STATE 0F INDIANA ) IN THE ST.

JOSEPH CIRCUIT COURT

) SS:
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY ) CAUSE NO. 71C01-2501-PL—000026

STATE OF INDIANA, EX REL

))))\I/)\II\I/\II))))
TODD ROKITA,
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF INDIANA,

Plaintiff
- FILED -

V
OCT 17 2025
WILLIAM REDMAN, in his official capacity as
Clem
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY SHERIFF, and St. Joseph Superior Court
ST. JOSEPH COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT

Defendants

ORDER

Plaintifi's appeared by Deputy Indiana Attorneys General, Blake E. Lanning, Bradley S.

Davis and Aaron M Ridlen, and Defendants appeared by counsel, Andrew B. Jones and Michael

P. Smyth, before the Honorable John E. Broden on June 18, 2025 for hearing on Defendants'

Motion to Dismiss. Hearing' had by way of oral argument. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

Court took the matter under advisement. Judge Broden thereafter, and pn'or to ruling on

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, recused from filrther proceedings in the above-captioned case.

The undersigied was subsequently appointed as Special Judge of the St. Joseph Circuit Court to

preside in this matter. The undersigied accepted and qualified for the appointment. Status

hearing was held on September 9, 2025, at which time, and without objection, the undersigied

advised counsel that she would obtain and review a copy of the transcript of the June 18, 2025

hearing (Transcript) and rule. She further advised if her review of the Transcript and the parties'
submissions lett questions in her mind, she would schedule firrther hearing. The Court obtained
Transcript on or about October 10, 2025, has now concluded its review and consideration of the

Transcript and submissions and enters the following order:

Plaintifi's' Complaint alleges that Defendants violated certain provisions of the Indiana

Code, specifically, I.C. 5-2-18.2.-3 and -4. Plaintifl's allege that Defendants "have implemented

and maintain policies and practices of impermissibly restricting Defendants' and Defendants'

ofiicers' cooperation and communications with federal immigration authorities" in "clear"

violation of these provisions of the Indiana Code.

Rhetorical paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs' Complaint cites I.C. 5-2—18.2-3 as providing that:

a governmental body "may not enact or implement an ordinance . . . or policy that

prohibits or in any way restricts another governmental body or employee . . . ,
including a law enforcement officer, a state or local oflicial, or a state of local
governmental employee from taking" specified "actions with regard to the
information of the citizenship or immigration status, 'lawful or unlawful, of an
individual."

The omission of the text represented by the second ellipsis is problematic. In its entirety,

I.C. 5-2—18.2—3 provides:

A governmental body or postsecondarJI educational institution may not enact or

implement an ordinance, a resolution, a rule or a policy that prohibits or in any
way restricts another governmental body or employee ofa postsecondary
educational institution, including a law enforcement officer, a state or local
official, or a state or local government employee, from taking the following
actions with regard to information of the citizenship or migration status, lawful or
unlawful, of an individual:

(1) Communicating or c00perating with federal officials.

(2) Sending to or receiving from the United States Department of

Homeland Security.

(3) Maintaining information.

(4) Exchanging information with another federal state or local

governmental entity.

(all emphasis added)

 For the reasons set forth in the endnote to this Order, it is not at all clear that the conduct

of which the Plaintiffs complain falls within the ambit of this statute. However, Defendants do

not make this argument, and, accordingly, for purposes of this Court's resolution of their Motion

to Dismiss the Court takes the reading of the statute the Plaintifi's proffer.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss alleges "(1) the Attorney General lacks standing to bring

this suit; (2) the complaint fails to state any claims which ofi'er plausible grounds for relief, and

(3) the Plaintifl's' complaint is an attempt impermissibly direct a local law enforcement agency to

assist ICE I, essentially deputizing local law enforcement to perform the bidding of the federal

government."

Plaintifl's' standing to bring this suit.

Plaintiffs' Response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss invokes the "injury to= the

sovereignty" of the State as the "injury in fact" necessary for there to be standing to sue.

Plaintifi's cite Vermont Agency ofNat. Res. v United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771

(2000). This Court respectfully disagrees with the Plaintiifs' reading of Stevens.

The United States- Supreme Court reminds us of the "irreducible constitution minimum"

constituents of standing: First, the plaintifi' must have suffered an "'inj ury in fact" --
an invasion

of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or imminent,

not conjectural or hypothetical. Second, there must be a causal connection between the injury

and the conduct complained of --

the injury has to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged

action of the defendant, and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not

before the court." Third, it must be "likely," as Opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury

will be "redressed by a favorable decision." Lujan v Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560,
119 L.Ed. 2d 351, 112 S.Ct. 2130 (1992). Plaintifi's have not met the first of these requirements

and Stevens does not provide the basis Plaintifl's claim.

