KEMBAR78
Data Privacy for Activists | PPTX
Data Privacy
For Activists
◎ Name for Today
◎ Preferred Pronouns (e.g. they, them, their)
◎ What brought you here? What do you want
from this workshop?
Introductions
Around the Room
Hello!
I am Greg Stromire (he, him, his)
I work for a data privacy
company.
I participate in activism.
I am not an expert in either.
And I am not a lawyer.
But I can still offer some tips.
Helpful Tools
Useful technologies to better
safeguard yourself and other
members.
Crypto 101
Whiteboard activity! Encryption is
a powerful tool in maintaining
privacy, but only when used
correctly. Some cryptography
fundamentals can help you make
smart choices.
Why We’re Here
What is data privacy, what it
means for activists, and some key
concepts for context.
Put in Practice
Hands-on practice using new tools
and best practices to establish
good habits when performing
organizing tasks.
Common Attacks
Overview of some of the most
common threat vectors for
activists -- which overlap with
personal and professional use.
Threat Modeling
Utilizing a basic framework for
security assessment to prevent
and prepare.
Agenda
1.
Why We Are Here
What is data privacy, and why does
it matter for activism?
Important Concepts
PrivacyAnonymity Authenticity
Privacy
Unhindered agency
to express oneself
selectively, with
direct control over
one’s own
information and
explicit boundaries.
Anonymity
The ability to exist,
and especially
communicate, in a
manner that does
not reveal any
personally
identifiable
information about
the source.
Important Concepts
Authenticity
Provide, with a high
level of confidence,
an assurance of the
identity of an
individual through
reliable and
verifiable means.
“
Arguing that you don't care about
the right to privacy because you
have nothing to hide is no
different than saying you don't
care about free speech because
you have nothing to say.
◎Edward Snowden
Activists
… have something to say.
JFK Airport - Craig Ruttle / AP Photo
2.
Threat Modeling
A basic framework for security.
Threat Modeling
◎Who would be most likely to target us?
Threat Modeling
◎Who would be most likely to target us?
◎How much money, time, and skill do they
have to dedicate to targeting us?
Threat Modeling
◎Who would be most likely to target us?
◎How much money, time, and skill do they
have to dedicate to targeting us?
◎What would they most likely want from us
(i.e. money? incriminating information?
access to trusted contacts?)
Threat Modeling
◎Who would be most likely to target us?
◎How much money, time, and skill do they
have to dedicate to targeting us?
◎What would they most likely want from us
(i.e. money? incriminating information?
access to trusted contacts?)
◎What would happen to us if they were
successful?
Threat Modeling
http://web.mit.edu/tweilu/www/eff-ssd-mockup/threatmodel.html
GovernmentsSurveillance state and law(less) enforcement
IndividualsUSB drives, webcams, and (spear) phishing
CorporationsBreaches, metadata, and (de)anonymization
COINTELPRO
(COunter INTELligence PROgram)
A series of covert, and often
illegal, projects conducted by the
United States FBI aimed at
surveilling, infiltrating,
discrediting and disrupting
domestic political organization.
Some of the Groups Targeted by the FBI’s COINTELPRO
Zinn Ed Project
Obama Opens NSA’s Vast Trove of Warrantless Data to
Entire Intelligence Community, Just in Time for Trump
The Intercept
White
Is the color of milk and
fresh snow, the color
produced by the
combination of all the
colors of the visible
spectrum.
Black
Is the color of coal,
ebony, and of outer
space. It is the darkest
color, the result of the
absence of or complete
absorption of light.
Databases
Breaches
Online services lose
user’s private
information
haveibeenpwned.com
“
The Guardian
December 15, 2016
DEMO
Has my account info ever been leaked?
https://haveibeenpwned.com
Place your screenshot here
DEMO
What does my online “fingerprint” look like?
https://panopticlick.eff.org/
Place your screenshot here
3.
Common Attacks
Get to know some frequently used
threat vectors.
