Cryptography and

Network Security
Chapter 14
Fourth Edition
by William Stallings

Lecture slides by Lawrie Brown

 Chapter 14 – Authentication
Applications
In practice , the effectiveness of a
countermeasure often depends on how it
is used; the best safe in the world is
worthless if no one remembers to close
the door.
—Safe Computing in Information AGE,
NRC
 Authentication Applications
 will consider authentication functions
 developed to support application-level
authentication & digital signatures
 will consider Kerberos – a private-key
authentication service
 then X.509 - a public-key directory
authentication service
 Kerberos
 trustedkey server system from MIT
 provides centralised private-key third-party
authentication in a distributed network
 allows users access to services distributed
through network
 without needing to trust all workstations
 rather all trust a central authentication server
 two versions in use: 4 & 5
 Kerberos Requirements
 its first report identified requirements as:
 secure
 reliable
 transparent
 scalable
 implemented using an authentication
protocol based on Needham-Schroeder
 Kerberos v4 Overview
a basic third-party authentication scheme
 have an Authentication Server (AS)
 users initially negotiate with AS to identify self
 AS provides a non-corruptible authentication
credential (ticket granting ticket TGT)
 have a Ticket Granting server (TGS)
 users subsequently request access to other
services from TGS on basis of users TGT
 Kerberos v4 Dialogue
1. obtain ticket granting ticket from AS
• once per session
2. obtain service granting ticket from TGT
• for each distinct service required
3. client/server exchange to obtain service
• on every service request
Kerberos 4 Overview
 Kerberos Realms
a Kerberos environment consists of:
 a Kerberos server
 a number of clients, all registered with server
 application servers, sharing keys with server
 this is termed a realm
 typically a single administrative domain
 ifhave multiple realms, their Kerberos
servers must share keys and trust
Kerberos Realms
 Kerberos Version 5
 developed in mid 1990’s
 specified as Internet standard RFC 1510
 provides improvements over v4
 addresses environmental shortcomings
• encryption alg, network protocol, byte order, ticket
lifetime, authentication forwarding, interrealm auth
 and technical deficiencies
• double encryption, non-std mode of use, session
keys, password attacks
 X.509 Authentication Service
 part of CCITT X.500 directory service standards
 distributed servers maintaining user info database
 defines framework for authentication services
 directory may store public-key certificates
 with public key of user signed by certification authority
 also defines authentication protocols
 uses public-key crypto & digital signatures
 algorithms not standardised, but RSA recommended
 X.509 certificates are widely used in S/MIME, IP
SEC, SSL/TLS, SET
 X.509 Certificates
 issued by a Certification Authority (CA), containing:
 version (1, 2, or 3)
 serial number (unique within CA) identifying certificate
 signature algorithm identifier
 issuer X.500 name (CA)
 period of validity (from - to dates)
 subject X.500 name (name of owner)
 subject public-key info (algorithm, parameters, key)
 issuer unique identifier (v2+)
 subject unique identifier (v2+)
 extension fields (v3)
 signature (of hash of all fields in certificate)
 notation CA<<A>> denotes certificate for A signed by CA
 What's Inside an X.509 Certificate?
The X.509 standard defines what information can go into a certificate, and
describes how to write it down (the data format). All X.509 certificates have the
following data, in addition to the signature:
Version
This identifies which version of the X.509 standard applies to this
certificate, which affects what information can be specified in it. Thus far,
three versions are defined.
Serial Number
The entity that created the certificate is responsible for assigning it a serial
number to distinguish it from other certificates it issues. This information is
used in numerous ways, for example when a certificate is revoked its serial
number is placed in a Certificate Revocation List (CRL).
Signature Algorithm Identifier
This identifies the algorithm used by the CA to sign the certificate.
Issuer Name
The X.500 name of the entity that signed the certificate. This is normally a
CA. Using this certificate implies trusting the entity that signed this
certificate. (Note that in some cases, such as root or top-level CA
certificates, the issuer signs its own certificate.)
Validity Period
Each certificate is valid only for a limited amount of time. This period is
described by a start date and time and an end date and time, and can be
as short as a few seconds or almost as long as a century. The validity
period chosen depends on a number of factors, such as the strength of
the private key used to sign the certificate or the amount one is willing to
pay for a certificate. This is the expected period that entities can rely on
