en Banc Binder
en Banc Binder
for the
FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT
i.
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
ii.
Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Environment, 523
U.S. 83 (1998) 6, 12
Circuit Courts
Achtman v. Kirby, McInerny & Squire, LLP, 464
F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2006) 7
Doe v. C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d
358, 371 n. 2 (3d Cir.2008) 5, 13
ii.
Doe v. Village of Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376
(7th Cir. 2016) 2
Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d
213, 219 (3d Cir. 2012) 2, 11, 13
Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256
F.Supp.2d 1250, 1257 (N.D. Ala. 2003) 11
Other
E.g., Brainerd v. Beal (C.A. 7th, 1974) 498 F.2d
901 9
ii.
Introduction
Appellant, Sensa Verogna, petitions for rehearing and rehearing en banc of the
district court's order of August 27, 2020, insofar as it denies plaintiff's motion to
proceed anonymously [TD. 15]; its order of September 14, 2020, insofar as it denies
reconsideration [Doc. 55] of its August 27 order; and its order of September 21, 2020,
denying plaintiff's motion to delay [Doc. 56] disclosure of his true name. The Opinion
also states that "Each of the remaining appeals is jurisdictionally defective for one or
more reasons and is therefore dismissed, as either untimely brought, duplicative, and/or
seeking review of certain non-appealable interlocutory orders. Those two appeals, Nos.
20-2091 and 21-1317, are therefore dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction". A panel
rehearing is appropriate when a material point of law was overlooked in the decision.
Fed. R. App. P. 40(a)(2). An en banc rehearing by this Circuit is proper when (1) the
panel decision conflicts with a decision of the Supreme Court or a decision of this
uniformity of the Court’s decisions or (2) the case involves a question of exceptional
The Opinion accepts appellate jurisdiction over orders relating to the anonymity
of parties, finding that an order denying leave to proceed anonymously does fall within
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the collateral order doctrine and is immediately appealable, citing Doe v. Village of
Deerfield, 819 F.3d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 2016). In the judgment of Appellant, the panel’s
decision in this matter overlooks material points of law regarding jurisdiction and does
not address a resulting conflict with another decisions of this Court in Halleran v.
Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1992). In this case the Judge’s intent of the [Anon
Order] and the [Permission Order] with regards to anonymity, are conclusively, a final
judgment. [Stayed Order] and [Stayed Order] and 10/06/2020 Order affirming
essentially a final order], Elliott v. Archdiocese of New York, 682 F.3d 213, 219 (3d Cir.
2012).
Also, because of this conflict, consideration by the full court is necessary to secure and
_______________________
[Doc. 87] USCA JUDGMENT as to [Doc. 57] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, [Doc.
63] ** Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, [Doc. 69 Notice of Interlocutory Appeal, [Doc.
78] Notice of Interlocutory Appeal. See Also Notice(s) of Appeal; 11/09/2020, [Doc.
69], challenging all Orders to date based upon Clear Absence of Jurisdiction. See Appeal
No. 4 No. 20-2091. 04/19/2021, [Doc. 78], challenging the all Orders to date based
upon voidness and fraud upon the court. See Appeal 5, No. 21-317. 10/13/2020, [Doc.
63], challenging the September 2lst, 2020, order denying [Doc. 56], to delay compulsion
of true name, and the September 28th, 2020, Order staying the case, and "thus
essentially a final order", based upon informal Notice of Appeal and Stripped
Jurisdiction. See Appeal 2, No. 20-2005. 09/25/2020, [Doc. 57], challenging the August
27, 2020, Order denying [Doc. 15], motion on anonymity, the September 14th, 2020,
Order denying reconsideration [Doc. 55], and the September 2lst, 2020, order denying
[Doc. 56], to delay compulsion of true name, for mis-application, erroneous standards
or errors in law when deciding Megless. See Appeal 1, No. 20-1933.
** The District Court Docket USCA JUDGMENT incorrectly states Doc. 63. See
Doc. 85.
