxton, 603 U.S.

(2024).

Some may say “court of review, not first view,” but the government, through

the Department of Justice, the Solicitor General, and both Civil and Criminal

divisions, has watched and been notified of each docket entry in both lower courts,

and HALL’S recusal mandamus in this Court, and has not once intervene to protect

§ 230 or attempted to participate and challenge HALL’S claims. So while the

judiciary branch was busy curb stomping HALL and his constitutional claims over

the last 4.5 years, the executive branch watched and its only actions were to

intimidate HALL by opening some type of “criminal investigation” by the criminal

division of the DOJ for simply pursuing his legal rights. A criminal division led by

then, Criminal Division Chief of the United States Attorney's for the District of New

Hampshire, Seth R. Aframe, who, by “coincidence”, was just recently given the job

of Appellate judge for the 1st Cir., and is the reason Judge Aframe recused himself

from participating in HALL’S En Banc Motion. To label this case first view would

be a perversion of justice in that HALL has brought these claims at each and every

Page 31 of 40
1 11?

step of the process, and the governments only actions were to use behind the scene

tactics to stop HALL claims from being adjudicated.

As this Supreme Court has the power of mandamus and of judicial review

under Marbury, which grants the judiciary the power to invalidate laws, and to

review and interpret the constitutionality of laws and government actions, and

because the 1st Cir. truly and unjustifiably failed to address a clear constitutional

violations, this Court should feel compelled to step in through mandamus to fulfill

its duty to protect the Constitution and HALL’S rights and invalidate § 230.

VIII. CONCLUSION

In conclusion, the District Court through JOHNSTONE, MCAULLIFFE and

ELLIOTT:

1. Failed to apply the Erie Doctrine in a diversity case;

2. Failed to apply L.R. 83.1(a);

2. Failed to apply Rule 8 to FLALL’S § 1981 and State Actor claims;

4. Failed to apply Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) and Rule 60(d);

5. Failed to apply § 455 and § 144;

6. Failed to invalidate 47 U.S.C. § 230 and have completely failed to address

a clear constitutional issue.

7. Promoted and utilized JOHNSTONE’S illegal policy while concealing its

existence and the bias of the Court.

Page 32 of 40
•

In conclusion, the 1st Circuit, through KAYATTA, GELPI, MONTECALVO,

BARRON and RIKELMAN;

1. Failed to uphold the Erie Doctrine in a diversity case;

2. Failed to uphold L.R. 83.1(a);

2. Failed to uphold Rule 8 to HALL’S § 1981 and State Actor claims;

4. Failed to uphold Rule 59, Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) and Rule 60(d);

5. Failed to uphold § 455 and § 144;

6. Failed to invalidate 47 U.S.C. § 230 and have completely failed to address

a clear constitutional issue.

7. Failed to uphold Rule 201(b) and Rule 201(e);

8. Concealed JOHNSTONE’S illegal policy and the bias of the Court.

In conclusion, the 1st Circuit, through LYNCH, KAYATTA, GELPI,

BARRON, MONTECALVO, in HALL’S mandamus appeal;

1. Failed to uphold § 455 and § 144.

Both the District Court and the 1st Cir. have demonstrated a pattern of ignoring

HALL’S Constitutional rights, procedural Rules, Federal Statutes and stare decisis.

When HALL brought claims against JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE and

TWITTER’S two attorneys, ECK and SCHARWTZ, Case No. l:21-cv-01047-LM,

Verogna (Hall) v. JOHNSTONE, the District Court, through head judge,

MCCAFFERTY;

Page 33 of 40
«

1. Failed to apply § 455 and § 144 and recuse herself as MCCAFFERTY was

simultaneously deciding issues regarding HALL’S claims of JOHNSTONE’S

illegal policies while also investigating those same policies within her

administrative duties as Chief Judge and as a member of the Commission. In

re Murchison, 349 U. S. 133, 136 (1955); Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S.

(2016).

2. Required HALL to plead a class- or race-based discriminatory animus in

order to maintain a private cause of action under § 1985(2)(clause i), Kush v.