Trust
At some point, you must
concede a level of trust in
the components of the
devices in your life
Keylogger
Could be wireless, could be
physically between keyboard and
cpu.
USB Drives
Not so innocent. Can provide an
attacker with control of the
machine with ease.
Rootkit
Programs that can control the
device. Hard to detect. Hard to get
rid of.
MITM
Monkey in the Middle. Someone in
between the intended sender and
recipient, without either know it.
Could be just listening, but could
also be modifying messages.
(Spear) Phishing
Messages meant to coerce a user
into entering their credentials into
a spoofed site. Spear- is targeting
one person specifically
Common Attacks
Brute Force
Common, weak, or reused
passwords. May include theft of
actual device. May be open Wifi or
bluetooth.
Phishing
Attempting to get you to
enter your own
credentials.
From: <mailadmin@stanford.edu >
Sent: Friday, Sept. 30, 2016 10:31 AM
To: <employee name>
Subject: Email Account Update
Due to migration to a new Open Source Email
Collaboration Solution (SunsetGates), it is
mandatory that you update your Stanford
University information immediately, using the
update link below:
http://update.sunsetgates.com/update/server/
admindesk/index.htm
Failure to update, will result to closure of your
account.
Thanks for your Co-Operation.
Email Admin Desk
Spear
Phishing
Targeted toward a
specific person.
From: "john.doe@ulberta.ca" (link sends e-
mail)
Sent: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 09:58:07 GMT
To: <recipient's name
removed>@ce.berkeley.edu (link sends e-mail)
<john.doe@ulberta.ca> (link sends e-mail)
Dear Dr. <recipient's name removed>;
I recently read your last article and it was very
useful in my field of research. I wonder, if
possible, to send me these articles to use in my
current research:
1-http://auth.berkeley.eduh.in/<link removed>
2-
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/p
ii/S1644966515000825
Thanks for you Cooperation in Advance.
John Doe
Department of Civil and Environmental
Engineering University of Alberta
Phone: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Alice
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Alice
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Alice
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Alice
Bob
Machine in the Middle
Eve
Alice
Bob
“Found” USB
Drives
Consider ALL
unsafe.
KeyLogger
Captures
keyboard input.
Brute Force Password Cracking Time
Number of
Characters
(A-Z, a-z) (A-Z, a-z, 0-9)
(A-Z, a-z, 0-9,
!@#$%^&*)
6 8 sec 3 min 13 min
8 3 hr 10 days 57 days
10 169 days 106 yrs 928 yrs
12 600 yrs 108k yrs 5m yrs
14 778k yrs 1bn yrs 5bn yrs
Brute Force Password Cracking
Brute Force Password Cracking
Actual actual reality: Nobody cares about his secrets. (Also, I would be hard
pressed to find that wrench for $5)
.https://xkcd.com/538/
Questions so far?
Useful technologies to better safeguard
yourself and your organization.
4.
Helpful Tools
Maintained
Has it been updated
recently? Have there
been fixes to bugs or
other security
vulnerabilities?
Audited
Has a security audit
been performed on
this program?
Open Source
Is the full source
code available for
inspection?
Guidelines for Selecting Quality Tools
Post-It Notes
Webcam attacks are real. Attackers
can gain access and control the
webcams on your laptop for
spying, and sometimes the best
solutions are the simplest -- cover
your camera with tape or sticker.
Password Manager
One of the best tools for protecting
accounts. Popular password
managers (e.g. Lastpass, 1Password)
can generate unique, super-strong
passwords for you. Use for every
account you have.
Privacy Badger
Another browser plugin to limit
trackers. Also provides a “Do-not-
track-me” mode that should be
respected.
HTTPS Everywhere
Browser plugin that can help
prevent Man in the Middle. Some
sites will start on HTTP before
being promoted to HTTPS.
uBlock Origin
Blocks ads. Useful because many
are trackers themselves, but also
could be vulnerable to attacks.