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conflicts with; the Supreme Court’s decision in Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, ___, 124
S.Ct. 906, 915, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004), (where it is firmly settled that challenges to
federal subject matter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time on appeal); Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005) (where lower federal courts
may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); this Court of Appeals in Halleran
v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1992); (where lack of jurisdiction may be raised on
review, and at any stage of the proceedings, and the decisions of other courts of appeal
overriding need for national uniformity. No. 4 Appeal, Appellant's Brief ¶ ¶ 10-28].
Furthermore, the panel’s decision conflicts with; the Supreme Court’s decision
in Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), (where Section 1292 allows
appeals from certain interlocutory orders as it would cause irreparable harm to the
Appellant if review were delayed as this is in “Real Time” and happening right now and
"involves 'an asserted due process right the legal and practical value of which would be
destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial.""). The intent of the District Court is
clear that these two Orders are in McAuliffe's own words "essentially final
_____________________
[23] In re Petronio (C.C.A.) 220 F. 269, 273; In re Ballou (D.C.) 215 F. 810, 813; in subject
matter jurisdiction are nonwaivable and may be raised at any time, including on appeal.
Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 775 n. 4 (9th Cir. 1991). 13 Wright & Miller § 3522, pp.
122–26. Levin, 74 F.3d 763, 766. Appellants Brief, [TAB A-1 ¶¶ 3-4], [Amended Notice,
at 81], [TAB A-7].
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10/6/2020 Order(s)]; this Court of Appeals in Halleran v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 47 (1st
Cir. 1992); (where lack of jurisdiction for a bias and unconstitutional court may be raised
on review, and at any stage of the proceedings; and the decisions of other courts of
appeal such as United States v. Estate of Stonehill, 660 F.3d 415, 444 (9th Cir. 2011)), (where
secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions. Furthermore, the panel’s
decision conflicts with; the Supreme Court’s decision in E.g., Becker v. Montgomery, 532
U.S. 757 (2001), where "imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where
no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from what judgment to which appellate
court."; Smith v. Barry, 502 U.S. 244, 248 (1992)., (informal pro se brief can serve as
notice of appeal); Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982), (divested
control over those aspects of the case which involved in the appeal); this Court of
Appeals in Halleran v. Hoffman, 966 F.2d 45, 47 (1st Cir. 1992); (where lack of jurisdiction
may be raised on review, and at any stage of the proceedings, and the decisions of other
courts of appeal such as E.g., Cobb v. Lewis (C.A. 5th, 1974) 488 F.2d 41, where in a
number of decided cases it has been held that so long as the function of notice is met
by the filing of a paper indicating an intention to appeal, the substance of the rule has
been complied with; which would substantially affects a rule of national application in
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which there is an overriding need for national uniformity. No. 2 Appeal- Appellant's
Brief ¶ ¶ 69-76].
secure and maintain uniformity of the Court’s decisions. Furthermore, the panel’s
decision conflicts with; the Supreme Court’s decision in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273, 289 n.19 (1982), and whether the facts in this case satisfy the statutory
standard of a Megless test; this Court of Appeals in Hooper-Haas v. Ziegler Holdings, LLC,
690 F.3d 34, 37 (1st Cir. 2012), where an abuse of discretion occurs "when a material
factor deserving significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon,
or when all proper and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious
mistake in weighing them."; and the decisions of other courts of appeal such as Doe v.
C.A.R.S. Protection Plus, Inc., 527 F.3d 358, 371 n. 2 (3d Cir.2008), where a decision is
clearly erroneous in fact and law, 'rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, is an
errant conclusion of law or an improper application of law to the facts in record and
Argument
I. The Opinion Overlooks a Material Point of Law Resulting in a Conflict
with Another Decision of this Court and Directly Conflicts with the Decisions
of Other Circuits and the Supreme Court and Substantially Affects the
Application of Jurisdiction in Federal Courts Across the Country, So That
Rehearing Is Necessary to Secure Uniformity of This Court’s Decisions.