Standing Iniurv in Fact

—

Stevens concerns the authority of an individual to file suit in federal court on his own

behalf and on behalf of the United States (if the United States subsequently intervened in the
individual's suit) (in which case the United States take the lead as acting on relation of the

individual) against a State to enforce the False Claims Act, 31, U.S.C. Secs. 3729-3733. The

final disposition of this case —

that an individual cannot file this qui tam action against a State —

is not a clear statement by the Supreme Court erecting a barrier around, or recognizing a limitless

license flowing fiom; the sovereignty of the State. It is a holding, in accord with Supreme Court

precedence, that the term "person," as used within the F CA to define the target of such suit, is

understood not to include any State of the Union.' That is the gavamen of the holding —

whether a state is a "person" against whom a claim can be brought under the FCA.

However, for purposes of this litigation, Stevens is instructive in understanding what is

required of Plaintiffs to allege injury in fact.

The FCA imposes civil liability upon "any person" who, inter alia, "knowingly presents,

or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . a false

or fi'audulent claim for payment or approval ." 31 U.S.C. Sec. 3729(a). The defendant/target of

the successful prosecution of an FCA claim is liable for up to treble damages and a civil penalty

of up to $10,000 per claim. Ibid. An F CA action may be commenced in one of two ways. First,

' A qui tam action is an action brought by an individual to address a violation of law, in which action, the
government may intervene. On a related point, it is not clear that the caption of this case properly reflects the
Plaintifi's status, as it is not clear that the Attorney General, who, in that capacity, is not a private individual
qualifies as a relator, as distinct fi'om the public official authorized, generally, to bring suit on behalf of the State.
the Government itself may bring a civil action against the alleged false claimant. Sec. 373 0(a).

Second, a private person (the "relator") may bring a qui tam civil action "for the person and for

the United States Government" against the alleged false claimant, "in the name of the

Government." Sec. 3730(b)'(1).

If a relator initiates the FCA action, he must deliver a cepy of the complaint, and any

supporting evidence, to the U.S. Attorney General and appropriate U.S. Attorney. The

Government then has 6O days to intervene in the action. If it does so, it assumes primary

responsibility for prosecuting the action, Sec. 373 0(c)(1), though the relator .maycontinue to

participate in the litigation. If the Government declines to intervene within the 60-day period, the

relator has the exclusive right 'to conduct the action, Sec. 3730(b)(4).2 A successful prosecution

of a claim under the FCA results in the financial recovery by the relator, or, if the Government

has intervened, a share of any proceeds fi'om the action, plus attorney's fees and costs. Secs.

3730(d)(1)-(2).

In Stevens, Jonathan Stevens brought a qui tam action in the United States District Court

for the District of Vermont against the Vermont Agency of Natural Resources (VANR) alleging
that VANR had submitted false claims to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in
connection with various federal grant programs administered by the EPA. The United States

declined to intervene in the action. The VANR moved to dismiss Stevens's suit arguing that a

State (or state agency) is not a "person" subject to liability under the FCA and that a qui

tam action in federal court against a State is barred by the Elevenfli Amendment. The District

Court denied the motion. The VANR Petitioner then filed an interlocutory appeal, and the

District Court stayed proceedings pending its outcome. The United States intervened in the

Subject to the potential for later intervention by the Government, upon a showing of "good cause. Sec.
2

3730(c)(3).
appeal in support of Stevens. A divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed, 162 F.3d 195

(1998). The Supreme Court granted certiorari.

According to Stevens, a private individual has standing to bring suit in federal court on

behalf of the United States under the FCA. Stevens met the requirements necessary to establish

Article III standing. Inparticular, he has demonstrated "injury in fact" --

a harm that is both

"concrete" and "actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical." Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495.

U.S. 149, 155, 109 L.Ed.2d 135, 110 S.Ct. 1717. Stevens argued before the Supreme Court that

he was suing to remedy injury in fact suffered by the United States —

"both the injury to its

sovereigrity arising from violation of its laws and the proprietary injury resulting from the

alleged fi'aud." The Supreme Court wrote that the concrete private interest that Stevens has in the

outcome of his suit, in the forrn of the bounty he will receive if the suit is successful, was

insufficient to confer standing, since that interest did not consist of obtaining compensation for,

or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right. However, shifting focus slightly, the

Supreme Court found an adequate basis for Stevens' standing, in the doctrine that the assignce of

a claim has standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor. Since the FCA could

reasonably be regarded as effecting a partial assignment of the'Govemment's damages claim, the

United States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing on Stevens.

