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The payload may contain literally anything:
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The payload may contain literally anything:
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Jwt == insecurity?
- 1. JWT == insecurity? Ajourney in the insecurity of JSON web tokens… by Louis Nyffenegger @PentesterLab louis@pentesterlab.com
- 2. Introduction01 Agenda The JWT format(simplified)02 By Design03 Libraries04 Using Libraries05 Conclusion06 PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab
- 3. About Me PentesterLab.com /@PentesterLab Security Engineer: PentesterLab: Pentester/Code Reviewer/Security consultant/Security architect Platform to learn web security/penetration testing 100% Hands-on Available for individuals (free and PRO) and enterprises Run a website to help people learn security
- 4. JOSE/JWE/JWS/JWT PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab •JOSE: • Javascript Object Signing and Encryption • Also the name of the working group • JWT: JSON Web Token == “jot” Token • JWE: JSON Web Encryption • JWS: JSON Web Signature • JWK: JSON Web Key • JWA: JSON Web Algorithm
- 5. Who uses JWT PentesterLab.com/ @PentesterLab • A lot of people for OAuth • A lot of people for sessions • A lot of people to manage trust • A lot of people for password reset • A lot of people who care about being stateless and multi-datacenter architecture
- 6.
- 7. JavaScript Object Notation(JSON) PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Human readable format to store or transmit objects
- 8. The Compact JWSFormat PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Header Payload Signature 3 parts in a JSON Web Token:
- 9. The Compact JWSFormat PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Header Payload Signature Separated by a dot . .
- 10. The Compact JWSFormat PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab eyJ0eXAiOiJK V1QiLCJhbGci OiJIUzI1NiJ9 eyJsb2dpbi I6ImFkb WluIn0 FSfvCBAwypJ4abF6 jFLmR7JgZhkW674 Z8dIdAIRyt1E Separated by a dot . . eyJ = Base64('{"')
- 11. The Compact JWSFormat PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Base64({…}) Base64({…}) Base64(…) Header and Payload are base64* encoded JSON . . * urlsafe base64 encoding without padding The signature is also base64 encoded
- 12. The Compact JWSFormat: Encoding PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Urlsafe base64 encoding without padding: *https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7515#appendix-C
- 13. The JWT Format:header PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Base64({"alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWS"}) The header contains an algorithm “alg” attribute: In this example HMAC with SHA256 was used To tell how the token was signed. … . . …
- 14. The JWT Format:Algorithms PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab A lot of different algorithms are supported*: None * https://jwt.io/ covers most HS256 HS384 HS512 RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 ES512 PS256 PS384 PS512
- 15. The JWT Format:Algorithms PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Scenario: one client talking to multiple services
- 16. The JWT Format:Algorithms PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab HS256 HS384 HS512 HMAC: All services need to know the secret
- 17. The JWT Format:Algorithms PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab HS256 HS384 HS512 HMAC: if one service gets compromised
- 18. The JWT Format:Algorithms PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab HS256 HS384 HS512 HMAC: the secret is compromised for all services
- 19. The JWT Format:Asymmetric PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 ES512 PS256 PS384 PS512 Asymmetric: sharing the key Private Public
- 20. The JWT Format:Asymmetric PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 ES512 PS256 PS384 PS512 Asymmetric: Only trusted services get the private key Private Public
- 21. The JWT Format:Asymmetric PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 ES512 PS256 PS384 PS512 Asymmetric: If one service gets compromised… Private Public
- 22. The JWT Format:Asymmetric PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab RS256 RS384 RS512 ES256 ES384 ES512 PS256 PS384 PS512 Asymmetric: Even in the browser! Private Public
- 23. The JWT Format:payload PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab … The payload may contain literally anything: Base64({"user":"admin", "roles": ["adm","users"]}). . …
- 24. The JWT Format:payload PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab The payload may contain registered claims: Base64({"user":"admin", "exp":12…, "iat":1234.. }). .… …
- 25. The JWT Format:payload PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab The payload may contain registered claims: • “iss”: issuer • “sub”: subject • “aud”: audience • “jti”: claim id • “exp”: expiration time • “nbf”: not before • “iat”: issued at* * useful for async processing
- 26. The JWT Format:creating a token PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab • Create the JSON header and base64 encode it • Create the JSON payload and base64 encode it • Concatenate with a dot the (encoded) header and payload • Sign the result (header+.+payload) • Base64 encode the signature • Append a dot then the signature
- 27. The JWT Format:verifying a token PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab • Split the token in three parts based on the dots • Base64 decode each part • Parse the JSON for the header and payload • Retrieve the algorithm from the header • Verify the signature based on the algorithm • Verify the claims
- 28. Keep in mind PentesterLab.com/ @PentesterLab • Multiple systems can issue tokens • A token can be used by multiple systems • All these systems can use different libraries
- 29.
