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CNIT 128 8. Android Implementation Issues (Part 2)
This document discusses exploiting Android devices through practical physical and remote attacks. It covers bypassing lock screens through USB debugging bugs, removing key files, and abusing application issues. Remote exploits discussed include browser and application memory corruption, JavaScript interface attacks, and maintaining privileged access through "minimal su". The document also mentions man-in-the-middle exploits and privilege escalation techniques.
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CNIT 128 8. Android Implementation Issues (Part 2)
- 1. CNIT 128 Hacking MobileDevices 8. Identifying and Exploiting Android Implementation Issues Part 2 Updated 3-11-2020
- 2. Topics • Part 1 •Reviewing Pre-installed Applications • Exploiting Devices • Start through "Explanation of Privilege Levels" (up to p. 402)
- 3. Topics • Part 2 •Exploiting Devices • "Practical Physical Attacks" (p. 375) through • "Polaris Viewer Memory Corruption" (up to p. 402)
- 4. Topics • Part 3 •Exploiting Devices • "Injecting Exploits for JavaScript Interfaces" (p. 402) and following • Infiltrating User Data
- 5.
- 6. Bypassing Lock Screen •Getting ADB Shell Access: Two Ways • USB Debugging • Unlocked Bootloaders
- 7. USB Debugging • adbshell • Usually turned off by default • Exposes data and can be used to install new packages • User must approve it • Not possible if screen is locked
- 8. Bug • In Android4.2.2 up to 4.4.2 • Navigating to emergency dialer or lock screen camera • Shows the USB debugging authorization prompt • With the screen locked
- 9. Privilege Levels • /default.propfile controls ADB privileges • By default: ro.secure=1 • Adb runs as the shell user • If ro.secure=0 • adbd runs as root
- 10. ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT • From Android4.3 onwards • ADB won't run as root unless it's compiled with the ALLOW_ADBD_ROOT flag • Even if ro.secure=0 • To get root, compile a custom version of adbd and overwrite the binary on the device
- 11. Unlocked Bootloaders • Firstboot phone into Fastboot mode • Hold down power and volume keys while turning on the phone • or adb reboot bootloader • Then flash or boot a custom image • Not possible with Genymotion, Nox, or Bluestacks • They have no recovery partition
- 12. Unlock Bootloader • Forcesfactory reset • Wipes all user data • To stop thieves
- 13. Unlocked Bootloader • Ifuser unlocked the bootloader and left it unlocked • Boot into ClockworkMod Recovery ROM (not updated since 2014) • Get a root ADB shell
- 14. Bypassing Lock Screens •Using the DISABLE_KEYGUARD Permission • Allows an app to remove the lock screen • App code: KeyguardManager kgm = ((KeyguardManager)getSystemService("keyguard")); KeyGuardManager.KeyguardLock kgl = kgm.newKeyguardLock("mahh"); kgl.disableKeyguard(); Even though the KeyguardManager.KeyguardLock
- 15. Custom Drozer Agent drozeragent build --permission android.permission.DISABLE_KEYGUAR D • Install agent with adb, launch it, and bypass screen lock • Works on Nox (Android 5.1.1) • Fails on Genymotion (Android 9.0)
- 16. Removing Key Files •Pattern lock screen uses data from • /data/system/gesture.key • PIN or password lock uses data from • /data/system/password.key • Removing these files disables lock screen entirely
- 17. Removing Key Files •But that requires running as system or root • Privilege escalation
- 18. Abusing Android Application Issues •On Android 4.3 and earlier, this intent unlocks the phone from an adb shell in any context: shell@android:/ $ am start -n com.android.settings/ com.android.settings.ChooseLockGeneric --ez confirm_credentials false --ei lockscreen.password_type 0 --activity-clear-task Starting: Intent { flg=0x8000 cmp=com.android.settings/.ChooseLockGeneric (has extras) }
- 21. Using Logic Flawsthat Don't Require Shell Access • Some actions are allowed when a phone is locked • Make emergency phone calls • Receive phone calls • Allow third-party apps to temporarily disable the lock screen • Or place an activity in front of it
- 22. Motorola Droid • Phonethe locked device • Answer the call • Press Back button • Escape the lock screen
- 23. Viber • Messaging andcalling app • Place a Viber call • Answer it • Press the back button multiple times • Escape the lock screen
- 24. Using Legitimate Lock ScreenReset Functionality • You can bypass a lock screen if you have the use's Google credentials • Entering the PIN five times incorrectly • Connects to a linked Google account • But only for Android 4 and earlier
- 25. Android Device Manager •Allows lock screen to be bypassed from a Google account • Not active by default--user must enable it • And it erases all your data (link Ch 8b)
- 26.
- 27. Remote Exploits • Launchedover the Internet • Three modes of exploitation: • Loading a drozer JAR that loads a limited agent • Installing and starting a rogue drozer agent by abusing INSTALL_PACKAGES • Loading a drozer JAR that is passed Context
- 28. Browser Memory Corruption • Themost technical method • Reverse shells via buffer overflow, etc. • Becoming rarer as the browser becomes more secure
- 29. Polaris Viewer Memory Corruption •Office and PDF file viewer • Pre-installed on some devices • Exploited in 2012 with a crafted DOCX file • Using a stack-based buffer overflow • App also had INSTALL_PACKAGES permission
- 30. Android Browser JavaScript Interface •All WebViews using JavaScriptInterface • And targeting API before 17 • Are vulnerable to code execution flaws • Includes all stock Android browsers on Android 4.1.1 and below • Can get Context and use full permissions of browser
- 31.
- 33. Privilege Escalation • Exynosdriver exploit on some devices • Drozer has a exploit.mmap_abuse module • Tries to get root by abusing the map device operation • Similar to the exynos exploit • Dangerous: may cause a kernel panic and reboot the device
- 34. Maintaining Access • Mustinstall a special su binary bundled with Drozer, called "minimal su" • Allows every app to escalate to root • Without alerting the user
- 35. Man-in-the-Middle Exploits • Gettingin the middie • Host a wireless network • ARP Poisoning • Use Burp
- 36. Man-in-the-Middle Exploits • InterceptingSSL requires the ability to get a root CA certificate • Only nation-states or very rich attackers • But many apps ignore this defense and allow MITM attacks anyway