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Trusted computing introduction and technical overview
Trusted computing aims to increase confidence in computing platforms by enabling platforms to prove their integrity and identity. The Trusted Computing Group is developing an open standard for a trusted platform module (TPM) that can reliably measure a platform's software state, attest to its identity and properties, and protect confidential data. The TPM acts as a root of trust and provides mechanisms for platform authentication, integrity reporting, and protected storage that enable trust in remote platforms and their expected behavior.
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Trusted computing introduction and technical overview
- 1. Network Security andTrustedNetwork Security and Trusted ComputingComputing Trusted Computing Introduction and Technical Overview Joe Pato HP Labs (owner)Dr. Zubair Ahmad KhattakDr. Zubair Ahmad Khattak (instructor)(instructor) Department of Computer ScienceDepartment of Computer Science
- 2. • Increase consumer andbusinesses confidence • Protect end-user private data – by enabling trust in end systems behavior • Reduce business risks – by enabling trust in the behavior (activities or actions) of critical information systems Why TrustedWhy Trusted ComputingComputing Platforms?Platforms?
- 3. Trusted Computing Platform properties •Recognize that a platform has known properties – Mobile platform access to corporate network. – Remote Access via known public access point. • Identify that a system will behave as expected: – Mobile access to corporate network with firewall and antivirus requirements. – Outsourced platform administration • Enable a user to have more confidence in the behavior of the platform in front of them – Trust a platform to handle my private data i.e., banking… – Achieving WYSIWYS: What You Sign Is What You See… Do I have confidence in interacting with this platform? Can I trust you to be what you say you are? Can I trust you to behave in an expected manner?
- 4. Trusted Computing Group(TCG)/Trusted Computing Group (TCG)/ The Trusted Computing PlatformThe Trusted Computing Platform Alliance (TCPA)Alliance (TCPA)
- 5. Trusted Computing Group (TCG) • AnIndustry work group focused on defining and advancing the concept of Trusted Computing • Founded in 1999 by Compaq, HP, IBM, Intel, and Microsoft. • 180+ members from the hardware, software, communications, and security technology industries
- 6. The TCG (or TCPA)charter • Provide a omnipresent and widely adopted means to address trustworthiness of computing platforms • Publish an open specification for public review • Define a technology specification that can be applied to any type of computing platform (not just PCs!)
- 7. TPM Evaluation completed by NIST 8/02 Platform Indevelopment Common criteria conformance specs Technology architecture specs TCG specification activity TCG/ TCPA Generic Platform Spec PC Specific 2002 onwards Founded 1999 Specification revised by membership Feb ‘01 Sept ‘01 Internet Appliances Mobile Phones Servers
- 8. TCG/TCPA concepts • Definition: A platformcan be trusted if it behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose OR Trusted Computing Group’s working definition: An entity can be trusted if it always behaves in the expected manner for the intended purpose. (TCG 2004) • TCG/TCPA technology provides mechanisms for: – Platform Authentication and Attestation • Identify the platform and its properties to a challenging party – Platform Integrity Reporting • Reliably measure and report on the platform’s software state – Protected Storage • Protect private and secret data. Protect integrity and identity information
- 9. The TCG/TCPA architecture relieson the concept of a Root of Trust • A third party can rely on information provided by a platform’s Root of Trust • The root of trust must be able to report on software that has executed • The root of trust must be able to keep secrets from the rest of the platform ⇒ measure the first piece of code that executes when the platform boots ⇒ independent computing engine ⇒ “secret” storage How does TCG/TCP A achieve this?