Thus, the Court did not dispense with the need to show injury in fact to confer standing.

Stevens' standing was as- assignee of the injury in fact the damages sustained by the United
-—

States by the submission (and its payment of) the false claim, not the damage to the sovereignty

of the United States.3 More importantly for the instant case, the United States was not simply

3
It is not clear that the status-standing of the United States was at issue, as-it was acting on the relationship of
Stevens, even though, ironically, the standing of Stevens was shown by the effective assignment to him of the
damages claim available to the United States under the FCA.
 interested in enforcing its laws out of a sense of sovereig11 dignity, the United States actually did

suffer an injury in fact —

the payment of a false claim. Indeed, the purpose of the FCA is to

redress a financial wrong committed against the United States. The Supreme Court also

acknowledged that injury to sovereignty arising fiom a violation of criminal law is sufficient to

support a criminal prosecution, but it did not affinn that injury to sovereignty without injury in
'

fact was sufficient to support a civil action brought in the name of a state.'

So, then, what are we to make of l.C. 5-2-18.2 5, which provides:

If the attorney general determines that probable cause exists that a governmental
body or a postsecondary educational institution has violated this chapter, the
attorney general shall bring an action to compel the governmental body or
postsecondary educational institution to comply with this chapter.

First, the General Assembly cannot override constitutional requirements.

Does that, then somehow vitiate LC. 5-2—18.2-5? No, it simply means that the stance or

circumtances under which such an action is brought must comport with the constitutional

requirements of standing. The authorization in I.C. 5-2-18.2-5 to bring an action still requires

that the constitutional requirements of standing be met with respect to the case that is brought.

A reasonable interpretation and one consistent with the fact that a violation of I.C. 5-2-

18.2 (at least as alleged in the Complaint in the instant case) does not inflict an injury in fact

upon the Plaintiffs, is that Sec. 5 authorizes the Attorney General, on the relation of an individual

who can be shown to have suffered a particularized in injury in fact, may bring suit for the

violatiOn of LC. 5-2-18.2. No such individual is identified in the Complaint, and the Complaint

is not brought in this mode.

4
See McLinden v. Tangoe United States, Ina, 263 N.E.3d 767 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) for a discussion of the
persistence of the obligation to show direct injury or immediate danger thereof necessary to establish standing in an
environment where now causes of action are legislatively created.
 Before moving on, consider Lopez-Aguilar v. Marion Cty. Shaw's Dept. 924 F.3d 375

(7m Cir. 2019). Bn'efly, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Indiana entered an

order approving the parties' stipulated judgment granting declaratory and prospective injunctive

relief in Lopez—Aguilar's civil action alleging that the Marion County Sheriff's Department, and

its Sherif (acting in his official and individual capacity) and a Seargent (acting in his individual

capacity) had violated his rights by detaining him.5

Afier entry of this order, the State of Indiana filed a timely Motion to Intervene and for

Extension of Time to File an Appeal, afier having been advised, informally, by an attorney at the

United States Department of Justice, that the State might have an interest in this case. The

District Court granted these motions.

As to the injury-in—fact element of standing (recognized by the 7'" Circuit in its opinion),

the State of Indiana argued that "the Stipulated Judgment interferes directly and

substantially with the use of its police power to cooperate with the federal government in the

enforcement of the Country's immigration laws.

The first thing to note about the 7m Circuit opinion is that it found the State of Indiana

had "suffered a cognizable injury sufficient for standing to appeal." (emphasis added) Standing

is a relevant consideration at all stages of litigation and its requirements at any time are in line

with what is required of parties at the particular stage of the proceedings. In the instant case, the

Plaintiffs are not seeking to intervene in an action to which it was not a party in order to weigh in

5
The District Court's order declared certain seizure actions taken by ICE violate the Fourth Amendment and that
certain hold or detention requests do not justify Fourtlr Amendment seizures. The District Court order permanently
enjoined the defendants from "seizing or detaining any person based solely on detention requests from ICE, in
whatever form, or on removal orders from an immigration court, unless ICE supplies a warrant signed by a judge or
otherwise supplies probable cause that the individual to be detained has committed a criminal offense." Lopez—
Aguilar at 3 81,382.
on appeal on the judgment entered in such a case; in the instant case, the Plaintiffs have

ifistigated this litigation.