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Appellant argues that for the same reasons the District Court cannot gain
jurisdiction until it has answered the jurisdiction for itself, this Appeals Court is left with
a case without a federal question to support the court's personal jurisdiction or subject-
matter jurisdiction over the parties. Gutierrez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417, 434-
35, 115 S. Ct. 2227, 132 L. Ed. 2d 375 (1995). [ V. Appendix I, Appellant's Brief
The Appellant's first question asked, "Did the Court establish an entirely new
and erroneous legal principle in deciding the merits which included analysis and
adjudication of State and Federal laws without first obtaining subject-matter or personal
jurisdiction? He asked because a court "generally may not rule on the merits of a case
without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in the suit
(subject-matter jurisdiction). Sinochem Int 'I Co. Ltd. v. Malaysia Int'! Shipping Corp., 549
U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (declining to address jurisdiction and holding that the district
court had authority to dismiss action on forum non conveniens grounds before considering
the merits) (citing Steel Co., 523 U.S. 83, 93-102, (rejecting doctrine of "hypothetical
jurisdiction" that would allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating
jurisdiction). Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 552 (2005)
(lower federal courts may not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); Ins. Corp.
of Ir. Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 701 (1982) (same).
Appellant further alleges that the judge, McAuliffe exercised the Courts jurisdiction not
specifically authorized by any federal statute. Evers v. Astrue, 536 F.3d 651, 657 (7th Cir.
Page 6 of 15
2008), and lacked the statutory grant of jurisdiction. Achtman v. Kirby, McInerny & Squire,
LLP, 464 F.3d 328 (2d Cir. 2006) and that Jurisdiction is lacking if a constitutionally
valid federal statute Section §230 bars the federal courts from entertaining the case.
("[A]n assertion of Section §230 immunity must be resolved before the court may
address the merits of the underlying claim(s).") Article III jurisdiction depends on the
If there was as alleged, fraud upon the Court, the court would therefore be a bias
court, which makes it an unconstitutional court, it would cause irreparable harm to the
Appellant if review were delayed as this is in “Real Time” and happening right now and
"involves 'an asserted due process right the legal and practical value of which would be
destroyed if it were not vindicated before trial." Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337
U.S. 541 (1949); It is obvious that, if Congress had allowed appeals only from those
final judgments which terminate an action, this order would not be appealable. Midland
Asphalt Corp. v. United States, 489 U.S. 794, 799 (1989); "effectively unreviewable on
appeal from a final judgment," and immediately appealable under the collateral order
exception to the final judgment rule, quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay 437 U.S. 463
(1978). [W]here the occasion has demanded, where enforcement of the judgment is
"manifestly unconscionable," Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U.S. 651, 32 S. Ct. 687, 689 (1912);
they have wielded the power without hesitation. Hazel-Atlas Glass Co. v Hartford-Empire
Page 7 of 15
Co., 322 U.S. 238 (1944); United States v. Buck, 281 F.3d 1336, 1344 (10th Cir. 2002),
Appellant also avers that the Court's verdict in its [Default Order], [MFR Order]
and [Rule 60 Order] are inconsistent with the law applicable in this case and utilized
unofficial rules which altered the judicial machinery of the Court and that this court
should grant a judgements in his favor as a matter of law.[2] [ V. Appendix I, page 4],
an error(s) of law; plainly abused his discretion; failed to consider adequately the
evidence, and; failed to give proper weight to the relevant legal factors. In Re: Apple Inc.,
No. 14-143 (Fed. Cir. 2014), when he pronounced upon the law’s meaning or
constitutionality when he had no jurisdiction to do so, and by very definition, and were
ultra vires and unconstitutional acts. [V. Appendix I, (Biased Court unconstitutional),
page 2]
Appellant argues that his [Delay Compulsion Motion, at 56] may be read to
include denial of underlying motion, and not simply denial of motion for
reconsideration, and “can be fairly inferred from the notice" that Appellant intended to
appeal the underlying motion. Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 15 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1997);
Correa v. Cruisers, 298 F.3d 13, 21 n. 3 (1st Cir.2002). (briefs as well as notice of appeal
can be consulted during this process); Chamorro v. Puerto Rican Cars, Inc., 304 F.3d at 3-4
(1st Cir. 2002). Here, based on a review of Appellant’s [Delay Compulsion Motion, at
56] brief, Appellant manifested an intent to appeal the underlying order denying the
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[Anonymous Motion, at 15]. Marie v. Allied Home Mortg. Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir.