the public value, if the associated private key has not been compromised.
Subject Name
The name of the entity whose public key the certificate identifies. This
name uses the X.500 standard, so it is intended to be unique across the
Internet. This is the Distinguished Name (DN) of the entity, for example,
CN=Java Duke, OU=Java Software Division, O=Sun Microsystems Inc,
C=US (These refer to the subject's Common Name, Organizational Unit,
Organization, and Country.)
Subject Public Key Information
This is the public key of the entity being named, together with an
algorithm identifier which specifies which public key crypto system this
key belongs to and any associated key parameters.
X.509 Certificates
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 1 (0x0)
Serial Number: 7829 (0x1e95)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: C=ZA, ST=Western Cape, L=Cape Town, O=Thawte Consulting cc,
OU=Certification Services Division,
CN=Thawte Server CA/emailAddress=server-certs@thawte.com
Validity
Not Before: Jul 9 16:04:02 1998 GMT
Not After : Jul 9 16:04:02 1999 GMT
Subject: C=US, ST=Maryland, L=Pasadena, O=Brent Baccala,
OU=FreeSoft, CN=www.freesoft.org/emailAddress=baccala@freesoft.org
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (1024 bit) Modulus (1024 bit):
00:b4:31:98:0a:c4:bc:62:c1:88:aa:dc:b0:c8:bb: 33:35:19:d5:0c:64:b9:3d:41:b2:96:fc:f3:31:e1:
66:36:d0:8e:56:12:44:ba:75:eb:e8:1c:9c:5b:66: 70:33:52:14:c9:ec:4f:91:51:70:39:de:53:85:17:
16:94:6e:ee:f4:d5:6f:d5:ca:b3:47:5e:1b:0c:7b: c5:cc:2b:6b:c1:90:c3:16:31:0d:bf:7a:c7:47:77:
8f:a0:21:c7:4c:d0:16:65:00:c1:0f:d7:b8:80:e3: d2:75:6b:c1:ea:9e:5c:5c:ea:7d:c1:a1:10:bc:b8:
e8:35:1c:9e:27:52:7e:41:8f
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
Signature Algorithm: md5WithRSAEncryption
93:5f:8f:5f:c5:af:bf:0a:ab:a5:6d:fb:24:5f:b6:59:5d:9d: 92:2e:4a:1b:8b:ac:7d:99:17:5d:cd:
19:f6:ad:ef:63:2f:92: ab:2f:4b:cf:0a:13:90:ee:2c:0e:43:03:be:f6:ea:8e:9c:67: d0:a2:40:
03:f7:ef:6a:15:09:79:a9:46:ed:b7:16:1b:41:72: 0d:19:aa:ad:dd:9a:df:ab:97:50:65:f5:5e:
85:a6:ef:19:d1: 5a:de:9d:ea:63:cd:cb:cc:6d:5d:01:85:b5:6d:c8:f3:d9:f7: 8f:0e:fc:ba:1f:
34:e9:96:6e:6c:cf:f2:ef:9b:bf:de:b5:22: 68:9f
 Obtaining a Certificate
 any user with access to CA can get any
certificate from it
 only the CA can modify a certificate
 because cannot be forged, certificates can
be placed in a public directory
 CA Hierarchy
 ifboth users share a common CA then they
are assumed to know its public key
 otherwise CA's must form a hierarchy
 use certificates linking members of hierarchy
to validate other CA's
 each CA has certificates for clients (forward) and
parent (backward)
 each client trusts parents certificates
 enable verification of any certificate from one
CA by users of all other CAs in hierarchy
CA Hierarchy Use
 Certificate Revocation
 certificates have a period of validity
 may need to revoke before expiry, eg:
1. user's private key is compromised
2. user is no longer certified by this CA
3. CA's certificate is compromised
 CA’s maintain list of revoked certificates
 the Certificate Revocation List (CRL)
 users should check certificates with CA’s CRL
 Authentication Procedures
 X.509 includes three alternative
authentication procedures:
 One-Way Authentication
 Two-Way Authentication
 Three-Way Authentication
 all use public-key signatures
 One-Way Authentication
1 message ( A->B) used to establish
 the identity of A and that message is from A
 message was intended for B
 integrity & originality of message
 message must include timestamp, nonce,
B's identity and is signed by A
 may include additional info for B
 eg session key
 Two-Way Authentication
2 messages (A->B, B->A) which also
establishes in addition:
 the identity of B and that reply is from B
 that reply is intended for A
 integrity & originality of reply
 replyincludes original nonce from A, also
timestamp and nonce from B
 may include additional info for A
 Three-Way Authentication
3 messages (A->B, B->A, A->B) which
enables above authentication without
synchronized clocks
 has reply from A back to B containing
signed copy of nonce from B
 means that timestamps need not be
checked or relied upon
 X.509 Version 3
 has been recognised that additional
information is needed in a certificate
 email/URL, policy details, usage constraints
 ratherthan explicitly naming new fields
defined a general extension method
 extensions consist of:
 extension identifier
 criticality indicator
 extension value
 Certificate Extensions
 key and policy information
 convey info about subject & issuer keys, plus
indicators of certificate policy
 certificate subject and issuer attributes
 support alternative names, in alternative
formats for certificate subject and/or issuer
 certificate path constraints
 allow constraints on use of certificates by
other CA’s
Public Key Infrastructure
 Summary
 have considered:
 Kerberos trusted key server system
 X.509 authentication and certificates