Second, the District Court's reading of the relevant Indiana law was considered by the 7'"

Circuit to be "so restrictive as to preclude state officers from cooperating with federal ofiicers

with respect to ICE detainers or immigration court removal orders. The district court's

interpretation of the statute restricts significantly the vitality of the statute and the capacity of the

State .to cooperate with the federal government." No court-imposed restrictions on the Plaintiffs

are at issue in the instant case. And, if this case were to proceed on the merits and a judgment
entered in favor of a Defendants, no such order would issue. Defendants have not filed a

counterclaim. Defendants, if their Motion to Dismiss were to be denied, would be seeking

judgment on the merits.

Plaintiffs agree that the Defendants are free to "participate in the enforcement of federal

immigration Iaw." (See pages 56 and 5 7 of the Transcript). The District Court's interpretation

of the law as embodied by its order approving the Stipulated Judgment in Lopez-Aguilar was

found, for purposes of State intervention, to be "so restrictive as to preclude state ofiicers from

cooperating with federal officers with respect to ICE detainers or immigration court removals."

No court-imposed restriction on the Plaintiffs is alleged in the instant case. Neither do

Plaintiffs seek any order of this Court interpretating of the statutes at issue that restricts their

conduct. To the extent Plaintiffs' interest in seeing that this Court allows them to instigate and

pursue a claim under those statutes, that interest does not vitiate the standing requirements at this

stage of the proceeding. Lopez-Aguilar must be read in context, not as a free-floating

authorization, untethered to any injury in fact, to act or intervene whenever that State is

concerned that the laws of the State are not being followed.
 Defendants' Motion to Dismiss as to the issue of Plaintiffs' standing is granted."

Facts upon which relief may be gamed —

T.R. 12(8116)

Reviewing the well-established standard when considering a motion to dismiss for failure

to state a claim upon which relief may be granted:

We begin by observing that a motion to dismiss under Ind. Trial Rule

12(B)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. We accept as true the facts
alleged in the complaint. Although a plaintiff need not set out in precise detail the
facts upon which the claim is based, he must still plead the operative facts
necessary to set forth an actionable claim. When ruling on a motion to dismiss,
the court must view the pleadings in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party with every reasonable inference construed in the non-movant's
favor. Dismissals under Trial Rule 12(B)(6) are rarely appr0priate. "Indeed,
dismissal is apprOpriate only when 'it appears to a certainty on the face of the
complaint that the complaining party is not entitled to any relief."' Ind Trial Rule
18(A) requires only "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the
pleader is entitled to relief." Ind. Trial Rule 8 (E) provides that "[e]ach averment
of a pleading shall be simple, concise, and direct." Ind. Trial Rule 8(F) provides
that "[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice, lead to
disposition on the merits, and avoid litigation of procedural points." The Indiana
Supreme Court has held that Indiana is a notice-pleading state and that, "[i]n
practice, this liberal standard merely requires that a 'complaint . . . put the
defendant on notice concerning why it is potentially liable and what it stands to
lose."' "To satisfy this standard, the plaintiff need not 'state all the elements of a
cause of action." Rather, the plaintiff "need only plead the operative facts
involved in the litigation." "Furthermore, although it 'may be highly desirable' for
the plaintiff to include a 'statement of the [plaintiff's] theory' of liability in the
complaint, the plaintiff 'is not required' to plead a specific theory of liability."
Simon Prop. Grp.. L.P v Stewart, 2025 Ind.App. LEXIS 190

And, from the Indiana Supreme Court:

The dispute here turns on the legal sufficiency of the HOA's claims against
(certain) Defendants for breach of the implied warranty of habitability and
negligence. To be sure, the question at this early stage of litigation is not whether
the HOA is entitled to relief; rather, the narrow inquiry is whether it is apparent
that the complaint allegations are "incapable of supporting relief under any set of
circumstances." Residences at Ivy Quad Unit Owners Assh v. Ivy Quad Dev., I79
N.E.3d 977 (Ind. 2022)

6
Plaintifl's have sufi'ered no injury in fact. As such, Plaintifi's cannot, of necessity, establish the second and third
prongs of the Lujan trident of irreducible constitutional minima.
 LC. 5-2-18.2-3 provides, in pan:

A governmental body .may not enact or implement an ordinance, a resolution,

. .

a rule, or a policy that prohibits or in any way restricts another governmental body
or employee of a postsecondary educational institution, including a law
enforcement officer, a state or local official, or a state or local government
employee, [from taking certain specific action] with regard to information of the
citizenship or immigation status, lawfill or unlawful, of an individual.

