Operation CHAOS:
A Domestic Ethical Divide
INTL305 B001: Law and Ethics in Intelligence
Goorjian A. Ferrell
April 26, 2024
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Introduction
Operation CHAOS, also known as Operation MHCHAOS, was a Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA)-led domestic covert operation directed at monitoring and infiltrating domestic
anti-war and civil rights groups within the United States (U.S.) who were under suspicion of
having ties to foreign powers. Established under the orders of President Lyndon B. Johnson and
further expanded by President Richard Nixon, the mission was shrouded in controversy as it
enabled the agency to conduct surveillance on U.S. soil, raising ethical concerns about its
conduct and whether it violated the Fourth Amendment, which protected American citizens from
unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the potential to seek to obstruct their First
Amendment right to freedom of speech and assembly. Operation CHAOS would create debates
on the ethical implications of intelligence agencies being used for political purposes, the lack of
ethical constraints they were bound by, and their conduct within the United States.
Definitions and Ethics on Covert Operations
The U.S. has long practiced its foreign policy abroad through covert and clandestine
activities within its intelligence agencies, primarily that of the CIA, using its often ethically
concerning directives to interfere and shape the affairs of others in the U.S. favor. Before
Operation CHAOS can be addressed, I want to define what covert action is and then address
whether it is ethical in a brief summary.
Covert action (CA), as defined by the 1948 National Security Directive 10/2 is, “an
activity, or activities, of the United States Government to influence political, economic, or
military conditions abroad, where it is intended that the role of the [government] will not be
apparent or acknowledged publicly, but does not include…traditional counter-intelligence,
diplomatic, military, or law enforcement activities.” (“Historical Documents - Office of the
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Historian,” n.d.) Coined originally by President Eisenhower, covert actions, or 'special
activities’, are commonly committed overseas in most countries, with a few exceptions, such as
domestic operations conducted by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB). Intended to be
strategic in nature, covert actions focus on larger objectives beyond immediate operational needs
to influence a location; this is particularly useful where military force is either not desired or
incapable of being used to further foreign policy goals. In essence, it is a hidden approach to
shaping events and people overseas through the use of propaganda, political and economic
programs, or paramilitary operations. (Miller, Regan, and Walsh 2022)
Having properly defined covert action, the ethicality of covert actions will now be
addressed. For as long as there has been statehood, the act of spying and collecting information
on allies and enemies has existed; the act of intelligence itself is inherently amoral and benign,
with covert actions in particular being focused on the collection of information to better inform
policymakers, and is rarely ever the commitment to an action as clandestine operations are. The
act of prying into the internal affairs of allies and enemies alike is often considered in public
ethics questionable, particularly in a secular society such as the United States. It should be noted
that a steady flow of information allows decisionmakers to create effective policy strategies. Due
to the obscurity of special activities, one especially ridden by controversy and scandal in U.S.
history within the CIA and Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), are such actions truly ethical
in any free society, and can they be conducted while maintaining the country's fundamental
values? (Strait, 1989) Covert actions, if not inherently unethical, are certainly unlawful according
to the Vienna Convention based on their ruling on diplomatic injunctions and interference within
domestic affairs (Stempel, 2007), and to push the narrative further, if one is to take the statement
of Catholic theologian John Courtney Murray into account, the ethics of the nation-state will
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vastly differ from that of the public, for its ethics are based on pragmatism and its security and
are not inherently ethically concerned with immoral or unlawfulness but justifiability. (Strait,
1989) This is not, of course, to state that such pursuits are justifiable by any means, especially if
they violate the core tenets of a country, such as those laid down by the U.S. Constitution.
Operation CHAOS
Purpose
Faced with urban race riots and a growing domestic protest against the war in Vietnam,
upon presidential requests the Director of Central Intelligence, established within the
Counterintelligence Staff a Special Operations Group (SOG) in August 1967, to collect,
coordinate, evaluate, and report on foreign contacts that would influence American dissidence.
(“Rockefeller Commission Report” 1975) With surveillance programs previously led by the FBI,
this new direction was unprecedented and was, at first, limited to American left-wing activists
overseas. When the first report provided little to no foreign involvement in U.S. domestic affairs
in protest groups, first President Johnson and later President Richard Nixon would expand the
collection parameters to domestic soil, which by law the CIA was prohibited from conducting as
its agency charter is strictly foreign intelligence in nature. Ultimately, it was the CIA's job to be
able to answer the president's questions and concerns, while internal security was strictly handled
by the FBI. (Carlisle 2015)
Methods
Led by Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) Richard Helms, responsibility would
ultimately be delegated to Chief of Counterintelligence James Angleton, with Richard Ober
being the group chief. Ober was instructed to collect and disseminate information on foreign
involvement in domestic extremism and dissidence connected to the Vietnam War protests, and
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ultimately to maintain a supporting database for the information collected by the FBI. Due to the
scale of the program, more than 30 people were initially recruited by mid-1969, with further
additions likely being required in the future to meet minimum demands, according to Obers
estimations. Multiple divisions were brought into a collaborative fold for the task, with
counterintelligence (CI) remaining the lead to maintain the CIA's control over the operation. The
Office of Security (OS), a collection division that monitors all incoming raw information,
believes that it should provide any pertinent information to Obers mission as it collects per its
normal security mission. (Rafalko 2011) During the first report submitted to the White House by
Ober in 1969, the report concluded that there was very little evidence of communist funding, or
training, within such movements or any communist influence from a foreign state that would
prove subversive or intentionally obstructive in nature. (Janos and Janos 2018)
As the team expanded to over 50 officers, there were two worldwide branches
established: one for the U.S. black militant movement and the other for the American New Left.