Helps to limit attack surface.
Browsing Online
2-Factor Auth
Another great tool for protecting
accounts, this one can help even if
your password is leaked or cracked.
Check out twofactorauth.org for
more info.
VPN
Virtual Private Networks
re-route and disguise
your traffic. Consider
mandatory for open
networks (e.g. coffee
shops). Some VPN
services are better than
others, so do some
research.
Tor
“Anonymizes” your
traffic by bouncing off
multiple nodes in
between source and
destination. Some
skepticism as to efficacy
without critical-mass
adoption, so proceed
with caution.
Protecting your network activity
Demo
Protected Network!
Place your screenshot here
Voice
Signal and
WhatsApp have
voice encryption
capability, but
quality can be
lacking. Not sure
about other options.
Text / Chat
Several options out
there, notably
Signal and
WhatsApp. Both are
end-to-end
encrypted as well.
Some controversy
around WhatsApp
“vulnerability.” More
like design decision,
but I prefer Signal’s
approach.
Email
Best solution is to
encrypt end-to-end.
This means a setup
like Thunderbird
(email client) and
Enigmail (crypto
add-on). Keep in
mind: Content is
encrypted. Metadata
and subject is in the
clear.
Data in Transit - Digital Communication
Demo
Encrypted email!
Place your screenshot here
VeraCrypt
Successor to
TrueCrypt, offers a
lot options.
Downside: offers a
lot of options.
Usually best to stick
with defaults.
Bonus: VeraCrypt
offers ability to
create “Hidden
Volumes”
GPG / Keybase
Command-line tools
have proven their
worth, but also
proven hard to use.
Some new
developments on
the horizon, but
these are usually for
those with more
experience.
Stock OS Apps
Great for full drive
encryption:
macOS: FileVault
Windows: BitLocker
Only basic features
for for files and
folders:
macOS: Disk Utility
Windows:
Encrypted File
Service
Data at Rest - Secure Storage
QubesOS
“A reasonably secure
operating system.”
Essentially runs a fresh
virtual machine for each
process, then burns it
down when you’re done.
Tails
A privacy-oriented OS.
Custom Linux build with
privacy settings maxed-
out. Still experimental.
Additional Security
5.
Put in Practice
Developing secure habits while
organizing
◎Think about what info is on
the phone
◎Disable fingerprint
◎Protect with passphrase
◎Backup data
◎Put in airplane mode
◎Pictures or video without
unlock
◎Consider a “dumb” phone,
or a “burner” with no
identity info attached
Mobile Security
◎ They know you called a gynecologist, spoke for a half hour,
and then searched online for the local abortion clinic’s
number later that day. But nobody knows what you spoke
about.
◎ They know you called the suicide prevention hotline from
the Golden Gate Bridge. But the topic of the call remains a
secret.
◎ They know you received an email from a digital rights
activist group with the subject line “52 hours left to stop
SOPA” and then called your elected representative
immediately after. But the content of those
communications remains safe from government intrusion.
Mind your Metadata
https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/why-metadata-matters
Verify Keys!
Eve
Alice
Bob
Out-of-Band
◎ Passwords on Everything (and don’t share!)
◎ Always lock and know where your devices are.
◎ Signal is pretty solid
◎ Thunderbird+Enigmail is too
◎ Get a VPN, but know its limits
◎ Legal in Oregon to record law enforcement
◎ 2-Factor Auth goes a long way
◎ So does a password manager
◎ Never provide passwords over email
◎ Look for HTTPS
◎ Mind your “cloud” accounts
Some final tips, recap, & recommendations
A word on digital security
But it can make a
big difference.
Especially if you
share your
knowledge.
One workshop
does not a private
activist make.
https://ssd.eff.org/en
Hands On
Let’s get set up!
Place your screenshot here
Thanks!
Any questions?