I.C. 5-2-18.2-4 provides:

A governmental body or a postsecondary educational institution may not limit or

restrict the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the fiill extent
permitted by federal law.

The Complaint does not allege the Defendants enacted or implemented an ordinance,

resolution or rule concerning the Defendants alleged actions or inactions concerning persons in

the custody of the St. Joseph County Sheriff/Police Department. Thus, to state a claim upon

which relief may be granted Plaintiffs' claim that Defendant violated I.C. 5-2-1'8.2-3 must allege

that Defendants enacted or implemented a policy impermissibly prohibiting or restricting the

conduct described in the statute.7

The Complaint speaks in terms of "policy and practice" or "policies and practices" or

"pattern and practice" of the Defendants. The terms "practice," "practices," and "pattern" are

not included in I.C. 5-2-18.2-3. Allegations within Plaintiffs' Complaint that complain of

conduct or lack of conduct that is only a practice or pattern, or that constitutes only practices or

patterns will not survive Defendant's 12(B)(6) Motion. The Court is lefi to consider those

portions of Plaintiff's Complaint which allege the maintenance of a policy that prohibits or in

(1) Communicating or cooperating with federal ofiicials.

(2) Sending to or receiving information from the United States Department of Homeland Security.
(3) Maintaining information.
(4) Exchanging information with another federal, state, or local government entity.
any way restricts law enforcement from taking the specific conduct referenced at I.C. 5-2-182-

3.3

Rhetorical paragraph 17 alleges in relevant part, Indiana Attorney General Rokita's

"belief [premised upon the content of Defendants November 7, 2024 response to Indiana

Attorney General Rokita's October 24 letter] that SJ CPD maintains a policy . . . that violates

state law."

Rhetorical paragraph 18 does not .allege Defendants enacted or maintained a policy that

prohibited or restricted law enforcement from taking specific conduct under the statute, but it

asserts that the alleged deficiency of Defendant's November 7 response "had given additional

cause to believe that Defendants are violating Indiana Code chapter 5-2-18.2."9

Rhetorical paragraph 19, alleges, in relevant part that Defendants have not engaged with

the Office of the Attorney General "regarding [Defendants'] immigration-related policies" since

submitting their November 7, 2024, response.

3
'Enactment or implementation' seems to suggest a genesis and animus (as in motivation as distinct from ill-will)
when speaking of a policy that is not suggested with the concepts "existence of a policy" or "existence of a policy
inferred from practice," or more so "enactment and implementation of a policy inferred from practice."

9
The Complaint alleges the implementation of a policy by Defendants as follows:

2. Defendants St. Joseph County Sherifi' William Redman (Sheriff

Redman) and the St. Joseph County Police Department ("SJCPD") have implemented
and maintain policies and practices of impermissibly restricting Defendants' and
Defendants' oflicers' cooperation and communications with federal immigration
authorities. Such policies and practices clearly violates (sic) state law.

3. Attorney General Todd Rokita has determined probable cause exists

that, by implementing and maintaining these policies and practices, Sheriff Redman
and SJCPD have committed multiple violations of Indiana Code chapter 5-2-18.2. The
appropriate remedy is for this Court to enjoin the violations.

8. William Redman is the St. Joseph County Sheriff Sheriff Redman is

responsible for the policies and practices implemented at SJCPD.
 Judge Broden, at the June 18, 2025 hearing, asked a question that came to this Court

when reading the Motion to Dismiss and the Response: "Can you infer a policy?"

Plaintiffs argued at the June 18, 2025 hearing:

[G]iven how closely related Section 3 is to Section 4(,) it's entirely appropriate
and dictated by standing statutory interpretations that these sections should be
read in harmony with one another. And so, Section 4 does not require a written
fonnal policy for there to be a violation. Un, it would be inconsistent, I think, if
the reading of the statute as a_ coherent whole to encourage that requirement on
Section 3. So that's the point I think before you make is neither Section
references, or requires something in writing, a written formal policy."

