KEMBAR78
Trusted Computing security _platform.ppt
Trusted Computing
Asmaa ALQassab Nagham ALLella
Lubna Thanoon
Supervised by Dr. Najlaa Badeea
WHO DO I TRUST?
• Today a computer trusts one of two entities
in a user and hacker model.
• The user is trusted and the hacker is not.
• But when does a computer know that the
user is not doing something harmful?
• With TC the user and the hacker are both
not trusted. This ensures that nothing is
done that can compromise the security of
the PC.
WHY TC?
“The theory is that software based key
generation or storage will always be
vulnerable to software attack, so private
keys should be created, stored, and used
by dedicated hardware”
TRUSTED COMPUTING: BASIC IDEA
• Addition of security hardware functionality to a
computer system to compensate for insecure
software.
• Enables external entities to have increased level of
trust that the system will perform as
expected/specified.
• Trusted platform = a computing platform with a
secure hardware component that forms a security
foundation for software processes.
• Trusted Computing = computing on a Trusted
Platform .
SO HOW DOES TC WORK?
• For TC to work you have to use the Trusted
Computing Module TPM which is a
hardware system where the core (root) of
trust in the platform will reside.
• TPM will be implemented using a security
microchip that handles security with
encryption.
WHAT IS A TPM?
• A chip integrated into the platform
• The (alleged) purpose is to provide more security
• It is a separate trusted co-processor
“The TPM represents a
separate trusted coprocessor,
whose state cannot be
compromised by potentially
malicious host system
software.”
THE TRUSTED COMPUTING GROUP
• The Trusted Platform Module TPM is an
international standard for a secure crypto-
processor.
• The TPM technical specification was written by
a computer industry consortium called the
Trusted Computing Group TCG.
• The Trusted Computing Group is a non-profit
industry consortium, which develops hardware
and software standards. It is funded by many
member companies, including IBM, Intel, AMD,
Microsoft, Sony, Sun, and HP among others.
TRUSTED COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE
TPM (Trusted Platform Module): a tamper-resistant hardware
module mounted in a platform.
Responsible for: measurement, storage, reporting and policy
enforcement.
Protected
Code
TPM
Boot Process
Operating System
App1 App2 App3
Encrypted
Files
ROOTS OF TRUST
• A Root of Trust is a hardware or software mechanism,
that is a component which must behave as expected,
because its misbehavior cannot be detected.
• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): the component
that can be trusted to reliably measure and report to the
Root of Trust for Reporting what software executes at
the start of platform boot.
• Uses Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) to record
the state of a system.
• Static entity like the PC BIOS.
• Root of Trust for Reporting (RTR) : the component that can be
trusted to report reliable information about the platform.
• trusted to report information accurately and correctly.
• Uses PCR and RSA signatures to report the platform
state to external parties.
• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) : the component that can be
trusted to securely store any quantity of information.
• trusted to store information without interference
leakage.
• Uses PCR and RSA encryption to protect data and
ensure that data can only be accessed if platform is in a
known state.
ROOTS OF TRUST
A CHAIN OF TRUST
• The core idea of the Trusted Computing architecture:
• Each stage measures and validates the next one.
• Measurements go into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs)
on the TPM.
• The chain starts with the hardware TPM,
• Then software:
• RTM, TPM Software Stack, BIOS, kernel
• Applications?
• At the end, the entire platform is verified to be in a
trusted state.
KEY CONCEPTS
• Secure input and output
• Memory curtaining / protected
execution
• Sealed storage
• Endorsement key
• Remote attestation
SECURE INPUT AND OUTPUT
• Secure I/O provides a secure hardware path
from the keyboard to an application.
• From the application back to the screen.
• No other software running on the same PC
will be able to determine what the user
typed, or how the application responded .
MEMORY CURTAINING
• Memory curtaining extends common
memory protection techniques to provide
full isolation of sensitive areas of memory.
• Even the operating system does not have
full access to curtained memory .
SEALED STORAGE
• Sealed storage protects private information by
binding it to platform configuration information
including the software and hardware being used.
• Data can be released only to a particular
combination of software and hardware.
• Embedding PCR values in blob ensures that only
certain apps can decrypt data.
ENDORSEMENT KEY
• The endorsement key is a 2048-bit RSA
public and private key pair.
• Created randomly on the chip at
manufacture time.
• Non-migratable, store inside the chip,
cannot be removed.
• It is never used for encryption or signing.
REMOTE ATTESTATION
• Prove to a remote party what
software/configuration is running on the target
system .
• Three phases:
• Measurement: machine to be attested must measure
its properties locally.
• Attestation: transfer measurements from machine
being attested to remote machine.
• Verification: remote machine examines
measurements transferred during attestation and
decides whether they are valid and acceptable.
FINALLY
• ● secure boot allows the system to boot into a defined and
trusted configuration.
• ● curtained memory will provide strong memory isolation;
memory that cannot be read by other processes including
operating systems and debuggers.
• ● sealed storage allows software to keep cryptographically
secure secrets.
• ● remote attestation allows a trusted device to present
reliable evidence to remote parties about the software it is
running.