You can find me at:
greg@tozny.com
PGP: 0x317DCBC8
Special thanks to these resources:
◎ Electronic Frontier Foundation
◎ Freedom of the Press Foundation
◎ American Civil Liberties Union
◎ Ctrl-H in Portland, Or
◎ Presentation template by SlidesCarnival
◎ Diagram featured by poweredtemplate.com
Credits
Special thanks to these articles:
◎ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/22/edward-snowden-nsa-reform
◎ https://theintercept.com/2017/01/13/obama-opens-nsas-vast-trove-of-warrantless-data-to-
entire-intelligence-community-just-in-time-for-trump/
◎ https://www.aclu.org/blog/whats-government-doing-targeting-civil-rights-leaders
◎ https://www.aclu.org/blog/shhhh-what-fbi-doesnt-want-you-know-about-its-racial-profiling-
program?redirect=blog/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice-national-security/shhhh-what-fbi-
doesnt-want-you-know-about
◎ http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/11/black_lives_matter_oregon_just.html
◎ https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/14/yahoo-hack-security-of-one-billion-
accounts-breached
◎ https://uit.stanford.edu/phishing
◎ https://tozny.com/blog/10-unnerving-privacy-fails-thru-data-aggregation/
Credits
Special thanks to these articles:
◎ https://security.berkeley.edu/news/phishing-example-spear-phishing-attack-articles
◎ http://www.theverge.com/2016/12/13/13940514/dnc-email-hack-typo-john-podesta-
clinton-russia
◎ https://thehackernews.com/2015/08/lenovo-rootkit-malware.html
◎ http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/49999/hacking/found-usb-drive-hack.html
◎ http://geeknizer.com/top-usb-hacks-pwn/
◎ https://www.inetsolution.com/blog/june-2012/complex-passwords-harder-to-crack,-but-it-
may-not
◎ https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/cloud-security-blog/you-wont-believe-the-20-most-
popular-cloud-service-passwords/
◎ http://imgur.com/gallery/iVHfwLc
◎ http://lifehacker.com/truecrypts-security-audit-is-finally-done-with-mostly-1695243253
◎ https://tails.boum.org/
◎ https://www.qubes-os.org/
Credits

Data Privacy for Activists

  • 1.
  • 2.
    ◎ Name forToday ◎ Preferred Pronouns (e.g. they, them, their) ◎ What brought you here? What do you want from this workshop? Introductions Around the Room
  • 3.
    Hello! I am GregStromire (he, him, his) I work for a data privacy company. I participate in activism. I am not an expert in either. And I am not a lawyer. But I can still offer some tips.
  • 4.
    Helpful Tools Useful technologiesto better safeguard yourself and other members. Crypto 101 Whiteboard activity! Encryption is a powerful tool in maintaining privacy, but only when used correctly. Some cryptography fundamentals can help you make smart choices. Why We’re Here What is data privacy, what it means for activists, and some key concepts for context. Put in Practice Hands-on practice using new tools and best practices to establish good habits when performing organizing tasks. Common Attacks Overview of some of the most common threat vectors for activists -- which overlap with personal and professional use. Threat Modeling Utilizing a basic framework for security assessment to prevent and prepare. Agenda
  • 5.
    1. Why We AreHere What is data privacy, and why does it matter for activism?
  • 6.
  • 7.
    Privacy Unhindered agency to expressoneself selectively, with direct control over one’s own information and explicit boundaries. Anonymity The ability to exist, and especially communicate, in a manner that does not reveal any personally identifiable information about the source. Important Concepts Authenticity Provide, with a high level of confidence, an assurance of the identity of an individual through reliable and verifiable means.
  • 8.
    “ Arguing that youdon't care about the right to privacy because you have nothing to hide is no different than saying you don't care about free speech because you have nothing to say. ◎Edward Snowden
  • 9.
  • 10.
    JFK Airport -Craig Ruttle / AP Photo
  • 11.
    2. Threat Modeling A basicframework for security.
  • 12.