This Court disagrees. The term Section 4 does not use any of the terms used in

Section 3 ("ordinance, a resolution, a rule or a policy that prohibits or in any way

restricts") which seems to undermine the argument that since Section 3 mentions a

"policy, but not a "written policy," and since Section 4 does not mention a policy, written

or otherwise, the policy mentioned in Section 3 need not be written. A more reasonably
harmonious interpretation would be to import or read the terms identifying as prohibited

means of restriction in Section 3 ("ordinance, a resolution a rule or a policy") into the

generalized prohibition ("restrict" —

the term appearing in both Sections 3 and 4) of

Section 4. Section 3, coming first in sequence, defines the means of impermissible

restriction. Section 4, following, describes the scope of such of the prohibition on such

restriction —
albeit the sc0pe is a challenge to discern fiom the language used in Section

4.

This may notbe the only interpretation, but it is one that gives voice to the first

rule of statutory interpretation: What is the plain language of the statute?

The term "pattern or practice" is not colloquial to the formal language of the law. It is

enshrined in federal civil rights law. While it is odd if the General Assembly intended "policy"
to include something less formal than a written or other formally memorialized code of conduct,

even if it is permissible to infer a policy fi'om a "pattem and practice" of conduct, Plaintiffs must

supply operative facts that give notice of the facts that support the inference. Or even the policy

yielded by the inference. The Complaint does not allege the enactment of a policy by the

Defendants. The Complaint does not allege the implementation of a policy by the Defendants

except tautologically, to use those words to substantiate that allegation. The Complaint does not

allege operative fact other than the ICE posting of Defendant's "noncooperation," which is

insufficient to infer a policy much less sufficient conduct that could be said to manifest the

existence of a policy or, more precisely, the implementation of a policy. That Plaintiffs' have

"cause" to "believe" that Defendants violated the statutes at issue, without providing any real

factual basis support those beliefs, is not enough to satisfy the low barrier established by

Indiana's notice pleading regime.

Certainly, as to the statutory language of Section 3 that prohibits the enactment of certain

policies that restrict certain individuals from "communicating or cooperating with federal

officials," "sending to or receiving from the United States Department of Homeland Security,

"maintaining information," or exchanging information with another federal state or'local

governmental entity," there is almost a total dearth of operative facts plead.

Home Rule/Federal Deputization of Local Police

Defendants' third basis in support of it Motion to Dismiss, [is somewhat widespread and

perhaps less precisely argued. It argues that under Indiana's Home Rule Act "the Sherifi' gets to

set his policies, not the Attorney General, the General Assembly, or federal immigration

officials."

The Indiana Home Rule Act does not apply to the St. Joseph County Sherifi'.
 Defendants also argue that the Attorney is attempting to "deputize local police in an

atteztlpt to assist with policy goals of the current federal administration . . . [thereby] seek(ing) to

impose responsibilities on the Sherifi' that are not his . . . [actions that exceed] the purview of the

responsibility of the [Indiana General]."

What Plaintiffs have done is allege the Sheriff has violated provisions of Indiana law, I.C.

5-2-18.2, and seek "an order enjoining Defendants from violating Indiana Code chapter 5-2-

182." The specific conduct of which Plaintiffs complain, in the preamble to their Complaint, is

the allege failure of the Sheriff to "honor ICE detainer requests by releasing aliens who are the

subjects of detainers before the 48-hour detention period requested by the detainer expires."

And, in rhetorical paragraphs 29 and 30, alleging Defendants have limited the communications

and cooperation of Defendants' agents with ice concerning the immigration status of aliens in the

custody of Defendants by providing inadequate notice to federal authorities about the release of

detained aliens. Plaintiffs claim this alleged conduct violated I.C. 5-2-18.2-3 and -
4.

8 USC Sec 1357(g) governs the interaction between ICE and local law enforcement agencies.

It provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(1) Notwithstanding section 1342 of title 31, United States Code, , the [United States]
Attorney General may enter into a written agreement with a State, or any political
subdivision ofa State,1° pursuant to which an officer or employee of the State or
subdivision, who is determined by the Attorney General to be qualified to perforrn a
function of an immigration ofiicer in relation to the investigation, apprehension, or
detention of aliens in the United States (including the transportation of such aliens across
State lines to detention centers), may carry out such function at the expense of the State
or political subdivision and to the extent consistent with State and local law.

****

"J Indiana Sherifi's are not

"political subdivisions" for purposes of Indiana's Home Rule Act. The Court does not
know whether the provisions of 8 U.S.C. 1357(g) assume or claim or so designate Sherifi's as being "political
subdivisions" for the purposes stated in that subsection.
(9) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require any State or political subdivision of a
State to enter into an agreement with the Attorney General under this subsection.
**** f

(10) Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to require an agreement under this subsection
in order for any officer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State—

(A) to communicate with the Attorney General regarding the immigration status
of any individual, including reporting knowledge that a particular alien is not
lawfiilly present in the United States; or

(B) otherwise to cooperate with the Attorney General in the identification,

apprehension, detention, or removal of aliens not lawfully present in the United
States.