Rutledge, 103 S. Ct. 1483, 61 WASH. U. L. Q. 849 (1983), when clause i does

not contain equal protection language. Kush v. Rutledge :: 460 U.S. 724-725

(1983). Read § 1985(2)(clause i).

3. Failed to Strike affirmative Defenses pled after judgment.

4. Failed uphold Rule 60 in allowing ECK’S and SCHARTZ’S attorneys to

plead new affirmative defenses after judgment.

5. Relied upon these new affirmative defenses when deciding to reconsider

HALL’S claims.

5. Introduced a plethora of misrepresentations of material facts.

In hearing HALL’S appeal, Case No. 22-1364, Verogna (Hall) JOHNSTONE,

the 1st Cir., BARRON, LYNCH, HOWARD, KAYATTA, GLEPI and

MONTECALVO affirmed MCCAFFERTY’S unlawful orders and;

Page 34 of 40
 1. Failed to uphold § 455 and § 144.

2. Failed to uphold Rule 60 and the finality of a judgments.

3. Upheld that a class- or race-based discriminatory animus is a requirement

of a § 1985(2)(clause i), when no such requirement exists.

3. Relied upon affirmative defenses brought after judgment.

4. Relied upon MCCAFFERTY’S misrepresentations. .

This Supreme Court has also demonstrated a willingness to ignore HALL’S

claims. In Case No. 22-7601, this Court denied HALL’S Mandamus and pleas for

help in dismissing a bias judge. In Case No. 22-7607, this Court denied HALL’S

claims to hole JOHNSTONE, MCAULIFFE, ECK and SCHWARTZ to account for

scheming to conceal the illegal policy, and all of what the lower courts had denied.

The 1st Cir., having failed their required duty to uphold the Constitution of an

unbiased tribunal and due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and

failed to provide HALL the (1) required mandatory procedure and duty to apply L.R.

83.1(a) evenly to protect HALL and (2) the required procedure of voiding

proceedings under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 60(b)(4) or (6) (void) and

Rule 60(d) (fraud on the court), plainly acted beyond its "jurisdiction" as prior

Supreme Court and 1st Cir. decisions have interpreted the term “pro hac vice” under

L.R. 83.1(a), which are mandatory, and the terms “extra-judicial” knowledge of

material facts, and “recusal”, which under § 455 and § 144, which are mandatory,

Page 35 of 40
•"i:

and therefore the 1st Cir. should be compelled to reverse its Orders and comply with

L.R. 83.1(a), Rule 59, 60 and statutes § 455 and § 144, and Order TWITTER’S

motion to dismiss stricken and void, Order default of TWITTER, and Order

judgment for HALL in the amount stated in the Complaint (500 million dollars) for

TWITTER’S participation in the fraud upon the court.

The 1st Cir., having not provided (1) required mandatory procedure and duty

to apply Rule 201(e) evenly and to protect HALL and the required mandatory

procedure of holding a hearing under Rule 201(e); and (2) the required mandatory

procedure of noticing indisputable material facts under Rule 201(b), plainly acted

beyond its "jurisdiction" as prior Supreme Court and 1st Cir. decisions have

interpreted this rule, for, Rule 201(e) is mandatory if requested, as did HALL, and

Rule 201(b) is mandatory if facts to be noticed are known in this jurisdiction,

undisputed and the court is supplied with the information, as HALL has done, and

therefore the 1st Cir. should be compelled to reverse its Orders and comply with Rule

201(b), and to hold a hearing and notice said material facts.

The 1st Cir., having not provided (1) the required application of notice

pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2), and (2) the statutory entitlements

proscribed in § 1981, the 1st Cir. plainly acted beyond its "jurisdiction" as prior

Supreme Court and 1st Cir. decisions have interpreted the term “intent” and the

notice pleading requirements of Rule 8, for a § 1981 claim which does not require

Page 36 of 40
intent to be pled within the complaint and requires no heightened pleading standards

under Rule 8(a)(2), which is mandatory as HALL has satisfied the notice pleading

requirements of under Rule 8(a)(2) and § 1981, and therefore the 1st Cir. should be

compelled to reverse its Orders and comply with Rule 8, § 1981, and reinstate

HALL’S claims.