  • 13.
    ◎Who would bemost likely to target us? Threat Modeling
  • 14.
    ◎Who would bemost likely to target us? ◎How much money, time, and skill do they have to dedicate to targeting us? Threat Modeling
  • 15.
    ◎Who would bemost likely to target us? ◎How much money, time, and skill do they have to dedicate to targeting us? ◎What would they most likely want from us (i.e. money? incriminating information? access to trusted contacts?) Threat Modeling
  • 16.
    ◎Who would bemost likely to target us? ◎How much money, time, and skill do they have to dedicate to targeting us? ◎What would they most likely want from us (i.e. money? incriminating information? access to trusted contacts?) ◎What would happen to us if they were successful? Threat Modeling
  • 17.
  • 18.
    GovernmentsSurveillance state andlaw(less) enforcement IndividualsUSB drives, webcams, and (spear) phishing CorporationsBreaches, metadata, and (de)anonymization
  • 19.
    COINTELPRO (COunter INTELligence PROgram) Aseries of covert, and often illegal, projects conducted by the United States FBI aimed at surveilling, infiltrating, discrediting and disrupting domestic political organization.
  • 20.
    Some of theGroups Targeted by the FBI’s COINTELPRO Zinn Ed Project
  • 21.
    Obama Opens NSA’sVast Trove of Warrantless Data to Entire Intelligence Community, Just in Time for Trump The Intercept
  • 23.
    White Is the colorof milk and fresh snow, the color produced by the combination of all the colors of the visible spectrum. Black Is the color of coal, ebony, and of outer space. It is the darkest color, the result of the absence of or complete absorption of light.
  • 24.
    Databases Breaches Online services lose user’sprivate information haveibeenpwned.com
  • 25.
  • 26.
    DEMO Has my accountinfo ever been leaked? https://haveibeenpwned.com Place your screenshot here
  • 27.
    DEMO What does myonline “fingerprint” look like? https://panopticlick.eff.org/ Place your screenshot here
  • 28.
    3. Common Attacks Get toknow some frequently used threat vectors.
  • 29.
    Trust At some point,you must concede a level of trust in the components of the devices in your life
  • 30.
    Keylogger Could be wireless,could be physically between keyboard and cpu. USB Drives Not so innocent. Can provide an attacker with control of the machine with ease. Rootkit Programs that can control the device. Hard to detect. Hard to get rid of. MITM Monkey in the Middle. Someone in between the intended sender and recipient, without either know it. Could be just listening, but could also be modifying messages. (Spear) Phishing Messages meant to coerce a user into entering their credentials into a spoofed site. Spear- is targeting one person specifically Common Attacks Brute Force Common, weak, or reused passwords. May include theft of actual device. May be open Wifi or bluetooth.
  • 31.
    Phishing Attempting to getyou to enter your own credentials. From: <mailadmin@stanford.edu > Sent: Friday, Sept. 30, 2016 10:31 AM To: <employee name> Subject: Email Account Update Due to migration to a new Open Source Email Collaboration Solution (SunsetGates), it is mandatory that you update your Stanford University information immediately, using the update link below: http://update.sunsetgates.com/update/server/ admindesk/index.htm Failure to update, will result to closure of your account. Thanks for your Co-Operation. Email Admin Desk
  • 32.
    Spear Phishing Targeted toward a specificperson. From: "john.doe@ulberta.ca" (link sends e- mail) Sent: Sat, 2 Jan 2016 09:58:07 GMT To: <recipient's name removed>@ce.berkeley.edu (link sends e-mail) <john.doe@ulberta.ca> (link sends e-mail) Dear Dr. <recipient's name removed>; I recently read your last article and it was very useful in my field of research. I wonder, if possible, to send me these articles to use in my current research: 1-http://auth.berkeley.eduh.in/<link removed> 2- http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/p ii/S1644966515000825 Thanks for you Cooperation in Advance. John Doe Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering University of Alberta Phone: (XXX) XXX-XXXX
  • 34.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Bob
  • 35.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Bob
  • 36.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Bob
  • 37.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Bob
  • 38.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Alice Bob
  • 39.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Alice Bob
  • 40.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Alice Bob
  • 41.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Alice Bob
  • 42.