• Low cost technology.

Trusted Computing security _platform.ppt

  • 1.
    Trusted Computing Asmaa ALQassabNagham ALLella Lubna Thanoon Supervised by Dr. Najlaa Badeea
  • 2.
    WHO DO ITRUST? • Today a computer trusts one of two entities in a user and hacker model. • The user is trusted and the hacker is not. • But when does a computer know that the user is not doing something harmful? • With TC the user and the hacker are both not trusted. This ensures that nothing is done that can compromise the security of the PC.
  • 3.
    WHY TC? “The theoryis that software based key generation or storage will always be vulnerable to software attack, so private keys should be created, stored, and used by dedicated hardware”
  • 4.
    TRUSTED COMPUTING: BASICIDEA • Addition of security hardware functionality to a computer system to compensate for insecure software. • Enables external entities to have increased level of trust that the system will perform as expected/specified. • Trusted platform = a computing platform with a secure hardware component that forms a security foundation for software processes. • Trusted Computing = computing on a Trusted Platform .
  • 5.
    SO HOW DOESTC WORK? • For TC to work you have to use the Trusted Computing Module TPM which is a hardware system where the core (root) of trust in the platform will reside. • TPM will be implemented using a security microchip that handles security with encryption.
  • 6.
    WHAT IS ATPM? • A chip integrated into the platform • The (alleged) purpose is to provide more security • It is a separate trusted co-processor “The TPM represents a separate trusted coprocessor, whose state cannot be compromised by potentially malicious host system software.”
  • 7.
    THE TRUSTED COMPUTINGGROUP • The Trusted Platform Module TPM is an international standard for a secure crypto- processor. • The TPM technical specification was written by a computer industry consortium called the Trusted Computing Group TCG. • The Trusted Computing Group is a non-profit industry consortium, which develops hardware and software standards. It is funded by many member companies, including IBM, Intel, AMD, Microsoft, Sony, Sun, and HP among others.
  • 8.
    TRUSTED COMPUTING ARCHITECTURE TPM(Trusted Platform Module): a tamper-resistant hardware module mounted in a platform. Responsible for: measurement, storage, reporting and policy enforcement. Protected Code TPM Boot Process Operating System App1 App2 App3 Encrypted Files
  • 9.
    ROOTS OF TRUST •A Root of Trust is a hardware or software mechanism, that is a component which must behave as expected, because its misbehavior cannot be detected. • Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM): the component that can be trusted to reliably measure and report to the Root of Trust for Reporting what software executes at the start of platform boot. • Uses Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) to record the state of a system. • Static entity like the PC BIOS.
  • 10.
    • Root ofTrust for Reporting (RTR) : the component that can be trusted to report reliable information about the platform. • trusted to report information accurately and correctly. • Uses PCR and RSA signatures to report the platform state to external parties. • Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) : the component that can be trusted to securely store any quantity of information. • trusted to store information without interference leakage. • Uses PCR and RSA encryption to protect data and ensure that data can only be accessed if platform is in a known state. ROOTS OF TRUST
  • 11.
    A CHAIN OFTRUST • The core idea of the Trusted Computing architecture: • Each stage measures and validates the next one. • Measurements go into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) on the TPM. • The chain starts with the hardware TPM, • Then software: • RTM, TPM Software Stack, BIOS, kernel • Applications? • At the end, the entire platform is verified to be in a trusted state.
  • 12.
    KEY CONCEPTS • Secureinput and output • Memory curtaining / protected execution • Sealed storage • Endorsement key • Remote attestation
  • 13.
    SECURE INPUT ANDOUTPUT • Secure I/O provides a secure hardware path from the keyboard to an application. • From the application back to the screen. • No other software running on the same PC will be able to determine what the user typed, or how the application responded .
  • 14.
    MEMORY CURTAINING • Memorycurtaining extends common memory protection techniques to provide full isolation of sensitive areas of memory. • Even the operating system does not have full access to curtained memory .
  • 15.
    SEALED STORAGE • Sealedstorage protects private information by binding it to platform configuration information including the software and hardware being used. • Data can be released only to a particular combination of software and hardware. • Embedding PCR values in blob ensures that only certain apps can decrypt data.
  • 16.
    ENDORSEMENT KEY • Theendorsement key is a 2048-bit RSA public and private key pair. • Created randomly on the chip at manufacture time. • Non-migratable, store inside the chip, cannot be removed. • It is never used for encryption or signing.
  • 17.
    REMOTE ATTESTATION • Proveto a remote party what software/configuration is running on the target system . • Three phases: • Measurement: machine to be attested must measure its properties locally. • Attestation: transfer measurements from machine being attested to remote machine. • Verification: remote machine examines measurements transferred during attestation and decides whether they are valid and acceptable.
  • 18.
    FINALLY • ● secureboot allows the system to boot into a defined and trusted configuration. • ● curtained memory will provide strong memory isolation; memory that cannot be read by other processes including operating systems and debuggers. • ● sealed storage allows software to keep cryptographically secure secrets. • ● remote attestation allows a trusted device to present reliable evidence to remote parties about the software it is running. • Low cost technology.