2005). [V. Appendix I, (ignore notice, lacks power, unconstitutional), page 7].
Because of the fact that the timely filing of the notice of appeal has been
characterized as jurisdictional (E.g., Brainerd v. Beal (C.A. 7th, 1974) 498 F.2d 901), which
is important that the right to appeal not be lost by mistakes of mere form. As another
subsection of Rule 3 warns, an appeal "must not be dismissed for informality of form
or title . .. , or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from
the notice." And as the Supreme Court has instructed, "imperfections in noticing an
appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists about who is appealing, from
what judgment to which appellate court." E.g., Becker v. Montgomery, 532 U.S. 757 (2001).
The Appellant also argued that from the time he noticed the Court on September
17, 2020, the District Court was stripped of its jurisdiction to compel the Appellant’s
true identity in the September 2lst, 2020, order denying [Doc. 56], or to enter the
September 28th, 2020, Order staying the case, and ordering "thus essentially a final
of Appeals and divested the District Court of its control over those aspects of the case
which involved in the appeal which were the Appellant's true identity. Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982). The Opinion must first address whether the
September 2lst, 2020 and September 28th, 2020, and if it did, which is true, those orders
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would be void on non-sufficient jurisdictional grounds. If they are void[ed] orders, there
are no order in which this Appeals Court would have jurisdiction over. The Opinion
neglects any mention of the September 28 Order, and specifies the September 21 Order,
but fails to state where it obtained its jurisdiction over this order.
“An appeal must not be dismissed for informality of form or title of the notice
of appeal, or for failure to name a party whose intent to appeal is otherwise clear from
the notice.” Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)(4). E.g., Becker, at 757 (Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 requirement
The rule of law as applied to the established facts in this case is violative, as the
facts provided by the Plaintiff meet the relevant statutory standards of the Megless test.
The Court used a higher standard of proof than the preponderance of evidence
standard required. The [Anon Order] establishes an entirely new and erroneous legal
principle and precedent that would require litigants to demonstrate a nearly impossible
bar of "near death" or "actual harm" in order to proceed anonymously out of fear from
retaliation. The [Compulsion Order] set a new standard and precedent in that any Doe
or Anonymous in cases like this, the litigant would lose his appeal rights as the judge
would be able to force disclosure before any review from the Appeals Court.
The Judge abused his discretion as his decision is clearly erroneous in fact and
law, 'rests upon a clearly erroneous finding of fact, is an errant conclusion of law or an
Page 10 of 15
improper application of law to the facts in record. Oddi v. Ford Motor Co., 234 F.3d 136,
146 (3d Cir.2000). The need to protect Appellant and his young family’s privacy and
safety during this lawsuit easily outweighs the presumption of judicial openness codified
in Rule 10(a). Estate of Rodriguez v. Drummond Co., Inc., 256 F.Supp.2d 1250, 1257 (N.D.
Ala. 2003).
Summary Argument
(“[E]very federal appellate court has a special obligation to satisfy itself not only
of its own jurisdiction, but also that of the lower courts in a cause under review, even
though the parties are prepared to concede it.”) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted); Ins. Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,456 U.S. 694,
702, 102 S.Ct. 2099, 2104, 72 L.Ed.2d 492 (1982) (“[N]o action of the parties can confer
subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court.”); In re Resorts Int'l, Inc.,372 F.3d 154,
161 (3d Cir.2004) ( “Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by consent of the
parties.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Samuel–Bassett v. KIA Motors
Am., Inc., 357 F.3d 392, 396 (3d Cir.2004) (“[P]arties may not confer subject matter
The Panel’s Opinion in this case conflicts with this Court’s earlier decisions such
as Halleran, (1st Cir. 1992); (where lack of jurisdiction for a bias and unconstitutional
court may be raised on review, and at any stage of the proceedings); Smith v. Kmart Corp.,
177 F.3d 19, 26 (1st Cir. 1999), (where there is a need to prevent miscarriage of justice);
Aybar v. Crispin-Reyes, 118 F.3d 10, 15 n. 5 (1st Cir. 1997) ("where notice can be fairly
Page 11 of 15
inferred from the notice"); Parella v. Retirement Board, R.I. Employeees', 173 F.3d 46, 55
(1st Cir. 1999), (where immunity must be resolved before a court may address the
merits); Gaydar v. Sociedad Instituto Gineco-Quirurgico, 345 F.3d 15, 22-23 (1st Cir. 2003),
(when the Court fails to provide case-specific, fact-based inquiry; Hooper-Haas (1st Cir.