    Machine in theMiddle Eve Alice Bob
  • 44.
  • 45.
  • 46.
    Brute Force PasswordCracking Time Number of Characters (A-Z, a-z) (A-Z, a-z, 0-9) (A-Z, a-z, 0-9, !@#$%^&*) 6 8 sec 3 min 13 min 8 3 hr 10 days 57 days 10 169 days 106 yrs 928 yrs 12 600 yrs 108k yrs 5m yrs 14 778k yrs 1bn yrs 5bn yrs
  • 47.
  • 48.
    Brute Force PasswordCracking Actual actual reality: Nobody cares about his secrets. (Also, I would be hard pressed to find that wrench for $5) .https://xkcd.com/538/
  • 49.
  • 50.
    Useful technologies tobetter safeguard yourself and your organization. 4. Helpful Tools
  • 51.
    Maintained Has it beenupdated recently? Have there been fixes to bugs or other security vulnerabilities? Audited Has a security audit been performed on this program? Open Source Is the full source code available for inspection? Guidelines for Selecting Quality Tools
  • 53.
    Post-It Notes Webcam attacksare real. Attackers can gain access and control the webcams on your laptop for spying, and sometimes the best solutions are the simplest -- cover your camera with tape or sticker. Password Manager One of the best tools for protecting accounts. Popular password managers (e.g. Lastpass, 1Password) can generate unique, super-strong passwords for you. Use for every account you have. Privacy Badger Another browser plugin to limit trackers. Also provides a “Do-not- track-me” mode that should be respected. HTTPS Everywhere Browser plugin that can help prevent Man in the Middle. Some sites will start on HTTP before being promoted to HTTPS. uBlock Origin Blocks ads. Useful because many are trackers themselves, but also could be vulnerable to attacks. Helps to limit attack surface. Browsing Online 2-Factor Auth Another great tool for protecting accounts, this one can help even if your password is leaked or cracked. Check out twofactorauth.org for more info.
  • 54.
    VPN Virtual Private Networks re-routeand disguise your traffic. Consider mandatory for open networks (e.g. coffee shops). Some VPN services are better than others, so do some research. Tor “Anonymizes” your traffic by bouncing off multiple nodes in between source and destination. Some skepticism as to efficacy without critical-mass adoption, so proceed with caution. Protecting your network activity
  • 55.
  • 56.
    Voice Signal and WhatsApp have voiceencryption capability, but quality can be lacking. Not sure about other options. Text / Chat Several options out there, notably Signal and WhatsApp. Both are end-to-end encrypted as well. Some controversy around WhatsApp “vulnerability.” More like design decision, but I prefer Signal’s approach. Email Best solution is to encrypt end-to-end. This means a setup like Thunderbird (email client) and Enigmail (crypto add-on). Keep in mind: Content is encrypted. Metadata and subject is in the clear. Data in Transit - Digital Communication
  • 57.
  • 58.
    VeraCrypt Successor to TrueCrypt, offersa lot options. Downside: offers a lot of options. Usually best to stick with defaults. Bonus: VeraCrypt offers ability to create “Hidden Volumes” GPG / Keybase Command-line tools have proven their worth, but also proven hard to use. Some new developments on the horizon, but these are usually for those with more experience. Stock OS Apps Great for full drive encryption: macOS: FileVault Windows: BitLocker Only basic features for for files and folders: macOS: Disk Utility Windows: Encrypted File Service Data at Rest - Secure Storage
  • 59.