Knowledge of CHAOS was highly restricted on a need-to-know basis and compartmentalized
within the Counterintelligence Division (CID). The groups would collect open-source
information (OSI) on the actions and whereabouts of these groups and individuals whenever they
traveled abroad, and the intelligence collected would be forwarded to the CI within the FBI.
Active investigations of targets who traveled to or took residency in countries where few
counterintelligence assets existed were common, and so penetrating foreign groups and assessing
the chances of foreign manipulation being active or existent on American personnel to determine
in what ways they could be detrimental to U.S. national security was common practice in
preparing an intelligence brief. No piece of information was discarded; nothing could be thrown
out, as any scrap could prove pivotal in uncovering a potential spy, who, at the height of the Cold
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War and its dying days, was at the forefront of many intelligence officers whose heads turned
towards the Communist Bloc. (Rafalko 2011)
Outcomes
By 1972, as the U.S. withdrew from Vietnam and anti-war protests ceased, the SOG
which was responsible for CHAOS, quietly ceased to exist. By 1973, the Director of
Counterintelligence, William Colby, curtailed any further operations by CHAOS, ultimately
ending its lifespan in 1974. Following its termination and handover of operational documentation
to the FBI, an article written by The New York Times accused the CIA of domestic espionage.
While the CIA sought to address the public's displeasure and outcry over the perceived mass
gathering of personal information through a press conference and the release of the ‘Family
Jewels’, these did little to reduce public and Congressional paranoia, and soon the Rockefeller
Committee was underway to investigate the CIA's involvement during that period in time, which
perpendicularly ran with the Church Committee that investigated the FBI and the intelligence
community as a whole. 1976, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905, which further
stressed the missions of the CIA and FBI in their respective charters; 1978, President Carter
created Executive Order 12036, which further protected American privacy by adding that any
intelligence activities against U.S. citizens must be coordinated with the FBI and approved by the
attorney general, while prohibiting mail-opening or physical and digital surveillance unless it is
for prospective Federal employees. (Carlisle 2015)
The intelligence community as a whole faced a backlash and a tremendously high price in
reputation for its actions during this period of time, with loss of morale being high and public
skepticism being prevalent in present times. This only worsened as there was never any evidence
of foreign involvement in these protests.
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Ethical Dilemmas of Operation CHAOS
Primarily, Operation CHAOS set several ethical dilemmas; firstly, it greatly went against
the CIA's charter of being solely responsible for foreign intelligence operations, and while
initially this was the case, it expanded into the collection of U.S. nationals with little-to-no
oversight or what would be considered ‘probably cause’ beyond presidential suspicion.
Secondly, there is a very real concern about it interfering with the Fourth Amendment, which
protects U.S. citizens from unjust searches and seizures. However, under Article 11, Section 1,
Clause 7 of the U.S. Constitution, it does give the President the authority to protect the
government against those who would subvert or seek to overthrow it by unlawful means, which
empowers the executive to order domestic or foreign surveillance against individuals who may
seek to destroy the American way of life. (Rafalko 2011)
Referring to the concept of jus in intelligentia, the collection of open-source material,
would raise little, if any, ethical problems, as the collection of information is in itself amoral and
not intended for harm but to have intelligence on hand for moments in which it may be required.
It would be more, in the public's moral sense, ethically acceptable than engaging in devious and
coercive means to obtain intelligence from organizations or states in which livelihoods are put in
danger and laws are actively broken. While these means would prove more highly beneficial if
the information is obtained in this manner, as it is a more closely guarded kind, it nevertheless is
the ‘dirty’ business that most agencies choose to use as a last resort when the sake of the public's
safety is concerned. (Omand and Phythian 2012)
The irresponsibility in Operation CHAOS does not stem solely from the CIA but also
from the President, who refused to accept the provided intelligence and pushed the agency
beyond its strategically mandated boundaries.
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My Recommendations
Many of the preventative measures I would recommend have already been addressed and
set in place. The presidents providing statutes to formalize and further emphasize the charters set
by these intelligence agencies and creating an oversight intelligence committee have proven to
be adequate in monitoring and ensuring that as few ethical-related problems would occur again,
such as the Patriot Act by President Bush that would lead to a special court being assembled to
review cases in which agencies need to probe into the personal lives of targeted Americans by
having evidence of malfeasance. While a more ethically codified approach, such as using the
Preventing, Allowing, and Doing (PAD) approach, is useful for determining how ethically viable
an approach is for an operation, it is equally useful as moral dilemmas are far more common in
the intelligence field than in the private sector. My recommendation would be to continue to
develop the PAD method of approach for internal development. Many of the other systems are
quite robust and only require experienced members to properly function, so staffing the oversight
committee with members who are experienced or ensuring their terms are indefinite to maintain
consistency is an important factor in monitoring intelligence activities and providing feedback.
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