The 1st Cir., having not provided (1) the required application of notice

pleading requirements under Rule 8(a)(2), and (2) the statutory entitlements

proscribed in the State Actor Doctrine, the 1st Cir. plainly acted beyond its

"jurisdiction" as prior Supreme Court and 1st Cir. decisions have interpreted the term

“notice pleading requirements” of Rule 8 and for a State Actor claim, which requires

no heightened pleading standards under Rule 8(a)(2) is mandatory as HALL has

satisfied the notice pleading requirements of a State Actor.

The 1st Cir., having failed in the required duty to uphold and protect HALL’S

Constitution rights, which requires it to invalidate 47 U.S.C. § 230 as it violates

HALL’S constitutional rights, and therefore the Court should invalidate § 230.

HALL has discharged his burden of proving that he is entitled to a writ of

mandamus, and the 1st Cir. erred when it denied his clear and indisputable claims.

See Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland:: 346 U.S. 379 (1953). supra, at 346 U. S.

384, quoting United States v. Duell, 172 U. S. 576, 172 U. S. 582 (1899).

Page 37 of 40
 Both lower courts failed to apply equal protection of the rules, failed to apply

the precedents of the Erie Doctrine in this diversity case, the 1st Cir. failed to comply

with the law in not adhering to and following the legal requirements, obligations,

duties and provisions as set forth by the applicable laws, statutes, regulations, or

court precedents which led to an erroneous legal outcome. The Court(s) deviation

from these established processes, prescribed rules, standards, procedures and legal

requirements resulted in a judgment that fails to uphold the intended purpose, rights,

or obligations established by the law which is essential to ensure fairness,

consistency, and justice.

Wherefore, HALL PRAYS for an adult to enter the room, and an impartial

assessment to ensure fairness and maintain public trust and requests an independent

review or investigation into the decision-making process of the 1st Cir. and District

Courts actions in this case, and 'to confine the courts to a lawful exercise of its

prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to

do so.'" See Will v. United States :: 389 U.S. 90 (1967) quoting Roche v. Evaporated

Milk Assn., 319 U. S. 21, 319 U. S. 26 (1943). (a judicial usurpation of power, will

justify the invocation of this extraordinary remedy. Will, supra at 389 U. S. 95, and

to order;

1. a writ of mandamus voiding the entire proceedings for fraud upon the Court

and award HALL 500 million dollars for TWITTER’S involvement in this
Page 38 of 40
 fraud and to deter future parties from overtaking a federal court and partaking

in fraud upon the court, or

2. a writ of mandamus vacating the 1st Cir.’s two rulings and remand the

case ordering the 1st. Cir. with instructions to properly apply the relevant

established law and precedents as these orders are clearly inconsistent with

established civil and evidentiary rules, precedent and establish the proper legal

principles to be applied; and

3. that the 1st. Cir. conduct an evidentiary hearing to more fully develop the

factual record before making a final determination to help ensure the 1st Cir.

has properly considered all the relevant facts in light of the applicable

established law.

Dated: September 15, 2024

Updated: November 4,2024

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Daniel E. Hall
Pro Se, Petitioner

Page 39 of 40
 IX. CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

Certificate of Compliance With Type-Volume Limit, Typeface Requirements,

and Type-Style Requirements

1. This document complies with the word limit of Fed. R. App. P. 21(d)(1) because,

excluding the parts of the document exempted by the Fed. R. App. P. 32(f) as this

document contains 8,995 words.

2. This document complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R. App. P.

32(a)(5) and the type-style requirements of Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(6) because this

document has been prepared in a proportionally spaced typeface using Microsoft

Word 2010 in Times New Roman, 14-point font.

Dated: September 15, 2024 /s/ Daniel E. Hall

Pro Se Petitioner

Updated: November 4,2024 /s/ Daniel E. Hall

Pro Se Petitioner

Page 40 of 40