- 10. • A Rootof Trust for Storage − A trusted implementation of a shielded location for one or more secret keys—probably just one, the storage root key (SRK); • A Root of Trust for Reporting – The component that can be trusted to store and report reliable information about the platform • A Root of Trust for Measurement – The component that can be trusted to reliably measure and report to the Root of Trust for reporting what software executes on platform boot Three Roots of Trust: Measurement, Store and Reporting
- 11. • It isnecessary to trust these Roots of Trust for TCG/ TCPA mechanisms
- 12. The Trusted Platform Module -TPM - • The TPM is the Root of Trust for Reporting • Think: smartcard-like security capability embedded into the platform – The TPM is uniquely bound to a single platform – TPM functions and storage are isolated from all other components of the platform (e.g., the CPU) random number generation Non-volatile Memory Processor Memory asymmetric key generation signing and encryption power detectionclock/timer I/O HMAC hash
- 13. The Core Root ofTrust for Measurement - CRTM - • The CRTM is the first piece of code that executes on a platform at boot time. (I.e. Bios or Bios BootBlock in an IA-32 platform) – It must be trusted to properly report to the TPM what software executes after it. – Only authorized entities must be able to reflash the CRTM… (those that vouch for its behavior)
- 14. CRTM and TPMduring the boot process The Authenticated boot process CRTM - Bios BootBlock BIOS OpRom1 OSLoader OpRom 2 OpRomN OS Hash code TPMReport Hashed code Hand-Off Hash code Hand-Off Hash code Hand-Off Report Hashed code Report Hashed code Hash code Hash code
- 15. • Platform authentication •ProtectedStorage• Integrity Reporting TCG/ TCPA feature-set
- 16. Platform Authentication • TCG/ TCPAprovides for the TPM to have control over “multiple pseudonymous attestation identities” • TPM attestation identities do not contain any owner/user related information => A platform identity attests to platform properties • No single TPM “identity” is ever used to digital sign data => privacy protection • TPM Identity certification is required to attest to the fact that they identify a genuine TCG/TCPA platform • The TPM Identity creation protocol allows for to choose different Certification Authorities (Privacy-CA) to certify each TPM identity
- 17. Generating an identity Certificates UnderOwner’s control for Privacy Identity Certificate Identity-binding Identity Certification Authority OwnerOwner CA ABCABC
- 18. Integrity Reporting • Measurements reportedto the TPM during (and after) the boot process can not be removed or deleted until reboot => No hiding code that has executed on the platform • The TPM will use an attestation identity to sign the integrity report • The recipient of integrity information can evaluate trustworthiness of the information based on the certificate of attestation identity Trust that the TPM is a genuine TPM on a genuine Trusted Platform
- 19. Integrity Reporting (2) • Therecipient of reporting information relies on “signed certificates” that attest that a given measurement represents a known piece of code – Cert(Phoenix BIOS v1.2 has hash value of H) – Cert(CorpIT config, combined hash value) • The recipient can verify these Integrity Metrics Certificates and compare certified metrics to reported metrics Trust that the reported metrics correspond to certified software Trusting the reported software is dependent on the recipient’s policy
- 20. Protected Storage • Cryptographickeys can be created that are protected by the TPM • Data can be encrypted using the TPM, that can only be decrypted using this same TPM • A specific software configuration can also be specified, that will be required for the TPM to allow data to be decrypted, or keys to be used This is called Sealing: parameters define which Integrity Metrics the data should be sealed to
- 21. Protected Storage Hierarchy Storage Keys TPM Protects(Stored Internally) Protects (Using encryption) Storage Root Key (Asymmetric key) Signature key Signature key Protects (using encryption) Protects (using encryption) Storage key Symmetric key Asymmetric key (signs data) Authorization secret Secret Data Secret Data Secret Data Secret Data Asymmetric Keys Arbitrary data TPM Protected Objects
- 22. Privacy-positive design • Notionof TPM Owner, think Platform Administrator • Ultimate TPM functionality control goes to the Owner • TPM Activation controlled by the Owner, and deactivation available to the User • No single TPM “identity” is ever used to digitally sign data • Multiple pseudonymous IDs (limits correlation) • Remote control of the TPM enabled by challenge response protocols for authorization mechanisms • Can prevent the revelation of secrets unless the software state is in an approved state
- 23. Short term TCG/TCPAbenefits – protected storage (Platform with a TPM, associated software provided by the TPM manufacturer) Customers can encrypt the data on their hard disks in a way that is much more secure than software solutions. – The TCG/TCPA chip is a portal to encrypted data. – Encrypted data can then only ever be decrypted on the same platform that encrypted it. – TCG/TCPA also provides for digital signature keys to be protected and used by the embedded hardware chip
- 24. Middle term TCG/TCPAbenefits – integrity checking (Short term solution plus additional software) Protection against hacker scripts, by automatically preventing access to data if unauthorised programs are executed. – TCG/TCPA provides for the measurement of integrity metrics of the software environment on the TCG/TCPA platform. – Allows for a remote party to verify what the software environment on a TCG/TCPA platform is. – The TCG/TCPA chip can then be used to encrypt data to disk so that this data can only ever be decrypted on that same platform, and ONLY if the platform has a given set of software environment integrity metrics.
- 25. Long term TCG/TCPAbenefits – e-commerce Customers and their partners/suppliers/customers can connect their IT systems and expose only the data that is intended to be exposed. – TCG/TCPA is designed so that platform identities and Integrity Metrics can be proven reliably to previously unknown parties. – Secure online discovery of platforms and services: confidence in the information about the software environment and identity of a remote party, enabling higher levels of trust when interacting with this party.
Editor's Notes
- #11 We’ll come back to Conformance and Certification later
- #24 Just TPM + protected storage + crypto functionality (SC)
- #25 TPM + boot chain + “OS” Protection against hacker scripts S/w state integrity verification
- #26 (Middle term solution plus some infrastructure support, whether restricted to a corporation or extended across organization boundaries) TPM + Boot chain + OS + certificate infrastructure (e.g. PKI) Use of TCPA functionality in consumer + e-services world
- #27 We’ll come back to Conformance and Certification later