Plaintifi's do not allege that the State, the Sheriff or St. Joseph County has entered into

such an agreement with the U.S. Attorney General. This shifis us to subsection 10, above.

Section 10 provides that in the absence of such an agreement, nothing in 8 U.S.C. Sec.1357(g)

prevents "any ofiicer or employee of a State or political subdivision of a State" fi'om

communicating with the U.S. Attorney General regarding the immigration status of any

individual . . . or otherwise to cooperate. . . in the identification, detention, or removal of aliens

not lawfiilly present in the United States.

Plaintiff's seem to be arguing, or would seem to be likely to argue, that Subsection

1357(g)(10) is likely to be the "federal law" cited in I.C. 5-2-1824:

A governmental body or a postsecondary educational institution may not limit or

restrict the enforcement of federal immigration laws to less than the fiill extent
permitted by federal law.

To argue a violation of I.C. 5-2-18.2-4 by virtue of restricting conduct permitted under 8

U.S.C. Section 1357(g)(10) means to argue that communication with the U.S. Attorney is being

restricted.

Plaintiffs, however, argue that Defendants have violated I.C. 5-2-18.2-4 by restricting

communications fi'om the Sheriff to I.C.E. I.C.E. is not the U.S. Attorney General.
 Plaintifi's have alleged that Defendants have limited or restrict the enforcement of federal

immigration laws to less than the full extent permitted by federal law. To the extent Plaintiffs

general allegations of Defendants' alleged violation of Section 4 is fleshed out somewhat in its

preamble of its Complaint, there are no allegations that Defendants have limited communications

the U.S. Attorney. Thus, any alleged violation of 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(g)(10) [as conduct

prohibited by 8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(g)(10)]is not supported by the Complaint and is dismissed

pursuant to T.R. 12(b)(6).

Plaintiffs' allegation that Defendants violated LC. 5-2-18.2-3 (the policy provision of I.C.

5-2-182) argues that Defendants have implemented a policy that restricts its communication

with state and federal officials, generally, and Homeland Security, specifically. LC. 5-2-18.2-3

does not require that Defendants allege that such conduct violates any specific federal law, or

state law other than Section 3, itself."

8 U.S.C. Sec. 1357(g)(10) does not appear to authorize the deputization of ofiicers and/or

employees of states or local subdivisions, as it merely provides that the absence of an agreement

under subsection (g)(10) does not limit the ability of those officers or employees to act as

described. 12

Subsection 1357(g)(10) does not authorize the State to "deputize" or mandate the Sherifl'

or his employees or St. Joseph County or its and employees to cooperate or undertake the

conduct described in Subsection 1357(g)(10)(a) and (b). But are Plaintifi's seeking to utilize I.C.

" Defendants argue that whatever they are allegedly doing or not doing does not constitute prohibiting or
restricting actions concerning "inforl'nation of the citizenship or migration status, lawful or unlawful, of an
individual" under I.C.5-2.2—18-3. This aspect of Defendants Motion to Dismiss need not be adjudicated to
rule on the Motion, but, if the Court's ruling does not survive review this position is likely to include a facmal
component that cannot be decided on a Motion to Dismiss.

'2
These agreements are what the Court believes Defendants refer to as "287(g) agreements."
5-2-18.2-4 to free up employees of the Shen'fi" and St. Joseph County, including their law

enforcement officers to, effectively, deputize themselves as ICE agents. And if so, is doing so a

violation of the 10th Amendment?

These latter questions go beyond the briefing of the parties and, if this Court's order is
appealed and reversed, are matters that require greater exploration by the parties and the Court.

The Court stands on the bases it cites herein, [standing, T.R. 12(b)(6), and the use of 8 U.S.C.

Sec. 1357(g)(10) as the "federal law" that may constitute a violation of LC. 5-2-18.2-4] that

support its decision to grant Defendants' Motion to Dismiss and leaves the exploration of this

last aspect of Defendant's widespread final basis for Dismissal to be addressed another day. At

this point, the Court cannot say that there are no set of circumstances pursuant to which a

violation of LC. 5-2-18.2-4 can be afforded relief. This does not mean, however, that this claim

survives as a standalone claim if the bases for Dismissing Plaintiffs' claim survives review.

Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted.

So ordered this 17'11 day of October, 2025.

Je y Pitts Manier, Spefiizil'i'ludge ..

*_
. Joseph Superior Court,
HE'S» \ .
-' '5- \\\I\'
cc: Counsel of Record
 ENDNOTES

LC. 5-2-18.2-3:
A governmental bodylj or postsecondary educational institution may not enact or
implement an ordinance, a resolution, a rule or a policy that prohibits or in any
way restricts another governmental body or employee ofa postsecondary
educational institution, including a law enforcement officer, a state or local
official, or a state or local government employee, from taking the following
actions with regard to information of the citizenship or migration status, lawfiil or
unlawfiil, of an individual:

(1) Communicating or cooperating with federal officials.

(2) Sending to or receiving fi'om the United States Department of

Homeland Security.

(3) Maintaining information.

(4) Exchanging information with another federal state or local

governmental entity.

To whom does this statute apply?

A governmental body or
A postsecondary educational institution

What is the prohibited vehicle?

'3
For purposes of this statute, "governing body" has the meaning set forth at I C 5 22 2 13

Sec. 13. "Governmental body" means an agency, a board, a branch, a bureau, a commission, a council, a
department, an institution, an office, or another establishment of any of the following:
(1) The executive branch.
(2) The judicial branch.
(3) The legislative branch.
(4) A political subdivision.

A "governing body" would seem to include the Sheriff ("an office"). Does it include St. Joseph County or
is it more likely only to reach its Board of Commissioners ("board") or County Council ("council"). This seems
somewhat likely as it is generally Boards of Commissioners and County Councils that pass ordinances and
resolutions. But perhaps naming the County is a proper was at subjecting this board and council to the outcome of
this litigation.
 An ordinance
A resolution
A rule or policy

That does what?

Restricts another governmental body or employee of a postsecondary_

educational institution from engaging in certain conduct.

Does the word "another" modiiy only the term "governmental body", or does it
also apply to the term "postsecondary educational institution?" That is, does the
statute provide that a governmental entity or postsecondary education institution
is (each) prohibited from enacting a policy that prohibits certain conduct on the
part of another governmental body or another employee of a postsecondary
institution, meaning that it does not prohibit a postsecondary' educational
institution from enacting such a policy prohibiting that conduct by its own
employees?
That seems unlikely. And, for purposes of this Motion, it is not necessary to
construe how the statue impacts the conduct ofpostsecondary educational
institutions. But the statue seems clearly to prohibit the actions of a governmental
body fiom enacting policies prohibiting or restricting another governmental
body. The work "another" is a clear and unambiguous term but how it functions
in this statute is unclear.

But, it may be argued, that the statute can be read to prohibit the actions of governmental entities
to enact policies prohibit or restricting conduct of. . . an employee." But there is no way to add
or delete or move commas that yields that interpretation. The word "or" prevents attaching the
word "employee" to the clause "other governmental body," as doing so leaves what follows the
word "or" ("of postsecondary educational institution") dangling.

That is not how the P-laintifi's parses the statute. Plaintifiis' Complaint cites the operative words
and phrases of the statute as follows:

22. Indiana Code § 5-2-18.2-3 ("Section 3") states that a governmental

body "may not enact or implement an ordinance . . . or a policy that
prohibits or in any way restricts another governmental body or employee
[omitted from the original text: of a postsecondary institution . . .] ,
including a law enforcement officer, a state or local official, or a state or
local government employee, from taking" specified "actions with regard to
information of the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or unlawfiil, of
'

an individual."
 Although the Court is not certain this is what the statute actually provides, it is a way of
reading the statute that shows how Plaintifl's feel it is applicable to the allegations it makes.
Defendants do not seem to quibble with this interpretation. The Court's ruling on'Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss accepts this unopposed aspect of the Plaintifi's' interpretation and application
of the state.
Where does that leave us, irrespective of whether "another" modifies "postsecondary educational
institution", it modifies "governmental body." 'Ihe language that follows this language
(including. . .") is where we find what categories of actors are included within the classification
"other governmental body" whose conduct cannot be prohibitedor restricted as the statute
provides.

So, accepu'ng that all of the examples of who is included in the statute applies to
the term another governmental body, and jettisoning further consideration of how
the statute applies to postsecondary educational institutions, then the following
are within the term "another governmental body:"

A law enforcement officer

A state or local ofiicial
A state or local government employee