- 30. By design: verifyingsignature PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Base64({ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWS"}) You need to base64 decode and parse JSON to verify the signature: Larger attack surface JSON.load vs JSON.parse, Base64 decoding … . . …
- 31. By design: verifyingsignature PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab The attacker controls the algorithm used: Downgrade attacks, confusion attack Base64({ "alg": "HS256", "typ": "JWS"}) … . . …
- 32. By design: Confusionattack PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Exploitation: • Get a token signed with RSA (you only have access to the public key) • Decode the header and change the algorithm from RSA “RS256” to HMAC “HS256” • Tamper with the payload • Sign the token with the public RSA key • Profit
- 33. By design: verifyingsignature PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab … Claims are optionals and not always supported*: Always-valid tokens? Base64({"user":"admin", "exp":12…, "iat":1234.. }). . … * Check https://jwt.io/
- 34. By design: verifyingsignature PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Claims are optionals and not always supported* Always-valid tokens? * Check https://jwt.io/
- 35. By design: verifyingsignature PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Signed data: you cannot (easily) manage quick- revocation*: The claim “jti” and a cache can be used to limit the impact of this No quick-revocation! Replay * Unless you rotate the key or manage a server-side cache
- 36. By design: TheNone algorithm PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab JWT RFC contains a None algorithm No integrity! Basically an unsigned token…
- 37. By design: TheNone algorithm PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Exploitation: • Get a token • Decode the header and change the algorithm to “None” or “none” • Decode and tamper with the payload • Keep or remove the signature • Profit
- 38.
- 39. Libraries: CVE-2018-0114 PentesterLab.com /@PentesterLab JWS allows you to add a “jwk” attribute (JSON Web Key) to the header to tell the receiver what key was used to sign the token:
- 40. Libraries: CVE-2018-0114 PentesterLab.com /@PentesterLab • Vulnerability in Cisco Node Jose • Node-Jose uses the embedded “jwk” key to check the signature Integrity bypass!
- 41. Libraries: CVE-2018-0114 -Exploitation PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Exploitation: • Get a token • Decode and tamper with the payload • Generate a RSA key • Add “n" & “e” to the header and use RS256 • Sign the token with your RSA key
- 42. Libraries: Go-JOSE version<= 1.0.5 PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Non-compact/full format for JWS:
- 43. Libraries: Go-JOSE version<= 1.0.5 PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab From: https://rwc.iacr.org/2017/Slides/nguyen.quan.pdf The issue:
- 44. Libraries: Go-JOSE version<= 1.0.5 PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab From: https://rwc.iacr.org/2017/Slides/nguyen.quan.pdf The issue: Integrity of the protected bypass!
- 45. Libraries: Go-JOSE version<= 1.0.5 PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab If the application trusts the protected*: * you cannot change the payload
- 46. Libraries: Go-JOSE version<= 1.0.5 - Exploitation PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Exploitation: • Get a token (compact or full) • Modify it to use the full format • Add your malicious protected • Profit
- 47.
- 48. Using Libraries: weaksecret PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Some developers use weak secrets. Reminder: you only need one token to brute force the secret (completely offline) Integrity bypass!
- 49. Using Libraries: decodevs verify PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab A lot of libraries have two functions/methods: • decode <- don’t use this one • verify Integrity bypass!
- 50. Using Libraries: decodevs verify PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab Exploitation: • Get a token • Decode and tamper with the header or payload • Profit
- 51. Using Libraries: notusing exp or iat PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab In many libraries you need to opt-in to use “exp” or “iat” Always-valid tokens?
- 52.
- 53. Recommendations PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab ✓Use strong keys and secrets ✓ Review the libraries you pick (KISS library) ✓ Make sure you check the signature ✓ Make sure your tokens expire ✓ Enforce the algorithm
- 54. Conclusion PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab •JWT are complex and kind of insecure by design • JWT libraries introduce very interesting bugs • Make sure you test for those if you pentest or do bug bounties
- 55. Any questions? FOR YOURTIME THANKS! louis@pentesterlab.com / PentesterLab.com / @PentesterLab