significant weight is ignored, when an improper factor is relied upon, or when all proper
and no improper factors are assessed, but the court makes a serious mistake in weighing
them."). United States v. Boch Oldsmobile, Inc., 909 F.2d 657, 661 (1st Cir. 1990), (Court
The Panel’s Opinion in this case conflicts with Supreme Court jurisprudence
such as: Cohen (1949), (where Section 1292 allows appeals from certain interlocutory
orders); Kontrick (2004), (where lack of jurisdiction may be raised on review, and at any
stage of the proceedings); Exxon Mobil Corp. (2005), (where lower federal courts may
not exercise jurisdiction absent a statutory basis); Sinochem, (2007), citing Steel Co. v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83 (1998), (rejecting doctrine of "hypothetical
jurisdiction" that would allow a court to rule on issues of law before adjudicating
jurisdiction) Cohen (1949), (Due process rights destroyed); E.g., Becker (2001),
("imperfections in noticing an appeal should not be fatal where no genuine doubt exists
about who is appealing, from what judgment to which appellate court."); Smith, (1992).,
(informal pro se brief can serve as notice of appeal); Griggs, (1982). (where conferred
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jurisdiction divested the District Court of its control); Pullman-Standard, (1982), (whether
the facts in this case satisfy the statutory standard of a Megless test);
The Panel’s Opinion in this case conflicts with the sister appellate courts such as
Elliott (3d Cir. 2012), (regarding affirmation of essentially final orders); In re Petronio, In
re Ballou, (regarding defects in subject matter jurisdiction); United States, (9th Cir. 2011),
(1990), (where void judgments may be attacked at any time, in any court, either directly
or collaterally); Doe, (3d Cir.2008), (where a decision is clearly erroneous in fact and law,
with the decisions of the Supreme Court, this Court and of other courts of appeal. The
discussed by the Court in this case or by the district court below. For these reasons, the
Opinion should be reheard so as to resolve these conflicts and secure uniformity in this
Page 13 of 15
Conclusion
The Panel's Opinion replicates the District Courts' actions of putting the cart
before the horse. On the one hand it accepts jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)., but on the other it cannot state for certain that the District
Court had any type of jurisdiction due to hypothetical jurisdiction, voided jurisdiction
for fraud upon or for bias of the Court, or for stripped jurisdiction after notice. In
stating that the Appeals Court has jurisdiction for an interlocutory appeal, it silently
concedes that the "true identity" orders were not the product hypothetical, voided, or
stripped jurisdiction without even any discussion, while simultaneously dismissing those
appeals and telling the Appellant that the Court has no jurisdiction over those issues
and cannot review them, which it must in order to confirm its own jurisdiction to make
the order it just made. For the foregoing reasons, Appellant Sensa Verogna, respectfully
request that this Court grant his request for a rehearing and rehearing en banc.
Respectfully,
_______________________________________
/s/ Plaintiff, Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
SensaVerogna@gmail.com
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 22nd day of August 2020, the foregoing document was
made upon the Defendant, through its attorneys of record to Jonathan M. Eck
jeck@orr-reno.com and Julie E. Schwartz, Esq., JSchwartz@perkinscoie.com and
David A. Perez, DPerez@perkinscoie.com.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I hereby certify that the body of this motion contains 3,872 words which excludes the
signature block, certificate of service and certificate of compliance and has no more
than 15 pages.
_______________________________________
/s/ Plaintiff, Anonymously as Sensa Verogna
SensaVerogna@gmail.com
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