    QubesOS “A reasonably secure operatingsystem.” Essentially runs a fresh virtual machine for each process, then burns it down when you’re done. Tails A privacy-oriented OS. Custom Linux build with privacy settings maxed- out. Still experimental. Additional Security
  • 60.
    5. Put in Practice Developingsecure habits while organizing
  • 61.
    ◎Think about whatinfo is on the phone ◎Disable fingerprint ◎Protect with passphrase ◎Backup data ◎Put in airplane mode ◎Pictures or video without unlock ◎Consider a “dumb” phone, or a “burner” with no identity info attached Mobile Security
  • 62.
    ◎ They knowyou called a gynecologist, spoke for a half hour, and then searched online for the local abortion clinic’s number later that day. But nobody knows what you spoke about. ◎ They know you called the suicide prevention hotline from the Golden Gate Bridge. But the topic of the call remains a secret. ◎ They know you received an email from a digital rights activist group with the subject line “52 hours left to stop SOPA” and then called your elected representative immediately after. But the content of those communications remains safe from government intrusion. Mind your Metadata https://ssd.eff.org/en/module/why-metadata-matters
  • 63.
  • 64.
    ◎ Passwords onEverything (and don’t share!) ◎ Always lock and know where your devices are. ◎ Signal is pretty solid ◎ Thunderbird+Enigmail is too ◎ Get a VPN, but know its limits ◎ Legal in Oregon to record law enforcement ◎ 2-Factor Auth goes a long way ◎ So does a password manager ◎ Never provide passwords over email ◎ Look for HTTPS ◎ Mind your “cloud” accounts Some final tips, recap, & recommendations
  • 65.
    A word ondigital security But it can make a big difference. Especially if you share your knowledge. One workshop does not a private activist make.
  • 66.
  • 67.
    Hands On Let’s getset up! Place your screenshot here
  • 68.
    Thanks! Any questions? You canfind me at: greg@tozny.com PGP: 0x317DCBC8
  • 69.
    Special thanks tothese resources: ◎ Electronic Frontier Foundation ◎ Freedom of the Press Foundation ◎ American Civil Liberties Union ◎ Ctrl-H in Portland, Or ◎ Presentation template by SlidesCarnival ◎ Diagram featured by poweredtemplate.com Credits
  • 70.
    Special thanks tothese articles: ◎ https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/may/22/edward-snowden-nsa-reform ◎ https://theintercept.com/2017/01/13/obama-opens-nsas-vast-trove-of-warrantless-data-to- entire-intelligence-community-just-in-time-for-trump/ ◎ https://www.aclu.org/blog/whats-government-doing-targeting-civil-rights-leaders ◎ https://www.aclu.org/blog/shhhh-what-fbi-doesnt-want-you-know-about-its-racial-profiling- program?redirect=blog/criminal-law-reform-racial-justice-national-security/shhhh-what-fbi- doesnt-want-you-know-about ◎ http://www.oregonlive.com/politics/index.ssf/2015/11/black_lives_matter_oregon_just.html ◎ https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/dec/14/yahoo-hack-security-of-one-billion- accounts-breached ◎ https://uit.stanford.edu/phishing ◎ https://tozny.com/blog/10-unnerving-privacy-fails-thru-data-aggregation/ Credits
  • 71.
    Special thanks tothese articles: ◎ https://security.berkeley.edu/news/phishing-example-spear-phishing-attack-articles ◎ http://www.theverge.com/2016/12/13/13940514/dnc-email-hack-typo-john-podesta- clinton-russia ◎ https://thehackernews.com/2015/08/lenovo-rootkit-malware.html ◎ http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/49999/hacking/found-usb-drive-hack.html ◎ http://geeknizer.com/top-usb-hacks-pwn/ ◎ https://www.inetsolution.com/blog/june-2012/complex-passwords-harder-to-crack,-but-it- may-not ◎ https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/cloud-security-blog/you-wont-believe-the-20-most- popular-cloud-service-passwords/ ◎ http://imgur.com/gallery/iVHfwLc ◎ http://lifehacker.com/truecrypts-security-audit-is-finally-done-with-mostly-1695243253 ◎ https://tails.boum.org/ ◎ https://www.qubes-os.org/ Credits

Editor's Notes

  • #4 Tozny -- data privacy and cryptography, emphasize user control over data SAFE -- violence prevention, focus on consent Guiding principles!! No oppression (racism, sexism, etc) Political views should be respected No stupid questions or people → tech is hard! Don’t hack each other
  • #5 Apologize for geeking out on this template We’ll break at halfway Crypto 101 IF WE HAVE TIME and INTEREST
  • #7 May not think about authenticity as important. I’ll get to that later.
  • #8 Maybe it’s clearer how Authenticity can be important?
  • #11 Last night at JFK
  • #12 We make mission statements, bylaws, constitutions for our orgs...
  • #13 Questions to ask ourselves as part of this assessment.
  • #14 We think of the government -- the surveillance state. Corporations? Other Groups? Maybe they’re an opposing group? Individuals?
  • #15 Not to be overlooked.
  • #19 Gov -- Sometimes they are the offenders Corps --
  • #21 Read some released docs -- they would see members handing out fliers, then arrest them on suspicion of drug use for “looks like needle marks”
  • #26 Note the 500m Note the date
  • #27 haveibeenpwned.com Please try this at home! Please immediately change your password if you have a result!
  • #28 https://panopticlick.eff.org/ https://tozny.com/blog/10-unnerving-privacy-fails-thru-data-aggregation/
  • #30 Caveat for sanity. Trust the manufacturer, distributor, operating system, applications, etc.
  • #31 Some of these want to capture information Some of these want control over your devices (for information, or other) Combinations Won’t go into details for each
  • #32 https://uit.stanford.edu/phishing
  • #33 Org chairperson, financial officer, etc. https://security.berkeley.edu/news/phishing-example-spear-phishing-attack-articles
  • #34 DNC Chair Meant to say “illegitimate,” said “legitimate”
  • #44 Two years ago Chinese firm Lenovo got banned from supplying equipment for networks of the intelligence and defense services various countries due to hacking and spying concerns. Earlier this year, Lenovo was caught red-handed for selling laptops pre-installed with Superfish malware. One of the most popular Chinese computer manufacturers ‘Lenovo’ has been caught once again using a hidden Windows feature to preinstall unwanted and unremovable rootkit software on certain Lenovo laptop and desktop systems it sells. https://thehackernews.com/2015/08/lenovo-rootkit-malware.html
  • #45 48 percent of USB drives were picked up by passers and plugged into a computer, and the unaware users also tried to open the file within. Bursztein used an HTML file (a document titled “final exam” or “spring break pictures,”) with phone-home capabilities, but he did not use remote access tools or any other spyware. http://securityaffairs.co/wordpress/49999/hacking/found-usb-drive-hack.html http://geeknizer.com/top-usb-hacks-pwn/
  • #46 Could be wireless, or connected in between keyboard and computer All keystrokes are logged online and locally. SMS alerts are sent upon trigger words, usernames or URLs, exposing passwords. If unplugged, KeySweeper continues to operate using its internal battery and auto-recharges upon repowering. A web based tool allows live keystroke monitoring.
  • #48 https://www.skyhighnetworks.com/cloud-security-blog/you-wont-believe-the-20-most-popular-cloud-service-passwords/
  • #49 Remember: Threat Model Breaches - PW reuse? A Word About “Security Questions”
  • #52 Open source may be counter-intuitive: relates to auditing best practices Avoids common mistakes
  • #53 Concern for intentional “backdoors” Audited, just found minor vulns No longer maintained Absorbed into VeraCrypt
  • #57 “Require Approval on Change”
  • #60 I HAVE NO EXPERIENCE WITH EITHER OF THESE
  • #64 Signal → tap number, scan QR Email → verify “out of band”